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From the Mycenaean period to 146 BC, when the Romans stopped play.

Blimey that's a long period. * = SoA discount

For Mycenaean 28mm:
Foundry (Mycenaean

For Classical 28mm
Foundry: "Age of the Greeks" (Steve Saleh sculpts), Macedonians (ditto I think)
* Warlord (Immortal plastics and metal, now being replaced, for the Classical period)
Scarab Miniatures
* Gorgon Studios (Spartans, again by Steve Saleh)
* 1st Corps
Vendel/Sgt Major

For Macedonian/Successor
Foundry (Steve Saleh again) Macedonian
* Warlord Macedonian (I assume by Bob Naismith but I could be wrong, for Macedonian)
* GB (late Successor, Steve Saleh sculpts)
* 1st Corps
Vendel/Sgt Major

Yes it does seem a long period. My general background reading tends to suggest that even during the "classical" period of the city states from say Marathon through to Alexander individual armies changed considerably. Are there any more specific army lists about for individual cities? I'm trying to build up a collection of 6mm Greeks and whilst not trying to be a historical "rivet counter", I'd like to have a reasonable level of accuracy whilst emphasising the difference.

Let us subdivide broadly along the following lines:

1) Mycenaean to Geometric - the chariot-and-foot period.

2) Geometric to Classical - working out the hoplite system under various tyrants.

3) Classical I: Pisistratus to Pericles - the metal-armoured hoplite and his trials and triumphs against the Achaemenids.

4) Classical II: Peloponnesian War to Pelopidas - the linothorax hoplite and the rise of the peltast.

5) Classical III: Iphicrates to Cleomenes (III) - the mercenary and epilektoi era and the time of the thureophoroi.

6) Classical IV: Sellasia to Corinth - the pike-armed armies.

Would anyone like to open with a useful source quote or two?

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2013, 07:56:35 PM
Let us subdivide broadly along the following lines:

1) Mycenaean to Geometric - the chariot-and-foot period.
2) Geometric to Classical - working out the hoplite system under various tyrants.
3) Classical I: Pisistratus to Pericles - the metal-armoured hoplite and his trials and triumphs against the Achaemenids.
4) Classical II: Peloponnesian War to Pelopidas - the linothorax hoplite and the rise of the peltast.
5) Classical III: Iphicrates to Cleomenes (III) - the mercenary and epilektoi era and the time of the thureophoroi.
6) Classical IV: Sellasia to Corinth - the pike-armed armies.

Would anyone like to open with a useful source quote or two?

No, we'll quibble over your periods instead  :)

That leaves me uncertain whether the Geometric era itself is in period 1 or 2.
Period 3, more or less, is the Archaic era - "Classical" surely starts after the Persian Wars.
I wouldn't use "linothorax" in a period description, since there is debate over whether the non-metal cuirasses are linen or leather, or both; and in any case, when linen cuirasses are mentioned in this period, the Homeric term linothorax is not used.
5,6 - you can't split the Hellenistic period into thureophoroi first and pikes later because they overlap - the Athenians are using thyreoi in 2nd-century Games when Achaians and Boiotians have given them up.

I would be old-fashioned and subdivide into:

Mycenaean
Dark Age
Geometric, say 900-750
Archaic to 479
Early Classical - to the Peloponnesian War
Late Classical (4th century, basically)
Hellenistic, say 280-146
Roman subjects, post-146

Duncan

Thank you for that.  Certainly for the earlier periods (pre-479 BC) this more matches my (very incomplete) understanding.  It also fits better with the pictorial representations we have IMnvHO).

Good I was hoping Duncan would dive in.

Now, David, if you have any specific questions about your Greek area(s) of interest, do air them while Duncan is still checking this thread.  ;)

Oh dear have I started something?

I'm looking at the Classical II and III principally although I think I've strayed into the Classical I Epoch (a term they've started using in the model railway fraternity to classify models to their period of use and paint schemes).

