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This discussion started under the Slings thread but has widened to include other missile weapons.

Several points have been discussed.  The actual number of casualties caused by shooting, whether shooting at long range is effective, whether shields have any value against missiles and the effects of different armour types against missiles.

To take to start the issue of shields, among the discussions are whether it is worth having a shield except for close combat.  There has been some discussion about how shields might be used - essentially dynamically to deflect missiles or more statically in a formation presenting seried shields.  Nick Harbud in particular has presented some challenging ideas on the effectiveness and otherwise of shields, which it is hoped he will develop more fully here.

shields were always a balance between an effective barrier against all threats, and a confidence building tool for the fighting man, and a specialist part of a specific weapons system.

is the shield designed to stop missile weapons, or help parry a hand to hand blow?
is the shield expected to be used as part of an attack, punching the opponent with it
is it a shield used to deflect light weapons, rather than stop the missile dead?
what is the main arm for the shield bearer?
what are the expected weapons of the opponents?

all this matters far more than whether one specific enemy with one type of weapon could penetrate the shield.

not to mention that the ancients took great care to protect the shield less side of men, which in itself must indicate the importance they placed on them - or at least did until armour reached a certain point - and penetrative weapons reached a certain point - that the weight an encumbrance became unwelcome.

Thanks Tony,

For those who would like to catch up on the discussion so far, the link below should send you to the "Slings...." thread.  One's own humble contributions and the ensuing digressions start around post #16.

http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=984.0 (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=984.0)

A key comment to note before proceeding is:

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 16, 2013, 11:32:33 AM

I thought I had made clear that I am not so much interested in casualties as effect on morale, etc, - particularly the ability of the target unit to carry through on an attack or hold its ground in the face of enemy missile fire.  In this respect, the shield is a minor factor compared to the ability of the shooters to hit their target or the opportunities they have to do so.  Research by modern archers indicates that a bowman might get off 3 shots at a charging cavalryman and up to 5 at a foot target, but the chances of a hit at the longer distances is minimal.  Pretty much all the effect comes from the closest shot, which as the Blenheim example earlier in this thread indicates, might only hit 20% of the time.  That sort of casualty rate did not discourage the attack at Blenheim and therefore, irrespective of whether one has a shield or not, it would probably not do so in antiquity.

Hence the essential point (Nick, please correct me if I have misunderstood) is that of the factors to detail when considering whether an attack succeeds or fails in the face of shooting, being shielded or otherwise is not high up on the list.

I would however question two of the above assumptions:

Quote
Pretty much all the effect comes from the closest shot

Actually my impression is the reverse: the first volley is the one that has most effect, with subsequent volleys maintaining and reinforcing such disorder and disadvantages as the first volley imposes.  If we consider Agincourt, the French attack started to go to pieces from the first serious English volley (I do not count the earlier tickling with flight arrows to get the French to move).  The closest volley, when indirect shooting would no longer have been possible, would have been comparatively ineffectual as many of the archers would not have had a clear shot - and the French did carry on to engage in melee (albeit at a significant disadvantage).  The pincushioning on the way in ruined their order, upset their orientation and turned the attack into a choked scramble.

Quote
which as the Blenheim example earlier in this thread indicates, might only hit 20% of the time.  That sort of casualty rate did not discourage the attack at Blenheim and therefore, irrespective of whether one has a shield or not, it would probably not do so in antiquity.

Most of our examples of massed missile use in the pre-gunpowder period come from mediaeval engagements, e.g. Crecy, Wisby, Poitiers, Agincourt.  While missile use rarely if ever stops an attack outright, it does considerably degrade and attenuate the attacker/defender, which admittedly is a separate question to discouragement.

I would however suggest that in a battle like Hastings, where the shield wall was an integral part of the English defence, the shields made a significant difference.  The Norman archery was never going to win the battle by itself, but was intended to soften up the English to the degree where a cavalry charge would be successful against them.  The archers duly delivered the required weight of shot - but to no avail or effect, apart from one that got in a rather important eye - and it was only later in the battle, when the angle of shooting was changed to circumvent the shields, that the archers were able to make an appreciable contribution and make the 'softening' work.

Hence, although I tend to agree that shieldedness or shieldlessness may not be critical in determining whether or not attackers close or defenders hold when being shot at, it can be a major factor in determining the overall effectiveness of shooting, especially regarding disorder or morale thresholds being reached.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 16, 2013, 03:51:09 PM

Quote
Pretty much all the effect comes from the closest shot

Actually my impression is the reverse: the first volley is the one that has most effect, with subsequent volleys maintaining and reinforcing such disorder and disadvantages as the first volley imposes. 

Not if you follow the curve derived for musket fire, which gives for a typical charging cavalry target:

20yds      84% hits
110yds    50% hits
220yds    26% hits

As can be seen more hits are scored in the closest volley than the preceding ones put together. 

Of course, these are ideal hits against a canvas screen.  As per earlier posts, one should probably divide by at least 4 to arrive at hits against a real target.  Indeed, Hughes quotes one contemporary estimate that no more than 15% of rounds fired were effective and this is without taking into account any protection from armour, shields, etc.

I would point out that musketry is a completely different weapon system from muscle-powered missile weapons.  To begin with, it is direct fire only (well, you can try shooting indirectly with muskets, but it tends to be just a waste of ammunition) whereas archery is mainly indirect, allowing many more ranks to participate effectively until the enemy is too close for an angled trajectory.  Second, it has a murderous recoil which is absent in bows, javelins, slings etc. and which tends to make musket shots go high, the more so if troops are not trained to fire low.  Third, muskets had a misfire rate variously estimated but I have seen 25% frequently touted, whereas the misfire rate for muscle-powered missile weapons was very much lower and essentially negligible.

Finally, though not necessarily exhaustively, formations were usually considerably deeper in the pre-gunpowder era, giving massed missile shooting more depth of target.  This would have increased the number of hits obtained by long-range volleys, or at any rate those using an indirect trajectory.

For these reasons I would not make comparisons between gunpowder weapons and pre-gunpowder missile weapons.  Personally, I would ditch the musketry statistics until the musket era comes round.  :)

Pat is correct that there is nothing worth comparing between our period and the musket period.  he and I have discussed this on other levels in the past.

Agincourt's first volley offers far more fruitful comparison

- remembering that it was a steeply plunging shot to achieve the range, and was therefore not against the armoured knight, but against his unarmoured horse - and that the response of the French knights in later battles was to dismount, does indeed suggest that even against the very best bows in the very best trained hands, good armour worked.

Using Agincourt as an exemplar for longbow/cavalry interaction has its problems.  The French were both badly organised and, because of the fact that the cavalry units were a mixture of factions who until the previous year were at war with each other, difficult to control.  They were also charging across a wet ploughed field.  Unlike most cavalry attacks in the HYW, therefore, they didn't contact (almost - three men apparently died in the archer lines).  It seems the primary cause was pulling up rather than being shot down (in wargames parlance, failed the charge home test). 

The other thing to remember is that Agincourt is rare in that the cavalry didn't charge home.  At Crecy the French cavalry charged home numerous times.  Mauron, Poitiers and others before Agincourt, Verneuil and Patay afterwards are other examples.  So even with a missile weapon as effective as a longbow, cavalry had a good chance (the English didn't trail stakes around for nothing).

On the devastating volley front, there is an anecdote in Montluc'smemoirs where, as a young officer in a crossbow company, he has his men hold their fire until short range then mows down some Italian cavalry.  If I have a moment, I'll track it down.

Purely from a reenacting perspective, I used to be a (long) bowman in an archer unit. We went to many shows from the small (Tintagel) to the enormous (Tewkesbury) and size does matter with regards to archery!

In the small engagements, there would be a few archers acting as fire support but no massed effect. Shooting into combat at these shows was almost pick your target and fire. Unfortunately the opposition would peel off individuals to chase us down and away. I guess you could say we acted as skirmishers. We could fire up to about 20 yards away (then no closer - partly for safety reasons and unless we had specific authority never "flat" shot) but mostly for the fact we were always on the cusp of running away! Shooting reasonably closely was accurate (ish) but normally you only got to fire off one or two rounds before running away

In the big engagements, we would be brigaded together with other archer companies and organised into mass shooting/volleys. In these occaisions, mostly without hills to help, we were almost exclusively shooting over our own troop blocks into the enemy until they engaged in hand to hand. This meant that the ranges we shot at were normally no closer than 30-40 yards. Generally we could get off quite a few volleys from long range to the time it was "danger close" for our own troops.

In terms of effect (this is purely reenactment and not a real battle context), the small engagements had a higher percentage hit ratio per archer than the large scale engagements although the shooters normally got mauled quicker. Also because the large engagements normally gave several rounds of fire more than the smaller engagements, the actual number of casualties was often higher.

Shields are remarkably effective against 45 degree shot "dropping" arrows if you have them, as they tend to have a circumference larger than the target's body. Flat or near flat shooting when skirmishing, one on one, clear target with no intervening troops, is easier to get a hit as the shield only covers a proportion of the targets front body mass.

One thing I will say is that even in reenacting where no one is trying to actually kill you, as an archer it is very unnerving to see the enemy up front and close and when they charge at you with a dirty great pointed stick or horrible chopping weapon....you run 

Here we go.  Montluc is commanding a company of crossbowmen at the skirmish of St Jean de Luz.  he has set out to try to relieve some gendarmes who are having a problem with a stronger force of Spaniards.  Montluc has about 200 men.

Captain, said I, take you only care to save
your self and your Gens-d'armes, at the
same instant crying out. Shoot, Comrades,
at the head of these Horse. I was not
above a dozen paces distant from the Enemy
when I gave them this Volley, by which
(as it appear'd by the testimony of the
Prisoners who were taken a few days after)
above fifty Horses were kill'd and wounded,
and two Troopers slain, an execution that
a little cool'd their courage, and caus'd their
Troops to make a halt.

The Spanish are halted long enough for the Gendarmes to withdraw but the crossbow company is now exposed and Montluc has to extracate his men - a hairy adventure.

Dave, your information about overhead shooting is interesting and useful to show what is possible, and also the usefulness of shields against 'dropping shot'.  Did you notice attackers being slowed by your shooting?  I have seen the occasional re-enactment with attackers slowing, bunching and holding up shields when shot at, and wonder if your 'opponents' noticeably slowed and bunched - or just put up the shields and carried on regardless.

Anthony, the point about Agincourt was not to hold it up as an exemplar of longbow/target interaction but rather to indicate that with massed archery the first, more distant volleys would be effective - as opposed to musketry or Montluc's crossbow volley where close means effective.  It is interesting that his 200 men downed, incapacitated or injured two men and 50 horses with the one volley - a rough rule-of-thumb casualty rate of 25% of the number shooting for this range and target.  Again, I suspect that some unfortunate targets took multiple hits rather than that 75% of the crossbowmen missed a side-of-a-barn-sized target at twelve paces.  As with musketry, hitting the horses is what stops the charge - at Agincourt, did the mounted French pull up because (as Mark suggests) they were fast disintegrating under the arrow storm or because their appetite for Englishmen had suddenly failed them and charging home no longer seemed appealing?

I think Nick may have a point about shieldedness not being a major determinant of whether or not a charge makes contact: I would however suggest that it can make a significant difference as to whether the charge arrives in a condition to do anything meaningful, and that this will further depend upon the degree of protection provided by the shield.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 17, 2013, 11:28:05 AM
Anthony, the point about Agincourt was not to hold it up as an exemplar of longbow/target interaction but rather to indicate that with massed archery the first, more distant volleys would be effective - as opposed to musketry or Montluc's crossbow volley where close means effective.

Fair enough.  What I think I'm trying to unravel is that Agincourt isn't a great examplar.  The French cavalry, knowledgeable as they were, were reluctant to get involved in this charge - because it lacked glory , because the Armangnac's wouldn't follow an accursed Burgundian or because everyone could see that the ground would slow them down so much they'd get shot to bits - your choice.  I therefore think, having made a show, they pulled up early before archery could have done much at all.  If you take the opinion of Mike Loades in the latest Osprey, the English didn't waste many arrows in "dropping shots" - they waited till the range was short enough to use a flat trajectory.  I understand his reasoning and while agreeing that most shooting at an attacking enemy probably belonged in a "mad minute" under 100 yds range , it seems to be that a lot of exchanges between archers occured at longer ranges (see the famous anecdote from Towton, for example) and I think a lot of provoking archery against a defender wouldn't be close in either.

Quote
It is interesting that his 200 men downed, incapacitated or injured two men and 50 horses with the one volley - a rough rule-of-thumb casualty rate of 25% of the number shooting for this range and target. 

Yes, it's why I remembered it.  It fits with Nick's musketry charts broadly speaking.  Other interesting points are that they clearly aimed at the horses and that, if the Spanish had been charging seriously, they couldn't have been stopped at 12 paces IMO (even dying horses would have covered that distance at a gallop before falling.  Perhaps the Spanish intended to intimidate them rather than get tangled up with them, as they were really wanting to fight with the French Gendarmes?  The Spanish may have been in more than one rank, so the front rank probably took a higher casualty rate percentage wise - this may have had an effect in checking their advance.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 17, 2013, 11:28:05 AM
Dave, your information about overhead shooting is interesting and useful to show what is possible, and also the usefulness of shields against 'dropping shot'.  Did you notice attackers being slowed by your shooting?  I have seen the occasional re-enactment with attackers slowing, bunching and holding up shields when shot at, and wonder if your 'opponents' noticeably slowed and bunched - or just put up the shields and carried on regardless.

In the big battles, the infantry blocks normally slowed and bunched just before charging to contact. Partly for protection against archery using collective shields and partly in anticipation of the shock of impact to the fore.

Many thanks to all for their varied and enthusiastic contributions.  I shall offer a few further thoughts for your consideration.

I contend there are a number of similarities between musketry and human powered missile weapons.  Firstly the probability of hitting the target broadly follows an inverse square relationship with distance and this would be true for both types of weapon.  The rationale behind this should be obvious and one can obtain a good curve fit use this formula to the observed results.

With respect to plunging or high angle fire, I suspect (but once I have had a chance to do a few sums, I shall share them with this forum) that inherently this is less accurate than flat trajectory fire.  That is, there is even less chance of hitting at long range than with direct fire alone.

Direct fire is, of course, necessary if one wishes to penetrate any protection on the target.  Partly this is because at any given range the high angle shot must have less force behind it than the flat trajectory.  Also, trials have shown that at more than 20-40 degrees from the perpendicular, an arrow will tend to glance off shields, plate armour, etc.

With regard to rates of fire, longbows and crossbows were not wildly better than the Napoleonic musket (5 rounds/minute).  In The Great Warbow Simon Stanley reckons the maximum rate of sustained longbow fire to be 6 shots/minute.  In Secrets of the English War Bow Mark Stretton carries out what is possibly a more realistic trial involving a moving target representing a charging horseman.  He concludes that 7s is required between shots for this short period.  In The Medieval Archer Jim Bradbury reckons it takes 12s to reload a windlass crossbow.  Incidentally, horsemen charge at around 10yds/sec and infantry at about half this speed.

With regard to Towton, this is a slightly different situation as the opposing sides did not immediately seek to contact one another, but stood off and engaged in a missile duel.  (Dare one say it, something not totally unfamiliar to the Duke of Marlborough.)  Instead of popping off a handful of volleys, they were able to empty their quivers (20-30 arrows per man).  Of course, all was confusion due to the weather, but one can speculate that both sides saw individuals on the other side hit from time to time and therefore concluded they were winning the duel without being able to judge the overall effect of their fire.

