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Beloved of wargamers. I notice it is something they very often do: wait until the main lines are about to close, then form columns with their infantry and try to snake around the place looking for ideal places to reform into line.

What role did columns actually play in historical battles? Could they move faster than lines? Could they fight? Who could form into them? Wargaming convention says any unit can form column during a battle, that columns are fast movers and fight just as well as units in line. But I somehow doubt it. Any input?

could you be a bit more wargame rules specific about this.

I've only seen stuff like that on Napoleonic tables.

Quote from: Mark G on July 11, 2013, 02:44:33 PM
could you be a bit more wargame rules specific about this.

I've only seen stuff like that on Napoleonic tables.

In DBA/M/MM anything can form a column. Columns get a bonus for moving along a road. A group must be in column to end a move in difficult terrain or traverse a tricky or dangerous river. Auxilia in column may cross difficult terrain as a group.

Looking into it, I don't see any special provisions for the column in FoG. I suppose a battlegroup 8 bases deep and 1 base wide just moves an impressive distance when wheeling on its front corner.

My question is, did formations actually adopt column formation once the battle had commenced? If so, how close to enemy? Were there different kinds of columns?

I think in general principle its easier to march in column than in line. The idea being that it is more difficult to maintain order the longer the line and that the wider you go the more variable the terrain between parts of the line (which of course is not a problem on a nice wide plain.

Does a pike block or a Theban 50 deep phalanx count as a column?

Apparently the Sumerians marched on the battlefield in column, marched to their battle positions (flank to the enemy) and then turned so that the column became a line - and I have no idea how anyone worked that out. But perhaps Hannibals veterans at Cannae performed the same manoeuvre?

Would I let you move around the table in column in TDIC? You betcha, you just reduce a column of march (which doubles your speed) morale dice by one (from 3 to 2), they cannot shoot or evade and are considered unformed if contacted by the enemy.

QuoteI suppose a battlegroup 8 bases deep and 1 base wide just moves an impressive distance when wheeling on its front corner.

And thats the thing, in a real column wheel, the column comes up to a point and wheels at that point, the rear ranks do not go haring across the countryside (as seen on the wargames table).

I'd cue Patrick on that one

- evidence of Hannibal's veterans at Cannae actually marching down the flank of the Romans?

evidence of this being a column?

looks to me like they engaged after the Romans march past them

- remember, the Spanish and Gaul's were instructed to give ground slowly to lure them in - or at least, until the Romans lost all formation anyway, after which, its not too difficult to surround a bewildered enemy.

anyway, back to topic - columns are approach march sorts of things, not something which you would employ tactically.

Think 18th century, not Napoleon, and you might get somewhere.

as for the rules allowing it - well, there are no units in DB - just amorphous elements which can coalesce at will throughout the battle, so its all just games at that level.

A bit like 7th edition march moves when more than a certain distance away from the enemy.

Quote from: Mark G on July 11, 2013, 04:10:49 PM
I'd cue Patrick on that one

- evidence of Hannibal's veterans at Cannae actually marching down the flank of the Romans?

evidence of this being a column?

looks to me like they engaged after the Romans march past them

To be honest, I am not sure on this one, but will give my current understanding of the subject.

At Cannae, Hannibal deployed his Gallo-Spanish centre in a convex arc.  The Romans advanced to meet it.  The centres contacted first, and to all intents and purposes locked in place while the Roman wings carried on until they, too, contacted opponents.  Result: a Roman line has become a Roman arc, with the ends showing.

Hannibal now has to slip a wing of veterans round behind each Roman wing - the fact that they are now invitingly advanced makes this easier, as instead of going ahead-right-across his veterans can go right and then across the enemy rear.  But how would they be deployed?

QuoteJS
My question is, did formations actually adopt column formation once the battle had commenced? If so, how close to enemy? Were there different kinds of columns?

The traditional way of moving bodies of troops any distance in any direction other than straight ahead has been to put them in column.  On the march, this would equate to Justin Taylor's TDIC march column - the more so because the troops would be in march order, with helmets off, weapons slung and maybe shields too.  On the battlefield things would be done slightly differently, because the troops would have helmets on and weapons and shields ready.

A battlefield column would be one of two things: a line turned sideways, so that when it got to where it wanted to be it could simply face right/left and lo, it would be a line of battle ready to move into action, or it could be a march column but with weapons ready.  The first would be employed for battlefield manoeuvres (e.g. flanking) and the second for redispositions (including sending your phalanx up a steep rugged hillside which they could not manage in fighting formation).

At Cannae, Hannibal would in all probability have employed the first option.  His veterans would start lined up with the rest of his army and then, as the Gallo-Spanish crescent advanced and the Roman infantry moved to meet it, each Carthaginian wing could have moved as follows:

1) Face left/right.  This would be done by individual subunits wheeling in that direction as their right (or left) hand neighbour moved out.  Why by subunits?  Because that way the standards would be in the right place, and troops know to follow their standard.

2) Move outwards and wheel.  Moving outwards, i.e. towards the flank, clears space for each subunit to wheel and follow.  Once the column is on the move, the leading subunit (directed by a senior officer) changes direction and heads towards the point designated by the senior officer by a direct or slightly circuitous route, depending upon whether it has to 'round the corner' of the enemy line.  By inducing the Roman infantry to adopt a bow shape with its flanks presented forward, Hannibal made the route his veteran columns had to take more direct and shorter - and also clear of the ongoing cavalry actions.

3) Adopt the position.  Moving towards the intended destination, the column passes behind the Roman infantry line, probably unnoticed on account of the dust and excitement to the Romans' front.  And if they are noticed, the fact that they are all equipped exactly like Romans means they are not immediately identified as enemies.  Besides, the Romans are fixed to the front: there is nothing they can do short of about-turn the triarii.  Even these will not stop Hannibal's men for long.

4) Face the enemy.  Again, the subunits wheel - the distance between subunits while marching allows each subunit (about maniple-sized) to turn to face the enemy without interference from its neighbours.  In a very short while, a battleline forms facing the enemy rear.

5) Charge and have fun.  The senior officer, seeing his men in position, in formation and ready, signals the charge before the enemy can react.  In they go, and even if the triarii have faced about to counter them it will be a fairly one-sided contest, with the triarii being pushed back onto the principes (or equivalents - Hannibal would initially have wrapped the allied alae rather than the legions themselves) and the whole Roman formation under pressure from all sides.  The flanks?  Either some veterans charge in or the unemployed peltasts can make themselves useful there (as they did at the Trebia).

QuoteJT
Does a pike block or a Theban 50 deep phalanx count as a column?

No.  These are close and/or deep battle lines, and intended as such.

Quote- evidence of Hannibal's veterans at Cannae actually marching down the flank of the Romans?

evidence of this being a column?

An idea, I have lots of ideas.

This one is based on the idea of going forward but attacking to the flank. So you march forward in column, turn to the side and hey presto you are facing in the direction you want to attack, just like the Sumerians.

mmm, so no evidence, just assumptions.

cause the thing is, columns are highly vulnerable in battle, which is why they are used as an approach formation, not a battlefield one (please, no numpties chiming in on napoleon, those are totally different things).

especially in ancient warfare, where the placement of the leading men was vital to the whole structure - which makes turning to flank a much more dubious proposition - especially when there was no cadence marching to help with that.

and the idea of the Carthaginian arc bending makes a much better answer if you then see the Romans moving into the jaws of the trap, rather than simply standing idly by watching the Carthaginian veterans marching down their flanks unimpeded.

that is - the Carthaginians did not have to march past the Romans, the Romans march into the Carthaginians.

once that trap starts to close, completing the surrounding moves is relatively easy - but while the Romans still have formation and order, you just cannot blithely allow them to be flanked without reacting.

Polybios 15.7 is pretty compelling against the whole notion in fact.

remember, all the examples which we have in the ancient world of a clear approach march and change of facing, occur as deployment and approaches -= not as tactical battlefield manoeuvres in the face of the enemy - Sumerians included.

in fact the first proper tactical example I can think of is not until Frederick with his oblique march - quite contrary to the expected column march to the field, deployment and then a commencement of the battle. and the army which came up with that had decades of drill before it until it could be used.

Patrick's analysis seems to imply that Hannibal had to do everything to ensure that his veterans did not have to fight anyone whilst moving in column. An organised fighting formation is files side by side in line. A column, if attacked, would have its files facing the wrong way. Result, disorientation of the men and resulting disorder and diminished fighting ability. Cannae was a carefully calculated risk by Hannibal - he had to be morally certain the Romans would not be able to react when employing columns in proximity to the enemy.

Transposing this to the wargames table, columns should suffer a severe minus modifier if attacked. In Optioese, a -2 perhaps.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 11, 2013, 05:58:49 PM
1) Face left/right. 

There's an old thread on ancmed about the Cannae manoeuvre, in which (I think) Steven James argues that the language Polybios uses implies columns that turn into battle formation to attack. I think it began with a discussion in which Steven was rejecting the whole idea of unit-sized "pivot wheels" in wargaming. You might find that useful to search for.

AncMed's search is atrocious, so I'll pass on that  - but will happily check the posts if you care to search on his behalf and give the post numbers

- but I was very unconvinced by Steven's Zama analysis - which also featured columns marching past Romans at close range, and then turning to flank, so I'd be surprised if he has anything significantly different to add from that.

If his theory on Cannae is the same, and I expect it is, then it conforms with Pat's on Zama and Cannae as well - that the romans start (or planned to start) in a march column, march right past 3 lines of legionaries who fail to react (no Cynoscephalae this time from the triarii), and the Carthaginians simply turn to face, and wallop.

As I have outlined, Polybios for one rejects this out of hand at Zama as impossible given the Roman triplex formation, and it just seems ridiculously complicated relying entirely upon the Romans utterly failing to react to your moves.

There is a much more simple explanation for both battles.

Cannae - the Spanish / Gallic crescent gives way drawing the Romans into the already aligned veterans, who are waiting for them - no need for fancy manoeuvres at all (thus conforming entirely with the Trebbia advance).

Zama - there never was a planned flank march, it was always exactly as reported - the veterans wait,  the Romans fight two battles where they expected only one, and its only the cavalry returning which swings it.

Quotemmm, so no evidence, just assumptions.

Indeed very little evidence available from so long ago. So yes my ideas (as stated) just as valid as anyone elses idea of course.

As to effect of being attacked whilst in column, already posted that.

QuoteCannae - the Spanish / Gallic crescent gives way drawing the Romans into the already aligned veterans, who are waiting for them - no need for fancy manoeuvres at all (thus conforming entirely with the Trebbia advance).

My reason for not going with this idea is that it is simply waiting. You can improve your chances/effect by moving, so the moving idea wins with me.

I don't understand where the idea of a flank attack by anyone comes into play at Zama. Seems frontal all the way (with the exception of the returning Roman cavalry).

For the battle of Trebbia

QuoteThe Roman cavalry on the contrary retreated: and the flanks of the line being thus left unprotected, the Carthaginian spearmen and the main body of the Numidians, passing their own advanced guard, charged the Roman flanks: and, by the damage which they did them, prevented them from keeping up the fight with the troops on their front. The heavy-armed soldiers, however, who were in the front rank of both armies, and in the centre of that, maintained an obstinate and equal fight for a considerable time.

I appreciate that spearmen could be considered heavy infantry but a) those are mentioned fighting in the centre and b) earlier references point to the 'spearmen' acting as skirmishers so I think these are javelinmen. So again another frontal battle, no columns involved. Just my 2p of course.

In fact most ancient battles seem straight forward frontal battles; Trasimene and Teutoburg forest being exceptions (and not going well for the armies in column of march).

It is intriguing to read people's thoughts on such matters because it reveals so much about their own approach to generalship.  :)

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 12, 2013, 10:13:51 AM
In fact most ancient battles seem straight forward frontal battles; Trasimene and Teutoburg forest being exceptions (and not going well for the armies in column of march).

Quite true - most were.  It is the exceptions that have us exercised.

Quote
I don't understand where the idea of a flank attack by anyone comes into play at Zama. Seems frontal all the way (with the exception of the returning Roman cavalry).

Intentions.  Hannibal's previous record shows him as not the kind of general to batter away frontally when he can improve on things by adding a bit of spice on the flanks.  He was a man with a plan - but his plan depended on being superior in cavalry, a misapprehension that Scipio apparently strove to cultivate in the run-up to Zama.

Take the 202 BC situation: for Carthage, it is very like the 255 BC situation in the First Punic War.  Regulus' army is running riot through Africa and Carthage is down to its last hope.  This hope is Xanthippus, who stocks up on elephants, fields the Carthaginian citizenry and uses his cavalry superiority to encircle the Romans while his elephants and citizenry mow them down from the front.  So what does Hannibal do?  Something remarkably similar: he stocks up on elephants, fields the Carthaginian citizenry and prepares for battle - but with only a handful of cavalry (two handfuls after Tychaeus joins him), so where is the encirclement of the Romans going to come from?