I've created an Athenian army based largely on the ten tribes militia hoplite, a Theban army with a sacred band and deeper hoplite formations and a Spartan one based around some elite hoplites.
Questions are really around:
1) What or who were the Theban and Spartan allies that the general texts seem to refer?
2) What did a Thessalian army of this period contain. My current "plans" have about 3,000 cavalry, 2,000 peltasts and about 1,200 hoplites but this is likely to wrong.
Any guidance welcome. Thanks.

David

Not to worry: I was conceptualising by systems while Duncan was more accurately delineating chronology (apart from the Mycenaean and Geometric periods - the 'Dark Age' is an artefact of erroneous Egyptian chronology, but that is another discussion entirely  ;) ).

I get the impression your armies are poised to refight campaigns in the 4th century BC, specifically 395-361 (Agesilaus' campaigns against Thebes and Epaminondas' against Sparta) with possible Peloponnesian War employment (Athens and Sparta never met in full and open battle during the war, though the Athenians fought the Thebans at Delium in 424 BC and during the mid-war truce (424-413 BC) joined the Argives to fight the Spartans at First Mantinea in 418 BC).

Spartan allies were other Peloponnesian city-states, e.g. Corinth, Sicyon, Elis, Tegea (trawling through Thucydides Book V gives a useful list).  Theban allies were the Boeotian city-states (apart from Plataea, which sided with Athens).

Xenophon's Hellenica is our main source for a Thessalian army under Jason of Pherae: I quote the relevant extracts.

This man, after concluding a truce with my city, had a meeting with me and spoke as follows: `Polydamas, that I could bring over your city, Pharsalus, even against its will, you may conclude from the following facts. You know,' he said, `that I have as allies the greater number and the largest of the cities of Thessaly; and I subdued them when you were with them in the field against me. Furthermore, you are aware that I have men of other states as mercenaries to the number of six thousand, with whom, as I think, no city could easily contend. As for numbers,' he said, `of course as great a force might march out of some other city also; but armies made up of citizens include men who are already advanced in years and others who have not yet come to their prime. Furthermore, in every city very few men train their bodies, but among my mercenaries no one serves unless he is able to endure as severe toils as I myself.'  - Xenophon Hellenica VI.1.4-5

'Well, then, this is plain to us, that if Pharsalus and the cities which are dependent upon you should be added to my power, I could easily become Tagus of all the Thessalians; and, further, that whenever Thessaly is under a Tagus, her horsemen amount to six thousand and more than ten thousand men become hoplites.' - idem VI.1.8

'Furthermore, the Boeotians and all the others who are at war with the Lacedaemonians are my allies, and they are ready to be my followers, too, if only I free them from the Lacedaemonians.' - idem VI.1.10

When, accordingly, they had exchanged pledges with one another, the Pharsalians at once observed peace, and Jason was speedily established by common consent as Tagus of the Thessalians. Having become Tagus, he assessed the contingents of cavalry and hoplites that the cities were to furnish, according to the ability of each. And the result was that he had more than eight thousand horsemen, including the allies, his hoplites were reckoned at not fewer than twenty thousand, and there were peltasts enough to be set in array against the whole world; for it is a task even to enumerate the cities which furnished them. - idem VI.1.18-19

Note that Jason as Tagus of Thessaly led quite a substantial army in the 370s BC, it being noteworthy that his boasts before the event amounted to considerably less than the actual totals Xenophon gives him as Tagus; Pherae alone would have fielded something more in line with your present totals.

Quote from: dwkay57 on February 17, 2013, 08:54:29 AM
1) What or who were the Theban and Spartan allies that the general texts seem to refer?

