This takes up Patrick's suggestion of a separate thread to discuss the persistence of Roman military units in the West after the fall of the Western Empire. The fact that there were post-imperial military formations that contemporary observers considered as being 'Roman' is not in question. Procopius makes this clear in his well-known quote from his History of the Wars, XII:
| Now other Roman soldiers, also, had been stationed at the frontiers of Gaul to serve as guards. And these soldiers, having no means of returning to Rome, and at the same time being unwilling to yield to their enemy who were Arians, gave themselves, together with their military standards and the land which they had long been guarding for the Romans, to the Arborychi and Germans; and they handed down to their offspring all the customs of their fathers, which were thus preserved, and this people has held them in sufficient reverence to guard them even up to my time. For even at the present day they are clearly recognized as belonging to the legions to which they were assigned when they served in ancient times, and they always carry their own standards when they enter battle, and always follow the customs of their fathers. And they preserve the dress of the Romans in every particular, even as regards their shoes. |
The questions are these:
1. To what extent were these military formations actually Roman? Were they recognisably Roman in their equipment, training, dress, lifestyle, etc. or were they just barbarian mercenaries who carted a Roman standard around with them?
2. How were they maintained and who maintained them?
3. What was their function and how did they integrate into the barbarian kingdoms they became part of?
4. How many and how large were they?
5. How long did they survive the demise of the Empire?
Taking up Roy's query in the Slingshot thread I'd like to focus on point 2.
QuoteJustin, it would be interesting to see your evidence for Roman units being maintained as units by Post Roman officials taking on the diversion of taxes to pay them and maintain them as units. There is evidence for landowners recruiting their own men as Jim says, but that is rather different from ieeping the state apparatus going.
The late imperial tax system and state apparatus collapsed in Gaul (and elsewhere) in the second half of the fifth century. My point is that local landowners could and did maintain military units on their territories out of the rents they collected from their tenants. Not money as such, but kind: food, clothing, equipment. The landowners in effect became these units' commanding officers, and there was a shift from a civil aristocracy leading a life of
otium on splendid country estates (as remained the case for a while in southern Gaul) to a militarised aristocracy who lived a much simpler lifestyle in fortified towns.
Chris Wickham (Framing the Early Middle Ages, Part II) argues for the persistence of a landowning aristocracy in northern Gaul. The will of Remigius (+533) shows him to be a landowner in the typical Roman manner, and his status can hardly have been unique in that period. Later wills towards the end of the sixth century onwards reveal the Paris basin to be under almost exclusive landowner control, with little sign of independent peasant communities, though many of these landowners were from the newly-created Frankish landed aristocracy.
This is the square hole. Into it I fit the square peg: the Roman units that persisted after the Empire that bankrolled them disappeared. Someone had to be paying their wages. Note that Procopius mentions that these units "gave themselves, together with their military standards
and the land which they had long been guarding for the Romans" to the Armoricans and Franks. Military garrisons did not control land in this period; the Gallo-roman aristocracy did. The implication here is that the commanders of these units
were the owners of the land.
This is deductive. I can't quote any text that says 'the Romans soldiers after the fall of the Empire fell under the authority of the local senators.' It just seems the most logical conclusion.
It is plausible and I think I said in the parent thread that Liebschutz leans that way. I'd suggest again that some units just collapsed, some hired out to local landowners, and the commanders of some strong armed their way to local power via say a marriage alliance. All are logical, as is hiring a barbarian with his war band to garrison your city or defended site. As most troops are going to be limitanei and farmer/soldiering I would not see them as having terrific military qualities. I would also doubt that fancy cavalry units survive, so the Equites Illyricani and Sagittarii would default to being ordinary cavalry, much reduced in numbers and serving a lord who could provide for them. Why, after all would a landowner need to have a large specialist mounted unit when most of the work is chasing down raiders, strong-arming peasants and escort duty.
Of course , if you gather together enough bodyguard units from an area then you have a force of cavalry and I imagine that is the composition of the Arvernian noble forces that were hurrying to help Alaric II at Vouille. I am not aware that the Arvernians are given a named leader which would support the idea of many smallish contingents
Do we find fortified rural villa sites in Gaul? I am not sure that we do. That suggests that the soldiers of whatever provenance are related to the fortified towns.
We are all in the land of conjecture here, of course.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 03, 2014, 10:49:28 AM
As most troops are going to be limitanei and farmer/soldiering I would not see them as having terrific military qualities.
Presuming that there was a state of war between the Franks and Syagrius's realm from 486 until Clovis's baptism in 496/7, these are the troops that "proved their valour and loyalty to the Romans and shewed themselves brave men in this war." They were able to stop Clovis dead in his tracks for a period of ten years - the only one of his enemies who succeeded in doing so. After the peace the Franks and Gallo-romans held them "in sufficient reverence to guard them even up to my time." This argues quality, which would suggest (looking at point 1) that they were a good deal more Roman than barbarian in their military makeup.
In Visigothic Gaul the landed gentry would have used any ex-soldiers they had in the manner you describe, and these would in consequence most likely have been low-calibre troops.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 03, 2014, 11:48:34 AM
This argues quality, which would suggest (looking at point 1) that they were a good deal more Roman than barbarian in their military makeup.
I'm reading this exchange with interest in the hope of learning more about this period. Can you explain why quality is directly related to Roman-ness? I've not yet seen anything that suggests we aren't dealing with a faction, perhaps a particularly coherent one based around a Roman heritage, similar to the forces ranged against them? The idea that these are regular Roman units with Roman discipline and tactics would need a deal more evidence. You may, however, have such evidence up your sleeve :)
If there was hard and detailed evidence that the Syagrian military were substantially Roman in discipline and tactics then this discussion would probably not be taking place. The trouble with history is that the theories grow but the evidence does not (or hardly does) :-\.
I look at it this way: Procopius's account that the 'Arborychi began to fight for the Romans' some time in the 470's makes sense only as a recruiting drive by Syagrius among his own subjects, the Gallo-romans of Armorica, replacing his reliance on the Franks with a surer dependence on a home-grown army. It was this army that fought Clovis up to his baptism in 496/7 and persisted as units under the overlordship of the Franks after that.
Question is, what was the nature of this army's training, equipment and structure? There are two opposing theories, with plenty of gradations in between.
Theory A: the Roman military tradition in northern Gaul had been dead for decades by the 470s, i.e. there were no longer any disciplined units with experienced officers capable of training new recruits in the Roman manner. The only model Syagrius had when he recreated his army was the barbarian one. His troops were equipped and trained in the barbarian manner, abeit with Roman battle standards and in Gallo-roman clothing, and that is how they fought.
Theory B: the Roman military tradition did survive in northern Gaul. Old formations were intact, albeit reduced in size, and they formed the nucleus of Syagrius's new army which was trained and organised by them. This force, substantially Roman in character, kept its identity even after the fall of Syagrius, only gradually losing it in the course of the 6th century.
Well, you can take your pick, but let me offer a few arguments in favour of theory B.
Nothing proves that the Roman army entirely disappeared in Gaul in the mid 5th century. It is more likely that it was much reduced in size and no longer capable, by itself, of fighting large battles. Hence Aetius's need for barbarian allies to face the Huns. Procopius's affirmation that 'even at the present day they are clearly recognized as belonging to the legions to which they were assigned when they served in ancient times', implies that the old legionary formations persisted right to the end of the 5th century and beyond. The fact that the soldiers belonged to 'legions' seems to rule out the notion that they were barbarian foederati, as these kept their own tribal structures and did not organised themselves into legions.
Of course, one could cast doubt on Procopius's use of the word 'legion' just as one could cast doubt on his whole account, but I prefer to take it at face value unless there is solid evidence for not doing so.
The economic and social network in northern Gaul remained intact throughout this period, as, for example, the pottery record shows, hence the means existed to maintain the traditional Roman formations. If these were privatised by the landed gentry then their upkeep was assured.
One can question whether these formations preserved all the nuances of the old Imperial army, but what would have made for differences between them? The Roman Army had always been an autonomous entity - the troops owed loyalty to their generals, not to the Empire as a whole. This attitude would have remained intact even when there was no longer an emperor and the 'Empire' had shrunk to northern Gaul. What motivated Roman troops to keep their standards up would have remained in place even after 476. The one thing that would have degraded the Roman character of the army is if it had ceased to be professional: paid troops living apart from the general populace. Nothing suggests that this was the case in northern Gaul.
There's a parallel to this in modern-day Britain. With the British Empire gone the British army has remained as professional as it ever was - even more so. It just became smaller. If you don't have numbers but you do have money then the natural inclination seems to be to go for quality.
Might the "arborychi" to whom Procopius refers be the remnants of Riothamus' British army - the timing is right?
Justin's analogy with the modern British army raises a possible comparison with post-colonial Africa, where there are essentially two effective military models: first, the traditional European system inherited from the colonial powers, second the "revolutionary" model acquired either fighting the colonialists or - more often - overthrowing an African government. The Malawi Army, for example, has very strong British traditions - one of its battalions is still sub-titled King's African Rifles. The Rwandan Defence Force on the other hand comes from the guerrilla movement which came to power in 1994. Both models can be effective in creating competent forces and, coincidentally, there can be a strong "warrior" tradition too (like the Tuareg rebels in Mali). The point is that such models create an ethos which can be quite durable, even in straitened financial circumstances. The Malawi army is not well-resourced but, like Procopius "Romans" perhaps, it's still fiercely attached to its Regimental Colours.
Owen
Just to put things into context with regards landowners supporting units. If we're wanting people to be 'full time' soldiers then they really have to have enough land to support servants as well.
So the figures I've come across I used in a slingshot article some time back.
The figure is the number of acres needed to support them.
Nicephorus II cataphract cavalry 460.8
Norman Miles in England 180
Cavalry of Themes 144
Cavalry of Tagmata 144
Cibyrrhaeot marines 144
Infantry of Themes 30
To get things in perspective, the landholding of a Thematic infantryman should produce enough grain to support 3.25 peasant families. So one family can actually farm the land, and the surplus is enough to support him.
We now have to look at how large some of these estates were, has anyone got any figures?
Jim
QuoteMight the "arborychi" to whom Procopius refers be the remnants of Riothamus' British army - the timing is right?
Jordanes affirms that Riothamus's men fled to the Burgundians after his defeat by the Visigoths:
| (XLV.237) "Now Euric, king of the Visigoths, perceived the frequent change of Roman Emperors and strove to hold Gaul by his own right. The Emperor Anthemius heard of it and asked the Brittones for aid. Their King Riotimus came with twelve thousand men into the state of the Bituriges by the way of Ocean, and was received as he disembarked from his ships. (238) Euric, king of the Visigoths, came against them with an innumerable army, and after a long fight he routed Riotimus, King of the Britons, before the Romans could join him. So when he had lost a great part of his army, he fled with all the men he could gather together, and came to the Burgundians, a neighboring tribe then allied to the Romans. But Euric, king of the Visigoths, seized the Gallic city of Arvernum; for the Emperor Anthemius was now dead." |
At this time the 'Romans' under Aegidius or Syagrius had a force of their own, though to what extent it was a mix of Frankish federates and Roman troops is unclear. Anthemus ruled from 467 to 472.
On the subject of Syagrian legions, the account of the 'British legion' north of the Loire in the
Vita Sancti Dalmatii is interesting:
| 'Naturally, after the realm of the Franks [who were] pious and illustrious and devotees of the Christian religion, had subjugated the city of Rodez (the people themselves conspiring in their [the Franks'] favour), the priest [Dalmas], filled with desire, strove to look upon the presence of the Christian king Theudebert. As the devout one [Dalmas] was tirelessly hurrying to him [Theudebert] in the region beyond-Loire [or: beyond-Loir], it is said he enjoyed an evening's hospitality in a certain place where some sort of Breton [or: Brittonic] legion (so to speak) nearby was stationed [or: was waiting].' |
This event took place after 534 when Theudebert became king. The best sense of the term 'ultralegeretannis' - 'beyond legeretannis' is that
legeretannis is a scribal corruption of
ligeranis 'pertaining to the Loire', which places it north of the Loire.
This mention of a legion is couched in prosaic terms in an account full of the marvellous, which if anything confirms its authenticity. What is interesting is that the legion is in exactly the place one would expect to find those 'other Roman soldiers' that defended the Loire frontier against the Visigoths. Its name is also interesting: 'legio bretonum'. The only legion with a name like this is the II Britannica, formerly posted in Britain before being withdrawn to Gaul at the end of the 4th century. Three of its vexillations - stationed in Gaul - are mentioned in the Notitia Dignitatum.
Speculation of course, but adding up to a coherent picture.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 04, 2014, 06:34:38 AM
Question is, what what the nature of this army's training, equipment and structure?
I would essentially agree. While the facts are admittedly scattered across time and locations, there is enough to say that forces identifying with former Roman army units persisted for some time after the disappearance of the Western Empire. I think where we differ is how militarily, rather than culturally or traditionally, Roman they were. We have evidence that some, at least, kept their standards but does this mean a traditional command or simply an affirmation of tradition and identity. They probably had a legacy stock of arms and armour - perhaps more than a passing warband would own. But other than that? I don't know.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 04, 2014, 08:44:09 AM
Just to put things into context with regards landowners supporting units. If we're wanting people to be 'full time' soldiers then they really have to have enough land to support servants as well.
We now have to look at how large some of these estates were, has anyone got any figures?
Jim
I'm no expert on this. Just a couple of ideas:
Roman farms were measured in iugera (1 iugera = 0.65 acres). Kehoe
Economics of Agriculture on Roman Imperial Estates in North Africa, affirms that you needed 2 jugera to support a man.
The Gallo-roman notables tended to own many large farms (latifundia, each 500 iugera or more), though usually within a single region. Collectively, these could amount to thousands or even tens of thousands of iugera. Given that the great majority of the population lived in the countryside and most of these, in Syagrius's realm at least, resided on these huge estates, one can assume that sustaining a unit of several hundred men would not have been an undue burden for a landowner.
I can't however locate any precise information on the size of a typical landowner's holdings in Gaul. Can anyone help?
On the Italian frontier we have two examples. The first is the Life of St Severinus which speaks of the Roman soldiers at Passau on the Danube who send off a detatchment to get the pay, then see their bodies come floating back downstream and so disperse as no more pay would appear to be forthcoming. This is around 470 Military units that are not paid and especially not fed, can collapse very quickly.
Contra this, in the early sixth century Cassiodorus pens a letter of Theoderic the Great ( IIRC) writes to a commander of limitanei who are probably in NE Italy. In Procopius 'Buildings' there is a reference to Justinian replacing a garrison of farmer soldiers with a garrison of regulars which is unpopular, presumably because that means the regulars need a tax contribution.
However, town garrisons need not be regulars, or even limitanei. In the Vth century Caesarius of Arles refers to sections of the walls being maintained by sections of the community, in this case the Jews and in the 530s The Jews defend their section of the walls of Naples against the Goths. Hence it would be a fair presumption that the quarters of a town were allocated wall sections to maintain and to defend. In the mid Vth century Majorian specifically removed the penalties for civilians carrying arms so that they could defend themselves against Vandal raids.
As to Procopius' accuracy, he is working in an Herodotean tradition and thus salts his account with stories which may have a basis in fact and may be embroidery. The story of surviving legions is in this category because we just do not know enough to be sure. Justin can see them as militarily effective and others can choose to show them as decayed remnants that provide part of a town defence, but are soldier farmers whose radius of action is the farmland of their city. Sadly we do not seem to have an example of them being involved in military activity, but then many of these multi contingent armies are not listed as conveniently as Majorian's is listed.
One pice of comparative continuity is the case of Goths in Septimania. these go on into the ninth century, after the fall of the Visigoth kingdom and the Frankish eviction of the Moors from the region. I remember reading that the longevity of the appellation 'Goth' might well be due to their being financial privileges attached to being a Goth which would have meant hereditary military service. Given there was a benefit to bearing the label it continued on for 200 years after the political entity to which it related had gone under. If Justin's Romans had a reason to muster and dress up at the drill hall once a month and receive a donative, or held land by reason of their membership of, in effect, a guild then they would keep it going.
My doubts about these Romans in Gaul are that we do not know of any political organisation that keeps them going for 60 years. being attached to cities is fine, but that will be small scale and with no coherent means of assembly as the cities do not have expeditionary armies, well not large ones.
Roy
I included Nicephorus II's cataphract cavalry with their 460.8 acre estate because they would to an extent be prominent local landowners
It's also not all that far from 500 iugera
From memory here, wasn't the iugera relative rather than absolute? Like the hide it was a measurement based on yield rather than mere area.
Mind you, if we take a landlord with 1500 acres.
He'd need 500 to maintain himself and his family (minimum)
Another 500 would support three or four full time cavalry
Another 500 would support 16 infantry.
To support a cavalry unit you'd need over 40,000 acres.
Jim Webster
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 04, 2014, 11:18:23 AM
To support a cavalry unit you'd need over 40,000 acres.
Jim Webster
That's about 160 square km, or 100 square miles. Syagrius's realm would have been in the region of 80 000 square km, most of it arable. Devote a twentieth of that to military upkeep and you have either 3500 cavalry or 40 000 infantry. Go fifty/fifty and you have 1750 cavalry and 20 000 infantry - far more than one can theorize as actually having been subsidized.
As a slight detour from the mainstream discussion we might argue for the persistence of sagittarii on the basis that a number of Alans seem to have settled in northern Gaul during the 5th century AD and their horse archery skilld are likely to have lasted for at least one generation. We might also consider the possibility of Illyricani being supplemented and eventually replaced by the light scout/raider types which Celts in general and Bretons in particular were fond of fielding.
The essential quality of 'Romanishness' that I see mattering is discipline (and for that matter fighting technique), with organisation as a secondary but useful feature. If you have an army that does what you want it to then you have an advantage over an opponent whose army does more or less what he wants it to. ;)
I see a general pattern in that the quality of Roman units seems to have been in fairly direct proportion to their proximity to a seat of rule. Troops far from a centre of rule, e.g. the units in Spain, seem to have been lacklustre, but the Illyrian units under the Nepos family were crack troops. The armies of Britain and Gaul were traditionally among the best troops the late Empire possessed, and had a tradition of making (usually ultimately unsuccessful) emperors. Aetius had built up a power base in Gaul (and presumably done his non-Hunnish recruiting there), with Aegidius and Syagrius apparently adopting this as a more or less going concern.
The question that seems less easy to address is the extent to which an effective taxation system still prevailed. If the Roman civil service persisted, then it may have drawn useful revenue from a basically prosperous province, as the usual contribution to the Imperial capital would no longer be made, allowing the entire revenue (such as it was) to be used by the ruler of what remained of Roman Gaul. In practice, one would envisage a degree of cutting out the middleman, with local nobility maintaining their own units (a revised limitanei system) and the ruler keeping a core of good quality palatini, both to give him credibility with barbarian tribes and to ensure that he remained the ruler.
One might assume that overall the towns provided the money, the countryside the manpower and the fabricae the equipment. Most importantly, having a ruler on the spot provided the means to keep everything coordinated and viable.
The number of Knights' Fees in England in 1166 was, by Dr. J. H. Round in his "Introduction of Knight Service in England," calculated at 5,000 or less, viz. 784 held by the Church, and 3,534 by such of the lay Barons as were included, with an allowance for omissions of the latter.
Now England is 50, 346 square miles. So that's ten square miles per knights fee.
So in proportion Syagrius's realm would have been ten knights fees.
I'm working from that end, top down rather than bottom up, because it sets something into high relief. The fact that the most important factor is maintaining the standard of living of those at the top of the system. If they're spending 90% of their income on defending it, they'll be better off surrendering and just paying 50% tax.
So by that reckoning Syagrius's realm could have supported ten or twenty major families.
What I'm driving at is that I suspect that these units had 'degenerated' into 'estate guards' rather than have remained 'soldiers' because I don't think there would have been the wealth or more importantly the willingness to maintain them at that social position.
In Wargaming terms I see them as men who aspire to be Ax(O) rather than those who rest confident in the face they're Bd(O) or Ax(S) :-)
Jim
I agree pretty much. absolutely Jim, I recall using the calculation of knights fees (which underestimates a bit the total cavalry potential because of the retainers of larger landowners that may have included more than the total of enfeoffed knights that they owe) to look at how many cavalry the island of Britannia could have supplied in 'Arthurian' times, when at some points there appeared to be 40 or so 'kingdoms ' or statelets in an area where population was much reduced by war, plague and the collapse of trade . On average these small entities could produce 150 mounted armoured warriors at. It doesn't actually matter if the calculation is wrong to some extent because the numbers just go down to 80 or up to 250. It puts the 300 warriors at Cattraeth into context.
Roy
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 04, 2014, 12:27:51 PM
What I'm driving at is that I suspect that these units had 'degenerated' into 'estate guards' rather than have remained 'soldiers' because I don't think there would have been the wealth or more importantly the willingness to maintain them at that social position.
In Wargaming terms I see them as men who aspire to be Ax(O) rather than those who rest confident in the face they're Bd(O) or Ax(S) :-)
Jim
This would probably be true of the landed nobility in southern Gaul, who did not face any dire military threat and who could not undertake military ventures of their own (the Visigoths took care of that).
England in 1166 was securely under Norman control. The Normans did not have to worry too much about the Welsh or Scots, and were largely concerned with keeping the subjugated Saxons under control. They didn't need a big army for that.
In northern Gaul, however, things were different. The area had been under constant barbarian threat from day one and showed considerable resilience in the face of that threat - it was still under Roman control nearly a century later. My reading of events is that Syagrius had decided to reaffirm Roman authority north of the Seine, first by rebuilding the Roman army, and second by reclaiming Belgica II from Clovis. This would require the best force he could create. Degenerate estate guards were no use; he needed good troops.
Presuming he started building up his army in the 470's (the 'Arborychi' started fighting for the Romans at the same time the Visigoths occupied Spain) , that gave him something like ten years to prepare for the Soissons takeover in 486 or thereabouts. He was quite confident he was ready as he had no fear of facing Clovis's Frankish coalition in battle. My impression is that he had the full support of the powerful Gallo-roman families in his realm - at least until he lost the battle, at which point he became a liability. Unlike the determined but improvised defences against the Visigoths in Auvergne, the Gallo-roman resistence in northern Gaul after Syagrius's fall stopped Clovis and kept him stopped. I can't see estate guards or a civilian militia managing that.
Quote from: aligern on January 04, 2014, 12:46:07 PM
I agree pretty much. absolutely Jim, I recall using the calculation of knights fees (which underestimates a bit the total cavalry potential because of the retainers of larger landowners that may have included more than the total of enfeoffed knights that they owe) to look at how many cavalry the island of Britannia could have supplied in 'Arthurian' times, when at some points there appeared to be 40 or so 'kingdoms ' or statelets in an area where population was much reduced by war, plague and the collapse of trade . On average these small entities could produce 150 mounted armoured warriors at. It doesn't actually matter if the calculation is wrong to some extent because the numbers just go down to 80 or up to 250. It puts the 300 warriors at Cattraeth into context.
Roy
But, worthy though these calculations are, the Roman Empire did not use knights' fees ... and one should remember the difference between Roman and barbarian scales of revenue: in North Africa, Geilimer's Vandals took a desultory 10% and were not avid in its collection, yet maintained a stated 80,000 mounted warriors in near-Sybaritic comfort. Justinian's tax collectors demanded 33% and accepted no excuses for lack of promptness.
If Syagrius was still using the Roman taxation system in whole or, more likely in part, he would still be commanding a quite respectable income. As Roy has pointed out, the main revenue providers would probably be the towns, although the coloni working the farms would also be contributing either to the state revenue or (perhaps more likely) to their lords, who might send on an agreed amount on a similar basis to the town
curia. They would perhaps have had more input than the
curia in agreeing the amount.
Contemporaries seem to have been in agreement that Syagrius was still ruling Roman-fashion, much like Odoacer in Italy (who similarly declared his realm a 'kingdom' following the deposition of Romulus Augustus).
Taking up again the reference to a British legion north of the Loire:
| 'As the devout one [Dalmas] was tirelessly hurrying to him [Theudebert] in the region beyond-Loire [or: beyond-Loir], it is said he enjoyed an evening's hospitality in a certain place where some sort of Breton [or: Brittonic] legion (so to speak) nearby was stationed [or: was waiting].' |
Notice the author's hesitation about the nature of the legion. It is 'some sort' of Breton/British legion 'so to speak'. Why the hesitation? I can think of only two reasons:
1. The author knew what a true legion looked like and realised that this particular entity didn't fit the bill. This however doesn't make sense. The author had no benchmark. The only 'legions' he would have known about were those units in sixth century Gaul that called themselves such. It's like a Malawian talking about 'some sort of battalion, so to speak' in the Malawi army. A Malawi formation calls itself a battalion, to a Malawian it's a battalion.
2. The author knew what British, or more exactly, Bretons, were like and realised that this legion did not resemble them remotely. This fits the picture better. He, like his contemporaries, would have lost sight of the source of the legion's name. That legion, centuries earlier, had been stationed in Britain and acquired the name of the territory it garrisoned, a name it retained after it was recalled to Gaul. The only formation that fits this description is the II Britannica. So we have here the last recorded reference to one of the oldest and best of the old Empire's legions.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 04, 2014, 12:55:51 PM
England in 1166 was securely under Norman control. The Normans did not have to worry too much about the Welsh or Scots, and were largely concerned with keeping the subjugated Saxons under control. They didn't need a big army for that.
I think you may be missing the point a bit Justin. I think the knight's fees analogy is about different scales of surplus productivity of land. As for this being a peaceful period, it is in reality a lull - a civil war had finished in the 1150s and there will be another one in the 1170s. So, maybe we are looking at a measure of how much of the surplus in a militarised society at a similar technological level will be diverted to maintaining a fighting elite.
Fair enough :). Having taken the trouble to read up on knight's fees, I note that they had to be large enough to maintain a knight, several horses and squires, weapons and armour. The fee could, theoretically, supply a small force of infantry in the bargain.
Transpose this to Syagrius's realm and you get something comparable to my estimates on how many horse/foot (along with servants and farm workers) 5% of the land could maintain. A small, well-equipped army of mixed cavalry and infantry in the +10 000 man range was quite feasible (excuse the pun) ;).
Furthermore, we may find it beneficial to make comparisons with Duke William's Normandy, which in territory was not too dissimilar to Syagrius' Domain of Soissons. William's realm was feudal rather than late Roman, hence perhaps deficient by comparison in population and revenue, but could field a quite respectable army, especially when allied with Bretons. He certainly brought more than ten knights to Hastings ... ;)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 04, 2014, 01:47:40 PM
... The author knew what British, or more exactly, Bretons, were like and realised that this legion did not resemble them remotely. This fits the picture better. He, like his contemporaries, would have lost sight of the source of the legion's name. That legion, centuries earlier, had been stationed in Britain and acquired the name of the territory it garrisoned, a name it retained after it was recalled to Gaul. The only formation that fits this description is the II Britannica. So we have here the last recorded reference to one of the oldest and best of the old Empire's legions.
Interesting deduction.
To return for a moment to Round and the knight's fee, I think it is safe to say that there was no one specific size of landholding that equalled a knight's fee. Indeed, already in the 12th century the English were shifting to value rather than acreage as the measure (allowing for the fact some fees were more productive than others). But Round himself reckoned that 10 hides was a typical figure and estimated an average hide as 120 acres. So typically a fully equipped horseman with entourage would be equivalent to an 1200 acres (so more, some less).
Sorry for working this through at length but it does show that the economic and political systems matter in trying to work out the military potential of these post-Roman states. Using Romanised production figures, justin can use 5% of the land to produce 3500 cavalry. To use feudal English estimates, the whole area would produce less than 2700. So, a big question has to be was there still an efficient administration in place to create productivity at the Roman rate or was the economy much more similar to the early Middle Ages?
Quote from: Erpingham on January 04, 2014, 04:26:40 PM
Using Romanised production figures, justin can use 5% of the land to produce 3500 cavalry. To use feudal English estimates, the whole area would produce less than 2700. So, a big question has to be was there still an efficient administration in place to create productivity at the Roman rate or was the economy much more similar to the early Middle Ages?
I based myself on Jim Webster's figures (over to you, Jim):
QuoteMind you, if we take a landlord with 1500 acres.
He'd need 500 to maintain himself and his family (minimum)
Another 500 would support three or four full time cavalry
Another 500 would support 16 infantry.
That's one cavalryman (with servants and farm labourers) per 150-odd acres, as opposed to one (with entourage) per 1200. Personally, I find the latter figure a bit incredible. With contemporary agricultural methods you can feed one person from just over 1 acre of farmland. Even presuming that Roman farming methods makes that 1 person per 2 acres, that still means you would need hundreds of people to put an armed man on a horse.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 04, 2014, 04:42:02 PM
That's one cavalryman (with servants and farm labourers) per 150-odd acres, as opposed to one (with entourage) per 1200. Personally, I find the latter figure a bit incredible. With contemporary agricultural methods you can feed one person from just over 1 acre of farmland. Even presuming that Roman farming methods makes that 1 person per 2 acres, that still means you would need hundreds of people to put an armed man on a horse.
Well, if we go with Round's minimum figure (2 hides), that's 240 acres for a cavalryman etc., which is closer. We can of course bring in the one armed man for 5 hides of the (at least parts of) late Anglo-Saxon system, which is a middle ground. He too would have had a horse (even if only for transport) and armour. Again looking to the social comparison, a knight doesn't just need a fee to keep him in military equipment. He needs it to live according to his estate. If our post-Roman soldier is quite soldier like, he doesn't have much social position to maintain. If he is already some sort of local bigshot, he does.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 04, 2014, 12:57:54 PM
But, worthy though these calculations are, the Roman Empire did not use knights' fees ... and one should remember the difference between Roman and barbarian scales of revenue: in North Africa, Geilimer's Vandals took a desultory 10% and were not avid in its collection, yet maintained a stated 80,000 mounted warriors in near-Sybaritic comfort. Justinian's tax collectors demanded 33% and accepted no excuses for lack of promptness.
If Syagrius was still using the Roman taxation system in whole or, more likely in part, he would still be commanding a quite respectable income. As Roy has pointed out, the main revenue providers would probably be the towns, although the coloni working the farms would also be contributing either to the state revenue or (perhaps more likely) to their lords, who might send on an agreed amount on a similar basis to the town curia. They would perhaps have had more input than the curia in agreeing the amount.
Contemporaries seem to have been in agreement that Syagrius was still ruling Roman-fashion, much like Odoacer in Italy (who similarly declared his realm a 'kingdom' following the deposition of Romulus Augustus).
I remember reading AHM Jones, Edessa, capital of Osrhoene and a town of commercial important, paid 2520 solidi a year. Heracleopolis, an Egyptian city with a large territory paid 57,500 Solidi and Oxyrhynchus with Cynopolis, 59,500.
Economically the tax from people living in the towns was almost irrelevant, they were important only where they could collect the tax from their agricultural hinterland. At times this was a very large agricultural hinterland and it was the Coloni who actually paid for everything.