The clue lies in the placement of his veterans in the third line - deployed with an unusual amount of separation from the rest of the army.  Why deploy them so far back?  It merely hinders their commitment if they are intended as the Ottoman-style final throw after the 'lesser' troops have been wastefully expended.  If however they were intended to part in the middle and half march right, half left, around the Roman army while a ferocious frontal attack by mercenaries and elephants,  supported by the citizen-troops, kept the Roman line pinned, the disposition starts to make sense.

So why did it not happen?  It depended on Hannibal having cavalry superiority to ensure nothing interfered with the march of these encircling columns (because as has been pointed out one needs a column to cover distances if doing manoeuvres that involve directional change, and such columns are vulnerable if attacked).  Scipio concealed Masinissa's presence from Hannibal's spies and, at the famous interview, from Hannibal himself.  Thus, on the day, Hannibal suddenly becomes aware that Masinissa's cavalry are, after all, present - he has been 'had' and his plan will not work.  End of flanking manoeuvre before it has even begun.

Quote
I appreciate that spearmen could be considered heavy infantry but a) those are mentioned fighting in the centre and b) earlier references point to the 'spearmen' acting as skirmishers so I think these are javelinmen. So again another frontal battle, no columns involved.

These 'spearmen' are 'lonchophoroi', peltast types (most translators do not seem to understand the concept).  Their initial role was to skirmish; once that ended, they, unlike the Roman velites, were not absorbed into the heavy infantry but were redeployed to the flanks and manoeuvred around the Roman flanks to recommence peltasting away.  So how would they have manoeuvred around the Roman flanks?  A column of subunits would seem the most efficient and reliable way.  Anyone is welcome to suggest an alternative.

Pat and I are quite in disagreement on this.

His argument rests on accepting that Hannibal must have had a better plan that the one described in the sources
- and that this plan was abandoned at short notice once the armies deployed but before they engaged - without ANY disruption or confusion to his army, and with no trace being left which could be recorded.

It is a complicated plan, involving repeated changes of facing and formation.
It relies upon the Romans failing to react in any way when they saw Hannibal's men marching past their flanks - which 15.7 explicitly speaks against.

and we have to dismiss Polybios when he states

"In the next place, when he offered battle he so managed matters that it was impossible for any commander with the same arms at his disposal to make better dispositions for a contest against the Romans than Hannibal did on that occasion"

and again

"He had placed the mercenaries in advance with the Carthaginians behind them in order that the Romans before the final engagement might be fatigued by their exertions and that their swords might lose their edge owing to the great slaughter, and also in order to compel the Carthaginians thus hemmed in on both sides to stand fast and fight, in the words of Homer

That e'en the unwilling might be forced to fight.

The most efficient and steadiest of his troops he had placed behind at a certain distance in order that, anticipating and witnessing from afar what took place, they might with undiminished strength and spirit make use of their qualities at the proper time"


But, if you want to believe that Hannibal had some master plan which he was unable to execute - that he was a god like general who could not be beaten when he was given the space to plan, then its as good as any.

Much simpler, and more believable, is to simply note that after a dozen years of fighting Romans, Hannibal had come to see the benefit of multiple lines to his army, and he maximised this by using the first lines to wear down the Romans, before seeking the major battle with his fresh men.  Just like Polybios says he did.

indeed the apparently random inclusion of the Homer quote could be said to argue that there was a specific rejection of any attempt to envelop the flanks, as it would have resulted in the Romans withdrawing rather than fighting.

the main sources and my interpretation are here

http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=907.0

QuoteThe clue lies in the placement of his veterans in the third line - deployed with an unusual amount of separation from the rest of the army.  Why deploy them so far back?  It merely hinders their commitment if they are intended as the Ottoman-style final throw after the 'lesser' troops have been wastefully expended.  If however they were intended to part in the middle and half march right, half left, around the Roman army while a ferocious frontal attack by mercenaries and elephants,  supported by the citizen-troops, kept the Roman line pinned, the disposition starts to make sense.

You may have read my earlier view that just makes a damn big hole in the middle of his army. For the above idea to work you have to expect the first two lines to hold So not a view I would share. We are of course told that the citizen troops were sandwiched between the veterans and the mercenaries because they were not keen to fight. Perhaps so badly that without anyone behind them, they simply would have 'bugged out' if they saw the first line breaking.

In fact thinking about it I think I would have gone; mercenaries/elephants, Italian veterans, Citizen troops.

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 12, 2013, 02:36:51 PM

QuoteThe clue lies in the placement of his veterans in the third line - deployed with an unusual amount of separation from the rest of the army.  Why deploy them so far back?  It merely hinders their commitment if they are intended as the Ottoman-style final throw after the 'lesser' troops have been wastefully expended.  If however they were intended to part in the middle and half march right, half left, around the Roman army while a ferocious frontal attack by mercenaries and elephants,  supported by the citizen-troops, kept the Roman line pinned, the disposition starts to make sense.

You may have read my earlier view that just makes a damn big hole in the middle of his army. For the above idea to work you have to expect the first two lines to hold So not a view I would share. We are of course told that the citizen troops were sandwiched between the veterans and the mercenaries because they were not keen to fight. Perhaps so badly that without anyone behind them, they simply would have 'bugged out' if they saw the first line breaking.

In fact thinking about it I think I would have gone; mercenaries/elephants, Italian veterans, Citizen troops.

Funnily enough, that is exactly Livy's description: he thinks Hannibal put his best troops in the second line and an untrustworthy, useless bunch (his opinion of the Italians) in the third line.  It would seem that the stiff fight put up by the Carthaginian second line fooled Livy into believing they were in fact Hannibal's veterans.

Hence both Polybius and Livy confirm that the second line put up a good fight: Hannibal could have executed a flanking manoeuvre without fearing a collapse of his forward lines.

While I have the highest respect for Polybius as a preserver of facts, he does have lapses of judgement (notably when criticising Callisthenes' account of Alexander's approach march to Issus) and his analysis of Zama may be one of them.  However we may note the ambiguity of the following:

"Meanwhile he kept  the most warlike and the steadiest of his fighting troops at some distance in the rear.  He intended that they should watch the battle from a distance, leaving their strength and their spirit unimpaired until he could draw upon their martial qualities at the right moment." - Polybius XV.16

If by this Polybius meant that Hannibal kept his veterans poised to commit when Scipio was vulnerable, sorting out his uncommitted troops and wounded hastati and with the Romans picking their way over the corpses, then this is something Hannibal signally failed to do.  If however Polybius had an inkling of Hannibal's intention to use his veterans to wrap around the Roman army when it was engaged with the lesser quality troops, this makes more sense.

One may also point out that if some troops are not keen to fight, it makes more sense to put one's final line immediately behind them, not some distance away from them.

Quote from: Mark G on July 12, 2013, 02:18:42 PM

Much simpler, and more believable, is to simply note that after a dozen years of fighting Romans, Hannibal had come to see the benefit of multiple lines to his army, and he maximised this by using the first lines to wear down the Romans, before seeking the major battle with his fresh men.  Just like Polybios says he did.

Here one might point out that this 'benefit of multiple lines' resulted in the only battle Hannibal is known to have lost.  ;)

QuoteFunnily enough, that is exactly Livy's description: he thinks Hannibal put his best troops in the second line and an untrustworthy, useless bunch (his opinion of the Italians) in the third line.

Yes that is what Livy says about the Italian veterans, I doubt we would agree with him.

But if you take some Livy, you really should take all of him on this battle - like accounting for the Macedonians, for the unbelievably short timeframe between when livy has Hannibal leaving Italy and zama, for the denigration of the veterans at the exposition of the citizens, for Hannibals force march to the field, for the numbers and for all the other myriad things that livy just gets wrong.

OTOH, you could take Polybios, who is straightforward and clear in every respect so long as you give up the convoluted argument necessary to sustain an abandoned flank march by infantry argument.

Patricks analysis that during the lull, Hannibal could have executed a flanking move is quite correct - and he did not, in fact he made no move whatsoever. 
This despite the potential time pressure which the cavalry situation could produce.  Nor did he seek to introduce them (prematurely) over a bloodied and disrupted battlefield - clearly he had no intention of using them to immediately follow up in support of the citizenry - and quite right too if you are unsure of the citizens ability to fight.

had the veterans been that close to the citizens, then the initial uncertainty the had could have routed through his whole army.  Had he intended to introducing them that quickly, Polybios would have commented on it, on the indecision, on the inability to capitalise on the opportunity.

Instead Polybios comments on the mess which the first field was in, on how disruptive and dangerous to fight over it was.  And how Hannibal let the romans advance through this before engaging them.

Hannibal and Polybios makes perfect sense if you simply see a plan to use the citzs, elephants and mercenaries to wear down the Romans, and then a fresh army of veterans to actually fight an equal battle with the remainder.  just like polybios says.

no dramatic flankings
no dramatic attack as the citizens are broken over the debri strewn field
just a plain and simple two stage battle.

that he lost is entirely due to the timely arrival of the Roman allied cavalry. 

But let us be assured, this was not a swift move, and it was not one which Hannibal could see coming at any point until he was fully engaged with the Romans infantry - for he had ample time to counter it, ample men to form a rear facing line which could easily deal with blown cavalry (especially Numidian light cavalry that was no doubt well out of javelins after it previous exertions).  he did not, for he was in no rush.

Ditto for Cannae - no flank march, no columnar veteran attack, just patience, and waiting for the Romans to come on to where you want to fight them after using expendable troops to blunt their swords and use up their javelins.

This seems to be a good list of where Mark G and I disagree.  :)

Quote from: Mark G on July 13, 2013, 10:48:25 AM
This despite the potential time pressure which the cavalry situation could produce.  Nor did he seek to introduce them (prematurely) over a bloodied and disrupted battlefield - clearly he had no intention of using them to immediately follow up in support of the citizenry - and quite right too if you are unsure of the citizens ability to fight.

I would apply a different logic: the veterans are well placed to circle round the 'bloodied and disrupted battlefield' while the fighting is still ongoing.  The evident lack of intent to give the citizen troops support from the third line shows confidence in their ability to fight, not uncertainty on this point.

Quote
had the veterans been that close to the citizens, then the initial uncertainty the had could have routed through his whole army.  Had he intended to introducing them that quickly, Polybios would have commented on it, on the indecision, on the inability to capitalise on the opportunity.

The problem here is that if the citizens are not going to fight properly but are going to put their main energies into routing, there is no point fielding them anyway.  If they are capable of fighting but unwilling and thus have to be watched, close supervision is better than distant supervision (which gives them a head start if they wish to abscond).  In the event, they did rather well - and when the remnants finally fled, the line of veterans did not stop them - it simply diverted them.  How would it have stopped the whole contingent if the latter had decided to leave?

Quote
Instead Polybios comments on the mess which the first field was in, on how disruptive and dangerous to fight over it was.  And how Hannibal let the romans advance through this before engaging them.

Whereas he could have advanced his veterans round it on both flanks, preferably while the Romans were still engaged.

Quote
Hannibal and Polybios makes perfect sense if you simply see a plan to use the citzs, elephants and mercenaries to wear down the Romans, and then a fresh army of veterans to actually fight an equal battle with the remainder.  just like polybios says.

If that is actually what he says.  The translation of this passage seems somewhat loose (I am still trying to work through the implications of the Greek).

Quote
that he lost is entirely due to the timely arrival of the Roman allied cavalry. 

Yes, and this is the one factor - inferiority in cavalry - that ruined Hannibal's entire battle.  If he planned to give battle with this deadly disadvantage hanging over everything he did, then he was no general - particularly with Vermina's reinforcements a few days away.  Why stick his head in a noose?

Quote
But let us be assured, this was not a swift move, and it was not one which Hannibal could see coming at any point until he was fully engaged with the Romans infantry - for he had ample time to counter it, ample men to form a rear facing line which could easily deal with blown cavalry (especially Numidian light cavalry that was no doubt well out of javelins after it previous exertions).  he did not, for he was in no rush.

But we do not see this formation of a rear line, nor do we see it holding off the Roman cavalry.  Rush or no, Hannibal still lost.

Quote
Ditto for Cannae - no flank march, no columnar veteran attack, just patience, and waiting for the Romans to come on to where you want to fight them after using expendable troops to blunt their swords and use up their javelins.