Thebes was the leading city of Boiotia, and the other Boiotian cities were usually either allied or subject to Thebes. The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia describes a Boiotian constitution - which "appears to be the one set up in 447 after the battle of Coronea and the defeat of Athens" (McKechnie & Kern, Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, p.154): 

Quote from: Hellenica Oxyrhynchia XVI.3-4All those who lived in that area were arranged in eleven divisions and each of these provided a Boiotarch, as follows. Thebes contributed four (two for the city, two for Plataia, Skolos, Erythrai, Skaphai and the other places previously linked to them in one political entity but at that time subject to Thebes); Orchomenos and Hysiai provided two Boiotarchs; Thespiai with Eutresis and Thisbai provided two; Tanagra one; and Haliartos, Lebadea and Koroneia provided another .... and in the same way one came from Akraiphnion, Kopai and Chaironeia. ... For the organisation of the army, each division had to provide about one thousand hoplites and one hundred cavalry.

How late this constitution lasted I am not sure, but in any case the numbers of soldiers are likely to have been roughly the same in the 4th century. These Boiotian cities are the only semi-permanent "allies" of the Thebans; otherwise it would simply be a question of who was allied with whom at any given time.

Quote2) What did a Thessalian army of this period contain. My current "plans" have about 3,000 cavalry, 2,000 peltasts and about 1,200 hoplites but this is likely to wrong.

There is a slightly odd quotation attributed to Aristotle:

Quote from: Schol. (Vat.) ad Eurip. Rhes. v. 307The pelte is a shield that lacks an outer border, just as Aristotle claims in the Constitution of the Thessalians, writing as follows: 'After dividing up the cities, Aleuas ordered that each of them provide 40 cavalry and 80 hoplites per kleros.'

Taken literally, this implies that a Thessalian army should have twice as may hoplites as cavalrymen. This would fit - approximately - with the other figures Patrick cites. But as it stands, the quotation  does not follow on from the scholiast's preceding sentence about the pelte at all, so it has been suggested that Aristotle wrote "40 cavalry and 80 peltasts". And of course the quote refers back to the legendary Aleuas (perhaps 7th century, if he was historical at all?), so it is not clear whether it is authentic information about an ancient period or interpolated from Aristotle's own day in the 4th century. If Aristotle did refer to peltasts, then that presumably must be fourth- rather than seventh-century data.

In Hellenica VI.1.9, Xenophon quotes Jason as saying:

QuoteAgain, while Thessaly is an exceedingly flat land, all the peoples round about are subject to her as soon as a Tagus is established here; and almost all who dwell in these neighbouring regions are javelin-men, so that it is likely that our force would be far superior in peltasts also.

These "subjects" are the perioikoi (the same name as the cities of Lakonia subject to the Spartans):

Quote from: http://ecommons.library.cornell.edu/bitstream/1813/2595/11/CHAPTER%202%20FINAL%20DRAFT.pdfThe three major perioikic regions—Magnesia, Perrhaebia, Achaia Phthiotis—are geographically contiguous to the tetrads.

Thanks for the information Duncan and Patrick.

Patrick is reading too much historical accuracy into my plans. The intention was to build a collection of 6mm Greek armies with which to fight solo battles and possibly (when I get more time) some form of campaign. The reason for choosing them was because as Duncan points out alliances tended to be fairly fluid and most of the historical battles seemed to suggest smallish armies at around the 10,000 person size. I could then mix and match accordingly. A 20,000 strong Thessalian army sounds slightly overscale.

I also wanted them to be differentiated between the different cities or conurbations, so whilst my Athenians and Spartans are each about 9,500 strong their rosters are substantially different. If I get my "play day" this Saturday they are due to face up, so I might bore everybody with posting a photo!

Look forward to it!  :)

For the Thessalians, there seems to be enough basis to go with the standard 1 cavalry: 2 hoplites: N peltasts (where N is a number between 4 and the limits of rationality) or Duncan's implied 1 cavalry: 2 peltasts.  Your choice.

If your Thessalians are assumed to be elbowing in before Jason of Pherae became established, then yes, a historical or hypothetical hopeful on the way to Tagus status might field about 10,000 at some point in his career.

Have fun!

