A heretic's take on Second Mantinea

[Justin Swanton]

Right, let's do it. This originally started as a look at the site of the battle, however after reading Duncan's excellent Battleday pack article I feel it deserved a fuller treatment. But let's start with the battlefield location. Most contemporaries agree it took place at the narrows between Mytika and Kapnistra. This, presumably, was the border between Mantinea and Tegea and hence the battle was named after the city that was closer to the field of battle (Mantinea's 6,3km vs Tegea's 11,9km).

The problem with this site though is that one is obliged to reject whole sections of primary source material to make it fit the battle.

First, its position. If Epaminondas left Tegea with his army on the day of the battle, he would have to march for about 11km to reach the narrows. Xenophon however does not mention any long march from the camp to the battlefield. He does imply that the army deployed into line as soon as it had quit the city:

But when he had led them forth, thus made ready, it is worthwhile again to note what he did. In the first place, as was natural, he formed them in line of battle.

If the army deployed into line as soon as it had left Tegea it would have to travel due north to reach the narrows. Xenophon however affirms it did something quite different:

And by doing this he seemed to make it clear that he was preparing for an engagement; but when his army had been drawn up as he wished it to be, he did not advance by the shortest route towards the enemy, but led the way towards the mountains which lie to the westward and over against Tegea.

Xenophon is clear: the army quits camp at Tegea, forms up in line, then marches towards the mountains that lie west of Tegea. Not north-west, not north-north west. West.

His march towards the mountains gives the impression he does not intend to fight a battle:

he did not advance by the shortest route towards the enemy, but led the way towards the mountains which lie to the westward and over against Tegea, so that he gave the enemy the impression that he would not join battle on that day.

Epaminondas reaches one of the mountains and his army grounds spears, giving the impression he is pitching camp. This makes sense in that a camp against a mountain range is more secure than a camp in the middle of a flat plain. Furthermore, there is a pass in the mountains west of Tegea that leads to Megalopolis - friendly territory. I'll cover this later.

How does Xenophon's description work for a battlefield at the narrows? Once an army deploys for battle, its movement options become limited. Cavalry and infantry have the choice of advancing straight ahead, countermarching and retiring backwards, or forming column from line and moving right or left (and then wheeling if they choose). Heading towards the westward mountains in this case would mean everyone forming column and marching off to the left. One thing armies did not do - in Antiquity or any other period - was pivot whilst in line backwards around the end of one of their flanks, like a door on hinges. So Epaminondas marches into the cul-de-sac to the west of the narrows. Then what?

(As an aside he is still in Tegean territory. Just sayin'  )

Presumably his column reforms line now facing south east with the mountains behind it (a natural place to pitch camp as his rear is secure), whilst Spartans & co. still face south. There's no mention of the latter doing any manoeuvring at this point: on the contrary they start loosening their ties. So how does the battle start?




Then there is the problem of terrain. At the narrows the ground is virtually dead flat, with the slopes of Mytika and Kapnistra rising up steeply on either side. There are no other terrain features. Xenophon mentions "some hills" on Epaminondas' right upon which he stationed cavalry and hoplites as a flank guard. This could conceivably refer to Kapnistra - there's a bit of gentle slope near the battlefield that might fit the bill:




But then you have the mentions of the "heights" on the other flank:

Diodorus
But having fled beyond the flanks, they managed to retrieve their defeat, for even in their retreat they did not break their own phalanx, and encountering simultaneously the Euboeans and certain mercenaries who had been dispatched to seize the heights nearby, they gave battle and slew them all.
.....
In fact the Athenians had defeated the Euboeans and mercenaries in the battle for the heights and were in possession of the dead; while the Boeotians, because they had overpowered the Lacedaemonians and were in possession of the dead, were for awarding the victory to themselves.

If the "heights" refer to Mytika then there is simply no way Athenian horsemen could have fought against infantry on it, never mind destroy them. My experience after a lot of Google Earthing is that steeply sloping mountains and hills that are not cultivated by humans tend to be covered by trees and bush, making them even more unusable by cavalry. That was certainly the case here:




Then you have the problem of the "higher ground" on which the heavy infantry fought:

Frontinus
Epaminondas, leader of the Thebans, when about to marshal his troops in battle array against the Spartans, ordered his cavalry to engage in manoeuvres along the front. Then, when he had filled the eyes of the enemy with clouds of dust and had caused them to expect an encounter with cavalry, he led his infantry around to one side, where it was possible to attack the enemy's rear from higher ground, and thus, by a surprise attack, cut them to pieces.