Once you lost control of the countryside around a town, the town was fiscally irrelevant, it is doubtful whether the tax it raised would subsidise the grain the inhabitants needed to stay alive
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 04, 2014, 04:42:02 PM
That's one cavalryman (with servants and farm labourers) per 150-odd acres, as opposed to one (with entourage) per 1200. Personally, I find the latter figure a bit incredible. With contemporary agricultural methods you can feed one person from just over 1 acre of farmland. Even presuming that Roman farming methods makes that 1 person per 2 acres, that still means you would need hundreds of people to put an armed man on a horse.
No because you are assuming the state is geared and optimised towards war.
In reality the state is geared and optimised to maintaining the standard of living of those who own it. One of the reasons the west fell was that the great landowners wouldn't pay tax or release men to the army. They're hardly likely to have suddenly had a burst of patriotic fever when it had fallen.
From their point of view the situation is simple.
If you bring in Barbarians, be they Visigoths or Franks, you'll end up losing about 50% of your income at the most and in return you'll keep your standard of living, you'll be no more exposed to arbitrary justice and the iron hand of the civil power than you were before, indeed in that regard things may actually improve.
In crude terms, to be worth supporting, Syagrius has to offer a better deal. Offer a worse deal and they'll not support him.
He cannot restructure the territory to hand out land to his men to support them, because if he does he'll alienate those who already own it, and without their support he'll have no legitimacy.
So effectively he has to take what is available, not what he'd like.
Jim
Quote from: Erpingham on January 04, 2014, 05:18:50 PM
Well, if we go with Round's minimum figure (2 hides), that's 240 acres for a cavalryman etc., which is closer. We can of course bring in the one armed man for 5 hides of the (at least parts of) late Anglo-Saxon system, which is a middle ground. He too would have had a horse (even if only for transport) and armour. Again looking to the social comparison, a knight doesn't just need a fee to keep him in military equipment. He needs it to live according to his estate. If our post-Roman soldier is quite soldier like, he doesn't have much social position to maintain. If he is already some sort of local bigshot, he does.
Remember that being a 'soldier' was to have a social position to maintain. In a world where a very high proportion of the population lived pretty much hand to mouth, you were salaried and fed. You were provided with clothing and equipment. You even had spare money to spend. Hell, you were almost as well off as a petty bureaucrat.
That's why I've drawn a big distinction between 'estate guards' and 'soldiers'.
Jim
Quote from: Erpingham on January 04, 2014, 05:18:50 PM
Again looking to the social comparison, a knight doesn't just need a fee to keep him in military equipment. He needs it to live according to his estate. If our post-Roman soldier is quite soldier like, he doesn't have much social position to maintain. If he is already some sort of local bigshot, he does.
One can presume a sharp social distinction between the ordinary Roman soldiers, mounted and foot, who didn't have that much social prestige, and their commanders who did.
What percentage of the land of a mediaeval hide was under agriculture? Was most of it forested? Late Roman agriculture did not substantially decline in areas that preserved the Roman social and economic structures, and Syagrius's region was agriculturally rich. I really can't see it needing hundreds of acres to feed the labourers, artisans and specialists required to husband a horse and equip a single rider.
Given the situation, one can also presume that landed gentry would have spared all the land they could to equip as large a force as possible. These were practical times: the Syagrian nobility dropped the luxurious country-villa lifestyle of their southern compatriots without a qualm.
Why would they have backed Syagrius? And why did they continue resisting the Franks after he fell? I suggest that they were beginning to feel their identity was threatened. Through the greater part of the 5th century I don't get the impression the Gallic aristocracy seriously considered that the Roman social order was on its way out. It was as if they felt the barbarians would eventually be assimilated into the Roman system or at least leave it intact. Serious resistance to the barbarians began only in the latter half of the century and climaxed in the war between Syagrius's realm and the Franks, in which a city like Paris would starve rather than surrender. Clovis could not be incorporated into the Roman structures. He was no longer a foederatus and he was not baptized: he had to be resisted at all costs.
It's possible of course that the Gallo-roman resistance was in part a popular movement and the nobility had no choice but to go along with it. The result was the same: they felt obliged to oppose Clovis or go under.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 04, 2014, 05:57:34 PM
One can presume a sharp social distinction between the ordinary Roman soldiers, mounted and foot, who didn't have that much social prestige, and their commanders who did.
What percentage of the land of a mediaeval hide was under agriculture? Was most of it forested? Late Roman agriculture did not substantially decline in areas that preserved the Roman social and economic structures, and Syagrius's region was agriculturally rich. I really can't see it needing hundreds of acres to feed the labourers, artisans and specialists required to husband a horse and equip a single rider.
Given the situation, one can also presume that landed gentry would have spared all the land they could to equip as large a force as possible. These were practical times: the Syagrian nobility dropped the luxurious country-villa lifestyle of their southern compatriots without a qualm.
I just checked. Remember Gaul had a lot of trouble with Bagaudae. According to http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Bagaudae (which is hardly a prime source) The main area of the revolt was located between the Seine and Loire rivers (where extensive deep forests provided excellent shelter).
Please don't think of it as an area of rolling arable acres. Remember the river valleys would be wooded and/or marshy. The main arable areas were the drier lands higher up the sides of the valley, and such land is less productive (but far easier to plough)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 04, 2014, 05:57:34 PM
Why would they have backed Syagrius? And why did they continue resisting the Franks after he fell? I suggest that they were beginning to feel their identity was threatened. Through the greater part of the 5th century I don't get the impression the Gallic aristocracy seriously considered that the Roman social order was on its way out. It was as if they felt the barbarians would eventually be assimilated into the Roman system or at least leave it intact. Serious resistance to the barbarians began only in the latter half of the century and climaxed in the war between Syagrius's realm and the Franks, in which a city like Paris would starve rather than surrender. Clovis could not be incorporated into the Roman structures. He was no longer a foederatus and he was not baptized: he had to be resisted at all costs.
It's possible of course that the Gallo-roman resistance was in part a popular movement and the nobility had no choice but to go along with it. The result was the same: they felt obliged to oppose Clovis or go under.
I think we can ignore a 'popular' movement. Remember the Bagaudae. Popular movements might be anti-Roman.
It may well be that they needed forces to hold down their own coloni and keep them working and until they could trust the Franks to provide the same service that the Visigoths had provided further south, they couldn't allow the Franks in
Jim
Patrick, it really is nonsense to credit the Vandals with 20,000 warriors. There might just have been 80,000 Vandals and Alans. and their families, servants and slaves who crossed frpm Spain to Africa, but even this is likely. to be wrongly based upon Geiseric creating 80 millenarii or thusundifaths 'leaders of 1000' who did not necessarily lead 1000. Or it may be that 80,000 is just a big number.
Large numbers in Procopius are not believable.
Roy
Here's another comparator, closer in space and time.
According to figures given in this article
http://www.academia.edu/4184131/Comitatus_to_Crusader_An_Analysis_of_the_Development_of_the_Medieval_Knight_as_a_Mounted_Combatant
A carolingian cavalryman needed 12 mansi to maintain his estate. A mansus is another of those sliding measure areas but the author thinks it is equivaalent to a hide. Put another way, the surplus required to support a cavalryman would need 12 families of peasants to maintain. Obviously we don't know the size of a mansus equivalent in Syagrius area but if we take the classic Roman figure as per wikipedia
In the Roman Empire, a family of 6 people would need to cultivate 12 iugera/ 3 hectares of land to meet minimum food requirements (without animals).[10] If a family owned animals to help cultivate land, then 20 iugera was needed.
So, a cavalryman by this sort of level of production would need around 90-100 acres. It's looking fairly consistent to me.
I crunched a lot of numbers when I did the article Anthony
The numbers are very consistent. The Athenian and the Byzantine Cavalryman needed the land to produce 12 tons of wheat, the Norman Miles in England was expensive and needed 19-20 tons of wheat. The latter might have been because William handed out land with a generous hand because he had to tempt people to stay as he depended entirely on their support.
Jim
Patrick, it really is nonsense to credit the Vandals with 80,000 warriors. There might just have been 80,000 Vandals and Alans. and their families, servants and slaves who crossed from Spain to Africa, but even this is likely. to be wrongly based upon Geiseric creating 80 millenarii or thusundifaths 'leaders of 1000' who did not necessarily lead 1000. Or it may be that 80,000 is just a big number.
i have a sneaking suspicion that Victor Vitensis claims the Vandals had. 80,000 people and that is likely to be the source of Procopius misinterpretation.
Roy
Large numbers in Procopius are not believable.
Roy
Jim, let me lend my support on the five hide proposition.
I am reasonably convinced that. the AS had a universal military obligation for all free men to serve in bridge building, fortification and in the field. However, large field armies of Egberts with a spear and shield were too slow and ill equipped to meet the Vikings , what was. needed was armoured men on horses, probably attended by a servant, perhaps also mounted . That meant five families, or rather the land that would support five, combining to fund one chap with the kit. Universal military service was, I believe retained for manning burghs.
Norman England was relatively systematically settled and organised for war as was the Byzantine Empire once it became thematised. Syagrius realm, was not, as far as we know, so organised. Whilst that might give us a theoretical number of cavalry that could be provided, is there any evidence for that sort of organisation. Well, in a way there is. When settling barbarians on the land the Late Empire appears to have allowed one third of the land or one third of the taxes from land to support the barbarian military charged with protecting the area. what we do not know, of course is the rate that this land supported troops at.
QuoteSo, a cavalryman by this sort of level of production would need around 90-100 acres. It's looking fairly consistent to me.
Makes sense. It was the 1200 acres that I found a bit odd.
QuoteI just checked. Remember Gaul had a lot of trouble with Bagaudae. According to http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Bagaudae (which is hardly a prime source) The main area of the revolt was located between the Seine and Loire rivers (where extensive deep forests provided excellent shelter).
From what I've read on the Bagaudae it seems a bit simplistic to see them as anarchistic peasants, as the pro-governmental writers of the time portrayed them. There appears to have been an element of the lower gentry who joined them. They arose out of a desire to escape the oppressive taxation or tax fraud that characterised the late Empire. It is perhaps better to think of them as local disaffected inhabitants who represented several classes of society and in all respects lived fairly normal lives except for the fact that they had decided to dispense with imperial authority. Aetius defeated them by 450 and there is no mention of them in this area after that. Agriculture would have been as central to their existence as it was to anyone else so one can assume they kept the farms going.
In any case I don't know if it is possible to form some idea of the proportion of land between the Seine and Loire that was actually under the plough in this period. Does anyone have any figures?
You are right Justin, Bagaudae are rebels, not just bandits. One of their leaders sought out Attila at his court and solicited him to come to Gaul after the Romans had campaigned against them.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 04, 2014, 08:56:47 PM
Large numbers in Procopius are not believable.
But may nevertheless be true. One may remember this same territory of Africa supporting quite large Carthaginian armies in earlier centuries, even if a fair amount of the manpower came from Gaul and Spain.
Might it be an idea to clarify what we are attempting to establish? As I see it, we are looking at the following facets of the Dominion of Soissons.
1) The size of the armed establishment (hundreds, thousands or tens of thousands).
2) The nature of the forces (regular legions and auxilia, hired barbarian warbands, loose collections of estate guards or whatever).
In connection with this we are looking at the potential revenue (which is more than just a matter of land area, although the latter is an important part of it), presumably as a means of estimating the number, type and quality of troops that could be maintained. If so, we ought to be devoting some attention to the pay scale, as far as is known or deducible.
Indications that some regular units may have survived into the late 5th century are very useful for delineating the possible existence of a regular army. Absence of mention of Franks, Visigoths, Burgundians etc. as part of Syagrius' core forces (as opposed to allies) may be an indication that recruitment relied upon the Gallic population.
We may also wish to comb contemporary literary sources for hints as to relevant economic factors and general activities: the epistolary Sidonius Apollonaris, in between extravagant literary effects, gives us a number of observations in his Letters, e.g. to Domitius, wherein he describes his own country property - and it is quite extensive, including (among other things) "plenty of sheep in its pastures and plenty of savings in the shepherds' purses". Wading through Sidonius is not a task for the faint-hearted, but might be fruitful in allusions and descriptions which help to fill out the bigger picture.
There might be an easier way of doing this. The Western Empire at the end of the 4th century had an army in the region of 200 000 men. Most of these were stationed on the ever-threatened Rhine and Danube frontiers. They would have been fed from local areas of agrarian production, since the Empire did not have such a developed infrastructure that it could cheaply transport bulk goods like grain long distances overland (and in fact bulk goods were not transported between the Mediterranean and northern Gaul).
For the Rhine troops that meant Britain and northern Gaul. The economy in these areas had to have been organised to feed and equip large numbers of soldiers, somewhere between 50 000 and 100 000 troops on or near the Rhine.
The distribution of Argonne and Mayen ware, pottery types widely disseminated throughout northern Gaul, did not cease in the 5th century, though their range lessened somewhat. Indeed, a new pottery type, ceramique biconique, was introduced and spread throughout northern Gaul in the late 5th century.
This argues the survival of a system of exchange across northern Gaul and the persistence of a wealthy class - these are fine wares, sought after by the affluent. The implication is that the landowning elite remained intact, and that their estates, many of which had fed the army, continued to transfer goods across northern Gaul, as the survival of the trade network suggests.
Would the portion of this system that remained under Roman control in northern Gaul been sufficient to supply a respectable army? The region is certainly big enough. Syagrius's realm was at least as large as Ireland, perhaps as large as England. I can see no reason why it could not have equipped at least 10 000 men, probably more.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 04, 2014, 09:22:02 PM
QuoteSo, a cavalryman by this sort of level of production would need around 90-100 acres. It's looking fairly consistent to me.
Makes sense. It was the 1200 acres that I found a bit odd.
Actually, it is my statement that doesn't make sense. It isn't consistent, in the sense of acreage, only of number of family units whose surplus provides the armoured horseman.
I've done some Google searching and I can say definitively that the mansus varied in size quite a bit :) But in The Birth of the Western Economy: Economic Aspects of the Dark Ages by Robert Latouche, which is pretty recent, he goes for the range 12-70 acres, which does cover most other estimates. So our cavalryman needs 144-840 acres. Our Roman figures are just a bit better than the best of these but aren't from Gaul and they aren't late Roman (as far as I can tell, they're Republican).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 05, 2014, 07:51:39 AM
Would the portion of this system that remained under Roman control in northern Gaul been sufficient to supply a respectable army? The region is certainly big enough. Syagrius's realm was at least as large as Ireland, perhaps as large as England. I can see no reason why it could not have equipped at least 10 000 men, probably more.
I don't think there is any doubt that the land area could support a large army. You used the area 80,000 k
2 earlier, which, given the sorts of areas we have been bandying around could support 15-25000 equipped men, provided it was structured to do so. But we return to the social organisation question - how much of this surplus production will be turned into soldiers and, of those soldiers, how are the accessible are they to a central authority? Patrick, for example, is assuming a centralised government with a tax system (presumably the late Roman in kind type) which supports regular units based (again presumably) in garrisons whereas Jim sees more the idea of major landholders raising their own troops to safeguard their interests, which may then be available in part to the central authority. There are presumably other models, like a city based model where nobles live in the cities but have most of their wealth in that city's rural hinterland (what the Italians would later call the
contado). The amount of wealth available becomes a question of how effective the relationship between contado and city are and your military objective becomes protecting that relationship. More collective than the landowner in the countryside model, less centralised that the small state model.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 05, 2014, 07:51:39 AM
Would the portion of this system that remained under Roman control in northern Gaul been sufficient to supply a respectable army? The region is certainly big enough. Syagrius's realm was at least as large as Ireland, perhaps as large as England. I can see no reason why it could not have equipped at least 10 000 men, probably more.
Equipment would have been more or less independent of overall resources in any event, as it depended largely upon the fabricae, centres for the production and storage of armour and weapons. The Notitia Dignitatum mentions the following in Gaul (about a century earlier than Syagrius' swan song, but these things tend not to move around much):
Argentomagensis armorum omnium (Argenton-sur-Creuse, central France) - makes everything
Matisconensis sagittaria (Macon, Burgundy) - makes bows and arrows
Augustodunensis loricaria, balistaria et clibanaria (Autun, Burgundy) - makes infantry armour, artillery and cavalry armour
Augustodunensis scutaria (ditto) - makes shields
Suessionensis........ [blank or unclear in original] (Soissons) - might be another armorum omnium, but no way to tell
Remensis spatharia (Reims) - makes swords
Triberorum scutaria (Trier) - makes swords
Triberorum balistaria (ditto) - makes artillery
Ambianensis spatharia et scutaria (Amiens) - makes swords and shields
Aegidius and Syagrius thus had most of the fabricae within their domain [names in bold], and the remainder close to the borders. Whether these latter remained operational under barbarian occupation is an open question, and there would be logic in removing the personnel and functions of these no-longer-controlled locations to Soissons, the central city of the Domain, which already possessed its own fabrica.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 05, 2014, 11:14:09 AM
... Patrick, for example, is assuming a centralised government with a tax system (presumably the late Roman in kind type) which supports regular units based (again presumably) in garrisons whereas Jim sees more the idea of major landholders raising their own troops to safeguard their interests, which may then be available in part to the central authority. There are presumably other models, like a city based model where nobles live in the cities but have most of their wealth in that city's rural hinterland (what the Italians would later call the contado). The amount of wealth available becomes a question of how effective the relationship between contado and city are and your military objective becomes protecting that relationship. More collective than the landowner in the countryside model, less centralised that the small state model.
Patrick makes the assumption that the central authority figure (Aetius, Aegidius or Syagrius) was quite strong, and his writ ran to the limits of his domain (and his influence beyond, at least up to AD 486). To Patrick, this would be associated with the likely maintenance of the Roman system under notionally Roman authority, but with a nod to Jim's thinking and Justin's point about major landholders being incorporated in the war machine. This Patrick would read as a probable adjustment to the
limitanei part of the system, with the nobility and their locally-raised troops taking over from the traditional (and by this date questionably effective) border troops maintained by the central authority (at least as long as the men sent to collect the pay chest do not come back empty-handed and/or dead). They would protect with vigour against border incursions and in theory turn up when summoned to join the main army. I would feel inclined to rate these troops similarly to Nikephorian Byzantine
akritoi, well-motivated and capable but of limited discipline. They would probably adhere to formal patterns of organisation, if only to provide an easy command structure. Procopius' comments would also point to the maintenance of a formal military organisation, but much of it not under central authority (making its own decisions after Syagrius' defeat).
The picture would thus involve semi-mobilised
limitanei round the borders but a core of
palatini troops based at the capital (Soissons) and neighbouring localities, numbers being anyone's guess but the historian Priscus considered them 'strong forces', which relative to 5th century armies probably means the low tens of thousands. If I had to guess, I would say 10,000+ for the
palatini and double or triple that for the
limitanei, the latter being rather spread around so unlikely ever to concentrate all in one place.
One may note that once Syagrius had lost his
palatini he did not attempt to defend the rest of his realm, but fled to the Visigoths. This might be seen as undermining Patrick's thoughts about a strong central authority, or it may be an indication that the central authority was strong only when it had an army of
palatini at its beck and call. Either way it looks as if the
palatini were a necessary part of that authority and once they were gone Syagrius had nothing to fall back upon - a pointed picture of the nature of Imperial authority in the Late Empire.
It just seems so unlikely that the tax collection system in Gaul stays productive enough to support fabricae into the 480s, or sophisticated military units. Ecdicius, when fighting against the Visigoths has a very small number of troops to relieve a city. this and examples such as Avitus battle with the Hun in defence of his own estate bespeak more of an economy that gas fallen back to the basics, that is about individual cities with their counts and bishops and local troops. If you have surplus you can hire barbarians, ir, most likely, give them some land to settle in return for military service. On that model limitanei who are already peasnt farmers can survive. I would not rule out a field army for Syagrius of 10,000, but that would be composed of his and other large landholders comitatensenses, limitanei, laeti , allied barbarianssuch as the Ostrogoths and perhaps Taifals and Alans (laeti), perhaps the Bayeux Saxons , Britons etc. These are the sort of armies that followed Aetius and Majorian and are what is listed even before Syagrius' time. They are forces that are close to the land and so not dependent upon a monetary economy.
Roy
I was just thinking, 10,000 men is an awfully large field army for the period.
Stilicho sent Mascezel with only 5000 men to recover north Africa, Belisarius had perhaps 15,000 to invade north Africa and by great efforts, stripping Gaul, Germany and Italy, Stilicho raised a reputed 30,000 men.
Frankly I doubt that Syagrius had a central force of more than 2000 men, some of whom would have to be garrisons to ensure control.
If you describe the estate militia and suchlike as limitanei then you might have a model
To put things in proportion, the field army of the Comes Britanniae in the Notitia is perhaps 4,800 men (6,600 if you assume the cavalry were in units 600 strong, not 300 strong.)
Jim
I wouldn't say 10.000 was awfully large Jim. the Goths at Adrianople had north of 20,000 men. Which I think is a reasonable estimate given that they defeat the East Roman field army and from later estimates we can see Roman Eastern armies of 20,000 to a maximum with huge effort of 50,000.
I would work with tribal armies on the basis of:
Small tribe 5000 warriors
Medium tribe 10,000
Large tribe 20,000
For comparison it appears that the two Gothic tribes in the Balkans in the 480s had about 10,000 warriors each which meant that each was a tough prospect for the Eastern Romans to take on. When Theoderic the Great combined them he moved to super-tribe status, became a real threat and triggered the emperor to send him and his people off to Italy to fight Odovakar.
those sorts of ranking numbers are consistent with the numbers quoted for the Heruls who were once a large or at least mid sized tribe, but had declined through defeat and splitting. It also fits with the Lombards, being a medium sized tribe who send half their number of warriors to fight with Narses in Italy. Incidentally such number rankings make sense of the Vandals too. Initially there are two groups of Vandals with say 10,000 each and the Alans who may have 5-10,000. They are attacked by an army of Visigoths, a 20,000 strong tribe and the Siling Vandals and Alans are crushed. The tribes then unite under Gaiseric and become a 20,000 warrior unit which conquers North Africa. That fits with the military potential of a tribe being 25% of the overall number of its people. Over the next eighty years the number of Vandal warriors declines because being on the move in migration makes men available that settled life does not.
So how about Northern France?
I would see the Franks as a combined entity having somewhat more than 20,000 warriors, but Clovis has only a portion of them. He moves to increase that number and. thus is in the 10 thousand range by the time he takes on Syagrius. On that basis I would see Syagrius having a similar sized force.
Clovis then adds in forces which enable him to take on the Allamanni and then the Visigoths.
As a cross check on this we have the armies, not Frankish, but sent by Frankish kings that intervene in Italy. At one point there are a believable force of 10,000 Burgundians and in 554 a force that splits in half to provide an army that takes on Narses who has approximately 18,000 men (his Taginae force minus the Lombards and other detachments)
The logic of this is, of course, based upon generals not seeking battle against armies that outnumber them very substantially.
On the continent I would tend to go for quite large armies because we know that tribal forces stood up to substantial Roman armies earlier and that the mechanism for raising tribal armies has not changed. If the Visigoths plausibly have 20,000 men in the Late fourth century and have had no reason to decline since then I cannot see why other players in the game of thrones that was Gaul would have much much smaller forces. If they did then the Visigoths would just have crushed them, or the Allamanni would have headed South and dominated the territory.
Roy
10,000 was an large army in Roman terms in this period. You are talking about someone who was controlling perhaps a quarter of Gaul.
As I said, Stilicho managed to scrape together 30,000 men (perhaps) and he controlled Gaul, Spain and Italy.
The Field Army of the Magister Equitum Intra Gallias was probably about that strong and that was the largest western field army
The problem with your barbarians and numbers is that if you work by relative rankings, the same system works if you decide that they had half the numbers, a quarter of the numbers or ten times the numbers. We have very few firm points to anchor the figures to, a reputed 80,000 Vandals crossing to Africa, which might include 30,000 slaves for all we know. There's also an estimate that 10,000 Goths died at Frigidus, which is 50% of the Adrianople figure dead. That's going to put a crimp in their numbers if either figure has any sort of realism
But taking the figure of 20,000 for the standard field army of the Eastern Empire, you're asking us to believe that somewhere barely the size of Cilicia is going to raise 10,000.
So let's start with a field army of 2000 for Syagrius which looks reasonable in proportion to the armies of Gaul earlier in the century. He faces the Franks for whom we have no real numbers and can hold his own against them. So the Franks might be able to raise 1000 warriors and by really shaking the tree they can get perhaps another nine thousand who have arms, but who aren't available for long term operations because they've got jobs to do.
Of this force Clovis has perhaps his household, say 300 full time warriors and he can shake out perhaps a thousand more for temporary operations.
So until Clovis gets control of the rest of the Franks he's not a problem, and even when he is a problem, 2000 field army and a further four or five thousand limitanei/estate guards/local landowners private retainers should be enough to tie him down in sieges of towns he cannot take until his men get bored and have to go home.
Jim
Also remember the Goths were a 'militarised' tribe. They received a lot of money from the Eastern Empire (and at times the Western Empire) so the proportion of their men who could afford to fight would be a lot higher than, for example, the Franks, who had basically expanded across the Rhine into a vacuum and who were supporting themselves by subsistence agriculture rather than being paid by the Empire
Jim
I recall that the Goth contingent at Frigidus was 10,000 which doesn't mean that they all died, Jim.
The benefit of my relativist approach is that it can be checked at points for consistency against some numbers that we have more certainty about. These Goths from the Frigudus are later able to take on Stilicho as equals and I do not see him as being likely to put less than 20,000 men in the field. later on against the Ostrogoths I would see the army of Italy under Odovacar as being around the 20,000 men or Theoderic would have had a much easier time at conquering Italy....or rather Odovacar would not have cone out and fought, but stayed behind walls unless he had parity of numbers. Stilicho had more. resources than later Imperial armies, but he had the ptoblem of usurpers in Gaul and Africa.
Remember I don't see Syagrius as having 10,000 permanent soldiers around, but that he can raise this through allies, limitanei , laeti (which I listed)
Aetius , not that much earlier managed to put together a 'Roman' army to fight against Attila which included all those contingents that I list plus a force of Franks, plus a large army of Visigoths and Aetius brought few troops. with him from Italy. So if Attila had a large army of 25'000 men and we gave Aetius 10,000 Goths , 4000 Alans 5000 Franks. and 10,000 Romans then the Allies have 30,000 men.
Note that I am not supporting 10,000 Palatini for Syagrius and his personal retinue might well be 2000 but then that would not be his full mobile military potential.
Roy
I should also say that we do not know how many barbarians Syagrius had settled upon his lands. I think there may well be an Ostrogothic contingent and a Saxon contingent and Franks. Plus what happens to the Orleans Alans? Are the Taifali still militarised? We know somewhat later thatthey are a community because they have a bishop, but they may well still be a biddable force and their relationship to Rome is what gave them a legal claim to land and perhaps lical subsidies so Syagrius might inherit that loyalty.
Roy
All we can do is relative, but we can set relative lower rather than higher. If we take the Frankish figure for Chalon as 5000, then Syagrius is going to be able to overawe them with a force of 2000 regulars.
Because the Franks settled themselves, I'd suggest they wouldn't have the wealth or organisation that we see with, for example, the Visigoths who were, at least for a while, part of the Imperial Army under Alaric who held an official position which would give them access to arsenals, factories and regular logistical support.
Jim
Quote10,000 was an large army in Roman terms in this period. You are talking about someone who was controlling perhaps a quarter of Gaul.
As I said, Stilicho managed to scrape together 30,000 men (perhaps) and he controlled Gaul, Spain and Italy.
The Field Army of the Magister Equitum Intra Gallias was probably about that strong and that was the largest western field army
Here is a proposed breakdown of the western army, based on the Notitia Dignitatum:
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/western%20army.png)
Note that the Gallic field army was based at Paris, in the heart of what was to become Syagrius's realm. His borders also contained the bases of the Dux Belgicae II and the Dux Tractus Armoricani, for a total of 35 000 men, all provisioned from this area.
Stilicho, it seems, did not dispose of these forces, as his 30 000 men corresponds to the forces immediately available to the Magister Utriusque Militiae (himself). This suggests that he was not permitted to combine the two Palatine armies - presuming that the Illyrican Palatines no longer existed. I see more a limiting of his power than a simple lack of resources. It certainly seems odd that a combined total of well over 60 000 palatine/comitatens men in Gaul and Italy in 406 should leave Stilicho - who stripped the Rhine and Danube frontiers of men - with 30 000 men in the same year. The low numbers for border units given by the Notitia suggests that the frontiers were indeed denuded of men. The hinterland legions however were untouched. It would be interesting to know what they were doing whilst the barbarians ran riot in Gaul. Honorius setting up Stilicho as a fall guy? Anything is possible in this period.
In any case, we have a region roughly comparable to the territory Syagrius would later control supporting a fully equipped professional force of +30 000 men. Given the continuity of the Roman infrastructure it is not unreasonable to suppose it could in 486 equip and supply a force one third or more of that size.
Quote from: aligern on January 05, 2014, 05:45:05 PM
I should also say that we do not know how many barbarians Syagrius had settled upon his lands. I think there may well be an Ostrogothic contingent and a Saxon contingent and Franks. Plus what happens to the Orleans Alans? Are the Taifali still militarised? We know somewhat later thatthey are a community because they have a bishop, but they may well still be a biddable force and their relationship to Rome is what gave them a legal claim to land and perhaps lical subsidies so Syagrius might inherit that loyalty.
Roy
All these would of course take land. If we assume they were settled on the usual 1/3rd of the land principle, then might make them into part of his 'field army' or it might merely mean that they took land he could no longer use, and they acted as bodyguards for their own leaders or for other local notables.
Jim
Quote from: aligern on January 05, 2014, 05:45:05 PM
Are the Taifali still militarised? We know somewhat later thatthey are a community because they have a bishop, but they may well still be a biddable force and their relationship to Rome is what gave them a legal claim to land and perhaps lical subsidies so Syagrius might inherit that loyalty.
Roy
Bachrach (whom I am aware is considered somewhat flakey in some circles) says in 'Merovingian Military Organization 481-751':
'Although Clovis' control of the Visigothic Kingdom in Gaul was challenged he and he lost Septimania, he was able to secure the more northerly areas.
The Taifal and Sarmatian leati in the Poitier area, as well as the Sarmatians in the Rodez-Velay region joined the Merovingian military' (p 12).
He cites the Notitia (so the information is a tad out of date...) but also says, citing Gregory, that the area around Poitier was so influenced by the Taifals that it was called Thifilia during the 6thC. This suggests they were still military capable.
Helpful point Rodger, Clovis will have had more than 5000 against Syagrius because he is putting together an alliance that gives him enough men to face The last Roman and that would need more.
the Franks were composed of several pre existing German tribes, the Ampsivarii, Bructerii, Chattuarii, Chamavii and Salii. If they were all 5000 warrior units that would give 25,000 warriors, if two were bigger entities that would take us to 35,000,interestingly the number given by Ammianus for a full muster of the Allamani against Julian. Of course, contra to certain Big Roman Army believers here I understand that Julian himself has a field army of 13000 at Strasbourg.
