Mentioned in many other forum posts but not sure if ever given a thread of its own...? How do we view logistics in terms of historical armies and also in wargaming? Do we prefer to acknowledge the historical aspect of logistics and putting an army in the field and especially for a campaign but not necessarily want this to 'intrude' upon our wargaming?
To take the historical aspect first, are logistics a major or minor consideration in determining the outcome of a battle over say weapons and training or morale? Also do we (logically) acknowledge the increasingly important part that logistics have to play in campaigns? Is the best fed and supplied army always the best?
To take the wargaming aspect secondly, are logistics required or even wanted at the table? One off battles are too restricted in terms of a timeframe to be affected by logistics in the wargame....or not? Does anyone make modifications to the set up or gameplay to reflect good or bad logistics? Obviously campaign games normally do have an element of supply (even if its just missile replenishment) in their mechanism but not all.
Thoughts?
Just reading Sawyer's Zhuge Liang, and the main impact of logistics seems to be in affecting whether there is a battle or not, or whether one army either breaks up or simply goes home because it can't be fed any more.
I remember reading John Peddie's 'Invasion' many years ago and was struck by the sheer scale of the logistics involved for the Claudian campaign in Britain
Not just logistics in the campaign setting but in the wider economic sense
Just reading 'Legions in Crisis by Paul Elliot. Early on he goes through the enemies, (I paraphrase) Germans, metal poor not much armour, Goths, sort of metal poor, some armour but not that much. Sarmations, 'Cataphracts, horse and man completely covered in ring mail or scale armour'
Hang on a minute, where'd the chuffing iron come from and how come nobody else found it?
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 03, 2015, 11:10:04 PM
Hang on a minute, where'd the chuffing iron come from and how come nobody else found it?
Jim
;D
Interesting though in all seriousness. Iron was a much sought after commodity so are we saying that those people that didnt have alot of it was because of lack of deposits or lack of knowledge on how to find it??? Or are the conclusions in the book you are reading a bit superficial and not taking into account other factors. ie were those tribes poor in metal because they werent set up to make such things as armour on a wide scale preferring to concentrate on other stuff and barter (or steal) for stuff like that?
Acc'd to AEIR, most Sarmatian armour was of horn or other organic materials.
Iron supply is in the field of strategic logistics - availability of raw materials and manufacturing capacity. The only way of building this into a game I can think of is through the army selection process - troops with plentiful iron would either be restricted or greatly more expensive than there equivalents on the iron-rich side. So, the German might be restricted to 5% of his force with iron armour against the Romans up to 100%. Or an unarmoured German or Roman might cost 1pt, an armoured Roman 2pts and an armoured German 10pts.
Then you have more operational logistics, like keeping the army in supply while in enemy territory. Operational logistics can have clear battlefield impacts - an army short of supplies may be forced to fight a battle that it would otherwise have avoided. Battles can take place around supply activities e.g. The Battle of the Herrings and Caesar I'm sure ends up in an action against the British in connection with sending his legions out foraging.
Then there are battlefield logistics, which have a direct effect but are usually abstracted out e.g. arrow supplies, spare horses, hunger and thirst.
Quote from: Holly on January 04, 2015, 08:25:55 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 03, 2015, 11:10:04 PM
Hang on a minute, where'd the chuffing iron come from and how come nobody else found it?
Jim
;D
Interesting though in all seriousness. Iron was a much sought after commodity so are we saying that those people that didnt have alot of it was because of lack of deposits or lack of knowledge on how to find it??? Or are the conclusions in the book you are reading a bit superficial and not taking into account other factors. ie were those tribes poor in metal because they werent set up to make such things as armour on a wide scale preferring to concentrate on other stuff and barter (or steal) for stuff like that?
