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In our epic debate on the size of persian armies, Patrick made the following comment in passing

QuoteMost armies, with the possible exception of Dark Ages barbarians, will have signals to 'advance' and 'halt', and optionally 'retire', which are transmitted at the speed of sound and/or standard-waving, and will be acted upon within a very short time.

Now, this is probably a fairly common view and turns up in some rules where signalling was actually modelled (the old WRG series, for example).  But what evidence do we have of signalling on the ancient and medieval battlefield?

I have something of an interest in this subject from a medieval point of view and my overall view is that battlefield signalling in anything but the most basic sense was rare.  Trumpet signals were certainly used in camp (there is a standard three stage preparation to strike camp marked by trumpet calls which is often refered to).  Some battlefield "signals" did exist.  As Patrick says, general advance could be signalled by trumpets, but this was in the sense of general blowing of trumpets.  Occassionally there are references to trumpets signalling "rally" to cavalry.  I've not come across "halt" or "retire" though.  Interestingly Macchiavelli wrote on the need to get back to using military music in the way of the ancients (as you might expect), noting that military music of his time was just noise.  Making an inspiring/intimidating noise does seem to have been the main role of medieval military music, rather than signalling.

This is just, of course, one example.  It would be interesting to hear other examples from other times and places.

In terms of the practical outworking of this, we might consider what impact having a working system of signalling might have in terms of modelling.  Is a signal system usually associated with regulars, for example, and can be abstracted into the command and control advantage of regulars?

I thought flags were more useful than trumpets.

I personally think some kind of modelling of an orders system is crucial. Battles in our period depend on how orders were understood and executed.

Today I tried a new orders mechanism for Optio at the club, with two games and IMHO successful results. The Optio grid is divided into cells each composed of 10x10 squares. Cells placed next to each other replicate the grid pattern. These cells further subdivide into segments, each 5x5 squares. The segments and given number and letter co-ordinates rather like a chessboard, as shown below:


An Optio army has one general and about 3 commanders or so. At the beginning of the game each commander is given one or more orders depending on his command rating: a commander rated 1 can be given only 1 order, a commander rated 2 can get 2 orders, and so on.

Orders consist of an octagonal counter, with an arrow on one side and a grid reference on the other:


The counter is placed next to the commander arrow side face up, the arrow pointing to the player's edge of the board. When an order is activated, the arrow is turned to point to the order's destination segment. It obliges the commander himself to head directly for that segment, travelling at least one grid square per movement phase (2 movement phases in a turn) until he reaches the segment. His command follows at the player's discretion - theoretically a commander can head for the destination segment alone and leave his entire command behind.

Once in the destination segment the order counter is flipped over, revealing the coordinates. The commander can move around in the segment under the player's control. His next order is activated at the player's discretion, moving him on to the next segment, and so on.

Orders can be changed only after a current order is completed and the commander is 8 grid squares or less from the general.

There are also general advance or retirement orders. The player declares a general advance: all current orders are cancelled. The orders counters' arrows are turned to face either nearest enemy or the enemy side of the mapboard and the commanders immediately start moving accordingly. For retirement orders, the arrows point to the player's own edge or the side edges if nearer.

In the two games we played the orders worked well. One commander unwisely advanced ahead of his mounted troops. These were charged by elephant and obliged to evade beyond the command distance of the commander, who had to continue in the direction of his orders without his men until fresh orders from the general brought him back into the battle. Moral of the story - a commander needs to stay with his men.

In a second game the general was killed, obliging the commander on the other wing to stay in his segment and continue the fight from there. His side still won the game.

Interesting as usual Justin.  It seems to me (correct me if I'm wrong) that you bundle together all forms of order giving; sound signals, flag signals, written, verbal?

Having a little spare time today, I went back to my books and did discover references to a medieval signal to withdraw from the field.  Froissart mentions it at Rosebeke and Cocherel.  In both cases, it is not a signal used in contact.  I also came across a reference at Woeringen to a signal at the end of the day for "Grub up" - again essentially a non-combat signal.

BTW, I got sidetracked into reading about Cocherel - this may yet form another of our "Odd battles of the Hundred Years War".  A small affair but with a strong cast :)

Results from the first three pages of a quick Google search using "battlefield signals in ancient warfare":

*Ancient Warfare 3.6 (http://www.karwansaraypublishers.com/pw/ancient-warfare/previous-issues/ancient-warfare-iii.6/) had the theme "Carnyx, cornu and signa: battlefield communications", so likely worth a look;

* This paper (https://www.academia.edu/1264341/Use_of_Musical_Percussion_Instruments_in_Ancient_Eastern_Warfare_the_Parthian_and_Middle_Asian_Evidence) available as a free download from academia.edu (you need to sign-up for the site, but that's pretty painless as it's free too), "The Use of Musical Percussion Instruments in Ancient Eastern Warfare: the Parthian and Middle Asian Evidence", by Valerii P. Nikonorov;

* An article by William R. Trotter from the June 2005 issue of Military History magazine, "The Music of War (http://www.historynet.com/the-music-of-war.htm)" available on the History.net website. Very readable, albeit a little brief in its coverage, and without references;

* A direct-link free PDF download to a paper by R. Cross, "Bold as brass: 'brass instruments' in the Roman army", available here (https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=20&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFIQFjAJOAo&url=https%3A%2F%2Fstudentjournal.mq.edu.au%2FCross.pdf&ei=ULaFVaGDNcb_UM-RgZgE&usg=AFQjCNE8lFJ1E3qiETB-6ui6-6zCVBI3fQ&sig2=uDQ6Ueh9upX44kf-1lom2w&bvm=bv.96339352,d.ZGU);

* Comments on and around page 8 of John Wallace and Alexander McGrattan's book "The Trumpet" based on text from the Dead Sea Scrolls' "War Scroll", the book partly available online via Google Books here (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=JcyYpIKW78kC&pg=PA8&lpg=PA8&dq=battlefield+signals+in+ancient+warfare&source=bl&ots=BRe8_C8uiN&sig=INpYmEQ-5x_vqxf2L1w-aDPAIJU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=0bOFVZG0CIn9UpKtg-gP&ved=0CEgQ6AEwBzgK#v=onepage&q=battlefield%20signals%20in%20ancient%20warfare&f=false). Although this is from a religious text, it seems probable the description was based on actual battlefield examples. From that:

The trumpets of Summons shall sound for disposal in battle formations and to summon the foot-soldiers to advance when the gates of war shall open; and the trumpets of Alarm shall sound for massacre, and for ambush, and for pursuit when the enemy shall be smitten, and for retreat from battle.

and

* This paper (http://jbq.jewishbible.org/assets/Uploads/402/jbq_402_handsignals.pdf), again a freely downloadable PDF, from the Jewish Bible Quarterly website, "Signalling in Biblical Warfare and Moses' Role as Military Commander", by S. H. Blondheim and Uri C. Cohen.

Should be something there or in the references to help make some progress, I'd hope!

Quote from: Erpingham on June 20, 2015, 07:42:32 PM
Interesting as usual Justin.  It seems to me (correct me if I'm wrong) that you bundle together all forms of order giving; sound signals, flag signals, written, verbal?

Yes. I wanted to keep things as simple as possible. One refinement that emerged from playtesting is that a commander in the execution of his order is not obliged to continue advancing into charge or shooting range of enemy bases. He can stop, arrange his own troops to clear a path before him, then continue in the direction his orders take him. But he cannot move in any other direction. Orders BTW must be such that a commander moves in one of the eight directions of the grid. If he wants to move one segment up and two segments across he will need two orders, one moving him diagonally and the other straight across.

His troops always remain free to move wherever the player wants them to go, but if they move out of command range of the commander, any further movement can only be either a charge against enemy or movement towards the commander in order to get back within command range.

Vegetius has a paragraph on signaling with instruments... 2.15.
Its unhelpfully vague though... like, "the trumpet sounds the charge and the retreat."

Is V's statement that "the cornu is used only to regulate the movements of the signa" the origin of the theory that the trumpet-blast was used to draw the soldiers' attention to the standard, which then signalled the manoeuvre required? Or is there another source for that?

I was trying to dig out the relevant quote from Procopius where Belisarius is besieging Auximum or is it Ariminum and  he are troubled by Gothic ambushes and he femembers that the Ancients used trumpet signals for recalls and B agrees to train the men to obey a trumpet signal. This , of course, implies that such signals had fallen into disuse.
There is an advantage that flags and signa have over trumpets. If the trumpets sound the same and one plays retreat for a particular unit how does the soldier know that this is his unit and not another. Using the trumpet to direct attention to the flag has the advantage that the soldier knows his flag and can see what it is signalling.
Must say I always felt that VIth edition's plethora of orders and signals was a bit of a nonsense. At least once I fought someone who had sheets of conditional orders forseeing every situation. 
Roy

Pre gunpowder you could count on most battlefields being visible enough for a go flag to work.

Obviously, once you start, dust becomes an issue, but the basic hold vs attack should always work, and detail under that involved pre battle planning.

Noise is always at risk of being drowned out for army level signals.

So I can believe trumpets to draw a unit to check what that units flag is telling them.  But not to signal an army command.

Quote from: Duncan Head on June 22, 2015, 09:25:16 AM
Is V's statement that "the cornu is used only to regulate the movements of the signa" the origin of the theory that the trumpet-blast was used to draw the soldiers' attention to the standard, which then signalled the manoeuvre required? Or is there another source for that?

Vegetius II.15 (Clark's translation):

"The music of the legion consists of trumpets, cornets and buccinae. The trumpet sounds the charge and the retreat. The cornets are used only to regulate the motions of the colors; the trumpets serve when the soldiers are ordered out to any work without the colors; but in time of action, the trumpets and cornets sound together [i.e. are each used]. The classicum, which is a particular sound of the buccina or horn, is appropriated to the commander-in-chief and is used in the presence of the general, or at the execution of a soldier, as a mark of its being done by his authority. The ordinary guards and outposts are always mounted and relieved by the sound of trumpet, which also directs the motions of the soldiers on working parties and on field days. The cornets sound whenever the colors are to be struck or planted. These rules must be punctually observed in all exercises and reviews so that the soldiers may be ready to obey them in action without hesitation according to the general's orders either to charge or halt, to pursue the enemy or to retire. For reason will convince us that what is necessary to be performed in the heat of action should constantly be practiced in the leisure of peace. "

The Latin:

"Habet praeterea legio tubicines cornicines bucinatores. Tubicen ad bellum vocat milites et rursum receptui canit. Cornicines quotiens canunt, non milites sed signa ad eorum obtemperant nutum. Ergo quotiens ad aliquod opus exituri sunt soli milites, tubicines canunt, quotiens mouenda sunt signa, cornicines canunt; quotiens antem pugnatur, et tubicines et cornicines pariter canunt. Classicum item appellatur quod bucinatores per cornu dicunt. Hoc insigne videtur imperii, quia classicum canitur imperatore praesente vel cum in militem capitaliter animadvertitur, quia hoc ex imperatoris legibus fieri necesse est. Sive ergo ad vigilias vel agrarias faciendas sive ad opus aliquod vel ad decursionem campi exeunt milites, tubicine vocante operantur et rursus tubicine admonente cessant. Cum autem mouentur signa aut iam mota figenda sunt, cornicines canunt. Quod ideo in omnibus exercitiis et processionibus custoditur, ut in ipsa pugna facilius obtemperent milites, sive eos pugnare sive stare sive sequi vel redire praeceperint duces; siquidem ratio manifesta sit semper in otio debere fieri quod necessario faciendum videtur in proelio."