Of Thessalians:

In the Salamander book "Warfare in the Classical World" their is an army list for the battle of Mantinea (362BC) which contains a Thessalian contingent of 2,000 hoplites; 1,500 cavalry and a major portion of the 4,000 light troops. How represntative this is I don't know as I couldn't find any other breakdowns which identified a Thessalian contribution in such detail. In order to follow my idea of differentiating each Greek army, I'm taking the interpretation (possibly inaccurate) that Aristotle wasn't too precise on his definition of an infantryman, so my Thessalians will look something like 2,000 cavalry, 3,000 peltasts and just 1,600 hoplites. Suspect possibly, but not easily confused with any other Greekish army.

And about the Thebans:

Thanks for the information Duncan on the eleven divisions. Somewhat fortunately, my current Theban foot corps consists of the Boiotarch with his guard, the Sacred Band and some trained hoplites; plus four big "blobs" of militia hoplites which could represent those from Thebes and its close allies. The other groupings listed provide a good structure on which to base some allied corps of varying enthusiasm, size and composition.

Write up of recent Athenian v Spartan battle attached for those who either can't sleep.

Interesting: what rules system were you using, David?  Everyone and everything seems to be conforming to a hex grid, as opposed to just using hexagonal terrain tiles.

The one surprise for me was the demise of the Spartan king in a victorious (at least in his sector) engagement.  If his unit had perished or been scattered to the four winds his demise would be less surprising, but I know of no Spartan king historically entering daisy-pushing mode while the troops of his immediate entourage were being successful.

Other than that (and peltasts rather than psiloi as a substantial portion of the Spartan light troop contingent) things went much as I would expect given the dispositions - the lowering morale of the Spartan light troops prevented their exploiting success after seizing the wood: this replicated what I would expect not so much from poor morale as from poor communications ("We've cleared the wood, now what?" "Dunno, no orders.") and characteristic Spartan lack of initiative by supporting arms.

One question-mark about Thessalians (which might be illuminating to explore on the tabletop battlefield) is how the army would be deployed and used.  Most of it is configured for rapid movement and presumably intended to pounce on an opponent's weak point(s) while avoiding the tougher parts of the line.  The hoplites are a slight anomaly here: too few for a line of battle, so may have been intended as a shock force to supplement a cavalry charge (pin 'em with the horse and smack 'em with the hoplites) in the style perhaps used by Alexander the Great's companions and hypaspists.  Peltasts can screen or at least stand watching the majority of an enemy infantry line and would probably avoid closing to contact, awaiting (and abiding by) the decision reached by the cavalry attack(s).

Whether the cavalry would go in head-on or try to flank the foe is an open question.  On the wargames table having the hoplites deploy to tackle the enemy wings while the cavalry outflanks to attack from flank or rear, and putting the peltasts in the centre to keep everyone else quiet, could work.

Anyway, congratulations to the Athenians on their success, and do keep us posted.  :)

Quote from: dwkay57 on March 05, 2013, 08:55:21 PM
In the Salamander book "Warfare in the Classical World" their is an army list for the battle of Mantinea (362BC) which contains a Thessalian contingent of 2,000 hoplites; 1,500 cavalry and a major portion of the 4,000 light troops.

Which is, I think, a guess. Neither Xenophon nor Diodoros mentions the size of the Thessalian contingent, except that D does mention they provided a lot of the light infantry.

The Fred Eugene Ray book has "maybe 3,000" of "might be 4-5,000" mercenaries being Thessalian, and number set at a third of that (i.e. 1,000) for the Thessalian cavalry contribution. Polyaenus mentions 1600 horsemen. My reading is that Ray extrapolates having to find 1,000 horsemen to add to 600 Thebans, then extrapolates the 3,000 hoplites from that as a cavalry:infantry ratio, then extrapolates the 4-5,000 from that (so that the Thessalians provide the majority of the mercenary infantry).

You can find the relevant section on Google books (or anyhow, I just did - I have the book at home though - it's good for this kind of thing).