To be fair to the book I've paraphrased a section which was meant to be a brief summary of something peripheral to the book's main thrust. So it isn't fair to judge the book on this
I agree with Andreas, it was traditionally assumed by wargamers that Sarmations used horn and leather. Which is actually more believable to be honest
Also with regard to strategic logistics, WRG points values used to make armoured 'barbarians' far more expensive than armoured regulars to try and cover this. This meant that Sassanid armies were small and somewhat select ;D
This all changed with the last great change in points values which brought in the new system which was geared more to table top effectiveness
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 04, 2015, 10:03:39 AM
Also with regard to strategic logistics, WRG points values used to make armoured 'barbarians' far more expensive than armoured regulars to try and cover this. This meant that Sassanid armies were small and somewhat select ;D
This all changed with the last great change in points values which brought in the new system which was geared more to table top effectiveness
An interesting debate in terms of points systems, which might fit with the discussions on gaming and simulation. The % model can get round this but it does have issues around the scale of the game. If we are representing 20,000 Germans, 5% might be right. But what if the army scales up to only 5,000? It could be the vanguard of the 20,000 and those 1,000 armoured men might be concentrated in it, so should we allow 20%?
And would those armoured men anyway largely be chieftains and select bodyguards if chieftains? One remembers that at Argentoratum (AD 357) Chnodomar led a contingent of Alemannii nobility and their retinues and bodyguards against Julian's line, where the German elite came to grief via the swords of the Primani.
This might have been in effect the '5%' concentrated in a single unit, particularly as many if not all of the nobles had been mounted at the outset of the action.
On the broader logistical front, I recall an Ancmed discussion about Carthaginian supply arrangements in Italy. To cut a long story short, it looks as if Hannibal's standard practice when on the move was to sweep the locality for supplies about once a week for a week's supplies, which seems to have been his army transport's carrying capacity, and when over-wintering in an area to sweep a rather larger locality and stock a nearby and convenient town with up to six months' supplies, then use it as a depot. He even had a principal supply officer whose job was to keep the foodstuffs coming in and being issued.
Caesar relied upon his Gallic allies for corn, and only went foraging himself when he lacked allies in close proximity. In Greece, he tried to persuade or imitate towns to supply him; in Spain he seems to have alternated foraging, reliance on friendly communities and receiving convoys by road and river.
Taking Anthony's point that there are three zoom levels in war: strategic level, operational level and battlefield level, my take is that for a wargame that focusses on a battle the strategic level logistics is decided by the army lists and points system, as it is way too complex and long to simulate unless you are playing Warcraft.
On the battlefield level logistics is also abstracted out. Hungry armies can suffer 'fatigue' negative modifiers in combat, or perhaps start out with a lower quality combat/morale rating.
It is on the operational level that one has the chance to actually see logistics at work. Operational warfare - the pre-battle marching and countermarching with the aim of picking up allies, supplies, and finding a good battlefield or laying an ambush - is to my knowledge completely ignored as a necessary preparation for the battle itself, and yet it is half the battle. To play an operational game followed by a battle once the two armies meet up might double playing time, sure, but it would give a totally different gaming experience.
A pre-battle operational game can be fairly abstract, simple and quick. It might even decide the battle before it is fought, in the way Caesar defeated the Pompeians in his Ilerda campaign.
Perhaps time to mention the role of water transport in pre-industrial logistics. In a world of poor roads, supplying an army with an accompanying fleet was always a popular option. Fleet logistics themselves were significant, especially for galley fleets. Galleys were thirsty and hungry and needed to resupply regularly. Rivers, lake and lagoon transport was also very important in many areas and could provide the background to all sorts of skirmishes (e.g. Flanders, the Baltic coast, the Venetian Lagoon).
Quote from: Erpingham on January 04, 2015, 11:44:08 AM
Perhaps time to mention the role of water transport in pre-industrial logistics. In a world of poor roads, supplying an army with an accompanying fleet was always a popular option. Fleet logistics themselves were significant, especially for galley fleets. Galleys were thirsty and hungry and needed to resupply regularly. Rivers, lake and lagoon transport was also very important in many areas and could provide the background to all sorts of skirmishes (e.g. Flanders, the Baltic coast, the Venetian Lagoon).
Indeed hence a Rhine and Danube frontier, huge supply bases in South Shields etc
Indeed it is difficult to find a city in the ancient world that is not on a coast or a navigable river
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 04, 2015, 10:48:26 AM
And would those armoured men anyway largely be chieftains and select bodyguards if chieftains? One remembers that at Argentoratum (AD 357) Chnodomar led a contingent of Alemannii nobility and their retinues and bodyguards against Julian's line, where the German elite came to grief via the swords of the Primani.