Roy
Oh, And I cannot agree that the Roman army in Gaul is supported from the area that Syagrius controls . The Romans had the wealth and taxes of Africa and Hispania backing Gaul and indeed grain exports from Britannia. Itis not. just a matter of grain, but. of oil and wine and. iron and silver that moves north along a network of rivers and canals and roads. Once those ties are cut, particularly after Spain is wrecked after 409 , Aquitania detached after 420 and Africa gone from 440 thenthe ability to support troops on the frontier collapses down to local initiative only.
Roy
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 05, 2014, 07:51:39 AM
The Western Empire at the end of the 4th century had an army in the region of 200 000 men. Most of these were stationed on the ever-threatened Rhine and Danube frontiers. They would have been fed from local areas of agrarian production, since the Empire did not have such a developed infrastructure that it could cheaply transport bulk goods like grain long distances overland (and in fact bulk goods were not transported between the Mediterranean and northern Gaul).
I'm not sure what you're counting as "local" here, but Wickham in
Framing the Early Middle Ages has much of northern Gaul involved in feeding the Rhine army. This presumably ends once the Rhine frontier breaks down, but the resources previously sent east could potentially be used to feed troops in the future "Syagria". The question is, I guess, to what extent the infrastructure to extract them for military use remained.
I must admit that I find the idea of a sizable Roman force in Gaul at odds with what I have read and surmised over the years (bearing in mind evidence is scarce and conjecture reigns).
The basis of Aegidius' forces may have been the remnants of the Army of Gaul, but these troops would not have presented the same threat the Gallic Comitatenses of the past offered.
More likely, when Aegidius broke with Rome, he used what was available; his own bucellarii (probably barbarian), foederati (some 'romanised' previously Comitatenses Franks) Coloni, Leati, Limitanei, garrison troops and troops raised from recruitment (Gallo-Romans and most likely Franks).
Some of Aegidius' forces may have previously been in the service of Majorian's (largely barbarian) force that was led into Spain. From John of Antioch:
'When he crossed into Italy, Ricimer plotted his death. Majorian had already dismissed his allies after his return.'
Now they may have been dismissed anywhere, but if dismissed in Gaul it is possible (I stress possible) they went north and were snapped up by Aegidius.
However how large this force was is moot; and even more moot the proportion of 'regular' Roman troops that mustered, that would once have stood proudly in the Army of Gaul.
How many of these troops were passed to Syagrius is open to yet more conjecture.
I think that the army that Syagrius led out of Soisson to face Clovis would have had a character more like the army of Clovis that it faced than a Gallic 'Roman' Comitatenses force of the past.
To sum up, my proposal that Syagrius's army was substantially Roman in character is based on this:
1. Syagrius's realm had the means to equip and provision a respectable army. The archaeological record confirms the persistence of trade and manufacture in northern Gaul, and there is evidence from several disciplines for the survival of the landed aristocracy in this region, who were capable of maintaining and did maintain troops.
2. Syagrius did indeed recreate an army using Gallo-roman recruits from his provinces. These are the 'Arborychi' of Procopius.
3. The Roman character of this army is indirectly alluded to by Procopius, who mentions 'other Roman soldiers (i.e. Roman soldiers in addition to those who had fought the Franks) on the frontier with the Visigoths. The 'legio bretonum' (the old II Britannica), still in existence in the mid 6th century, would be one of these units. It is in consequence reasonable to assume that the Roman military tradition had not died out in Syagrius's realm.
4. The army Syagrius created was, in his estimation, more than enough to deal with Clovis, who led a Frankish confederation against him. This confidence would come either from superior numbers or superior quality. The successful Gallo-roman resistance against Clovis after the fall of Syagrius, and the fact that the Gallo-romans and Franks 'held them [the Roman soldiers] in reverence' after the final peace, implies quality. An army better in quality than a good barbarian one (the Franks had an excellent track record as federates) had to have been Roman in training and equipment.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 05, 2014, 07:54:15 PM
The 'legio bretonum' (the old II Britannica), still in existence in the mid 6th century, would be one of these units.
Justin, I would be very grateful if you could point me at the evidence for this.
I have read, in translation, the relevant section of the 'Vita Sancti Dalmatii' that mentions the 'legio bretonum'. Is there more?
Checked with Wickham's Framing the Middle Ages and on pay 102ff he is less supportive of the case for the survival of the tax system in Northern Gaul
He gives the latest date for the occupation of the Rhine fort at Alzey as around 450 and says 'the one certain casualty of the century was the fiscal infrastructure which channeled money and produce taken in taxation to the Rhine. The only information that we have about food supply for the second half of the century consists of ad hoc local initiatives.
Whilst some of us might disagree about the provenance of the permanent force of Syagrius, there seems little doubt that if he was to have an army sufficient to march up a hill and down again it would have to be a seven nation army of the stripe that Aetius or Majorian fielded and not a permanently embodied Roman force.
Roy
Quote from: rodge on January 05, 2014, 07:27:29 PM
The basis of Aegidius' forces may have been the remnants of the Army of Gaul, but these troops would not have presented the same threat the Gallic Comitatenses of the past offered.
More likely, when Aegidius broke with Rome, he used what was available; his own bucellarii (probably barbarian), foederati (some 'romanised' previously Comitatenses Franks) Coloni, Laeti, Limitanei, garrison troops and troops raised from recruitment (Gallo-Romans and most likely Franks).
Some of Aegidius' forces may have previously been in the service of Majorian's (largely barbarian) force that was led into Spain. From John of Antioch:
'When he crossed into Italy, Ricimer plotted his death. Majorian had already dismissed his allies after his return.'
Now they may have been dismissed anywhere, but if dismissed in Gaul it is possible (I stress possible) they went north and were snapped up by Aegidius.
We may like to look at how Aegidius' forces were used. In 458-460 he marches into Burgundian and Visigothic territory as the northern prong of Majorian's campaigns. The combined forces swiftly reduce the Burgundians and Visigoths to subjection. Following the death of Majorian, Aegidius (who is an enemy of Ricimer, the power behind the throne in Italy) wins a fight against the Visigoths, whom Ricimer through Severus has prodded into action, then dies of either assassination or the plague while sending an embassy to the Vandals.
These look like the activities of a thriving military power rather than a last-ditch patchwork force. Syagrius inherited the realm from his father, and apart from beating off a Saxon attack on Angers (with Frankish assistance) seems not to have done much meaningful campaigning until his final and fateful clash with Clovis. His confidence that he had noting to fear from a Frankish army suggests he felt he had troops of respectable number and quality.
This of course tells us nothing about their ethnicity, but I would also suggest that the Army of Gaul had traditionally recruited locally, with troops such as Taifali and Alans being peripheral additions (laeti, perhaps). Hence I would see Syagrius' forces as consisting principally of locally-recruited Gauls, on the basis that the manpower was present, he was cut off from Imperial authority (after 480 he
was Imperial authority in the West) and native Gallic troops were less expensive and more reliable than barbarian bands, who might at this period be increasingly difficult to obtain as their parent nationalities were now settled in Roman provinces in well-defined kingdoms. We see Syagrius using allied Franks against Saxons and trying to use Visigoths as allies against Franks, but his attitude seems to have been that this was icing on the cake, and that he could deal with Clovis by himself when it came to the crunch.
Quote from: aligern on January 06, 2014, 09:26:15 AM
Checked with Wickham's Framing the Middle Ages and on pay 102ff he is less supportive of the case for the survival of the tax system in Northern Gaul
He gives the latest date for the occupation of the Rhine fort at Alzey as around 450 and says 'the one certain casualty of the century was the fiscal infrastructure which channeled money and produce taken in taxation to the Rhine. The only information that we have about food supply for the second half of the century consists of ad hoc local initiatives.
This is not the picture one gets from contemporary letters, at least those I have seen: these suggest a still-flourishing economy, with a surprising amount of communication still going on between the dissociated parts of the Empire. It also seems to me that drawing conclusions from the abandonment of Rhine forts when the frontiers of the Domain of Soissons were not actually on the Rhine is not wholly helpful as an indicator for Syagrius' realm. As Andreas points out, the abandonment of a system which shipped resources to the Rhine could well see those resources freed for local use.
Quote from: rodge on January 06, 2014, 08:44:01 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 05, 2014, 07:54:15 PM
The 'legio bretonum' (the old II Britannica), still in existence in the mid 6th century, would be one of these units.
Justin, I would be very grateful if you could point me at the evidence for this.
I have read, in translation, the relevant section of the 'Vita Sancti Dalmatii' that mentions the 'legio bretonum'. Is there more?
Let me reproduce here my earlier post on the subject:
| 'As the devout one [Dalmas] was tirelessly hurrying to him [Theudebert] in the region beyond-Loire [or: beyond-Loir], it is said he enjoyed an evening's hospitality in a certain place where some sort of Breton [or: Brittonic] legion (so to speak) nearby was stationed [or: was waiting].' |
Notice the author's hesitation about the nature of the legion. It is 'some sort' of Breton/British legion 'so to speak'. Why the hesitation? I can think of only two reasons:
1. The author knew what a true legion looked like and realised that this particular entity didn't fit the bill. This however doesn't make sense. The author had no benchmark. The only 'legions' he would have known about were those units in sixth century Gaul that called themselves such. It's like a Malawian talking about 'some sort of battalion, so to speak' in the Malawi army. A Malawi formation calls itself a battalion, to a Malawian it's a battalion.
2. The author knew what British, or more exactly, Bretons, were like and realised that this legion did not resemble them remotely. This fits the picture better. He, like his contemporaries, would have lost sight of the source of the legion's name. That legion, centuries earlier, had been stationed in Britain and acquired the name of the territory it garrisoned, a name it retained after it was recalled to Gaul. The only formation that fits this description is the II Britannica. So we have here the last recorded reference to one of the oldest and best of the old Empire's legions.
(I would add to this that Bretons and British did not have legions, or any legionary tradition, which explains the author's puzzlement. It would be like talking about 'some sort of Phalanx, so to speak, in the British army')
This legion perfectly fits the bill of the 'other Roman soldiers' mentioned by Procipius. It is in the right place, at the right time, and it has the right name.
Right place: it is located north of the Loire, which is the only conceivable 'frontier of Gaul' that Procopius's 'other Roman soldiers' could have been guarding against the 'Arians' (Visigoths) which they refused to join after the final peace, throwing their lot and their lands in with the new Gallo-roman - Frankish union.
Right time: Dalmas went to see king Theudebert some time after 534 when he was crowned. Procipius was writing some time in the middle of the 6th century.
Right name: The Notitia Dignitatum mentions at least 2 vexillations of II Britannica, both in Gaul. The legion was very old and venerable, and old and venerable institutions have a habit of carrying on.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 06, 2014, 11:07:05 AM
This is not the picture one gets from contemporary letters, at least those I have seen: these suggest a still-flourishing economy, with a surprising amount of communication still going on between the dissociated parts of the Empire.
Even if we are to accept this, and those of you who know this period better than me seem divided, it is a long stretch from this to a fully-functioning, disciplined Roman army. The personnel could be Gallo-Roman, they could be well equipped in contemporary terms and they may even have revered the standards of old Roman units but they may still be no more than militia stiffened with buccelarii of the major leaders, with various "barbarian" ally contingents/feodorati/laeti or whatever we wish to call them at this time. Justin was right that we are in the realms of speculation but we seem to be dividing down the lines of precursors of what will follow in the early Middle Ages and the final flourish of a mighty Empire. In the absence of concrete evidence, I'm afraid I find the former a more likely scenario (though I'd read the novel based on the latter :) ).
Thank you Justin, and apologies, I seem to have missed that original post.
There is a paper on the issue of the 'legio bretonum' here:
http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/wiseman/DECB/Wiseman-Dalmas-JAEMA.pdf
I offer it for interest.
Oh Patrick.
Number one yu should not be dismissing the idea of a 'patchwork army" as I have pointed out this was the nature of the army of Aetius and that of the emperor Majorian. Actually it is the nature of the army of Belisarius, so you don't have much basis for claiming that an army with different contingents is worse than a homogeneous one. In fact the elites of several groups would make a very good army.
Secondly, you are missing something in your claim that letter writing shows that the empire was still alive and taxing in Nortern Gaul as evidenced by collections of letters. The letters come from Provence, from the Visigothic South West and from the Burgundian East. All these are places where the tax system DOES continue... and does not, incidentally, However there are not the same letters from Northern Gaul where, I submit, the economy is much more disrupted. :-)
I don't doubt that Syagrius could put together a force to stand up to the Franks, but the logic is that this is an alliance not some sort of mini Comitatensian force.
In Italy where Roman troops and efficient taxes do continue on they are so few in number by 476 that they cannot stand up to Odovakar's barbarians when he launches a coup.
Roy
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 06, 2014, 09:26:15 AM
Checked with Wickham's Framing the Middle Ages and on pay 102ff he is less supportive of the case for the survival of the tax system in Northern Gaul
He gives the latest date for the occupation of the Rhine fort at Alzey as around 450 and says 'the one certain casualty of the century was the fiscal infrastructure which channeled money and produce taken in taxation to the Rhine. The only information that we have about food supply for the second half of the century consists of ad hoc local initiatives.
Whilst some of us might disagree about the provenance of the permanent force of Syagrius, there seems little doubt that if he was to have an army sufficient to march up a hill and down again it would have to be a seven nation army of the stripe that Aetius or Majorian fielded and not a permanently embodied Roman force.
Roy
Two
solidi of Julius Nepos (473-475) and two
tremissis of Zenon (Eastern emperor 474-491) have been discovered in Cote d'Armour, northern Brittany. Two of these coins were found at Castel Kerandroat, in Plésidy, a small Roman castrum where coins from Vespasian were also found. These could be seen as pay for Roman/Breton troops quartered in Brittany, which argues the persistence of a tax system in the 470's and beyond. Source here (http://schnucks0.free.fr/forum/viewtopic.php?f=39&t=485).
Quote from: rodge on January 06, 2014, 11:53:21 AM
Thank you Justin, and apologies, I seem to have missed that original post.
There is a paper on the issue of the 'legio bretonum' here:
http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/wiseman/DECB/Wiseman-Dalmas-JAEMA.pdf
I offer it for interest.
Thanks Rodger. I've seen that article already. It is interesting, but I think Wiseman goes wrong in identifying the Armoricans (Arborychi) with the Bretons. Armoricans were the native inhabitants of Armorica, which is the whole region between the Seine and the Loire, not just the peninsula of Brittany. Bretons are never called Armoricans or vice versa in the primary sources. They were newcomers, foreigners, and the region they established control over was eventually named after them. Furthermore, they didn't intermarry with the Franks, whereas the Gallo-romans of Syagrius's former realm did. And they didn't become a great nation with the Franks, which, again, the Gallo-romans, melded with the Franks into a single state, did.
Truth to tell, there is actually no indication in the historical record that the Bretons had anything to do with the war between Syagrius's realm and the Franks, though one tends to think they helped the Romans. But it's possible they kept out of it until the peace of 496/7, after which they began to tussle with the Franks in their turn.
To flesh out the distribution of solidi in western Armorica: this article (http://mediatheque.letourp.com/doc_num.php?explnum_id=6543) (in French) has some useful tables and maps showing where individual solidi (as opposed to hoards) were found, and the emperors under which they were minted. There is a total of 32 solidi found in western Armorica in the 5th century compared to 44 in the 4th. Of the 32, 14 were under the emperors Libius Severus, Julius Nepos and Zenon, i.e from the period 461 to 491 - a third of this century. Hardly indicative of a collapse of the monetary system, at least in what concerned payment of the military. Seems Patrick has a point.
The article unfortunately does not give figures for eastern Armorica, but I imagine the statistics are broadly similar.
Even if we accepted them as military pay... and they may not be, they are not in Syagrius area are they?
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 06, 2014, 06:26:54 PM
Even if we accepted them as military pay... and they may not be, they are not in Syagrius area are they?
Roy
Most of them are. I've pulled the map below from the article, giving the distribution of the solidi in the western half of Syagrius's realm. For the period 461-491 10 of the 14 coins are found outside Brittany, in territory directly controlled by Syagrius. Note that this is comparable to the coins found in the first half of the century. There's no sign of a decline at all.
I can't imagine any practical use for solidi in this period other than paying soldiers. A solidus had an enormous value and would not have been seen in a marketplace, and the huge and magnificent buildings they once paid for were a thing of the past.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/map.png)
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 05, 2014, 06:43:06 PM
I'm not sure what you're counting as "local" here, but Wickham in Framing the Early Middle Ages has much of northern Gaul involved in feeding the Rhine army. This presumably ends once the Rhine frontier breaks down, but the resources previously sent east could potentially be used to feed troops in the future "Syagria". The question is, I guess, to what extent the infrastructure to extract them for military use remained.
A more usual thing to happen was that once the army stopped buying, production stopped. What's the point of producing grain that you cannot sell?
A lot of land went out of production in the North of England, or reverted to grassland and grazing animals.
If the army couldn't pay, the grain wouldn't be forthcoming. Yes, giving a passing general an occasional load of grain as a gesture of support is fair enough, but you cannot run an agricultural economy on that basis. The agricultural economy changes and evolves and arable declines.
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 06, 2014, 06:42:30 PM
Quote from: aligern on January 06, 2014, 06:26:54 PM
Even if we accepted them as military pay... and they may not be, they are not in Syagrius area are they?
Roy
I can't imagine any practical use for solidi in this period other than paying soldiers. A solidus had an enormous value and would not have been seen in a marketplace, and the huge and magnificent buildings they once paid for were a thing of the past.
I think you have fairly clear evidence of a connection with the wider world, either through trade or diplomatic gifts. However, a scatter of high value coins doesn't archaeologically mean a functioning money economy. You need a much larger number of lower denomination coins for that. However, that is in itself a bit of a red herring. Even if there was no money economy, gold coinage is a fairly good form of portable bullion so could still be used to pay soldiers. What I am missing is why these soldiers, money economy or no, are Roman regulars. Before this, the Romans were paying money to the barbarians in their midst. Could they not be doing that now? Could they not be payment to household troops or buccelarii, whatever their origin?
There may be good reasons to assume that Roman regulars (as opposed to hired groups of barbarians) formed the basis of the army of the Domain of Soissons.
1) Gallic troops were still being recruited into Roman units long after Italians had largely given up serving. Unlike in Italy, there seems to have been no tradition in Gaul of deliberately avoiding military service: the popular existence of the term murciones, indicating self-mutilation by removal of a thumb, indicated how widespread the problem was in Italy.
2) The Romano-Gallic military establishment had been run by Roman Magistri Militum for three generations, whereas the Romano-Italian military establishment had been run by barbarians for an even greater length of time (notably Arbogast, Stilicho, Ricimer, Odoacer).
To my mind, it seems reasonable to conclude that Gaul-based units would continue to recruit from the local populace, an option not open in Italy (but which was available in Illyria, which seems to have retained Roman-pattern formations up to the deposition of Julius Nepos in AD 480), and hence would not need to scratch around for barbarian bands to make up core numbers.
Italy-based armies, such as those fielded by Majorian, would have a large barbarian representation because of the general reluctance of Italians to serve and perhaps an inclination of generations of barbarian Magistri Militum to recruit from a barbarian manpower base. There seems to be nothing in the Domain of Soissons to correspond to Odoacer's wholesale importation of Rugians into the army of Italy (and the Eastern Empire seems to have utilised its indigenous recruiting base as the core of a Roman-organised army, fleshed out with hired barbarian contingents).
The Domain of Soissons was, however, the realm of successive Roman Magistri Militum, men who could be expected to maintain the Roman military tradition - and who better than they? In the absence of a late 5th century Notitia Dignitatum or tactical handbook we are reduced to deduction and surmise, and my deductions and surmise point to a still-regular Late Roman-style army in the Domain rather than a fudged collection of paid or unpaid barbarians gathered under some temporary standards. The circumstances and personnel were right for the maintenance of Roman military tradition, if not at its shining best, and I feel this is more credible than simply assuming that the army of Gaul went down the Italian plughole.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 07, 2014, 09:08:46 AM
I think you have fairly clear evidence of a connection with the wider world, either through trade or diplomatic gifts. However, a scatter of high value coins doesn't archaeologically mean a functioning money economy. You need a much larger number of lower denomination coins for that. However, that is in itself a bit of a red herring. Even if there was no money economy, gold coinage is a fairly good form of portable bullion so could still be used to pay soldiers. What I am missing is why these soldiers, money economy or no, are Roman regulars. Before this, the Romans were paying money to the barbarians in their midst. Could they not be doing that now? Could they not be payment to household troops or buccelarii, whatever their origin?
If coins are being used to pay for anything, then you have some sort of money economy. I tend to doubt that buccelarii or household troops belonging to landowning notables would be paid in coin. It would be simpler for their lord just to provision them from his own resources: why pay someone else to do something you can do yourself for less? Paying money to troops implies that someone else other than the payer is doing the provisioning. If the provisioner accepts solidi it is not because they are pretty and shiny, but because they are an accepted medium of exchange. Either they can be given to the local government in lieu of provisions as tax (monetary tax), or they can be given to other producers for their goods (monetary economy), or both. The payment of troops in coin also implies that they were in effect separate entities, not integrated into the villa communities of the local notables, even if they fell under their authority.
Procopius does not mention any barbarian foederati fighting for Syagrius against the Franks, but he does make the point that the Arborychi (Gallo-romans of Armorica) fought them. The implication is that the bulk of Syagrius's army was Gallo-roman. Gallo-romans had fought in the Roman military tradition for centuries, being to a large extent the backbone of Western Empire's legions.
So we have Gallo-romans, fighting for a Gallo-roman Magister Militum, in a territory that had remained under Roman control, did not have any known barbarian federates fighting for it after the 470's, had known Roman units still in it, possessed a functioning economy and a Gallo-roman nobility. Do we have to believe that Syagrius's forces were untrained barbarians under Roman banners?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 07, 2014, 11:32:02 AM
If coins are being used to pay for anything, then you have some sort of money economy.
I disagree, for reasons stated above. Coins can be used as convenient pieces of portable wealth, or for prestige exchange. I'm not saying there wasn't a money economy - insufficient information - but it isn't necessary to "pay" troops anyway.
Quote
Procopius does not mention any barbarian foederati fighting for Syagrius against the Franks, but he does make the point that the Arborychi (Gallo-romans of Armorica) fought them. The implication is that the bulk of Syagrius's army was Gallo-roman. Gallo-romans had fought in the Roman military tradition for centuries, being to a large extent the backbone of Western Empire's legions.
<snip> Do we have to believe that Syagrius's forces were untrained barbarians under Roman banners?
I presume Procopius avoided calling Belisarius' army Roman because he knew it had barbarians in it? I suspect not. Also, to be honest, I have no problem with Gallo-Romans being in Syagrius' army. But Gallo-Roman ethnicity doesn't automatically translate to trained regular soldier to me.
Why shouldn't Syagrius have a Roman army like Aetius or Belisarius? Operationally, why can't he have something that more closely parallels everyone else around him - a core of well-armed cavalry provided by himself and his major supporters (landowners, allied tribal leaders, towns) plus a militia of (indigenous Gallo-Roman) infantry? Kit these out with Roman standards and legacy Roman equipment and you have a Roman army.
I'm not saying I'm right but I am saying that this is a plausible proposal which isn't contradicted by what evidence we have. I'm afraid the regular Romans model does feel a bit like something out of "Age of Arthur", where whole sub-Roman histories are built on odd snippets from histories that are asides to the main narrative and the non-miraculous bits of saints lives.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 07, 2014, 12:15:27 PM
Why shouldn't Syagrius have a Roman army like Aetius or Belisarius? Operationally, why can't he have something that more closely parallels everyone else around him - a core of well-armed cavalry provided by himself and his major supporters (landowners, allied tribal leaders, towns) plus a militia of (indigenous Gallo-Roman) infantry? Kit these out with Roman standards and legacy Roman equipment and you have a Roman army.
The problem then is to explain Syagrius's confidence. It is clear from the record that he took the offensive against Clovis, reoccupying Soissons and then moving on to engage him in battle. To lead an army composed substantially of militia against barbarian warriors of the calibre of the Franks is suicide, cavalry core nothwithstanding. I'm not aware of any military leader of that time who tried it with any success. Belisarius attempted it once at Rome and it did not go well.
Native militia had success only in defending cities, where city walls and barbarian inepititude at siege warfare equalised the odds. To say that Syagrius's militia were sufficiently trained and equipped to be able to take on the Franks in the field with at least equal chances is tantamount to saying they were Roman soldiers. The only military traditions and methods Gallo-roman recruits would have known about or been formed in were those of the Roman army. Without them they wouldn't have stood a chance.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 07, 2014, 11:32:02 AM
If coins are being used to pay for anything, then you have some sort of money economy. I tend to doubt that buccelarii or household troops belonging to landowning notables would be paid in coin. It would be simpler for their lord just to provision them from his own resources: why pay someone else to do something you can do yourself for less? Paying money to troops implies that someone else other than the payer is doing the provisioning.
No, because in the late Roman army you got provisioned, but then at various set times (Emperors accession, fifth anniversary etc) you were paid a donative.
I'd say that if gold coins are found, if they have anything to do with military matters (as opposed to being a generally good way of carrying wealth easily) then they're donatives. There is no reason why a general's buccelarii or barbarian mercenaries shouldn't be paid and receive donatives.
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 07, 2014, 02:10:21 PM
The problem then is to explain Syagrius's confidence. It is clear from the record that he took the offensive against Clovis, reoccupying Soissons and then moving on to engage him in battle. To lead an army composed substantially of militia against barbarian warriors of the calibre of the Franks is suicide, cavalry core nothwithstanding. I'm not aware of any military leader of that time who tried it with any success. Belisarius attempted it once at Rome and it did not go well.
Native militia had success only in defending cities, where city walls and barbarian inepititude at siege warfare equalised the odds. To say that Syagrius's militia were sufficiently trained and equipped to be able to take on the Franks in the field with at least equal chances is tantamount to saying they were Roman soldiers. The only military traditions and methods Gallo-roman recruits would have known about or been formed in were those of the Roman army. Without them they wouldn't have stood a chance.
Firstly the Franks weren't particularly formidable at this point. They were a number of mutually antagonistic petty kingdoms. It wasn't until 509 that Clovis united them. The only person he beat, other than other Franks, was Syagrius. This merely means that Franks were competent at fighting Franks
There is a school of thought that Clovis and his father were Roman Military commanders under Aegidius and they controlled Belgica Secunda. So their forces need not have been particularly huge or formidable
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 07, 2014, 02:48:01 PM
Firstly the Franks weren't particularly formidable at this point. They were a number of mutually antagonistic petty kingdoms. It wasn't until 509 that Clovis united them. The only person he beat, other than other Franks, was Syagrius. This merely means that Franks were competent at fighting Franks
There is a school of thought that Clovis and his father were Roman Military commanders under Aegidius and they controlled Belgica Secunda. So their forces need not have been particularly huge or formidable
Jim
That would mean that Clovis, even before he united the Franks in 509, succeeded in beating, not only Syagrius, but also the Alamans and the Visigoths, the latter undoubtedly the greatest barbarian power in western Europe at that time. Not bad for a small band of warriors who were barely a match for Gallo-roman militia. ;)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 07, 2014, 03:40:16 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 07, 2014, 02:48:01 PM
Firstly the Franks weren't particularly formidable at this point. They were a number of mutually antagonistic petty kingdoms. It wasn't until 509 that Clovis united them. The only person he beat, other than other Franks, was Syagrius. This merely means that Franks were competent at fighting Franks
There is a school of thought that Clovis and his father were Roman Military commanders under Aegidius and they controlled Belgica Secunda. So their forces need not have been particularly huge or formidable
Jim
That would mean that Clovis, even before he united the Franks in 509, succeeded in beating, not only Syagrius, but also the Alamans and the Visigoths, the latter undoubtedly the greatest barbarian power in western Europe at that time. Not bad for a small band of warriors who were barely a match for Gallo-roman militia. ;)
We are talking about 486
It was after this he united at the Franks so that with their help, in 496 he apparently narrowly defeated the Alamans
In 500 he couldn't subdue the Burgundians
After this he allied with the Armoricans and then he fought the Visigoths in 507.
So the forces he led against the Visigoths were very different from those he'd controlled when he fought Syagrius twenty years before. I don't think you can compare them. Against Syagrius he was just one among a number of minor Frankish kings.
Against the Visigoths he led the combined Franks plus the Armoricans and perhaps Alamans as well. A very different army.
Jim
One would still need to explain how Clovis's Franks could beat Alamans and Visigoths when they were on the level of Gallo-roman militia. Getting help from those same Gallo-romans would hardly have improved their chances.
The extensive use the late Empire made of barbarian foederati, particularly Franks, I think sufficiently confirms their fighting ability. Barbarian tribes who could not cut it on the field of battle in those times simply went under.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 07, 2014, 04:51:33 PM
One would still need to explain how Clovis's Franks could beat Alamans and Visigoths when they were on the level of Gallo-roman militia. Getting help from those same Gallo-romans would hardly have improved their chances.
The extensive use the late Empire made of barbarian foederati, particularly Franks, I think sufficiently confirms their fighting ability. Barbarian tribes who could not cut it on the field of battle in those times simply went under.
Remember that they only have to be no worse than each other.
Take as your benchmark late Roman troops. A lot of them were 'semi-professional' and even the regulars were a mixed lot. Julian is commended for using his good troops to provide a hard shell to protect the poorer troops.
But however good or bad they were, it was easier and cheaper to replace them with barbarians because you couldn't recruit enough citizens. Some of this was that landlords wouldn't release men, (so why they should suddenly have had a fit of conscience and released them for Syagrius so he could build a 'national army' is something that hasn't been explained).
The use made of foederati merely shows that they were cheap and could be hired without the political difficulties that you'd face if you tried to make landowners pay tax and release the men necessary to raise more regulars.
Then let's look at the Visigoths. They'd been fought to a standstill by Stilicho and his successors, they'd been starved into submission and they'd been given lands. Once settled the men have got their land, their lifestyle. The mixture of Visigoths (and all other sorts of goths) and freed slaves and deserters aren't combat veterans in drilled units, they're now a collection of small landowners dispersed over a fair area. Yes they can be summoned to arms, from what we know of other peoples in a similar position, they might have been summoned once or twice a year to be inspected and even paid (which might explain the solidi). Sometimes they'd be called out for desultory fighting (which for a while consisted of blockading a city until whoever was Patrician sent a force to chase them off home again.
I think we have to be careful not to over-estimate the competence or professionalism of any army in the west in this period.
The problem is that if you assume someone is good, then you end up having to assume that their neighbours were equally good because they survived contact with them.
Actually if they're all pretty mediocre it still works. Also if you assume mediocrity, then it becomes more apparent how someone like Aetius who probably was competent and has some authority behind him can restore order and overawe people.
Jim
Though you would be arguing with Merobaudes who spoke of the Visigoths in the mid Vth century as not just the unsophisticated easy tobeat barbarians that they had once been.