Polyaenus
To gain the advantage of ground over the Lacedaemonians near Tegea, Epaminondas ordered the commander of his cavalry, with sixteen hundred men, to ride up and down, a small distance in front of the army. By this means they raised a cloud of dust, which prevented the enemy from observing his movements. Then he moved away, and took possession of the higher ground. When the Spartans saw his new position, they realised the reason for the movements of his cavalry, which they had been unable to understand beforehand.

There isn't any "higher ground" at the narrows on which hoplites could have fought. If they fought between the two spurs then they fought on a billiard table, simple as that.

So one is obliged to discard the pre-battle movement account of Xenophon, the heights description of Diodorus and the higher ground descriptions of Frontinus and Polyaenus.

Let me continue this in other posts.

[Justin Swanton]

Before going any further a quick aside on my understanding of the organisation and size of the Spartan army. The size of the professional standing army remained pretty constant throughout the 5th and 4th centuries: about 3,500 men, but its structure evolved somewhat. When Thucydides described the Spartans at the first Battle of Mantinea (418BC) there were 3 tiers of command: lochos (512 men), pentekosty (128 men), enomotia (32 men). Each command is a quarter of the size of the command above it. 7 lochoi in all so a total strength of 3,584 men.

Some time after first Mantinea (i.e. when Thucydides is writing about the present state of affairs) there are now 4 tiers of command: 6 morai each have 4 lochoi; each lochos has 2 pentecostyes; each pentecosty has 2 enomotias. The simplest explanation for this is that the original pentecosty has been subdivided into two subunits. The subunits kept the name of pentecosty. The old pentecosty was now called a lochos and the old lochos was now called a mora. The new subdivision was necessary to create a square-shaped subunit which could wheel in battle to turn the line into an instant column. This was needed to envelope the enemy line. Hence the reason for polemarchs and pentecosters being summoned to military conferences whilst lochargoi were not: the new pentecosty was the unit of manoeuvre on the battlefield.

This new organisation meant there were now 24 lochoi. By the time one gets to Xenophon, who wrote after Thucydides, the organisation had slightly changed again. The lochos was doubled in size and now two lochoi made up a mora (and presumably four pentecostyes made up a lochos). So 12 lochoi by the time one reaches Second Mantinea. Throughout all this the professional army remained about the same size.

Why only 3,500 men? Because Sparta could not afford to maintain a standing army larger than this. Some other Greek poleis maintained professional troops but they never exceeded 1,000 men in size. Greek city states simply did not have the resources to support large contingents of full-time troops. The bulk of the Greek heavy infantry were citizen hoplites who earned their own keep in peacetime and bought their own equipment, dusting off the family aspis when it was time to go to battle and supplying their own needs when on campaign. Philip of Macedon barely managed to pay (when he did) for his full-time phalangites. Even with his conquests and acquisition of the gold mines near Krinides Macedonia was virtually bankrupt when he died. It was only when Alexander conquered the vast resources of the Persian Empire that large full-time armies became feasible.

This is all in my book BTW. 

The heretic will continue tomorrow evening. (have to earn my own keep and all that )

[Justin Swanton]

There's one other problem with putting the site of the battle at the narrows and that is the city of Sparta.

As Epaminondas headed towards Tegea, 3 Spartan lochoi were campaigning in Arcadia and the remaining 9 were on their way with Agesilaus to Mantinea or had already arrived there. When exactly or even if they reached Mantinea is unclear. For Xenophon Epaminondas was already at Tegea when Agesilaus with the bulk of the Spartan army was at Pellana. For Diodorus Epaminondas was "near Mantinea" when the Spartan army was in the territory of Tegea (which is logical given that the route from Sparta to Mantinea passes through Tegea). For Polybius, when Epaminondas reached Tegea the Spartans had already arrived at Mantinea. According to Polybius Agesilaus was warned at Mantinea about Epaminondas' intentions: Then however a contretemps occurred: a deserter made his way into Mantinea and told Agesilaus what was going on. - Polybius: 9.8. According to Diodorus king Agis (I won't be arguing about whether he existed or not) warned Agesilaus before he reached Mantinea.