From the Latin Library (http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/vegetius2.html) Epitoma Rei Militaris, which employs a different numbering system (II.15 is II.22 here).  It also employs 'u' for 'v' throughout (adjusted above).

The gist appears to be that the hornblowers (cornicines) are used for in-battle control of specific units (each of which follows its signum, standard) while the trumpeters (bucinatores) are employed for general signals affecting the whole army.  If one hears a horn blowing but cannot make out the signal, one knows it is intended for somebody else - if it were intended for one's own unit a closer horn-blower would be sounding - but the strident trumpet blasts would be distinguishable above almost any noise and would grab everyone's attention.

The versatility of the horn as a musical instrument compared to a (valve-less) trumpet would allow it a wider repertoire of calls.

Quote from: aligern on June 22, 2015, 10:16:57 AM
I was trying to dig out the relevant quote from Procopius where Belisarius is besieging Auximum or is it Ariminum and  he are troubled by Gothic ambushes and he femembers that the Ancients used trumpet signals for recalls and B agrees to train the men to obey a trumpet signal. This , of course, implies that such signals had fallen into disuse.

A quick google found this incident in Chapter 2 of The Trumpet by John Wallace & Alexander McGrattan, where the place is identified as Arcona.  Interestingly, they refer to several references in Byzantine military manuals on the use of horns and trumpets (not entirely consistent).  One source states that each unit should have 4 men to transmit orders - two by voice, one by trumpet, one by signal.  Alas, the preview doesn't contain the footnotes :( 

Quote from: Erpingham on June 22, 2015, 01:27:16 PM

Quote from: aligern on June 22, 2015, 10:16:57 AMOne source states that each unit should have 4 men to transmit orders - two by voice, one by trumpet, one by signal.  Alas, the preview doesn't contain the footnotes

Asklepiodotos suggests three:

Quote from: Tactics II.9The supernumeraries were formerly attached to the company, as their name (ektaktoi) indicates, because they were not included in the number of the company: an army-herald, a signalman, a bugler, an aide, and a file-closer. The first was to pass on the command by a spoken order, the second by a signal, in case the order could not be heard because of the uproar, the third by the bugle, whenever the signal could not be seen for the dust; the aide was there to fetch whatever was needed, while the supernumerary file-closer was to bring up the straggler to his position in the company.

The Bible is replete with battlefield signalling.  Exodus 17:9 (Moses standing on a hill with his staff raised) might be a first example, Numbers 2:2 details standards and banners, Numbers 10:1 details use of silver trumpets to signal assembly and breaking camp ("if only one is sounded, the leaders... are to assemble before you.  When a trumpet blast is sounded, the tribes camping on the east are to set out. At the sounding of a second blast, the camps on the south are to set out. The blast [Hebrew taqa - Strong's 8628] will be the signal for setting out. To gather the assembly, blow the trumpets, but not with the same signal [Hebrew ruwa, Strong's 7321, to sound an alarm, make noise, shout].  Numbers 10:9, "When you go into battle... sound a blast [or "signal" - Hebrew ruwa again] on the trumpets."  The horns used at Jericho were rams horns (Josua 6:4, Hebrew shofar Strong's 7782) not the silver horns.  When attacking Ai and Bethel, Joshua arranged a visual signal of a burning city to signal a counterattack. In Judges 3:27, Ehud blew [Hebrew taqa again] a trumpet [or horn, Hebrew shofar Strong's 7782] to gather his men.

While details are skimpy, various trumpets and visual signals were used to effect command and control of Israelite armies.

Quote from: Dave Beatty on June 23, 2015, 10:52:09 PM

While details are skimpy, various trumpets and visual signals were used to effect command and control of Israelite armies.

It is interesting that many of the examples are actually to do with camp life, or assemblies, not battlefield signalling, much like the Medieval stuff.  Interesting to see different trumpets and horns being used for different purposes, as with the Romans.

So far, I think Patrick's initial observation is reasonably correct.  Camp and march signals seem common.  Most armies have "big picture" signals.  Only so far have the regulars of the Roman, Byzantine and Hellenistic periods shown a hint of unit signals to change battlefield orders.

On the visual signalling front, do we know what signals were made by the standards? Medieval standards were primarily markers for where commanders were and troops under command positioned or moved themselves according to what their standard did.  I get the impression from the regular examples that they had more to it than that.

Quote from: Erpingham on June 24, 2015, 09:39:04 AMOnly so far have the regulars of the Roman, Byzantine and Hellenistic periods shown a hint of unit signals to change battlefield orders.

There's a fairly sophisticated Chinese tradition of flag signals for unit manoeuvre using signal-flags in the colours of the Five Directions, but I haven't dug out any quotes for it. They also have the "big picture" signals - beat the drums for the advance, sound the gong for the retreat - from an early date.

Is there anything that indicates signals giving the timing of the execution of prearranged orders?

There's the Sellasia flag-signals - "named unit will attack as arranged on signal A" - and one of those appears to be triggering an ambush by concealed troops:

Quote from: Polybios II.66-67It was arranged that the Illyrians, who had bivouacked in full order during the previous night along the river Gorgylus, close to the foot of Euas, were to begin their assault on the hill when they saw a flag of linen raised from the direction of Olympus; and that the Megalopolitans and cavalry should do the same when the king raised a scarlet flag.

The moment for beginning the battle had come: the signal was given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the officers to their men to do their duty, and in a moment they started into view of the enemy and began assaulting the hill.

I suppose Mel Gibson in brave heart doesn't count.
But it was one of the few bits that felt right.

Quote from: Duncan Head on June 24, 2015, 01:19:40 PM
There's the Sellasia flag-signals - "named unit will attack as arranged on signal A" - and one of those appears to be triggering an ambush by concealed troops:

Quote from: Polybios II.66-67It was arranged that the Illyrians, who had bivouacked in full order during the previous night along the river Gorgylus, close to the foot of Euas, were to begin their assault on the hill when they saw a flag of linen raised from the direction of Olympus; and that the Megalopolitans and cavalry should do the same when the king raised a scarlet flag.

The moment for beginning the battle had come: the signal was given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the officers to their men to do their duty, and in a moment they started into view of the enemy and began assaulting the hill.

Ta Duncan. I imagine I can invoke this to justify a general rule.

Normally pips are spent in a wargame to move troops.
But if signaling was limited to such big picture objectives, it seems more appropriate to spend pips to stop troops moving in accordance with the pre-battle plan.

Polybius has an extensive section on fire-signaling 10.43 to 10.47.

I struggle to believe that his coding of the alphabet into torch signals was practical (10.45.6) despite him telling us - modestly, that it was, "perfected by myself."

For Classical Greeks a useful article is:
J. K. Anderson, "Cleon's Orders at Amphipolis"
The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 85 (1965), pp. 1-4

I'll summarize his main findings below:

Signals are divided by Arrian (Arrian Tactica 27) into three groups. Verbal orders, being most readily intelligible, are preferable when they can be heard above the din of battle. Visual signals may be obscured in the dust and confusion. Finally, the trumpet is useful in overcoming 'atmospheric disturbances'

Visual signals are found in Greek warfare from at least the fifth century B.C. onwards, but they are generally prearranged, either to convey the news that some foreseeable event has actually occurred (e.g. Thucydides viii 95-4; Xenophon, Hellenica i 1.2, ii 1.27.) or to coordinate the operations of two bodies of troops who are widely separated but in sight of each other (Thucydides i 63.2.). But the signals used ... are all obviously arranged for the occasion. There does not seem to have been any code by which the commander of a Greek army, at any rate in the classical period, could convey orders to his men on the spur of the moment by visual signals.

Trumpet signals, on the other hand, seem to have been codified at an early date. Distinct calls for the 'charge' and 'retire' are implied by passages in Thucydides, Xenophon and later writers.
Thucydides vi 69.2
Xenophon, Anabasis iv 4.22

Better evidence is provided by stories of generals who ordered their men to attack when the recall was sounded, and retire on the sounding of the advance
Polyaenus v 16.4
Diodorus xiv 52.1-5
Xenophon, Anabasis iv 3.29-32 [and here they are barbarians who wouldn't know the actual calls]

It is possible that there were other distinct trumpet calls for other contingencies, such as a sudden attack by the enemy.
Polyaenus i 41.3; Xenophon, Anabasis vii 4.16.

We do find, however, in Xenophon special signals for pitching or moving camp, sounded not upon the trumpet but upon the horn
Xenophon, Anabasis ii 2.4; Cyropaedia v 3-44

But though the trumpet might convey an 'executive' order with the definite meaning 'Charge' or 'Retire', it could not explain how the operation was to be carried out. Therefore, whenever possible the good officer would issue a 'cautionary' command beforehand, giving full details of the procedure to be adopted. Once more, examples are found in Xenophon's Anabasis.
Xenophon, Anabasis iii 4.3-4; v 2.12-14; vi 5.25.

The verbal cautionary order might be given by a single loud-voiced herald, like Tolmides of Elis (Xenophon, Anabasis ii 2.20; iii 1.46; iii 4.36; v 2.I18.), or it might be passed from man to man down the ranks, as was the watchword before Cunaxa.... It was better for the general to issue his orders to a 'command group' of senior officers, and send them or other 'appropriate persons' (Xenophon, Anabasis v 2.12) to pass on his orders to the different units. [Or for Spartans, proper command structure (Thucydides v 66.3)] In any case, he could not count on the verbal orders reaching everyone simultaneously. The cautionary order had therefore to be followed by the executive order, given by trumpet, which coordinated the operations of the different units and made certain that they all acted at once.