In fact, though, armies change a lot and do decline and rise quickly, The troops who were a tough proposition ten year ago could decay into uselessness in a decade or so of being in a comfy garrison. Soldiers tombstones show an average career span that is well less than the 25 years of nominal service (of course the 25 year men have let and end up being buried on the farm) . Hence personnel could turn over quite quickly.
Clovis has four good reasons that enable him to beat the Visigoths.
Firstly he is a hard , driving man who is a warrior rather than a king
Second the Goths have a lot of their men in Spain and the Visigoths' Gallo Roman Allies do not get there in time.
Third he has assembled a large army of elites by taking in the comitatuses of those he has subdued or brought to alliance
Fourth, his army is experienced, he has a lot of troops who have a recent track record of success.
That said his objectives are limited and he does not go on to face off Theoderic the Great or take Provence.
Roy
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 07, 2014, 02:39:37 PM
No, because in the late Roman army you got provisioned, but then at various set times (Emperors accession, fifth anniversary etc) you were paid a donative.
I'd say that if gold coins are found, if they have anything to do with military matters (as opposed to being a generally good way of carrying wealth easily) then they're donatives. There is no reason why a general's buccelarii or barbarian mercenaries shouldn't be paid and receive donatives.
If
ca AD 500 barbarian mercenaries were like their Viking Age equivalents, they'd
expect to be provided with both pork and bling by their employers.
(Note tangentially that the vast amounts of silver coins found in Viking Age Scandinavia didn't come with a money economy.)
discussion in Penny McGeorge Late Roman warlords. Her take is that the production of a debased form of Late Roman silver coins is just inconclusive. It goes on into the period that the Franks rule the area and I assume they were not paying Roman troops. The coins could be for trade, for paying soldiers or for tribute (as Andreas says) . They may have been buying federate troops or buying off Franks or other threatening neighbours.
the coin evidence does not take us anywhere because it is not particularly associated with military sites.
One interesting point in her coin section was that the early medieval military system in the area is different from other Merovingian systems and is of levying troops by city. That I would take as support for the view that Syagrius has his buccellarii (largely barbarians?) and that the bulk of his troops are the garrisons of the cities who may be downgraded ex Romans, local recruits or hired in bands of barbarians. This method of raising troops is then taken over by Clovis.
Like Jim I don't think that being a city garrison makes you a bad person, but it does not give you the efficiency of a large, professional Late Roman unit of professional soldiers who have full time officers who have followed a military career in the army, not some garrison and have the attributes in terms of discipline and learning and technique that being a comitatensian professional officer who has moved from unit to unit,brings.
To gloss Jim's pont about professionnels versus a land based army I suggest that the elites of a land based foce such as knights may well be better at certain élan based actions than professionals. Its like aristocratic led British cavalry in the Peninsula versus Bourgeois led French forces:-)0
Roy
One curious aspect of the situation is that when Syagrius is - unexpectedly - beaten by the Franks, he does not try to hold out in his domain, but flees straight to the Visigoths. Is this because the local lords will not have him (despite determinedly opposing the Franks; it took Clovis about a decade before he subdued or compounded with them all) or because he thinks a Visigoth army will be a better bet than his lords' 'militia'?
Syagrius' behaviour seems best explainable by his having a decent palatini army (regular troops using Roman organisation and techniques) as the foundation of his power. This would give him the confidence to take on Clovis - and once it was lost, may explain his preference for obtaining a Visigothic army as a temporary substitute rather than trying to last out in the long haul and go it alone with his pseudo-limitanei. Naturally, he may have wished to avoid the Visigoths joining in with the Franks to dismember his domain, but the impression I get is that his authority was tied to a central army and went when the army did. To me, this implies the existence of a proper palatini army, maintained by taxes and arsenals (fabricae), in line with the basic system used by Constantine and his successors.
If we have to guess at quality, most of the armies in the area were getting fairly regular practice against each other, at least up to AD 476 - and all were familiar with Roman military systems and tradition (they had all beaten and/or been beaten by the Romans at some point or other). They had been campaigning on and off for the better part of three quarters of a century, fighting both for the Romans and against them. Their fathers had beaten off the Huns and tweaked the metaphorical nose of the Scourge of God. Alaric II of the Visigoths may have been Alaric the Unready, but he seems to have been the exception rather than the norm.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 07, 2014, 07:54:22 PM
One curious aspect of the situation is that when Syagrius is - unexpectedly - beaten by the Franks, he does not try to hold out in his domain, but flees straight to the Visigoths. Is this because the local lords will not have him (despite determinedly opposing the Franks; it took Clovis about a decade before he subdued or compounded with them all) or because he thinks a Visigoth army will be a better bet than his lords' 'militia'?
Syagrius' behaviour seems best explainable by his having a decent palatini army (regular troops using Roman organisation and techniques) as the foundation of his power. This would give him the confidence to take on Clovis - and once it was lost, may explain his preference for obtaining a Visigothic army as a temporary substitute rather than trying to last out in the long haul and go it alone with his pseudo-limitanei. Naturally, he may have wished to avoid the Visigoths joining in with the Franks to dismember his domain, but the impression I get is that his authority was tied to a central army and went when the army did. To me, this implies the existence of a proper palatini army, maintained by taxes and arsenals (fabricae), in line with the basic system used by Constantine and his successors.
Actually it might just mean he was running 'a protection racket' based on the strength of his personal buccellarii (which he might have inherited from his father, just as Sebastianus seems to have inherited those of Bonifacius.)
To do this he doesn't need arsenals etc, just blacksmiths and basic metal workers, and he doubtless called them taxes, those he collected them off might have felt them justified whilst he was winning, but once he'd gone and had no buccellarii, there was no point in paying him.
It's a far simpler solution
Jim
Simpler, true, though it does not explain why this son of a Magister Militum felt he and his presumed bucellarii 'racketeers' could go out and beat a Frankish army.
As we seem to have run through the evidence and arguments on this subject, I wonder, Jim, if you could give us a walk through of the Roman police, estate guards and other non-regular/'private army' forces that you have discovered in various parts of the Empire. It may have some bearing on the topic, and I would be interested to learn. :)
That will take some time to put together, it's a project I started a while back, and then had to put it on hold because of life and waiting to get hold of sources.
But it's something I do want to do.
As for why he felt his bucellarii 'racketeers' could beat Clovis, he was of the opinion that his bucellarii 'racketeers' plus the part time farmer/militia soldiers he could field were stronger than Clovis and his bucellarii 'racketeers' plus the part time farmer/militia soldiers
That's why, when Aetius or someone like that turned up with a proper army with long service professionals, they could restore order so quickly.
But for those who really wonder why Syagrius wasn't too bothered about the barbarians, here is Sidonius's letter to his Brother in Law in 474AD
To his brother-in-law Ecdicius
A. D. 474
[1] THERE never was a time when my people of Clermont needed you so much as now; their affection for you is |67 a ruling passion for more than one reason. First, because a man's native soil may rightly claim the chief place in his affection; secondly, because you were not only your countrymen's joy at birth, but the desire of their hearts while yet unborn. Perhaps of no other man in this age can the same be said; but the proof of the statement is that as your mother's time advanced, the citizens with one accord fell to checking every day as it went by. [2] I will not dwell on those common things which yet so deeply stir a man's heart, as that here was the grass on which as an infant you crawled, or that here were the first fields you trod, the first rivers you swam, the first woods through which you broke your way in the chase. I will not remind you that here you first played ball and cast the dice, here you first knew sport with hawk and hound, with horse and bow. I will forget that your schooldays brought us a veritable confluence of learners and the learned from all quarters, and that if our nobles were imbued with the love of eloquence and poetry, if they resolved to forsake the barbarous Celtic dialect, it was to your personality that they owed all. [3] Nothing so kindled their universal regard for you as this, that you first made Romans of them and never allowed them to relapse again.1 And how should the vision of you ever fade from any patriot's memory as we saw you in your glory upon that famous day, when a crowd of both sexes and every rank and age lined our half-ruined walls to watch you cross the space between us and the enemy? At midday, and right across the middle of the plain, you brought your little company of eighteen 2 safe through some thousands of the Goths, a feat which |68 posterity will surely deem incredible. [4] At the sight of you, nay, at the very rumour of your name, those seasoned troops were smitten with stupefaction; their captains were so amazed that they never stopped to note how great their own numbers were and yours how small. They drew off their whole force to the brow of a steep hill; they had been besiegers before, but when you appeared they dared not even deploy for action. You cut down some of their bravest, whom gallantry alone had led to defend the rear. You never lost a man in that sharp engagement, and found yourself sole master of an absolutely exposed plain with no more soldiers to back you than you often have guests at your own table. [5] Imagination may better conceive than words describe the procession that streamed out to you as you made your leisurely way towards the city, the greetings, the shouts of applause, the tears of heartfelt joy. One saw you receiving in the press a veritable ovation on this glad return; the courts of your spacious house were crammed with people. Some kissed away the dust of battle from your person, some took from the horses the bridles slimed with foam and blood, some inverted and ranged the sweat-drenched saddles; others undid the flexible cheek-pieces of the helmet you longed to remove, others set about unlacing your greaves. One saw folk counting the notches in swords blunted by much slaughter, or measuring with trembling fingers the holes made in cuirasses by cut or thrust. [6] Crowds danced with joy and hung upon your comrades; but naturally the full brunt of popular delight was borne by you. You were among unarmed men at last; but not all your arms would have availed to extricate |69 you from them. There you stood, with a fine grace suffering the silliest congratulations; half torn to pieces by people madly rushing to salute you, but so loyally responsive to this popular devotion that those who took the greatest liberties seemed surest of your most generous acknowledgements. [7] And finally I shall say nothing of the service you performed in raising what was practically a public force from your private resources, and with little help from our magnates. I shall not tell of the chastisement you inflicted on the barbaric raiders, and the curb imposed upon an audacity which had begun to exceed all bounds; or of those surprise attacks which annihilated whole squadrons with the loss of only two or three men on your side. Such disasters did you inflict upon the enemy by these unexpected onsets, that they resorted to a most unworthy device to conceal their heavy losses. They decapitated all whom they could not bury in the short night-hours, and let the headless lie, forgetting in their desire to avoid the identification of their dead, that a trunk would betray their ruin just as well as a whole body. [8] When, with morning light, they saw their miserable artifice revealed in all its savagery, they turned at last to open obsequies; but their precipitation disguised the ruse no better than the ruse itself had concealed the slaughter. They did not even raise a temporary mound of earth over the remains; the dead were neither washed, shrouded, nor interred; but the imperfect rites they received befitted the manner of their death. Bodies were brought in from everywhere, piled on dripping wains; and since you never paused a moment in following up the rout, they had to be taken into houses which were then hurriedly set |70 alight, till the fragments of blazing roofs, falling in upon them, formed their funeral pyres. [9] But I run on beyond my proper limits; my aim in writing was not to reconstruct the whole story of your achievements, but to remind you of a few among them, to convince you how eagerly your friends here long to see you again; there is only one remedy, at once quick and efficacious, for such fevered expectancy as theirs, and that is your prompt return. If, then, the entreaties of our people can persuade you, sound the retreat and start homeward at once. The intimacy of kings is dangerous; 1 court it no more; the most distinguished of mankind have well compared it to a flame, which illuminates things at a short distance but consumes them if they come within its range. Farewell.
This passage is a good example of the effect a very small force can achieve against a very large one when it has the advantage of complete surprise. A careful reading of the passage however suggests that the entire force of Ecdicius was not as small as 18 men.
To give a bit of context: in 471 the Visigothic army of Euric began to besiege the towns of Auvergne with the aim of annexing the entire region from the moribund Western Empire. This was during the time of dire Roman military weakness, when the disastrous failure of the attempt to reconquer North Africa from the Vandals was followed by open hostility between the western Emperor Anthemus and his Magister Militum Ricimer. No imperial troops, Roman or federate, were available to help the cities in Auvergne.
The only force able to resist the Visigoths was that raised by Ecdicius. He was the son of the former Emperor Avitus. The Aviti were among the foremost Gallo-roman senatorial families, possessing immense estates. Sidonius states that his brother-in-law had raised 'a kind of public army' publici exercitius speciem, which implies a force considerably larger than 18 men. Ecdicius's personal guard may have been good, but one does not undertake a campaign against a barbarian army with a squad of men this size.
His army had already made several surprise attacks against the Visigoths, killing a good number of them, before it reached Clermont-Ferrand. This implies a much larger force, probably of mounted men, that did not dare fight set-piece battles against the Visigoths but hit their forces at vulnerable moments. Ecdicius, clearly, was a master of ambush.
At Clermont the barbarian army was strung out around the city, not in fighting formation, relaxed and off guard. Waiting for the right moment, Ecdicius hit a part of it with his picked men. Since no-one in his right mind would attack an army of several thousands with 18 men, he counted on the barbarians assuming they were being attacked by the spearhead of a much larger force, and panic accordingly. His bluff worked. Without pausing 'to note how great their own numbers were and yours how small' the Visigoths pulled their scattered men together on to a nearby hill, waiting for the appearance of the rest of Ecdicius's force. This gave Ecdicius the time to enter Clermont.
It is quite possible, of course, that the Visigoths did exactly the right thing: i.e. Ecdicius did have more men waiting further back, ready to hit the Visigoths if they tried to move in on him before they were properly formed up. In other words, Ecdicius and his elite band were bait, to be used to turn a relief expedition into an opportunity to sting the Visigoths once again.
Everyone considered that Ecdicius, in facing off a foe several hundred times larger than his own company, had achieved something incredible. In other words, it was not normal for even an elite Gallo-roman force this small to have such an effect on Visigoths. Visigoths were not as a rule easily frightened rabbits.
The passage proves only what could be achieved by a well-armed and well-trained guard of veteran Roman mounted men at the right moment against an unwary barbarian foe. It does not prove any innate fighting ineptitude on the part of those barbarians.
Ecdicius also shows how the Gallo Romans have to cobble together a military force. If there was still a substantial Roman force in Gaul it would have been nice to see it intervening to reign in Euric.
roy
Syagrius would not have felt any compulsion to intervene on the behalf of cities nominally under the authority of an emperor he did not recognize and who looked like he was about to be removed by his Magister Militum anyway. It was a confused situation in which the normal thing to do was to await developments.
Presuming that the 'Arborychi began to fight for the Romans' = Syagrius rebuilt/augmented his army using Gallo-roman recruits (probably on the foundation of an existing but small force), he would not yet have been ready, since Procopius has the Arborychi active only after the Visigoths occupy Spain, which itself took place at about the same time as the Visigothic offensive in the Auvergne. I find it interesting that the reference to the Arborychi puts it about ten years or so before Syagrius finally takes a high hand with the Franks in 486. This would seem to suggest that he had a lot of preparing to do.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 08, 2014, 06:12:21 PM
The passage proves only what could be achieved by a well-armed and well-trained guard of veteran Roman mounted men at the right moment against an unwary barbarian foe. It does not prove any innate fighting ineptitude on the part of those barbarians.
Actually the passage proves what the passage says, that the military structures of Gaul were so decayed that you only needed a handful of enthusiastic and well equipped men to allow them to 'punch well above their weight.'
We have here an example of an eyewitness account, with numbers given. It Ecdicius had turned up with 300 men or a thousand men, there are plenty of literary antecedents for Sidonius to turn to, whereas to the best of my knowledge eighteen merely happens to be a number without any homeric or other considerations.
It fits in nicely with the pattern that shows a degree of military ineptitude. There is no evidence that there were any more men lurking out of sight, they're not mentioned marching in later or in any way referred to.
Why on earth should the barbarians have been so military efficient? If non-latin speaking peasant farmers and their landlord's bucellarii/comitas/bodyguard were the peak of military efficiency, why on earth did anybody bother with the expense and hassle of a regular army?
The Barbarians took advantage of a combination of circumstances.
1) The weakness of the regular army due to an unwillingness to release recruits to it or money to pay it.
2) A series of civil wars that had weakened the army
3) A desperate shortage of men which led Emperors to allowing barbarians to settle within the Empire under their own leaders forming their own military units, as opposed to merely conscripting them into the army proper.
Let's look at the Visigoths. They were settled in Gaul in 418. They defeated the Alans and drove the Vandals into Africa (Just how much driving was necessary is another point) and in 475 they were politically powerful enough for the Romans to grant them independence.
In 486 the last of Alaric's veterans had probably been dead forty or fifty years, the last men who had been formally part of a Roman army were in their dotage. They were a lot of soldier settlers with a limited military structure to support them, with the leader's bucellarii as the professional spearhead and a lot of part-timers to call up to bulk out the army.
Jim
it is the very smallness of Ecdicius force that saves it because the Goths would not have believed that such a bold attack could have been launched by just a few men. Moreover, being few in number it will have made sneaking up a whole lot easier.
I said earlier that armies decay very quickly so I have a lot of sympathy with Jims POV, though these Visigoths have earlier crushed the Siling vandals and crushed the Alans. The contextual evidence for that is these two groups have to submit themselves to the Asding Vandals for protection. To believe that these were not massacring defeats there would have to be a contrary source and there is not one..
That said, those victories are Visigoths in the 430s which is a generation before the siege of Clermont, though not that long after Chalons where the Goths had fought well.
For me the clincher as to Roman forces is that
Aetius relies upon Huns around 430.
Litorius relies on Huns
Aetius puts t ogether a badbarian and limitanei force in Gaul. I do not recall any mention of regular Roman comitatenses.
Majorian is followed by a whole throng of barbarians when he goes to push back the Visigoths and to relconquer Africa.
The Procopius quote fits well with Roman style troops holding garrisons. There could even have been a Nominally Roman core of men around Aegidius and Syagrius, but these will have been bucellarii and very likely barbarians as individuals. Plus there will have been Gallo Roman landowners and their retainers and garrison units for the fortified cities that may well have been limitanei.
The killer is that , when Africa and Spain are lost, the money dried up. Local money in Gaul will have provided garrison troops, not a comital army which would have been hugely expensive.
As I said earlier, in400 the Western army is supported by the economy of Britain, Gaul, Africa, Spain and Italy. There is just no wY in which a kingdom the size of a fifth to a quarter of Gaul can supply a large army. Armies after 450 have to be supported by the land and maybe Jim is right that that involves degrading the average warrior so that only buccellarii are military professionals.
That is why I would still go with Syagrius having a force of buccellarii, garrisons and limitanei and then allied contingents, just like the forces of Aetius and Majorian, though I accept that the small force of retainers and garrisons alone is plausible.
To believe in an army of 10,000 well equipped and drilled Roman regulars would take some really strong evidence and that just is not available.
As a piece of contra evidence, if Syagrius had a comital army it should have whipped Clovis.....and clearly it did not.
Roy
If Syagrius had a comital army ten thousand strong he could have invaded Italy, never mind whipped Clovis.
Remember that crushing the Alans and Siling Vandals is only an achievement if they are militarily formidable. If Barbarian forces are a core of comitas/bucellarii and a far greater body of armed peasantry/yeomen/whatever who are not military professionals then suddenly once your bucellarii have beaten the other guys bucellarii, you're left with the situation that the other guys semi-trained rabble will disperse, flee or otherwise make for home.
Ecdicius and his bucellarii could have taken and held the field because whoever was in charge on the Visigoth side had an even smaller bodyguard, who were dispersed trying to keep order amongst the semi and untrained that they'd brought along to sit round the city and starve it into submission.
When the Empire is strong, they're basically taking Barbarian nobles and their comitas into the army as units. That's probably why we hear so much about barbarian princes (such as the one present when Constantine was proclaimed emperor, this is from memory) whilst ordinary barbarians wandering across the border were just drafted into regular units.
When the empire is weak all that's happening is that the noble and his comitas are being supported but at arms length and the other barbarians aren't being drafted into regular units, they're being supported as part of the noble's entourage. Sometimes the noble (like Alaric) would be given office and access to regulars, rather than just money (Theodoric's predecessors) and it maybe that Alaric used this to train his men to be soldiers.
But otherwise barbarian forces would be largely composed of men who didn't regard themselves as warriors, carried weapons because that's what free men did, and as far as I know there is no evidence that they were ever trained or drilled or even maintained on a permanent basis once they settled down on the land they'd managed to acquire.
Jim
I suggest that what you say is true some of the time Jim, but not all of the time:-)).
barbarian forces are much better at fighting when they are not part time peasant soldiers and that is the situation when they are on the move and when they are kept in employment for some time. I suggest that is true for the Vandals and Alans in Spain, they have cossed the Rhine and kept moving for more than a decade and fought Franks, Romans and then Goths. Similarly the Alaric Goths keep together as a military force.
Once they move into Africa we can look at the Vandals as either being kept together as a military force supported by taxes or as a series of buccellary forces that stay militarised and mounted and a lot of lower grade chaps who farm and degrade militarily. Unfortunately we just do not know for certain. It might be that both systems operate, it might be that the Vandals are a paid army and that only top Vandals get land.
Similarly with the Ostrogoths and the Visigoths in Spain, there is evidence both ways as it looks as though there are permanent garrisons. The thing that detrains a portion of the Visigoth army in Liguria, for example, is the threat to their families, not their farms. The Visigoths seem to have maintained permanent garrisons in the Basque country, though that does not preclude thyme from settling elsewhere and wee both believe that when a Goth gets enough money he buys an estate so there will have been leakage from paid soldier only status into farming over time.
Unfortunately the settlement details, which have been taken as settling the whole tribe on a rather democratic basis, fit just as well with only the better off getting land and the rest getting pay. The leaders of both major Gothic settlements had every reason to hold them together as paid armies and leave the land with the Romans once their Gothic nobles had been rewarded. These are not, after all, democracies.
We are probably on common ground that armies, even regular armies, that do nothing, decay.
IMO the Saxons suffer this in England and are found wanting and unarmoured when the Danes arrive, both in the ninth and the tenth centuries. The original Saxon settlement is, of course, different from the Visi and Ostro Goths, Vandals and Lombards, because they do not arrive as an army, but in smaller groups and by and large , in Britain, there is not much of a state to support them as pure soldiers.
The decay is what I was driving at.
The Visigoths who were the neighbours of Syagrius in 486 were 76 years from the death of Alaric. That's nearly four generations. Are you or I a soldier because our grandfathers and fathers (or in some cases Great grandfathers and grandfathers) were conscripted and spent years under arms fighting in the greatest wars to rend humanity?)
Indeed just paying people to be soldiers, to be garrisons, isn't going to make them soldiers either. At least if they reverted to being farmers they'd have kept physically fit :-)
Is there any evidence of any sort of programme of training, of drill? Or were they garrisons in that their duties would involve 'customs inspection' on the gates, patrols at night to keep order, beat up drunks and stop trouble. Frankly that sounds like city militia to me.
But yes, I've given strong emphasis to one side of the argument because I felt people were getting far too keen on the opposite argument which I felt lacked any real evidence. Someone with a disciplined regular force ten thousand strong wouldn't have huddled in a corner of the Empire, he'd almost certainly have restored order and marched on Rome :-)
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 11:22:14 AM
I've given strong emphasis to one side of the argument because I felt people were getting far too keen on the opposite argument which I felt lacked any real evidence. Someone with a disciplined regular force ten thousand strong wouldn't have huddled in a corner of the Empire, he'd almost certainly have restored order and marched on Rome :-)
Jim
The argument that Syagrius was confident about his ad-hoc militia-grade force rests on the assumption that the barbarians at the end of the 5th century were no better as fighters, and probably worse. This too needs evidence.
What does the historical record say about the fighting ability of barbarians - specifically Franks, Alamans and Visigoths - at the end of the 5th century and into the beginning of the 6th?
Presuming that barbarians remained good fighters during this period, it makes sense that Syagrius with a smallish army of Comitatens-grade troops did not feel he could singlehandedly reconquer the Empire, even if he could manage a grouping of Salian Franks.
There are two papers of interest in this online PDF of 'War and Society in the Roman World'
http://tinyurl.com/oulyq77
Liebescheutz 'The End of the Roman Army in the Western Empire' Ch11. p265-276
Whittaker 'Landlords and Warlords in the Later Roman Empire' C12.p277-302
I read them a while back and am a tad busy to precis/comment right now.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 10:26:57 AM
If Syagrius had a comital army ten thousand strong he could have invaded Italy, never mind whipped Clovis.
He would have to have done a lot better than Riothamus and his twelve thousand.
"
Now Euric, king of the Visigoths, perceived the frequent change of Roman Emperors and strove to hold Gaul by his own right. The Emperor Anthemius heard of it and asked the Brittones for aid. Their King Riotimus came with twelve thousand men into the state of the Bituriges by the way of Ocean, and was received as he disembarked from his ships. Euric, king of the Visigoths, came against them with an innumerable army, and after a long fight he routed Riotimus, King of the Britons, before the Romans could join him. So when he had lost a great part of his army, he fled with all the men he could gather together, and came to the Burgundians, a neighboring tribe then allied to the Romans. But Euric, king of the Visigoths, seized the Gallic city of Arvernum; for the Emperor Anthemius was now dead." - Jordanes XLV.237-238
The question is: if just the Visigoths under Euric can crush Riothamus, what does Syagrius need to keep his domain intact from Visigoths, Franks, Saxons and Burgundians? Diplomacy has its limits.
Quote from: rodge on January 09, 2014, 11:41:39 AM
There are two papers of interest in this online PDF of 'War and Society in the Roman World'
http://tinyurl.com/oulyq77
Liebescheutz 'The End of the Roman Army in the Western Empire' Ch11. p265-276
Whittaker 'Landlords and Warlords in the Later Roman Empire' C12.p277-302
I read them a while back and am a tad busy to precis/comment right now.
Liebeschuetz airs the view that Roman armies of the mid-late 5th century consisted principally (if not exclusively) of federated barbarian bands, drawing his argument from much the same examples as have already been mentioned in this discussion. He argues from lack of direct mention that Roman units effectively no longer existed in the West.
Whittaker is a 'small tribes' enthusiast, albeit without any real evidence to back his views. His main interest (and the thrust of his paper) is his focus on what he sees as the growing extent and influence of 'private armies'. He has some perhaps useful thoughts on this subject, e.g. the following:
Quote
A good deal of the debate about bucellarii in the past has ranged around the question of whether they herald the advent of feudalism by virtue of the personal oath of allegiance they gave to their leader (e.g. Bachrach 1967; Gascou 1976). But, apart from the fact that medievalists now use the term 'feudalism' less freely than some classical historians, most of the argument about private—as opposed to public—armies is misplaced. Procopius is clear that the private contract (perhaps for what was later called paramone) was supplemented by the sacramentum to the emperor ( Vand. 4. 18). But obviously the public oath was of limited relevance if the patron rebelled, or if imperial rule was not recognized; the loyalty of the soldiers then became private obsequium.
This ambiguity is well captured by Sidonius when describing the siege of Clermont in 474, at a time when the ties with an unknown western emperor were of the most tenuous and there was no imperial army in sight. In a letter to Ecdicius, Sidonius lauds the exploits of this great landlord, who with a comitatus of barely eighteen sodales —'fewer than your table normally has guests'— managed to cut his way through and put to flight 'several thousand' Goths without loss (Sid. Apoll. Epist. 3. 3. 3–4).
Gregory of Tours improves upon these incredible figures by giving Ecdicius only ten companions ( Hist. Franc. 2. 24). But I think we are here victims of terminology rather than of rhetoric. Those who rate a mention are only Ecdicius' free satellites, his amici (whence the reference to his table), who are sometimes called clientes . No publicity was given to the far more numerous lesser clientes, servi and coloni in attendance on each companion—in Procopius' language, we have the doryphoroi without the hypaspists (cf. Procop. Secret History 4. 13).
This is not unlike like the example of Sarus, the Goth whom we know to have had two to three hundred personal followers. When he died fighting against Athaulf's army of 10,000, he is said to have had only eighteen or twenty men, according to the strict account of Olympiodorus (fr. 18, p. 183 Blockley).
All of this is helpful for Italy-based armies of the 5th century, but of questionable applicability to the question of whether northern Gaul under the Magistri Militum had or did not have an army, i.e. a regular palatini-type force. While one would have expected the Domain of Soissons to be influenced by the prevailing trend, one would also expect the tradition of recruitment from Gaul itself to have been maintained, especially when years of peace permitted the ruling Magister Militum to raise and develop such forces as he saw fit - in line with what he could afford (which is of course another largely absence-of-evidence subject). The point about the Domain is that the ruler was effectively his own emperor, so he held command over such Imperial forces as were stationed in that locality and was the man who would traditionally maintain, train and recruit the regular forces of the Empire. The Domain thus seems (to me, at least) more likely to have had a regular Roman force than any other part of the Empire.
They're both worth reading Rodge
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 09, 2014, 12:25:35 PM
While one would have expected the Domain of Soissons to be influenced by the prevailing trend, one would also expect the tradition of recruitment from Gaul itself to have been maintained ....
I think one of the key elements of the debate really is whether "the prevailing trend" and "recruitment from Gaul itself" are actually mutually exclusive. Why should troops recruited from Gaul be assumed to be elite regulars? If we assume there is a traditional of Gallo-Roman fighting prowess, why can it not be expressed as personal followers and clients with personal followers forming the core force? Also, why the assumption that the Gallo-Romans, inheritors of this ethnic prowess, have no chance of standing up against "fierce" barbarians without forming a drilled regular force? Maybe I've been corrupted by reading modern revisionist history but the logic of the reappearance of a revitalised Imperial Roman army in the far reaches of Gaul isn't working for me as well as a nominally Roman successor kingdom following the prevailing local trend in military organisation.
Perhaps the best approach is to look at the terminus a quo and ad quem, and try to form an idea of what existed between them.
Terminus a quo: Ad the end of the 4th century, an army of up to 200 000 men in the West (according to the Notitia) that was of a sufficient quality to beat +/- 25 000 Alamans at Argentoratum without too much trouble even though outnumbered 2:1. Those Alamans were no slouches either.
Terminus ad quem: surviving units of the old regular Comitatens legions in the early 6th century, who keep the customs, clothing, names and banners those legions had preserved through previous generations of soldiers (note the implication that soldiering was a hereditary occupation). These units have a strong sense of Roman identity:
'they handed down to their offspring all the customs of their fathers, which were thus preserved, and this people has held them in sufficient reverence to guard them even up to my time. For even at the present day they are clearly recognized as belonging to the legions to which they were assigned when they served in ancient times, and they always carry their own standards when they enter battle, and always follow the customs of their fathers. And they preserve the dress of the Romans in every particular, even as regards their shoes.'
One can disregard this passage, twist it (e.g. making 'customs' the tribal traditions of Celts/barbarians), or just accept it in its obvious sense.
In between these two points there must have been an army that perhaps varied greatly in size but remained substantially constant in its core discipline and military practice.
A common notion is that the western Army collapsed as a trained fighting force some time before the death of Stilicho, perhaps even before he fought Radagaisus for which he relied on barbarian mercenaries. After Stilicho there is no mention of a western Roman army, only of western Roman generals who relied almost exclusively on foederati, using the imperial paychest to keep the barbarians in thrall for three quarters of a century. If there was a Roman army what was it doing?