Hope this provokes further stimulating discussion.

We can add a few more data points to our longbow shooting.  Loades quotes Mark Stretton (again) as saying he could deliver 10 shots in a minute with a 140lb longbow but not 20 in two minutes.  It should also be remembered that the sixteenth century professionals reckoned six shots a minute.  I think it is solidly a modern myth that longbowmen would rain clouds of death on anything within 350 yds.  Almost certainly one of the things that sorted the men from the bows was dropping a few livery shafts on the enemy at range and seeing what he came back with.  At Towton, the Lancastrians emptied their quivers at long range - poor judgement, rubbish fire control.  For another example, look at the Genoese at Crecy.  Professionals, they tested the range a couple of times but the English held fire until they were well in range then let them have it.  Controlled shooting, giving heed to effect but also to sustaining the fight, was a hidden skill in the longbow story.  We just don't know how longbowmen were commanded in the field.  Indeed, when it got up close and personal were they shooting controlled volleys or shooting as individuals?  In wargames rules, it is below the level of abstraction for everything but one-to-one skirmishing I'd guess.    Incidentally, in Villani's opinion, longbowmen could shoot three arrows for every one a crossbowman got off.

it is logical that a distance the archer captains asked for controlled releases in order to conserve ammunition supply. Then when the opponent got closer they would order the equivalent of the 'mad minute' of the Old Contemptibles in 1914.  At that point the trajectory is flat, the target is large and the archers have to hold their nerve and shoot the opponents down.

It all then depends upon the archers holding their nerve. I they are experienced and brave the advancing troops will be suffering really powerful direct blows and some penetrations. They will not be able to look directly at the archers as they advance. It is then a question of who cracks first.
Roy

The whole discipline of volley shooting (for archers) seems to have depended upon plenty of practice at landing their arrows on the space called for - at ranges over 60-80 yards this would involve a curving trajectory for anything less powerful than a ballista, and for rear ranks of a deep archer formation to participate a curving trajectory and shooting on command rather than attempting to sight the target would be required.

The analogy I would use is a Second World War artillery barrage.  While the chance to hit using direct fire at close range was indeed individually much higher than the chance to hit firing indirectly at a distance, indirect fire allowed more guns to participate (Mike Target, Uncle Target, etc.) and would put a greater weight and concentration of fire on the target, which was what did the damage.  Archers similarly needed to do their job before the enemy got to close range, and the way to do this was to drop a lot of missiles in a limited space quickly, which meant shooting in practised concentrations on command.  What was needed of the individual was to put his missile within a certain ground radius of the overall aiming point, no more and no less than that: his comrades would all be doing the same.  This kind of massed archery broke formations and caused confusion (and casualties) among opponents, and one can see Derby at Auberoche (1345) directing his archers to concentrate on knots of Frenchmen who were forming up and getting organised, shifting target when sufficient disorganisation had been achieved.

In essence, effective massed archery relied on a concentration of shooting on a called point of delivery.  Experienced officers would know the rates of advance (Nick has mentioned these) and the flight times for various distances, so would aim to have the volley arrive when the target did - individual accuracy would not be a factor, because the individual did not need to aim, merely to follow his training.  (We may note that experienced archers could be remarkably accurate, 700 Arabs losing an eye at the Yarmuk courtesy of Armenian archery and Italians being amazed that English archers in 1361 or so could put an arrow in a man's eye at considerable distances.)

This kind of massed shooting relied on accurate calling by the 'target designating officer', and there were ways to beat it.  Diodorus tells us that at Cunaxa Clearchus ordered his men to speed up the pace of their advance when the Persians shot their first volley, and the Greeks progressively increased in speed as they closed, avoiding any casualties or loss of order from shooting.  The Persian troops facing them were made of less stern stuff than Dave's re-enactors and took to their heels before contact could be made.  (This is analogous to 'salvo chasing', altering course towards the last enemy salvo, a technique used with success by some light cruisers when shadowing the enemy fleet - it worked when the enemy's shooting was accurate, because they corrected in the wrong direction.)  Such occasions were, however, the exception rather than the rule: usually the attacker just pressed on and took his lumps.

I think it is important that we understand the nature of volley-shooting for archers, as otherwise we shall tend to underrate the effectiveness of volley shooting at range - and overrate it at closer distances when the attacker was starting to get inside the 'reaction loop' and the archer unit as a whole would have difficulty bringing their arrows down so close to friendly lines.

Quote from: Holly on November 17, 2013, 12:45:43 PM

In the big battles, the infantry blocks normally slowed and bunched just before charging to contact. Partly for protection against archery using collective shields and partly in anticipation of the shock of impact to the fore.

Thanks, this is much as I would expect, although historical originals being pelted by clothyard shafts at greater ranges might start to bunch and put the brakes on a bit earlier, as the first shafts began to bite.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 17, 2013, 12:10:24 PM

... Other interesting points are that they clearly aimed at the horses and that, if the Spanish had been charging seriously, they couldn't have been stopped at 12 paces IMO (even dying horses would have covered that distance at a gallop before falling.  Perhaps the Spanish intended to intimidate them rather than get tangled up with them, as they were really wanting to fight with the French Gendarmes?  The Spanish may have been in more than one rank, so the front rank probably took a higher casualty rate percentage wise - this may have had an effect in checking their advance.

If the period is early 16th century, I believe multiple ranks for cavalry were still in vogue, so a concentration on the front rank would be an effective 'stopper'.  If the crossbows actually shot at 12 paces as opposed to shooting at, say, 20 paces so that the equine casualties piled up at 12 paces, the Spanish cavalry must have been progressing at a trot or at most a canter rather than a gallop - suggesting that the 'pursuit' was more concerned with keeping order than with going all-out to catch the gendarmes, although the latter were also probably not moving with great rapidity.  One of the things that strikes me about pre-gunpowder warfare is that much of it seems to have been carried out at a pace we would regard as leisurely.

so just to recap on the salient points here.

two examples of cavalry stopped by archery - Agincourt and the early Montluc.  once at long range, the other at close.

in both cases, the worst affected target is the horse not the rider.

ergo

two examples that armour in period works
- and both periods see changes designed to alter this balance - the French dismount (no horses to target), and the late medieval / early renaissance sees metal horse barding shaped to deflect incoming arrows.

Perhaps we should consider cost as a factor. Why supply so many soldiers with shields if they are mostly ineffectual? Looking at some data on logistics from the Jewish Wars around 70 AD I would say that shields were considered to be important enough to justify shipping them along with the grain and water.

Good point

I would suggest that shields are quicker, easier and cheaper to make than armour for one! Also you get a lot of bang for your buck with a shield....melee defensive help, melee offensive help, projectile defensive help and a big psychological boost if nothing else! Again as a reenactor, having "fought" in a hand to hand melee (in a shieldwall!), having a shield along with a helmet and hand protection were the base minimum items you would want to take on the field with you. 

Quote from: Dave Gee on November 18, 2013, 10:35:59 AM
Perhaps we should consider cost as a factor. Why supply so many soldiers with shields if they are mostly ineffectual? Looking at some data on logistics from the Jewish Wars around 70 AD I would say that shields were considered to be important enough to justify shipping them along with the grain and water.

I reckon a shield is a distinctly useful item....

....but probably more so for hand-to-hand fighting rather than as protection against missiles, unless it is the heavy pavise type.  Personally, I reckon the best defense against massed missile fire is to move, either out of range or to close with the pesky individuals shooting at me.

Quote from: aligern on November 17, 2013, 08:23:55 PM
it is logical that a distance the archer captains asked for controlled releases in order to conserve ammunition supply. Then when the opponent got closer they would order the equivalent of the 'mad minute' of the Old Contemptibles in 1914.  At that point the trajectory is flat, the target is large and the archers have to hold their nerve and shoot the opponents down.

It all then depends upon the archers holding their nerve. I they are experienced and brave the advancing troops will be suffering really powerful direct blows and some penetrations. They will not be able to look directly at the archers as they advance. It is then a question of who cracks first.
Roy

Don't forget the timing of all this.  The horsemen charge at 10yds/sec, which means they take 24 seconds to cross the 240yds from extreme range to contact.  At 7s/volley this gives 3 volleys, bearing in mind that the archer will take time to draw his melee weapon.  (No bayonets for a couple of hundred years.)  The crossbowmen are in an even worse state and would be lucky to get off 2 volleys before they find themselves in the thick of it.

Of course, the archer can laugh at his opponent if he has had the forethought to set up behind a wall, stakes, muddy field or two rolls of razor wire...  :)

Quote from: Holly on November 17, 2013, 10:45:47 AMIn the big engagements, we would be brigaded together with other archer companies and organised into mass shooting/volleys. In these occaisions, mostly without hills to help, we were almost exclusively shooting over our own troop blocks into the enemy until they engaged in hand to hand. This meant that the ranges we shot at were normally no closer than 30-40 yards. Generally we could get off quite a few volleys from long range to the time it was "danger close" for our own troops.

Having done archery in my youth I'm curious - what was the draw weight of your bows and were your arrows weighted and padded on their tips? I used a 45 pound recurve bow and at 30 yards the arrow trajectory was nearly flat.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on November 18, 2013, 03:34:35 PM

Quote from: Holly on November 17, 2013, 10:45:47 AMIn the big engagements, we would be brigaded together with other archer companies and organised into mass shooting/volleys. In these occaisions, mostly without hills to help, we were almost exclusively shooting over our own troop blocks into the enemy until they engaged in hand to hand. This meant that the ranges we shot at were normally no closer than 30-40 yards. Generally we could get off quite a few volleys from long range to the time it was "danger close" for our own troops.

Having done archery in my youth I'm curious - what was the draw weight of your bows and were your arrows weighted and padded on their tips? I used a 45 pound recurve bow and at 30 yards the arrow trajectory was nearly flat.

The arrows had blunts (rubber) on them making them quite "front heavy". We occaisionally used sharps but only for target practice shooting, never in combat! We also used a variety of fletchings, sometimes even using flu flus to stop the range being too extreme when we where in a small area (we have done archery "fights" in castle courtyards before now!

The bows we used were longbow type (5-6 foot) although with laminated materials being used. One of the chaps we used to have in the group did a homemade bow from a yew tree branch, knobbly knots and all left in!

Our group generally had 35-45 lb draw weights depending on the individual's strength defining which draw weight to go for  :)

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 18, 2013, 02:22:01 PM

Don't forget the timing of all this.  The horsemen charge at 10yds/sec, which means they take 24 seconds to cross the 240yds from extreme range to contact. 

This is much too fast, even on good going.  Rogers in his extended article on Agincourt, using various manuals from 18th- 20th century, concludes a charge from 325 yds would take 90 seconds, 275 yds 76 seconds.  This is because the charge starts at a halt and, like later cavalry, we know that men-at-arms didn't go immediately to the charge but stepped up to it.  Indeed, they may not have "charged" faster than a fast trot.  The fastest gallop Rogers quotes is 440 yds/min - British 20th century regulations.

In terms of the effect of mud, he notes Austrian cavalry tests from the 19th century which showed a trot speed of 150-160 m/min, down from a regulation 225 m/min, in soft going.  Rogers ultimately estimates the charge would have taken 2 1/2 to 3 minutes to contact.  From these figures, the English could have hit the French with 15 volleys with ease.  Whether they did or not is another question :)  Note that the slow start allows the English early volleys to hit a slow moving target.  When the cavalry have picked up speed, the trajectory is flattening out, making target speed less of an issue.

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 18, 2013, 02:08:15 PM
I reckon a shield is a distinctly useful item....

....but probably more so for hand-to-hand fighting rather than as protection against missiles, unless it is the heavy pavise type.  Personally, I reckon the best defense against massed missile fire is to move, either out of range or to close with the pesky individuals shooting at me.

Which is probably quite correct, although one does not always have the option, or (like the Gauls at Telamon and Olympia) may not think one has.  A dinky little buckler such as Cretans used would have obvious limitations as a missile-stopper, but the scutum, hoplon and thureos were all considered good missile-stoppers by their contemporaries, apart from the Gallic variety which was fine against missiles from the front but was criticised by classical authors as being a) to small to protect the whole Gaul properly and b) too flat to allow protection against anything coming in at an angle other than directly ahead.

Failing the ability to close with and destroy those irritating missilemen, the next best option is to have a fair-sized assemblage of wood and leather (or at a pinch woven osiers) that one can line up and duck behind.  Going to a full pavise, gerrhon of even mantlet obviously provides the best protection, and in sieges, where melee was not usually going to be a factor until the ladders went up on the walls, shooters used these in preference to shields.  For assaults (i.e. where one did not have time for a siege) they locked shields and moved in to bash gates and/or undermine walls.

I would suggest that we can differentiate between the pavise/mantlet/gerrhon, which provides 95-99% protection (100% if you close the slit), the 'large shield' of the scutum/hoplon/thureos variety which provides about 75% protection (more if one crouches or holds it up), the 'medium shield' such as the pelta or heater or Gallic thureos or Saxon round shield which gives maybe 50% protection (more if held up and/or used to deflect missiles) and the 'small shield' such as the targe or buckler which really is only capable of conferring meaningful protection in a one-to-one melee; against missiles one might generously allow it to provide perhaps 25% protection (apparently at Culloden some Highland targes stopped bullets, e.g. Lord George Murray's).  If desiring greater simplicity, we could conflate these into three categories: 'mantleted', 'shielded' and 'unshielded'.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 18, 2013, 07:17:32 PM
This is much too fast, even on good going.  Rogers in his extended article on Agincourt, using various manuals from 18th- 20th century, concludes a charge from 325 yds would take 90 seconds, 275 yds 76 seconds.  This is because the charge starts at a halt and, like later cavalry, we know that men-at-arms didn't go immediately to the charge but stepped up to it.  Indeed, they may not have "charged" faster than a fast trot.  The fastest gallop Rogers quotes is 440 yds/min - British 20th century regulations.

Are you sure about this?  I mean...

325 yards in 90 secs = 3.33 m/s
275 yards in 76 secs = 3.34 m/s
440 yards in 60 secs = 6.77 m/s

By contrast, Roger Bannister (without horse) could run 1760 yards in 240 secs = 6.77 m/s.

According to Wikipedia horse speeds are as follows:
Trot = 13 km/h = 3.6 m/s
Canter = 16-27 km/h = ~7 m/s
Gallop = 40-48 km/h = 11-13 m/s

According to The Artillery Officer's Assistant 1848, cavalry is expected to make the first half mile at the trot, the next quarter mile at a canter and the final 440yds at the gallop.  Incidentally, this worthy manual recommends loosing 2 rounds of case shot in the final 350yds, which seems eminently achievable, given that a well-practiced crew should be able to manage 3 rounds of case shot/minute.

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 19, 2013, 04:12:22 PM

Are you sure about this?

Well, I'm not an expert but what I've read (and just now checked on the internet) is that Rogers' figures are pretty sound for heavy cavalry.  Trots were around 220-250 yds a minute, gallops 330-440 yds a minute.  Some online sources estimate lower (as did Charles Grant in the Wargame).  I'm not sure of the reasons but I'm guessing they were slower partly because a cavalry horse is carrying a lot more weight than a recreational riding horse (and Roger bannister) partly because they were keeping in formation.  As to charge length, it probably varied according to doctrine but 18th-20th century cavalry could deliver their charge from 200-300 yds from a halt, so it is plausible that the French cavalry could deliver a respectable charge from a long bowshot.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 19, 2013, 07:19:40 PM
Well, I'm not an expert but what I've read (and just now checked on the internet) is that Rogers' figures are pretty sound for heavy cavalry.  Trots were around 220-250 yds a minute, gallops 330-440 yds a minute.  Some online sources estimate lower (as did Charles Grant in the Wargame).  I'm not sure of the reasons but I'm guessing they were slower partly because a cavalry horse is carrying a lot more weight than a recreational riding horse (and Roger bannister) partly because they were keeping in formation.  As to charge length, it probably varied according to doctrine but 18th-20th century cavalry could deliver their charge from 200-300 yds from a halt, so it is plausible that the French cavalry could deliver a respectable charge from a long bowshot.