These assertions I would disagree with, and would also point out that at Cannae the Romans had a 2:1 infantry superiority whereas at Zama the situation was reversed.  Besides, Hannibal's veteran Spanish were not 'expendable'.

your logic totally misses the point that at no point did any move by the veterans ever get made.

if they were so well placed, if there was clear time to move them, then why did they not move as your plan has it?

if he was worried about the cavalry, why did he take no movement to counter them when he had the chance?  he had plenty of time to react to both attack with his infantry and defend with against the cavalry, he did neither. 

And he lost.

The way I read the situation is that Hannibal became paralysed by paranoia once he realised Scipio had outwitted him and brought Masinissa to the field.  He only moved his veterans once Scipio put all his infantry 'in the shop window' - indicating (as I understand it) a fear that Scipio may have had something else hidden, quite possibly as a counter against an enveloping march.  Once he saw that Scipio had nothing extra in the infantry inventory, he committed his veterans.  This may or may not be the explanation, but it seems consistent with Hannibal's inactivity up to that point.

The sad thing is that had he sent them round to envelop Scipio's army as soon as the cavalry (and stray elephants) were off the field, the envelopment would have worked.  Whether our historical sources would now be written in Greek and Punic rather than Greek and Latin is another matter ...

well, its an unusual bass for a theory

- Hannibal was a brilliant general, too brilliant to sit around and not have a cunning plan which we do not know about.

so he forms up with a cunning third rank flank march.

then see all the enemy cavalry, and abandons the plan

then the cavalry are all sent off the field, early, in the battle

and Hannibal freezes and fails to order the envelopment which he has already drawn up the army preparatory for.

OTOH, there is Polybiios' straightforward description of the plan and the outcome.

Of course you can game it and try out your theories  :)

I think I did Zama once but I cannot find any records of the game - anything dating back to the days of floppy discs seems to have gotten lost.

Strangely enough ...

Aaron Bell and I had this idea and did a PBEM game of Zama.  It followed the historical pattern pretty closely except that Hannibal did send his veterans round Scipio's flanks while the bulk of the infantry on both sides were fighting it out.  As a result, although it was a 'close-run thing', the Roman infantry did collapse just as the Roman cavalry was returning, Scipio it the dust of Africa trying to stem the rout and Hannibal won the day.

Not necessarily absolute and unquestioned validation of the concept, but interesting.

Quote from: Mark G on July 14, 2013, 09:04:49 AM

- Hannibal was a brilliant general, too brilliant to sit around and not have a cunning plan which we do not know about.

Sorry, Mark, this is a bit vague: does this mean he was too brilliant to have a plan or too brilliant not to have one, or that if he had had a brilliant plan it would be transparently obvious to us less brilliant mortals?  Or what did you mean to convey?

Quote
so he forms up with a cunning third rank flank march.

then see all the enemy cavalry, and abandons the plan

then the cavalry are all sent off the field, early, in the battle

and Hannibal freezes and fails to order the envelopment which he has already drawn up the army preparatory for.

Not surprising, as he, ever the master stratagemist (if such a word exists), would in turn fear another stratagem.  Only when he saw Scipio's infantry fully deployed, i.e. he knew the Romans could have no more surprises in reserve, did he move his veterans.

Quote
OTOH, there is Polybiios' straightforward description of the plan and the outcome.

But is it as straightforward as we think?

"Next, having accepted battle, the excellence of his dispositions for a contest with the Romans, considering the identity of the arms on each side, could not have been surpassed. For though the Roman line is hard to break, yet each individual soldier and each company, owing to the uniform tactic employed, can fight in any direction, those companies, which happen to be in nearest contact with the danger, wheeling round to the point required. Again, the nature of their arms gives at once protection and confidence, for their shield is large and their sword will not bend: the Romans therefore are formidable on the field and hard to conquer." - Polybius XV.15

Polybius is considering only the Roman infantry, not Hannibal's deadly inferiority in cavalry - one wonders why, in view of his mention after Cannae that "it is more effective to have half as many infantry as the enemy and an overwhelming superiority in cavalry than to engage him with equal numbers" (III.117)

"Still Hannibal took his measures against each of these difficulties in a manner that could not be surpassed. He provided himself with those numerous elephants, and put them in the van, for the express purpose of throwing the enemy's ranks into confusion and breaking their order. Again he stationed the mercenaries in front and the Carthaginians behind them, in order to wear out the bodies of the enemy with fatigue beforehand, and to blunt the edge of their swords by the numbers that would be killed by them; and moreover to compel the Carthaginians, by being in the middle of the army, to stay where they were and fight." - idem XV.16

All this is for dealing with the Roman infantry, although if the aim were to 'compel the Carthaginians to fight' stationing them in the van with the mercenaries behind them would be a better way to do it.

"But the most warlike and steady part of his army he apostasei parenebale kharin tou prooroumenous ek pollou to sumbainon kai diamenontas akeraious tois te somasi kai tais psykhais sun kairo khresasthai tais spheteras aretais." - ibid

Translating phrase by phrase:
apostasei parenebale = drew them up separated
kharin tou prooroumenous = for the sake of preparing for
ek pollou = from a distance
to sumbainon = the contingency/opportunity
kai diamenontas akeraious tois te somasi = and maintaining whole their bodies
kai tais psykhais = and their minds
sun kairo khresasthai = when the right time [should come] to use
tais spheteras aretais = their special qualities/virtues

'Kairo' generally means 'measure, proportion or fitness' but also has the meaning of 'exact or critical time'.  If, as seems likely, this is what Polybius intended, then Hannibal was indeed holding his veterans out of the battle for use for a specific opportunity at a critical time, or at least intending to.

Polybius' final judgement also hints at a plan thwarted:

"And, if in spite of having done everything that could be done, he who had never been beaten before failed to secure the victory now, we must excuse him. For there are times when chance thwarts the plans of the brave; and there are others again, when a man "Though great and brave has met a greater still."" - ibid

So Polybius' verdict seems to be a cunning plan thwarted by a greater opponent as opposed, to, say, a plan carried out but not bringing success.

the problem with gaming it, Justin, is the rules.

As we have been discussing this summer, rules overemphasise flank attacks, punish armies for keeping their best troops in the rear, and overemphasise cunning plans and high risk moves.

most of which is fine for hoplite and even Hellenistic warfare, but it just does not work for armies which always attempted to match their frontages and add extra depth rather than width whenever they have the men to do so - such as those in the punic wars.

This was why we put some much effort into covering Sabin's model of combat in the WMWW articles - I see Duncan zoned out of them, quite understandably too, but the point of all that text was not as much to show that the WMWW was nonsense (its pretty clear once you take the heat out of it really), as to use it to get into models of ancient combat, so that we could help break the single line of battle and hoplite style tactics which rules seem wedded too.

this missing flank march argument analysis perfectly chime with current wagamer tactics.

deducing a deadly inferiority in cavalry - yet Hannibal took no action to counter this in any respect once the cavalry had left the field, so it cannot have been that serious on the day for him (unless he froze, which is a tautological answer if ever there was one).

deducing that because the cavalry were gone, the flanks of both armies were entirely exposed- and in good wargamer fashion, concluding that there must have been a flank march to exploit this, using the only troops remaining - which still never happened because the general froze.

And deducing that because the best troops were kept back, they must not have been intended to fight in the front line, but were intended to make some ultra cunning super move, which failed to come about because of the unprovable general freezing argument.

all exactly conforming with the outcomes you would expect of every set of wargaming rules I have ever come across.  dramatic high risk moves with elite troops, flanks winning battles, cunning plans beating hard slogs every time.

to deduce that 'using their special qualities at the right time', in fact meant to engage in some repeated change of formation and performance of an on field flank march in the face of the enemy - rather than as is commonly held, that it simply meant holding them back until the detritus had done their work and worn the enemy down - fine, believe that if you want, but its utterly dependent on far too many 'yes but what if this was true' moments.

but it was a good article, and fun to re read again.  But I doubt either of us has much new to add anymore on it

as for gaming it, well, I think even lost battles might make the infantry flank march tactic virtually impossible - but it would not have the pursuing cavalry go so far away as to be something you need not prepare for the return of, so even those rules would likely see the cavalry sweep back and envelop the flank early.  the right troops would win the game for the romans, but they would do so well before the triarii had been fully engaged - in an unsatisfying manner which would lead the Carthaginians to simply put their elephants on the flanks to win the cavalry battle, and so on.

I'd also suggest if we want to keep going on this we should return to the thread on zama, or the earlier one on where zama went wrong

http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=903.30

which was where this really started.

the point for columns in battle being that with the arguable exception of cannae - when the vets might have marched in a column, or might not (I say not), columns are not something which can be tactically employed, and should be restricted to an approach formation.

since they clearly were NOT used as such at Zama, irrespective of whether you think they might have been a plan to do so or not.

So unless you want your rules to normalise exceptions - which IMHO is the absolute worst thing that you can do in a set of rules, columns should not be allowed to be used within a tactically relevant distance of the enemy.

Quote
So unless you want your rules to normalise exceptions - which IMHO is the absolute worst thing that you can do in a set of rules, columns should not be allowed to be used within a tactically relevant distance of the enemy.

Hence the degree of separation between Hannibal's veterans and the rest of his army - and the enemy.   He had them beyond the tactically relevant distance (a useful clue concerning his intentions).  (Ultimately we have to make up our own minds about Zama: was Hannibal a skilled tactical general or a mere pounder?)

*

We do have two different types of 'column' attested: one is the march column, 6' between men in all directions, often with kit packed and not ready for action, not used in proximity to the enemy.  The other is the column-waiting-to-become-a-line that Polybius describes in VI.40: march ready for action, subunits arranged in a line so that wheeling each subunit creates an instant battleline.  This can be used in the presence of the enemy, though as Mark indicates a 'tactical distance' is advisable.  This 'tactical distance' will vary with the enemy's ability to react: if he is unengaged, and under command, approaching within 200 yards may be inadvisable.  If he is busily engaged to his front, 50 yards may be ample.  The key is how long it would take to halt the column and get the subunits wheeled to face the enemy - if this is achievable before the enemy can close within effective hurled missile range, you have the right amount of separation.

It may be worth noting that phalanxes (Hellenistic) seemed to do things differently.  At Cynoscephalae, Philip's phalanx moved up-slope in two parts, apparently in 'march mode' but on battle frontage, and when on top of the ridge deployed into combat formation (or rather Philip's half did; Nicanor's half found itself among broken ground and was unable to assemble before being hit by the Roman elephants).

This feature of travelling in march formation (albeit with weapons ready) but on battle frontage is also notable in Callisthenes' description of Alexander's approach march to the battlefield at Issus.  The less detailed surviving accounts suggest that he did the same at Granicus and Gaugamela.  We might conclude that 'pike columns' should not be considered for Hellenistic armies (mediaeval armies are a different matter).

*

For Roman armies, the column in testudo seems well enough established as a means of assaulting fortifications that we need some rules for this if we are to represent field fortifications.

On the battlefield, the governing formation is the cohesive line.  That said, some armies formed very deep lines.  Egyptians 100 deep at Thymbra are attested in Xenophon's Cyropaedia.  Greeks 50 deep are occasionally encountered.  Romans formed a triple line equating to a depth of 21-25 men, and occasionally doubled this.  Some might be tempted to try and class these as 'columns' - and under Napoleon-speak, they would be.  In the classical era, however, they are lines and should be treated as such.

*

However, an exceptional general with exceptional troops might well break the rules.  Hannibal's veterans (once reconfigured as Romans) had the skill, the small-unit organisation and the mobility to attempt this kind of hitherto forbidden manoeuvre.  We note that only his peltasts made a flanking move at the Trebia, but at Cannae it was his veterans who delivered this decisive stroke.  It was evidently not something the Romans were expecting, perhaps because it had never been done before and was deemed impossible to execute.

Following Cannae, Hannibal twice more annihilated a Roman army - in 212 BC and again in 210 BC he destroyed a Roman army at Herdonea (some scholars think Livy is duplicating the same engagement two years apart).  In each case, what we can extract from Livy's account suggests that the superior discipline and manoeuvrability of Hannibal's troops were the key elements in the Carthaginian victory.  Thereafter, the Romans seemingly became more wary, and operated in greater force.

In conclusion, while it does seem that manoeuvre in column on the battlefield was a rarity, it was a rarity that Hannibal seems to have used with sufficient frequency to merit his veterans being permitted to do so under any set of rules.

Quotethe problem with gaming it, Justin, is the rules.

As we have been discussing this summer, rules overemphasise flank attacks, punish armies for keeping their best troops in the rear, and overemphasise cunning plans and high risk moves.

I don't know if rules overemphasise flank attacks, attacks in the flanks of most troops seem to have been (and continue throughout history) to be decisive, maximising enemy losses and minimising your own. Perhaps your thoughts are how fast players can get round flanks with things like 3 moves a turn with Warmaster Ancients or DBM?