It is possible that Agesilaus himself hadn't reached Mantinea but Agis (if he existed) with the 3 lochoi from Arcadia had. The inhabitants of Sparta were forewarned of Epaminondas' approach and held off Epaminondas until the Spartan army returned to Sparta with the bulk of the Mantinean army: Having learned from his captives that the Mantineians had come in full force to assist the Lacedaemonians, Epameinondas then withdrew a short distance from the city and encamped - Diodorus: 15,84

My own take is that Agesilaus may well have been at Mantinea. The route from Mantinea to Sparta through Megapolis is 87km. Mantinea to Sparta via the more direct route Epaminondas took is 62km but Epimanondas took that route to return to Sparta so it is likely ruled out. Epaminondas' own overnight forced march is 43km. That means the Spartans had to hold out for about a day before the reinforcements arrived, taking two days to get there. Here's an operational map to give an idea of places and distances:




The Mantinean army returned with the Spartans for the main battle against Epaminondas:  And presently the Lacedaemonians and Mantineans made their appearance as well, whereat all got ready for the contest which was to decide the issue and summoned their allies from every direction. - Diodorus: 15.84

And here's the problem. Epaminondas - encamped at Tegea - was between Mantinea and Sparta. It would be unthinkable for Agesilaus to leave Sparta open to another potential attack by Agesilaus. The Spartan army by itself was not large and had had to rely on the Mantinean reinforcements to defend the city against Epaminondas. Presuming Epaminondas had arrived with the Thebans and his cavalry - something like 7,000 hoplites and possibly several hundred cavalry, Agesilaus would need the Mantineans (about 3,000 hoplites) along with the Spartans (say 3,500 hoplites) to be sure of making the city safe. He couldn't go anywhere whilst Epaminondas was in the vicinity.

Which means few if any Spartans or Mantineans would have been present at the battle presuming it took place at the narrows. According to the general theory, the Mantineans and Spartans along with the rest deployed at the narrows whilst Epaminondas was still at Tegea. That meant they had in effect abandoned Sparta. Quod absit.

There is however a way for the Spartans and Mantineans to take part in the battle whilst keeping Sparta safe. To be continued....

[Justin Swanton]

Is it possible to reconcile the sources and make sense of the battle?

My approach, as everyone knows by now, is to treat the historians in Antiquity as intelligent and discerning men who understood the critical approach to history just as well as we do. They were like that man who was asked by his fiancee: "Darling, is it true you've been married five times already?" To which he replied: "Don't go listening to old wives' tales, dear."

Of course they could have inadequate sources, be biased, not understand their subject, get the wrong end of the stick, etc. Obviously I don't think every writer in the past was omniscient and infallible, but I have found that presuming from the outset that they are and refusing to reject a primary source unless absolutely obliged to, pays off.

So, the battle. Why was it called the "Battle of Mantinea"? The original cavalry fight took place at the narrows according to Pausanias: As you go along the road leading from Mantineia to Pallantium, at a distance of about thirty stades, the highway is skirted by the grove of what is called the Ocean, and here the cavalry of the Athenians and Mantineans fought against the Boeotian horse.

A Greek stade is about 185m (if based on the Attic foot) so the grove was 5,5km from Mantinea due south, which puts it near or at the narrows. What is interesting though is the mention of the road "leading from Mantinea to Pallantium." Pallantium was an independent polis, west of Tegea, important enough to feature by name in the list of Theban allies. (there was a dyke between them and Tegea to mark the border - anyone know where it was?) Tegea then, didn't control the entire valley.

It is assumed that the border between Mantinea and Tegea was at the narrows, but I can't find any confirmation of that. The only thing that seems certain about Greek city states was where the actual cities were. The mention of a road between Mantinea and Pallantium suggests that they had a common border. I propose that Mantinea territory extended well south of the narrows, something like this:




Flat arable land is at a premium in Greece. The valley north of the narrows is about 62km² in area, the flat land south is about 134km² (I'm leaving out the side valleys). Pallantium would have an area of about 24km² which leaves Tegea with 110km², nearly twice that of Mantinea. But Mantinea could field 2,500-3,000 hoplites whereas Tegea fielded 2,000-2,500. Something doesn't look right. If however Mantinea had a good slice of the southern half of the valley then Mantinea's superior manpower makes more sense. This is all theoretical of course. Can we know how much territory - more specifically flat arable land - Mantinea actually controlled?