Should we be starting a new topic on the ability of infantry evaders to outrun charging cavalry?   ;)

I am with Erpingham that the charge takes longer than Nick is estimating. I doubt that medieval knights had the degree of practise that 19th century cavalry had, nor the sub unitisation that gave control. the leaders have to move out slowly so that the other nobles can move with them , or rather just behind them, in appropriate sequence. It is then likely that they move forward slowly so that the whole mass can keep together, only moving to faster speeds for the last 50 yards? to gain the impetus of momentum. If they went at the gallop from the beginning they would arrive in disorder and good order is  vitally important. Add the slowing effect of the mud and there is plenty of time for controlled volleys
Incidentally the Arab chronicler of the Pecheneg v Byzantine battle that I cited in the article on Huns in a recent Slingshot has the Byzantine charge being stopped by the shooting of stationery Petcheneg horsemen.

As to shields the Byzantine manuals seem to think that forming a wall of shields is an important defence against archery. Also, there is a question of how the shield is held. If it is held outwards by a central grip then a smallish shield covers a large area of the body. It also keeps penetrating missiles away from the body , even if they do break through the face of the shield.
Roy

Quote from: Erpingham on November 19, 2013, 07:19:40 PM

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 19, 2013, 04:12:22 PM

Are you sure about this?

Well, I'm not an expert but what I've read (and just now checked on the internet) is that Rogers' figures are pretty sound for heavy cavalry.  Trots were around 220-250 yds a minute, gallops 330-440 yds a minute.  Some online sources estimate lower (as did Charles Grant in the Wargame).  I'm not sure of the reasons but I'm guessing they were slower partly because a cavalry horse is carrying a lot more weight than a recreational riding horse (and Roger Bannister) partly because they were keeping in formation.

I understand that the average knight at the time of Crecy or Agincourt would be riding something more akin to the ancestor of the shire horse than the modern racing variety.  And given the yucky, muddy ploughed field the French had to cross at Agincourt I suspect that on that day mounted movement rates were down from even the relatively modest mediaeval knightly norm.

I was almost swayed to Nick H's way of thinking until a thought occurred to me whilst watch a documentary about Gettysburg. That thought was that as missile weapons have evolved from missiles that travelled comparatively slowly and could be deflected (stones, spears, arrows) to fast moving and better penetration (crossbow, arquebus, rifle) then the use of shields has declined and disappeared.

This has lead me to the opinion that the shield was used primarily to allow the warrior/soldier to survive long enough to get into hand to hand combat and was hence an 'anti-missile device'.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 20, 2013, 09:08:11 PM


I understand that the average knight at the time of Crecy or Agincourt would be riding something more akin to the ancestor of the shire horse than the modern racing variety. 

Most would probably be quite close to the heavy cavalry horse of later centuries (maybe a bit shorter) and the weight they carried (unarmoured) would be similar, so the comparisons from later manuals have some validity.  The mud would have been a serious problem but, short of some re-enactment tests in armour across those fields, it's hard to quantify.  Conditions would have been far from optimal for a cavalry attack.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 20, 2013, 09:08:11 PM
I understand that the average knight at the time of Crecy or Agincourt would be riding something more akin to the ancestor of the shire horse than the modern racing variety.  And given the yucky, muddy ploughed field the French had to cross at Agincourt I suspect that on that day mounted movement rates were down from even the relatively modest mediaeval knightly norm.

You may wish to read the links below for further information regarding size and carrying capacity of war horses.

http://www.horsesciencenews.com/horseback-riding/how-much-weight-can-a-horse-carry.php (http://www.horsesciencenews.com/horseback-riding/how-much-weight-can-a-horse-carry.php)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horses_in_the_Middle_Ages (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horses_in_the_Middle_Ages)

Quote from: aligern on November 20, 2013, 08:17:09 PM
I am with Erpingham that the charge takes longer than Nick is estimating. I doubt that medieval knights had the degree of practise that 19th century cavalry had, nor the sub unitisation that gave control. the leaders have to move out slowly so that the other nobles can move with them , or rather just behind them, in appropriate sequence. It is then likely that they move forward slowly so that the whole mass can keep together, only moving to faster speeds for the last 50 yards? to gain the impetus of momentum. If they went at the gallop from the beginning they would arrive in disorder and good order is  vitally important. Add the slowing effect of the mud and there is plenty of time for controlled volleys

I think the idea of of medieval knights having no training or ability to perform coordinated maneuvers does not really stand up.  These links discuss further.

http://deremilitari.org/2013/06/the-myths-of-medieval-warfare/ (http://deremilitari.org/2013/06/the-myths-of-medieval-warfare/)
http://web.archive.org/web/20110805101324/http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/articles/bennett1.htm (http://web.archive.org/web/20110805101324/http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/articles/bennett1.htm)

Incidentally, a number of posters seem to concentrate on Agincourt to illustrate their points.  As others have pointed out, this is really not a good example for drawing wider conclusions.

What I think the knights do not have is training as large formations. I am with you Nick that they do train, but that it is in small groups and that a large body charging such as at Crecy , would have  a slow run up, keeping pace and trying to stay in rider. After all, If you get ahead of the Duke of X then it might be career limiting.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on November 21, 2013, 04:29:08 PM
What I think the knights do not have is training as large formations. I am with you Nick that they do train, but that it is in small groups and that a large body charging such as at Crecy , would have  a slow run up, keeping pace and trying to stay in rider. After all, If you get ahead of the Duke of X then it might be career limiting.
Roy

Knights were, I think we can agree, accomplished horsemen.  I think we can also agree that few of them had much experience in moving in large formations.  We do have fairly good evidence though that they were worried about falling into disorder and as Roy says probably manoeuvered quite slowly.  As to not overtaking the Duke of X, it seems standard in several disciplinary ordnances that riding in advance of the standards was an offense.  The standard led, directed, gave the pace - if people pushed ahead of it, order was lost.  I think they got this from the Romans ultimately - Verbruggen points out the instruction not to advance in front of the standard is found in Byzantine manuals.

Anyway, back to the original topic, I strongly suspect that the main thing archery would do is not stop a cavalry charge dead but break it up so that it was delivered piecemeal.

Taking up Nick's suggestion, here is an example from a medieval battle that is not Agincourt.  It is from the Battle of Nogent-sur-Seine, 1359

The French cavalry are attacking the English men-at-arms and archers on foot.  The English archers have withdrawn to high ground

At this time, however, the French infantry, who could not make such haste as the men at arms, arrived. This infantry were full nine hundred men, and, being armed with lances and large shields, broke through the line of the archers and flung them in disorder; for their shields were so strong, that the arrows made no impression on them.

The broken archers were then ridden down by the men-at-arms.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 21, 2013, 07:04:34 PM
Taking up Nick's suggestion, here is an example from a medieval battle that is not Agincourt.  It is from the Battle of Nogent-sur-Seine, 1359

The French cavalry are attacking the English men-at-arms and archers on foot.  The English archers have withdrawn to high ground

At this time, however, the French infantry, who could not make such haste as the men at arms, arrived. This infantry were full nine hundred men, and, being armed with lances and large shields, broke through the line of the archers and flung them in disorder; for their shields were so strong, that the arrows made no impression on them.

The broken archers were then ridden down by the men-at-arms.

The large shields sound like pavises. 

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 22, 2013, 08:19:20 AM

The large shields sound like pavises.

Agreed but I haven't checked the French.  Berners apparently translated them as pavisses but he may just be making the same assumption as us.

French now checked - the large shields are indeed "pavaix".

In perhaps similar vein, but with shields instead of pavises, is the following extract from Ammianus Marcellinus (XXIV.2.5).

"At daybreak the enemy were already in sight, and we then saw them for the first time in their gleaming helmets and bristling with stiff coats of mail; but our soldiers rushed to battle at quick step, and fell upon them most valiantly. And although the bows were bent with strong hand and the flashing gleam of steel added to the fear of the Romans, yet anger whetted their valour, and covered with a close array of shields [clipeorum densitate contecti] they pressed the enemy so hard that they could not use their bows."

Ammianus uses 'clipeus' (a round shield of roughly hoplon dimensions) rather than 'scutum' to describe the Roman shields.  Whatever the shields were, they provided good protection during closure.

Shortly thereafter, Julian's army attacked the fortress of Perisabor, which proved to be rather a tough nut:

"Whereupon the emperor, hastening to try every lucky throw amid the mutual slaughter, surrounded by a band in wedge-formation, and protected from the fall of arrows by shields held closely together [densetisque clipeis], in swift assault with a company of vigorous warriors, came near the enemy's gate, which was heavily overlaid with iron. [15] And although he and those who shared in his peril were assailed with rocks, bullets from slings, and other missiles, nevertheless he often cheered on his men as they tried to break in the leaves of the folding gates, in order to affect an entrance, and he did not withdraw until he saw that he must soon be overwhelmed by the volleys that were being hurled down upon him. [16] After all, he got back with all his men; a few were slightly wounded, he himself was unhurt, but bore a blush of shame upon his face." - Ammianus XXIV.2.14-16)

Although the shields involved are termed 'clipeus' by Ammianus, implying they are of a round type, they seem to confer quite adequate protection against missiles when the men are closely formed.

Quote from: Holly on November 17, 2013, 10:45:47 AM
Purely from a reenacting perspective, I used to be a (long) bowman in an archer unit. We went to many shows from the small (Tintagel) to the enormous (Tewkesbury) and size does matter with regards to archery!

Question for Holly - what were the max ranges you were capable of shooting?  And what did you consider to be your max effective range?  I bow hunt here in the US and I will never take a shot longer than 40 yards (well, okay, I once shot at a mountain lion at about 60 but just because he was stalking me and I was getting nervous - missed by the way but got close enough that I scared the cat off).  I don't know anyone who would take a shot at an animal beyond 50 yards and expect to hit - a good hunter wouldn't take that shot because even if you hit the animal chances are you won't kill it.  I shoot a bow with a 30" draw, 55 pound pull and about 280 feet per second speed at release.  My son (who is a bit taller than I) shoots at 70 pounds and about 310 FPS.  We killed two elk this year - both at about 30 yards.  So I'm curious what y'all learned in the reenactment business compared to what we do in the hunting business...

Quote from: Dave Beatty on November 25, 2013, 06:56:30 AM

Quote from: Holly on November 17, 2013, 10:45:47 AM
Purely from a reenacting perspective, I used to be a (long) bowman in an archer unit. We went to many shows from the small (Tintagel) to the enormous (Tewkesbury) and size does matter with regards to archery!

Question for Holly - what were the max ranges you were capable of shooting?  And what did you consider to be your max effective range?  I bow hunt here in the US and I will never take a shot longer than 40 yards (well, okay, I once shot at a mountain lion at about 60 but just because he was stalking me and I was getting nervous - missed by the way but got close enough that I scared the cat off).  I don't know anyone who would take a shot at an animal beyond 50 yards and expect to hit - a good hunter wouldn't take that shot because even if you hit the animal chances are you won't kill it.  I shoot a bow with a 30" draw, 55 pound pull and about 280 feet per second speed at release.  My son (who is a bit taller than I) shoots at 70 pounds and about 310 FPS.  We killed two elk this year - both at about 30 yards.  So I'm curious what y'all learned in the reenactment business compared to what we do in the hunting business...

Hi Dave,

I guess the main thing to note here is that we rarely flat shot and never in combat (although having said that very occaisionally for specific exhibitions, we were allowed to demonstrate flat shooting with blunts against the "clankies" :) ). We always fired "drop shots" we reenacting, partly for going over intervening troops and partly to extend the range of the bows. Obviously 45 degrees was used for our maximum distance. We also used a variety of fletchings depending on the show/battle we were in. If space was a restriction then flu flus were employed to keep the distance down.

As to maximum distances (using angled dropping shots), I have seen fellow reenactors send arrows up to 200 yards (bigger lads than me with bigger draw-weights I hasten to add!). For me, I had a draw-weight of around 35-40lbs and could normally expect to achieve 100-120yards. As to effective maximum range, if firing into a body of troops, I would say half to 2/3 the above distances. If firing on an individual, I would say no more than about a 1/4 of the above maximums, depending on the skill of the bowman!!!  ;D

Its a different style of shooting to modern bows and with the longbow, we had to "nock, draw and loose" in one fluid motion to transfer the maximum amount of stored energy from the bow and string into the arrow to achieve the distances.

Patrick what is the Latin word used for bristling in your Ammianus quotation??
Roy

Quote from: aligern on November 25, 2013, 10:59:07 AM
Patrick what is the Latin word used for bristling in your Ammianus quotation??
Roy

horrentes, meaning ruffled, rough, bristling

Ammianus writes: horrentes indutibus rigidis, literally 'apparel bristling with stiff things', which I suppose is one way of describing scale mail.  One MS adds 'aere' (of bronze) before 'rigidis'.

Quote from: Dave Beatty on November 25, 2013, 06:56:30 AM

Question for Holly - what were the max ranges you were capable of shooting?  And what did you consider to be your max effective range?  I bow hunt here in the US and I will never take a shot longer than 40 yards (well, okay, I once shot at a mountain lion at about 60 but just because he was stalking me and I was getting nervous - missed by the way but got close enough that I scared the cat off).  I don't know anyone who would take a shot at an animal beyond 50 yards and expect to hit - a good hunter wouldn't take that shot because even if you hit the animal chances are you won't kill it.  I shoot a bow with a 30" draw, 55 pound pull and about 280 feet per second speed at release.  My son (who is a bit taller than I) shoots at 70 pounds and about 310 FPS.  We killed two elk this year - both at about 30 yards.  So I'm curious what y'all learned in the reenactment business compared to what we do in the hunting business...

You make a valid point, certainly with respect to individual effective range.  FWIW, in modern target archery one shoots at targets of between 80cm and 122cm diameter at various ranges between 40yds and 100yds.  Field archery, which aims to provide a competition with greater resemblance to a hunting trip, sets its targets at variable distances up to 80yds.  Often in field archery the range is not marked.  At longer ranges the effect on accuracy is more pronounced.  In clout archery competitors shoot at a post (the clout) up to 200yds away and typically any arrow landing within 7 meters scores.  Indeed, the above is one of my supporting arguments in favor of the hit probability curve that featured in the earlier postings.

With regard to bow strength and range, most people researching reconstructed longbows seem comfortable with 140lb draw weight, although bows recovered from the Mary Rose are estimated to be up to 180lb.  A replica of a 150lb longbow found on the Mary Rose was able to shoot up to 360yds.  (See The Great Warbow.)  Also see Secrets of the English War Bow page 44 for ranges achieved with different arrow types and bow strengths.  Stretton reckons that each additional 10lb draw weight adds 10yds to effective range.

Most of the replica arrows have a weight in the range 53-95g (2oz to 3.3oz) with a drag coefficient between 1.8 and 2.1.  (Although Mark Stretton developed a quarrel-type bodkin that was very good at penetrating plate armor, which weighed in a 125g.)  A good initial velocity is around 60m/s.  I guess you are using a compound bow to achieve 280-310fps?