Personally I prefer to use my best troops for a decisive attack (Alexander style). I agree though, rules which say that after X amount of your army is destroyed then the game is over would preclude keeping a decent reserve - solution, use different rules?

As for cunning plans and wild gambles, yes thats my style of play (its only a game) and sometimes I have to be restrained in multi-player games from my wild attacks. I must admit I do seem to have more success with my attacks restrained by others.

But I do suggest you try the Die is Cast for your games and see if they suit your ideas of 'real' battles any better.

To sum up the thread thus far:

The only recorded examples of the use of columns during a battle are by Hannibal: Trebia (limited to his Peltasts) and Cannae (his veterans), with a possible third intended use at Zama. That's it.

Conclusion: the use of columns should be banned in Ancients simulations unless the player commands Hannibal.

Hang on, there's another example - Cynoscephalae. The tribune of the victorious legion on the flank of Philip's advancing phalanx gets his Principes and Triarii to move across and flank the Macedonians. The only way that could have been done with any semblance of order would have been to form column and march across to the rear of the phalanx before forming line again. If this was the case then forming column during a battle had become a standard manoeuvre (a tribune could order it on the spur of the moment), not often used, but handy when necessary.

We need rules then that make columns rare but not impossible on the wargames table. Picking up on the hypothesis that Flamininus's army had got the idea of battle columns from Hannibal (the dates are right), we should perhaps limit it to certain OBs, or certain generals, obliging the majority of armies to fight and move in lines.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 15, 2013, 05:14:17 PM


Conclusion: the use of columns should be banned in Ancients simulations unless the player commands Hannibal.

Though you are following Patrick and defining things like 50 deep Thebans as short, deep lines.  many wargames rules probably wouldn't make that distinction.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 15, 2013, 05:18:06 PM

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 15, 2013, 05:14:17 PM


Conclusion: the use of columns should be banned in Ancients simulations unless the player commands Hannibal.

Though you are following Patrick and defining things like 50 deep Thebans as short, deep lines.  many wargames rules probably wouldn't make that distinction.

The trouble is that you cannot accurately represent a 50 deep Theban column with bases since the width to depth ratio of bases is so hopelessly inaccurate. But if you could see a real Theban column from the air it would look like what it is: an unusually thick line.

And can a Theban column kink when it wheels? Does it do better in difficult terrain, etc. etc.? Even for wargamers it behaves like a line.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 15, 2013, 05:41:25 PM


And can a Theban column kink when it wheels? Does it do better in difficult terrain, etc. etc.? Even for wargamers it behaves like a line.

You are assuming that the only form of column is a narrow march column.  Therefore, as march columns are kept away from the fighting, you're supposition that they weren't used in battle is, by definition, correct.  I merely point out that other rules call very deep units columns or blocks, not just lines.  These tend to assume some advantage of depth in combat - we can debate exactly what that might represent - not just manoeuver advantage.

A Theban column is not a manoeuvre formation. It looks and behaves exactly like a very deep line. By 'column' I mean a manoeuvre formation which is flexible and meant to get a body of troops quickly to a point that is not straight ahead (some time we must do a thread on large-formation wheels - something else beloved of wargamers that did not exist historically). One should call the Theban column something else to avoid confusion, perhaps the 'Theban ram'.

Patrick pointed out that there were two kinds of column - the loose march column and the more compact battle column, the latter meant to form into line at very short notice. Neither were fighting formations, and never used as such by the very few historical commanders who actually employed them. This implies they were extremely vulnerable if attacked. I would tend to up that -2 modifier to a -3 or even -4.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 15, 2013, 06:26:34 PM
One should call the Theban column something else to avoid confusion, perhaps the 'Theban ram'.

One could but not everyone does :)  However, moving on, should we assume that assault columns did not exist in this period?

Quote from: Erpingham on July 15, 2013, 06:35:26 PM

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 15, 2013, 06:26:34 PM
One should call the Theban column something else to avoid confusion, perhaps the 'Theban ram'.

One could but not everyone does :)  However, moving on, should we assume that assault columns did not exist in this period?

I think that's been said elsewhere. The Napoleonic column had no equivalent in Antiquity.

Glad to see we are over the case of semantics.  :)  Actually part of the problem is that organisation in the classical period depended on the file, which is a kind of miniature column in itself, and formations were ultimately made up of a greater or lesser number of files.  Semantically speaking, we could say that all attacks during the classical period were made in column ... however to all intents and purposes we can treat these formations as lines made up of large numbers of small subunits (as the commanders did).

The one instance of actual columns being used in the attack during the classical period is when a fortification was being assaulted.  The Romans typically got into testudo and arrived at a point which had been breached or which they could readily excavate a way through - and then poured in.  Other cultures did much the same thing when escalading a wall and/or storming a breach.

Latin sources make occasional references to an 'agmen' being used to attack an enemy line (e.g. Second battle of Bedriacum).  This is often translated as 'column', though its general sense is a large number collected for a purpose and we can almost certainly treat it as a deep line.

Theban 25-deep and 50-deep formations were definitely intended for head-on combat rather than exciting movement.  In essence they were very deep lines, and I would prefer to keep the designation 'column' for march and tactical manoeuvre formations in the classical period.  In theory, anyone can turn a line sideways and obtain an instant column for manoeuvre.  In practice very few seem to have done so, perhaps because they usually started off with their troops where they wanted them in the first place (unlike many wargamers ...).

Any column should kink when they wheel, thats how wheels work.

I see the Theban extra deep phalanx as really giving it staying power, rather like blocks of Persians or Germans. Probably would move a bit faster than a normal phalanx (the longer the line the more difficult it is to move). So for those reasons I go with Patricks idea of a deep line rather than a column.

Question, did ancient armies used cadenced step for formed units? Spartans, perhaps. It is supposed to make formations move faster.

well, I would draw you to Polybios on Cannae, which seems pretty clear to me that there was no march there, but rather the romans were sucked into a trap by the convex becoming concave retreat of the Spanish and celts - so as I said, Caannae is as debatable an example as Zama for a column used tactically to redeploy on the field itself.

and I would strongly suggest that cynocephalae was just the triarii wheeling a couple of maniples and charging, rather than engaging in some dramatic march and redeployment.

which would be quite different from a column move, I am afraid.

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 15, 2013, 11:07:13 PM
Question, did ancient armies used cadenced step for formed units? Spartans, perhaps. It is supposed to make formations move faster.

They certainly used music and, one would suspect, this gave a rhythm and a pace.  I'm not sure whether we actually know for certain about cadence.  In more modern times, cadence is thought to have been invented (or reinvented) by the Swiss in the sixteenth century.

Quotewell, I would draw you to Polybios on Cannae, which seems pretty clear to me that there was no march there, but rather the romans were sucked into a trap by the convex becoming concave retreat of the Spanish and celts

I consider that rather passive way to fight and personally I take the the view that the veterans would have moved to maximise the effect. Just because that seems a better way to do it rather than just waiting for them to fall into a trap. But views differ.

using music to keep a unit cohesive is not the same as cadence and the drill that can be used as a consequence.

the best guide we have is probably escplodolplous (or whatever his name is) but he is @ 400 years after the punic wars, and there were quite a lot of changes in between.

short answer is, they had music in the renaissance, bands, drums, etc, but no cadence, and  they didn't manage the drill in the same way as was done in the 18th century with cadence marching.

it really does make a difference, which is why it was emphasised so much for such a long time after it was developed.

For what it is worth, Spartan armies definitely marched in step and are so depicted in contemporary art.

Marching in step is depicted on Egyptian monuments so the practice was known to and available for civilised peoples to adopt.  There are definite advantages to moving in step when carrying out any form of battlefield movement (except skirmishing or rout) and it is hard to see non-tribal infantry avoiding doing so.  It would be particularly difficult to maintain the cohesion of a pike phalanx unless the participants marched in step.

Asclepiodotus is probably a reasonable guide for Hellenistic organisation and practices more or less from the organisation of the first pike-armed phalanx, though as Mark points out a couple of centuries intervened and one difference that emerges from Polybius is the greater popularity of a 16-deep phalanx in the later period as opposed to the original 8-deep.  That apart, the basic unit organisation looks very similar, although Philip and Alexander may have used a 1,536-strong phalanx taxis rather than Asclepiodotus' 2,048-man formation.

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 16, 2013, 08:16:58 AM

Quotewell, I would draw you to Polybios on Cannae, which seems pretty clear to me that there was no march there, but rather the romans were sucked into a trap by the convex becoming concave retreat of the Spanish and celts

I consider that rather passive way to fight and personally I take the the view that the veterans would have moved to maximise the effect. Just because that seems a better way to do it rather than just waiting for them to fall into a trap. But views differ.

I am with Justin on this: having the veterans just stand there carries two serious risks, namely 1) that the Gauls and Spaniards will be beaten before the Romans have pushed on sufficiently far to walk into the trap and 2) that Roman commanders will notice they are slowly being drawn into an unpromising situation and start taking countermeasures.  Hannibal needed to spring the trap while the Romans were unaware of its nature and before they could react - that means speed, and speed means movement.

Mark seems to have a view of Hannibal as a rather passive general who uses a wasps-to-jam-pot approach, hoping the enemy will somehow drown himself.  This does not fit with my understanding of him, particularly at the Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae and Herdonea, or for that matter when he escaped Fabius' little trap at the Eribianus pass (Polybius III.92-3), in all of which cases he moved actively and rapidly to take advantage of a foe's induced or self-inflicted disadvantage.

Quote
and I would strongly suggest that cynocephalae was just the triarii wheeling a couple of maniples and charging, rather than engaging in some dramatic march and redeployment.

Our sources are pretty clear that the movement of one legion's principes and triarii (i.e. 10 maniples of each) was ordered and executed by a tribune.  A 'couple of maniples of triarii' would anyway not have had the weight to take down Philip's phalanx quickly nor the spread to catch most of the formation in the rear.

not at all Pat,
I do not see Hannibal as a passive general,
but nor do I require him to be executing high risk battlefield makeovers at ever occasion.

I simple believe Polybios on these two battles.

3.115

QuoteFor a short time the Iberian and Celtic lines stood their ground and fought gallantly; but; presently overpowered by the weight of the heavy-armed lines, they gave way and retired to the rear, thus breaking up the crescent.

The Roman maniples followed with spirit, and easily cut their way through the enemy's line; since the Celts had been drawn up in a thin line, while the Romans had closed up from the wings towards the centre and the point of danger.

For the two wings did not come into action at the same time as the centre: but the centre was first engaged, because the Gauls, having been stationed on the arc of the crescent, had come into contact with the enemy long before the wings, the convex of the crescent being towards the enemy.

The Romans, however, going in pursuit of these troops, and hastily closing in towards the centre and the part of the enemy which was giving ground, advanced so far, that the Libyan heavy-armed troops on either wing got on their flanks.

Those on the right, facing to the left, charged from the right upon the Roman flank; while those who were on the left wing faced to the right, and, dressing by the left, charged their right flank,1 the exigency of the moment suggesting to them what they ought to do.

Thus it came about, as Hannibal had planned, that the Romans were caught between two hostile lines of Libyans—thanks to their impetuous pursuit of the Celts.

it seems pretty clear to me - the crescent sharp gravitates the Romans toward the centre, which gives way, the Romans advance - as they always do - until they are caught.

What I do not see there is any suggestion that the veterans marched forward, past the Romans, and then turned to face before attacking.

I might yield to you on cynocephalae though.

care to have another look at Polybios 18.25

Perseus has "they were still in column of march," which would be good to see your magic run over to see what sort of implications that has in the original.

he also has "keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right against the enemy" - which is probably a bit more than a couple, but less than one legion's principes and triarii (i.e. 10 maniples of each)

and the elephants seem to be overlooked by all.

Even if only some of the maniples shifted over to attack the advancing phalanx, the only way they could have got there without dissolving into a mob would have been by column. To anticipate a possible separate thread, they could not have got there by wheeling in line: wheeling would have been limited to relatively small formations, it could not be managed by a significant part of a legion's second and third lines. Someone pointed out that large-scale wheeling in battle had to wait until the Napoleonic era, where it could be done only by the very best veterans (Wellington's lot, wasn't it?)

Besides Cynoscephalae, Trebia and Cannae I can't think of any other example from our era in which the column was employed during a battle. Any suggestions?

are you not assuming that the entire line wheeled as one?

its just as conceivable that each maniple wheeled and they attacked in an echelon.

and let us not forget those elephants, and the shape of the phalanx.

Quote from: Mark G on July 16, 2013, 02:56:24 PM
are you not assuming that the entire line wheeled as one?

its just as conceivable that each maniple wheeled and they attacked in an echelon.

and let us not forget those elephants, and the shape of the phalanx.