I wonder if the silence on the army is not perhaps due to a tendency of the writers of that time to write about armies only in the context of major battles and those events directly connected with major battles. An example: the historical record makes no mention of the Palatine army of Gaul (about 30 000 men in strength) during Stilicho's time. This army did not join Stilicho, nor did it do anything about the barbarian incursions in Gaul. It gets no mention at all during this calamitous period. The temptation is to conclude that it did not exist, that 30 000 men somehow disappeared even though their existence was recorded in the Notitia.
What is possible though is that the army was there all the time, but did nothing effective. It did not join up with Stilicho (political reasons?) nor did it stop the barbarian invasions. The latter is not surprising as Palatine legions were effective against barbarian raiding parties only if the barbarians stopped moving or congregated into large masses. There may simply have not been an opportunity to combat the many small groups of barbarians before they passed into Spain (notice that the barbarians did not settle in Gaul). The Gallic army is not mentioned, but that does not mean it did not exist.
An army may remain good in quality but become too small to fight major battles on its own. A lot of reasons for joining or belonging to the army evaporated in the course of the fifth century, which would leave - paradoxically - a core of dedicated and professional men, rather than the dregs who had nowhere else to go (they would find somewhere else to go). It is not necessary that an army be fighting all the time to keep up its standards. It is enough that it live in a time where it may be required to fight at any moment, i.e. when the situation is troubled and insecure. Look at the US army. The Roman generals of that time, Aetius, Aegidius, Majorian, Syagrius, Ecdicius certainly seem to have come from a professional military background. I suspect a certain lingering prowess of Roman arms would have been necessary to keep the barbarian foederati in line. The paychest by itself would not have been enough. That prowess would have had to go hand-in-hand with Roman discipline and fighting methods. That was what made the Roman army what it was in the first place.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 09, 2014, 02:44:22 PM
An example: the historical record makes no mention of the Palatine army of Gaul (about 30 000 men in strength) during Stilicho's time. This army did not join Stilicho, nor did it do anything about the barbarian incursions in Gaul. It gets no mention at all during this calamitous period. The temptation is to conclude that it did not exist, that 30 000 men somehow disappeared even though their existence was recorded in the Notitia.
It not merely didn't join Stilicho, it sat to one side and watched with bland disinterest as Constantine III invaded from Britain, declared himself emperor, and then proceeded to sit on the side lines ignoring the attempts to kick him out again.
Frankly I think that the only thing we can assume is that it didn't exist.
It may well have been that it is on a section of the Notitia that wasn't updated after, say 380AD.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 04:00:53 PM
It not merely didn't join Stilicho, it sat to one side and watched with bland disinterest as Constantine III invaded from Britain, declared himself emperor, and then proceeded to sit on the side lines ignoring the attempts to kick him out again.
Frankly I think that the only thing we can assume is that it didn't exist.
It may well have been that it is on a section of the Notitia that wasn't updated after, say 380AD.
Jim
Just found the relevant passage from Zosimus,
Historia Nova, book 6:
| When Arcadius was reigning, Honorius being consul the seventh time and Theodosius the second, the troops in Britain revolted and promoted Marcus to the imperial throne, rendering obedience to him as the sovereign in those countries. Some time subsequently, having put him to death for not complying with their inclinations, they set up Gratian, whom they presented with a diadem and a purple robe, and attended him as an emperor. Being disgusted with him likewise, they four months afterwards deposed and murdered him, delivering the empire to Constantine. He having entrusted to Justinian and Nevigastes the command of the Celtic legions, crossed over from Britain. Having arrived at Bononia, which is the nearest to the sea-side, situated in the lower Germany, and continuing there some days, he conciliated the attachment of all the troops between that place and the Alps, which separate Gaul from Italy, thus appearing now secure in the empire. |
The sense of the passage is that Constantine himself came to Gaul - leaving his lieutenants in charge of the legions - and gained the support of the troops in Gaul between the Channel and the Alps, which would include the Gallic Palatine Army. This hints at a disaffection between the Palatine Army commander and Stilicho, something which I already suspected.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 09, 2014, 04:49:33 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 04:00:53 PM
It not merely didn't join Stilicho, it sat to one side and watched with bland disinterest as Constantine III invaded from Britain, declared himself emperor, and then proceeded to sit on the side lines ignoring the attempts to kick him out again.
Frankly I think that the only thing we can assume is that it didn't exist.
It may well have been that it is on a section of the Notitia that wasn't updated after, say 380AD.
Jim
Just found the relevant passage from Zosimus, Historia Nova, book 6:
| When Arcadius was reigning, Honorius being consul the seventh time and Theodosius the second, the troops in Britain revolted and promoted Marcus to the imperial throne, rendering obedience to him as the sovereign in those countries. Some time subsequently, having put him to death for not complying with their inclinations, they set up Gratian, whom they presented with a diadem and a purple robe, and attended him as an emperor. Being disgusted with him likewise, they four months afterwards deposed and murdered him, delivering the empire to Constantine. He having entrusted to Justinian and Nevigastes the command of the Celtic legions, crossed over from Britain. Having arrived at Bononia, which is the nearest to the sea-side, situated in the lower Germany, and continuing there some days, he conciliated the attachment of all the troops between that place and the Alps, which separate Gaul from Italy, thus appearing now secure in the empire. |
The sense of the passage is that Constantine himself came to Gaul - leaving his lieutenants in charge of the legions - and gained the support of the troops in Gaul between the Channel and the Alps, which would include the Gallic Palatine Army. This hints at a disaffection between the Palatine Army commander and Stilicho, something which I already suspected.
All it says is that any troops left in Gaul declared for him.
If there was a 30,000 strong field army why wasn't it kicking the Germans back across the Rhine?
This passage is every bit as true if there were fifty thousand men under arms in Gaul, or a couple of thousand.
Certainly it is well known that there was disaffection in Gaul, some of it due to the fact that the Gallic nobility were being frozen out of the top jobs. Previously when Emperors had been based at Trier they'd done very well, but now the Italians were taking the plum posts.
Jim
He gained the support of enough troops to appear 'now secure in the empire', which suggests a large number. The troops weren't the Rhine garrisons as Stilicho had already taken those. They had to be sizeable contingents in the hinterland, of which the first and foremost was the Field Army quartered at Paris.
Nailing down barbarians who were running amok in many small groups was very difficult to do, even if a large professional army was in the area (keeping in mind it was a very big area). Remember the incursions in the 3rd century. Julian later had success only because the Alamans concentrated their strength in one place. If roving bands kept on the move it would take time to pin them down.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 09, 2014, 05:14:23 PM
He gained the support of enough troops to appear 'now secure in the empire', which suggests a large number. The troops weren't the Rhine garrisons as Stilicho had already taken those. They had to be sizeable contingents in the hinterland, of which the first and foremost was the Field Army quartered at Paris.
Nailing down barbarians who were running amok in many small groups was very difficult to do, even if a large professional army was in the area (keeping in mind it was a very big area). Remember the incursions in the 3rd century. Julian later had success only because the Alamans concentrated their strength in one place. If roving bands kept on the move it would take time to pin them down.
I'd suggest that Stilicho was unlikely to have stripped the Rhine of garrisons if there were 30K men in a field army. Similarly the argument that you cannot use a field army against small groups doesn't hold water. Read the account of Flavius Theodosius reconquering Britain, where it specifically said his field army swept up all sorts of small parties. A field army can hardly sit and sulk and let the province be destroyed because the barbarians refuse to play by the rules and fight a big battle.
Obviously it would take time to do it,but it would still be done, it had to be done because if it wasn't done there'd be neither supplies or income to support the field army.
There may be men who claimed to be part of this unit or that unit, whether they were mobile, or more that city guards is moot, they certainly never seem to act as a field army. Aetius and Constantius IInd never seem to have come into contact with a Gallic field army
Jim
Jim
If we believe the Notitia, then was clearly impossible for Constantine III to seize control of Gaul with any hope of permanent success using only the forces he had available in Britain with a few scraps from Gaul. Looking at the totals in the Notitia on the assumption that the Gallic Field army had somehow ceased to exist:
Constantine:
Comes Britanniae: 3,400 men
Dux Britanniarum: 9,250 men
Surviving forces in Gaul: +/-6,000 men
Total: 18,650 men
Honorius:
Personal command at Ravenna: 3,500 men
Palatine army at Milan: 28,000 men
Comes Africae: 9,000 men
Dux Tripolitanae: 3,500 men
Dux Mauretaniae: 2,000 men
Comes Hispaniae: 10,500 men
Comes Tingitaniae: 2,450 men
Total: 58,950 men
One does not pick a fight at odds like these.
If however Constantine gained the support of the 32,000 man Gallic Field Army, then his total strength rises to 50,650 men, which makes his chances look much more reasonable. Still cause for concern if Honorius could get the forces in Spain and Africa to commit against Constantine, which is something he feared.
The problem is that instead of nearly 59,000 men Stilicho struggled to raise a field army of 30,000 and that was by robbing the frontiers.
Looking at the forces
Honorius:
Personal command at Ravenna: 3,500 men
They're not going to leave Ravenna, they're needed to protect the Emperor from wandering generals with unseemly ambitions.
Palatine army at Milan: 28,000 men
Given that only 30,000 were raised by stripping the frontiers, I beg leave to doubt that there was a 28,000 strong field army sitting waiting to be used
Comes Africae: 9,000 men
They were never going to leave Africa.
Dux Tripolitanae: 3,500 men
Same again, it was unlikely that they could be withdrawn
Dux Mauretaniae: 2,000 men
ditto
Comes Hispaniae: 10,500 men
Given that Constantine managed to conquer Spain, these do not seem to have been an issue. Assuming they existed, they may already have been sounded out and were prepared to change sides.
Comes Tingitaniae: 2,450 men
Again he is unlikely to abandon his province to rush men to Gaul
So looking at the balance of forces, Constantine struck when the central government was busy, he obviously had hopes and expectations for aid from Spain and perhaps beyond the Rhine, and had doubtless sounded out Gaul. He might even have expected to be accepted as a partner Augustus, on the grounds he could restore order in Gaul.
Jim
Must say I cannot see the point of going back beyond Aetius. When Attila invades he collects up every odd group he can get to turn up plus the Alans and Visigoths. These groups must be around equal to the Hun force because we are not told that one side outnumbered the other,.
Before the Chalons campaign Aetius and Litorius use Hund federates against the Goths I am unaware that this is because there is a whacking great Roman army in Gaul that is standing on the sidelines. If there was a substantial Roman force Aetius would have used it. So would Majorian. Justin appears to be asking us to believe that there are 30,000 Trained Roman troops in Gaul who do not answer the summons of the appropriate magisters or of the emperor himself for a period of 60 years and yet the empire goes on paying them. The Gallic field army looks like it is wrecked in the civil wars of Constantine, the invasion of 406 and three years of war, the Gothic Wars etc.
Like the Norwegian Blue the Gallic field army is dead or, more likely reduced to a couple of thousand men, enough to guard the MM, but not enough to take on a major threat.
Roy
At Arles In 411 the relieving force was comprised of Alamanni and Franks. It is therefore likely that the Rhine frontier was secured with the assistance of barbarian tribes local to the river (Burgundi, Franks and Alamanni ) some, in the case of the Franks, who had resisted the incursion across the Rhine in 405 or 406/7 (note that none of the other tribes joined the barbarian incursion in any appreciable numbers) and Constantine certainly had enough gold coin to pay them. The relief army headed by the Frank Edobich and Gerontius, which raised the siege of Valence and compelled Sarus to retire back to Italy, was a force born out of the Rhine defences and is likely to have had a substantial barbarian contingent.
In 408 Honorius sent a force under Sarus from Italy but, despite initial successes in the Rhone valley, Sarus was soon forced to withdraw by Constantine's magister militum Gerontius. Constantine then went on to occupy all of Gaul up to the Alps.
He also appointed Constans (his son) as Caesar in 408 and sent him into Spain to quell a revolt headed by relatives of Honurious.
This revolt was duly suppressed and the magister militum Gerontius was left in charge in Spain when Constans returned to Gaul.
In 409 Britain revolted against Constantine's rule and Constantine's confidence waned. He wrote to Honorius in late summer 409, asking forgiveness for having seized power and promising help against the Visigoth Alaric in Italy; Honorius recognized him, sent him an imperial robe and possibly granted him the consulate.
Then in late 409 the Vandals, Alans and Suevi, crossed into Spain from Gaul. Gerontius restored control over the situation but then revolted against Constantine and acclaimed Maximus as emperor; control of Britain and Spain was thus lost.
In summer 410 Constantine was faced by the troops from Spain who had invaded Gaul under Gerontius and was besieged at Arles. By now, Gerontius had promoted Maximus (either his son or one of his staff) to the rank of Augustus.
Following Alaric's death, Honorius' general Constantius entered Gaul in 411 and after defeating Gerontius besieged Constantine in Arles. When Constantius ambushed a relieving force under Constantine's magister militum Edobeccus Constantine lost hope; he relinquished the purple, took refuge in a church and was ordained before surrendering to Constantius.
Constantine was then sent to Italy, but was murdered before he reached Honorius. His head was sent to Ravenna where it was exhibited.
So, what did he occupy up to the Alps with? I think a large proportion could well have been 'barbarian troops' ...
Quote from: aligern on January 09, 2014, 07:22:55 PM
Justin appears to be asking us to believe that there are 30,000 Trained Roman troops in Gaul who do not answer the summons of the appropriate magisters or of the emperor himself for a period of 60 years and yet the empire goes on paying them.
Roy
No, I'm not saying that. My contention is that the Roman army in Gaul, at whatever size it was reduced to, kept its professional and Roman character all the way to Syagrius. The fact that there is not a constant record of a 'Gallic Palatine Army' from the Notitia until 486 does not mean it did not exist, as the historical documents tended to talk about armies only when they fought major battles. My last couple of posts is an attempt to deduce the existence of the Gallic Field Army during Stilicho and Constantine's time even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the contemporary texts (except the Notitia of course).
On the subject of Gallic Army under Aetius, this extract from Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Catalaunian_Plains#cite_note-23) might be of interest:
| A better sense of the size of the forces may be found in the study of the Notitia Dignitatum by A.H.M. Jones.[29] This document is a list of officials and military units that was last updated in the first decades of the 5th century. Notitia Dignitatum lists 58 various regular units, and 33 limitanei serving either in the Gallic provinces or on the frontiers nearby; the total of these units, based on Jones analysis, is 34,000 for the regular units and 11,500 for the limitanei, or just under 46,000 all told. However, this figure is the estimate for the year 425 A.D. The regular Roman field army present at the battle may have numbered around 22,500 men if one accounts for paper strength, attrition, and other factors. The federates would have been far greater in number, possibly between 20,000 and 50,000 men. While the Roman forces in Gaul had become much smaller by this time, if we accept this number as the total of all of the forces fighting with Theodoric and Aëtius, one should not be too far off. Assuming that the Hunnic forces were roughly the same size as the Romano-Gothic, the number involved in battle is around 100,000 combatants in total. This excludes the inevitable servants and camp followers who usually escape mention.' |
Quote from: aligern on January 09, 2014, 07:22:55 PM
If there was a substantial Roman force Aetius would have used it. So would Majorian.
The Wikipedia entry on Aegidius (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Aegidius) is interesting:
Quote
When Avitus had been deposed—then killed—by Ricimer, Majorian became the new emperor. One of his first acts was to replace comes Agrippinus with Aegidius, who then accused his predecessor of various kinds of treachery. Allegedly, Agrippinus was sent to Rome where he was tried and sentenced to death, but managed to escape prison, gain a pardon from the Emperor, returned to Gaul "exalted with honours." As a result, the two became rivals.
Next Majorian overawed with force the Visigoths of southern Gaul and their neighbors the Burgundians. Aegidius assisted this effort, marching down the Rhone, his troops burning and pillaging as they advanced, and he seized Lyons in 458, then in the next year allowed the Goths to encircle him at Arles. "The Goths thought that they were supposed to perform the usual federate ritual outside the walls of the Gallic capital," writes Wolfram, "but they were rudely awakened from their daydreaming by an attack of Majorian and the 'Frankish' Aegidius."
However, relations between Ricimer and Majorian soured; when Majorian's campaign in Hispania against the Vandals proved unsuccessful Ricimer deposed him (461), murdering another Emperor, replacing him with Libius Severus. Aegidius refused to recognize Ricimer's new figurehead, Separated from Ricimer and Severus in Northern Gaul by the Visigoths and Burgunds, Aegidius was safe from any direct response they might make. Ricimer did accept as a supporter Aegidius' rival Agrippinus, whom contemporaries claimed betrayed Narbonne to the Visigoths in return for their help. Aegidius was soon drawn into a war with the Visigoths; Hugh Elton suggests that Ricimer's puppet Emperor Severus had bribed the Visigoths to go to war against Aegidius.
Aegidius struck back by attacking Orleans with the help of Childeric, and the brother of king Theoderic, Frideric, was killed in the fighting. However, Aegidius did not press his victory; Elton speculates that Aegidius' attention was distracted by "increasing conflict with various Frankish groups on the north-eastern frontier or lack of resources." Hilton notes that Aegidius had other rivals beyond the Visgoths he needed to confront: there were Saxons in the Loire valley, Bretons under Riothamus who fought the Visigoths, "sometimes in co-operation with the Italian imperial Romans", and other Roman factions led by the comites Paul and Arbogast.
Aegidius' force was apparently instrumental in Majorian's successes against the Burgundians and Visigoths. Interestingly enough, in Imperium Romanum II, the Majorian scenario does not provide any forces for the Domain of Soissons (it just does not assign Lugdunensis to any power) and the Roman player has an uphill struggle to achieve half of what Majorian accomplished.
Now this does not tell us the size of Aegidius' army (or that of the opposition), but it does suggest that the Domain of Soissons was instrumental, perhaps decisive, in Majorian's successes. What we can glean from this is that Aegidius fielded a respectable force, and when Syagrius inherited it he used it successfully against the Saxons of the Loire, with Frankish assistance.
"
While these things were happening a great war was waged between the Saxons and the Romans. The Saxons fled and many of their men were cut down by the Romans who pursued them. Their islands were captured and laid waste by the Franks." - Gregory of Tours II.18
Who were these 'Romans'?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 09, 2014, 07:42:40 PM
My contention is that the Roman army in Gaul, at whatever size it was reduced to, kept its professional and Roman character all the way to Syagrius.
As it existed under a Magister Militum, then another Magister Militum and his son, I see this as reasonable even without Procopius' remarks being taken into consideration.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 06:32:28 PM
The problem is that instead of nearly 59,000 men Stilicho struggled to raise a field army of 30,000 and that was by robbing the frontiers.
Looking at the forces
Honorius:
Personal command at Ravenna: 3,500 men
They're not going to leave Ravenna, they're needed to protect the Emperor from wandering generals with unseemly ambitions.
If his throne depends on it he will use them. That's what they're there for - to protect him from wandering generals with unseemly ambitions like Constantine III.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 06:32:28 PMPalatine army at Milan: 28,000 men
Given that only 30,000 were raised by stripping the frontiers, I beg leave to doubt that there was a 28,000 strong field army sitting waiting to be used
The figures in the Notitia for Italy and the Rhine frontier appear to represent the situation
after the Rhine had been stripped of troops to augment the forces in Italy, i.e. the 28,000 men corresponds neatly to the 30,000 men Stilicho eventually managed to assemble.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 06:32:28 PMComes Africae: 9,000 men
They were never going to leave Africa.
Why not? The record shows that Africa stayed loyal to Honorius.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 06:32:28 PMDux Tripolitanae: 3,500 men
Same again, it was unlikely that they could be withdrawn
Again, why not?
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 06:32:28 PMDux Mauretaniae: 2,000 men
ditto
Not if the emperor was fighting for his life. "Send your men. You won't? Then you're a traitor." Who do you back - an emperor with 60 000 men or an upstart with 18 000?
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 06:32:28 PMComes Hispaniae: 10,500 men
Given that Constantine managed to conquer Spain, these do not seem to have been an issue. Assuming they existed, they may already have been sounded out and were prepared to change sides.
They did not change sides. Constantine was in a position similar to Napoleon: surrounded by larger but separated forces. Rather than wait for them to gang up on him, he decided to defeat them in detail first, starting with Spain. But for that he needed decisive local superiority, which 18 000 men, a large part committed to shoring up the Rhine frontier, was not going to give him.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 06:32:28 PMComes Tingitaniae: 2,450 men
Again he is unlikely to abandon his province to rush men to Gaul
Would he have had a choice?
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 09, 2014, 06:32:28 PMSo looking at the balance of forces, Constantine struck when the central government was busy, he obviously had hopes and expectations for aid from Spain and perhaps beyond the Rhine, and had doubtless sounded out Gaul. He might even have expected to be accepted as a partner Augustus, on the grounds he could restore order in Gaul.
Jim
He had the support of Gaul, or more exactly, of important Roman forces in Gaul, and that's what gave him confidence that he could lay hold of the entire western Empire, something he was never going to do with 18 000 men.
Just a couple of things. Remember that a lot of Stilicho's men were barbarians who changed sides when he was murdered. So I wouldn't regard the 28,000 field army as being too closely related to the 30,000 men that Stilicho had
As for pulling men out of Africa, that was Rome (and Italy's corn supply). Yes it stayed loyal, and because it was loyal, Honorius remained Emperor. He could cope with Visigoths rampaging around Italy, because they'd eventually have to leave. But if he didn't control Africa he was screwed. He couldn't feed italy and they'd get someone who could. Remember the effort he went to to retake Africa.
Also there is the logistics. Firstly getting the men to agree to leave, secondly getting the shipping to do it. Those who invaded from Africa later seem to have used the bucellarii only and the amount of shipping was huge. Same with the other African troops
1) Would they leave africa or like Julian's men would they proclaim their own general as Emperor so they could stay.
2) How many men were there anyway, I think you're assuming full strength units.
3) Logistics, by the time they'd got the shipping organised it would be too late anyway. Ironically Africa had the best logistics but ship troops and you cannot ship grain and that is bad news for Italy and the Emperor
And it isn't an Emperor with 60K men and a usurper with 18K. At various times the Usurper was recognised as a proper Augustus, the 60K men assumes full strength units, and most of them are busy where they are.
This 60K men is as fanciful as a 30K field army in Gaul which leaves no mark on history, but after 406AD it seems to exist purely a bureaucratic construct on paper
Jim
It might be worth considering the numbers of troops that could have possibly been involved at Soissons to give a bit of perspective on the debate. This does mean working backwards from 496 but I am unaware of any further information.
MacGeorge has a footnote in her chapter about the military force of Aegidius and Syagrius; at the Baptism of Clovis (Christmas 496) Gregory states (History II.31) that 3000 of his men were baptised alongside Clovis and in the 9th C work of Hincmar of Reims 'Vita Regmigii' he says that about half of the Frankish warriors were baptised.
Working on those source numbers that would give a force of circa 6000.
Allowing for literary inflation of 10% would give us 5400 men, at 20% 4800 men etc.
This possible total was after Clovis had killed Chararic (and probably absorbed some of his troops) and had allied with other Frankish sub-kings in order to tackle the Thuringians in 491AD and the Alemanni in 496AD.
So the number in 486 could quite possibly have been a lot lower than 6000 or 5400 or 4800 etc.
Assuming (on the generous side) 4000 men in 486 (including Ragnachar's troops that fought with Clovis at Soissons) we have a possible number to compare with Syagrius' own numbers (4000 of Clovis' troops plus or minus Chararic's men who were there but did not take part).
Clovis issued his challenge to Syagrius and Syagrius accepted the challenge, leaving the relative safety of Soissons taking the field confident of his chances and his army so was confident as we are told.
If his confidence came from his parity (he also may well have been confident of their quality or dismissive of his opponent's quality), or advantage of numbers, at around 4000 men how was this force made up ?
1000 Bucellarii, perhaps 1000 Gallo-Roman Estate troops, 1000 Limitanei etc. and ex- Comitatenses Franks and 1000 remnants of the real Army of Gaul?
I think there is general agreement that Syagrius had military support other than just a standing Roman Army of Gaul force.
So how large was the Roman part of this force out of 4000? 1000 men? 2000?
That does not suggest the type of Roman Army being currently discussed unless I'm missing something.
And if Syagrius' force was much larger than 4000 and had more 'Roman' troops in it (and it lost) does that not suggest that (if they were primarily Roman regulars or their ilk) that they were not really up to much?
At least it would not be the powerful Roman force that has been discussed?
The 6000 troops are more likely Clovis's personal warriors from his tribe at Tournai, rather than the entire Frankish army that had confronted Syagrius at Soissons.
At this time the Franks were not yet organised into a single cohesive kingdom, but were a loose confederation of tribes under chieftains several of whom were linked by ties of blood. This confederation was tenuous, as shown by Chararic's ability to sit out the Battle of Soissons without fearing an immediate retribution from Clovis. When Clovis was baptized it would have been in a personal capacity, without the involvement of the other Frankish chieftains. Clovis did not have the power to be able to tell the warriors of his allied chiefs which religion to belong to. He barely had enough prestige to get some of his own warriors to follow him in his conversion.
The death of Ragacar is put at 509, well after the conversion of Clovis, which indicates that the Franks were far from being consolidated by Clovis in 496.
Extrapolating from this interpretion, one can posit that Clovis at Soissons had something like 20,000 warriors: his 6000 plus another 15 - 20,000 supplied by his allied chiefs. This corresponds to the numbers the Alamans, a roughly equivalent people, had at Argentoratum. Syagrius had to meet this with an army of at least 10,000 men of markedly superior quality.
Inclined to agree. Good idea, Rodge, and nicely spotted, but not so sure about concluding that the 6,000 included every Frank in Clovis' domains.
Agathias has 75,000 Franks and Alamanni cross into Italy in 553, the first stage of a campaign leading to Narses' famous victory at Casilinum (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_the_Volturnus_%28554%29?qsrc=3044). During this campaign the Franks, apparently numbering around 30,000, split off and did their own thing, getting whittled down by high living and disease to perhaps 20,000 before eventually meeting up with Narses' 18,000 or so and getting trounced at Casilinum.
These 30,000 could not have been the whole strength of the Franks as of 553, otherwise there would have been nobody left at home to maintain the Frankish kingdom. Enough fighting men had to stay behind to avoid the Franks becoming history at the hands of their neighbours, suggesting a total fighting establishment of at least another 20,000 or so who did not come to Italy.
I would thus be more inclined to go with Justin's estimate of c.20,000 for Clovis' army at Soissons.
Huge Barbarian armies is a literary Topos with a long pedigree. I'd be wary of the 75,000 for a start. Mind you, remember Theodoric's comment. "A poor Roman plays the Goth, a rich Goth the Roman"
The 30,000 Franks (if that is indeed the correct number) might well include Burgundians, Visigoths, and small Gallic landowners who'd become Franks. 553AD is three generations after Soissons. Plenty of time for the boundaries to become blurred.
Jim
No no no Patrick. The army sent to Italy in 553 is very largely Allamanic and is led by two Allamannic dukes.
If we believe the figure of 35000 for the Allamanni at Strasbourg then IMO that is a large force, at or hear home base. Franks are mentioned at Rimini, but only a small force and these might be Allamans as well. I very much doubt if the Allamans are capable of delivering many more men and to get them across to Italy it would be a lot less.
The Frankish kings have a bit of a history of sending others to fight and that might be a matter of realpolitik or even of plausible deniability. It is very very unlikely that there were 75,000 in any German army.
Of course I know that you won't be convinced Patrick. we just have to accept that some of us see ancient numbers as being entirely trustworthy and some see them as gospel. i very much doubt whether Agathias had access to any count of these Allamanni, it is possible that not even Lothar and Buccelin knew the number of their own men.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 10, 2014, 12:14:01 PM
It is very very unlikely that there were 75,000 in any German army.
It appears that Narses led between 20,000 and 30,000 imperial troops into Italy. These would have been the best that Justinian could supply. Up until his confrontation with Butilinus, Narses won his battles with very little loss of men. At the Battle of the Volturnus he had 18,000 men, which suggests the Franks/Alamans had at least as many, probably more. Since that number was less than what Butilinus originally set out with, the implication is that the combined Frankish-Allemanic army was very large indeed.
Presuming that half the original combined force was Frankish, the other half Alemanic, and even scaling down the numbers, it becomes quite plausible that when the Franks and Alamans mixed it up at Tolbiac 50 years previously, each side could have mustered anything from 20,000 men upwards. The Alamans had fielded a force of 35,000 men a century and a half before that. The numbers certainly seem to tie up.
The fact that the sources are no more accurate than 'between 20,000 and 30,000 men' should teach us to be wary.
As for them being the best that Justinian could supply, a fair proportion were barbarians hired by Narses on his way to Italy. He had good personal links with the Heruls and also hired a lot of Lombards.
Justinian provided the cash and some men.
The fact that the Eastern Empire couldn't field an army of 20,000 without frantically hiring barbarians to pad the numbers out shows us that it's ridiculous to assume a 10,000 strong field army in Gaul in 486AD
Similarly there is no reason to assume the Franks outnumbered Narses. They might have been desperate to fight to get supplies or to a healthier area, they might have been grossly overconfident, or they may have just been badly let down by their intelligence.
Army commanders do give battle when they shouldn't, either because they have to or merely make mistakes , there is no reason why the Franks should be immune to this.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 10, 2014, 03:25:33 PM
The fact that the sources are no more accurate than 'between 20,000 and 30,000 men' should teach us to be wary.
It does however give us an idea of scale: 20,000-30,000 and not, say, 2,000 to 3,000.
Quote
The fact that the Eastern Empire couldn't field an army of 20,000 without frantically hiring barbarians to pad the numbers out shows us that it's ridiculous to assume a 10,000 strong field army in Gaul in 486AD
Not necessarily, Jim. Justinian had been throwing away troops on the Persian frontier since the start of his reign, then doing the same in Illyria and Africa, plus sending a large contingent to Lazica. Furthermore, his reign was noteworthy for a virulent and widespread plague which did nothing to help with manpower levels. Conversely, as was earlier pointed out on this thread, the Domain of Soissons had had a period of relative peace, good for increasing population, revenue and forces.
Having wondered about Agathias' reliability, I did a bit of reading of his surviving work. His tone is surprisingly level-headed and realistic, and when we can evaluate him on detail (e.g. on the equipment of Franks he appears to be more precise, and perhaps more accurate, than Procopius) he is sufficiently reliable for some scholars to have suspected him of being pagan! ;)
Therefore when he says 75,000 Alemanni and Franks invaded Italy I take him as being substantially correct. Had he been of the Orosius school I would have serious reservations doing so - Orosius seems to be good and bad, largely depending on his source, a proverbial curate's egg of a historian. Agathias, however, where he is checkable seems to check out.