This might have been in effect the '5%' concentrated in a single unit, particularly as many if not all of the nobles had been mounted at the outset of the action.
If early Germanic armies (and those of sundry other barbarians) consisted of a core of chieftain's retinues of "professional" warriors bulked out by a more-or-less general levy of freemen, one might expect that the proportion of armour would be in rough inverse proportion to army size. A raiding force of 200 may
be a retinue all in armour, while an army of 20k would be very largely of less well-equipped and less skilled fighters.
Effectively then the army list mechanism of allowing x men in armour (no matter how large the army) is a reasonable way of showing this (provided we get x right)
Jim
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 04, 2015, 04:35:12 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 04, 2015, 10:48:26 AM
And would those armoured men anyway largely be chieftains and select bodyguards if chieftains? One remembers that at Argentoratum (AD 357) Chnodomar led a contingent of Alemannii nobility and their retinues and bodyguards against Julian's line, where the German elite came to grief via the swords of the Primani.
This might have been in effect the '5%' concentrated in a single unit, particularly as many if not all of the nobles had been mounted at the outset of the action.
If early Germanic armies (and those of sundry other barbarians) consisted of a core of chieftain's retinues of "professional" warriors bulked out by a more-or-less general levy of freemen, one might expect that the proportion of armour would be in rough inverse proportion to army size. A raiding force of 200 may be a retinue all in armour, while an army of 20k would be very largely of less well-equipped and less skilled fighters.
I would add that a centrally controlled 'state' would be able to equip troops with standardised (possibly) metal armour and that tribal forces would indeed follow the size vs inverse armour percentage worn rule
Do we get an extensively armoured barbarian army when the Goths defeat Decius or when they win at Adrianople? or when Alaric gets a position as Magister Milutum in Illyricum? or when Odoacer and Theoderic held Italy for 60 years? or, for that matter, when Clovis wins three major battles in a row and takes on the remnants of whatever arms and armour production is left in Gaul.
Perhaps we should see the Roman Empire as having a very efficient armour production system, but from Maurice onwards the manuals accept that in the infantry it was. often enough to get an armoured front rank.
i'll bet there was far more variation in equipment levels than a simple barbarian versus civilised dichotomy.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 04, 2015, 09:22:41 PM
Do we get an extensively armoured barbarian army when the Goths defeat Decius or when they win at Adrianople?
Some years ago, Luke U-S wrote:
Quote from: https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/Tabulae_Novae_Exercituum/conversations/messages/7248Retainers: I rate these as Wb (S), since despite frequent Roman comments about the lack of armour amongst barbarians generally, the situation may have been quite different amongst the retinues of the reiks (chiefs), and of the Goths in particular. For instance Olympiodoros talks of a force of 3000 men (hence the 24 elements allowed at half normal scale) all in mail fitting tightly around the waist. Such retinues were professional warriors, further buttressing their classification as Wb (S), and marked contrast to the commoners who normally only fought in defensive wars; accordingly allied contingents from this list may be composed entirely of such retainers.
I'm not sure exactly when the Olympiodoros citation refers to, though.
Quote from: Holly on January 03, 2015, 08:15:17 PMDo we prefer to acknowledge the historical aspect of logistics and putting an army in the field and especially for a campaign but not necessarily want this to 'intrude' upon our wargaming?
Yes! Pushing lumps of iron and baggage around on the table top wouldn't be so engaging. :)
But from a historical perspective... its very interesting IMHO.
I personally think you can go one macro level higher and get a lot of explanatory power from looking at the economics (behind the logistics, behind the armies, behind the generals etc.) of adversaries.
For me, I wouldnt mind an element of logistical supply 'intruding' upon the game, depending on what and how applied
For instance it could be a game based factor (eg no water giving a morale or fighting negative factor) or could be round based (eg low missile availability giving only 'x' rounds of shooting) and would be a random (dice/card) event
Just enough to keep you on your toes
The challenge with adding a 'logistical factor' is that with good players you may soon find yourself in a 'logistical game' as players seek to gather supply for themselves and, furthermore, deny it to their opponents.
Nothing particularly wrong with this, and one sees a lot of it in Caesar's campaigns, but it could mean a lot of extra work for the DM - I mean umpire - working out how much food of what nature is to be had at various locations and how well the locals have hidden it ...