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 25, 2013, 04:10:29 PM

... Often in field archery the range is not marked.  At longer ranges the effect on accuracy is more pronounced.  In clout archery competitors shoot at a post (the clout) up to 200yds away and typically any arrow landing within 7 meters scores.  Indeed, the above is one of my supporting arguments in favor of the hit probability curve that featured in the earlier postings.

Individual accuracy at range is of less importance when a unit of 200+ archers are all shooting indirectly at the same approximate point of aim.  The idea behind clout shooting is to saturate an area similar to the space occupied by the typical enemy target - hence although at the ranges typically involved only Robin Hood could hit an individual target, the arrival of so many shafts with a fairly narrow 'circular error probability' is going to be bad news for quite a few people in the 'beaten zone'.

Hence the accuracy curve and the hit probability curve will be two different and essentially unrelated things.   In WW2 the USAAF went for accuracy (yes, that is what the Norden bombsight was for) and the RAF went for hit probability - hitting a city was easier. :)

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 25, 2013, 07:18:39 PM
Hence the accuracy curve and the hit probability curve will be two different and essentially unrelated things.   In WW2 the USAAF went for accuracy (yes, that is what the Norden bombsight was for) and the RAF went for hit probability - hitting a city was easier. :)

Have I understood your argument correctly?  30 men firing one shot will score more hits in specific area than 1 man firing 30 shots?

Incidentally, Bomber Command is probably not such a good analogy to support your argument.  I mean, when the RAF wanted to hit a specific target rather than any large urban area they went for accuracy.  For example, Peenemunde or the dambusters raid.

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 26, 2013, 05:38:27 PM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 25, 2013, 07:18:39 PM
Hence the accuracy curve and the hit probability curve will be two different and essentially unrelated things.   In WW2 the USAAF went for accuracy (yes, that is what the Norden bombsight was for) and the RAF went for hit probability - hitting a city was easier. :)

Have I understood your argument correctly?  30 men firing one shot will score more hits in specific area than 1 man firing 30 shots?

No, sorry, I explained it poorly.  The point is that 300 men trained to shoot together on command at a given range will drop 300 shafts into a crowd of enemies and cause losses at ranges where 300 men shooting individually would be unable to hit individual targets they were aiming at.

Quote
Incidentally, Bomber Command is probably not such a good analogy to support your argument.  I mean, when the RAF wanted to hit a specific target rather than any large urban area they went for accuracy.  For example, Peenemunde or the dambusters raid.

Or the 44 (Rhodesia) Squadron and 97 Squadron raid on the Augsburg MAN diesel works in 1942, or the Amiens jail breakout in 1944, or the Shell House Copenhagen raid in 1945, but these were exceptions.  99% of the time it was a case of the Pathfinders mark the city (usually the right one) and everyone else unloads on the markers.  Interestingly enough, the US strategic bombing offensive against Japan went the same way: after six months of repeatedly failing to hit factories through traditional attempts at high-level accuracy, Curtis LeMay took over, adopted RAF bombing doctrine wholesale and went for hit probability instead - massed night attacks against cities with incendiaries at low altitude - and although accuracy per se was near zero, the percentage of hits was around 100%.  When a lot of rounds are dropped together on a large target it is hard to go wrong.

The pacific bombing campaign is not a safe comparison with Europe - the aircraft available had a much lower altitude, and le may took the decision to go in fast and dirty.

that many houses were wood and paper helped in the decision.

The approach was still a shift from high-altitude precision attacks by day to area incendiary bombing by night at medium altitudes, discarding attempts at accurate bombing of specific targets in favour of massed bombing of targets that offered a much greater hit probability.

The point (hopefully) being made is that an accuracy curve is not necessarily the same as a hit probability curve, given a suitably-sized target.  If preferred, I shall go back to battleships and salvoes as a means of illustrating the point.

Actually, I may have mis-remembered the details - it may have been the reverse - given bombers which could fly higher than the Japanese air defences, and thus, either fly low and accurate and be under threat, or go high, inaccurate, and have minimal casualties - hence, higher and with no thought to accuracy (paper houses no doubt added to that calculation).

either way, the point is, in Europe there was a thought to accurate bombing, in the East their was not.

the source was Robert MacNamarra's documentary film, BTW - well worth taking a couple of hours out to watch if you ever get the chance - its not often you get to hear directly (and AFAIK without any political calculations behind the answers) from someone who ran strategy for two wars.

US strategic bombing in the Far East used B-29s, which could fly at and bomb from 30,000 feet with accuracy - over the Nevada ranges.  Over Japan with its turbulent jetstreams bomb strings were deflected on the way down so only about 5% landed close to where they were intended.  Because the jetstreams were unpredictable (read: not really known about yet) there was no effective way of compensating for them.  Ironically, on the very last mission on the very last day of the high-altitude precision bombing offensive the winds were for once in abeyance and the target was hit with almost perfect accuracy.

Because most of the secondary component manufacturing firms were located in Japanese cities, Curtis LeMay decided to use the RAF approach and area-bomb the cities, eliminating component manufacturing firms and the skilled workforce at one stroke.  No longer would the bi-ni-ju-ku (B-29s) delight Japanese watchers with their glittering high-altitude formations: henceforth, with armament largely stripped out to reduce weight, they would drone in by night, packed with incendiaries, and 'Hamburg' Japan's main industrial cities from 10,000 feet.

All of which brings us back to shields and shooting. (How? Don't ask - I just have to get back on topic. :) )  It would appear that in classical (and possibly Biblical) times the equivalent of controlled volley shooting gave, or was believed to give, effective results to the limit of bowshot.  Diodorus Siculus' account of Cunaxa (XIV.23) is interesting in this respect.

"When the armies were about three stades apart, the Greeks struck up the paean and at first advanced at a slow pace, but as soon as they were within range of missiles they began to run at great speed. Clearchus the Lacedaemonian had given orders for them to do this, for by not running from a great distance he had in mind to keep the fighters fresh in body for the fray, while if they advanced on the run when at close quarters, this, it was thought, would cause the missiles shot by bows and other means to fly over their heads. [2] When the troops with Cyrus approached the King's army, such a multitude of missiles was hurled upon them as one could expect to be discharged from a host of four hundred thousand. Nevertheless, they fought but an altogether short time with javelins [paltois, light Persian throwing-spears] and then for the remainder of the battle closed hand to hand."

Clearchus followed Nick's (and my) preferred technique of picking up the pace as the first volley was shot, causing it to land behind one's troops, and increasing the pace again when the second volley came over.  This works if the opposition are shooting indirectly en masse ('clout shooting') and, for that matter, if shooting with individual aiming at long ranges, but in each case relies on the opposition being reasonably good shots!  I suspect that at Cunaxa the average Achaemenid archer could not be expected to hit targets at 200 paces or so and that massed shooting techniques would therefore be employed - which might also go some way to explaining the Persian panic as the Greeks closed, the mass shooting techniques having been rendered ineffective, whereas archers shooting individually and directly would welcome a closer target and put shafts into it.  Xenophon's own account refers to plenty of dropped and discarded arrows lying around after the battle but none in Greek shields (or in Greeks).  Hence my belief that Achaemenid archers shot indirectly, en masse.

Now for a piece from the same author indicating that with missiles of sufficient weight/impact/penetration, shields and for that matter armour become almost an irrelevance (Diodorus XIV.27.4-6):

" ... the Greeks made their way for seven days through the mountains of the Carduchi, suffering greatly at the hands of the natives, who were a warlike people and well acquainted with the region. [5] They were enemies of the King and a free people who practised the arts of war, and they especially trained themselves in hurling the largest stones they could with slings and in the use of enormous arrows, with which missiles they inflicted wounds on the Greeks from advantageous positions, slaying many and seriously injuring not a few. [6] For the arrows were more than two cubits long and pierced both the shields and breastplates, so that no armour could withstand their force; and these arrows they used were so large, we are told, that the Greeks wound thongs about those that had been shot and used them as javelins to hurl back."

This suggests to me that in assessing the effects of armour and shields we need to consider not only the degree and quality of protection but also the missiles in use: some were more easily stoppable than others.  Carduchian arrows might laugh at Greek shields: Persian arrows seem to have been stopped by them, not so much at Cunaxa as at Thermopylae, Plataea and perhaps also Mycale.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 26, 2013, 08:34:44 PM
No, sorry, I explained it poorly.  The point is that 300 men trained to shoot together on command at a given range will drop 300 shafts into a crowd of enemies and cause losses at ranges where 300 men shooting individually would be unable to hit individual targets they were aiming at.

Well the technique you describe is the same as the one that generated my probability curve.  The original researchers lined up a group of musketeers and had them shoot at suitably sized canvas screens set at various ranges.  In other words, the curve you see already takes account of such effects.

Now I accept that the bows are different from muskets, but both will have a hit probability curve.  So what do you think the curve for bows should look like?

I would suggest the technique is different: for assessing indirect archery one should not have an upright screen but one laid flat to represent the depth of the target, which for indirect shooting will be more important than the height.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 28, 2013, 12:32:47 PM

" ... the Greeks made their way for seven days through the mountains of the Carduchi, suffering greatly at the hands of the natives, who were a warlike people and well acquainted with the region. [5] They were enemies of the King and a free people who practised the arts of war, and they especially trained themselves in hurling the largest stones they could with slings and in the use of enormous arrows, with which missiles they inflicted wounds on the Greeks from advantageous positions, slaying many and seriously injuring not a few. [6] For the arrows were more than two cubits long and pierced both the shields and breastplates, so that no armour could withstand their force; and these arrows they used were so large, we are told, that the Greeks wound thongs about those that had been shot and used them as javelins to hurl back."

This suggests to me that in assessing the effects of armour and shields we need to consider not only the degree and quality of protection but also the missiles in use: some were more easily stoppable than others.  Carduchian arrows might laugh at Greek shields: Persian arrows seem to have been stopped by them, not so much at Cunaxa as at Thermopylae, Plataea and perhaps also Mycale.

The thing I guess to note here is that the Carduchians would presumably have to be firing at close range because the longer/heavier arrows would have a much reduced range compared to "standard" arrows?

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 28, 2013, 06:54:48 PM
I would suggest the technique is different: for assessing indirect archery one should not have an upright screen but one laid flat to represent the depth of the target, which for indirect shooting will be more important than the height.

A normal flat shot loosed at 60m/s requires an elevation of 22 degrees to hit a target at 200m.  At 45 degree elevation, it is necessary to reduce the velocity to 51m/s.  Incidentally, the latter shot soars to a height of around 60m compared with 24m of the flat shot.  The extra length of the trajectory means it takes roughly twice as long to travel to its target requiring to be loosed 3-4 seconds ahead of shooters in the front rank.

Notwithstanding all of this, what do you think the hit probability curve should look like?

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 29, 2013, 05:19:04 AM

A normal flat shot loosed at 60m/s requires an elevation of 22 degrees to hit a target at 200m.  At 45 degree elevation, it is necessary to reduce the velocity to 51m/s.  Incidentally, the latter shot soars to a height of around 60m compared with 24m of the flat shot.  The extra length of the trajectory means it takes roughly twice as long to travel to its target requiring to be loosed 3-4 seconds ahead of shooters in the front rank.

Notwithstanding all of this, what do you think the hit probability curve should look like?

On the assumption that volley-shooting archers can land arrows within, say, 20 feet of the 'call' at 200 yards and keep this grouping down to c.100 yards, the number of shafts landing on the opposition will depend upon

a) the depth of the target
b) the ability of the caller to judge timing and distances (if he is no good he would not be doing this).

In practice, given a caller who knows his stuff, archers who have had adequate training and an opponent advancing at least 8 deep (8 yards/24 feet depth) one would expect 24/40 of the shafts to land on the target formation, and of those perhaps half would hit empty space, the remainder distributing themselves between shields, helmets, shoulders, throats and various other bits of temporarily exposed anatomy, which may or may not be armoured.  Hence expect about 30% of shots to be hitting targets, most of which will be sticking in upheld shields or glancing off armoured troops but potentially or actually incommoding or maiming anyone without any sort of protection.  Up the percentage by, say, 4% for every extra rank the target possesses up to 12 ranks (c.46%), after which the beaten zone is of less depth than the target so no increase is likely.  Conversely, drop it by about 4% for every rank less than 8, down to about 2% for a single rank.

Things become trickier as the range shortens below, say, 100 yards, because like a mortar an indirect shooter has to shoot higher to bring the volley down closer, and timing starts to become a significant consideration, particularly as the target will begin a charge at, say, 40 yards or so.  Archers will have to, or at least want to, switch to direct shooting, which will have a lower angle but will still spread the shot over the height and depth of the target, until the target is at point-blank (flat trajectory) at which point only the front rank or two of archers can realistically participate (and the majority may be wishing to betake themselves elsewhere unless provided with stakes, good close-combat weapons, etc.).

Hence I would see massed archery as being effective from c.200 yards down to c.80 yards, at which point it starts to become less effective and direct shooting more individually effective (better penetration at short ranges) but less effective overall (fewer shooters able to participate and trickier calling, especially if the target speeds up for a charge).  Unfortunately I have not been able to locate any studies on this subject as yet, so the above figures are 'guesstimates'.

It may be worth noting that at Cunaxa, the Greeks were faced by (assumed) Egyptians with large shields and yet were still shot at by archers.  This suggests that archers were deployed en masse behind the spearmen and shooting indirectly over them, i.e. would have to be depending upon called shooting (from a mounted officer who could see the target) and would be relying on indirect shooting entirely.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 29, 2013, 11:16:16 AM

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 29, 2013, 05:19:04 AM
Unfortunately I have not been able to locate any studies on this subject as yet, so the above figures are 'guesstimates'.

I do have a copy of an article on the effect of pavises in absorbing arrows (in the sense of physically blocking them).  It has lots of diagrams but I don't know if it has serious maths.

I'll also, when I get the time, cut and paste some of Saxton Pope's experiments.

As promised, some Saxton Pope quotes from his book Hunting with the Bow and Arrow  Not quite as scientific as the technical appendices of Strickland and Hardy but an interesting example of early tests.  The power of the bow quoted is a long way less than the alleged 80J needed to kill people, though it should be noted that it kills a variety of animals throughout the book  :)  I suspect Pope's simple method is not giving a correct measure of the impact energy.


A light arrow from a heavy bow, say a sixty-five pound yew bow, travels
at an initial velocity of one hundred and fifty feet per second, as
determined by a stopwatch.

Shooting at one hundred yards, such an arrow is discharged at an angle
of eight degrees, and describes a parabola twelve to fifteen feet high
at its crest. Its time in transit is of approximately two and one-fifth
seconds.

Shooting straight up, such an arrow goes about three hundred and fifty
feet high, and requires eight seconds for the round trip. This test was
made by shooting arrows over very tall sequoia trees, of known height.

The striking force of a one-ounce arrow shot from a seventy-five pound
bow at ten yards, is twenty-five foot pounds. This test is made by
shooting at a cake of paraffin and comparing the penetration with that
made by falling weights. Such a striking force is, of course,
insignificant when compared with that of a modern bullet, viz., three
thousand foot pounds. Yet the damage done by an arrow armed with a
sharp steel broad-head is often greater than that done by a bullet, as
we shall see later on.

Shooting a blunt arrow from a seventy-five pound bow at a white pine
board an inch thick, the shaft will often go completely through it. A
broad hunting head will penetrate two or three inches, then bind. But
the broad-head will go through animal tissue better, even cutting bones
in two; in fact, such an arrow will go completely through any animal
but a pachyderm.