Procopius gives a precise description of the nationalities and numbers of the barbarian contingents used by Narses:
2,500 Lombards
3,000 Herules
'Great numbers' of Huns
'Many' Persian deserters
400 Gepids
'Many' more Herules
He does not give the precise number of the regular contingents of the Eastern Roman army, speaking only of 'a host of Roman fighting men.' The Roman component of the army was raised by Germanus, who had been given access to the imperial treasury by Justinian with permission 'to raise a very formidable army from Thrace and Illyricum.' Narses himself brought 'a notable army' from Constantinople which combined with the troops raised by Germanus.
Expeditionary armies in this period were around the 20,000 man mark. Belisarius fielded 25,000 men at Dara, and at least 20,000 men at Callinicum. He led more than 17,000 men against the Vandals. Praesental armies, about 20,000 men apiece, could be combined: 38,000 men in Thrace in 478 (a praesental army with the regional army of Thrace), 52,000 men in 503 (2 praesental armies combined with a 12,000 man force under the Magister Militum per Orientis). The Roman contingent of Narses army can hence be calculated at at least 20,000 men.
It must also be noted that expeditionary armies made generous use of barbarian contingents: the regular recruiting mechanisms were insufficient when it was necessary to quickly increase the size of available forces. Barbarian units, usually skilled horsemen, were an ideal answer to the sudden need for short-term manpower.
Agathius records Narses possessing 18,000 men at Casilinum, by which point he had dismissed the Lombards. This is after garrisons, sieges and casualties had whittled down his numbers, with no mention of reinforcements. It is unlikely that a force of a few thousand Alaman/Frankish warriors would have contemplated giving battle to a trained and experienced army this size.
Yes, 20,000 for an Empire which included Africa, Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, Thrace and Greece.
Not a couple of cut off provinces in northern Gaul
Yes, Justinian had more problems but he had the whole eastern part of the Empire to share them with. Julian Norwich estimates the army on Justinian's death to be 150,000, which is field armies, garrisons, the lot.
Yet a rump state between the Somme and the Loire was supposed to have a field army of 10,000 men. And that all local Roman recruits. Not padded out with barbarian mercenaries!
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 10, 2014, 05:30:39 PM
Agathius records Narses possessing 18,000 men at Casilinum, by which point he had dismissed the Lombards. This is after garrisons, sieges and casualties had whittled down his numbers, with no mention of reinforcements. It is unlikely that a force of a few thousand Alaman/Frankish warriors would have contemplated giving battle to a trained and experienced army this size.
You're assuming he had a choice. It wasn't an equal points game, it was a Frankish army crippled by disease that had come to a halt and had got a Byzantine army across their way home. They had two choices, fight or surrender.
They'd have had the same choice whether they'd had 10,000 men or 50,000 men.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 10, 2014, 05:36:12 PM
Yes, 20,000 for an Empire which included Africa, Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, Thrace and Greece.
Not a couple of cut off provinces in northern Gaul
Yes, Justinian had more problems but he had the whole eastern part of the Empire to share them with. Julian Norwich estimates the army on Justinian's death to be 150,000, which is field armies, garrisons, the lot.
Yet a rump state between the Somme and the Loire was supposed to have a field army of 10,000 men. And that all local Roman recruits. Not padded out with barbarian mercenaries!
Jim
Yes....one has the image of Syagrius holed up in a little corner of Gaul the size of a Welsh principality. Images however can be deceiving. Below is a map showing the relative sizes of Syagrius's domain and the Eastern Empire. One must keep in mind that all of Syagrius's land was fertile and arable, whereas large swathes of the Empire were unproductive mountain or desert. Looking at the map can one see any reason for Syagrius not maintaining an army one fifteenth the size of the Eastern Empire's establishment?
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/soissons%20and%20empire.jpg)
Halsall has Syagrius holed up in a Kingdom that extended as far as his troops could march in a day....
Seriously Justin, I think you ought to treat yourself to 'Fifth-Century Gaul: A Crisis of Identity."
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Fifth-Century-Gaul-A-Crisis-Identity/dp/0521529336
There is a whole heap of stuff there that will answer your question far better than I can.
Jim
Quote from: rodge on January 10, 2014, 07:17:24 PM
Halsall has Syagrius holed up in a Kingdom that extended as far as his troops could march in a day....
But on what basis?
Gentlemen, do we feel we have gone about as far as we can with this topic?
Justin, I don't think that we can claim that Justinian sent some sort of elite army with Narses. This was the army that Germanus was gathering before he died and was likely based heavily upon the forces in Illyria and Thrace, nearest the Italian theatre. As has been pointed out t was bulked up with barbarians. Of the 5000 Lombards half are 'elite' half are retainers. The Gepids sound lije a pPrince and his retinue, there a couple of thousand Heruls, perhaps 1,500 Huns or Bulgars.
As Jim poiinted out inperial expeditionary armies are mostly around the 20,000 mark. On the Eastern frontier50,000 men are assembled and they do nothing, probably because the whole is too big to move. The ability of the East to raise more soldiers is because of the large number of troops in garrisons there that can be added to the mobile armies. Estimates of Sasanian armies come to similar conclusions, a major effort is 50,000 men, a more normal army around 20,000.
The main limit on armies is feeding them. For E A Thompson one of the main differences between Barbarian and Roman armies is that the lattter have much more professional logistics. The Romans carry with them wagon loads of food and of weapons. Given that Justinian has a problem building up a force of much more than 20,000 is it really conceivable that the Allamanni can bring 75,000 men across the Alps? To take another Procopian number is it really feasible that the Goths in Italy have 200,000 men , especially when the evidence is good that Theoderic invades Italy with around 20,000. Can we believe that after the revolt of Milan the Goths and Burgundians massacre 300,000 of the rebellious citizens? These numbers occur in the context of authors who are otherwise stating quite reasonable figures. It may well be a matter of the sources that Procopius and Agathias are using ( though the source for the Goth number is supposedly a letter of Procopius to Justinian. This is the same author who gives a listing of Gothic garrisons and Byzantine detachments that is realistic within much smaller total numbers. Hence I suggest that the big numbers are official propaganda. It suited the imperial regime to exaggerate the number of barbarian enemies , especially when those barbarians are subsequently beaten and to overestimate the number of Romans massacred by the barbarian enemy. The numbers of detachments or of contingents in the army quite likely come from. official reports .
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 10, 2014, 10:16:42 PM
Gentlemen, do we feel we have gone about as far as we can with this topic?
The discussion may have run it's course as I do not believe there are any new facts for us to uncover that could advance either side of the debate or sway us from the respective positions.
The critical point of when the Army of Gaul collapsed (and was no longer a potent force) divides us, and there is no conclusive evidence for that.
On Halsall I cannot find the quote, it was in my notes and I did not reference it. My apologies. If I find it and it has anything compelling to support his statement I will post it.
History of the Wars 8.20.26
She accordingly collected four hundred ships immediately and put on board them an army of not fewer than one hundred thousand fighting men, and she in person led forth this expedition against the Varni.
This is Procopius on the revenge of the Anglian queen . Four hundred ships is oretty well unbelievable, let alone cramming 100,000 men into them , but it is understandable in a. context in which the attitude to numbers is not like our modern attitude.
And yes, I agree that we should bring this line to a close!
Roy
Fine, let's close it then.
It has been fun though. :)
It's a discussion that could restart when people have had time to go through the literature, there's an awful lot of interesting stuff out there which has been written taking into account archaeology, the original sources (which for Gaul is everything from Chronicles to Saints' lives and theological discussion) and work done on the agriculture and trade of the period.
Jim
As promised, the 'day's march' quote info:
The 'day's march' quote is not Halsall, it is from Elton 'Defence in 5thC Gaul' from Drinkwater and Elton's '5thC Gaul: A Crisis of Identity?'.
It is based on the idea that both Aegidius, post the victory at Orleans 463, and Syagrius (following his assumption of some kind of position of authority) had their hands full in Northern Gaul with threats from everywhere; including Franks, Saxons, Alamanni and Burgundians.
Aegidius' offensive operations stopped after Orleans perhaps because things were just too hot at home.
Aegidius' ambassadorship to the Vandals in 465 is attributed to the aim of cooperation against yet more threats to the southwest from the Visigoths, though this may be interpreted as the seeds of an offensive strategy.
Elton also states that Aegidius may have had 'factions' (other than those led by Arbogast and Paul) of Roman attitude (but he does not, frustratingly name them, but says 'we also know of') who could have been subordinate, allied, non-aligned or even hostile to Aegidius.
Perhaps this is a reference to Gallo-Roman landowner factions who fancied themselves as the boss...or not.
His conclusion in this section of the paper:
'Though often portrayed as an independent Roman state in north Gaul, Aegidius and Syagrius' 'kingdom' was probably not much bigger than a day's march from their army'.
What is suggested is that northern Gaul was much more fragmentary than is conferred by the phrase 'the kingdom' and Aegidius' and Syagrius' grip on it only extended as far as the force they could project.
This would explain why Syagrius fled when he was defeated. He didn't have any general support or 'legitimacy'. He was effectively a warlord dependent on the ability of his comitas/bucellarii and once they were broken he no longer had any control over the area.
The local power brokers were still strong enough to hold out. Or at least strong enough so that they may have been able to play off Franks and Visigoths, in that neither was willing to let the other control the area.
Jim
Thanks, Rodger. I would suggest that if we resume discussion of the topic at some point it would be worth at the very least giving Sidonius' correspondence a good look through for what it tells us about conditions in southern Gaul, which seems to have been a lot more troubled and fought over than the Domain of Soissons.
Jim, your observation applies equally if Syagrius' power depended upon a regular army and he lost that.
Yes Patrick, I agree.
Let's all take a breather and resume if and when.
Just something to throw into the pot and to stress that people really need to get a look at "Fifth-Century Gaul: A Crisis of Identity."
I've tried to attach an illustration taken from the book of coin finds from 5th century Gaul. It is interesting that there are no coins that anyone has said were minted by Syagrius, and the only coins found in what might be his territory are Visigoth (The black dots and the white circle with the line across it might be Frankish) . His core territory appears to be a coin free zone.
It makes it very difficult to see how he was supporting a regular force when there is no 5th century coinage found in his area.
Two observations. I think there is some confusion over the realm of Syagrius - Justin seems to have acknowledge a much larger territory in the West, towards modern Brittany, than Jim, even without the comment that Rodger found. Secondly, if we compare this coin find map with that in post #75, there are apparent 5th century coins in the latter which are not in this map. Could be several reasons for that (e.g. one is more cautious on provenance than the other) but does suggest caution when using coin evidence to base any theory on.
That said, I agree with those who commented that maybe the subject should be rested till more evidence is available.
I'm trying to be good.... ::)
Quote from: Erpingham on January 11, 2014, 01:38:58 PM
Two observations. I think there is some confusion over the realm of Syagrius - Justin seems to have acknowledge a much larger territory in the West, towards modern Brittany, than Jim, even without the comment that Rodger found. Secondly, if we compare this coin find map with that in post #75, there are apparent 5th century coins in the latter which are not in this map. Could be several reasons for that (e.g. one is more cautious on provenance than the other) but does suggest caution when using coin evidence to base any theory on.
That said, I agree with those who commented that maybe the subject should be rested till more evidence is available.
If you mean the maps at http://mediatheque.letourp.com/doc_num.php?explnum_id=6543
I thought the abstract was interesting
Abstract
The Roman isolated gold coins are more likely than hoards to give a picture of the monetary stock locally available in various circles of society. The cause of its isolation can be varied : loss, hiding, religious offer. The sample for 12 «départements» in the west of France consists of 209 coins covering 535 years. The analysis of geographical and chronological repartitions leads to
some hypothesis : quick but late penetration of gold ; bad économie integration of Armorica under the Julio-Claudians reflected by accumulations of inactive gold ; well balanced economy during the second century ; scarcity of coins during the third century except for the gallo-roman Empire ;
wider circulation during the fourth and fifth centuries when gold is not necessarily connected with the presence of the army.:-)
Jim
And there I suggest we leave the matter for the present, as a 'wider circulation of coins' suggests an expansion of the kind of taxable economy that would support a regular army whether or not the discovered coins are directly linked to how that army is paid.
If I'm excused for flogging the undead horse, all this is about gold coins, right? I would suggest that the expansion or contraction of a money economy is more likely to be discernible in smaller silver or copper coins - few day-to-day transactions would usefully conducted in gold.
If the circulation of high denominations (ie. gold coins) increases but that of smaller coins does not - I stress I don't know if this applies to 5C Gaul - I would suspect that to reflect the essentially non-monetary use of gold coins as high status gifts (Jim's soldiers' donatives, say) rather than anything about the health of the "real" economy.
(Of course, an increase in smaller coins doesn't necessarily reflect an expanding money economy either - cf again Iron Age Scandinavia - but it is more likely to do so than one in gold coins.)
It is interesting that the Empire never really considered the need for 'small change' except inadvertently by debasing the currency which converted silver into small change. Some experts seem to hold that a lot of coins, such as the barbarous radiates (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbarous_radiate) were produced privately because of the desperate need for small change.
One of the coins circulating in Britain, notionally silver, doesn't seem to have had any silver in it, and even the lead included was lead from which the silver had been extracted.
When a government mints nothing but gold, a large proportion of the population are unlikely to handle cash and most 'retail' trade is going to be done on a barter basis.
Jim
We have had a few days for still-interested parties to dig around, at least metaphorically.
Has anyone unearthed any further evidence on this topic, and if so do they wish to air it?
I am in the process but am now swamped by work for the next 6 days so hopefully can post something the week after next
Also rather swamped. On the subject of the late Roman solidi I may have one or two things to say, but I'm like to spend the weekend looking into any evidence for the existence of the Gallic Field army in the course of the 5th century. The historical record, for example, is extremely vague on the exact composition of the forces that Aetius commanded during his campaigns even if it does mention barbarian contingents.
There are two ways to read the multi comtingent lists that we are given by Sidonius , Jordanes and to an extent by Procopius. One is that the only effective troops in period are barbarian contingents and that the vast bulk of Roman units are in garrisons and not mobile. That fits with a picturej of economic deline in which the most expensive Roman units, the large cavalry troops have decayed whereas the infantry who are more cloaely tied to places that support them have tended to survive. Barbarians for hire, or settled and then summoned by treaty or individually recruited as bucellarii become the source for cavalry and probably infantry too.
There is an alternative view, which is that the Roman mobile army still exists, but that it is a luterary fashion to mention the contingents of barbarians because the numbering off of submissive tribes following the standards indicates Roman power and it is just unfashionable to mention the Roman regulars. One could read the Sidonian description of Majorian's force in this way, at least in part because he mentions following the standards and fancy antiquarian names are used. Alternatively it could well be that, apart from a couple of guard units, the barbarians are Majorian's force. We know that at least a unit of scholae survived in Italy til Theoderic's reign, though it may only be membership of a shadow unit.
There is mention that when Odovacar launches a coup the Roman troops are too diminished to stand up to the barbarians. As this is in Italy, where it is likely taxes were still paid I take this as indicating that there is no Roman mobile army worth speaking of in 476.
Looking at Jordanes description of Aetius' force against Attila it looks very much as though he has to put together a wide alliance of troops that are no longer really Roman and even then he needs the Visigoths. If Gaul harboured a Roman field army after 450 it would have been with Aetius. contra that you could say that Jordanes gives Attila a speech that describes a Roman army with its wall of shields, but then that is a prime candidate for an item of rhetoric, not a description of Aetius' real polyglot force.
Reaching back, if In the 430s there is a sizeable, mobile, Roman force in Gaul then why does Litorius not use it? Instead he leads a large force of Huns. We know that the Western Empire is strapped for cash at this time which leads to the further question of how would they manage to pay for a Roman army and a force of 10,000 Huns?
Similarly, the structure of Aetius' army is a clue as to what has happened. It is made up of federates, laeti, a group of limitanei etc. If the land is supporting all of these various groups it is surely because the system of having ac largely disarmed civilian population and a professional full time, military has broken down.
Roy
All good points, if true.
Sidonius Apollinaris was a contemporary of the later 5th century AD in Gaul and his letters provide some interesting clues about the continuing presence and pervasiveness of Roman administration.
Letter IV.17, to Epriphus, dated between AD 461 and 467
Quote
The talk was enlivened with amusing jests and pleasantries; above all (and what a blessed thing it was!), there was not a word about officials or taxes, not an informer among us to betray, not a syllable worth betrayal. Every one was free to tell any story worth relating and of a proper tenor; it was a most appreciative audience; the vein of gaiety was not allowed to spoil the distinct relation of each tale.
We note the reference to officials and taxes.
Letter IV.13, to Pannychius, dated AD 469
Quote
HAVE you heard that Seronatus is coming back from Toulouse? If you have not (and I hardly think you have), learn it from these presents. Evanthius is hurrying to Clausetia, making passable the parts of the road in the contractor's hands, and clearing it wherever it is choked with fallen leaves. When he finds any part of the surface full of holes, he rushes in a panic with spadefuls of soil and fills them with his own hands; his business is to conduct his monster from the valley of the Tarn, like the pilot-fish that leads the bulky whale through shoals and rocky waters. [2] But lo! the monster, swift to wrath and slow to move by reason of his bulk, no sooner appears like a dragon uncoiling from his cave, than he makes immediate descent upon the pallid folk of Javols, whose cheeks are pale with fear. They had scattered on all sides, abandoning their townships; and now he drains them dry by new and unparalleled imposts, or takes them in the mesh of calumny; even when they have paid their annual tribute more than once, he refuses to let these unhappy victims return to their homes.
We observe contractors, imposts and an annual tribute exacted by what appears to be a Roman official.
This at least indicates that Roman administration was functioning, even in the debatable part of Gaul, as of the 460s AD. We shall consider soldiery and the economy later. For now one observation will suffice.
Quote from: aligern on January 17, 2014, 09:44:50 AM
If Gaul harboured a Roman field army after 450 it would have been with Aetius. contra that you could say that Jordanes gives Attila a speech that describes a Roman army with its wall of shields, but then that is a prime candidate for an item of rhetoric, not a description of Aetius' real polyglot force.
Attila to my mind would seem an unlikely candidate to use rhetoric when his army could see quite plainly what was in front of them. My own reading of this description - and the simplest explanation - is that Attila was referring to Aetius' regular infantry, whatever their ethnic composition, and not to the entire army fielded by the anti-Hun alliance. We can speculate about whether Armoricans or laeti turned up in Roman-style formations, but Aetius' regular contingent would be the logical irreducible minimum for Attila's comment.
One thing to remember with Sidonius is that he was based in Southern Gaul, Lyons and then the Visigoth area. As far as I can make out his correspondents are in the same area. Southern Gaul retained contact with the Empire far longer than the north and I'm not sure that we can extrapolate what happened in the north from what happened in the south
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 17, 2014, 01:29:14 PM
Quote from: aligern on January 17, 2014, 09:44:50 AM
If Gaul harboured a Roman field army after 450 it would have been with Aetius. contra that you could say that Jordanes gives Attila a speech that describes a Roman army with its wall of shields, but then that is a prime candidate for an item of rhetoric, not a description of Aetius' real polyglot force.
Attila to my mind would seem an unlikely candidate to use rhetoric when his army could see quite plainly what was in front of them. My own reading of this description - and the simplest explanation - is that Attila was referring to Aetius' regular infantry, whatever their ethnic composition, and not to the entire army fielded by the anti-Hun alliance. We can speculate about whether Armoricans or laeti turned up in Roman-style formations, but Aetius' regular contingent would be the logical irreducible minimum for Attila's comment.
However, remember that Aetius did also bring troops from Italy - "
auxilia" says Sidonius, and in the Catalaunium thread we discussed what he might have meant. If these Italian units formed up in a regular Roman wall of shields, Attila's quote (even assuming Jordanes didn't just make it up) need say nothing about whatever troops Aetius found
in Gaul.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 17, 2014, 01:29:14 PM
We can speculate about whether Armoricans or laeti turned up in Roman-style formations, but Aetius' regular contingent would be the logical irreducible minimum for Attila's comment.
This brings to mind a possible comparison with the Rhodesian army (I am ex-Rhodesian so what can I say?). The Rhodesian army was eminently a White institution, modelled closely on the British army and using methods the British army developed in its own guerilla war in Malaya in the 1950's. It existed to uphold White rule in Rhodesia and the way of life established by the Whites. It was an extremely professional force, perhaps the most potent anti-guerrilla army ever developed.
What most people don't know, however, is that two-thirds of its effectives were blacks. All Blacks had the same training as the Whites. The RAR (Rhodesia African Rifles - entirely Black with White officers) for example, took part in Fireforce operations, parachuting in to attack guerrilla positions. The RLI (Rhodesia Light Infantry) was an all-White regiment, and something of a glamour unit, but the best unit of the army, the killer regiment par excellence, were the Selous Scouts.
The Scouts accounted for about 66% of all guerrillas killed in the Rhodesian War (just 'the War' to us Rhodies). It was about 80% Black, though the officers were White. A large proportion of the Blacks were captured guerrillas who were offered the choice of enlistment or execution. Given their lives, medical care if necessary and regular pay, these became some of the best soldiers in the regiment.
The Scouts were entirely professional in their training and fighting ability. The odds did not matter: guerrillas were just dead meat if the Scouts encountered them. At Nyadzonya, for example, 84 Scouts equipped with armoured cars, machine guns and assault rifles destroyed a camp of about 5000 guerrillas.
The point I'm making with this is the power the
esprit de corps of a military unit has on its members. The training and discipline of a professional formation moulds the minds and wills of soldiers in a way that a civilian perhaps cannot grasp. Furthermore in time of war soldiers depend in each other for their lives, and this creates bonds between them that have nothing to do with politics or race. A soldier's loyalty, and his source of pride and professionalism, is to his unit - regiment or legion - and not to wider and more abstract concepts. And the nature of the unit depends entirely on the officers who control it.
Thus, in looking for a Roman army in Gaul we need to discern which formations were professional troops - regardless of their background - and which were temporarily employed barbarian federates. If the commanders and officers were Roman or Gallo-roman, then the units were effectively Roman.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 17, 2014, 04:41:56 PM
Thus, in looking for a Roman army in Gaul we need to discern which formations were professional troops - regardless of their background - and which were temporarily employed barbarian federates. If the commanders and officers were Roman or Gallo-roman, then the units were effectively Roman.
A slight shift in emphasis, I think? I don't think anyone would have a problem with elite units with strong identities led by Roman officers being Roman. But aren't these
buccelarii? Also, what defines a professional? I would suggest it is a kept fighting man. Such a man does not need to be part of a drilled unit with a monetary reward. He can be someone who receives quality provisions , provided with weapons, clothes, jewels maybe even property if lucky. He may be a hired thug or he may have the glamour of a gunslinger or a modern day sports star - the acknowledgement and respect he receives is part of the reward of being a professional. Like a modern sports star, his ethnicity may not matter - he is paid for his skills. Beyond that, I suspect you have a caste of socio-professionals - these could be farmer-soldiers or men who serve for a priviledge like a land holding (several models of this evolve in the early middle ages) or even men who serve because it is an expression of their position in society. And beyond that - short or long term bands of hirelings or allies and, if all else fails, armed civilians.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 17, 2014, 05:19:56 PM
I don't think anyone would have a problem with elite units with strong identities led by Roman officers being Roman. But aren't these buccelarii?
Bucellarii are, strictly, private or household troops retained by an individual, as opposed to regular forces maintained by the state. They may be organised on a regular pattern (like Belisarius' household regiment) but they are private retinues - maintained by their individual paymaster - as opposed to professional soldiers.
Quote
Also, what defines a professional? I would suggest it is a kept fighting man. Such a man does not need to be part of a drilled unit with a monetary reward. He can be someone who receives quality provisions , provided with weapons, clothes, jewels maybe even property if lucky. He may be a hired thug or he may have the glamour of a gunslinger or a modern day sports star - the acknowledgement and respect he receives is part of the reward of being a professional. Like a modern sports star, his ethnicity may not matter - he is paid for his skills. Beyond that, I suspect you have a caste of socio-professionals - these could be farmer-soldiers or men who serve for a privilege like a land holding (several models of this evolve in the early middle ages) or even men who serve because it is an expression of their position in society. And beyond that - short or long term bands of hirelings or allies and, if all else fails, armed civilians.
Actually there is a very simple and obvious criterion for a professional soldier in Late Roman times: his ultimate superior is the Magister Militum. And he does need to be part of a drilled unit for a monetary reward if he wants to collect his pay! :)
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 17, 2014, 02:41:03 PM
However, remember that Aetius did also bring troops from Italy - "auxilia" says Sidonius, and in the Catalaunium thread we discussed what he might have meant. If these Italian units formed up in a regular Roman wall of shields, Attila's quote (even assuming Jordanes didn't just make it up) need say nothing about whatever troops Aetius found in Gaul.
Indeed. But if it was Gallic units that formed the regular Roman wall of shields with or without the auxilia from Italy then Jordanes is attesting to Gaul-based Roman regular units at Chalons. The sad fact is that we cannot tell for certain one way or the other, but we can say that the description he places in Attila's mouth is
consistent with the presence of a not negligible contingent of Roman regulars under Aetius' command.
We may note in passing that when Attila invaded Italy in AD 453 there seems to have been no army to oppose him. Aetius' power base was in Gaul, and Valentinian III had Aetius murdered just before the Huns invaded Italy. Is it too much to suggest that the Roman army had remained with Aetius and had been principally stationed in Gaul following Chalons?
Quote from: aligern on January 17, 2014, 09:44:50 AM
Reaching back, if In the 430s there is a sizeable, mobile, Roman force in Gaul then why does Litorius not use it? Instead he leads a large force of Huns. We know that the Western Empire is strapped for cash at this time which leads to the further question of how would they manage to pay for a Roman army and a force of 10,000 Huns?
I would doubt the existence of such a force in the 430s because the Battle of Rimini (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Ravenna_%28432%29?qsrc=3044), fought between Bonifacius and Aetius, had consumed Aetius' army with the result that he fled to the Huns. It would have taken a while to reconstitute the army.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 17, 2014, 07:18:31 PM
Bucellarii are, strictly, private or household troops retained by an individual, as opposed to regular forces maintained by the state. They may be organised on a regular pattern (like Belisarius' household regiment) but they are private retinues - maintained by their individual paymaster - as opposed to professional soldiers.
Actually there is a very simple and obvious criterion for a professional soldier in Late Roman times: his ultimate superior is the Magister Militum. And he does need to be part of a drilled unit for a monetary reward if he wants to collect his pay! :)
Ok, we clearly have a different view of what professional soldiers are :) To me, a soldier maintained by a paymaster
is a professional - who the paymaster helps define the type of professional. And there was I thinking I'd found some common ground :(
It really does help to take a good look at the primary sources, preferably in the original language, in this case Jordanes' description of Aetius's forces at Chalons. The Latin:
| A parte vero Romanorum tanta patricii Aetii providentia fuit, cui tunc innitebatur res publica Hesperiae plagae, ut undique bellatoribus congregatis adversus ferocem et infinitam multitudinem non impar occurreret. Hi enim adfuerunt auxiliares: Franci, Sarmatae, Armoriciani, Liticiani, Burgundiones, Saxones, Ripari, Olibriones, quondam milites Romani, tunc vero iam in numero auxiliarium exquisiti, aliaeque nonnulli Celticae vel Germanie nationes. |
And a translation:
| On the side of the Romans, meanwhile, the foresight of the Patrician Aetius, on whom the whole Empire of the western reaches depended, was so great that, by gathering warriors from everywhere, it was not on unequal terms that he met the fierce and numberless multitude. Now these were his auxiliaries: Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones (once Roman soldiers and now the flower of the auxiliaries), and some other Celtic or German tribes. |
The sense of the passage can be seen as this: Aetius needed to meet Attila on equal terms, with the implication that he could meet him on unequal terms with what he already had - his regular Gallic troops. He buffed up his numbers by 'gathering warriors from everywhere', and these warriors were not his core army, they were his
auxiliaries.
Another point: The fact that Olibriones were 'once Romans soldiers and now the flower of the
auxiliaries ', implies that they left the regular army but kept the training and expertise - which in turn implies that the regular army was still around, and that it was still good.
This interpretation is reinforced by Attila's speech, where he clearly distinguishes between the Romans and various barbarians, calling them a 'union of discordant races', after which he focusses his contempt (probably assumed for the benefit of his troops) on the Romans. Attila - bear in mind - makes this speech
after Aetius's men have won the fight for the heights on the Roman left.
The Latin:
| Aggrediamur igitur hostem alacres ; audaciores sunt semper qui inferunt bellum. Adunatas despicite dissonas gentes ! Indicium pavoris est, societate defendi. En, ante impetum nostrum terroribus jam feruntur : excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et, sera plenitudine, in campis munitiones efflagitant. Notum est vobis quam sint levia Romanorum arma : primo etiam non dicam vulnere, sed ipso pulvere gravantur, dum in ordine coegunt et acies testudinesque connectunt. |
And a literal translation:
| Let us then attack the foe eagerly; for they are ever the bolder who make the attack. Despise this union of discordant races! To protect oneself by alliance is proof of fear. See, even before our attack they are smitten with terror. They seek the heights, they seize the hillocks and, when it is far too late, clamor for fortifications in the level fields. You know how ineffectual the weapons of the Romans are. They are weighed down, I will not say even by the first wound, but by the dust itself while they are still gathering in formation and joining up their battle lines and tortoises. |
The reference to 'testudines' can mean only a Roman military formation. The sense of the Latin is of drilled, trained troops. The next part of Attila's speech is particularly interesting:
| Vos confligite perstantibus animis, ut soletis, despicientesque eorum aciem ! Alanos invadite, in Wisigothas incumbite ! Inde nobis est citam victoriam quaerere, unde se continet bellum. Abscisis enim nervis mox membra relabuntur ; nec potest stare corpus, cui ossa subtraxeris.
Then on to the fray, remaining resolute in heart as is your wont, and despising their battle line. Attack the Alans, fall on the Visigoths! It is for us to seek a swift victory in the place where the fight is kept up. For when the sinews are cut the limbs soon drop, nor can a body stand when you have removed the bones. |
The sense is this: the Huns have been stopped dead in their tracks by the Roman troops on their right flank. Attila tells them not to lose heart - the Romans' heavy equipment makes them slow. The Huns must leave them and hit the Alans and the Visigoths, for with these swept out the way, the Roman troops cannot hope to stand on their own.
All of which argues a professional Roman army, smallish in size, but still better in quality than anything it fought one to one.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 17, 2014, 07:18:31 PM
Actually there is a very simple and obvious criterion for a professional soldier in Late Roman times: his ultimate superior is the Magister Militum. And he does need to be part of a drilled unit for a monetary reward if he wants to collect his pay! :)
I think you're being a bit simplistic in the definition. Firstly a soldier's ultimate superior is actually the Emperor and it will be to him he will swear the military oath.
Secondly I don't think you can just dismiss Bucellarii. Indeed by your definition the Bucellarii of the Magister Militum are soldiers.
I think we have to be rather more flexible in our definition of soldier, (as Aetius might well have been.)
I think in this period a soldier is someone who is armed and is performing military duties. We might add 'for reward', we might add something about 'under orders from an authority recognised as legitimate by at least some factions'.