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 05, 2015, 01:11:42 PM
The challenge with adding a 'logistical factor' is that with good players you may soon find yourself in a 'logistical game' as players seek to gather supply for themselves and, furthermore, deny it to their opponents.
I have heard one or two people complaining, over the years, that they don't enjoy playing a campaign just to discover that all their troops have starved to death. In other words, not everyone likes the logistical game.
But then, "Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics" - and we are amateurs, after all.
good points both
I would suggest that keeping track of logistical effects of dice/cards would be a case of writing it down or using unit markers. In terms of logistics in a game per se, it all depends on whether you want playability or historical accuracy (and thus a link back to the other thread! :) ) For me a little bit of logistics shouldnt unblance the game but it should be there to help avoid the '20 shot' 6-shooters used in many Holywood cowboy films ::)
Like many of these things, it is about all agreeing why we have logistics in the game and designing accordingly. We also need to be clear how much effect the logistic issue will have and whether it is worth modelling. Do I need in my Western game to count the shots of my shootists, or can I design a mechanism that allows for the fact that shooting behaviour will fit the rounds available (except maybe for green horns who misjudge the amount of ammunition to bring or blaze away regardless)?
For an in-period example, think longbow arrow supply. Very few rules actually cover this yet it is an area where we have very clear evidence that it could be an issue. WE could go bottom up and allow the player to determine rate of shooting and count the arrows expended. We could limit the number of rounds of shooting a unit could undertake (maybe throwing in the option of the odd double-rate shoot). We could abstract it so that our shooting model takes into account optimum arrow usage according to tactical circumstances. Personally, the key is that limited arrow supply affects battlefield behaviour rather than we actually model the fate of each arrow and we could abstract that without explicitly covering the logistic element at all.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 05, 2015, 04:53:41 PM
For an in-period example, think longbow arrow supply. Very few rules actually cover this yet it is an area where we have very clear evidence that it could be an issue. WE could go bottom up and allow the player to determine rate of shooting and count the arrows expended. We could limit the number of rounds of shooting a unit could undertake (maybe throwing in the option of the odd double-rate shoot). We could abstract it so that our shooting model takes into account optimum arrow usage according to tactical circumstances. Personally, the key is that limited arrow supply affects battlefield behaviour rather than we actually model the fate of each arrow and we could abstract that without explicitly covering the logistic element at all.
At Agincourt, it seems to focus on 1) the availability of a volley or six of flight arrows, which have increased range over and above the tabletop norm; 2) the ability to deliver a cloud of arrows which a) slowed and b) split the oncoming attackers and 3) the capacity to replenish from 'arrow bags' and battlefield recovery between French attacks.
One way to handle this might be to give a limited ammunition ration but allow specific effects by expending specific amounts of ammunition. For example, shooting the flight arrows causes the French to start moving; delivering a double volley splits the attacking formation so that it funnels towards the men-at-arms and shooting a normal volley just slows attackers and inflicts casualties. Ammunition is consumed each turn of shooting but can 'grow back' a volley or two towards an intermediate level of availability for each turn on non-combat (e.g. waiting for the next attack).
Hence the archers could start with 10 'shots'. One is the flight arrow ration, which is gone when expended; nine are standard volleys, which can be delivered at one or two per turn. If a turn is without combat, the current level of volleys can be increased by one, or by two if one expends arrow bags. Arrow bags can also increase the current availability by one even if shooting (so if using arrow bags and shooting a volley in the same turn there is no change). Hence, if four volleys suffice to beat off a first attack, and two turns intervene before the next attack comes in range, the volleys available can creep up from 6 to 8. If the second attack comes in straight away, and four volleys are needed before it goes, then it may be an idea to bring out the arrow bags (of which there is a limited supply, say 2 or 3) if a third wave is in sight.