Cleon at Amphipolis (Thuc v 10 3-4) ordered the signal to be given as he began to issue his verbal orders [resulting in confusion and defeat].

Quote from: Dangun on June 24, 2015, 06:21:11 PM
Normally pips are spent in a wargame to move troops.
But if signaling was limited to such big picture objectives, it seems more appropriate to spend pips to stop troops moving in accordance with the pre-battle plan.

We actually played some games of DBA with 'negative pips'
Basically you played pips to get a base to 'change it's state'.
So if it was stationary it too a pip to get it to move in a certain direction. If it was moving it took a pip to stop it or get it to turn.

We discovered that the big disadvantage was that you had to remember what the base had been doing last move. It did mean that retreats were good and could escalate if you didn't get in there and sort things  8)

Jim

Quote from: Jim Webster on June 25, 2015, 05:17:22 PM
We actually played some games of DBA with 'negative pips'
Basically you played pips to get a base to 'change it's state'.
So if it was stationary it too a pip to get it to move in a certain direction. If it was moving it took a pip to stop it or get it to turn.

That is interesting.
So you have a basic state - advancing, halted or withdrawing, and then you pay with pips for any variance with the basic state.

Quote from: Dangun on June 26, 2015, 04:28:09 PM

That is interesting.
So you have a basic state - advancing, halted or withdrawing, and then you pay with pips for any variance with the basic state.

You might add facing to the basic state list.

I recall a set of rules I think by Simon Macdowell which used a "steady state" system but his was slightly more complex, some troop types being more difficult to start and others more difficult to stop.

It does overcome some problems with "stop/go" using pips but overall, does it lead to any less artificial battlefield behaviour?

Quote from: Dangun on June 26, 2015, 04:28:09 PM

Quote from: Jim Webster on June 25, 2015, 05:17:22 PM
We actually played some games of DBA with 'negative pips'
Basically you played pips to get a base to 'change it's state'.
So if it was stationary it too a pip to get it to move in a certain direction. If it was moving it took a pip to stop it or get it to turn.

That is interesting.
So you have a basic state - advancing, halted or withdrawing, and then you pay with pips for any variance with the basic state.

Yes, so if a unit is pushed back and not followed up, it keeps going back unless you throw pips at it. But if your battle line is advancing towards the enemy battle line, once you've got it going, it keeps going.

Also it seems that you need about the same number of points as you do with the normal system  8)

Jim

Quote from: Erpingham on June 26, 2015, 04:42:18 PM

Quote from: Dangun on June 26, 2015, 04:28:09 PM

That is interesting.
So you have a basic state - advancing, halted or withdrawing, and then you pay with pips for any variance with the basic state.

You might add facing to the basic state list.

I recall a set of rules I think by Simon Macdowell which used a "steady state" system but his was slightly more complex, some troop types being more difficult to start and others more difficult to stop.

It does overcome some problems with "stop/go" using pips but overall, does it lead to any less artificial battlefield behaviour?

probably leads to differently artificial behaviour  ;)

Jim

Quote from: Jim Webster on June 25, 2015, 05:17:22 PM
We actually played some games of DBA with 'negative pips'

As recounted in a Slingshot article an issue or two back IIRC (and as proposed in my series an issue or two before that). As I recall you found that behaviour under 'negative pips' was pretty similar to 'positive pips' - but to me it still feels better.

Quote
We discovered that the big disadvantage was that you had to remember what the base had been doing last move.

Use dust markers - coloured cotton wool. Behind the unit = advancing, in front of it = retreating, and no dust = standing still. No feats of memory required.

I like the idea of the dust markers

Jim

I had never really thought about it before, but the scarcity of sources for battlefield signals, is a little perplexing.

What are we to make of a battle narrative when the cavalry does x, or the right wing does y? Do we just assume that the signal was always unrecorded? Do the narratives lead us to over-estimate a general's ability to control?

Why was describing signals concerning the camp and march more interesting a topic to our sources than the description of battlefield signals?

Quote from: Dangun on June 30, 2015, 07:20:02 AM


Why was describing signals concerning the camp and march more interesting a topic to our sources than the description of battlefield signals?

I would suggest it wasn't.  March and camp signals were easily regulated, easily transmitted and received and used day after day, rather than one off in battle, so they were probably more common and this is what is reflected in our sources.

It seems to me from what we've assembled is a lot of armies have no more than basic signalling capability (General advance, general withdrawal, rally after pursuit - this last perhaps being the equivalent of "to me!").  Some armies had more sophisticated signals (Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, Chinese were noted) but even here there is implicit recognition of the limitations of signals - hard to make out in the din and dust of battle - and "shout and repeat through the ranks" seems a popular alternative.

That might have been the advantage of the old Battle cry. Once you heard people start shouting it, you knew you were going forward

Jim

This raises to the question: how much control should a player be allowed to have over his troops? It's probably the biggest point of divergence between realism and playability: Rome Total War is an extreme case of realism sacrificed for playability, but most rulesets tend to give the player too many puppet strings. The abandonment of orders mechanisms reflects I suspect a tacit acquiescence to playability as the prime motivator for wargaming. After all, who wants to issue a string of orders to the different commands, then discover one's opponent has second-guessed one's intentions, and spend the rest of the game a nearly-helpless spectator of the dismemberment of one's army. That would be realism.  :o

Quote from: Justin Swanton on June 30, 2015, 12:33:52 PM
This raises to the question: how much control should a player be allowed to have over his troops?

"Should" is a subjective term IMO and depends heavily on what the player wants to get out of the game. For much of our period battlefield generalship ended with deployment. After that, the general's role was either to inspire (e.g. leading by example in the front rank) or to manage reserves locally by committing rear lines to plug gaps. The wide sweeping maneouvres we see on a lot of tabletops tended to occur rarely, and to be limited to especially talented leaders with well-trained troops and I suggest that most historical generals had relatively few decision points once battle was joined.

Unfortunately games that boil down to "line up and kill whatever is in front of you" tend to make for a boring gaming experience, especially when you consider that wargamers fight far more battles than any historical general ever did. Most successful rules therefore grant unrealistic levels of control to players to generate the decision points that make the gaming experience interesting.

Cheers
Mick 

The level of control may or may not be unrealistic, depending who or what the player represents. The C-in-c? The C-in-c plus the other generals in the army? The entire command structure? I forget who it was, but I do recall on some list or other someone(*) suggesting that we actually represent not so much an individual as the presiding genius or daimon of the army as a whole. 

(*) Note the precise source citation that is my trademark  :(

Before we lament the loss of order mechanisms and their contribution to realism, we might like to think were they really realistic or did they represent and essentially gunpowder era system dropped into an earlier period?  Is a world of generals standing on a convenient ridge firing off small message chits, or using complex signalling systems, realistic in our period?  Did every unit have detailed orders which they stuck to to the letter regardless until changed? Or were the main components of an army mostly on their own once everything kicked off and their commanders were left to use their skill and judgement to bring the army battleplan to fruition?  And did the minor bits of the army do what they always did in the place in which they were told to do it?  Not offering a definitive answer here but there may be more than one way of viewing what is realistic.

Quote from: Duncan Head on June 30, 2015, 01:15:19 PM
The level of control may or may not be unrealistic, depending who or what the player represents. The C-in-c? The C-in-c plus the other generals in the army? The entire command structure? I forget who it was, but I do recall on some list or other someone(*) suggesting that we actually represent not so much an individual as the presiding genius or daimon of the army as a whole. 

(*) Note the precise source citation that is my trademark  :(

That makes sense.

It also provides a fig leaf for the fact that we're a lot of tinkerers who want to be everything from the centurion to the Imperator

Jim

What I'm trying to do with the Optio orders system (any resemblance to a promo blurb is purely coincidental  ::)) is allow for local initiative whilst constraining overall initiative. Orders counters don't oblige a commander to do anything other than personally progress at his own speed to a particular segment of the battlefield which itself is large enough (5x5 squares or about 10x10") for him to do interesting things once he gets there. How he makes his command follow him is entirely at the discretion of the player, and once in the battlefield segment the commander has considerable scope for local action. The only limitation is that he cannot perform grand tactical manoeuvres - like moving from one wing to the other - without orders.

A few more games will establish how well it works. BTW anyone up for playtesting over the internet?

Quote from: Duncan Head on June 30, 2015, 01:15:19 PM
The level of control may or may not be unrealistic, depending who or what the player represents. The C-in-c? The C-in-c plus the other generals in the army? The entire command structure?

That is an elegant solution.

But we probably have even less evidence for what degree of autonomy / initiative a subordinate general, let-alone a centurion, might have...
It is difficult... yet the sources refer to some quite complicated maneuvers - interpenetration of heavy troops by skirmishers, the mysterious line relief/rotation. Presumably someone initiated this type of maneuver with a command?

Quote from: Dangun on June 30, 2015, 06:27:30 PM

Quote from: Duncan Head on June 30, 2015, 01:15:19 PM
The level of control may or may not be unrealistic, depending who or what the player represents. The C-in-c? The C-in-c plus the other generals in the army? The entire command structure?

That is an elegant solution.

But we probably have even less evidence for what degree of autonomy / initiative a subordinate general, let-alone a centurion, might have...
It is difficult... yet the sources refer to some quite complicated maneuvers - interpenetration of heavy troops by skirmishers, the mysterious line relief/rotation. Presumably someone initiated this type of maneuver with a command?

Withdrawing skirmishers seems to have been an army-level command (cf. Polybius III.115.4: "then the legionaries took the place of the light-armed and closed with the enemy") so would have had an army-level signal.  Line relief seems to have similarly been an army-level occurrence, as the Romans - at least post-300-and-something BC - seem to have exchanged the complete line or none.

The obvious chap to have initiated such a command would be the consul, or the C-in-C in a non-Roman army.  Incidentally, line relief does appear to have been a one-time relief rather than a periodic rotation, and the relieved line seems to have taken station directly behind the line relieving it, providing moral and perhaps a little physical support.  This at least is what I extract from Livy's account of the Battle of Vesuvius in Book VIII, chapters 8-10.

Quote from: Duncan Head on June 30, 2015, 01:15:19 PM
I forget who it was, but I do recall on some list or other someone(*) suggesting that we actually represent not so much an individual as the presiding genius or daimon of the army as a whole. 

(*) Note the precise source citation that is my trademark  :(

We do perforce represent every level of command from C-in-C to file leader, as tabletop figures are incapable of thinking or even moving for themselves.  There is really no way around that.  As someone on some list or other ;) has undoubtedly pointed out, real armies are not manoeuvred around by 450-foot-tall deities with dice and measuring tapes, but then real battles are not fought by lining up metal (or plastic, or terracotta) statues and expecting them to get on with it.