To test a steel bodkin pointed arrow such as was used at the battle of
Cressy, I borrowed a shirt of chain armor from the Museum, a beautiful
specimen made in Damascus in the 15th Century. It weighed twenty-five
pounds and was in perfect condition. One of the attendants in the
Museum offered to put it on and allow me to shoot at him. Fortunately,
I declined his proffered services and put it on a wooden box, padded
with burlap to represent clothing.

Indoors at a distance of seven yards, I discharged an arrow at it with
such force that sparks flew from the links of steel as from a forge.
The bodkin point and shaft went through the thickest portion of the
back, penetrated an inch of wood and bulged out the opposite side of
the armor shirt. The attendant turned a pale green. An arrow of this
type can be shot about two hundred yards, and would be deadly up to the
full limit of its flight.

let's just shoot holes in a 15th century mailshirt?
Wow, that's as non PC as you get.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on November 29, 2013, 06:08:03 PM
let's just shoot holes in a 15th century mailshirt?
Wow, that's as non PC as you get.
Roy

Different times, different mores  :)

I loved the assistant's offer - Health and what?

Quote from: Erpingham on November 29, 2013, 07:01:24 PM

Quote from: aligern on November 29, 2013, 06:08:03 PM
let's just shoot holes in a 15th century mailshirt?
Wow, that's as non PC as you get.
Roy

Different times, different mores  :)

I loved the assistant's offer - Health and what?

yes, I liked that bit as well, especially his reaction to seeing the effect :-)

Jim

The "deadly up to the full limit of its flight" bit is also useful to know for calculating effects.

Thanks for that extract, Anthony: it gives us a bit more knowledge to work with.

Do I take it that we are now entertaining the notion that the 3-ply plywood scutum (5-6mm thick) was perhaps not the complete protection against missiles that sundry ancient authors might have led us to believe?

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 30, 2013, 04:09:05 AM
Do I take it that we are now entertaining the notion that the 3-ply plywood scutum (5-6mm thick) was perhaps not the complete protection against missiles that sundry ancient authors might have led us to believe?

Pope's tests probably tell us more about thicker wooden shields like an aspis or board shields from Gauls to the Middle Ages.  Plywood is a strange material, which can be harder to split than board (all that cross lamination).  Also, Pope's board had no leather cover.  Once you are talking of a protective system made of layers of different materials, things become more complex.  However, we should also note Pope conducts these tests at short range and that a barbed arrow head would reduce the penetration (it binds, I presume because of the greater effort needed to push a larger surface area of arrow through).

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 29, 2013, 10:48:02 PM
The "deadly up to the full limit of its flight" bit is also useful to know for calculating effects.

Thanks for that extract, Anthony: it gives us a bit more knowledge to work with.

Pope is of course speculating (although he probably could have got a museum assistant to help him test  :) ).  Most of his shooting against live targets was at around 60-85 yds, so he doesn't know his 200yds shots would have been effective.  In favour of his speculation, though, is that he was a surgeon, so his anatomical understanding was pretty good.  Incidentally, his findings are backed by what medieval English evidence we have of murders and accidental shootings.  Hunting arrows caused massive wound trauma and haemorage and people were killed accidentally at long ranges by people practicing (there is one sad case where a man goes out to test how far his bow will shoot with his friend.  He stations the friend at the far end of the field to mark where the arrow falls - you can guess the rest)

Aye. *removes hat and stands silent for a moment*

From a kinetic energy point of view an arrow shot skywards is subject to the 'what goes up must come down' rule otherwise known as the law of potential energy.  At the mid-point of a parabolic or hyperbolic curve the energy imparted by the shooter and his equipment has been converted, albeit with less than 100% efficiency, to potential energy, which then converts to momentum on the way down and impact upon arrival.

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 30, 2013, 04:09:05 AM
Do I take it that we are now entertaining the notion that the 3-ply plywood scutum (5-6mm thick) was perhaps not the complete protection against missiles that sundry ancient authors might have led us to believe?

It was excellent protection against arrows, as Centurion Scaeva's experiences, or at least shield-marks, at Dyrrhachium suggest (Caesar, Civil War III.53).  A heavy missile like a pilum or spiculum or any of the narrow-shafted, point-headed, weight-enhanced close-range throwing weapon fraternity could go right through it and possibly into the man beyond unless he was wearing lorica segmentata (the classic hooped armour) rather than lorica hamata (basically chainmail).  If you saw one coming, you tried to dodge it or get your boss* in the way as the metal would stop or deflect the point.  Carduchian arrows might have performed similarly, but I do not think anyone ever got the chance to try.

*Shield boss, not the Society President!  ;)

The other article I mentioned was :

The Longbow-Crossbow Shootout at Crecy (1346) Has the Rate of Fire Commonplace been Overrated? - Russell Mitchell, Dallas County Community College in The Hundred Years War (Part II) Different Vistas Edited by L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay



As promised I have reread this to see what it can add to our discussions.  Unfortunately, it's arguments, though involving a bit of geometry to estimate target areas, are laid out in a narrative I can't easily extract info from :(  Add to this that I think some of his arguments are wrong, or incomplete, I don't think I'll try.

Essentially though, Mitchell emphasises that the English used plunging fire against the Genoese, which meant they were shooting at an area target.  He calculates the equivalent horizontal target for archers shooting at 45 degrees at a suggested formation of 300 man frontage and 20 ranks deep is 600ft by 90ft.  This is like "hitting the side of a city block" and he doubts even a moderate archer could fail to do this.  (This is one of those areas where his argument doesn't quite work IMO - the 300 x20 formation are supposed to be Genoese and I cannot see them drawing up so deep, as they are there to shoot not to provide target practice).   He is on less secure ground in trying to work out how many arrows would hit something and I don't think he makes any solid case.  He does have a digression on kettle helmets and their effectiveness against plunging shots (good, because they protect head and a lot of the shoulder) and estimates a crossbowman sheltering behind a pavise wearing a kettle hat is 90% protected.

Twenty ranks deep for the Genoese does seem a bit surprising: does he assume they used some form of foot 'caracole'?

[Edit:] Just adding a few thoughts following a quick perusal of Lt Col Burne's account of Crecy.  A deep formation, or at least disposition, for the Genoese might be suggested by the following:

1) The undisciplined French arrival.  While King Philip was discussing with his officers whether to engage or make camp and fight on the morrow, the French knights seem to have taken matters into their own hands and pushed ahead - pushing the Genoese before them.  The Genoese apparently halted, or attempted to halt, three times during their advance, suggesting they were trying to improve their deployment (or even to deploy) but were urged on by the impatient French knights.

2) The Genoese are described as loosing shots as they came, which is consistent with a deep caracole-type tactical formation although it does not necessarily require one.  (Wet crossbow strings may explain why all these shots are noted as falling short, even at c.150 yards.)

3) The English cannon appear to have done considerable execution, or at least had considerable effect, on the Genoese.  While the novelty effect of battlefield artillery would anyway have considerable impact, the material effects would be more pronounced against a deeper formation.

4) When the Genoese faltered, Alencon and his men rode them down but other contingents en route to the English lines apparently bypassed the fracas.

There might thus be something in Mitchell's suggested 300x20 deployment, although I suspect it would have been mainly involuntary on the part of the Genoese! [/Edit]

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 25, 2013, 04:10:29 PM

I guess you are using a compound bow to achieve 280-310fps?

Yes, we use modern hunting bows - examples here: http://www.cabelas.com/product/Hunting/Archery/Bows/Compound-Bows|/

I also hasten to mention that our arrows are much lighter than discussed in ancient/medieval sources as we go for penetration of skin with the intent to cut arteries.  We strive for complete penetration which is easily achieved at 40 yards.  This means the arrow goes completely through the animal.  This allows maximum tissue damage and a clean entry and exit wound allowing double the blood flow to assist in tracking.  Along that line, it is rare to drop an animal on the spot with any weapon (bow or rifle) - it will normally run some distance usually related to how close to the heart the shot landed. 

Which morphs into yet another random thought - perhaps an intent of ancient missile weapons was more to stun the target by weight of impact rather than kill outright.

Dave

likely the intent of the missile weapons is to degrade the opponent's fighting capability . Thus Benkin the Fleming who shot arrows with such force that men who were not pierced were knocked down and bruised by the impact of his shafts did not have to wound or kill to drive off attackers.  So, if enough arrows or slingstones hit hard enough to disrupt the opponent and render him less capable of defending himself then the job is done.
Persian archers quite likely formed deep and sent massed showers of arrows at their opponents. the Greeks learned to run at them so that the bows could not hold them in their killing zone (I think that. this was covered earlier) . Perhaps this was done by the Greek  commanders ordering  a change of pace at each volley and, as Nick pointed out, a fast moving opponent, rather than a static one, considerably reduces the number of volleys that can be delivered. The other difference for the Persians, of course, is that once the Greeks reach them the Persians are far inferior to the Greeks at hand to hand. French knights reaching an English line have to deal with English knights whom missiles have not degraded.
Skirmishers whether with javelins, slings or bows must deliver a lot less fire per yard of frontage than massed bowmen and thus would take. a long time to wear down an opponent. At Pylos the Athenians had plenty of time to degrade the Spartans to the point where they would not  take on Athenian hoplites. However, in the normal course of battle, the skirmishers do their bit and then the battle lines close. that probably does not allow time for their kills to be conclusive, but enough, if one side wins the skirmish battle, to give their heavy troops an advantage, or at least not the disadvantage of being forced to take casualties from opposing skirmishers without reply.

Roy

A few more thoughts on Genoese crossbow tactics

1. Mitchell formation is odd in that he gives each crossbowman on 2ft frontage to operate in.  I doubt you can effectively operate in that width and you certainly couldn't "fire by induction".  Other than men passing loaded weapons like a bucket train this formation would be fairly useless.

2. He chooses to accept 6,000 Genoese - many others would say fewer, possibly as few a 2,000.

3. There is an assumption that these Genoese were all crossbowmen.  Unlikely, as Italian tactics of the time (and many others too) was to accompany the crossbowmen with pavise bearers.  David Nicolle reckons a ratio of 3 or 4 crossbows to a shield bearer.  The fact that the pavises had become separated from the crossbow unit (in the baggage) may mean these men weren't on the field or it maybe they supported their comrades with just their spears.   For an impression of what a 14th century Italian crossbow unit looked like, http://warfare.atwebpages.com/Italy/Sinalunga-DetailLeft.htm
This looks fairly dense but is on its approach march, not deployed to shoot. (a better colour image here http://scoprendoasinalunga.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/7749182518_0f56f64c7d_k.jpeg  - you get the whole thing and it is zoomable) 

4. My best interpretation of the Genoese as described by Froissart is that they are trying to shake out of march order as they funnel onto the field.  They keep moving in order to make space for themselves - it is a narrow entrance to the field, probably at an angle to the English, so they are moving forward, lengthening their line and probably coming round more parallel to bring their full firepower into action.  The shouting is fairly standard - to signal an advance the commander advanced his banner, and shouted the war cry (maybe San Georgio for Genoese - very confusing as the English were shouting Saint George) - the war cry was taken up along the line and they advanced.  They may have shot each time to test the range and the English firecontrol, they may have shot only once.  The English, judging their distance, held fire until the crossbowmen were in range, stepped forward (by order or signal) and delivered a volley.  They probably followed this with more shooting but we can't say whether this was shot in volleys, by contingents or by individuals shooting at will.

5. It is difficult to see Philip ordering his cavalry to "kill the cowards" - even if he could see what was going on, was their time to send an order?  Or was his lead division forced to cut down the fugitives to get into position to charge and the order was a later excuse?  Remember, this story was not told against Philip - he was supposedly being a decisive leader, keen to engage the foe - so could be put in later to rescue parts of his tattered reputation. 

Was it not Alencon and his retinue who were the chief culprits in firstly chaperoning the Genoese ahead before they could properly deploy and then riding them down when they showed reluctance to advance into a shower of clothyard shafts and the roar of the odd cannon?  My impression is that Philip was near the rear of his army and trying to get it to encamp when certain of his subordinates took matters into their own hands ("What do we want?  Action!  When do we want it?  Now!").  One is reluctant to ascribe to him the kind of 20th/21st century cynicism that would see wiping out his own mercenaries on the battlefield as a way of reducing his campaign expenses!

Mention of 'San Giorgio' as the probable Genoese war cry might put a new complexion on the way the French laid into them - what does a knight think when the mercenaries on his side take up the enemy's battle-cry?  A good observation, and one which perhaps deserves more examination as a possible contributor to French conduct on the day, assuming some French contingents were unfamiliar with customary Genoese war shouts.

If Mitchell wants to limit his crossbowmen to 2' apiece that would indeed rather preclude any movement except of crossbows being passed forward to be shot and back to be reloaded (not easy if the men are advancing at the same time).  One question that does arise seeing the crossbow unit at Sinalunga with pavisers fronting it is what all those back ranks of crossbowmen expected to do - did they shoot indirectly, Swedish-style, or would they each advance to the front, peer over/round the pavise, let go a shot and drop back to reload or would they stay as they were with the best shot discharging weapon after weapon and the rest reloading and passing them along?

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 04, 2013, 11:15:49 PM
Was it not Alencon and his retinue who were the chief culprits in firstly chaperoning the Genoese ahead before they could properly deploy and then riding them down when they showed reluctance to advance into a shower of clothyard shafts and the roar of the odd cannon? 

Yes, I think so.  I don't think it was top down command - the French were (as often the case) all over the place - but an on-the-spot response.  Alencon (or whoever commanded the lead division - it varies) is confronted with his crossbow screen disintegrating under the weight of shooting.  Time for the next phase - the cavalry engagement - but the Genoese are milling about in the way.  Nothing for it but to cut through, reform on the far side, and sweep the enemy away.

QuoteMention of 'San Giorgio' as the probable Genoese war cry might put a new complexion on the way the French laid into them - what does a knight think when the mercenaries on his side take up the enemy's battle-cry?  A good observation, and one which perhaps deserves more examination as a possible contributor to French conduct on the day, assuming some French contingents were unfamiliar with customary Genoese war shouts.

This is one of David Nicolle's theories

QuoteOne question that does arise seeing the crossbow unit at Sinalunga with pavisers fronting it is what all those back ranks of crossbowmen expected to do - did they shoot indirectly, Swedish-style, or would they each advance to the front, peer over/round the pavise, let go a shot and drop back to reload or would they stay as they were with the best shot discharging weapon after weapon and the rest reloading and passing them along?

The Sinalunga picture, splendid as it is (it is one of my favourite medieval battle images), clearly shows the crossbowmen advancing into action - note they are preceded by drummers and what appear to be mounted officers, then the pavise bearers across the front and down the flanks, then the crossbows in quite deep formation round their company banners.  It is unclear how that formation would have shaken itself out to shoot.

As promised in earlier posts, I have cranked a bit of the maths on plunging fire and direct shooting.  For this I have assumed archers firing a 96g arrow at an aiming point 200m away.

Taking the plungers first of all.  They shoot their arrows at 51m/s and an elevation of 45 degrees.  All the arrows land within 6m of the aiming point, as per Patrick's earlier post.  This gives a beaten zone of 12m depth of which some 68% will fall in the center 4m (assuming a normal distribution of arrow fall.)  Their target is a body of close order foot some 8 ranks or 7m deep.  As can be seen in the attached diagram, if the archers get the range right, they get a fair proportion of their arrows on the target.  However, due to the high angle of fire and relatively low velocity, it takes about 8s for the arrows to travel the distance, during which time the infantry (whose keen-eyed officers have doubtless spotted the bow release) can change the speed of charge.  Consequently, the target could be up to 40m away from where it was when the arrows left the bows (assuming a charge speed of up to 5m/s.)  Then again, if the archers anticipated the reduction in range, the target might choose to halt, also resulting in a miss.