If that makes any sense ...
perfect sense Patrick
The alternative is to go for the more abstract way of accounting for arrow supply which is reduce the combat factor by one for each round of shooting down to a minimum or similar. Or go for a one off reduction in the factor for the second round of shooting onwards (a bit like the Lance factor under 6th Ed WRG)
True. I was thinking along the lines of Anthony's observation that we could relate ammunition expenditure to the actual effect on the enemy, on the basis that archery can affect opponent behaviour and it takes a certain weight and/or type of delivery to achieve that effect. Hence we could just say that the archers have:
one 'force attack' card
two 'funnel attack' cards
three or four 'cause losses' cards
and can pick up a replacement card during each non-combat turn; also that their player has one spare 'funnel attack' and one 'cause losses' card up his sleeve (arrow bags). This would handle their ammunition supply and its tactical employment in one convenient package.
Or something like that.
Unless we're just looking at a tightly focussed ruleset (English v the world 1415 plus or minus 50 years 8) ) then how will you fit Persian archers in here. With them v Hoplites do the same cards work?
Can we assume that they have 'arrow bags'? I can see them having 'force attack' and 'cause losses' cards but did they 'funnel attack'
For Byzantines, one can see with, for example, Battle of Taginae, force attack, funnel attack and cause losses cards coming into play.
Jim
I think Achaemenid archers would have a different 'hand' of cards, which when matched against Greek hoplites would mostly be 'pin down' or 'provide shade' 8) ...
good idea re the cards and dare I say angling towards the 'accuracy' end of the wargaming spectrum ;)
re the different types of archers and their historical performance/MO then look up tables would work I think.
Also for Cretan archers there could be a card for 'shoot them heffalumps in the eye son' :)
I think there is an interesting cross-over with our discussions in another thread on simulations and game parameters. Patrick's idea could be turned into an "archer" game, where the player is just commanding a force of archers and concentrating on operating them tactically. Or perhaps it is, as Jim says, an interesting place to start to create a specific set of rules to refight Agincourt. As a wider set of rules for longbow archery, or wider still, we'd need a more extensive going over of the topic in another thread. But as an example of how logistics might be brought into a tabletop game in an integral way, shows what can dome.
Bow could get +1 on their first "shot/volley," +0 on the next, -1, -2 etc. until they "run out" and become light infantry - psiloi or Auxilia?
Quote from: Dangun on January 06, 2015, 10:41:49 AM
Bow could get +1 on their first "shot/volley," +0 on the next, -1, -2 etc. until they "run out" and become light infantry - psiloi or Auxilia?
what an interesting idea.....
Sometimes I think we are too 'flat' or 2 dimensional with regards to army organisation on the wargaming battlefield. I know it would mean extra figures but I am very interested in having more formation changes during a battle eg close density versus open density for troops that operated in that manner. Your example of changing a bow unit from say Bw(4) to Aux(3/4) or Ps(2) due to missile usage (and/or other operational considerations such as changing orders) could work nicely
Quote from: Dangun on January 06, 2015, 10:41:49 AM
Bow could get +1 on their first "shot/volley," +0 on the next, -1, -2 etc. until they "run out" and become light infantry - psiloi or Auxilia?
I think I would prefer something more abstract, to avoid record keeping if possible. Running out of ammunition, to me anyway, has two main factors - supply and rate of use. rate of use is affected by tactical circumstances and to the experience and discipline of troops. So, perhaps we give our longbowmen three modes - skirmish, sustained and arrowstorm. We might also give them markers for arrows issued per man (say one for a mobile role, two for a static one). After each round of shooting, throw a dice. There is a chance, depending on shooting mode and unit experience, that an arrow marker is expended.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 06, 2015, 12:08:54 PM
Quote from: Dangun on January 06, 2015, 10:41:49 AM
Bow could get +1 on their first "shot/volley," +0 on the next, -1, -2 etc. until they "run out" and become light infantry - psiloi or Auxilia?
I think I would prefer something more abstract, to avoid record keeping if possible. Running out of ammunition, to me anyway, has two main factors - supply and rate of use. rate of use is affected by tactical circumstances and to the experience and discipline of troops. So, perhaps we give our longbowmen three modes - skirmish, sustained and arrowstorm. We might also give them markers for arrows issued per man (say one for a mobile role, two for a static one). After each round of shooting, throw a dice. There is a chance, depending on shooting mode and unit experience, that an arrow marker is expended.