Separate maniples moving separately one behind the other would still have become chaotic. Large formations, even if composed of subunits, need to deploy and move in clearly recognizable shapes (line/column) for the subunits and men to know their place and what they are expected to do. The only exception I know to this is when the general pitches up and takes personal command of one or two subunits.

Quote from: Mark G on July 16, 2013, 02:33:47 PM
I might yield to you on cynocephalae though.

care to have another look at Polybios 18.25

Perseus has "they were still in column of march," which would be good to see your magic run over to see what sort of implications that has in the original.

he also has "keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right against the enemy" - which is probably a bit more than a couple, but less than one legion's principes and triarii (i.e. 10 maniples of each)

and the elephants seem to be overlooked by all.

Will do.

The Macedonian phalanx at Cynoscephalae arrived at the top of the ridge in two parts: the right, under Philip himself, formed up and slammed into the Romans, forcing them back so that Flaminius wrote off the left as a lost cause and betook himself to the right.  There he found to his delight that the left half of the Macedonian phalanx was still struggling to get into formation and so let rip with his elephants, followed by the hastati.

"Still in column of march" seems to be the translator's rendering of "hepomenoi poreias", literally a 'following mode of walking'.  This would seem to mean they were still at march formation intervals (6' frontage per man) but unable to close up because the ground did not permit it.  They were trying to get into a 'diathesin' (order, arrangement) of 'parataxeos' (lined up/closed up for battle), which I read as filling in the files first to 3' per man then to 18" frontage per man.

Meanwhile, the right half of the phalanx was driving all before it.  Polybius XVIII.26:

"The main body of the Roman right followed and slaughtered the flying Macedonians. But one of the tribunes, with about twenty maniples, having made up his mind on his own account what ought to be done next, contributed by his action very greatly to the general victory. He saw that the division which was personally commanded by Philip was much farther forward than the rest of the enemy, and was pressing hard upon the Roman left by its superior weight; he therefore left the right, which was by this time clearly victorious, and directing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge them on the rear."

Each Roman wing had two legions (or one legion and one ala).  The tribune would be able to command only troops from his own legion, and twenty maniples is coincidentally all the principes and all the hastati from one legion.  This, and not XVIII.25, is the famous manoeuvre that everyone talks about.

Quote from: Mark G on July 16, 2013, 02:56:24 PM
are you not assuming that the entire line wheeled as one?

its just as conceivable that each maniple wheeled and they attacked in an echelon.

and let us not forget those elephants, and the shape of the phalanx.

Bearing in mind that (from a Roman perspective) they were on the right of the field and Philip was on the left, they had to travel laterally to move from right to left, and the tribune had to move the triarii further left than the principes (or vice versa) if he wanted to make use of both lines' frontage (if not, why bother with both lines?).  So how does he get the line, or rather both lines, to travel laterally from one part of the field to another, and then commit the two lines together and simultaneously in the Macedonian rear (otherwise the first subunit to hit alerts everyone that something is up)?

On the subject of elephants, it is noteworthy that all the big Roman successes against phalanxes were attributable to elephants: Pyrrhus' elephants stormed through their own ranks at Beneventum, Antiochus III's did the same at Magnesia and the Romans used elephants offensively with success at Cynoscephalae and Pydna (at Pydna, the point at which the elephants were committed was the point at which the Macedonian line first started to come apart).   Naturally, the legions took the credit, and have distorted historical analysis and wargaming ever since.

Another possible case of use of column in a battle might be Ilipa, where Scipio extended his wings (infantry and cavalry) to envelope the flanks of Hasdrubal's larger Carthaginian army. Since this involved redeploying laterally it would have had been done by column.

So a possible general rule might be to limit the use of columns by infantry to Hannibal and those better-quality Roman commanders directly influenced by him. Everybody else sticks to lines.

Did cavalry use columns more frequently in the course of a battle? Since they were meant to flank the central body of infantry if possible, I suspect they did, as that would involve lateral movement.

nice one Pat.

the interesting thing there is that these 20 maniples are taking the phalanx in the rear, not the flank - I doubt anyone has much difficulty in seeing that being accomplished without need for the Romans to necessarily form a column to redeploy.  Given they get across the field initially by taking a march column, I'm still inclined to see that as an opportunity attack, not an organised redeployment first. 

the report has Flaminius leading to attack, not redeploying and then attacking.  Given the opportunity nature - I still lean toward that being swift and a bit ad hoc, and the time taken to reform into columns to march and deploy back again would simply allow the phalanx to react.

so its possible to see the only column on the field being the Macedonian one which was caught out badly (18.25) - and the tribune has pulled back the pursuit, which is then able to take advantage of the first phalanx - from the rear. (18.26) without any need for columns on the Roman part.

interestingly, Pats translation there has them directing the march to the rear - possible column. but Penelope has them wheeling

"3 For noticing that the Macedonians under Philip had advanced a long way in front of the rest, and were by their weight forcing back the Roman left, he quitted those on the right, who were now clearly victorious, and wheeling his force in the direction of the scene of combat and thus getting behind the Macedonians, he fell upon them in the rear. "

anything more specific on the options intended to be conveyed at that point?

given it was troops who had charged from the right to the left, and were now pursuing (so clearly well behind the advancing phalanx), who were then ordered to basically go back the way the came - an about face wheel down a bit to aim at the phalanx seems much easier than another redeployment into a column then order to march to position then deploy back again and then attack.

the point of columns being that the greater speed over distance compensates for the time taken to change formation twice, after all.  and these are tactical evolutions, where the distance is necessarily restricted.

QuoteSo a possible general rule might be to limit the use of columns by infantry to Hannibal and those better-quality Roman commanders directly influenced by him. Everybody else sticks to lines.

I would not be inclined to do that as it would exclude any action that we did not know about. Leave it to the players as to what they choose to do?

I am generally in favour of player choice.  :)  One could add in player notes that moving in column on the battlefield is quick but the consequences of being caught in combat are dire - only the best generals are known to have done this, and only when they had tied down everything on the opposing side that could interfere.

So players can feel free to use the option - but they have been warned!

That said, a player who hits a column in front with a small unit should not do huge amounts of damage (he is basically opposing a combat-ready subunit with a combat-ready subunit, say a mere -1 on the universal disadvatage scale); one who hits it 'on the nose' and on both flanks at the same time should slaughter it.  (This is of course the proper way to take down a battlefield manoeuvre column or a column of march - one flank and the survivors will turn to face after the initial ruckus*; both flanks and it will not be alive long enough to decide which way to turn).

*or fracas, or rumpus, depending upon exactly where one is hit, I suppose.  ;)

Mark, a quick run through Polybius XVIII.26.  Our initiative-showing tribune:

"... therefore left the right [apolipon ... dexiou], which was by this time clearly victorious, and directing his march [epistrepsas = turning] towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge them on the rear."

This says to me that the tribune and his twenty maniples moved laterally from the right to the left and then went in with the cold steel, as opposed to about-turning and going back the way they had come and finding a row of backs conveniently presented.  It does look like a lateral movement across the field, basically a left-face, movement ahead, another left-face and drive in from the rear.  The movement across from right to left really has to be in a succession of subunits, which it is hard to call anything except a column.

A lot of wargaming tradition involves wheeling lines, or at least trying to.  The more I look at classical warfare, the more I am convinced that nobody ever wheeled a line as such: what they did was to turn each individual subunit and proceed with the subunits facing in the right direction, then have the subunits catch up and lo, they have a line which looks as if it has wheeled.  The key to classical manoeuvres seems to be the 'beads on a string' concept: the subunits are the beads, and you can roll the whole string forwards or drag it sideways by one end, and if doing the latter you can snake it around a bit.  The key is that there is always one bead that the others follow or line up on, and this can be one of the beads at the end or one in the middle.

wheeling subunits was exactly what I had in mind with initiating the attack in echelon.

It works fine for me at a tactical level, and fits in well with the Romans in this battle.

But I don't think that's what anyone would describe a DBM column as - which is much closer to the second Macedonian phalanx, I think.


I'd also ask you to consider the importance of the positioning of the key fighting men - which is something you also have to factor in when 'allowing' a march column to fight.  Basically, all the good guys are positioned ready for them to reform back into battle order - so even on a man to man frontage fight, the column should be disadvantaged further.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 17, 2013, 11:13:22 AM

The more I look at classical warfare, the more I am convinced that nobody ever wheeled a line as such: what they did was to turn each individual subunit and proceed with the subunits facing in the right direction, then have the subunits catch up and lo, they have a line which looks as if it has wheeled.  The key to classical manoeuvres seems to be the 'beads on a string' concept: the subunits are the beads, and you can roll the whole string forwards or drag it sideways by one end, and if doing the latter you can snake it around a bit.  The key is that there is always one bead that the others follow or line up on, and this can be one of the beads at the end or one in the middle.

This clearly would work best with drilled units.  Would you ban undrilled troops from carry out such a "wheel" or allow to make it with some penalty (e.g. slower, ending up disordered)?  Do we assume other troop types like cavalry manouevered the same way?

WRG 6th edition allowed all troops to make the same manoeuvres, whether "regular" or "irregular"; it's just that the latter took twice as long, except for skirmish infantry and light horse.

Quote from: Mark G on July 17, 2013, 01:57:25 PM
wheeling subunits was exactly what I had in mind with initiating the attack in echelon.

It works fine for me at a tactical level, and fits in well with the Romans in this battle.

But I don't think that's what anyone would describe a DBM column as - which is much closer to the second Macedonian phalanx, I think.


I'd also ask you to consider the importance of the positioning of the key fighting men - which is something you also have to factor in when 'allowing' a march column to fight.  Basically, all the good guys are positioned ready for them to reform back into battle order - so even on a man to man frontage fight, the column should be disadvantaged further.

The 'DBM column' is really an improvisation for getting large numbers of troops through difficult terrain.  In a sense it is a red herring, as classical commanders seem to have taken the view that if terrain is restrictive you do not send troops through it, and if you can send troops through it it is not restrictive.  Sending a phalanx up a rocky slope (difficult terrain) on or close to the battlefield was not done in column but in battle formation in extended order.  The left of the Macedonian phalanx at Cynoscephalae (i.e. the bit the elephants made a mess of) was not a column in any shape or form, but a battle line in deep files at 6'intervals, ready to 'dense up' to 18" per man as soon as it had got through the difficult terrain.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 17, 2013, 04:03:34 PM
Would you ban undrilled troops from carry out such a "wheel" or allow to make it with some penalty (e.g. slower, ending up disordered)? 

If this is asking, would I permit the rear ranks of the fyrd at Hastings to attempt a Hannibalistic double envelopment of the Norman army, the answer has to be: no.  Would the wings be permitted to face left/right and move some distance to create a gap for newly-arriving reinforcements? Probably not.  I do not think anyone except the huscarls in Harold's army would have the ability to perform such manoeuvres, although the huscarls might have it (especially if Harold had been at them with his Vegetius).  It would be nice if we had a more detailed account of Stamford Bridge to show what manoeuvre capabilities were available.

If however we look at the Black Prince's army at Najera (Navarette), this seems to have had a high degree of discipline and ability to manoeuvre, and the way Percy and the Captal de Buch wrapped up du Guesclin and his vanguard was worthy of a small-scale Hannibal.  So despite its ambiguous regular/irregular status, the English army of the Hundred Years war looks as if it would qualify.

These are guideline instances.  I am rather wary of making blanket general statements on the subject, but the obvious gentlemen to rule on for the classical period would be Gauls and Germans (in tribes, not in the Carthaginian or Roman army).  This requires a look at their command structure, which appears to be on a tribal basis and hence such manoeuvres as they could perform would tend to be based on the tribe or a subset of the tribe with someone important enough to follow.  In Caesar's Gallic War manoeuvres seem to be done by tribe, e.g. in the fight against the Helvetii (Bibracte) the Gallic flank attack is carried out by the Boii and Tulingi.

This focusses us on the degree to which a tribe could itself manoeuvre, and one of the characteristics Caesar describes is fluidity: what the Gauls lack in precision they seem to make up for in rapidity of movement.  Such rapidity comes with its own cost: the Atrebates at the Sambre (Caesar vs the Nervii and friends) zoom out of the woods, cross the river, race up the hill - and are so out of breath that the first volley of pila stops them and they are routed by the Roman charge.

The conclusion to which this points is that Gauls can move themselves with not dissimilar effect in a not dissimilar time period compared to our regulars, but at a cost in combat effectiveness.

Other irregulars might or might not be able/inclined to act similarly: Germans (including Saxons) seem to have had a more deliberate approach to battle with more pre-positioning and less manoeuvre.  Their manoeuvre capabilities are thus harder to evaluate (and I shall avoid a snap judgement here).