Our goal is presumably to design for effect, so that the player has approximately the same options and choices as historical troops would have had at every level of command meaningful at the represented scale of the action.

Another example from Caesar's ready stylus, this one from his battle against the Nervii at the river Sabis (Sambre) in 57 BC:

Quote"Caesar had every thing to do at one time: the standard to be displayed [vexillum proponendum], which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; the signal to be given by the trumpet [signum tuba dandum]; the soldiers to be called off from the works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of seeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle to be formed [acies instruenda]; the soldiers to be encouraged [milites cohortandi]; the watchword to be given [signum dandum = 'the signal given', perhaps for beginning battle]. A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy. Under these difficulties two things proved of advantage; the skill and experience of the soldiers, because, having been trained by former engagements, they could suggest to themselves what ought to be done, as conveniently as receive information from others; and because Caesar had forbidden his several lieutenants to depart from the works and their respective legions, before the camp was fortified. These, on account of the near approach and the speed of the enemy, did not then wait for any command from Caesar, but of themselves executed whatever appeared proper." - Gallic War II.20

Displaying the 'standard' (actually vexillum - a flag dangling from a crosspiece) was the signal for the men to arm.  The trumpet signal was, depending upon how one reads the text, either an auditory reinforcement of the same, as the translator has it, or (more likely) was the signal to recall men engaged in finding materials for and working on the rampart.  Then the men had to form up and finally - after the indispensable pre-battle speech (Caesar had to abort this on account of lack of time) the (unspecified) signal for battle is given (he details this in II.21 where he makes a 'short speech' to one legion and then, as the Nervii are close, gives the signal for battle).

Caesar gives the impression that much if not all of this was done as and when the C-in-C gave instructions by signal.  Given the speed of the Nervii attack, there was insufficient time for Caesar to attend to it all, but the experience of the troops, who knew what was expected of them, filled the 'command control gap'.

During the battle, while Caesar was fully occupied straightening out the VII and XII legions on his embattled right, his subordinates acted with military common sense to save the day.  Labienus, whose left wing of the IX and X legions had routed their opponents and pursued them onto the high ground in the enemy rear, sent the X Legion to help out without being asked.  At about the same time, the commanders of the two legions covering the baggage marched to the sound of the battle cries and took a hand in the fighting.

Now it was the turn of the Nervii to be hard-pressed, but they either did not have a withdrawal signal or scorned to use one, so perished fighting to the last.

In his account of the destruction of Sabinius' legion by the Eburones, Caesar notes evidence of battlefield signalling exhibited by that particular tribe:

Quote"But judgment was not wanting to the barbarians; for their leaders ordered it proclaimed through the ranks "that no man should quit his place; that the booty was theirs, and for them was reserved whatever the Romans should leave; therefore let them consider that all things depended on their victory. Our men were equal to them in fighting, both in courage and in number, and though they were deserted by their leader and by fortune, yet they still placed all hope of safety in their valor, and as often as any cohort sallied forth on that side, a great number of the enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when he observed this, ordered the command to be issued [pronuntiari iubet] that they throw their weapons from a distance and do not approach too near, and in whatever direction the Romans should make an attack, there give way (from the lightness of their appointments and from their daily practice no damage could be done them); [but] pursue them when betaking themselves to their standards again." - Gallic War III.34

Caesar does not say how this command was issued: we may conjecture that a change in the note and timbre of the carnyxes (Gallic war horns) might convey the message, although someone would have to shout in the ears of the first few carnyx-blowers so they could change their tune and the rest follow suit.  How the Gauls signalled this change of orders is uncertain, but it seems they did have a signal for this purpose.

We are dealing here with Caesar's account of a battle that he was not at so he may be post rationalising a report from a survivor.
If we want to make sense of the Galluc actions, let us add a bit more than Caesar. It is highly lijely that the gauls assault the romans and then, when they prove a tough nut to crack,mthere is a pause. In that pause the word is passed down to move to a a more skirmishing form of warfare. Depending upon how we read the Latin this skirmishing warfare may be something that these Gauls practise and thus be a standard drill .

It might thus be that all Ambiorix has to shout and have uttered through the ranks is 'Plan B Bonny Lads!'. It must also be that this method is a drill because it is being carried out by Gallic units retreating and advancing upon an order.
It might, if course, also be that Caesar has borrowed a description of Numidians or Spaniards fighting Romans and just pasted it in to explain a common way of fighting with the javelin in the West.
Roy

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 02, 2015, 09:08:22 AM

Quote"But judgment was not wanting to the barbarians; for their leaders ordered it proclaimed through the ranks "that no man should quit his place; that the booty was theirs, and for them was reserved whatever the Romans should leave; therefore let them consider that all things depended on their victory. Our men were equal to them in fighting, both in courage and in number, and though they were deserted by their leader and by fortune, yet they still placed all hope of safety in their valor, and as often as any cohort sallied forth on that side, a great number of the enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when he observed this, ordered the command to be issued [pronuntiari iubet] that they throw their weapons from a distance and do not approach too near, and in whatever direction the Romans should make an attack, there give way (from the lightness of their appointments and from their daily practice no damage could be done them); [but] pursue them when betaking themselves to their standards again." - Gallic War III.34

Caesar does not say how this command was issued: we may conjecture that a change in the note and timbre of the carnyxes (Gallic war horns) might convey the message, although someone would have to shout in the ears of the first few carnyx-blowers so they could change their tune and the rest follow suit.  How the Gauls signalled this change of orders is uncertain, but it seems they did have a signal for this purpose.

This seems to me a very complex signal to be produced by horn playing, unless it is "Go to standing order no.3" or such like.  Unless the highlighted phrase pronuntiari iubet implies a musical signal, might this be better seen as passing an order by word of mouth? 

Quote from: Erpingham on July 02, 2015, 10:00:22 AM
This seems to me a very complex signal to be produced by horn playing, unless it is "Go to standing order no.3" or such like.  Unless the highlighted phrase pronuntiari iubet implies a musical signal, might this be better seen as passing an order by word of mouth?

This may in fact be how it was done: I was put in mind of Gauls spreading news by shouting from one field to another (cannot find the reference  :-[ ), which might suggest that they had the kind of enhanced parade-ground voices which could repeat an order throughout a comparatively small (no more than 15,000 at most) army in a fairly short time.

Quote from: aligern on July 02, 2015, 09:59:39 AM

It might thus be that all Ambiorix has to shout and have uttered through the ranks is 'Plan B Bonny Lads!'. It must also be that this method is a drill because it is being carried out by Gallic units retreating and advancing upon an order.

Essentially we seem to be heading towards very similar conclusions.  Hopefully this is a case of great minds thinking alike ...

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 02, 2015, 08:43:11 PM

This may in fact be how it was done: I was put in mind of Gauls spreading news by shouting from one field to another (cannot find the reference  :-[ ), which might suggest that they had the kind of enhanced parade-ground voices which could repeat an order throughout a comparatively small (no more than 15,000 at most) army in a fairly short time.

Remember the density of people working on the land would probably be quite high and they wouldn't have to shout very loud and almost certainly wouldn't need anything like the Silbo gomero

I remember the quote and at the time I assumed that it was a mixture of shouting news and nipping across to the boundary and telling them

I think the point is not that they have loud voices but that there's an awful lot of them and they're terrible gossips  8)

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 02, 2015, 08:43:11 PM
This may in fact be how it was done: I was put in mind of Gauls spreading news by shouting from one field to another (cannot find the reference  :-[ )

Caesar, Gallic War VII.3: "The report is quickly spread among all the states of Gaul; for, whenever a more important and remarkable event takes place, they transmit the intelligence through their lands [fields?] and districts [villages? boundaries?] by a shout (clamore per agros regionesque significant); the others take it up in succession, and pass it to their neighbors, as happened on this occasion; for the things which were done at Genabum at sunrise, were heard in the territories of the Arverni before the end of the first watch, which is an extent of more than a hundred and sixty miles."

Thanks, Duncan.  Knew it had to be there somewhere.

As a means of spreading word quickly, it would seem useful, given its approximately 13.5 miles per hour omnidirectionality.  Whether the order to revert to skirmishing tactics was given by Gallic male voice choir or some other means, its transmission in battle, even if during a relative lull, would seem to imply a signal as opposed to a discussion during a tea-break.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 03, 2015, 11:28:45 AM
As a means of spreading word quickly, it would seem useful, given its approximately 13.5 miles per hour omnidirectionality. 

Skepticism may be useful here.
Over any significant distance that's faster than either people or horses, and therefore untestable at the time.

Can we return to the original order for a moment

QuoteAmbiorix, when he observed this, ordered the command to be issued [pronuntiari iubet] that they throw their weapons from a distance and do not approach too near, and in whatever direction the Romans should make an attack, there give way (from the lightness of their appointments and from their daily practice no damage could be done them); [but] pursue them when betaking themselves to their standards again.

The complexity of message would stretch the most competent message passer (my inner Douglas Adams wants to refer to these as Chief Shouting Officers but I will resist).  Returning to Roys suggestion, is what is shouted "Switch to back up plan" or that this style of combat is well known to the tribes and you shout "southern style" or some such and everyone knows what you mean?  I'm trying to reach for the level of order change we might get from a signal, as opposed to an "O" group.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 03, 2015, 07:19:15 PM

The complexity of message would stretch the most competent message passer ...  Returning to Roy's suggestion, is what is shouted "Switch to back up plan" or that this style of combat is well known to the tribes and you shout "southern style" or some such and everyone knows what you mean?  I'm trying to reach for the level of order change we might get from a signal, as opposed to an "O" group.

Caesar seem to be describing the result as opposed to transcribing the message itself.  One can speculate regarding the actual content, though it would have to include a) stop what you are doing and b) start doing what you have been trained to do.  As Caesar reckons the Eburones had been 'trained by daily practice to execute such manoeuvres' there would have been a specific term involved, dedicated daily activities almost invariably generating their own jargon, so something along the lines of: 'Fall back, start toulegeton' would suffice.  (Inclusion of: 'You dozy b*st*rds' optional.)

Quote from: Dangun on July 03, 2015, 12:18:17 PM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 03, 2015, 11:28:45 AM
As a means of spreading word quickly, it would seem useful, given its approximately 13.5 miles per hour omnidirectionality. 

Skepticism may be useful here.
Over any significant distance that's faster than either people or horses, and therefore untestable at the time.