This seems to me a more 'realistic' approach, on the basis (or perhaps assumption) that archers used a set rate or rates of shooting while they had ammunition, but did not scale down their shooting as their quivers emptied 10%, 20% etc. Three basic modes with the chance or perhaps the certainty of ammunition depletion looks very good to me - and if we want to extend this approach to a few additional periods, then skirmishers can be differentiated by not having the 'arrowstorm' mode as one of their options, while close formation volley archers (e.g. Egyptians) do not get the 'skirmish' option. Clever types like Cretans might get all three modes.
or looking at it the other way
if you wanted to simulate a massed/rapid arrow deluge, you can add a one off +1 factor and then not have to do much record keeping.
I dont mind a bit of record keeping personally having cut my teeth on 5th and 6th WRG (a notebook was ever present at my side for recording casualties, writing orders and drawing deployments) so actually quite like Dangun's suggestion
This puts me in mind of an old kids dogfight game, where the shooting deck had varying levels of burst (effectiveness), and you drew one each shot.
So you knew she you had used all the good shots, but not what the next shot would be
Add two "empty" cards, and if both come out your are done, and you have an easy ammo come effect system...
Quote from: Holly on January 06, 2015, 09:25:23 PM
or looking at it the other way
if you wanted to simulate a massed/rapid arrow deluge, you can add a one off +1 factor and then not have to do much record keeping.
But then you don't incorporate logistics in the game, which is where we came in.
Quote
I dont mind a bit of record keeping personally having cut my teeth on 5th and 6th WRG (a notebook was ever present at my side for recording casualties, writing orders and drawing deployments) so actually quite like Dangun's suggestion
My own primary objection is the same as Patrick's - did archers reduce their rate of shooting proportional to the amount of ammunition they had left or did they have a standard rate of shooting, varying perhaps with tactical requirements, until they ran out of ammunition. The first gives you a gradual decline of effectiveness with each shot, the second gives even effect until they can't shoot anymore. I would favour the latter.
We run into a problem.
With estimated agricultural yields, known climate variation and modern modelling, known sources of metals and estimated outputs, quoted tax revenues etc then it is probably possible to produce an economic and logistical model of, for example, the Roman Empire.
It will be wrong in many ways but might be 'good enough' to give a sense of how things could hang together.
But the more we drill down into deeper and deeper levels of complexity, the less we actually know. Worrying about ammunition supply when with the vast majority of armies we haven't a clue about ammunition supply, stockpiles and similar is a waste of time, (unless I suppose you try and work up from the bottom to produce figures which show that to achieve a historically observed event, there had to be missile stockpiles.
Even with the Romans, we don't know what stocks of missiles they took on the march. It's only by chance that we know in the republic there were probably spare shields carried with the army on campaign. I don't think we've got a clue about missiles.
With the English longbowmen we have accounts which show how many arrows are purchased but some of these could have been dropped off to build up the stocks held in depots.
I think that with wargames logistics we might be better off worrying about food and water and supplying that and the effect that has on lines of advance and defensive positions.
Jim
It really depends upon whether we want to focus on battlefield logistics or campaign logistics. Granted that we lack firm information on such things as the 'basic load' of missiles carried by most archers and the level of resupply present, though we can surmise from the exceptions what the norm was likely to be.
At Dyrrhachium, one of Caesar's forts beat off a Pompeian attack and the centurion Scaevola's shield was found to have 120 arrows or holes in it. This suggests (along with anecdotes such as Pontic archers using bundles of arrows instead of swords at Orchomenus) that the classical period civilised archer was generally quite well supplied with missile ammunition.
Conversely, at Carrhae, the Romans were expecting the Parthians to run out of arrows and have to come to hand-strokes. When they learned that the Surena had brought along a whole camel-train stocked with arrows they became distinctly less happy. From this we can deduce that such thoughtful resupply arrangements were the exception for Parthians, at least up to that date, and that a limited 'basic load' was normal.
Campaign logistics bring in a whole different game: hilltops and springs of water, or stretches of farmlands with ripe corn (or pasture land where flocks and herds are still present) become significant considerations. Maps replace tabletops for 99% of the campaign and planning of routes and marches becomes essential, as does obtaining reliable guides. Scouting becomes a vital activity rather than just a way to see if someone gets a flank march. Cities become places where you can fix or replace your kit and pick up an easy instalment of food. This is real soldiering as it was in the pre-gunpowder era. It might not be that easy to fix a quick game at the club, though.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 07, 2015, 02:00:34 PM
Quote from: Holly on January 06, 2015, 09:25:23 PM
or looking at it the other way
if you wanted to simulate a massed/rapid arrow deluge, you can add a one off +1 factor and then not have to do much record keeping.