Quote
Do we assume other troop types like cavalry manoeuvred the same way?

Yes, cavalry seems to have manoeuvred by squadrons: 30-strong turmae in the Roman army, and similar (32-man) strength subunits in Greek armies.  Hellenistic armies fielded the ile of c.200 or 300 men, usually fighting in wedge; Romans the ala of 300 (later 500).  The principle seems to have been the same: if one, for example, wished one's cavalry to travel from one flank to another (as Hasdrubal did at Cannae after defeating the Roman cavalry right), one would order each line, as a chain of subunits, to face flank and travel (following the leader).  Each subunit of c.30 cavalrymen would wheel to face the direction of travel, which puts the standard bearer or officer where the men can follow easily and takes only a few seconds to implement, and the end-most subunit leads off.

Arriving in the vicinity of the foe on the opposite flank, Hasdrubal inclines his direction of travel to pass behind Varro's cavalry at a distance of, say, 200 yards and then, when he sees his line positioned where he wants it, orders the halt and then a turn by subunits to face the foe, so each subunit wheels on the spot and ends up facing the foe, having taken a few seconds to do so.  (At this point, if Varro had not taken fright and run, there would have been a charge to produce Italian cavalry sandwich.)

[Edited typos]

In WAB2 most troops are no longer allowed to turn 90 degrees - only Drilled troops may do so these days.

In the Die is Cast I go with the old WRG system, warriors (irregulars) turn, wheel and change formation at half the speed of regulars. Light troops make no deduction for any turns and wheel, change formation at the same speed as regulars.

Of course in Warmaster ancients, troops can move in any direction at normal speed.

It seems from the example given above that trained infantry can form column in the heat of battle but untrained infantry cannot. Going around in vulnerable columns in close proximity to the enemy requires a good deal of nerve, which semi-trained or untrained troops simply do not have.

My suggestion then is that drilled/trained foot of a certain calibre may form column, but other types may not.

As regards attacking a column...in Optio terms charging a column on its sides would be the equivalent of a double flank attack. Let's see.... a flank attack confers a +2 modifier to the attacker and a -1 to the defender. Take an average calibre base in column, with 6 morale intervals. If it is attacked from both sides and the basic charge factors are 2 for attacker and 2 for defender (normal for infantry), that becomes 4 + 4 for the two flanking attackers and 1 for the defender (who can fight back against 1 attacking base only) = 8 vs 1. The difference is 7 and the base in column routs immediately. Yes, it works. Excuse the digression  ::)

how do you figure that from the above debate Justin?

(ed) as in a what do you agree with, and what not / show working sort of way

And any lmiitations on what a unit can do whilst in column. Would you reckon that it could shoot, charge, evade?

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 17, 2013, 09:24:55 PM

In the Die is Cast I go with the old WRG system, warriors (irregulars) turn, wheel and change formation at half the speed of regulars. Light troops make no deduction for any turns and wheel, change formation at the same speed as regulars.

Paul Innes also mentioned the old WRG system, which seems to work fairly well.  The rationale is perhaps that if big chief saith "Turn left" the assembled multitude will indeed turn left, but then spend the rest of the move sorting themselves out, hence the half-speed condition.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 17, 2013, 09:46:46 PM

My suggestion then is that drilled/trained foot of a certain calibre may form column, but other types may not.

That is reasonable, because such troops are taught to manoeuvre by subunits, and have the drill and experience to carry out orders of this nature.  Ordering troops who have not been trained to manoeuvre this way to form a 'column' on the battlefield is going to get nobody anywhere.  (Ordering tribal troops to follow their chief and having the chief move toward a geographical objective or specific opposing contingent would probably be the nearest irregular equivalent.  Such a manoeuvre would take longer and be less precise because as far as we know tribal troops had no provision for subunit organisation, so 'loose mob' might be the basic formation here.)

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 18, 2013, 08:22:29 AM
And any limitations on what a unit can do whilst in column. Would you reckon that it could shoot, charge, evade?

There is really one thing that it can do, and that is to react to form a line of battle.  Shoot? - the leading subunit may be able to do so if it really wants, but that is not its job and it then holds up everyone else.  Charge? - the leading subunit might be able to do so, but one then has a command crisis for the rest of the column as they are expecting to switch into line and can no longer do so because the marker subunit is now tied down.  Evade - not really.  The counter to an attack is to get into line and take it from there (which is why one ideally keeps enough distance from an opponent to allow such reaction to take place).

The usual precondition for moving such a column was for any enemy capable of interfering with its move to be tied down or, at a pinch, sufficiently far away that if they began approaching with intent the column could form line (if the foe was coming from the flank) or, in the unlikely event of an opponent appearing ahead, the head of the column would swing off to one side in order to present a flank, and the line would form facing that flank.

If we view the battlefield column as a means of transporting a line from one place to another swiftly and with style, we cannot go far wrong.  The leading subunit could blitz three men and a boy out of its way, but would not wish to enter combat with an enemy formation any more than one would want to head into the attack with just the lead vehicle of a convoy.

Quote from: Mark G on July 18, 2013, 07:11:06 AM
how do you figure that from the above debate Justin?

(ed) as in a what do you agree with, and what not / show working sort of way

Just Patrick's observation that a column attacked in both flanks would go down faster than it could react. In Optio charge and melee combat are separate, with a unit having the ability to react to some extent if it survives the charge.

I imagine that hitting a column in the side equates to all the benefits/penalities conferred by a flank attack in the various rules systems.

QuoteThe rationale is perhaps that if big chief saith "Turn left" the assembled multitude will indeed turn left, but then spend the rest of the move sorting themselves out, hence the half-speed condition.

Indeed, the early days of basic training are a real scream for anyone watching. I loved the bit in the film Glory where the sergeant taught the recruits their left from their right (and yes it does happen in real life).

I totally agree a column should not be able to; shoot, charge or evade.

it was more the forming of any column in the heat of battle that I was looking at, Justin.

I think we all agree that once formed, it would be highly vulnerable if caught.

but I don't think its as simple as just saying, oh, well, the (regular) men face to the flank, and that's now a column, and off they go.

That's 19th century drill.

Ancients, especially regulars, required the best men to be at the front.  its therefore arguable that a whole series of evolutions might be necessary in order to get men who know how to lead the way into a position from which to do the leading - and conversely, men who never expect to have to make the decision could easily be the ones suddenly having to work out how to set the pace.

have you considered that aspect at all?

Now, if they are far enough away from any threatening enemy, then it should be pretty routine to go through that (although I would expect a 'full move' to do it, unlike some rules which have it happening quite quickly.)

But to do so when there was an enemy near ?  I think that's back into the same DBMM position which this thread started on - something that might look neat on the table, but is just wrong.

Once you get into a tactical distance, wheeling (or turning, if you prefer) seems the only way to ensure that the men you need at the front (and back) remain there.

anything else is forming a route march column - which they just would not do near the enemy.

Quotehave you considered that aspect at all?

Absolutely but mostly discounted it. For instance I am not a fan of the standard being in the front rank theory, standards being important things and you don't want to risk losing them. So I favour a nice sensible position.

I hope that shows you where I am coming from.

As to changing formation, yes that allowed in TDIC and therefore changing into a column is no different from changing into a line - and therefore takes time which might be more usefully spent doing other things. I suppose a game of TDIC takes 8-10 turns so you don't have time to waste (one move forming column, so you can move the next turn and another move taken coming of column so you can fight!). As to stopping players from doing silly things, well the first thing you realise is that you never can, then you go through the phase of saying is there any silly thing I should stop them doing at all and then you get to the final stage of, let them do it, they will learn, its not as if anyone is going to die. Bearing in mind, any rule you write is something people have to read and then apply to their games, so the simpler a set of rules are the better. Motto is, only write what you have to.

Now as to history, if Sumerians can approach in column, turn to the flank to form line of battle then I reckon that anyone should be able to do so. I will leave it to them to sort out how their officers get to the right place. I am sure they were happy with the solution.

Quote from: Mark G on July 18, 2013, 02:56:24 PM

but I don't think its as simple as just saying, oh, well, the (regular) men face to the flank, and that's now a column, and off they go.

That's 19th century drill.

Ancients, especially regulars, required the best men to be at the front.

Classical armies manoeuvred by subunits.  What this means us that if you want a line of, say, ten maniples to shift themselves elsewhere, it happens as follows:

1) Each maniple pivots 90 degrees on the spot, around the standard(s) in the middle of the maniple.  This incidentally seems to be why the Roman maniple had a 'prior' and 'posterior' century: when the maniple pivots, one goes in one direction and the other about-faces and goes in the opposite direction.  It approximately halves the time spent on the manoeuvre, even adding in two about-turns for the posterior century.

2) Each maniple is now facing in the direction of desired travel, in a chain one behind the other.  Note that as far as each maniple is concerned all the people are in the right places.  Leaders are at the front, optios closing up the rear, standards in the middle.

3) The signal is given and they move off.  The foremost maniple leads and the others follow in its track.

4) Arriving in the right general location, the procedure in 1) above is reversed, so all maniples are now lined up side by side.

5) The line now moves to close with the enemy.

This is not 19th century drill; that had not yet been invented.  It is classical drill, Roman-style - like most worthwhile things, simple if you know how but effectively impossible if you do not.  The men do not left-face or right-face, each subunit pivots independently so that all assume the new orientation.

Justin (T), if each turn in TDIC is nearer 20 minutes than 2 minutes, you might even consider letting a line form a column and move off, or a column move and reface to form a line, in the same turn.  This is just a suggestion as TDIC is your system.

Absolutely, if you had 2 minutes per move then a) you would have to have a lot of moves in a game (around 10 rounds of combat before a Roman line was replaced?) b) you would find game time running a lot slower than real time (so you would have to plan a couple of days to fight your battle).

But the time delay in forming column/line adds an appropriate penalty to doing it in a game - so discourages it being done lightly. I am sure you know the old army saying, "Hurry up and wait." which means you spend a lot of time rushing to get something done and then hang around waiting for the next instruction!

I am very impressed at your proposed drill manoeuvre, as thats far more complex than anything I ever learned.

absolutely right Pat, which is why maniples would never face to flank and march off laterally.

yet that's where this debate seems to have headed.

we can debate whether this was by posterior treading backwards or not, or by a more traditional wheel type turn - it largely depends on whether you think they formed a continuous line of paired centuries or not.

but the details of that matter not when its ignored in favour of allowing another 19th century style 90 degree turn - which appears to be free or with minimal penalty - and off you go.

the only rationale so far seems to be to ensure that units are hyper manoeuvrable, which is entirely missing the point.  They were not, they basically formed up at a safe distance, and marched forward to attack - which is exactly what the Sumerians did - using march columns at a safe distance from the enemy, forming line of battle, and moving to engagement distance.

quite wrong to interpret that as a tactical movement.  so why do it?

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 18, 2013, 09:36:12 PM
Absolutely, if you had 2 minutes per move then a) you would have to have a lot of moves in a game (around 10 rounds of combat before a Roman line was replaced?) b) you would find game time running a lot slower than real time (so you would have to plan a couple of days to fight your battle).

Roman line replacement probably only took a couple of minutes.  What seems to have been involved (judging by obiter dictu comments like Livy's retro cedentes in VIII.8 and Polybius' epi poda in II.33 plus a lack of references to maniples performing any sort of manoeuvre during line relief) was simply the files of hastati backing through the files of principes, which means eight men have to shuffle backwards between eight men on either side.  Even at one pace per second, which is pretty slow time, the whole business can be done in a less than half a minute (including the hastati getting clear and lining up behind the corresponding files of principes).

Add thirty seconds or so from the giving of the signal for the principes line to throw its pila over the hastati into the midst of the enemy and then draw swords, moving up so that each file of principes was positioned to be between two files of hastati, and the whole manoeuvre could be done in a minute with two signals: one which instructs the principes to hurl their pila and position themselves (and alerts the hastati that relief is imminent) and the other, given as soon as the principes are poised in position, to instruct the hastati to start backing away.

Quote
But the time delay in forming column/line adds an appropriate penalty to doing it in a game - so discourages it being done lightly. I am sure you know the old army saying, "Hurry up and wait." which means you spend a lot of time rushing to get something done and then hang around waiting for the next instruction!

I know it only too well.  ;)  But try that on a classical battlefield and you end up on the losing side pretty quickly - these people did not just drill for training, esprit de corps and ceremonial purposes; to them it was life and death, just as a good fire plan is today.

Quote from: Mark G on July 19, 2013, 07:15:16 AM

the only rationale so far seems to be to ensure that units are hyper manoeuvrable, which is entirely missing the point.  They were not, they basically formed up at a safe distance, and marched forward to attack - which is exactly what the Sumerians did - using march columns at a safe distance from the enemy, forming line of battle, and moving to engagement distance.

quite wrong to interpret that as a tactical movement.  so why do it?