Patrick,

I was using my own rules (as featured in Slingshot 282). Each group of units (a division in my terminology) moves a hex at a time unless all mounted or in column on a road.
The Spartan's King unit did indeed die to the last man. The other Spartiate unit in the division was at 13% of initial strength and their skirmishers were long gone, so the combined effect of casualties and the King's death (being also their divisional commander) caused them to break. Command then passed to the reserve King with the Laconians who held on for a while longer.

The number of very poor quality Spartan peltasts arose from the Plataea question from last year of "What shall we do about the helots?" and are my personal interpretation of what they might have been. With his nearly last breath the Spartan King did utter "Tell the light troops to deal with those Athenian cavalry behind us" which meant they run back into the wood and then stayed there as they saw the Spartiates collapse.

David,
I do wonder at how a Spartan king would give his skirmishers an instruction to go in a direction and deal with a specific enemy once the battle had been joined. Was there a chain of command to these lights or did they get a specific and probably traditional mission at the beginning of a battle and just complete that, then falling back to behind or to the sides of the phalanx?
Did these chaps have officers that kept them together as units that could be recalled and rest asked? I tend to think that in most sets of Ancient Rules light troops have way too much ability to see a threat and respond to it. Once an order had been transmitted wouldn't  skirmishers be on autopilot.

Roy

Quote from: dwkay57 on March 06, 2013, 07:40:54 PM
The number of very poor quality Spartan peltasts arose from the Plataea question from last year of "What shall we do about the helots?" and are my personal interpretation of what they might have been. With his nearly last breath the Spartan King did utter "Tell the light troops to deal with those Athenian cavalry behind us" which meant they run back into the wood and then stayed there as they saw the Spartiates collapse.

Understood.  My own reading (for what it is worth) of post-Plataea developments is that all Greek armies cut down on light troops (possibly after a think about the supply difficulties in the Plataea campaign) so that Athenians only fielded a few (witness their problems when fighting Aetolians and their struggle to raise light troops for the Sicily campaign) and Spartans seem to have dispensed with them altogether: they are conspicuous by their absence in Thucydides' Peloponnesian War accounts and Xenophon's battle narratives in the Hellenica.

Now that you describe the circumstances of the Spartan king's demise one can definitely see why it happened.  ("Men, I know you are dead but one more push will give us ... arrgh!")

that stands in contrast to the view that the Peloponnesian war saw a great increase in the use of mercenaries (Thracian and Greek), who were basically peltasts since they could neither afford hoplite equipment or horses.

Iphikrates figures in this equation as well, and that the demands of the Peloponnesian war marked the end of the 'classic' hoplite warfare model which we know, and saw the beginnings of a proper combined arms warfare model that developed into the Macedonian machine over time.

Chris Webber has a very good summary of the argument and evidence for the use of peltasts in his book on the Thracians, Gods of War, and I think I remember correctly that this also fits in with Wheeler and co in the Cambridge history of G and R warfare.

We certainly see a peltast contingent (about one tenth of the overall force) performing in Xenophon's Anabasis (March of the Ten Thousand) and subsequently Iphicrates' peltast contingent makes a mess of a Spartan mora near Corinth, but are there any pointers in sources about the role and function (or even presence) of peltasts in a Greek hoplite battle?

Roy,

Yes there is a command structure in my rules that goes along the lines of side - army - corps - division - unit. When I did start playing I didn't record any orders and found myself constantly second-guessing myself. So I now record as cell comments in one of the spreadsheets the current orders at each level down to corps. All the divisions in a corps normally move around in adjacent hexes and usually assume the same orders as their Corps commander who they can see waving at them in the next hex, although I can see an argument for them to have their own instructions. If a division is despatched on a special flanking or holding mission then it gets its own specific instructions. All units in a division stay in the same hex and are assumed to have the old WRG "move in company" and "attack/skirmish in support" type instructions but only for their own division. Changes of orders can be issued down the chain of command so a side CinC can issue an order to an army general who can then issue a further order to his corps commanders. I normally add the new order as cell comment in a cell appropriate to when it would be received, so it prompts me to deal with it at the right point. The time it takes for an order to be received does depend on the distance between the sender and the receiver.