Verification of actual distance covered has perforce to be retrospective, a bit like measuring faster-than-light travel, but need be no less accurate on that account.  Dawn and nightfall provide the measurement parameters (for Gallic news transmission as opposed to FTL travel) so retrospective verification is not a problem.

Maybe.

But it sounds like an overly precise anecdote.
It might more accurately read - word of mouth spread surprisingly fast. But that fast? mmm...

Quote from: Dangun on July 04, 2015, 07:29:10 PM
Maybe.

But it sounds like an overly precise anecdote.
It might more accurately read - word of mouth spread surprisingly fast. But that fast? mmm...

Wearing my freelance journalist hat it's the sort of anecdote that people like. It's the sort they remember because they can visualise it and they can take away the message.

Someone, somewhere made the initial report which might even have been correct, but there may have been special circumstances which dropped out of the tale because they didn't improve it or weren't thought to be necessary.
If you treat these stories as a guide to what people felt could be possible when everything was going right they're useful.
But they're difficult to use as the foundations of any sort of study of communications. For example how fast would word travel in January?

Jim

In the current context, the question is would a similar method be used, and work on, battlefield?  The implication of the piece is that shouting over distance was a practiced skill.  Against this, the premodern countryside was much quieter than a battlefield and both shouters and hearers might be more distracted in combat.  The original story does not imply sudden change in a way one might get from an advance or retire signal, so may have been used in a lull to change plans (which would have the advantage of less background noise).

In defence of the shouted and repeated message may I point out thatI suggested that the change takes place in a lull in the fighting. The Eburones have had a go and been trown back with casualties. That is a quiet moment when Ambiorix can decide on plan B and the message can be transmitted and absorbed.
Roy

Here (http://uk.ask.com/youtube?q=Carnyx+signals&v=trJWwO7-K2E&qsrc=472) is a You Tube video (more of a slideshow with background noise) recording the sounds made by a man blowing a carnyx.  The instrument has a surprisingly varied repertoire and could carry well above the sounds of battle.  Some voices are also included, but the background sound effects are rather token and do not give any idea of the actual volume of a fight with thousands of men on each side.

Whether the Eburones passed on the change in tactics by instrument, voice or a combination of instruments calling attention to and being followed by vocal instructions, the event would seem to count as a battlefield signal.

Caesar unfortunately does not detail his opponents' signalling arrangements,and pays only cursory attention to his own.  Even so, he is one of our best sources on signalling in action.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 05, 2015, 11:05:12 AM
Here (http://uk.ask.com/youtube?q=Carnyx+signals&v=trJWwO7-K2E&qsrc=472) is a You Tube video (more of a slideshow with background noise) recording the sounds made by a man blowing a carnyx.  The instrument has a surprisingly varied repertoire and could carry well above the sounds of battle. 

I have to say, I was more persuaded by the theory that the carnyx was used to make an awful racket to terrify the enemy after hearing that :)

But I did look up the Lur, which is a much more capable instrument - listen to the examples given on this page for example  (you can find entire CDs of them on the internet)

http://abel.hive.no/trompet/lur/bronze/
(http://abel.hive.no/trompet/lur/bronze/)

However, does capability mean use?  Did Bronze Age Scandinavian forces have complex military signals because modern musicians can play modern army bugle calls on the lur?

Quote from: Mick Hession on June 30, 2015, 01:06:49 PM
Unfortunately games that boil down to "line up and kill whatever is in front of you" tend to make for a boring gaming experience, especially when you consider that wargamers fight far more battles than any historical general ever did. Most successful rules therefore grant unrealistic levels of control to players to generate the decision points that make the gaming experience interesting.

What do mean boring?  This is my normal tactic with the sort of hairy armies I end up with and it is not at all boring for me, although my opponent occasionally finds it distressing that his really expensive troops types, who brushed off the first wave of riff-raff, get soundly thrashed by the second or third wave. 

Recreating an historical level of troop control is simple.  I normally find that several pints of pre-match lager does the trick! ;D

Unfortunately most modern rules no longer support this tactic, because they insist the army should pack up and go home once a third of its number (ie, the first wave) has been destroyed.  :'(

Quote from: Erpingham on July 05, 2015, 12:15:57 PM
However, does capability mean use?  Did Bronze Age Scandinavian forces have complex military signals because modern musicians can play modern army bugle calls on the lur?

The relevant evidence consists of roughly executed rock carvings of people apparently playing the things. I'm not sure there's even any clearly associating them with combat.

The usual guess seems to be that they served a cultic purpose, but then "probably served a cultic purpose" tends to be archaeologists' first guess for anything not obviously meant for something else.

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on July 05, 2015, 07:10:14 PM


The usual guess seems to be that they served a cultic purpose, but then "probably served a cultic purpose" tends to be archaeologists' first guess for anything not obviously meant for something else.

We would probably put the carnyx in the same category if it wasn't for the Romans recording they were used in warfare.  I'm not saying that the Lur was anything but cultic, but they could be associated with secular pomp just as well and in either function have found themselves on a battlefield.  The evidence just isn't there.

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 05, 2015, 05:12:04 PM

Quote from: Mick Hession on June 30, 2015, 01:06:49 PM
Unfortunately games that boil down to "line up and kill whatever is in front of you" tend to make for a boring gaming experience, especially when you consider that wargamers fight far more battles than any historical general ever did. Most successful rules therefore grant unrealistic levels of control to players to generate the decision points that make the gaming experience interesting.

What do mean boring?  This is my normal tactic with the sort of hairy armies I end up with and it is not at all boring for me, although my opponent occasionally finds it distressing that his really expensive troops types, who brushed off the first wave of riff-raff, get soundly thrashed by the second or third wave. 

Recreating an historical level of troop control is simple.  I normally find that several pints of pre-match lager does the trick! ;D

Unfortunately most modern rules no longer support this tactic, because they insist the army should pack up and go home once a third of its number (ie, the first wave) has been destroyed.  :'(

This could be a serious problem for Ottoman armies, which routinely did this sort of thing (in with the bashi-bazouks, then send in the provincials over their bodies and finally wrap up with the janissaries).

Ottoman armies, incidentally, seem to have been fairly inflexible in their battle plans once their empire got going, but even so they had 'attack' and 'retire' signals, the latter being evidenced during the siege of Malta, when on 7th August 1565 Mustafa Pasha launched what he expected would be the final and decisive assault against the main positions of Birgu and Senglea.  Repulsed at Birgu, the Turks managed to gain a footing on the citadel of St Michael at Senglea.  Mustafa Pasha was leading the janissaries in to exploit the breach when suddenly news arrived that a Christian relief force had landed and was sacking the Turkish camp.

"Clear above the noise of battle, the Turks heard the signal to retreat." - Ernle Bradford, The Great Siege: Malta 1565, p.170

Mustafa Pasha feared that the relief force would take his army in the rear just as he and his best troops were funnelled into an uncomfortable narrow space.  In point of fact it was not the relief force (which did not arrive for another month) but a cavalry sortie from the city of Mdina in the north of the island.  Mustafa Pasha was not pleased when he learned that he had aborted his best chance of taking the key Hospitaller stronghold in Malta, but he did at least demonstrate that the Ottomans had a signal for breaking off and retiring. :)

On a more serious note, I suspect that most battlefield communication was undertaken by couriers.  Mark Adkin in "The Charge: Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost" goes into some detail on this subject due to its importance in the events his book deals with.

The big advantage of couriers over audible or visual signals is not only the complexity of the message, but also the ability of the recipient to question the messenger, who was expected to be familiar with the sender's intent and to provide such clarification as required. 

One might also consider the relative speed of delivery.  Horses canter at 16-27 km/h, covering a kilometre (~15 base widths) in 2-4 minutes.  A gallop is about twice as fast.

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 06, 2015, 03:58:18 PM
On a more serious note, I suspect that most battlefield communication was undertaken by couriers.  Mark Adkin in "The Charge: Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost" goes into some detail on this subject due to its importance in the events his book deals with.

In the Crimea, the armies are operating a completely different type of leadership, where a general can sit on a hill with a telescope, sending off notes with ADC  Ancient and medieval generals always strike me as being more in the thick of it.  That's not to say messengers didn't come to and fro.  Patrick will doubtless conjur up that occassion when Alexander in one of his battles gets a sit-rep from one of his division commanders during a battle.  And Xenophon's story, which I think was covered in the Persian thread of the Greeks being sent orders which they respectfully declined at Cunaxa. But I'd suggest this method of comunication, though always present, may have been more restricted in ancient times because of reduced opportunity.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 06, 2015, 11:05:50 AM
"Clear above the noise of battle, the Turks heard the signal to retreat." - Ernle Bradford, The Great Siege: Malta 1565, p.170

Very weird that you should bring that up since I just downloaded this to Kindle while waiting for my flight out of Malta.  ???

Quote from: Dangun on July 06, 2015, 05:57:00 PM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 06, 2015, 11:05:50 AM
"Clear above the noise of battle, the Turks heard the signal to retreat." - Ernle Bradford, The Great Siege: Malta 1565, p.170

Very weird that you should bring that up since I just downloaded this to Kindle while waiting for my flight out of Malta.  ???

One of life's little coincidences. :)  It is quite a good account, with the author explaining what was important and why (and how) as an integral part of the narrative.  This makes the details of the siege (and peripheral activities like the preparation of the relief force) fairly easy to follow.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 06, 2015, 05:43:14 PM

In the Crimea, the armies are operating a completely different type of leadership, where a general can sit on a hill with a telescope, sending off notes with ADC  Ancient and medieval generals always strike me as being more in the thick of it.  That's not to say messengers didn't come to and fro.  Patrick will doubtless conjure up that occasion when Alexander in one of his battles gets a sit-rep from one of his division commanders during a battle.

At Gaugamela, Parmenio sent messengers to Alexander at least twice and perhaps three times (depending on whose account you read) saying he was in trouble and some help would be very welcome.  Alexander sent a return message which in essence was to stop being a wet blanker and get on with it; however the final message was couched in such terms as to cause Alex to abandon his pursuit of Darius and return to the battlefield.

This is the only case I can remember of Alexander, or rather one of his subordinates, making use of a messenger during a battle.   The lack of messengers at the Hydaspes is very notceable despite this battle involving more complex and intricate manoeuvring than Gaugamela.