These were not 'march columns' in the sense of a getting an army from A to B: these were battlefield manoeuvre formations.  Whether the movements they undertook would be termed tactical or operational is largely a matter of how one views the perspective of the battlefield.  What matters is that they took place: Cynoscephalae and Cannae both show movement to envelop the enemy rear, and the only way troops could have moved with expedition within the time frame involved would be as a chain of subunits such as we might call a 'column'.

Turning a maniple through 90 degrees on its centre has several advantages over trying to wheel one on its right or left marker, the two main ones being a saving in time and the retention of the correct interval between standards thus enabling immediate reassembly as a line when turning each subunit to face the enemy.

It is also worth remembering that such 'columnar' manoeuvres would not be undertaken unless any enemy troops within interfering distance were tied down.  A 'safe distance' could be comparatively close when nobody is capable of interfering with the manoeuvre - it could be well within what would normally be considered 'engagement distance' (whatever that is).

QuoteIt is also worth remembering that such 'columnar' manoeuvres would not be undertaken unless any enemy troops within interfering distance were tied down.  A 'safe distance' could be comparatively close when nobody is capable of interfering with the manoeuvre - it could be well within what would normally be considered 'engagement distance' (whatever that is).

indeed, which takes us back to the quite sensible proposition that such manoeuvres - say anything greater than a simple 45 degrees turn - should be restricted by proximity to the enemy.

QuoteRoman line replacement probably only took a couple of minutes.

Sorry what I was thinking of was the length of time that the Romans would fight before being replaced, at 2 minutes per turn that would be around 10 turns of combat - in the meantime units would of course would be continuing to move around on the battlefield.

So the idea of a 2 minute per turn makes for a very slow game, 20 minutes per turn really get things moving. So Romans; in, fight and then replaced in the next turn.

QuoteI know it only too well.  ;)  But try that on a classical battlefield and you end up on the losing side pretty quickly - these people did not just drill for training, esprit de corps and ceremonial purposes; to them it was life and death, just as a good fire plan is today.

Its not about the moving, its about the instructions to move - as we have discussed, command and control. You do what you are told and then wait for the next orders. So yes. loads of drill in the Roman army; how to fight, how to set-up camp, no doubt how to manoeuvre. Not bad (in Republican times) for a bunch of farmers. Possibly why the professional legionaries were better, they had more time to learn it all. Of course the British army still likes drill to be smart and snappy - but people don't start off that way.

I can see the order, advance and fight the enemy is going to be fairly simple. Then you start making life more complex. Move forward, stop, wait for someone to decide that the velites have done their work, let them back through the lines, move forward, throw pila, fight and then do a line replacement. No wonder they had a lot to learn

Quote from: Mark G on July 19, 2013, 10:35:41 AM

QuoteIt is also worth remembering that such 'columnar' manoeuvres would not be undertaken unless any enemy troops within interfering distance were tied down.  A 'safe distance' could be comparatively close when nobody is capable of interfering with the manoeuvre - it could be well within what would normally be considered 'engagement distance' (whatever that is).

indeed, which takes us back to the quite sensible proposition that such manoeuvres - say anything greater than a simple 45 degrees turn - should be restricted by proximity to the enemy.

Or rather, by the enemy's reactive ability.  Proximity alone is meaningless; it is the ability to interfere that is all-important - and that is a function of whether the enemy has troops uncommitted, not troops nearby.

As an example, doing a 45-degree turn 30 yards away from an opponent able to act will probably get you charged and broken.  Doing an entire Trooping the Colour repertoire 20 yards behind men who are already committed to fighting for their lives puts you in no danger.

Battlefields are dynamic: what you can and cannot safely do is a direct function of initiative and tempo (which are poorly represented in most rules, which is why Alexander's battles are so hard to simulate - Alex was a master of tempo, and always kept inside his opponent's 'command loop' and reactive ability).  What Alex achieved by dynamic positioning and action, Hannibal achieved by dynamic planning: he also planned for a moving battlefield, with relationships changing all the time, and sought to put his own stamp on it by predicting the enemy's manoeuvres and then capping them with his own.  (If the enemy did not oblige, Hannibal was in a bit of a quandary.)

What this brings us to is that a 'safety radius' is dependent not upon distance from the enemy but upon the enemy's degree of freedom to react.  Hold him by the nose and you can do what you like elsewhere.  ;)

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 19, 2013, 10:55:52 AM

QuoteRoman line replacement probably only took a couple of minutes.

Sorry what I was thinking of was the length of time that the Romans would fight before being replaced, at 2 minutes per turn that would be around 10 turns of combat - in the meantime units would of course would be continuing to move around on the battlefield.

So the idea of a 2 minute per turn makes for a very slow game, 20 minutes per turn really get things moving. So Romans; in, fight and then replaced in the next turn.

QuoteI know it only too well.  ;)  But try that on a classical battlefield and you end up on the losing side pretty quickly - these people did not just drill for training, esprit de corps and ceremonial purposes; to them it was life and death, just as a good fire plan is today.

Its not about the moving, its about the instructions to move - as we have discussed, command and control. You do what you are told and then wait for the next orders. So yes. loads of drill in the Roman army; how to fight, how to set-up camp, no doubt how to manoeuvre. Not bad (in Republican times) for a bunch of farmers. Possibly why the professional legionaries were better, they had more time to learn it all. Of course the British army still likes drill to be smart and snappy - but people don't start off that way.

I can see the order, advance and fight the enemy is going to be fairly simple. Then you start making life more complex. Move forward, stop, wait for someone to decide that the velites have done their work, let them back through the lines, move forward, throw pila, fight and then do a line replacement. No wonder they had a lot to learn

I see what you meant.  It may however be better to drop the idea of Romans or Greeks as 'a bunch of farmers' and start thinking of them instead as Territorials who get regular (usually annual) combat deployments in addition to their training.

The Romans were a very systematic people, and put a lot of thought into creating an army that would basically run itself, leaving the consul to tell them where he wanted them to march, when he wanted them to fight, but otherwise having a military machine that could do what it needed to without his input (and given the general level of military talent among Republican consuls this was probably a necessity).  Naturally, the Roman army did not develop in isolation: it learned from its opponents (and got the occasional shock when its opponents learned from it), so over time quite a repertoire built up.

The result was an army that could do several things extremely well, but had embarrassing gaps in other areas.  Fighting against an opponent superior in cavalry was always a problem, though this was by no means unique to the Roman army (Hannibal famously went under at Zama when he tried).  The legion was useless frontally against a phalanx, and found it necessary to resort to cavalry, rough ground and/or elephants in order to crack one.  Fighting in woods was another problem, as the legion was optimised for clear terrain fighting and the careful cooperation between subunits and drill for replacing lines could get truly messed up by fighting amid trees, which also wreaked havoc on the carefully-controlled pila volleys.

While they did have a lot to learn, they came from a society where these things were expected of everyone; the boys would watch the manoeuvres on the Field of Mars every recruitment season, daddy would tell them what he did in the war (or rather in several of them) and they would have a pretty good idea of what to expect when their turn came to don their kit and take their places in the ranks.  Given that they would be training with the men and in the formations in which they would fight, everyone would know what was expected of him when they did march to war: the hardest part to master was probably establishing a camp, and there the Roman habit of 'a place for everything and everything in its place' would mean that they picked up their place in the scheme of things very quickly.

Not able to get to the computer for a few days and I see things have moved along.  I think one thing that it flags up for me is the question of how much we need to model process and how much effect.  So we are agreed that forces regular or irregular have ways of forming column and for forming line - they must have because we see them in both states.  Regular drilled troops could do this quickly, irregulars more slowly (or perhaps could move quickly from one organised state to another, as opposed to going from organised, through milling mob to getting back in some semblance of order).  We think that some well drilled experienced troops could risk these evolutions during battle, rather than while forming up, but rarely did.  So, can we manage the whole thing in rules terms with a set of rates of change, with drilled troops able to affect the change without disorder unless obstructed (e.g. by being attacked) while irregulars descend into a disorderly state which takes time to recover from?

One area we haven't particularly tackld yet where one might want to model columns in combat is the hollow square.  Here we do have columns which need to fight to the flank.  Interesting question here about how much moving in column could be done when the enemy were actively threatening but in terms of a game design with a long time period e.g.  1 move per hour as per old WRG, we may wish to tackle it.

Are there any historical examples of a hollow square we should consider?

Alexander's deployment at Gaugamela has been likened to a hollow square (or at least rectangle).  His pikes formed the front end of the formation, his Thracians a second line some distance behind, and the 'flanks' were covered by cavalry.  A 'spoiling force' of light infantry and cavalry covered the forward corners.  It would seem that no columns were involved.

Appian has Antiochus III's phalangites forming a hollow square at Magnesia; these formations however were static (or at least seem to have remained static) and appear to have been a defence against cavalry.

Can anyone think of any others, anywhere within the SoA period?

On the rules front, we can with some confidence let drilled troops form a column of subunits and move around on the battlefield (Claudius Nero at the Metaurus in 207 BC is another example that comes to mind), and I think we can allow it to be part of a normal move rather than a change-formation-and-wait exercise because in the examples we have, it seems that troops were only put into this formation when they were intended to move immediately.

Irregular troops are more of an enigma, as we have the effect but not the process.  The effect seems to be that large-scale movements are possible (e.g. the Boii and Tulingi attacking Caesar's flank at Bibracte when he was fighting the Helvetii) but a column of subunits may not have been the means, although one can guess that something akin to it, following the primary chief's retinue in a de facto 'column of contingents' and expanding on both sides to fill out the line of battle, may have occurred.  This would be a less rapid and precise process than that used by regulars, as well as differing in detail, in that a battle line is created by expansion rather than by all the subunits executing a 90-degree turn, so at a certain level of abstraction could just take longer to execute.  If representation is to be any more concrete, then counting as disordered until reassembly is complete seems appropriate.  One does note that at Bibracte Caesar had time to interpose his third line between the incoming flank attackers and his army's flank, which gives us an indication of the comparative speed of the respective systems.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 20, 2013, 11:56:13 AM
Are there any historical examples of a hollow square we should consider?

The one that comes immediately to mind is Arsuf 1191.  IIRC, Smail felt that moving in a box formation was quite common during the crusades.  However, the crusades aren't really my period, so I'm willing to hear that this theory has been swept away by modern scholarship.

I have no idea what modern scholarship would attempt to put in its place.  ;)

That is actually a very pertinent observation, because the Crusaders did maintain march discipline despite constant harassment of not just their cavalry/crossbowmen rearguards but also the infantry forming the 'flank' component of the marching force.  This infantry would have to have been moving in something very closely resembling what we understand as a column.

The standard Frankish (i.e. Crusader) procedure, as I understand it, was to have couple of files of spearmen with large shields on the side of the column facing the likely direction of attack (if marching along the coast this direction was inland) and two or more files of crossbowmen marching adjacent to them on the side away from the direction of attack.  Upon the appearance of Saracen archers the troops would just keep marching and accept any arrows shot at long range - they would do no damage to men armoured western-fashion (one may remember as early as the First Crusade tales and depictions of Crusaders walking around with a dozen or so arrows sticking out of their armour).  If the Saracen mounted (or foot) bowmen approached closer, a command would be given: the column would halt, the spearmen would kneel facing the enemy, the crossbowmen would loose a volley, reload, see if the enemy wanted more, and if they pulled back then everyone would face the direction of travel and resume their former movement.  At least that is how I think it was supposed to happen ...

Richard is regarded as having perfected this kind of formation and procedure, and he did have detachments of trusted knights riding up and down the column on the inside to make sure no gaps developed and everyone kept at their duties.  Gaps usually appear where different contingents meet, and the troops on the march to Arsuf were deployed by national contingents (or sub-groups of national contingents) but unlike the classical approach, the Crusaders seem to have developed the left-face by individuals rather than the left-pivot by subunits.  This is surmised rather then definite but seems likely.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 20, 2013, 11:56:13 AM
Appian has Antiochus III's phalangites forming a hollow square at Magnesia; these formations however were static (or at least seem to have remained static) and appear to have been a defence against cavalry.

Can anyone think of any others, anywhere within the SoA period?

Gabiene (http://www.academia.edu/2469521/The_fight_for_Asia_The_battle_of_Gabiene_317_16_BC). After the rest of Eumenes' army had routed, the veteran Argyraspides, having smashed Antigonus's phalanx, formed a square. As this was a counter to cavalry it seems likely the square was hollow, able to present sarissas in all directions. In this formation they marched off the battlefield, keeping Antigonus's cavalry at bay.