So in this specific example: The King's Spartiates did have their own skirmishers who milled around near the hoplites throwing sticks and making flank attacks. The main Spartan light troop contingent were in a separate corps lead by their own commander with his own "character". So the King did issue an order which took time to get there before it was acted upon.

I don't know if that clears the mud to any extent.

Just a quick comment here: at First Mantinea in 418 BC the Spartan king issued orders directly to two unit commanders (who obeyed) and two other unit commanders (who disobeyed as they felt there was not enough time to carry out the orders).  The king then countermanded the orders for the two units which had obeyed and the result was a right royal mess on that wing.

What this shows us of the Spartan command structure is that (at least as of 418 BC) there were no intermediate command levels between king and unit commander - the individual contingents of 500-700 men were directly subordinate to the king (who was on the right of the line).  Once he got into melee everyone acted 'on autopilot' but once he beat his immediate opponents (which happened very fast as the Athenians opposing him fled just prior to contact) he issued new orders to his wing (turn and attack the other enemy wing).  His Argive and Mantinean opponents either did not or could not issue fresh orders and the Spartans rolled up their opponents' hitherto victorious right.

There may be something in this for rules for the period, but I leave that to those who actually write rules ...

Patrick

Patrick,

I remember reading somewhere that it was wrong to install a modern command structure on an ancient army, although you could probably find examples (most likely later in the period) where there was. But I did it anyway just to suit what I was trying to achieve from my games, which are more for my own entertainment than precise historical accuracy. But as you say this is probably a subject for a different discussion thread.

Not a problem, David: it depends upon what one is trying to simulate (and also what information one had and did not have at the time one was rule-writing: nobody ever tells you at the time).  I may have the opportunity to bore everyone to death on the subject in a joint article with George Falco de Mats in a few Slingshots' time about command in classical armies, but the long and short of it here and now is that the corps-division-brigade/regiment-battalion structure that developed for the extended battlefield (initially for long lines of musket-armed troops in 3 ranks, subsequently even longer lines of dispersed infantry) was not present in classical armies, where there was a single OC and a number of battalion-size units (Greek hoplite and some tribal armies) or commanders for the left, right and centre each of whom had a number of battalion-size units (most others).  This is a huge generalisation but gives the basic idea.

Of great importance were 1) continuity of the battleline and 2) signalling.  1) was achieved both by lining units up side by side and by giving them someone or something to follow, often a standard or other tall object, while 2) was the key to controlling troops on the battlefield.  Being clever generally meant doing a bit of pre-planning, as generals who could improvise on the fly - at least successfully - were comparatively few and far between.

Anyway, the important thing is that none of this should be allowed to put you off writing rules, playing out battles and/or sharing the results.  :)

I for one look forward to the command article....as understanding the command and control mechanisms and their relationship to army structure on the battlefield (units/sub-units) is key to designing rules mechanisms that capture its effect (as you can see I tend to believe in top down simulation/rules design, rather than a bottom up simulation/rules). 

So any chance of a sensible thread on C2, army structure (units/sub-units) on battlefield, and ability to move elements around the battlefield (particularly from sector to sector in reaction to unfolding events (as opposed to in accordance with an initial plan)?  By sensible I mean what and how to structure the evidence?

Quote from: gavindbm on March 13, 2013, 11:01:38 PM
So any chance of a sensible thread on C2, army structure (units/sub-units) on battlefield, and ability to move elements around the battlefield (particularly from sector to sector in reaction to unfolding events (as opposed to in accordance with an initial plan)?  By sensible I mean what and how to structure the evidence?

Good idea: in fact, please feel free to start one.  :)

A few thoughts.