The upshot is that one can site the battle west of Tegea and still have it in Mantinean territory. With that sorted out, it becomes possible to find a battlefield that caters for pretty much everything in the sources and discard the pruning shears (rather than the sources). Which rejoices my heart. But more in another post.

[Justin Swanton]

Putting all the sources together, what do we need for a battlefield?

First, as mentioned earlier, it needs to be west of Tegea. Which raises the question: where exactly did the Mantineans, Spartans, Athenians and the rest deploy? Up until now Epaminondas had used Tegea as a base from which to launch lightning strikes against vulnerable targets. To stop that, the allies had to confront him at Tegea itself. But first they had to join forces, something which Epaminondas had been trying to forestall. Where to join up? There is one plausible place: a side valley 4km west of Tegea. It could be easily reached from north and south and offered a secure campsite. It would pin Epaminondas at Tegea, obliging him to offer battle there or retire, closely pursued by the allied armies and incapable of any further mischief.




Taking up Xenophon, Epaminondas exits Tegea and forms a battleline just north or northeast of the city, facing the allied troops at the side valley entrance. His army is initially deployed in a conventional manner, a line of hoplites with cavalry in front. My own take is that an infantry battleline generally did not deploy wider than about a mile (1,6km) in order to be able to move and manoeuvre in a coherent fashion. In this case I suspect both sides pushed it to the limit and deployed about 2km wide. If Epaminondas had about 30,000 heavy foot then deployed around 16 deep the phalanx would be about 2000m wide. His opponents, with about 20,000 foot at an average of about 10 deep - 8 deep here, 12 deep there - would have the same frontage. If both sides had fewer hoplites then the lines deployed a little shallower. The allies likewise deployed their cavalry in front of their infantry: the allied army would have its flanks secure against the sides of the valley and so they didn't have to worry about being outflanked:




Having deployed and looking ready for a straight-up frontal fight, Epaminondas then does the unexpected. Stay tuned...

[Justin Swanton]

Having deployed as if to fight the Mantinean-Spartan-Athenian alliance, Epaminondas does not close with them but heads off "towards the mountains which lie to the westward and over against Tegea." He arrives at a new battlefield which according to the sources must have the following characteristics:

1. it is at the foot of the western mountains opposite Tegea,
2. it is next to one mountain that stands out from the others,
3. facing back east, Epaminondas will have some hills on his right flank in which cavalry and hoplites can lie in wait for any attempt to outflank his right,
4. there are "heights" on his left flank which can be seized by infantry but fought over by Athenian cavalry,
5. there is "higher ground" towards his left which his Theban column seizes to gain a better position.

Does anything fit the bill? I found this piece of ground that meets all the requirements:




The site is at Tripoli, about 7,5km to the west (and a little to the north) of the original deployment at Tegea. You can see the site on Google Maps. I advise moving around to get a sense of the elevation of the ground:
https://www.google.com/maps/@37.5040779,22.3543666,2822m/data=!3m1!1e3

It's an ungodly hour so let me continue this tomorrow.

[Jon Freitag]

Fascinating study and analysis, Justin.  Superb effort.

After reading your serial and studying Google Earth, I wonder why you assert that Mantineia and Pallantium must share a common border based upon noting a road leading from one to the other.  Could this road linking the two not traverse Tegea?  If not, why not?

Google Earth Archaeology opens up new doors to explorations.

[Justin Swanton]

Fascinating study and analysis, Justin.  Superb effort.

After reading your serial and studying Google Earth, I wonder why you assert that Mantineia and Pallantium must share a common border based upon noting a road leading from one to the other.  Could this road linking the two not traverse Tegea?  If not, why not?

Google Earth Archaeology opens up new doors to explorations.

Thanks Jon.    I'm proposing a common Mantinean-Pallantium border as a possible indication that Mantinean territory extended further south of the narrows than is generally assumed. It's of course possible that the road passed through Tegean territory, but "from Mantinea to Pallantium" seems to imply it didn't (or at least offers the possibility it didn't). Put the borders of Mantinea south of Tripoli and adjacent to Pallantium and all the problems posed by Xenophon disappear. It becomes possible to make a jigsaw puzzle using all the pieces and without forcing any of them into place.

[Jon Freitag]

Put the borders of Mantinea south of Tripoli and adjacent to Pallantium and all the problems posed by Xenophon disappear. It becomes possible to make a jigsaw puzzle using all the pieces and without forcing any of them into place.