As Anthony says, it was a different type of battlefield and a different type of battle.  On the classical battlefield you could see the whole of your army and that of your opponent.  As a rule of thumb, 5,000 men in the classical period would deploy on the frontage of 500 men in the Napoleonic period.  If you wanted your subordinate to do something different, and it was in the book, you usually had a signal.  If not, then unless you led from the front Macedonian-style you could usually nip over yourself and have a word - a general could ride as fast as a messenger and was much better able to assess the situation and decide what was needed.

Quote
And Xenophon's story, which I think was covered in the Persian thread of the Greeks being sent orders which they respectfully declined at Cunaxa. But I'd suggest this method of communication, though always present, may have been more restricted in ancient times because of reduced opportunity.

In fact it was Cyrus himself who paid the Greeks a visit and dropped a broad hint that maybe they should reposition themselves where they could win the battle at a stroke.  This was before the fighting started: once it began Cyrus quickly became involved leading his bodyguard from the front and that was that as far as messages were concerned.

We get mention of C-in-Cs perambulating about the battlefield (e.g. Sertorius at Lauron, Caesar at the Sambre) far more often than we find any mention of battlefield messengers, who seem to be a rara avis turning up only when the situation has taken an unexpected turn.  I cannot offhand think of any mention of a classical commander issuing orders through a battlefield messenger, though doubtless the ability was there should it be desired.  It just seems not to have been used.

Gaugamela is a rather interesting case as there is a lot of ordering going on, though it's not made clear how the orders are transmitted (Signal? Messenger? Presumably not in person). The word used is generally κελεύω keleuo, 'ordered' without any elaboration.

Examples (using the translation by E. J. Chinnock because it's to hand (or to mouse))
Arr Anab 3.13 f.

"Alexander led his own army more towards the right"
Presumably A just leads and everyone follows

"Then Darius ... ordered the front ranks of his left wing to ride round the right wing of the Macedonians"
Darius stayed in the centre - so was this a messenger order? Pre-arranged signal?

"Alexander ordered the cavalry of the Grecian mercenaries under the command of Menidas to attack them."
Again A doesn't leave the Companions. Unless signals had been arranged for specific units to attack (seems unlikely), this seems to be a messenger.

"But the Scythian cavalry and the Bactrians, who had been drawn up with them sallied forth against them,"
As ordered by Darius? On their own (or Bessus', or some other leader's) initiative?

"Alexander then ordered Aristo at the head of the Paeonians and Grecian auxiliaries to attack the Scythians"
Another messenger?

"Notwithstanding this, the Macedonians sustained their assaults, and assailing them violently squadron by squadron"
Standing orders / doctrine

"Meantime the foreigners launched their scythe-bearing chariots against Alexander himself"
This could be done easily by signal (from Darius presumably).

"the Agrianians and the javelin-men with Balacrus, who had been posted in front of the Companion cavalry, hurled their javelins at them"
Standing orders / doctrine

"the men stood apart and opened their ranks, as they had been instructed"
Pre-arranged orders

"As soon as Darius began to set his whole phalanx in motion"
A 'general advance' signal?

"Alexander ordered Aretes to attack those who were riding completely round his right wing"
Another messenger?

"and up to that time he was himself leading his men in column"
Lead/follow

"Alexander wheeled round towards the gap, and forming a wedge as it were of the Companion cavalry and of the part of the phalanx which was posted here, he led them with a quick charge and loud battle-cry straight towards Darius himself"
The Companions can lead/follow, but what about the phalanx? Pre-arranged?

"Simmias and his brigade were not yet able to start with Alexander in pursuit, but causing the phalanx to halt there, he took part in the struggle, because the left wing of the Macedonians was reported to be hard pressed"
A report (from whom?) to Simmias, and Simmias on his own initiative stopping to help.

"some of the Indians and of the Persian cavalry burst through the gap towards the baggage of the Macedonians"
Own initiative (attacking what is (or isn't) in front of them).

"But the commanders of the men who had been posted as a reserve to the first phalanx, learning what was taking place, quickly moved from the position which they had been ordered to take"
Pre-arranged orders overridden by initiative

"At this juncture, while the Macedonians were doubtful as to the result of the battle, Parmenio sent a messenger to Alexander in haste"
First definite messenger! In this case, bearing information not orders, up the command chain.

"When this news was brought to Alexander, he immediately turned back again from the pursuit, and wheeling round with the Companion cavalry, led them with great speed against the right wing of the foreigners"
Lead/follow

Quote from: RichT on July 07, 2015, 12:41:52 PM"Then Darius ... ordered the front ranks of his left wing to ride round the right wing of the Macedonians"

It is interesting to find so many "orders" being described by Arrian.
Although I wonder whether many of the references are literary artifacts rather than information from Arrian's sources.

This is more obvious in the instances of Darius' "orders". Arrian's source was more likely Greek than Persion and probably only saw 'Darius phalanx go left' and then either the source or Arrian inferred that 'Darius ordered the phalanx left'. The inference may be correct, but it may equally be a literary choice to focus on the actions - real or otherwise - of two individuals - Big Al and Darius.

You could make the same argument about Alexander's 'orders'. Its not as strong because the sources (including Aristobulus)  probably knew more about the Macedonians than the Persians. But its a very small literary addition to change a fact - Aristo's auxiliaries attacked the Scythians - to 'Alexander then ordered', especially when it fits Arrian's more hagiographical tendencies.

I stopped to think about it and it struck me that there were an awful lot of Greeks who had served at pretty high levels in Persian armies. Probably at a higher level than in Macedonian armies. So it's not entirely impossible for something to have come down to say how the Persians did things

Jim

Quote from: Dangun on July 07, 2015, 02:01:21 PM
Although I wonder whether many of the references are literary artifacts rather than information from Arrian's sources.

I agree in principle, especially as regards the Persians (when the Bactrians rode out to attack I don't suppose anyone in Alexander's army knew what the trigger was, whether messenger from Darius, signal, pre-arranged plan, or initiative. Describing all movements of an army in terms of positive intentions of the commander is after all commonplace (Napoleon sent in his cavalry, Hitler sent in his panzers etc etc). Though there would have been opportunities for Ptolemy and Artistoboulos to find out afterwards if they were so inclined ("so tell me Mazaios, how does command and control work in your army?").

For Alexander, while I'm as wary as anyone of attributing all positive actions to him alone, the feeding of units into the right wing cavalry fight does read as if this is how it really happened. Note that nothing whatever is said of what was going on on the left where presumably Parmenion was conducting a similar exercise with his cavalry (completely outside Alexander's control - Alexander didn't have any idea what was happening on the left until Parmenion's messenger found him).

Quote from: RichT on July 07, 2015, 03:10:37 PM


For Alexander, while I'm as wary as anyone of attributing all positive actions to him alone, the feeding of units into the right wing cavalry fight does read as if this is how it really happened. Note that nothing whatever is said of what was going on on the left where presumably Parmenion was conducting a similar exercise with his cavalry (completely outside Alexander's control - Alexander didn't have any idea what was happening on the left until Parmenion's messenger found him).

An interesting observation which might indicate what the command and control "horizon" may have been.  Alexander can successfully control the elements of the right wing but can be much less hands on with the left wing because he isn't there.

Quote from: RichT on July 07, 2015, 03:10:37 PM

Quote from: Dangun on July 07, 2015, 02:01:21 PM
Although I wonder whether many of the references are literary artifacts rather than information from Arrian's sources.

I agree in principle, especially as regards the Persians (when the Bactrians rode out to attack I don't suppose anyone in Alexander's army knew what the trigger was, whether messenger from Darius, signal, pre-arranged plan, or initiative. Describing all movements of an army in terms of positive intentions of the commander is after all commonplace (Napoleon sent in his cavalry, Hitler sent in his panzers etc etc). Though there would have been opportunities for Ptolemy and Artistoboulos to find out afterwards if they were so inclined ("so tell me Mazaios, how does command and control work in your army?").

Wouldn't even need to ask a defeated Persian general, they'd have enough Greeks and Iranian horsemen who'd been in Persian service who would know how it had done.
I suspect that there'd be a 'transition' period where the new contingents had to learn Greek ways, or Greek ways might change to take up on bright ideas the new chaps brought in

Jim 

Richard's contribution is excellent.

Fundamentally, the chronicler is detailing the key reactions of units to developments during the battle that could probably not have been foreseen and accounted for in pre-battle orders, briefings, councils of war, etc.  IMO there are only 3 possible explanations as to how Alexander 'ordered' his units:

• He gave one or more signals
• He did not give any orders and it was all down to the local commander using his initiative
• He sent messengers.

To 'signal' a particular unit to attack a particular enemy (eg,"Alexander then ordered Aristo at the head of the Paeonians and Grecian auxiliaries to attack the Scythians") would require a complex signal system, which whether or not one believes in its existence, would definitely require a significant and sophisticated effort to develop. 

Of course, Aristo might have decided to attack by himself, but would he really risk such an irrevocable act without the command or at least agreement of his notoriously unforgiving CinC, and if so, would such an unusual act not have been recorded as elsewhere in the narrative?

The simplest explanation is often the correct one.  Grab the nearest junior officer-type, instruct him go over to Aristo and tell him to get stuck in.

One might also note that the creators of sophisticated battlefield signalling systems in more modern times were the navies, not the armies.

This would have the advantage that the junior officers nearest to Alexander would almost certainly be individuals known to the rest of the officer corps

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 07, 2015, 04:19:29 PM
The simplest explanation is often the correct one.  Grab the nearest junior officer-type, instruct him go over to Aristo and tell him to get stuck in.

I would have thought the simplest explanation is your option 2 - that the local commander (e.g. Aristo) did it himself, and that the literary sources later ascribed 'an order' to Alexander.

I would also suggest that the simplest of all options should be added to your list - that noone ordered anything. Perhaps the two lines - under only the broadest of macro instructions - just closed to a distance at which they started swinging at each other. 'and then x attacked y' makes it sound it more controlled, and leads us to infer intentions and orders. But there are many layers of authoring at which such conjunctions may have been added to the facts.

Actually I missed a couple of useful bits from the previous paragraph of Arrian:

Arr 3.12 "Directions had been given to the commanders of these men posted in reserve, to wheel round and receive the attack of the foreigners, if they should see their own comrades surrounded by the Persian army... Instructions had been given to Menidas and the troops under him to wheel round and attack the enemy in flank, if they should ride round their wing."

(The word used for 'directions/instructions had been given' is 'parangello').

Which then applies to these two incidents form the fighting:

Arr 3.13 "Then Darius, fearing that his chariots would become useless, if the Macedonians advanced into uneven ground, ordered the front ranks of his left wing to ride round the right wing of the Macedonians, where Alexander was commanding, to prevent him from marching his wing any further. This being done, Alexander ordered the cavalry of the Grecian mercenaries under the command of Menidas to attack them."