Most (perhaps all) civilised armies had a distinct hierarchical unit formation and officer structure.  In many cases this was not unlike the present platoon-company-battalion-regiment/brigade-division hierarchy in size and organisational relationship.  However this seems to have had a different emphasis on the battlefield: low-level unit commanders seem not to have acted as tactical thinkers and leaders so much as organisers of the minutiae of deployment and sustainers of cohesion and orientation.  In other words, rather than lead men in action (implying individual responsibility) they commanded men in action - basically a glorified NCO role.

It was very unusual to see units operating independently, and those that did were usually cavalry.  One famous case in classical times was when at Sellasia (222 BC) Phocion, commanding the Achaean cavalry, charged without orders when he saw a dangerous situation developing (Spartan cavalry working round a friendly flank) and saw off the problem.  His own cavalry commander was not pleased that he had acted without orders, but King Antiogonus praised him for it.  At Raphia (217 BC) Echecrates, commanding Ptolemy's cavalry on the right, used his initiative to circumvent the opposing elephants and attack the Seleucid left wing cavalry in flank, deciding the battle.  One searches in vain for the exercise of similar initiative by infantry contingents.

Alexander's army had a left-wing commander, a right-wing commander (generally Alex) and sub-commanders for the left and right of the phalanx plus the occasional detached role, e.g. the contingent watching the 20,000 Persian light infantry clustered on the high ground at Issus.  The phalanx usually had a commander of the left three phalanxes and a commander of the right three phalanxes, and at Gaugamela the former is recorded as deciding on his own initiative to halt in order to stay in touch with Parmenio's cavalry while his counterpart carried on piking Persians.  This non-movement on Simmias' initiative seems to have been a straight decision that it would be less harmful to lose touch with the right of the phalanx than to lose touch with the cavalry and auxiliaries on the left, and so he chose.  If he had not needed to choose which part of the army to stay with he would have carried on as part of the whole.

The infantry contingents on both sides at Raphia had a commander for each ethnic contingent, but lined up in a single block and advanced or retired in a single block.  It would seem that the role of the contingent commanders was to make sure that orders were passed on in the right language and everyone kept their place rather than being available for independent activities.

It was possible for contingents to be detached for separate activities prior to a battle: Hannibal's Mago-led surprise force at the Trebia, Paullus' 10,000-man detachment sent to seize Hannibal's camp and the popular if often conterproductive Late Roman habit of sending a c.5,000-strong force to get astride the enemy's line of retreat all show that independent command was possible.  Command and organisational structures permitted this sort of detachment, but it was rarely done on the battlefield and if done seems to have been limited to special-role units (Alexander at the Hydaspes sends ahead his horse archers to harass the Indian left and detaches Coenus to ride round the Indian right, 'marking' the cavalry from that flank; Pelopidas and the Theban Sacred Band at Leuctra in 371 BC appear to have detached from the main Theban mass and possibly flanked the Spartan right).

All in all, just getting a significant mass of men to move forward in coordination appears to have consumed most of the 'command points' available to most armies.  Clever moves by subunits seem not to have been a usual part of the repertoire, not least because with two cohesive lines facing each other there is little scope for clever manoeuvring.  But there were occasions when they were possible.

What section was meant by "C2"? I'm willing to start it off if you can clarify which is the right section.
My initial thought is that it is under either the history or more probably the rules discussion arena.

C2 often means Command and Control. If so then it means starting a thread on those topics as related to Ancient armies?
Roy

Here we go:

http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=777.0 (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=777.0)

Did the Greeks ever really curl up in a ball behind their shields?

I know one or two movies demonstrate such a manoeuvre but I realise that is not evidence it actually happened.

Many years ago a Greek opponent spent 15 minutes at the start of a battle telling me how the Greeks used to do this to reduce casualties from missile fire. I agreed that if his hoplites were stationary, not in melee and declared in "curled up mode", any missile attacks against their front would be reduced by a factor of 1. He was pleased with this. He was less pleased when I deployed my Trajanic Romans without a single archer.