Now compare this with the flat shot, direct fire approach.  This departs at 60m/s and an elevation of 22 degrees.  It reaches the target in not more than 3.5s, giving the latter much less opportunity to dodge.  The other sketch depicts this scenario. Note that even 22 degrees of elevation results in a fair few shot hitting rear ranks of the target.  This difference would be even more pronounced with a cavalry target.

Of course, one can make all sorts of assumptions on the probability of the target successfully dodging the bulk of arrows under both scenarios, but I would estimate that one would need to fire something like 4-6 times as many arrows on a high trajectory to obtain the same number of hits as can be achieved by direct fire.  Some archer captains might consider it more effective to deploy their units in a shallower formation of greater frontage.

One final point to note is that for a 96g arrow the minimum velocity required to achieve 80J hitting the target is 40.8m/s.  At 200m drag has a significant effect, slowing the flat shot down to 44.6m/s and the high angle shot to 39.6m/s.

That is interesting, Nick.

I notice the assumption that the target moves at a charge speed in excess of five yards per second - this 10 mph dash could only apply during the last 40 yards or so of closure; before then an infantry target would be moving at closer to 1m/s, the usual slow formation-keeping advance seen on the battlefield (keen tribesmen and Pontic chaps dashing uphill at Zela could double or triple this, but dodging archery was not on their menu when fighting pre-Imperial Romans and they tended to arrive a bit winded).  Hence with an 8-yard (or metre) closure during the 8 seconds of arrow flight the target would not move substantially out of the beaten zone, just expose more of its rear-rankers to the arrow shower.

Once a formation reaches a speed of 4-5 yards/second you are right about the difficulty of predicting where the volley should land, and this may go a long way to explaining (e.g.) the success of the Athenians at Marathon and also of chariotry in Biblical times, when 'deflection shooting' seems to have been rare.  It is however worth pointing out that few if any troops will be advancing at a rate above a walk at ranges over 120 yards, and that keen-eyed officers spotting the release and acting upon it seem to have been quite rare, eminently sensible though the tactic may be.  Halting a formation moving at speed is a procedure fraught with cohesion-destroying adjustments: the only force I know of which managed to do this was Caesar's veteran infantry at Pharsalus, when they saw their opponents were not counter-charging.  That they were able to halt after getting going seems to have surprised their opponents, who apparently did not consider it possible.

Also worth noting is that the indirect volley lands mainly on those parts not covered by a shield, whereas the direct volley is taken exactly where shield coverage is best and greatest.  Hence even if we say that a direct volley will give a greater percentage of hits (in itself a not unreasonable conclusion) it would seem that an indirect volley will deliver at least as many effective hits as its direct counterpart, and will allow more ranks of archers to participate - not necessarily much of an advantage with the comparatively small English armies of the Hundred Years' War period, but an important consideration with the vast masses of Biblical period manpower that our original sources unanimously foist upon us.

Trying to get some sort of conclusion from the above, I would suggest that massed indirect shooting at range is still going to generate a lot of hits because an infantry target will usually be moving slowly, and more of those hits will be effective against armoured/shielded troops than with direct shooting because they will arrive at angles that are not covered by the shield (Norman archery at Hastings might exemplify this).  If armour and shield are not in use, direct shooting becomes much more effective and indirect shooting only somewhat more effective.

Volley-avoidance techniques (primarily speeding up as slowing down can be problematical) could be dramatically effective but were very rarely practised: Greeks are recorded as doing them twice (Marathon and Cunaxa) and we can perhaps extrapolate that they became standard practice against Persians after 490 BC, though the Spartans at Plataea sat tight and acted as targets for some time before finally closing, and Romans seem to have used them once (under Julian during his AD 363 campaign).  These armies are obvious candidates to take advantage of a speed-up-and-avoid rule.  Other armies seem to have lacked the command, communications and general nous for thinking of and attempting such tactics, at least with their infantry.

One last thought, this time about lethality.  Does adding acceleration due to gravity make a significant difference to indirectly dropping shots' energy at impact?

You do need something like a 150 lb bow/prod to get 60m/s.   So  late medieval heavy crossbows then ?

Quote from: tadamson on December 06, 2013, 01:44:52 PM
You do need something like a 150 lb bow/prod to get 60m/s.   So  late medieval heavy crossbows then ?

Longbows retrieved from the Mary Rose have been estimated to be up to 180lb draw weight.  A number of people have trained themselves to shoot with reconstruction longbows of around 150lb draw.  The 60 m/s is a measured speed from some of their trials.

Crossbows also work.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 06, 2013, 11:16:22 AM
I notice the assumption that the target moves at a charge speed in excess of five yards per second - this 10 mph dash could only apply during the last 40 yards or so of closure; before then an infantry target would be moving at closer to 1m/s, the usual slow formation-keeping advance seen on the battlefield (keen tribesmen and Pontic chaps dashing uphill at Zela could double or triple this, but dodging archery was not on their menu when fighting pre-Imperial Romans and they tended to arrive a bit winded).  Hence with an 8-yard (or metre) closure during the 8 seconds of arrow flight the target would not move substantially out of the beaten zone, just expose more of its rear-rankers to the arrow shower.

Once a formation reaches a speed of 4-5 yards/second you are right about the difficulty of predicting where the volley should land, and this may go a long way to explaining (e.g.) the success of the Athenians at Marathon and also of chariotry in Biblical times, when 'deflection shooting' seems to have been rare.  It is however worth pointing out that few if any troops will be advancing at a rate above a walk at ranges over 120 yards, and that keen-eyed officers spotting the release and acting upon it seem to have been quite rare, eminently sensible though the tactic may be.  Halting a formation moving at speed is a procedure fraught with cohesion-destroying adjustments: the only force I know of which managed to do this was Caesar's veteran infantry at Pharsalus, when they saw their opponents were not counter-charging.  That they were able to halt after getting going seems to have surprised their opponents, who apparently did not consider it possible.

Also worth noting is that the indirect volley lands mainly on those parts not covered by a shield, whereas the direct volley is taken exactly where shield coverage is best and greatest.  Hence even if we say that a direct volley will give a greater percentage of hits (in itself a not unreasonable conclusion) it would seem that an indirect volley will deliver at least as many effective hits as its direct counterpart, and will allow more ranks of archers to participate - not necessarily much of an advantage with the comparatively small English armies of the Hundred Years' War period, but an important consideration with the vast masses of Biblical period manpower that our original sources unanimously foist upon us.

Trying to get some sort of conclusion from the above, I would suggest that massed indirect shooting at range is still going to generate a lot of hits because an infantry target will usually be moving slowly, and more of those hits will be effective against armoured/shielded troops than with direct shooting because they will arrive at angles that are not covered by the shield (Norman archery at Hastings might exemplify this).  If armour and shield are not in use, direct shooting becomes much more effective and indirect shooting only somewhat more effective.

Volley-avoidance techniques (primarily speeding up as slowing down can be problematical) could be dramatically effective but were very rarely practised: Greeks are recorded as doing them twice (Marathon and Cunaxa) and we can perhaps extrapolate that they became standard practice against Persians after 490 BC, though the Spartans at Plataea sat tight and acted as targets for some time before finally closing, and Romans seem to have used them once (under Julian during his AD 363 campaign).  These armies are obvious candidates to take advantage of a speed-up-and-avoid rule.  Other armies seem to have lacked the command, communications and general nous for thinking of and attempting such tactics, at least with their infantry.

One last thought, this time about lethality.  Does adding acceleration due to gravity make a significant difference to indirectly dropping shots' energy at impact?

The maths I use takes into account both gravity and air resistance.

Regarding infantry approach speeds, it should be noted that even a gentle 3mph stroll = 1.36 m/s and some find it perfectly possible to run at 6.77m/s for up to a mile.  Therefore, keeping up 5m/s for around an eighth of this distance does not seem beyond human capabilities.  Incidentally, the object is to illustrate the substantially greater uncertainty involved with forecasting a moving target's range when using a high trajectory.  I mean, unless anyone feels like re-enacting this type of missile dodging, we will probably never know how practical it might be to speed up or slow down an approach.

Regarding protection from armour or shields, I think plenty has been written in earlier posts.  If after reading it you still believe that 5mm of plywood or a mail shirt will stop a longbow shaft then there is probably nothing I can add that will change your mind.  The only thing that I will mention yet one more time is that modern trials indicate that an arrow or crossbow bolt will tend to bounce of a flat plate if it hits any more than 20-40 degrees from the perpendicular.  Even with the flat trajectory example, I would expect that shields might deflect a reasonable number of missiles.  (Before anyone latches on to this, be aware that it is my view that the total number of hits at this range is so small, the handful saved by their shields is not that significant, but see earlier posts for the arguments behind this.)

However, the main point of the two diagrams and narrative was to examine the relative effect of plunging fire compared with a conventional direct fire approach.  Several posters contend that the former is substantially more effective than the latter, but I do not see how this can be the case.  If anyone has any evidence of modern trials, I would really be interested in hearing it.

It strikes me that the main effect of 'dropping fire' would be to stir an enemy force into moving. If the target stays still, once the firing unit has the range then the target quite literally has to move or die slowly through attrition.
So they could either fall back out of range, or move forward. If the latter then they'll be subject to direct fire, and perhaps can be engaged in hand to hand combat under more favorable conditions

Jim

I have previously mentioned Hastings as a case where direct shooting proves ineffectual but indirect shooting (same target, same shooters, not sure about same distance) proves effective.

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Regarding protection from armour or shields, I think plenty has been written in earlier posts.  If after reading it you still believe that 5mm of plywood or a mail shirt will stop a longbow shaft then there is probably nothing I can add that will change your mind.  The only thing that I will mention yet one more time is that modern trials indicate that an arrow or crossbow bolt will tend to bounce off a flat plate if it hits any more than 20-40 degrees from the perpendicular.  Even with the flat trajectory example, I would expect that shields might deflect a reasonable number of missiles.  (Before anyone latches on to this, be aware that it is my view that the total number of hits at this range is so small, the handful saved by their shields is not that significant, but see earlier posts for the arguments behind this.)

Unfortunately not all shields are 5mm plywood, not all armours are mail shirts and not all missiles are longbow arrows.  Some forms of protection are good at stopping certain missiles and some are not: the missile/protection interrelationship is a graded continuum and not a single one-size-fits-all entity.  This point could benefit from further and more detailed examination.

As I believe Nick's example of indirect shooting demonstrated, a volley of this nature that 'straddles' the target will obtain a reasonable percentage of hits.

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As can be seen in the attached diagram, if the archers get the range right, they get a fair proportion of their arrows on the target.

Where we really appear to differ is in the estimation of speeds on the battlefield, particularly when closing at a distance.  Yes, Athenians at Marathon may well have maintained a speed in excess of 3m/s for a furlong or so while closing with the Persians: this was an innovation at the time but apparently a successful one.

And the famous Highland charge in the Jacobite risings (particularly 1745) was carried out at a very rapid pace, which disconcerted inexperienced troops (at Prestonpans) but provided excellent target practice for experienced soldiers (at Culloden).

However most armies appear to have closed comparatively slowly, not at a trot or a run.  Infantry usually tended to be concerned with keeping formation, staying level with their neighbours, carrying long, heavy standards, pikes, polearms or shields and generally trying to keep some breath in their bodies for the final charge to contact.  The Roman infantry in Ammianus advance to 'a slow anapestic rhythm', Spartans advance at a deliberate pace in time with flute music and the Cimmerians at Vercellae advanced in a huge square, allegedly with the front rank chained together.  The Helvetii at Bibracte advance slowly in close formation against Caesar's troops; conversely the allies of the Nervii at the Sambre dash into contact (for a distance of about a furlong) - and arrive breathless, to be defeated in short order.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 06, 2013, 07:15:47 PM

However most armies appear to have closed comparatively slowly, not at a trot or a run.  Infantry usually tended to be concerned with keeping formation, staying level with their neighbours, carrying long, heavy standards, pikes, polearms or shields and generally trying to keep some breath in their bodies for the final charge to contact. 

Certainly true of medieval infantry, who rated cohesion and order higher than impetus.  They usually walked, not jogged,  into battle.

If they moved at all. Maybe it is a reason why defenders do so relatively well in mediaeval battles. Advancing a whole line of infantry several thousand strong is fraught at the best of times without the distractions of enemies shooting at you. Better to stay put with everyone in their place.
Roy

perhaps, although the weapons must also have been a factor in the attack or defend decision - bowmen do tend to struggle in an infantry attack, and it takes a real sense of teamwork to get an attack with a long spear or pike.

not to mention the expectation for most of the period that the other side will charge with knights in full armour if you break formation.

Quote from: aligern on December 07, 2013, 09:56:59 PM
If they moved at all. Maybe it is a reason why defenders do so relatively well in mediaeval battles. Advancing a whole line of infantry several thousand strong is fraught at the best of times without the distractions of enemies shooting at you. Better to stay put with everyone in their place.
Roy

As Jean le Bueil says
"A formation on foot ought not to march but should always wait for the enemy. For when they march they cannot maintain their order – it only takes a bush to break them up. A force which marches in front of another force is defeated, unless God gives them grace. So, take up the most advantageous position you can, as soon as you can."

Of course, both armies can't do this at the same time  :)  Though some tried  (e.g. the non-battle at Tournahem in 1369, where the English and French faced each other from fortified hilltops for three weeks).

All of which makes English archers so much more effective, e.g. against Scots who have taken up a solid defensive position on a hill in the best le Bueil tradition (Homildon Hill AD 1402).

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 08, 2013, 11:46:33 AM
All of which makes English archers so much more effective, e.g. against Scots who have taken up a solid defensive position on a hill in the best le Bueil tradition (Homildon Hill AD 1402).

Yes, it is a good question whether it was statistically correct as a predictor of victory :) Certainly, the English won few battles by just letting the enemy come onto them - there had to be some tactical skill in know when to manoeuver & when to counter attack and, of course, this had to develop further in the WotR.

And by way of an interlude ...

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Archery was a dangerous pastime, both for participants and spectators. Coroners' reports reveal 56 accidental deaths from people standing too close to the targets or those who decided on just the wrong time to go and collect the fired arrows.

There were also some bad judgement calls. Thomas Curteys of Bildeston, Suffolk, was practising archery on a fine June evening in 1556, when he took off his hat and invited another bowman called Richard Lyrence to try to hit it with an arrow. No prizes for what happened next.

Coroners even noted the depth of wounds. The unwanted record is held by a Nicholas Wyborne, who was lying down near a target when he was hit by a falling arrow, which pierced him to a depth of six inches.

From a recent BBC internet article on strange ways in which people managed to depart this mortal coil under the Tudors.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-13762313 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-13762313)

Hi guys. I saw a video in YouTube be where you could see a thick wooden plate being penetrated by many inches by arrows shot by a modern composite bow. So even if modern bows are a bit more powerful, I am sure that Shields could be penetrated by Bodkin arrows thrown at close range by longbows. I will look for the video. While steel plate armor was much more resistent to arrows. I have seen some video where Bodkin arrows Pierce it a bit but never enough to hurt the guy wearing it.

Quote from: andrew881runner on July 15, 2014, 09:54:24 PM
Hi guys. I saw a video in YouTube be where you could see a thick wooden plate being penetrated by many inches by arrows shot by a modern composite bow. So even if modern bows are a bit more powerful, I am sure that Shields could be penetrated by Bodkin arrows thrown at close range by longbows. I will look for the video. While steel plate armor was much more resistent to arrows. I have seen some video where Bodkin arrows Pierce it a bit but never enough to hurt the guy wearing it.