('ordered' is 'keleuo')

Arr 3.14 "But the commanders of the men who had been posted as a reserve to the first phalanx, learning what was taking place, quickly moved from the position which they had been ordered to take, and coming upon the Persians in the rear, killed many of them there collected round the baggage"

No advance orders equivalent to those to Menidas are recorded for Alcetas or Aristo(n) (which isn't to say they weren't given of course - we just don't know).

In the case of Menidas, Alexander seems to be ordering him to execute a pre-arranged order - which could indicate that a signal was all that was needed - however, there is no evidence here or anywhere else for unit-specific signals of this kind. But this does tie in nioely with the Anderson article I quoted earlier in this thread - Greek armies seem to have worked by giving a verbal preparatory order explaining what was to be done, then a visual or audible executive order to carry out the instructions.

In the case of the anonymous commanders of the reserve, it seems they didn't receive or need an executive order from Alexander - when the circumstances coincided with the preparatory instructions they had, they executed them.

It just shows how little we really know about how ancient warfare worked. If I had to place a bet, it would be that Alexander gave more or less detailed advance orders to all his commanders ('part to let chariots through', 'attack attempted outflankers', 'face about to deal with encirclement' etc); then in the course of the battle, when events occured within his view (which would have been limited) he could issue the executive orders (which I would guess was by messenger as the commanders in question were posted close by), and for those outside his field of vision (a few hundred yeards? Less?) the local commander (Parmenion) or unit commanders (Simmias, anon reserve officers) would carry out an equivalent function). Arrian's account of Alexander ordering in the various counterattacks would then be accurate - Alexander would have issued the executive orders in each case - but this was only in a narrow bubble around Alexander, outside of which (the reserve, Simmias' taxis, Parmenion's cavalry) Alexander would have no idea what was happening until he found out (by messenger or by going there in person) later on.

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 07, 2015, 04:19:29 PM
Richard's contribution is excellent.

Agreed. :)

I rather like Richard's 'bet' about the way things would have worked.  The cavalry contingents sent off to deal with the Persian left would have been pre-briefed, and Alexander would have kept things flexible depending upon how successful Menidas' contingent was.  In the event he seems to have needed only Ariston in support, allowing Alexander to hold on to the Prodromoi (Sarissophoroi) until these could be released with devastating effect into the flank and rear of Bessus' cavalry.

Regarding order transmission for the cavalry on Alex's right, I think Richard has the right idea about a messenger - probably one of Alexander's inner circle of somatophylakes - going over to say: "Menidas, now's your time!" or some such equivalent.

Quote from: Dangun on July 08, 2015, 01:23:44 AM

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 07, 2015, 04:19:29 PM
The simplest explanation is often the correct one.  Grab the nearest junior officer-type, instruct him go over to Aristo and tell him to get stuck in.

I would have thought the simplest explanation is your option 2 - that the local commander (e.g. Aristo) did it himself, and that the literary sources later ascribed 'an order' to Alexander.

Junior commanders acting on their own initiative seems to have been so rare as to be noteworthy when it happened.  Philipoemen at Sellasia is a case in point.

"Philopoemen was stationed among the Macedonian cavalry with his own fellow-citizens,2 and had as a support the Illyrians, a large body of good fighters, who closed up the line of battle. [2] They had been ordered to lie quietly in reserve until, from the other wing, a signal should be made by the king with a scarlet coat stretched upon a spear. But the Illyrians, at the command of their officers, tried to force back the Lacedaemonians, while the Achaeans, as they had been ordered to do, kept quietly waiting at their post. Therefore Eucleidas, the brother of Cleomenes, who noticed the gap thus made in the enemies' line, quickly sent round the most agile of his light-armed troops, with orders to attack the Illyrians in the rear and rout them, now that they had lost touch with the cavalry.

[3] These orders were carried out, and the light-armed troops were driving the Illyrians before them in confusion, when Philopoemen perceived that it would be no great task to attack the light-armed troops, and that the occasion prompted this step. At first he pointed this out to the king's officers. Then, when they were not to be persuaded by him, but looked down upon him as a madman (since his reputation was not yet great enough to justify his being entrusted with so important a manoeuvre), he took matters into his own hands, formed his fellow-citizens into a wedge, and charged upon the enemy. [4] At first the light-armed troops were thrown into confusion, then put to rout with great slaughter." - Plutarch, Philopoemen 6.1-4

Note the 'consultation' preceding Philopoemen's initiative.  After the battle:

"After his victory, therefore, Antigonus put his Macedonians to the question, and asked them why, without his orders, they had brought the cavalry into action. [7] They defended themselves by saying that they had been forced against their will to attack the enemy, because a young man of Megalopolis had first led a charge against them. At this, Antigonus gave a laugh and said: 'Well, then, that young man behaved like a great commander.' " - idem 6.6-7

Given the sentiments expressed about acting without orders, I would consider it to have been extremely rare.

Of course, the pre-battle conditional orders could have been another literary mechanism for justifying what subsequently happened, and enhancing Alexander's reputation for forecasting opponents' actions into the bargain....

QuoteJunior commanders acting on their own initiative seems to have been so rare as to be noteworthy when it happened.  Philipoemen at Sellasia is a case in point.

It certainly shows how these things were structured in terms of age, experience and ally status in this case.  The senior Macedonian commanders had their orders and did not judge they should deviate from them.  A junior allied officer makes the case against his superiors, fails but decides going it alone is the best choice (high risk - not many young officers would have taken that risk).  Luckily, he is proved right.  On the other side, Eucleidas spots a gap, orders troops through it.  Almost certainly an initiative move, possibly a conditional order (if a gap opens up.....).  But this is a more senior commander, established in the hierarchy - no issue or scandal commented on.

At Sellasia, the battle was divided into two parts because the Spartans manned two hills: Cleomenes (the king) commanded on one and Eucleidas, his brother, the other.  Polybius II.65 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D65) has the details.  Eucleidas thus, unlike Philopoemen, had full authority for handling the cavalry under his command.

For the record, Eucleidas lost the battle by trying to be a bit too clever (he lured his Macedonian and Illyrian opponents all the way up the hill so his men could have a fine time pushing them all the way back down, but their initial impetus pushed his troops back over the crest and did unto them what they had hoped to do to their foes).

For the purposes of this thread, the interesting bit about the battle is the prearranged signals:

Quote"It was arranged that the Illyrians, who had bivouacked in full order during the previous night along the river Gorgylus, close to the foot of Evas, were to begin their assault on the hill when they saw a flag of linen raised from the direction of Olympus; and that the Megalopolitans and cavalry should do the same when the king raised a scarlet flag." - Polybius II.66.10-11

Anyone who moved before the relevant flag was raised would need a very good reason for doing so.  Philopoemen actually had one.  Another clue about how rare the use of individual initiative was is provided by the sequel:

"This naturally brought Philopoemen into high repute. Antigonus was eager that he should take service under him, and offered him command and pay." - Plutarch, Philopoemen 7.1

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 08, 2015, 02:46:30 PM
Of course, the pre-battle conditional orders could have been another literary mechanism for justifying what subsequently happened, and enhancing Alexander's reputation for forecasting opponents' actions into the bargain....

There is actually a fairly involved story behind both sides' pre-battle orders at Gaugamela: one which was missed by our still-extant sources, and which I intend to expound in a forthcoming article about Gaugamela.  Suffice to say we shall probably be assessing both Darius' and Alexander's generalship in a new light.

I doubt the quality of the sources supports the precision or certainty that we would like to ascribe to them.

Thanks for the clarifications on Sellasia Patrick - not a battle I know.  The signals are interesting but the example illustrates something on the limits of independent action.  Eucleidas, a wing commander, has the initiative both to exploit a gap and attempt a ploy which fails.  Further down the chain of command, Philopoemen, who seems to be commander of a cavalry contingent, has the right to approach his superiors with a suggestion but breaks the rules by taking independent action.  We might suggest from this example that our rules might reflect an unlikelyhood of independent initiative by units but a possibility by wings and divisions.  That possibility might be encouraged or constrained.  The Macedonian cavalry were under very strict orders not to do anything until signalled.

If we take this through to the medieval period we see a similar pattern, perhaps with more flexibility given to the divisional commands (or this may be an artefact of the different style of reporting). 

So, how do we best game this?  I think it does give justification, if not to the general towering over the field, then to the active playing of the main commanders - which is good because most of us don't like putting most of the army on autopilot and only playing the general figure.  However, within those main commands, the individual units might have limited initiative.  Signals seem to be of two sorts; standard and one-off.  An army would recognise "General advance", "Withdraw to camp", "Rally to your standards".  Then there could be perhaps one or two special signals meaning "execute pre-planned action" - cloak waving, a particular call etc.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 09, 2015, 10:02:12 AM

So, how do we best game this?  I think it does give justification, if not to the general towering over the field, then to the active playing of the main commanders - which is good because most of us don't like putting most of the army on autopilot and only playing the general figure.  However, within those main commands, the individual units might have limited initiative.  Signals seem to be of two sorts; standard and .  An army would recognise "General advance", "Withdraw to camp", "Rally to your standards".  Then there could be perhaps one or two special signals meaning "execute pre-planned action" - cloak waving, a particular call etc.

A good summary.

One might also allow some armies which historically displayed the ability to fiddle creatively with small contingents (e.g. Alexander's army at Issus and Gaugamela) to do so with units designated as 'semi-independent' (extra points paid by either the units or the general?) which can be despatched from within a certain radius of the C-in-C.  This could cover the putative messenger aspect which emerged in discussion.

WRG 6th paid lip service to this aspect of command by limiting the number of units an army list could field, e.g. an Alexandrian Macedonian army could use up to 20 regular command 'factors' @ 10 points and 8 irregular command 'factors' @ 25 points (one command 'factor' being needed for each unit unless it served as a non-detachable bodyguard) while a Feudal French army could use only 6 and 12 respectively.  Assuming significant and equal point values (about 3x the usual 1,000-1,500 points) the Feudal French would field fewer units, mainly irregular (the regulars are almost all mercenaries) while the Macedonians could have large infantry formations and many small, flexible cavalry units.

Signalling was covered (sort of) on p.21 of the 6th Edition WRG rules, as follows:

One new order or signal per turn maximum (not both).

Orders are sent by messenger, represented by a figure from the general's bodyguard which peels off and moves at charge speed.

Signals are assumed to be visible and audible if a general is accompanied by a standard, otherwise audible only.