Jim
Quote from: rodge on January 11, 2014, 10:15:48 AM
As promised, the 'day's march' quote info:
The 'day's march' quote is not Halsall, it is from Elton 'Defence in 5thC Gaul' from Drinkwater and Elton's '5thC Gaul: A Crisis of Identity?'.
It is based on the idea that both Aegidius, post the victory at Orleans 463, and Syagrius (following his assumption of some kind of position of authority) had their hands full in Northern Gaul with threats from everywhere; including Franks, Saxons, Alamanni and Burgundians.
Aegidius' offensive operations stopped after Orleans perhaps because things were just too hot at home.
Aegidius' ambassadorship to the Vandals in 465 is attributed to the aim of cooperation against yet more threats to the southwest from the Visigoths, though this may be interpreted as the seeds of an offensive strategy.
Elton also states that Aegidius may have had 'factions' (other than those led by Arbogast and Paul) of Roman attitude (but he does not, frustratingly name them, but says 'we also know of') who could have been subordinate, allied, non-aligned or even hostile to Aegidius.
Perhaps this is a reference to Gallo-Roman landowner factions who fancied themselves as the boss...or not.
His conclusion in this section of the paper:
'Though often portrayed as an independent Roman state in north Gaul, Aegidius and Syagrius' 'kingdom' was probably not much bigger than a day's march from their army'.
What is suggested is that northern Gaul was much more fragmentary than is conferred by the phrase 'the kingdom' and Aegidius' and Syagrius' grip on it only extended as far as the force they could project.
Notice that this is a pile of suggestions without a scrap of hard evidence. The only evidence I am aware of for Syagrius controlling only Soissons and its immediate environs is the reference in the
Vita Sanctae Genovefae to Childeric occupying Paris:
| The king of France, Childeric, how be it he was a pagan, held her in great reverence, so did also the barons of France, for the fair miracles that she did in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.
Whereof it happened on a time that the said king held certain prisoners judged to death, but because Genevieve should not demand them, he issued out of Paris, and made to shut the gates after him. The holy virgin knew it anon, and went hastily after him for to help to deliver them. As soon as she came to the gates, they opened without key, all the people seeing which, thought it a great wonder. She pursued the king and obtained grace for the prisoners. |
Paris was right in the centre of Syagrius's realm, which would mean that the Frankish king controlled the territory to the north and south of Soissons, leaving Syagrius with very little to call his own. This interpretation however is incredible: it means that Syagrius would have had only a small force of men to lead against the Frankish alliance of Clovis, and yet with that small band he was eager to meet Clovis in battle. Was he seeking an honourable death? Then why did he flee to the Visigoths?
The idea that Childeric occupied Paris is contradicted by the Vitae itself:
| The said king [Clovis] did increase much the realm of France, and franchised it by his puissance from the Romans. He conquered Melun, and the land lying by Seine and Loire, Touraine, Toulouse, and all Guienne, and at his coming to Angouleme the walls of the city fell down. He made Almaine and Bourgogne his tributaries, he ordained and instituted Paris to be the chief siege of the realm. |
It was Clovis who conquered the Paris region and by implication Paris itself (the idea of the Franks controlling an isolated town for years in the middle of hostile Roman territory is absurd).
The best way to interpret the incident of Childeric in Paris is to suppose that the scribe, out of confusion or a possible deference to Clovis, substituted his father's name for an incident that involved Clovis when he was still a pagan, i.e. just before his baptism in 496/7.
You are confusing Childeric the king of a group of the franks and Childeric the roman official. Whilst they were the same person, given that Childeric was an important part of the plans of both Aegidius, and Comes Paul of Angers, there is no reason why, at some point, he wasn't the officer in charge of Paris a generation before Syagrius.
We mustn't fall into the trap of drawing a hard and fast line between 'Roman' and 'Barbarian'. There is no more reason why a Frank should not become the officer commanding Paris than why a Vandal, a Burgundian or a Goth should not become magister militum
As for complaining about a lack of hard evidence, there appears to be none whatsoever for a Regular field army in the North of Gaul in the time of Syagrius. :-)
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 17, 2014, 10:18:53 PM
The sense of the passage can be seen as this: Aetius needed to meet Attila on equal terms, with the implication that he could meet him on unequal terms with what he already had - his regular Gallic troops. He buffed up his numbers by 'gathering warriors from everywhere', and these warriors were not his core army, they were his auxiliaries.
Given the number of auxiliaries listed, it would be logical though to assume they form a large part of the army. There is, in this passage, no reference to a core "Roman" army. This could be read,
contra your interpretation, that such a force was not significant in the makeup of the army. Not saying that's true but hardly a clincher.
Turning to your suggestion of looking at the original language, I think we should think about Jordanes literary style too. I know nothing about this but we know some authors used more traditional latin than others. Does Jordanes use military language technically or does he use it in a more literary style? In this passage, are "auxiliaries" a reference to a type of military service, a classically-inspired reference to imply that these are not true Romans or just a common term for supporters? This will also help with terms like
testudo. In Early Medieval Latin, this had already shifted meaning to "shieldwall". Is Jordanes using it with this looser meaning, rather than a Roman drill formation?
'Notice that this is a pile of suggestions without a scrap of hard evidence.'
To be honest Justin there is very little hard evidence on this period as you know.
The evidence we have is fragmentary and capable of having wildy varying conclusions drawn from it; as this thread demonstrates.
Elton's conclusions are as valid as anyones (within reason).
Even ours.
Can you give a quick breakdown of the 10,000 troops you believe Syagrius had at Soisson please (apologies if it is buried somewhere in the thead) so we can all be sure how many ex/Army of Gaul disciplined Roman troops we are looking at?
Quote from: rodge on January 18, 2014, 09:01:11 AM
'Notice that this is a pile of suggestions without a scrap of hard evidence.'
To be honest Justin there is very little hard evidence on this period as you know.
The evidence we have is fragmentary and capable of having wildy varying conclusions drawn from it; as this thread demonstrates.
Elton's conclusions are as valid as anyones (within reason).
Even ours.
Can you give a quick breakdown of the 10,000 troops you believe Syagrius had at Soisson please (apologies if it is buried somewhere in the thead) so we can all be sure how many ex/Army of Gaul disciplined Roman troops we are looking at?
Let me say right away that that remark was not directed at your good self. It just irritated me that the affirmation: 'Though often portrayed as an independent Roman state in north Gaul, Aegidius and Syagrius' 'kingdom' was probably not much bigger than a day's march from their army' could be made on the basis of the kind of cotton wool that writer seems to provide.
It's true that there is not much evidence. We are never going to be able to quote long primary sources giving a detailed description of the makeup of Syagrius's army. Everything we have confortably fits into a few pages and it will not get any bigger.
I feel, however, that one can play at Sherlock Holmes with the evidence, putting together the few pieces we have and coming to some definite conclusions. But this requires an acceptance of the literary record unless clearly refuted by other evidence. If one casts doubt on primary sources when they don't fit a popular theory then one must give up doing history altogether and write movie scripts or something (sorry, getting irritable again).
To answer your question:
I posit a terminus a quo and ad quem, and a point between them, all of which indicate the existence of a trained and professional Roman army in northern Gaul throughout the 5th century.
1.
A quo: the Notitia describes the makeup of the Gallic Field army, headquartered at Paris, which puts its strength at about 32,000 men. The account of the usurper Constantine make it fairly clear that he needed the support of these troops to have any hope of taking over the Western Roman Empire. The forces he had in Britain were nowhere near enough. Hence the Gallic Field army was alive and well even during and after the barbarian incursions after 406. I might add that similar incursions took place in the latter 3rd century without that implying that the Roman army in Gaul had ceased to exist. In times of civil war, the Roman generals were preoccupied with beating each other; barbarian raiders were a secondary consideration.
2.
Midpoint: Aetius's Roman troops at Chalons. Jordanes contents himself with describing only the Auxilia of Aetius. Writers of the time seem to have preferred detailing the barbarian contingents under Roman command and devoting much less space to describing the Roman contingents if they described them at all, so nothing unusual about this. The Roman troops had to be large and professional enough to beat off a Hunnish/Gepid attack and dissuade Attila from attacking them again. At a guess we're talking between 10,000 and 20,000 men.
3.
Ad quem: The Roman soldiers stationed along the Loire as described by Procopius. These were the surviving units of legions, respected for their quality, recognizably Roman and proud of being so. One of them can be identified: the 'legio bretonum' or II Britannica.
The question is, how large and Roman was Syagrius's army, situated between 2. and 3 (nearer 2)? It had to be large enough to stand up to Clovis's Franks with a good chance of success, and Clovis could easily have assembled an army of 20,000 men or more. So make Syagrius's Romans about 10,000 men. The pride and professionalism of Procopius's legions would mean that Syagrius's troops were just as professional, if not more so. They were full-time soldiers, it being a profession handed from father to son as affirmed by Procopius.
Nothing prevented Syagrius from maintaining an army this size. His territory had retained its economic and social infrastructure. Contrary to a popular notion, northern Gaul did not depend economically at all on the Mediterranean. Bulk goods were not shipped from the south to the north or vice versa (hence little use of olive oil in the north). Northern Gaul with Britain had had to provision a Roman army of several tens of thousands in the past. Syagrius's territory could easily supply a 10,000 man army.
I'll talk about the coinage in another post, enough to say for now that the distribution of solidi
does indicate, at least to a large extent, a paid soldiery.
The picture hangs together and everything is accounted for. All that is missing is detailed and conclusive documentary evidence, a
Vita Syagrii. But then we wouldn't be having this discussion....
'Let me say right away that that remark was not directed at your good self.'
It wasn't taken as such Justin :), but thanks for saying it.
The two (or more) camps in this discussion currently seem to be:
1) Northern Gaul was hale and hearty, Roman in nature, in military prowess (in terms of its troops, their formations and training and to some extent numbers) and administration (administration mechanics were, as far we know and to a certain extent, carried on into the reign of Clovis and beyond).
2) Northern Gaul was fragmented; it was a loose arrangement of Gallo-Romans, Britons, Alans etc and erstwhile Imperial soldiers and their families. It was not a last bastion, or echo of the Roman Empire, but was an area in flux and conflict and did not have a standing army based on the the model (nor a sizable proportion of the numbers) of the Army of Gaul.
Is that a fair summation?
I would say so, yes.
Quote from: rodge on January 18, 2014, 10:05:56 AM
'Let me say right away that that remark was not directed at your good self.'
Is that a fair summation?
Almost exactly as I had it summarised in my head. Each camp views the evidence through the prism of the viewpoint it has determined (including myself). One person's Holmesian reasoning is another's flight of fantasy. Even with more evidence of the same equivocal nature, I'm not sure how we can advance :(
Quote from: Erpingham on January 18, 2014, 10:13:04 AM
I'm not sure how we can advance :(
I think we all need to agree that
1) the sources are equivocal
2) that there is no 'right' answer
I'm more than happy to continue under this kind of aircover.
It is an interesting and informative discussion and, who knows, may provoke a friendly and intelligently comparative piece in Slingshot...?
Off for a dig.....
i think logic and a sensible understanding of the evidence can give us a best fit picture, but it eill be more like a 60/40 likelihood than a 90/10 level of certainty. However, at 60/40 there would still be a right answer.
Its a bit like the question of King Arthur
To say that there was a King Arthur would be wrong.
To say that the Britons had a leader who defeated the Sacons causing a 50 year gap in their advance would be right.
We might go for an answer that has a relict Roman force in North Gaul if there was just no description of an army from the region, but we do have such a description, it is from Jordanes and fails to mention these Romans. There are plenty of other opportunities for this force to be mentioned... it isn't. What the evidence does support is that Syagrius has a force of buccellarii and has perhaps other allied troops from the sort of source that Jordanes quotes for Aetius.
Having read through the posts since ny last post I would like to make a few points that refer to various contributions.
Patrick, Your piece quoting Sidonius is highly inconvenient for your case. Sidonius is writing in the Visigothic area of Gaul to other Roman notables in that area. So when you show that tax collection is going on and road repairs they are happening in an area that has no formal Roman army, the troops supported are the army of the Visigoth king.( The obe caveat to this would be the fleet at Bordeaux, however that fits best with a model in which some limitanei and garrisons with a Roman history survive, not field armies)
Justin, you are asking too much of Jordanes. There is no mention of a regular Roman army there and implying that he has a force that needs a few extra auxilia to face off Attila is yet a further stretch.
Aetius brings a few troops from Italy. In Gaul he collects a whole string of allies who are not enough to face Attila until he gets the Alans and Visigoths too. If there is an unmentioned Roman contingent then clearly it is tiny.
Jordanes raids other texts for much of his description of the Goths early history. Attila's battle speech doesn't tell us much about Roman military methods a century before he wrote. it will have been written to put an appropriate oration in the text.
The most destructive part of Jordanes account for Justin's case is the contingent that were formerly Roman soldiers. Accidentally this tells us what happened to the field army that existed in 420, its units made their own local deal , almost certainly when the tax payments stopped.
The whole idea that Northern Gaul supplied the Rhine defences and the field army of itself is highly unlikely . The Romans have an extensive tax system that supports its own bureaucracy and the army and Rome and Constantinople. The big producers in this regime are, Egypt, the Eastern cities and North Africa. Because the Empire is split in two the West is highly dependent upon Africa and once those revenues are list the payment mechanism for troops is compromised and they are forced to default to their own locality. Even in Italy the army consists of hired barbarians. Given the list of troops that Aetius has that are non Roman i.e. no longer swear an oath to the emperor is it not likely that these people are using up the supplies in the area that would support soldiery, especially when the zone also has to support the buccellarii of the local notables.
Ji is right, we should not get hung up on the definition of a soldier as regular or irregular here. You could be a member of a regular unit that was split up in fortlets, spent its time doing police work and farming, was full of dead pays and was thoroughly inefficient or you might be a young well born barbarian who campaigned with his kin group annually and was thoroughly militarily efficient.Alaric wanted the position of Magister Militum per Illyricum so that he could feed and clothe his Visigoth army. Now would that have made them Roman soldiers?
Roy.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 18, 2014, 09:49:17 AM
I posit a terminus a quo and ad quem, and a point between them, all of which indicate the existence of a trained and professional Roman army in northern Gaul throughout the 5th century.
1. A quo: the Notitia describes the makeup of the Gallic Field army, headquartered at Paris, which puts its strength at about 32,000 men. The account of the usurper Constantine make it fairly clear that he needed the support of these troops to have any hope of taking over the Western Roman Empire. The forces he had in Britain were nowhere near enough. Hence the Gallic Field army was alive and well even during and after the barbarian incursions after 406. I might add that similar incursions took place in the latter 3rd century without that implying that the Roman army in Gaul had ceased to exist. In times of civil war, the Roman generals were preoccupied with beating each other; barbarian raiders were a secondary consideration.
The problem here is the Notitia. There are a lot of arguments about the date, and whether various sections were updated together or were last updated. Indeed I've seen one argument http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/JRS/10/Notitia_Dignitatum*.html that the notitia entry for Britain proves that it was still part of the Empire in the 420s.
However I know of no theory which suggests the Gallic entry is later than about 430. This is about sixty years earlier than the battle of Soissons, and given what has happened in Gaul since, is not necessarily a good indicator of the situation in 486.
Another thing to remember is that even assuming the units existed, we know from other evidence in other parts of the empire that units might only be shadows of their former selves with regards numbers. Some of the units could have dwindled to city garrisons, others might be a third or a quarter of their paper strength. This 'field army' might not have been able to field a field army of more than a couple of thousand men.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 18, 2014, 09:49:17 AM
2. Midpoint: Aetius's Roman troops at Chalons. Jordanes contents himself with describing only the Auxilia of Aetius. Writers of the time seem to have preferred detailing the barbarian contingents under Roman command and devoting much less space to describing the Roman contingents if they described them at all, so nothing unusual about this. The Roman troops had to be large and professional enough to beat off a Hunnish/Gepid attack and dissuade Attila from attacking them again. At a guess we're talking between 10,000 and 20,000 men.
Remember here we're at least twenty plus years after the Notitia, and there has been a lot of campaigning by Aetius and others in Gaul. You're also arguing from silence. Jordanes didn't mention Roman regulars because it was unfashionable. Unfortunately he would also have failed to mention Roman regulars if they had not been present. Even if present, they could have come from Italy rather than Gaul.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 18, 2014, 09:49:17 AM
3. Ad quem: The Roman soldiers stationed along the Loire as described by Procopius. These were the surviving units of legions, respected for their quality, recognizably Roman and proud of being so. One of them can be identified: the 'legio bretonum' or II Britannica.
Indeed it's perfectly possible for city militias with long histories to hang on. The last units of limitanei in Egypt lasted up until the conquest of the Arabs.
Within the context of a city or town militia then this would give them their 'unit traditions', their source of recruits and their economic base. The unit traditions might even extend to them doing some basic drill.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 18, 2014, 09:49:17 AM
The question is, how large and Roman was Syagrius's army, situated between 2. and 3 (nearer 2)? It had to be large enough to stand up to Clovis's Franks with a good chance of success, and Clovis could easily have assembled an army of 20,000 men or more. So make Syagrius's Romans about 10,000 men. The pride and professionalism of Procopius's legions would mean that Syagrius's troops were just as professional, if not more so. They were full-time soldiers, it being a profession handed from father to son as affirmed by Procopius.
Remember it has been pointed out that there is no evidence whatsoever that Clovis could raise 20,000 men in 486, indeed the evidence points to him struggling to raise that sort of numbers far later in his reign.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 18, 2014, 09:49:17 AM
Nothing prevented Syagrius from maintaining an army this size. His territory had retained its economic and social infrastructure. Contrary to a popular notion, northern Gaul did not depend economically at all on the Mediterranean. Bulk goods were not shipped from the south to the north or vice versa (hence little use of olive oil in the north). Northern Gaul with Britain had had to provision a Roman army of several tens of thousands in the past. Syagrius's territory could easily supply a 10,000 man army.
I'll talk about the coinage in another post, enough to say for now that the distribution of solidi does indicate, at least to a large extent, a paid soldiery.
The picture hangs together and everything is accounted for. All that is missing is detailed and conclusive documentary evidence, a Vita Syagrii. But then we wouldn't be having this discussion....
I'm afraid that I disagree with you about the area retaining its 'economic and social infrastructure'. Northern Gaul had been troubled by the Bagaudae, the slow steady erosion of territory by the Franks, who you feel could raise 20,000 men but could support them without apparently impinging on the rest of Gaul. The units on the Rhine were often fed with grain shipped from Britain, which obviously wasn't forthcoming any more, and as far as I know all the evidence is that villas in the north of gaul declined, agriculture was in recession.
Jim
Quote from: aligern on January 18, 2014, 10:55:19 AM
The whole idea that Northern Gaul supplied the Rhine defences and the field army of itself is highly unlikely . The Romans have an extensive tax system that supports its own bureaucracy and the army and Rome and Constantinople. The big producers in this regime are, Egypt, the Eastern cities and North Africa. Because the Empire is split in two the West is highly dependent upon Africa and once those revenues are list the payment mechanism for troops is compromised and they are forced to default to their own locality.
Are you suggesting here that the Rhine army was fed by Tunisian grain? That seems a little unlikely on logistical grounds. Or merely that Tunisian taxes paid for more locally sourced grain?
In Wickham's version at least, the idea that northern Gaul supported the Rhine army is primarily about raw materials. In his version, northern Gaul (and Britain) is largely cut off from the Mediterranean area as far as traffic in staples goes, because land transport is prohibitively expensive and the sea route around Hispania is too long.
Interesting paper on supplying the Roman army on the Rhine
http://dpc.uba.uva.nl/jalc/04/nr02/a01
Also 5. Food supply to the Roman army in the Rhine delta in the first century A.D.
Whilst only really looking at the 1st and early 2nd century their conclusion is that some grain was produced further east along the Rhine for use on the Rhine but a lot was imported
Jim
Interesting. The writer affirms that part of the food supply would have had to be 'imported' i.e. brought in from somewhere outside the immediate Rhine area. That would be northern Gaul and Britain. In other words, the frontier regions of the Rhine would not, by themselves, have been able to feed tens of thousands of troops garrisoned there (keeping in mind this is a period when most of the army was stationed on the frontier). Fair enough.
I note this extract:
| Although the agrarian population to the south of the Rhine was integrated in the Roman empire to a high degree, hardly any imported food plants have been found in the agrarian settlements. Based on these results, it is assumed that in the Roman period the rural population produced its own food and did not import food from elsewhere. |
Which suggests the absence of long-distance trade between this region and the Mediterranean basin.
I don't think anyone has seriously suggested that grain was hauled from the med, although the Rhone was a major artery for some commerce.
But the problem is that
1) Britain was no longer a potential source
2) A lot of the land on the Rhine was now in Frankish hands
3) The local area had struggled to provide the grain for the frontier garrisons, organised agriculture and villas were in decline (one reason for allowing the Franks in was that there was so much 'deserted' land available)
Finding the wealth to fund a large standing field army looks difficult
Jim
Not really.
1) A large part of Britain's produce had gone towards feeding the troops stationed there. Gaul had the lion's share of feeding troops stationed in Gaul.
2) And plenty remained in Roman hands. As we've seen earlier, If 5% of Syagrius's realm was committed to military support, that would have left him with an army well in excess of the figure we are contemplating.
3) No evidence either for a struggle or a decline. The only reason for 'allowing' Franks in was that it was easier to co-opt their support in exchange for land than to fight them. The policy was adopted with the Visigoths and it worked quite well. Natural to extend it to the Franks.
Taxes in non frontier provinces went to pay the soldiery who then bought food locally. When Jim talks agriculture I generally do not argue and a little while back he made the point that, if there is no profit in it, farmers soon stop producing because there is no market. Troops also consume oil, well fats, wine, beer, fish, meat, leather, wood, iron , armaments etc. The whole being dependent upon a tax system that stimulates local oroduction. Given the high number of expensive units on the Rhine and in Northern Gaul it would have been ruinous to concentrate all the demands of the army on local producers on a tax basis. If you tax basic production and agriculture too high the farmers up and leave which they of course did.
In theory the lands of the Empire could produce enough for a large number of troops, but in a Society such as medieval England , which is organised for war the actual number of men supported is quite small. This is because there are other demands such as the standard of living of the better off(luxuries) the support of the poor, monks, nuns, bureaucrats, farm managers, towns and all their costs (walls for a start ) .Hence there are many costs in a sophisticated society that have to be borne as well as just the cost of troops. Later arome was no different.
When we see symptoms of tax rebellion such as the Bagaudae and resistance to conscription and the imposition of laws to force the middle classes to collect taxes and be responsible for their total payment that cause people to avoid public service, then we are seeing a society that cannot pay for its troops . That is further evidenced by granting land to barbarians in return for military service without those barbarians being broken up into small groups, but allowed to settle together. This happens because Rome can no longer afford the armies necessary to break the Visigoths and the franks.
Rome can be compared to the Soviet Empire in its inefficiency and corruption and in its response to military competition.
For the Romans it was a further disaster that the 406 invasion and the civil wars disrupted provinces and eventually removed the richest. From 430 onwards the loss of Spain, Africa, Southern Gaul and Britain must have crippled tax receipts. In attempting to secure Gaul Aetius has to rely on settling Alans and Burgundians and hiring a Hun field army. I just do not see how this situation is compatible. with the survival of any sort ofRoman field army. Awtius activities only make sense if there is no Roman core and land must be ceded to create a counterbalance to Bagaudae and barbarians already settled on the basis that even back in the 410s the Romans cannot take a major tribe head on and force it to submit and break up.
Roy
The three main objections to a field army surviving in northern Gaul appear to be:
a) there is no direct and unequivocal mention of it,
b) there wasn't enough money to pay for it, and
c) there was no centralised authority to run it.
Does that sum it up?
Not quite Justin
My main objection is that there are mentions of forces in the period and area that describe a different construction, one of numerous contingents, laeti, limitanei, federates and we can assume buccellarii . So there is an alternate model by which Aegidius and Syagrius can build a decent sized force and that model has more supporting, albeit contextual, evidence.
So my objection to the survival if a regular Roman army in Northern Gaul that descends from Notitia units or is reinvented and new recruited is just that there is a solution that better fits the evidence.
Roy
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 18, 2014, 01:36:31 PM
3) No evidence either for a struggle or a decline. The only reason for 'allowing' Franks in was that it was easier to co-opt their support in exchange for land than to fight them. The policy was adopted with the Visigoths and it worked quite well. Natural to extend it to the Franks.
I am sorry but that is just wrong
First we have
The corn supply of Ancient Rome. Geoffrey Rickman
"The areas of greatest importance for corn were two, First the area in southwest France, the plains of Gascony, the lands of the Upper Garonne, and the Rhone valley; secondly the plains further to the north around the Loire and the Seine. It was the first area in the south and south west Gaul that was most obviously connected with the exporting centres of Narbonne and Arles. The second area was most naturally connected with supplies for the Rhine armies, but it was certainly not impossible for the products of this region to find their way up the Loire and then down the Rhone valley to Arles."
Then I would recommend you looked at
'The Roman Villa' by John Percival. It has a section looking at the villas in Gaul. He discusses the north. "Lying as it does on major routes of communication, the area not surprisingly suffered considerably in the troubles of the third century, but the indications of destruction at this period are fairly evenly matched by those of repair and reoccupation afterwards, and individual coin lists, such as those for the villas around Josnes, away to the north east, would seem to imply occupation until the end of the fourth century and perhaps even later."
Talking about the Paris area he comments "the general picture seems to be one of initial settlement fairly late in the first century, widespread destruction or abandonment in the third and then repair and recovery, (though often at a somewhat lower level) in the fourth."
This seems to be a general pattern, a really rough third century with signs of some recovery in the fourth, but the fourth century not as prosperous as, say, the second century
So this is the big grain area that might have fed (and paid) the armies, prosperous 2nd century, collapse in third century, fourth century some improvement, no real evidence for continuation into the fifth century.
Then we have
'The economies of Roman-British villas', the specific article of interest is
John Percival
'The villa economy, problems and perspectives'."It may be that at certain periods there was a tendency for villas to become more self sufficient; I have argued elsewhere that this happened in parts of Gaul in the later Empire, and that as a result a number of villas were able to survive into a period when the social and economic organisation of the Roman World was no longer there to be integrated into. But if they did, they ceased, effectively, to be villas, not simply in the sense that they no longer resembled villas, but in the deeper sense that they had become separated from the very world which had defined them. "
So basically the agriculture in northern France drifted down into peasant self sufficiency, outputs were considerably lower, they were not producing for a market, the market had disappeared, and the villas seem to have become small hamlets or villages inhabited by subsistence cultivators.
There is no evidence for the wealth of the area, in fact by claiming the area was wealthy you are flying in the face of the archaeological evidence.
Indeed if you read J F Drinkwater '
The Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul' in
Fifth-century Gaul: A crisis of Identity,
He points out that there was a major problem for landowners in Gaul in the 5th cent because there was increasing taxation (because Africa was no longer part of the Empire) which fell on the shoulders of the lesser landowners. Barbarian invasion, civil war, disease and starvation reduced the labour force. An increase in the number of internal frontiers meant that coloni and slaves found it easier to escape to better working conditions
To quote "In the first half of the 5th century the western empire was burdened by continuing heavy expenditure, principally on warfare, that had to be funded from a taxation base that was damaged and shrinking. As a result, those who were still available to be taxed were bound to be asked to pay more, In theory the burden of this extra taxation should have fallen on the shoulders of those who owned the most wealth, the great landowners. However and I have suggested, these may have already been facing a significant diminution in their incomes as a result of lower agricultural rents, higher wages and, we are entitled to suppose, a depressed market caused by a general contraction of the economy. In other words such people may well have faced very real difficulties ."
So in northern Gaul you have agriculture in decline, and Drinkwater points to various of the writers at the time to show that the Bacaudae were not distressed slaves and coloni fleeing to hide in the woods. They didn't need to, they merely had to flee to better conditions on another holding where a new master would be delighted to have their labour.
"Roman Gaul' resulted from the Roman military presence on the Rhine; the Rhine frontier gave Gaul its shape and meaning. In the fifth century, although there may have been some general policy of continuing to hold the Rhine, the position was clearly not as before. Specifically west of the river there developed internal frontier beyond which the imperial writ did not run, and over which refugees from imperial rule could seek asylum. "
"To maintain itself; that is to protect itself and fill its treasury, the Roman state needed to recover as many as possible of these lost territories. It was too weak to wage indiscriminate war against the Barbarians who had settled or who were settling on Roman soil, therefore its obvious strategy was, while attempting to limit further barbarian expansion, to concentrate on the gaining of those areas that had drifted out of Roman control but which, as yet, had not been claimed by Germans. In brief in the north at least, imperial generals operated a policy not of defence or even policing, but of reconquest."
"Until this period, the members of the external communities suggested above may well have considered themselves to be involved in no direct rebellion against Rome. They probably thought of themselves as Roman. They may even have continued to recognise the authority of the emperor, if on their own terms. They will certainly not have called themselves Bacaudae. However , when the attempt was made to integrate them fully within the Roman empire, they resisted, in necessary by force, with the help of their dependents, free and slave."
To put it simply, North Gaul was screwed ;-)
Jim
Jim has just made an excellent case for the continuation of Roman administration in northern Gaul. :)
Drinkwater notes the 'increasing taxation' and "In brief in the north at least, imperial generals operated a policy not of defence or even policing, but of reconquest." Hmmm ...
Percival indicates that "the villas around Josnes, away to the north east, would seem to imply occupation until the end of the fourth century and perhaps even later." My impression is that he does not address the 5th century.
Regarding Rickman, let us look at Sidonius again.
Quote
"when the Gothic ravages were over, and the crops were all destroyed by fire, you distributed corn to the destitute throughout all the ruined land of Gaul at your own expense, though it would have been relief enough to our starving peoples if the grain had come to them, not as a free gift, but by the usual paths of commerce. We saw the roads encumbered with your grain-carts. Along the Saône and Rhone we saw more than one granary which you had entirely filled. [6] The legends of the heathen are eclipsed; Triptolemus must yield his pride of place, whom his fatherland of Greece deified for his discovery of corn; Greece, famed for her architects, her sculptors and her artists, who consecrated temples, and fashioned statues, and painted effigies in his honour. A doubtful story fables that this son of Ceres came wandering among peoples savage and acorn-fed, and that from two ships, to which poetry later assigned the form of dragons, he distributed the unknown seed. But you brought supplies from either Mediterranean shore, and, if need were, you would have sought them among the cities of the Tyrrhenian sea; your granaries filled not two paltry ships, but the basins of two great rivers." - Book III Letter 12 to Bishop Patiens, AD 474
We observe the all-too-real ravages of the Gothic incursion, but also that significant granaries still exist (as of AD 474) and that one bishop can afford to buy relief for a whole region "from either Mediterranean shore", indicating that perhaps grain trade and transportation were not so limited as Rickman thinks. We may note, as Jim has, the use of the Rhone and Saone for the transportation of grain.