One must add that these were Alexander's elite troops, possibly the best trained and most experienced infantry in Antiquity.

Well spotted, Justin: a moving pike square.  In all likelihood this would be hollow, given that there were only 3,000 or at most 4,000 Argyraspides in existence.  Assuming 3,072 in total, i.e. 48 64-man subunits, each side of the square would have 12 such subunits and a frontage of 104 men (12x8 = 96 plus one subunit overlap at each corner) or 12 on two sides and 14 on the other two (frontage 96 and 'flankage' 112).  A hollow formation has the advantage that commanders can ride around inside and keep everything in hand.

This does mean we have to consider such formations for rules purposes.  As the drill when threatened was presumably to halt and present pikes in the direction of the threat, or to have the leading edge advance towards the threat, we can treat the entire formation as having no flank or rear; all attacks on it are considered frontal, but its speed is reduced, say by 25% for veteran troops, 50% for average and poor troops cannot move at all in this formation (not sure that average troops could; we may wish to restrict movement in square to veterans).  If charged from any direction except frontally it would stand and receive the charge; it could presumably charge/countercharge frontal opponents.

Is this not used by an entire army?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anabasis_%28Xenophon%29

and of course Carrhae

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Carrhae

Really its just made up of lots of individual units moving in a common direction, with the troops on the flanks simply turning to face (90 degrees)when threatened. I am sure most rules would allow for it (although not WAB2 as most troops cannot turn 90 degrees).

there is a question about whether you would class arsuf and carrhae as battles at that point.

the battle at arsuf happens near the end of the march, and features stages of deployment before the knights break and charge, while carrhae has the moving infantry formation as a retreat after the fixed battle has occurred.

neither of these formations are normal battle formations, and frankly, neither is game able on a tabletop, as they are formations used to cover long distance marches when under an expectation of harassing skirmishing from light mounted troops.

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 21, 2013, 08:43:12 PM


Really its just made up of lots of individual units moving in a common direction, with the troops on the flanks simply turning to face (90 degrees)when threatened. I am sure most rules would allow for it (although not WAB2 as most troops cannot turn 90 degrees).

Indeed so.  What we are looking at is an example of having to deal with columns (in my Arsuf example, this does appear to be what we are dealing with - I leave it to the better informed whether that is how it workd e.g. at carrhae) having to form lines for combat.  Not in an emergency but as part of a plan.  Now, I suspect that any serious attack, the column would halt and face it off, so we could fight our whole battle from that standpoint, but a Carrhae or Arsuf battle re-enactment, we'd probably want our army to be making progress across the field.  As to whether a column ever forms line by turning 90 degrees is surely one of the main themes of this thread.

I rather like Carrhae as a game so have done a scenario for it

http://www.3vwargames.co.uk/documents/carrhae_53bc.pdf

I think we are agreed that columns can turn to face to the sides, the mechanisms for it maybe unclear but the fact that it can done, is sufficient for me.

well I only agree if you mean wheeling.

in which case, its not a column at any point.

What I am saying is it happens, mechanism not much of interest for me.

But I don't see wheeling a line to a flank being appropriate for the hollow square, a simple 90 degree turn of a column of troops would be a lot faster.

Others of course can make their own minds up.

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 22, 2013, 09:26:04 AM

But I don't see wheeling a line to a flank being appropriate for the hollow square, a simple 90 degree turn of a column of troops would be a lot faster.

That makes sense.  It is interesting how the hollow squares start to pop up as soon as we begin looking for them.  We have units (pikes) in hollow square and armies in hollow square (Carrhae), the latter being essentially, as Justin points out, a number of units all going in the same direction and keeping station on one another.  The pikes at Gabiene are a number of subunits all going in the same direction and keeping station on one another.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 22, 2013, 07:30:20 AM

Indeed so.  What we are looking at is an example of having to deal with columns (in my Arsuf example, this does appear to be what we are dealing with - I leave it to the better informed whether that is how it worked e.g. at Carrhae) having to form lines for combat.  Not in an emergency but as part of a plan.  Now, I suspect that any serious attack, the column would halt and face it off, so we could fight our whole battle from that standpoint, but a Carrhae or Arsuf battle re-enactment, we'd probably want our army to be making progress across the field.  As to whether a column ever forms line by turning 90 degrees is surely one of the main themes of this thread.

Indeed.  It does seem to take 'regular' discipline to have such a reaction take place, given the general lack of accounts of tribal armies turning 90 degrees to face a threat, although this might simply be the result of a lack of tribal historians.   The general principle that each subunit turns to face the foe seems sound, and a well-planned order of march will mean this can be done without developing any gaps.

Arsuf and Carrhae (and for that matter the Seleucid pikes at Magnesia) were cases of armies under harassment by missile-armed cavalry which had total initiative.  This does not mean we declassify them as battles.

One more army square: the Cimbri at Vercellae.

"As for the Cimbri, their foot-soldiers advanced slowly from their defences, with a depth equal to their front, for each side of their formation had an extent of thirty furlongs [stadious triakonta]." - Plutarch, Life of Marius 25.6

Patrick says:

It does seem to take 'regular' discipline to have such a reaction take place, given the general lack of accounts of tribal armies turning 90 degrees to face a threat, although this might simply be the result of a lack of tribal historians.


I can think of one such instance adopted by tribal warriors, Telamon, with warriors fighting back to back, preumably with each facing group comprising more than one line - a 180 degree turn, not just 90 degrees.  However, this could be explained as a deployment rather than a mid-battle decision, since the Gauls adopted the formation well before their infantry became engaged.

Paul

the point about Arsuf and Carrhae  Pat, is that the bit you are discussing is not the battle, but the day long march to (or retreat from) the battle.

and that is not a battle, it is an harassed march/retreat.

so you are using examples from something entirely not a battle in order to justify rules for a battle.

Quote from: Mark G on July 22, 2013, 02:33:14 PM
the point about Arsuf and Carrhae  Pat, is that the bit you are discussing is not the battle, but the day long march to (or retreat from) the battle.

and that is not a battle, it is an harassed march/retreat.

so you are using examples from something entirely not a battle in order to justify rules for a battle.

They are essentially day-long battles with an extended skirmishing phase.  My criterion for the start of a battle is when the missiles begin flying rather than the inception of the first charge.  If the missiles fly for a long time and everyone involved keeps moving, fine.  At the end of the day (and indeed throughout) the army on the receiving end still has to move with an active opponent breathing down its neck and able to push home an attack at any time whether or not we call this condition a battle.  Hence we need rules to cover it for those occasions when it happens on the tabletop.

Quote from: Paul Innes on July 22, 2013, 01:33:04 PM

I can think of one such instance adopted by tribal warriors, Telamon, with warriors fighting back to back, presumably with each facing group comprising more than one line - a 180 degree turn, not just 90 degrees.  However, this could be explained as a deployment rather than a mid-battle decision, since the Gauls adopted the formation well before their infantry became engaged.

Inclined to agree, as the Gauls set up with these dispositions and awaited the Roman armies rather than trying to, say, move out with this arrangement and take the battle to one of them.  The Cimbri at Vercellae did attack in a moving (and from its size presumably hollow) square, but as Marius' troops on the wings managed to march straight past it (a stark indication of the limitations of battlefield visibility on a hot and dusty day) the ability of the flanks of the Cimbri square to face out seems not to have been tested (or recorded).

Quoteso you are using examples from something entirely not a battle in order to justify rules for a battle.

Yes it goes like this, they can do it, so they can do it in different situations. They don't forget how do it.

The thing is Justin.

They don't do it when under threat of engagement in melee.

And if you have rules which allow it because it might be possible, guess what the players will all do when they find it has a real advantage.

you are normalising a strategic march formation into a tactical rule set.  bad idea.

Mark, I trust you do appreciate that this is not what Justin is doing.

A 'strategic march formation' involves troops moving at march spacing of 6' per man with shields and weapons slung, helmets off, unready for combat and passing the time singing or otherwise taking their minds off the sheer crushing boredom of it all.

A tactical column on the battlefield has troops armed and armoured ready for combat, moving in subunits at combat spacing (3' per man), following their subunit standards and the orders of their officers.  The entire formation is alert and vibrant (or d__d well should be), covering distance from tactical point A to tactical point B where they will swiftly revert to a line of battle by each subunit making a 90-degree turn.

Even so, no sensible general moves a tactical column if there are any uncommitted enemy forces able to intercept it: he ties them down first.  This is not because the tactical column is hugely vulnerable (although fighting in this formation is not recommended), but rather because he wants it going where he needs it to go on a very tight timescale and any interference will wreck his battleplan.

QuoteThey don't do it when under threat of engagement in melee.

I suggest that is entirely why they are doing it. Because of the threat of enemy attack that they have to be able to respond to. If there were not the threat they would not be doing it, because the normal column of march is a completely different animal.

QuoteAnd if you have rules which allow it because it might be possible, guess what the players will all do when they find it has a real advantage.

So that is why in a set of rules you don't make it too much of an advantage. I can give you an example from the first version of WAB. Before normal moves took place, drilled Romans could make a formation change. So it was standard practice for them to form into column of march and then move where they wanted at triple speed (column of march speed) then in the next move they could form line of battle to the left, right or facing forward and charge (because the manoeuvre was done before movement had taken place. This became known as 'silly Roman tricks' and has been removed from WAB2. But likewise in WAB2 a hollow square would be no use at all, because normal troops are not allowed to make a 90 degree turn - so would be hit in the flank and routed.

So yes I am aware of the trap of letting rules allow players to do silly things. I suppose with 42 years of playing ancients, I had better of learned.

I find that all of the examples which are produced are of non tactical formations in non tactical situations.

we shall agree to disagree on this in the interests of others having a go.

That WaB example is strikingly similar to the DBM example at the top of this thread.

You may, perhaps, now see my point about not allowing this sort of stuff in the first place.  Or maybe not.

Quote from: Mark G on July 23, 2013, 12:55:19 PM
I find that all of the examples which are produced are of non tactical formations in non tactical situations.

It is very difficult to see that a battle like Carrhae or Arsuf didn't have a tactical element - there was shooting and charging involved and you don't get more tactical than that.  It is fair comment to say it wasn't a formal encounter, with the two sides ranged in lines on opposite sides of a field.  But there are gamers who want to fight these sort of things, as there are with other weird battles like Teutoberger Wald or Largs (less a battle, more an extremely hazardous salvage operation  :) ).  So, the rule writer either says "Here are standard rules for formal battles - if you want something hinky, write your own adaptions" or tries to provide for every eventuality.    If you do the latter, you run the risk of non-standard or even unique actions becoming a gaming commonplace because of advantages deliberately or accidentally confered.

Yes I have had players asking to refight the 'battle' of Lake Trasimene. My response is that is remarkably hard to find people willing to play the Romans.

There are battles which are not much more than slaughters of the other side. And if anyone asks you to play a game where one army is in a column marching with one flank to a lake, think twice.

In a sense, the learned discussion about the column or the othismos is something of a red herring (shoving people with a fish!?) to people like me, because while I can appreciate the details of the discussion, what interests me even more is how tabletop rules can or should give the same overall result.  Example:

The ruleset favoured by our group in the corner of our club for 25/28mm games is the playtest version of Tactica II.  Hardly a statistical universe, but I shall press on regardless...  The rules specify a range of unit sizes and also a range of permitted formations.  The maximum size for a massed infantry unit is 48 figures, in a minimum of 8 files, maximum of 12.  In other words, two or three elements wide.  The end result is something that seems to us to emulate historical practice, with less powerful troops tending to form up in deep lines, or far lack of a better term, 'columns'.  A typical heavy infantry unit will maybe be comprised of 36 figures in three ranks of twelve, while 'medium' types may form up 48 strong in six ranks of 8.  These configurations work on the field of battle.  There is a small dice advantage for being deeper than the opposition, but the main purpose of deeper formations for less powerful troops is that it gives them more staying power on the same frontage to compensate for their relative weakness in combat.  Imagine if you will two strong hoplite units of 36 figs, each 12 wide, fighting three blocks of 48 Kardakes in depth.  That is the effect generated by the rules on the tabletop, and it works in practice.

These are effectively 'fighting columns', and the result works.  Anyone else have anything similar?

Paul

Yes that all sounds sensible (although I favour the old WRG idea of a figure representing 5 men wide, 4 ranks deep, so 2 ranks of figures would be equivalent to your 8 ranks of figures). Only combat advantage in TDIC for deeper formations is for pikes (again the good old WRG 4 ranks, representing 16). But if you lose a round of combat, are close order foot and out-number your enemy by at least 2:1 then thats a bonus of 3 to your morale roll. Tends to keep units in the fight. Buts thats just my view that a fighting column of troops is a bonus to morale in combat.