If they did really "curl up", I assume they had to remain stationary and that the protection was only really to their front. Is this right and what sort of damage reduction would we anticipate from such a formation? I'm considering adding something into my rules to cover this, a Roman testudo and possibly a shieldwalled warband.

The closest I can think of is the crouched position you see in artworks like http://www.coinarchives.com/34f5ca2c584b1935f2a6fd2783854bc1/img/cng/092/image00122.jpg (http://www.coinarchives.com/34f5ca2c584b1935f2a6fd2783854bc1/img/cng/092/image00122.jpg)

(http://www.coinarchives.com/34f5ca2c584b1935f2a6fd2783854bc1/img/cng/092/image00122.jpg)

What is the current thinking on how well trained Greek hoplites were?

In my early days of wargaming they were always regarded as solid regulars on a par with Alexander's phalangites and Roman auxiliaries, but other analysis (e.g. Duncan's Armies of the Macedonian & Punic Wars, the DBM army lists of 1993 vintage and the Osprey Plataea book) suggest this may not have been the case. Consequently I've tended to rate my own hoplites generally at a "militia" level which may have made them too much of a Dads' Army than a credible fighting force.

Any thoughts on this?

They were a) part-time but b) generally good.  Most classifications regard the two as mutually incompatible and assume that part-time soldiers have to be less than fully effective.  It might be worth remembering that the Republican Roman army was for most of its life composed of part-time soldiers.

Like all things, down to how the city wanted to defend itself. Constant warfare would provide the need to keep the citizens sharp and up to scratch. Take that away and the standards could easily fall. I think that was said of the Persians, that they messed with the wrong people, the Greeks had been fighting amongst themselves for generations.

I have just done two Greek lists for TDIC. The early one was really what I expected with lots of armoured hoplites, some light infantry and a bit of cavalry. The later Greek list really got interesting with more better quality hoplites and the interesting thing is that both the Spartan royal guard and Theban Sacred Band were 300 strong, so the same unit can be used for either (although the Sacred Band can be split up and used as the front ranks of other Theban hoplites).

Funnily enough, the same basic question has emerged on Ancmed.

A few pointers that might help to evaluate how good Greek hoplites were:

1) They trained: Greeks had their gymnasia, where their young men could (and did) improve their fitness.  This would give them an edge in strength, stamina and general staying-power over most of their opponents.

2) They were free men: they were (usually) in the field because they wanted to be there, not because they had been dragged away from the plough to extend the domains of some ruler they had barely heard of.  This manifested in high elan in combat.

3) Everyone wanted them: the Greek hoplite was the mercenary of choice for Persians, Egyptians and even Assyrians and Chaldeans.  Even under the Macedonian supremacy, mercenary Greeks were still in constant demand (admittedly mainly for garrisons).

My own impression of city-state hoplites is that they tended to be of fairly uniform quality, all varying shades of good.  Dorians were considered superior to Ionians and Spartans superior to other Dorians.  There was the occasional hieros lochos, or 'Sacred Band', of which the Theban was the most famous, but otherwise quality seems to have been fairly uniform.  During the Peloponnesian War, some cities (notably Argos) began to train contingents of epilektoi, picked troops, as a means of matching high-quality Spartans*.  Following the Peloponnesian War, epilektoi were usually first in line for hiring out to Persian and Egyptian paymasters in what rapidly became a new industry - the provision of large contingents to provide a cutting edge for even larger native armies.  Persian attempts at reconquering Egypt in the 4th century BC were invariably spearheaded by a strong contingent of Greeks - generally around the 20,000 mark.  When Alexander started to do what Agesilaus boasted of attempting, the Persian response was to hire ever-increasing numbers of Greek mercenaries.

[*Paradoxically, as the best troops in the army they tended to be deployed on the right and so never met Spartans, only Peloponnesian allies.]

Which brings us to rating Greeks in wargame terms: my own recommendation would be to think Territorial Army (for a British player) or the best of the National Guard (for a US player).  In essence, treat them as effective regulars despite their part-time nature.