One of the better accounts I have come across of tests on armour and shield penetrations is Mark Stretton in Secrets of the English Longbow chapter 5. 

Incidentally, this book has a source for the notorious 80 Joules fatal blunt force trauma energy; Controlling Risks Around Explosives Stores by the HSE.  Apparently it is based upon experiments carried out by the clever French shooting lead balls at something or someone.  But before you all go off thinking "Well, that's it then," you might like to read Mike Loades' account of shooting blunt arrows at an instrumented dummy in Longbow.

I couldn't resist looking up the HSE ref :

27. Not all falling debris will
be potentially lethal. The traditional criterion in the US
and Western Europe is that debris possessing a kinetic energy of 80 joules or more
should be considered potentially lethal. An example of such a missile would be a
cricket ball (mass approximately160g) thrown hard. In the view of some members of
the Working Group the criterion is pessimistic. Much will depend on the part of the
body stuck; a missile possessing a kinetic energy of 80J might well prove fatal should
it strike a person on the skull but is unlikely to do so should it strike a limb.

Remarkably similar to the discussion in this thread above.  Note also the word "potentially" which tends to get missed and the need to consider where debris/arrow strikes.

.

And perhaps also the question of penetration - arrows being traditionally superior to cricket balls in this regard.  ;)

Anyway, nice to pin down the source: well done, gentlemen.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 16, 2014, 07:40:18 PM
And perhaps also the question of penetration - arrows being traditionally superior to cricket balls in this regard.  ;)

Indeed.  The controversial context though was when discussing the effect of arrows which failed to penetrate armour.

Which adds a further consideration for non-penetrating hits: the ability of the armour to spread the impact.  A good gambeson worn underneath could help to transmit the force partly sideways, Chobham armour-style.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 17, 2014, 11:34:02 AM
Which adds a further consideration for non-penetrating hits: the ability of the armour to spread the impact.  A good gambeson worn underneath could help to transmit the force partly sideways, Chobham armour-style.

Even better if you used a layered armour of plate over mail over gambeson, or even leather, mail, fabric.  Looking at later medieval armours, before good alwhite armours and for many people after them, this was the way it was done.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 16, 2014, 03:30:45 PM
...a cricket ball (mass approximately160g) thrown hard....

...and some people consider this to be good sport rather than a potentially lethal industrial hazard.   ;)

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 17, 2014, 03:47:23 PM

Quote from: Erpingham on July 16, 2014, 03:30:45 PM
...a cricket ball (mass approximately160g) thrown hard....

...and some people consider this to be good sport rather than a potentially lethal industrial hazard.   ;)

But they tend to wear armour while doing it - helmet, arm-guards, gloves, chest protector and pads - just to be on the safe side :)

Whilst researching for a recently completed project concerning the Battle of Adrianople I looked at sources that mentioned actual casualty figures for both the Romans and their opponents where listed in battles.

I was quite surprised to note that when figures were mentioned, and they were not as many as I had initially thought, the Romans when victorious appeared to suffer a lot less casualties than I was expecting on the whole. I was expecting to see a few percent more as all the accounts appear to show an exchange of missiles before the battle lines clashed.

After further study I came to the conclusion that the missile barrage was more connected with boosting morale whilst attempting to lower the opponents. The missiles otherwise appeared to have little effect (apart from at Ad Salices where Goth's throwing large, fire-hardened clubs managed to disrupt the Roman front line). The majority of the casualties caused was when one side's morale gave out and the army broke, the pursuer's then causing horrendous casualties on those fleeing before them.

A welcome conclusion Adrian and borne out by almost all classical battles. The asymmetry of casualties is at the heart of Mark Grindlay and I's rejection of the idea that the Roman armies were essentially based upon plum throwing and are, as traditionally thought, primarily swordsmen. The plum is a weapon that prepares the way for the sword by , hopefully,  rendering the opponent's shield ineffective. Its effect is described by Caesar at Bibracte and at the end of the Classical period, by Agathias when portraying the warfare of the Franks. (using angons).  If the hand thrown missiles were that effective then casualties in Roman battles, particularly Roman against Roman , would be much heavier on the winning side because they would have endured a storm of hand thrown missiles equally with the losers.

Roy

But classical armies certainly felt the need for a skirmishing missile force.  And the Romans of the Polybian legion period had quite a lot of dedicated javelin skirmish power.  Even if we allow that these didn't kill many people (and Adrian's conclusions seem to mirror those of others in this respect) they must have had an important role.  What was the point of deploying a skirmish screen in warfare of this period, if we accept it wasn't causing casualties to the enemy main body?

Quote from: Erpingham on July 24, 2014, 01:27:59 PM
But classical armies certainly felt the need for a skirmishing missile force.  And the Romans of the Polybian legion period had quite a lot of dedicated javelin skirmish power.  Even if we allow that these didn't kill many people (and Adrian's conclusions seem to mirror those of others in this respect) they must have had an important role.  What was the point of deploying a skirmish screen in warfare of this period, if we accept it wasn't causing casualties to the enemy main body?

Skirmishers that are free to shoot up a body of heavy troops over a long period of time will eventually annihilate them. I'm thinking of Carrhae and that fight between Spartan hoplites and peltast skirmisher types who essentially spent the day decimating them at no cost to themselves. And if skirmishers are able just to spend some uninterrupted time disrupting the formation of the heavies, that leaves the latter vulnerable to charges by shock troops, which if I'm not mistaken was the tactic of the Huns and Mongols.

Hence the need for a skirmisher screen to keep one's own heavy troops fresh and orderly, ready for the main clash with their counterparts. Since skirmisher vs skirmisher does not produce significant results, their role was relegated to a pre-battle warm-up that bought time whilst each general sized up his opponent and decided what he was going to do.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 24, 2014, 01:27:59 PM
But classical armies certainly felt the need for a skirmishing missile force.  And the Romans of the Polybian legion period had quite a lot of dedicated javelin skirmish power.  Even if we allow that these didn't kill many people (and Adrian's conclusions seem to mirror those of others in this respect) they must have had an important role.  What was the point of deploying a skirmish screen in warfare of this period, if we accept it wasn't causing casualties to the enemy main body?

I'm sure its in Vegetius but it appears the skirmishers main role was to screen your armies battlefield deployment and prevent disruption of the battle lines before they were fully deployed. Any attacks by the skirmishers would be on the skirmishers of the other side who were attempting the same thing, or by pelting the opposing force who did not possess skirmishers thus delaying their deployment and thereby allowing your force to attack the enemy at a disadvantage.

Regarding the effects of missile fire, the main protective factor that outweighs all others is that the shooters simply miss.  I mean there are plenty of examples in later periods when people were better at keeping detailed records of such things, including:

• During the British advance on Blenheim village a French brigade of 4,000 musketeers discharged their weapons at 30 yards, yet caused only 800 casualties.


• And lest you think this is simply down to the inaccuracy of the weapon, one might also cite the defenders of Rorke's Drift who fired 20,000 rounds of Martini-Henry rifle ammunition, yet are estimated to have caused less than 1,000 Zulu casualties.

Your Roman example does not surprise me.

In terms of wargames rules this is quite a key point.  Currently nearly all rules regard a shield as predominantly being a protection against missiles on the approach to the extent that troops lacking such protection can find it difficult even to make contact.  Of course, if one takes a view that it is has minimal value outside hand-to-hand combat then all sorts of armies start to be come more interesting.

You are thinking of sphacteria, with spartans beaten py peltasts the recent osprey on it is quite good, but it is not as simple as 'shot up by psiloi'.

I incline to believe that velites were there as much to acclimatise youngsters to battle (only 5-7 javs remember) as to be central to the battle plan.

Quote from: Mark G on July 24, 2014, 05:01:33 PM
I incline to believe that velites were there as much to acclimatise youngsters to battle (only 5-7 javs remember) as to be central to the battle plan.

I've always thought that velites have quite a few javelins by comparison to some others - 2 or 3 seems to be common (or is this just a convention among those who create reconstruction drawings?)

I've seen the figures 5 and 7 used nist often, but nothing to support it.
The point is, not very many

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 24, 2014, 03:22:18 PM
Regarding the effects of missile fire, the main protective factor that outweighs all others is that the shooters simply miss.  I mean there are plenty of examples in later periods when people were better at keeping detailed records of such things, including:

• During the British advance on Blenheim village a French brigade of 4,000 musketeers discharged their weapons at 30 yards, yet caused only 800 casualties.

Apparently at Blenheim many of the front-rank British troops took 2 or 3 shots each, so the hit rate may have been somewhat in excess of the kill rate.  Musketry hit rates are anyway perhaps not a good comparator for archery hit rates because of a) much shallower target formations and b) much more erratic missiles.  A classical archer or javelinman typically hit whomever he aimed at unless the target dodged or interposed a shield.  A musketeer shooting individually typically missed whomever he shot at.  If instead one looks at the hit rate for rifles against massed targets (Rorke's Drift is not a good example because a significant amount of ammunition was expended suppressing and picking off Zulu snipers on the hillside through much of the action, while the repulse of Zulu charges was by comparison brief and infrequent) one finds a disappointing lack of records being kept but one does see battlefield patterns changing (e.g. the difference in success between massed infantry attacks in the Napoleonic wars and in the Franco-Prussian War), and the point I am somewhat ramblingly trying to make is that when making such statistical evaluations one must consider the inherent accuracy of the weapon as this really matters in addition to the tactical circumstances.

Quote
In terms of wargames rules this is quite a key point.  Currently nearly all rules regard a shield as predominantly being a protection against missiles on the approach to the extent that troops lacking such protection can find it difficult even to make contact.  Of course, if one takes a view that it is has minimal value outside hand-to-hand combat then all sorts of armies start to be come more interesting.

Not to mention shieldless - but one then has to ask why so many armies, even those which dispensed with armour, felt a shield to be essential - especially in Biblical times, when the archer was the principal troop type.  Even if only one missile in 20 hits, an opponent who issues 20 missiles to each man in his force can land you in dead trouble ...

Another element to consider is the effectiveness of training of the respective troops.  At Munda (45 BC) Caesar's veteran legions attacked (uphill) against Pompey the Younger's comparatively raw troops.

"... when the javelins [pila] were thrown, vast numbers of the enemy were hit and fell in heaps."

The 'enemy' are the Pompeians.  One may surmise that Caesar's troops, after shooting, put their shields up and advanced, while their opponents, probably hurling their first volley of pila in anger, may have been watching to see how they landed, and neglected to cover themselves against the opposing volley already on the way.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 24, 2014, 08:41:46 PM

Quote
In terms of wargames rules this is quite a key point.  Currently nearly all rules regard a shield as predominantly being a protection against missiles on the approach to the extent that troops lacking such protection can find it difficult even to make contact.  Of course, if one takes a view that it is has minimal value outside hand-to-hand combat then all sorts of armies start to be come more interesting.

Not to mention shieldless - but one then has to ask why so many armies, even those which dispensed with armour, felt a shield to be essential - especially in Biblical times, when the archer was the principal troop type.  Even if only one missile in 20 hits, an opponent who issues 20 missiles to each man in his force can land you in dead trouble ...

Another element to consider is the effectiveness of training of the respective troops.  At Munda (45 BC) Caesar's veteran legions attacked (uphill) against Pompey the Younger's comparatively raw troops.

Where possession of a shield requires additional points to be spent, then armies will be tailored in the most cost effective manner, but normally one should design the combat rules first and the points system last.  One can also look at many medieval troop types (not all of whom were clad in plate from head to foot, who dispensed with the shield.

Interestingly, DBM equates possession of a shield with morale/efficiency.  For example, it does not matter how fired up you might feel yourself to be as an Auxilia or Psiloi, if you do not possess a shield you are never going to be Superior or even Ordinary.

Interesting that Sphacteria and Carrhae are quoted as examples of skirmishing achieving high kill rates. There is also a Hellenistic battle where the battle cavalry of one wing are chased off and the phalanx is surrounded by skirmishers and surrenders.
I doubt that any of these examples says much about high kill rates by skirmishing. The surrenders occur because there is no hope of succour and the troops are being subjected to a low but constant rate of casualties. There is also the stress of constant risk because the victims have to be constantly alert to defend themselves against incoming.
That suggests to me that the effect of skirmishers in battle beyond Adrian's screening, covering and scouting is to degrade the enemy's resolve . This is unlikely to win the battle, but it hopefully gives your own close order troops an advantage when they come to handstrokes. As we generally agree, even melee does not kill that many of the enemy, but it reduces their cohesion to the point where they break and can be massacred.
Accurate representation of the moment of victory in a wargame is generally unsatisfactory. We can represent casualties rather easily by removing figures, but casualties are only a component of thenmechanism of victory. More important is what is going on in the heads of the opposing crowd , at what point do they decide that this is all so unwinnable and so risky that the danger of turning one's back is less than the risk of staying in the fight?
Generally casualties are only a component of that devision.
Roy

You make an interesting point Roy about what is the trigger point for when the troops collectively decide enough is enough and run off the battlef9ield.

The triggers for Late Roman troops appeared to be different to their 'barbarian' counterparts.

The barbarian tribesmen appeared to break either as a result of an unexpected threat coupled with a failure of a breakthrough of the Roman main battle line, as happened at Argentoratum, or the troops appetite to continue the fight waned the longer it went on (this may be linked to the barbarian troops not usually being paid to fight but being promised a share of any loot gathered afterwards. If the troops felt that the risk outweighed the benefits then this does seem to have triggered flight in several battles).

The Romans generally fought until dusk when they then used darkness as a cover for their flight, as happened at Ad Salices and Adrianople.

Mind you, this is straying off topic a a bit.

I'm going to to challenge  sphacteria.
Its not a battle which demonstrates missile troops defeating heavy infantry.
It is a battle which is better thought of as a long siege, which culminated with troops (light troops)  scaling undefended cliffs to emerge in the rear of heavy infantry which were already engaged to the front.

Hence, its usefulness for this case, and for spartans surrendering in battle, is limited and couched in heavy caveats about singular situations

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 25, 2014, 06:02:02 AM

One can also look at many medieval troop types (not all of whom were clad in plate from head to foot), who dispensed with the shield.

True, although unless they had decent armour their battlefield effectiveness in the presence of a strong missile force seems to have been rather muted.

What may be a valid point (in mine humble estimation) is that many mediaeval European armies began using crossbows as their primary missile weapon in the couple of centuries following the Crusades.  The traditional arrow-stopping shield seems to have been less than adequate against crossbows, and a tendency to carry polearms (requiring both hands for use) would militate against the use of shields.  For all that, if we look at mediaeval Italian armies, there was a distinct fondness for the pavisier, whose portable side-of-a-garden-shed type shield could stop crossbow bolts - and this seems to have been its principal function, because pavises were not really useful in melee combat.

Quote from: aligern on July 25, 2014, 08:37:33 AM
Interesting that Sphacteria and Carrhae are quoted as examples of skirmishing achieving high kill rates. There is also a Hellenistic battle where the battle cavalry of one wing are chased off and the phalanx is surrounded by skirmishers and surrenders.

Ipsus?

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I doubt that any of these examples says much about high kill rates by skirmishing. The surrenders occur because there is no hope of succour and the troops are being subjected to a low but constant rate of casualties. There is also the stress of constant risk because the victims have to be constantly alert to defend themselves against incoming.

While the kill rates per se are not particularly high or rapid, one should consider also the inacpacitation rates, which are somewhat higher.