The puzzle piece showing Mantineia directly abutting Pallantium might be a tight fit.

[Erpingham]

Interesting thoughts, Justin.  The battle becomes more complicated by the minute 

Just wondering where you think "Ocean" was?  Given its prominence in Pausanius as related to the place of Epaminondas' death, or his burial place, it would be useful to pin down.

[Justin Swanton]

Put the borders of Mantinea south of Tripoli and adjacent to Pallantium and all the problems posed by Xenophon disappear. It becomes possible to make a jigsaw puzzle using all the pieces and without forcing any of them into place.

The puzzle piece showing Mantineia directly abutting Pallantium might be a tight fit.

We don't know where the border was. There are no geographic features that serves as a natural separation between Mantinea and Tegea. One assumes the border was at the narrows because that looks pretty on a map, but the narrows aren't that narrow - they're over 2km wide - and the frontier could just as easily have been further south as there. Putting the frontier further south has the effect of making Xenophon's entire pre-battle movement account fit snugly. I'll take it.

[Justin Swanton]

Interesting thoughts, Justin.  The battle becomes more complicated by the minute 

Just wondering where you think "Ocean" was?  Given its prominence in Pausanius as related to the place of Epaminondas' death, or his burial place, it would be useful to pin down.

Pausanias doesn't say Epaminondas was buried at Ocean, he just seems to imply he died there (without categorically stating that he did). Pausanias, like Diodorus and Diogenes are problematic in that they give the impression - without explicitly affirming it - that the cavalry battle and the main battle were one and the same. Pausanias puts Ocean 30 stades south of Mantinea, i.e. 5,5km, which is just north of the narrows themselves. Natural place for the cavalry fight but the main battle was clearly a separate action that took place later and happened somewhere else.

Epaminondas BTW could have been buried anywhere, not necessarily at the site of the battle. Tripoli in those days didn't exist as a city and the site seems to have been in the middle of nowhere. It's plausible that Epaminondas may have been buried somewhere more accessible to travellers - and since the cavalry fight was the prelude to the battle, why not there? (though of course we have no certain idea where he actually was buried)

[Justin Swanton]

Interesting thoughts, Justin.  The battle becomes more complicated by the minute 

The battle of Leuktra indeed was simple, and confined to one division of the forces engaged, and therefore does not make the writer's lack of knowledge so very glaring: but that of Mantineia was complicated and technical, and is accordingly unintelligible, and indeed completely inconceivable, to the historian. - Polybius: 12,25

One does try to see the wood in the trees nonetheless.

[Erpingham]

Epaminondas BTW could have been buried anywhere, not necessarily at the site of the battle.

Though Pausanius explicitly says he was buried where the armies met.

I agree it is difficult to pin down if Pausanius meant Epaminondas was killed near or even in Ocean, though his implication is that it was nearby is there in the oracle prediction story. 

[Justin Swanton]

Epaminondas BTW could have been buried anywhere, not necessarily at the site of the battle.

Though Pausanius explicitly says he was buried where the armies met.

Sorry, yes. Pausanias affirming that Epaminondas was told by an oracle to beware of Ocean would imply that Pausanias is conflating the cavalry fight with the main battle, since he clearly makes Ocean the place of the cavalry battle. It's peculiar that several sources seem to have done this.

One could argue that the cavalry fight was the beginning of the end for Epaminondas, his defeat there allowing the allies to join up and confront him in a decisive battle. But that would really be straining the text.

Edit: It is possible that Pausanias may have based his account on Diodorus who himself seems to have telescoped events: For just as he was approaching the unprotected city, one opposite side of Mantineia there arrived the reinforcements sent by Athens, six thousand in number with Hegesileôs their general, a man at that time renowned amongst his fellow citizens. He introduced an adequate force into the city and [here some time should pass] arrayed the rest of the army in expectation of a decisive battle. [3] And presently the Lacedaemonians and Mantineians made their appearance as well, whereat all got ready for the contest which was to decide the issue and summoned their allies from every direction..

This seems to imply that the Athenians reached Mantinea just in time to stop Epaminondas' cavalry from sacking it, and then immediately deployed for battle against the Theban main army. Which, following Xenophon, clearly wasn't the case. Diodorus' telescoping may have been transformed into conflation by Pausanias with the addition of the flourish about the oracle.