But then you don't incorporate logistics in the game, which is where we came in.
Quote
I dont mind a bit of record keeping personally having cut my teeth on 5th and 6th WRG (a notebook was ever present at my side for recording casualties, writing orders and drawing deployments) so actually quite like Dangun's suggestion
My own primary objection is the same as Patrick's - did archers reduce their rate of shooting proportional to the amount of ammunition they had left or did they have a standard rate of shooting, varying perhaps with tactical requirements, until they ran out of ammunition. The first gives you a gradual decline of effectiveness with each shot, the second gives even effect until they can't shoot anymore. I would favour the latter.
I probably didnt explain myself well enough, the +1 is the simplest way of simulating arrow logistics (without record keeping) by 'allowing' a one of massed arrow storm before reverting to standard usage. If we expand this method then we have the +1,0,-1,-2 scenario already described. If you want to look at it a slightly different way then archers shoot at standard rate for the first volley then have a -1 for the rest of the game
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 07, 2015, 08:59:10 PM
It really depends upon whether we want to focus on battlefield logistics or campaign logistics.
both are important although should be treated differently and of course not everyone plays campaign games
you could simulate some aspects of logistics on the battlefield in one off battles by 'spending' some point allocated to the army composition or by having a 'pot' of points specifically for logistics elements. eg spend points on water and food, missiles, secure supply lines which has an effect on battlefield effectiveness.
Ultimately, from the wargamer's point of view it does seem to come down to battlefield effectiveness. What might also be usable as a quasi-logistical exercise is to swap troop effectiveness for 'victory points', so that by degrading one's army under a variety of viable logistical excuses one can start with some victory points already under one's belt. The only reason for this would be if one has a cunning plan for an early success in competition play, and if not carefully regulated could see both sides auctioning off army point value for victory points as they gleefully commit their troops to thirst, hunger and/or ammunition depletion in quest of an early victory point margin.
Now who was it said that competition play encourages bad generalship?
In essence, logistical effects on the battlefield would be to permit extra capabilities (e.g. more ammo = more shooting or better shooting effect) or impose limitations (e.g. hungry = limited movement). There might also be small but significant behavioral aspects, e.g. thirsty troops in proximity to a stream will on their next move unless attacked form up facing the stream and spend (say) two turns without moving.
If running an operational campaign, finding sufficient water for one's troops and locating campsites near water sources becomes important. Failure to do this will perhaps have gleeful umpires imposing penalties in the form of random percentages of units wandering off in search of water. I know of two cases where an army suffered from a deficient water source just before or during a battle: Hannibal prior to Zama had to make do with a poor water supply, which imposed extra burdens on the camp followers, and Bayazid at Angora (AD 1402) found that Timurlane had inconsiderately diverted the nearby creek on which the Ottomans were relying for water. (One could add the second day of Hattin to this list, and doubtless others.) The intriguing point is that the affected side does not seem to have had its combat effectiveness reduced until well into the battle.
Food is another consideration. Missing breakfast is said to have disadvantaged the Romans at the Trebia and the Carthaginians at Ilipa. Given that 10,000 Romans broke through the Carthaginian (mainly Gallic) centre at the Trebia and the engaged Spanish in the Carthaginian army at Ilipa fought on for hours before melting away, one wonders just how much of a disadvantage it really was. Again, any debilitating effects seem to have taken place late rather than early.
What this post has drifted into is that logistical deficiencies seem to have inflicted effects late rather than early in a battle. This might best be represented by allowing a logistically-deficient force a set number of turns at full capability and then having its capabilities taper off - perhaps rapidly for troops in combat, more slowly for those simply moving or waiting.
really good points Patrick
I like the idea of imposing penalties such as units staying in position near water sources and the capability reduction after a few turns for logistically challenged forces.
Another way would be to have rolls for random events or drawing 'event' cards during a game.