" Thus many died, and the survivors also were incapacitated for fighting. And when Publius urged them to charge the enemy's mail clad horsemen, they showed him that their hands were riveted to their shields and their feet nailed through and through to the ground, so that they were helpless either for flight or for self defence. " - Plutarch, Life of Crassus, 25.6

Justin's point, however, is that had the targets declined to surrender they would have been annihilated by continuing missile shooting, just as Leonidas' bodyguard and their 700 Thespian allies were shot to death by Persian missilemen after refusing to surrender at Thermopylae.

I also suspect that Justin was referring to Iphicrates' gradual slaughter of most of a Spartan mora near Corinth in 394 BC rather than to Sphacteria.

We might note also the following episode:

"And finally, there were the slaves whom Marius had used as allies during the war and as body-guards of his tyranny. They had thus become powerful and rich, partly by the permission and under the orders of Marius, and partly through their lawless and violent treatment of their masters, whom they would slay, and then lie with their masters' wives, and outrage their masters' children. Such a state of things Sertorius felt to be unendurable, and therefore when the (ex-)slaves were all encamped together he had them shot down with javelins, and they were as many as four thousand in number." - Plutarch, Life of Sertorius, 5.5

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That suggests to me that the effect of skirmishers in battle beyond Adrian's screening, covering and scouting is to degrade the enemy's resolve. This is unlikely to win the battle, but it hopefully gives your own close order troops an advantage when they come to handstrokes. As we generally agree, even melee does not kill that many of the enemy, but it reduces their cohesion to the point where they break and can be massacred.

Inclined to agree, given a normal battle where one side is not vastly superior in skirmisher types and does not have the terrain or situation to use them to advantage.  Adrian's point about different Roman and barbarian 'triggers' is also significant: the Romans seemed able to hang on as long as hope and discipline remained.  Barbarian armies were more inclined to be aggressive on the battlefield and more inclined to give up the fight if that aggression failed to produce a result - perhaps because they had only hope and not discipline, and that hope was invested in a clear victory which, when not materialising, proved rapidly discouraging.

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Accurate representation of the moment of victory in a wargame is generally unsatisfactory. We can represent casualties rather easily by removing figures, but casualties are only a component of the mechanism of victory. More important is what is going on in the heads of the opposing crowd , at what point do they decide that this is all so unwinnable and so risky that the danger of turning one's back is less than the risk of staying in the fight?
Generally casualties are only a component of that decision.
Roy

As a very general observation, one might suggest that morale took a plunge when the unexpected - and adversely unexpected - occurred, or when that which was anticipated but dreaded became apparent.  Those who have studied Wars of the Roses battles will know the deadly effects of a cry of "Treason! Treason!" in the middle of fighting.  At Delium in 424 BC the Athenians were winning handily when a couple of Theban cavalry squadrons hove into view - and the Athenians jumped to the conclusion that a fresh army had arrived, panicked - and ran (and threw away their victory).

In the WRG rules, casualties were the trigger mechanism for practically everything, but post-battle recovery rules suggested that not many of the casualties were actual losses.  In essence, WRG rules used morale indicators but called them 'casualties', not least because at the time wargamers tended to be a bloodthirsty lot who loved seeing their opponents' figures removed.

How we represent this on the tabletop is tricky, because in theory the player's mind is substituting for that of the troops.  However the player is focussed on victory rather than self-preservation and will anyway make dispositions and take risks that few real-life army commanders would.

Ultimately we would seem to need a 'Real Morale Project' to study the triggers to various morale states and then how to weave these into conflict simulation rules.  Failing that, a 'Morale' thread in this forum might air some ideas ...

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 25, 2014, 11:36:17 AM

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 25, 2014, 06:02:02 AM

One can also look at many medieval troop types (not all of whom were clad in plate from head to foot), who dispensed with the shield.

True, although unless they had decent armour their battlefield effectiveness in the presence of a strong missile force seems to have been rather muted.

What may be a valid point (in mine humble estimation) is that many mediaeval European armies began using crossbows as their primary missile weapon in the couple of centuries following the Crusades.  The traditional arrow-stopping shield seems to have been less than adequate against crossbows, and a tendency to carry polearms (requiring both hands for use) would militate against the use of shields.  For all that, if we look at mediaeval Italian armies, there was a distinct fondness for the pavisier, whose portable side-of-a-garden-shed type shield could stop crossbow bolts - and this seems to have been its principal function, because pavises were not really useful in melee combat.

I think it is fair to say that pavises were a common response to archery in the Middle Ages.  Popular in Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Bohemia and even used by the Scots at Flodden.  One where the rule writer does need to acknowledge an effect, IMO.

I would concur about the lack of armour being an issue - English writers refer to the sufferings of "naked" i.e. unarmoured men under archery bombardment.  On two handed weapons, there is a trade off between having an effective melee weapon and protection going on.  What does it tell us about the relative importance of shooting v. melee as a battle decider?

Finally, to the list of shooting victories, one should add Humbleton/Homildon 1402.  The Scots took up a strong position on a hill, unfortunately in effective range of English archers.  They were slowly worn down and the one attempt to attack was too little too late.  Eventually morale went, the English mounted their horses and massacred the fugitives.  To pick up on a point made by Patrick, many more men were probably injured than killed by missiles.  Wounded men who would have survived in victory were likely to be killed in a rout - another reason for casualty disparity.

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Failing that, a 'Morale' thread in this forum might air some ideas ...

Good idea, though I suspect we've had a go at this before.

I've worked out the battle where the Spartans are shot down by peltasts etc that folk are referring to above.

Its Lechaeum

But as with Sphacteria (and I would argue the retreat from Syracuse also), its not as straightforward as 'Hoplites in battle shot to pieces'.

- actually, a comparison of the three might be interesting for an article -

anyway, its not in the Peloponnesian war, which is, to my mind, the very end point of classical hoplite v hoplite battles - by then the importance of peltasts and cavalry is well known and demonstrated, and there are very few big battles, and a lot more actions which you can't do with a phalanx.

Lechaeum is a generation later, and the key thing is that it mostly demonstrates idiocy on the part of the Spartan general (such stupidity that he could almost be a Roman Consul).

he splits off his cavalry from his infatnry in the face of the enemy, and sends the infantry alone (one Mora - @600 men) right across the front of the enemy forces holding Corinth.

a long and drawn out (as you would expect) encounter ensues with Spartan charges out failing to make contact and eventually the Spartans retreating to a hilltop. 

here they are still pretty fine if quite uncomfortable, but then they see the Athenian hoplites coming up - and that is when they run for it hoping to reach a series of boats about half a mile away which have been brought up for them to escape in, and that run is when they get cut down in large numbers (overall 250 / 600 casualties).

Wikipedia also mentions something about the cavalry returning to join them on the plain but refusing to charge away from the infantry, making itself worthless to the only job it needed to do - drive the peltasts (etc) off.

The Athenian hero here is iphirates - if that spurs anyone on to a thread on what the heck he was all about.

anyway, conclusion - no evidence here necessarily that the Spartan armour and shields failed in significant numbers so long as the formation held (which is after all the point of hoplite equipment - formation), but plenty of evidence about the importance of not having idiots in charge, and the dangers of running when faced with a faster enemy able to pursue.

I'm sure Pat will post the xenopon shortly if it has anything more of interest to tease out beyond that.

From Xenophon's Hellenica IV.5.13 and following.  We start with the Athenians in Corinth noticing this force of 600 Spartans wandering around in their vicinity and sallying out to attack them.

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But those in the city of the Corinthians, both Callias, the son of Hipponicus, commander of the Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates, leader of the peltasts, when they descried the Lacedaemonians and saw that they were not only few in number, but also unaccompanied by either peltasts or cavalry, thought that it was safe to attack them with their force of peltasts. For if they should proceed along the road, they could be attacked with javelins on their unprotected side and destroyed; and if they should undertake to pursue, they with their peltasts, the nimblest of all troops, could easily escape the hoplites.

Note that the Spartan cavalry are currently escorting the men of Amyclae past Corinth; the Amyclaeans are en route to their Hyacinthia festival.  Once the Amyclaeans are out of danger, the cavalry will return.  Meanwhile, the cat is away and the mice come out to play.

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[14] Having come to this conclusion, they led forth their troops. And Callias formed his hoplites in line of battle not far from the city, while Iphicrates with his peltasts attacked the Lacedaemonian regiment. Now when the Lacedaemonians were being attacked with javelins, and several men had been wounded and several others slain, they directed the shield-bearers to take up these wounded men and carry them back to Lechaeum; and these were the only men in the regiment who were really saved. Then the polemarch ordered the first ten year-classes to drive off their assailants.

This was the usual counter, and it has always worked before - and would work again.  It did not work this time because Iphicrates had warned his men to stay at long javelin cast and to start running as soon as the Spartans moved.

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[15] But when they pursued, they caught no one, since they were hoplites pursuing peltasts at the distance of a javelin's cast; for Iphicrates had given orders to the peltasts to retire before the hoplites got near them; and further, when the Lacedaemonians were retiring from the pursuit, being scattered because each man had pursued as swiftly as he could, the troops of Iphicrates turned about, and not only did those in front again hurl javelins upon the Lacedaemonians, but also others on the flank, running along to reach their unprotected side. Indeed, at the very first pursuit the peltasts shot down nine or ten of them. And as soon as this happened, they began to press the attack much more boldly.

The Spartans were in an unenviable situation: if they carried on marching, they would lose men slowly but steadily.  If they charged to drive off the peltasts, they would lose men who were individually vulnerable while returning to the formation.

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[16] Then, as the Lacedaemonians continued to suffer losses, the polemarch again ordered the first fifteen year-classes to pursue. But when these fell back, even more of them were shot down than at the first retirement.

In essence, the Spartans were doomed no matter what they did.  But then the cavalry arrived - and, on account of tactical ineptitude, failed to save the day.

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And now that the best men had already been killed, the horsemen joined them, and with the horsemen they again undertook a pursuit. But when the peltasts turned to flight, at that moment the horsemen managed their attack badly; for they did not chase the enemy until they had killed some of them, but both in the pursuit and in the turning backward kept an even front with the hoplites.

This left the Spartans just as badly off as before.

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And what with striving and suffering in this way again and again, the Lacedaemonians themselves kept continually becoming fewer and fainter of heart, while their enemies were becoming bolder, and those who attacked them continually more numerous.

Note the steep decline of Spartan morale under the unremitting shooting.  With nothing else working, the Spartans prepared for a famous last stand.

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[17] Therefore in desperation they gathered together on a small hill, distant from the sea about two stadia, and from Lechaeum about sixteen or seventeen stadia.

Rescue - or the hope of rescue - came, ironically, from the sea.

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And the men in Lechaeum, upon perceiving them, embarked in small boats and coasted along until they came opposite the hill.

The state of Spartan morale at that point can be judged from the following.

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Then the troops, being now desperate, because they were suffering and being slain, while unable to inflict any harm themselves, and, besides this, seeing the Athenian hoplites also coming against them, took to flight. And some of them plunged into the sea, and some few made their escape with the horsemen to Lechaeum.

Ordinarily, the Spartans would have welcomed a clash against Athenian hoplites and gone to meet them with great joy.  Here the peltasts had so shattered their morale that they simply broke.  As at Sphacteria, the Spartans suffered a steady drain of physical casualties, but the greatest effect of Athenian missiles was on their morale.

One might incidentally point out that this period (c.395-371) did see large classic hoplite battles, Haliartus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Haliartus), the Nemea (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nemea) and Coronea (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Coronea_%28394_BC%29) all being fought within two years (395-394 BC).

I Have always wondered... how can a missile kill a heavy hoplite? I mean, his chest is entirely covered by both shield and armor, he has greaves, helmet covering almost all his head... where would the javelin go to kill or wound badly the man? in the eyes? would it be able to Pierce bronze armor? thx. Same applies for arrows or slings.
Even if as I think, javelins were thrown not frontal ly but at an angle in order to overcome the shield wall, the only place where they could do damage was the right arm if this was uncovered by armor. Because the chest even in the sides was covered by armor (bronze or lined covered by bronze segments). I have never tested a javelin but I guess that it cannot Pierce bronze, am I right?

Well, at Lechaeum, the Spartans were probably not that heavyily armoured - remember that at Sphakteria Thucydides says that the pilos would not stop arrows? And at Lechaeum, Xenophon tells us that they were shot in the unshielded flank: "and not only did those in front again hurl javelins upon the Lacedaemonians, but also others on the flank, running along to reach their unprotected side. Indeed, at the very first pursuit the peltasts shot down nine or ten of them".

Quote from: andrew881runner on August 20, 2014, 12:07:39 PM
I have never tested a javelin but I guess that it cannot pierce bronze, am I right?

Yes and no: it depends upon a number of factors, such as the weight of the weapon, the force with which it is thrown, the angle at which it strikes the target (a direct 90-degree strike has more chance of penetrating) and how well the armour fits the wearer (loose-fitting or very tight-fitting armour is easier to penetrate).  There are (if I remember correctly) 52 factors or variables that affect penetration of armour by a projectile, from quality of manufacture to wind and humidity, but of these only about 10-12 will really matter.

Hoplites mostly ceased to wear bronze between 479 BC and 431 BC: the linen thorax (linothorax, pictured here (http://www.newyorker.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/how-to-make-greek-armor.jpg)) seems to have replaced it as the armour of choice and remained in fashion until Parthians and the expanding Roman Empire caused metal armour to start being re-adopted as protection.  (I would point out that Macedonian kings also wore iron armour styled to resemble the linothorax; an example was discovered in Philip II's grave at Vergina).  Here are some modern reproductions (http://jhupress.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/aldrete_plate.jpg) of the 'linothorax' style of armour.

It would seem that the hoplite relied on his shield to stop a javelin, and it is possible that the round, convex hoplon or aspis was a better javelin-stopper than the rectangular scutum or thureos; in the incident at Lechaeum, Iphicrates' peltasts place great importance on getting to the right (unshielded) side of their hoplite targets in order to shoot effectively.  The younger Spartans who chased the peltasts suffered losses when returning to the main formation, when their shields were away from the enemy, leaving them vulnerable.

When in formation, hoplites would be able to rely on the protection of their shields.  A combination of direct and indirect shooting, as seems to have occurred at Sphacteria, would give them problems because of the difficulty of holding shields up to cover their heads and forward to cover their bodies at the same time.  Simple volleys of javelins from ahead do not seem to have troubled them (this may be why Greeks gave up the second, throwing, spear during the 6th century BC - it would have been ineffectual against shielded hoplites).

Even when bronze armour was in general use, e.g. in 480-479 BC, the Spartan hoplites at Plataea still suffered casualties from Persian arrows and remained behind their shields until the order was given to advance (Herodotus IX.61).  Most if not all of these casualties would have been arrow wounds in unprotected parts of the body: arms, legs, neck and perhaps a few unlucky shots through helmet slits into the face.

Greek armour was designed to keep an active wearer alive in melee: it provided reasonable protection against missiles but not complete safety.  It would seem that the shield was intended to provide the additional protection the armour lacked, and this is also the case with Roman legionaries, Caesar (Gallic War V.35) noting that legionaries were vulnerable to javelins thrown at their unshielded (right) side.

All armour is a compromise between protection and mobility.  If one wears too little armour, one rapidly becomes a casualty.  If one wears too much armour, one can collapse under the burden and become a casualty, like a Parthian armoured camel or a dismounted Sarmatian - so the ideal amount of armour reduces vulnerability and makes it more likely that the wearer will emerge from a hard fight wounded but still alive.