Audible signals are heard at 100 paces and repeated by units hearing them.  Repeats are heard by everyone within 80 paces of the officer of the repeating unit.  (Keep your units close together if your army uses only audible signals!)

Visual signals are seen at the limits of vision (usually the whole table except at night or in bad weather).

There are two types of signal everyone can use and understand:

- Change present order to Attack

- Mounted troops change present order to Attack

Regular troops add:

- Mounted troops change present order to Skirmish

- Foot change Hold order to Attack

- Foot change Attack order to Hold

We could probably suggest some improvements to this, particularly in connection with contingents given specific roles (ambush, reserve, etc.).

Quote from: Erpingham on July 09, 2015, 10:02:12 AM


If we take this through to the medieval period we see a similar pattern, perhaps with more flexibility given to the divisional commands (or this may be an artefact of the different style of reporting). 

I'm not sure we can extrapolate. We know that in the Medieval period there are examples of 'officers' refusing to take orders from their superiors who were also their social inferiors.
We also have the issue that in the medieval period the commander of a 'unit' wasn't the person you as general put in command of that unit, he was the owner of that unit who'd brought them with him. In some circumstances he might have to be treated more as an ally to be cossetted and jollied along than a subordinate

Jim

I think Anthony was referring more to the broad nature of battlefield signals than the officering thereof, though the point about mediaeval social susceptibilities is well made.

Jim points are indeed good, though we may disagree how much actual difference they made - how often did the hierarchy not work for social reasons, for example.  It was certainly a factor in the "omnishambles" which was French command at Agincourt.  We should also note personal tensions over points of honour.  Commanders suggesting caution were often (at least according to our sources) often accused of cowardice.  It took a confident man to brush this off.  A headstrong man could launch himself and his men on a suicide mission because of this (see e.g. Dupplin Moor).

With these allowances for complicating factors, the general pattern of leadership and signalling capability seems fairly similar between Antiquity and the Middle Ages. 

On the subject of units being more like allies than subordinates, again a good point.  However, this was hardly a uniquely medieval problem.  Classical Greeks seem to have had similar problems and I'm sure it wasn't straightforward getting a Gallic or German army to follow a strict "command and control" model :)

Interestingly, I was re-reading Michael Mallet's account of Fornovo, as this has some interesting command and signalling issues.  In particular, Gonzaga tried to tightly control the actions of his army, rather than going for a more normal medieval delegated command framework.  This might have worked if he had sat back with the reserve but instead he charged with the first forces to attack and was killed.  No signals or messengers triggered the release of the reserves, and a possible victory drifted into defeat.

Quote from: Jim Webster on July 09, 2015, 07:19:46 PM
I'm not sure we can extrapolate. We know that in the Medieval period there are examples of 'officers' refusing to take orders from their superiors who were also their social inferiors.
We also have the issue that in the medieval period the commander of a 'unit' wasn't the person you as general put in command of that unit, he was the owner of that unit who'd brought them with him. In some circumstances he might have to be treated more as an ally to be cossetted and jollied along than a subordinate

Jim

Jim makes a good point, which demonstrates the superiority of messengers over signals.  A messenger represents the CinC and can argue with the recipient and/or threaten him wth the consequences of not acting, as well as providing confirmation to the CinC that the order was properly delivered and understood.

Signals are even less likely to be receieved than that really important email.

Yes, the signal says 'forward'

The good messenger says 'The CinC has been considering the wise counsel you offered at the discussion last night and agrees totally that you should be the one to take your lads forward"


Jim

One is left wondering then why everyone who was anyone in the classical period seems to have preferred signalling.

One factor to consider is reaction time: some actions were quite opportunity-sensitive, so 'emerge and charge when you see a red flag on the hill to the left' can be implemented with very little time lag involved once the commander decides to get it going.  Conversely, if he sends off a messenger there will be a time lag of at least a few minutes during which the opportunity may pass.

Quote from: NickHarbud on July 11, 2015, 04:38:00 AM

Signals are even less likely to be received than that really important email.

If one thing emerges from classical sources, it is the reliability of battlefield signalling, barring the odd situation like Caesar at Gergovia, where he ascribes his repulse to a misunderstanding of - or rather lack of obedience to - signals (Gallic War VII.43-51).

Where messengers were habitually and (usually) beneficially used was for agents or advance detachments or similar reporting back to the C-in-C.  Tigranes (the 'Great') of Armenia is famously reported to have killed the first messenger bringing him news of Lucullus' army's progress, and from then on Tigranes could get no news because the messengers all avoided him. (Plutarch, Lucullus 25)

I think there is the issue of timeliness as you said.
Also a signal can be seen over a long distance and also perhaps over intervening enemy troops

Jim

I am getting a little confused.
What are we suggesting - in this discussion - when we use the word "signal"? Are we suggesting the signal is visual (waving a flag), or aural (sounding a horn), or either.

Sometimes the sources are precise "ordered the signal to be sounded" (Gallic War 7.46). Most of the time they are not.
Similarly, if a source says "signal" but not "order" is it being used to differentiate or synonymously?

If signals were visual, it seems odd that we never get a better description of them.

Quote from: Dangun on July 14, 2015, 06:06:10 AM
I am getting a little confused.
What are we suggesting - in this discussion - when we use the word "signal"? Are we suggesting the signal is visual (waving a flag), or aural (sounding a horn), or either.

We appear to be talking about both visual and sound signals.  The latter seem most common.  We have muddied the waters by moving onto other ways of communicating on battlefields, such as shouting or sending messages.

Other than a hint from Duncan (I think) about Chinese signalling, we haven't turned up much evidence of a complicated "signal book" at unit level - mostly we are talking fairly broad commands at higher level with the occassional "special" .

Quote from: Dangun on July 14, 2015, 06:06:10 AM

What are we suggesting - in this discussion - when we use the word "signal"? Are we suggesting the signal is visual (waving a flag), or aural (sounding a horn), or either.

Sometimes the sources are precise "ordered the signal to be sounded" (Gallic War 7.46). Most of the time they are not.
Similarly, if a source says "signal" but not "order" is it being used to differentiate or synonymously?

In this context, a 'signal' is a cue to execute an 'order'.  The order is prearranged, either through it being part of usual tactical procedure, e.g. going on to the attack (and what you do when you go on the attack) or by a pre-battle briefing ("When you see a red flag hoisted on this hill you will charge") or through it being a standard army procedure (general advance, general retirement, general halt).  The signal is the audial and/or visual cue to execute the order.

Giving new orders to a unit or command seems to have involved the direct intervention of the C-in-C.  One example of an order change in mid-battle is Claudius Nero on the Roman right at the Metaurus in 207 BC.  His wing of crack troops were getting nowhere in their attempts to scramble up unforgiving terrain in the face of Hasdrubal's Gauls, so he decided to switch some of them them to the Roman left by a march around the rear of Livius Salinator's army, which was engaged with Hasdrubal's Iberians.

"Claudius shouted to his soldiers, "Why then have we covered so long a march at headlong speed?" and endeavoured without success to lead his line up the hill. [13] Thereupon, after discovering that they could not get to the enemy in that direction, he drew off a number of cohorts from the right wing, where he saw that they would be standing idly by instead of fighting. [14] He led them round behind the battle-line, and to the surprise not only of the enemy, but also of his own side, charged into the enemy's right flank. And such was his speed that, soon after showing themselves on the flank, they were already attacking the rear." - Livy XXVII.48.12-14

Note how the C-in-C (of that particular wing of the army) personally 'drew off a number of cohorts' and personally led them round behind Livius Salinator's army to assail Hasdrubal's right flank and rear.  This kind of personal intervention by the C-in-C may have been par for the course for a change of orders in classical times: anyone is welcome to quote instances of this or other mid-battle order changes so we can examine this aspect.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 14, 2015, 11:43:14 AM
In this context, a 'signal' is a cue to execute an 'order'.  The order is prearranged, either through it being part of usual tactical procedure, e.g. going on to the attack (and what you do when you go on the attack) or by a pre-battle briefing ("When you see a red flag hoisted on this hill you will charge") or through it being a standard army procedure (general advance, general retirement, general halt).  The signal is the audial and/or visual cue to execute the order.

That is of course very coherent.
And in this case of Gallic Wars 7.47 it is really clear.
But I am not sure we can always rely on the texts differentiating these meanings as precisely as the forum particpants do.

Even later in  the same paragraph, we see that some orders have signals but some orders are just orders.

Quote from: Gallic Wars on July 14, 2015, 11:43:14 AMCaesar, having accomplished the object which he had in view, ordered the signal to be sounded for a retreat; and the soldiers of the tenth legion, by which he was then accompanied, halted. But the soldiers of the other legions, not hearing the sound of the trumpet, because there was a very large valley between them, were however kept back by the tribunes of the soldiers and the lieutenants, according to Caesar's orders;

Ever-doubtful, this paragraph looks a bit off to me, because if Caesar's orders halted the other legions, why did he have to blow a signal to halt the legion he was accompanying? Hadn't the tribunes received the same orders/briefing. Its odd to have to make an extra effort to stop the troops closest to you.

I suspect the "according to Caesar's orders" in the last line is a casual hagiographical addition, when in reality it might have been standard operating procedure by the leaders of the other legions.

Quote from: Dangun on July 15, 2015, 05:49:45 AM

Quote from: Gallic Wars on July 14, 2015, 11:43:14 AMCaesar, having accomplished the object which he had in view, ordered the signal to be sounded for a retreat; and the soldiers of the tenth legion, by which he was then accompanied, halted. But the soldiers of the other legions, not hearing the sound of the trumpet, because there was a very large valley between them, were however kept back by the tribunes of the soldiers and the lieutenants, according to Caesar's orders;

Ever-doubtful, this paragraph looks a bit off to me, because if Caesar's orders halted the other legions, why did he have to blow a signal to halt the legion he was accompanying? Hadn't the tribunes received the same orders/briefing. Its odd to have to make an extra effort to stop the troops closest to you.

I suspect the "according to Caesar's orders" in the last line is a casual hagiographical addition, when in reality it might have been standard operating procedure by the leaders of the other legions.

Caesar's 'orders' (praeceptum = maxim, principle) in this case were not battlefield orders but standard operating procedure: his officers were apparently acting on his general principles (do not let the men loose unless Julius signals it).  The officers were trying to keep the men back but the troops were having none of it: they went on anyway, having not heard the recall signal which the Tenth had heard and obeyed.  That is all Caesar is saying here.

Ammianus gives accounts of various battles where signals were mentioned during the course of the battle. The battle always appears to start at the signal given by 'trumpets'.