In fact, Sidonius gives the impression that Roman administration, tax collection and, oddly enough, the Roman army are carrying on at full blast as of 474-475. Having warned his kinsman Apollinaris that an intrigue is afoot ("venomous tongues have been secretly at work, whispering in the ear of the ever-victorious Chilperic, our Master of the Soldiery" - V.6), in his next letter he identifies the intriguers as certain base fellows who are abusing the administration of Gaul:
Quote
"These are they at whose appearance the world's great scoundrels would confess themselves surpassed, Narcissus, Asiaticus, Massa, Marcellus, Carus, Parthenius, Licinus, Pallas, and all their peers. These are they who grudge quiet folks their peace, the soldier his pay, the courier his fare, the merchant his market, the ambassador his gifts, the farmer of tolls his dues, the provincial his farm, the municipality its flamen's dignity, the controllers of revenue their weights, the receivers their measures, the registrars their salary, the accountants their fees, the bodyguards their presents, towns their truces, taxgatherers their taxes, the clergy the respect men pay them, the nobles their lineage, superiors their seats in council, equals equality, the official his jurisdiction, the ex-official his distinctions, scholars their schools, masters their stipends, and finished pupils their accomplishments." - Letters V.7.3 AD 474-5
The picture Sidonius paints is of a very present and pervasive Roman administration being (perhaps characteristically for the period) abused by various officials. We should bear in mind that the provincials in the debateable lands of southern Gaul appear to have been sustaining both a Roman administration and, from the reference to soldiers and pay, an army.
We may note also how power seems to rest with Chilperic, the Magister Militum, the commander of the army.
This seems to me to be a good measure by which to assess the condition, status and administration of northern Gaul in the same period, albeit without the destructive Gothic incursions or the parasitic Imperial favourites. I do not see Aegidius or Syagrius having any incentive to abandon the existing system.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 18, 2014, 10:55:53 PM
Jim has just made an excellent case for the continuation of Roman administration in northern Gaul. :)
Drinkwater notes the 'increasing taxation' and "In brief in the north at least, imperial generals operated a policy not of defence or even policing, but of reconquest." Hmmm ...
Yes, the Bagaudae were a major problem between AD 409-17. The increasing taxation which led to them was in that period. Once you have them, they aren't paying taxes any more.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 18, 2014, 10:55:53 PM
Percival indicates that "the villas around Josnes, away to the north east, would seem to imply occupation until the end of the fourth century and perhaps even later." My impression is that he does not address the 5th century.
Nor the 6th, nor the 7th. But as I pointed out later, the villas that did continue did so on an entirely different economic basis, they couldn't keep slave or coloni labour forces easily, labour costs rose and they reverted to subsistence agriculture
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 18, 2014, 10:55:53 PM
Regarding Rickman, let us look at Sidonius again.
Quote
"when the Gothic ravages were over, and the crops were all destroyed by fire, you distributed corn to the destitute throughout all the ruined land of Gaul at your own expense, though it would have been relief enough to our starving peoples if the grain had come to them, not as a free gift, but by the usual paths of commerce. We saw the roads encumbered with your grain-carts. Along the Saône and Rhone we saw more than one granary which you had entirely filled. [6] The legends of the heathen are eclipsed; Triptolemus must yield his pride of place, whom his fatherland of Greece deified for his discovery of corn; Greece, famed for her architects, her sculptors and her artists, who consecrated temples, and fashioned statues, and painted effigies in his honour. A doubtful story fables that this son of Ceres came wandering among peoples savage and acorn-fed, and that from two ships, to which poetry later assigned the form of dragons, he distributed the unknown seed. But you brought supplies from either Mediterranean shore, and, if need were, you would have sought them among the cities of the Tyrrhenian sea; your granaries filled not two paltry ships, but the basins of two great rivers." - Book III Letter 12 to Bishop Patiens, AD 474
We observe the all-too-real ravages of the Gothic incursion, but also that significant granaries still exist (as of AD 474) and that one bishop can afford to buy relief for a whole region "from either Mediterranean shore", indicating that perhaps grain trade and transportation were not so limited as Rickman thinks. We may note, as Jim has, the use of the Rhone and Saone for the transportation of grain.
The church in Italy in this period tended to import grain from Sicily where there were considerable estates which had been donated to the church. Whether the grain in this case is African or Sicilian we cannot know.
In fact, Sidonius gives the impression that Roman administration, tax collection and, oddly enough, the Roman army are carrying on at full blast as of 474-475. Having warned his kinsman Apollinaris that an intrigue is afoot ("venomous tongues have been secretly at work, whispering in the ear of the ever-victorious Chilperic, our Master of the Soldiery" - V.6), in his next letter he identifies the intriguers as certain base fellows who are abusing the administration of Gaul:
Quote
"These are they at whose appearance the world's great scoundrels would confess themselves surpassed, Narcissus, Asiaticus, Massa, Marcellus, Carus, Parthenius, Licinus, Pallas, and all their peers. These are they who grudge quiet folks their peace, the soldier his pay, the courier his fare, the merchant his market, the ambassador his gifts, the farmer of tolls his dues, the provincial his farm, the municipality its flamen's dignity, the controllers of revenue their weights, the receivers their measures, the registrars their salary, the accountants their fees, the bodyguards their presents, towns their truces, taxgatherers their taxes, the clergy the respect men pay them, the nobles their lineage, superiors their seats in council, equals equality, the official his jurisdiction, the ex-official his distinctions, scholars their schools, masters their stipends, and finished pupils their accomplishments." - Letters V.7.3 AD 474-5
The picture Sidonius paints is of a very present and pervasive Roman administration being (perhaps characteristically for the period) abused by various officials. We should bear in mind that the provincials in the debateable lands of southern Gaul appear to have been sustaining both a Roman administration and, from the reference to soldiers and pay, an army.
We may note also how power seems to rest with Chilperic, the Magister Militum, the commander of the army.
This seems to me to be a good measure by which to assess the condition, status and administration of northern Gaul in the same period, albeit without the destructive Gothic incursions or the parasitic Imperial favourites. I do not see Aegidius or Syagrius having any incentive to abandon the existing system.
[/quote]
Remember Sidonius was from Southern Gaul, a very different world from the North. Also if I remember correctly Chilperic was a Burgundian and his force was probably largely Burgundian. Also Southern Gaul was far more settled and prosperous in the north until the Visigoths finally broke their leash in the time of Sidonius. Up until about 470 the south was barely disputed
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 18, 2014, 11:17:49 PM
Remember Sidonius was from Southern Gaul, a very different world from the North. Also if I remember correctly Chilperic was a Burgundian and his force was probably largely Burgundian. Also Southern Gaul was far more settled and prosperous in the north until the Visigoths finally broke their leash in the time of Sidonius. Up until about 470 the south was barely disputed
How was southern Gaul a 'very different world' from the north? This statement seems to be the basis of the assumption that northern Gaul could not support an army, and hence might be worth quantifying as much as possible, or at least pointing out the indicators that lead to this conclusion.
Drinkwater's analysis of bacaudae seems less than relevant to the northern Gaul of the post-450s where the Magister Militum seems free to set his own tax rates (and is not paying any of it to Rome - not so much because of Burgundians or Visigoths in the way as because Aegidius did not recognise the post-Majorian emperors).
I am a bit puzzled by the insistence that northern Gaul reverted to subsistence agriculture because the smaller farmers were getting squeezed (in 1st century BC Italy, despite spectacular slave revolts, the squeezing of small farmers went hand in hand with the rise of huge estates) and that slaves and/or coloni could have found it easier to flit to places where their services were more appreciated. If we insist that northern Gaul was cut off by barbarians, where are they going to go, particularly if some scholar tries to restrict the Domain of Soissons to a day's travel in each direction?
What was true in AD 409-417 seems no longer to be true in 468-486 - unless I am missing something?
One further quote from our friend Sidonius, who is waxing lyrical about his own villa (Aviaticum) in a letter of AD 461-7 (Letter II.2 to Domitius). Having rhapsodised about the dwelling and the lake, he summarises the actual land thus:
Quote
"It is not in my bond to describe the estate itself; suffice it to say that it has spreading woods and flowery meadows, pastures rich in cattle and a wealth of hardy shepherds."
This seems to be an estate in flourishing condition and by no means reduced to subsistence agriculture on smallholdings.
It is a pity that we lack a similar correspondent from northern Gaul - Remigius' Declamations, praised by Sidonius in Letter IX.7 as a result of a citizen of Clermont making a journey to Rheims and bringing back a copy, are lost to us. One does not however get the impression that Sidonius' travelling citizen found northern Gaul very different from his home.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 17, 2014, 07:36:19 PM
Ok, we clearly have a different view of what professional soldiers are :) To me, a soldier maintained by a paymaster is a professional - who the paymaster helps define the type of professional. And there was I thinking I'd found some common ground :(
Unfortunately while this is certainly true of the mediaeval and Renaissance periods it is not a wholly helpful pointer in the case of the Domain of Soissons, because the point at issue seems to be whether or not a state-maintained regular army existed. Lumping
bucellarii (who admittedly were usually of similar type and training levels to regulars) together with the
milites of the
legiones and
auxilia rather blurs the issue on this particular point. The aim is not so much to discover common ground as to identify what is being grown in it. :)
[Apologies incidentally for irregular replies: connections are a bit spotty in my neck of the woods.]
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 19, 2014, 12:48:56 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 18, 2014, 11:17:49 PM
Remember Sidonius was from Southern Gaul, a very different world from the North. Also if I remember correctly Chilperic was a Burgundian and his force was probably largely Burgundian. Also Southern Gaul was far more settled and prosperous in the north until the Visigoths finally broke their leash in the time of Sidonius. Up until about 470 the south was barely disputed
How was southern Gaul a 'very different world' from the north? This statement seems to be the basis of the assumption that northern Gaul could not support an army, and hence might be worth quantifying as much as possible, or at least pointing out the indicators that lead to this conclusion.
Drinkwater's analysis of bacaudae seems less than relevant to the northern Gaul of the post-450s where the Magister Militum seems free to set his own tax rates (and is not paying any of it to Rome - not so much because of Burgundians or Visigoths in the way as because Aegidius did not recognise the post-Majorian emperors).
No the Magister Militum is not free to set his own tax rates. We have no evidence that the 'MM' in the north could even collect taxes. We have no evidence there was much prosperity to tax. Remember the archaeolog, the villas do not thrive in the fourth century and there is little evidence for them in the 5th, other than as peasant settlements.
Actually if he's acting within proper Roman authority a MM cannot set tax rates anyway, if he's setting tax rates you're already admitting that proper Roman systems have collapsed.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 19, 2014, 12:48:56 PM
I am a bit puzzled by the insistence that northern Gaul reverted to subsistence agriculture because the smaller farmers were getting squeezed (in 1st century BC Italy, despite spectacular slave revolts, the squeezing of small farmers went hand in hand with the rise of huge estates) and that slaves and/or coloni could have found it easier to flit to places where their services were more appreciated. If we insist that northern Gaul was cut off by barbarians, where are they going to go, particularly if some scholar tries to restrict the Domain of Soissons to a day's travel in each direction?Quote
Simple, there was plenty of land that wasn't under Imperial control. After all that's what the 5th century Bagaudae appear to have been. Also there were the 'barbarians' who had land and could always use more labour and offered better conditions. Comparing it with Italy is a total red herring, where could a coloni or slave go? In Gaul, a weeks walk brought you into an entirely different jurisdiction.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 19, 2014, 12:48:56 PM
What was true in AD 409-417 seems no longer to be true in 468-486 - unless I am missing something?
Well the Bretons were still enticing away slaves from even southern Gaul, (sidonius) so the situation seems to be rumbling on.
One further quote from our friend Sidonius, who is waxing lyrical about his own villa (Aviaticum) in a letter of AD 461-7 (Letter II.2 to Domitius). Having rhapsodised about the dwelling and the lake, he summarises the actual land thus:
Quote
"It is not in my bond to describe the estate itself; suffice it to say that it has spreading woods and flowery meadows, pastures rich in cattle and a wealth of hardy shepherds."
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 19, 2014, 12:48:56 PM
This seems to be an estate in flourishing condition and by no means reduced to subsistence agriculture on smallholdings.
Yes, and it is in the southern half of Gaul, where the area between the Burgundians and Visigoths seems to have remained reasonably prosperous and under reasonable Imperial control under the Visigoths finally took it over. It isn't in the northern half of Gaul.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 19, 2014, 12:48:56 PM
It is a pity that we lack a similar correspondent from northern Gaul - Remigius' Declamations, praised by Sidonius in Letter IX.7 as a result of a citizen of Clermont making a journey to Rheims and bringing back a copy, are lost to us. One does not however get the impression that Sidonius' travelling citizen found northern Gaul very different from his home.
A man travels north, buys a book of a bishop and travels back. The same could have happened in 6th or 7th century Gaul and none of it proves that the Roman empire is in control. The fact that there Sidonious's correspondents are in the south, not the north is part of the evidence for the fact that literary society (as opposed to Bishops selling what appear to be collected copies of their sermons) had ceased. Sidonious corresponds, when safe, with his social contemporaries living amongst the Visigoths and the Burgundians because Roman life continued there, but his correspondence with the north is entirely lacking for the very reason that the sort of people and their way of life had gone. Yes, the Church is still there, and churchmen are still literate and perhaps even literary, but they're in a different milieu.
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 19, 2014, 12:55:46 PM
Unfortunately while this is certainly true of the mediaeval and Renaissance periods it is not a wholly helpful pointer in the case of the Domain of Soissons, because the point at issue seems to be whether or not a state-maintained regular army existed. Lumping bucellarii (who admittedly were usually of similar type and training levels to regulars) together with the milites of the legiones and auxilia rather blurs the issue on this particular point. The aim is not so much to discover common ground as to identify what is being grown in it. :)
I suppose this is the nub of it really. I approach the problem from its future and you from its past. I really don't think a world of armed and drilled legiones and auxilia existed in the West any more and really hadn't for some time. To me, a state-maintained regular army is gone, replaced by a state sanctioned/ supported professional force of bucellarii of the major players, paid contingents of barbarian troops (who we may call laeti, foederates, auxilia or what ever classical terminology our Roman elite felt comfortable with), allies and garrison militias (who may well be able to trace an ancestry to units of the old Imperial army). It is an army that looks like that of Aetius or even Byzantine armies in 6th century Italy. It looks like what Early medieval armies will become. However, we have to come to this through surmise from the evidence we have and we weight evidence and surmise differently :)
To refer to a point I made earlier but we haven't picked up is the role of towns in all this. Unlike Roman Britain, towns persist. Villas may decline or become subsistence farms but do the rich move into the towns and continue to farm for surplus in their territory from the safety of their walls? This is the way things go in Italy. If so, what does this do to our political/military dynamic?
In some cases the villas become the landed estates of Barbarian nobles. Apparently there are a lot of villas/villages around Paris which apparently became Royal estate at a very early stage and it might even have been Clovis who acquired them.
The Visigoth nobility also seem to have 'Romanised' and to have moved into Villas, before being kicked out and fleeing south to Spain, and after them even if the villas failed as elite dwellings, their land/estates may have continued, but farmed by small tenants of varying degrees of freedom rather than by labourers.
On thing that is commented on is how the Roman aristocracy in southern Gaul migrates to the Church. They had no chance of Imperial preferment (or very little) and they went into the Church instead, often after they'd had families who could follow on behind them.
This didn't happen to the same extent in Italy where there were still Imperial positions. So it might be that the Gallic church was the thread of continuity, and it does seem that Bishops were important civic figures, hence Sidonius as bishop of Clermont took a leading role in the defence against the Visigoths when they besieged it in 474
Interestingly whilst he hopes for assistance from the Burgundians, he never seems to have hoped for succour from some northern field army which could easily have raised the siege, even if they did so with Burgundian assistance.
Jim
My worry about the economic argument is that we become led into a line of logic that says
1) There once was a field army in Northern Gaul, let us say in the late 4th century.
2) We suspect that it was there to get beaten in the 406 multi-tribal Rhine crossing.
3) It could have been reconstituted by Constantine.
4) the economy of Northern Gaul was strong enough to support it without the aid of the tax base of the rest of the Western Empire.
5) this army survives as the force of the MM per Gallias at least in part until 486 under Aegidius and then Syagrius.
Given that the Aquitaine region supports 20,000 or so Goths (maybe) and that Burgundia may well support more than 10,000 it is reasonable to assume that the potential Northern realm of Aegidius.can provide support for an army as big as that of Euric , or at least as big as the forces of the Burgundians.
The above sort of looks like a case, but it has a huge problem and that is that there is a better case and that is that :
a) The norm military forces in Late Roman Gaul are The buccellarii of rich landowners, federate Germans such as the Franks and Burgundians. Laeti such as the Alans and perhaps Taifali, independent players such as the Saxons at Bayeux and the Loire and the Bretons. I, of course, accept that the Visigoths, Burgundians and Franks all become independent actors within the fifth century. There are also relict Roman forces probably linked to surviving civitates who are almost certainly also hiring barbarians such as the force of 'Goths' that may be associated with a particular brooch style in a 5th century context.
b) These forces are living in a Gaul that. is much dislocated from its earlier more prosperous times. This likely means that troops need a close relationship with the land.
c) Generally to build a large force a leader needs to create an alliance, so Clovis needs to coerce other Franks to his banner, AlaricII expects reinforcements from the Arverni.
d) The prime example of a large army scraping together troops from all sources is that of Aetius. It consists of federates, laeti, independents and crucially troops who were formerly Roman soldiers.
Doubtless these or similar formations, much reduced are the source of the Romanised dress and drill of those that Procopius reports.
As this force is raised in Northern Gaul it is almost certain that there is no Roman field army in Northern Gaul in 450.
That does not preclude Aegidius from having tax, especially tax in kind, resources, a force of buccellarii, federates and allies and hired troops.
What it does put into fantasy land is that he had regular Roman troops trained and equipped in lineal descent from the army of the Notitia.
Roy
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 19, 2014, 01:24:43 PM
No the Magister Militum is not free to set his own tax rates. We have no evidence that the 'MM' in the north could even collect taxes. We have no evidence there was much prosperity to tax. Remember the archaeolog, the villas do not thrive in the fourth century and there is little evidence for them in the 5th, other than as peasant settlements.
Actually if he's acting within proper Roman authority a MM cannot set tax rates anyway, if he's setting tax rates you're already admitting that proper Roman systems have collapsed.
Not at all, simply that the divided civil and military functions have been reunited. A Magister Militum ruling a domain of his own is not going to ask the emperor he does not recognise in a city he is supposedly 'cut off from' for permission to change the tax rate.
We might with benefit look at another of Sidonius' letters in this respect. The name Tonantius Ferreolus is perhaps unfamiliar; he was the grandson of consul Afranius Syagrius, three times prefect and a patrician.
Quote
"It has passed over your administration of the Gauls when they were still at their greatest extent. It has been silent on the efficacy of your measures against Attila the enemy on the Rhine and Thorismond the guest of the Rhone, and on your support of Aetius the Liberator of the Loire. It has not related the dragging of your chariot by cheering provincials, whose fervent applause proclaimed their gratitude for the prudence and the foresight with which you handled the reins of power; since you ruled the Gauls with such wisdom that the exhausted proprietor was relieved from the unbearable yoke of taxes. " - Letters VII.12 c.AD 479
A Magister Militum 'cut off' from Rome, or at least not recognising the current emperor, is not going to feel himself limited by any stipulation that his rank prevents him from adjusting taxes, particularly when he is the sole end-user. If a prefect can do it (although this may have been done when Ferreolus was a patrician, a rather enhanced status), Aegidius is not going to feel he is debarred from doing so - nor is Syagrius, who would have inherited Aegidius' arrangements.
And since we have already agreed that Drinkwater does not address the 5th century AD, we cannot with any certainty pronounce that northern Gaul lacked the resources to tax.
Quote
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 19, 2014, 12:48:56 PM
I am a bit puzzled by the insistence that northern Gaul reverted to subsistence agriculture because the smaller farmers were getting squeezed (in 1st century BC Italy, despite spectacular slave revolts, the squeezing of small farmers went hand in hand with the rise of huge estates) and that slaves and/or coloni could have found it easier to flit to places where their services were more appreciated. If we insist that northern Gaul was cut off by barbarians, where are they going to go, particularly if some scholar tries to restrict the Domain of Soissons to a day's travel in each direction?
Simple, there was plenty of land that wasn't under Imperial control. After all that's what the 5th century Bagaudae appear to have been. Also there were the 'barbarians' who had land and could always use more labour and offered better conditions. Comparing it with Italy is a total red herring, where could a coloni or slave go?
Gaul? ;)
I think the attempt to depict northern Gaul as an isolated enclave of unadministered subsistence farmers is wearing thin. Southern Gaul is admitted to be comparatively wealthy - but not northern Gaul. However when it comes to the idea that coloni were deserting in droves, an allusion to a letter of Sidonius in which he mentions coloni being lured from
southern Gaul by the Bretons is used to imply identical conditions/processes in
northern Gaul. Yet when any other attempts are made to suggest similarities based on Sidonius' descriptions of conditions in southern Gaul we get an immediate insistence on complete and utter difference between the two.
Which is why I remain convinced that Syagrius had a Roman administration and an army supported by taxes - there seems to be no convincing argument to the contrary, and all the indications in neighbouring southern Gaul are that the administration survived right up to the final demise of the western Empire. There seems to be no good reason why Aegidius and Syagrius would drop an existing and functional administration. If it was creaky, they could fix it, as Tonantius Ferreolus did in southern Gaul - and with more permanence.
On the matter of troop composition, the point has (rightly) been made that Chilperic, the Burgundian Magister Militum, preferred to enlist Burgundians. Odoacer the Rugian, although chief of foederati rather than Magister Militum per se, similarly preferred to enlist Rugians. Now, who are Aegidius and Syagrius, both of a long-established Gallo-Roman family, going to recruit by preference when they each become Magister Militum? And if there really are coloni still leaving the farms, joining the army means they do not have to go very far or evade very hard.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 19, 2014, 02:49:14 PM
... Sidonius as bishop of Clermont took a leading role in the defence against the Visigoths when they besieged it in 474
Interestingly whilst he hopes for assistance from the Burgundians, he never seems to have hoped for succour from some northern field army which could easily have raised the siege, even if they did so with Burgundian assistance.
This is a more valid point, at least to my mind, than trying to depress northern Gaul below the poverty line. The question arises what Syagrius himself would have been doing as of AD 474, and unfortunately our sources do not seem to throw a lot of light on that.
Actually Patrick, if you read Drinkwater's paper you'd realise he concentrates on the 5th century. His entire paper is about the 5th century Bacaudae
The process in Southern Gaul was slower, because there was still more order and control
As for there being no evidence to the contrary that there was order in North gaul, have you ever bothered looking at the archaeology?
It's not that we're arguing from silence, it's that your stance is only possible if you ignore the archaeology
I posted a bit about the villas which just happen to be taken from books I have about. But Drinkwater uses the archaeology as do a lot of the other historians. G Halsall has a fascinating paper on 'The Origins of the Reihengraberzivilisation forty years on' which might explain a lot about the aristocracy in the north.
There is a large amount of work that has been done on the issue, and you're just ignoring it.
Anyway I've got to be one the road for three or four days, so I'll not be near a computer. I might look in when I'm back to see if I'm still spitting into the wind on this. Because until people actually bother to check the stuff that is there, there is no point in engaging in wild flights of fancy as to what might be there.
Jim
The Empire was always a negotiation between the military power, generally the emperor or. his representatives, and the landowners. I think it is a complete flight of fancy to think that A Magister Militum could just set himself up as dictator and set the tax rates he liked. Whatever they did would have to be in conjunction with the people who controlled big agriculture.
Someone earlier talked about landowners moving into towns and there is some evidence for this. In insecure areas this will have led on to the abandonment of outlying areas. That has tax implications. If I am a farmer I do not plant all my land, I plant what I can eat or sell. If there is a tax placed on me then I plant more land in order to pay the tax. This is why low levels of tax are an economic stimulant.
However, if barbarians raid the area or if my peasants run away to avoid having to work hard then the area that is abandoned comes directly off the area of land whose produce pays the taxes. So in a sophisticated economy with a full time soldiery, supported by tax the loss of say 20% of agricultural production is a disaster for the military. For a year they could coerce payment, but that initiates a downward spiral which will remove more production next year. However, if one looked at the fields the
vast majority of them, 80%, would still be full of grain. In such a situation it is much easier to keep an infantry unit in being by getting the chaps out to work in the fields than it would be to keep a cavalry unit going. Of course, some units will collapse completely as the garrison of Patavis does, some will reduce in numbers, some join the buccellarii bands of landowners and city states that are now looking after themselves. That I think, explains the former Roman soldiers that join Aetius and the antique uniforms story in Procopius.
Clearly troops are still maintained and can be raised by such as Ecdicius, but they are personal retainers rather than regular soldiers in units and the economic surplus to support them is being spent on them and not on a non existent field army.
Halsall's view IIRC is that local aristos become Franks and compete to be more Frankish than the Franksand there could be a lot of useful truth there. in Spain it looks like the local landowners find it useful to become Goths, because the upper classes of any groups in close proximity have more in common than with each other than they do with the lower classes of their parent culture and language. That all makes a lot of sense, especially when there is no competing way of advancement via imperial service and you are having to defend yourself and your land with forces raised from that land. One is reminded of Theudis he Goth who married a rich Roman lady in Spain and maintained a force of 2000 men on his estates. also the laws of Euric which codify the relationship between the buccellarius and his master.
As Anthony said earlier, if a situation starts with army type A , then goes through a dark period, then emerges with army type A we can accept as fact that during the dark oeriod the army was type A.
When the army type start as A, the regular Notitia force and after the dark oeriod emerges as type B, a force based upon personal relationships, tribal groupings and relict garrisons we have to look for a change. In the case of Northern Gaul that change has to take place before the actions of Aetius in 450 because we have of Aetius army and we know that it did not include a large force of regularly embodied Roman troops from the old regular army.
Given that the change has taken place by 450, nether Aegidius or Syagrius will have been fielding the army of the Notitia in the 460s, 70s or most definitely 486.
Roy
I'm rather distracted with after-hours design work at present, so expect an erratic presence from me for the next week or so.
Doesn't mean I haven't got lots to say. ;)
I have not been giving Roy the attention he deserves, so ...
Quote from: aligern on January 20, 2014, 11:28:43 AM
The Empire was always a negotiation between the military power, generally the emperor or. his representatives, and the landowners. I think it is a complete flight of fancy to think that A Magister Militum could just set himself up as dictator and set the tax rates he liked. Whatever they did would have to be in conjunction with the people who controlled big agriculture.
One must ask why, given that Aegidius or Syagrius was the ultimate authority in his domain. The theoretical chain of command had ceased to operate at the highest level once Ricimer had Majorian murdered.
Quote
Someone earlier talked about landowners moving into towns and there is some evidence for this. In insecure areas this will have led on to the abandonment of outlying areas. That has tax implications. If I am a farmer I do not plant all my land, I plant what I can eat or sell. If there is a tax placed on me then I plant more land in order to pay the tax. This is why low levels of tax are an economic stimulant.
If landowners move into towns the land is not necessarily abandoned - tenant farmers and estate slaves continue to farm or die. If land is actually too insecure to sustain coloni (where in the Domain of Soissons actually fitted this bill?) the logical step is to plant soldier-farmers (see remarks on laeti, below).
Quote
However, if barbarians raid the area or if my peasants run away to avoid having to work hard then the area that is abandoned comes directly off the area of land whose produce pays the taxes. So in a sophisticated economy with a full time soldiery, supported by tax the loss of say 20% of agricultural production is a disaster for the military. For a year they could coerce payment, but that initiates a downward spiral which will remove more production next year.
Not necessarily - it represents a 20% drop in revenue, but as I understand Late Roman arrangements the military had first call and civic projects (roads, aqueducts, new buildings) got what was left once the soldiery had been taken care of. Hence a drop in revenue meant a decline in civic amenities rather than troops and would not necessarily initiate a downward spiral.
Quote
However, if one looked at the fields the vast majority of them, 80%, would still be full of grain. In such a situation it is much easier to keep an infantry unit in being by getting the chaps out to work in the fields than it would be to keep a cavalry unit going. Of course, some units will collapse completely as the garrison of Patavis does, some will reduce in numbers, some join the buccellarii bands of landowners and city states that are now looking after themselves. That I think, explains the former Roman soldiers that join Aetius and the antique uniforms story in Procopius.
I believe this was the idea behind the laeti system: barbarian types were settled on land which they farmed and they provided recruits instead of taxes (it is not wholly clear whether this was on a basis of leaving the fields to fight when called or of providing a set number of recruits per year to join regular units permanently). Whether Procopius was actually referring to laeti I am not sure: he could equally have been referring to limitanei units which had been taken over as a going concern, although these would probably have been in the soldier-farmer category by that time.
Quote
Clearly troops are still maintained and can be raised by such as Ecdicius, but they are personal retainers rather than regular soldiers in units and the economic surplus to support them is being spent on them and not on a non existent field army.
Although Sidonius c.AD 474 does refer to troops being deprived of their pay by state officials, which is inapplicable to bucellarii and similar personally-retained types.
Quote
Halsall's view IIRC is that local aristos become Franks and compete to be more Frankish than the Franksand there could be a lot of useful truth there. in Spain it looks like the local landowners find it useful to become Goths, because the upper classes of any groups in close proximity have more in common than with each other than they do with the lower classes of their parent culture and language. That all makes a lot of sense, especially when there is no competing way of advancement via imperial service and you are having to defend yourself and your land with forces raised from that land. One is reminded of Theudis he Goth who married a rich Roman lady in Spain and maintained a force of 2000 men on his estates. also the laws of Euric which codify the relationship between the buccellarius and his master.
All well and good, but would local aristocrats in northern Gaul have become honorary Franks, so to speak,
before the Franks took over?
Quote
As Anthony said earlier, if a situation starts with army type A , then goes through a dark period, then emerges with army type A we can accept as fact that during the dark oeriod the army was type A.
When the army type start as A, the regular Notitia force and after the dark oeriod emerges as type B, a force based upon personal relationships, tribal groupings and relict garrisons we have to look for a change. In the case of Northern Gaul that change has to take place before the actions of Aetius in 450 because we have of Aetius army and we know that it did not include a large force of regularly embodied Roman troops from the old regular army.
This begs some fairly important questions, notably whether such a change took place in northern Gaul prior to Aetius (who is fielding what look very like Roman troops at Chalons and who seems to hang onto them in Gaul once Attila has gone) and whether we do indeed "know that it did not include a large force of regularly embodied Roman troops from the old regular army".
Otherwise the logic is impeccable. :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 20, 2014, 08:25:47 AM
Actually Patrick, if you read Drinkwater's paper you'd realise he concentrates on the 5th century. His entire paper is about the 5th century Bacaudae
Yes, sorry, I was referring to your summary of the book as a whole (Drinkwater being the main co-author/editor along with Elton) as it deals with villas (notably Percival's article), not Drinkwater's individual paper. These collaborative books consisting entirely of articles are a bother to refer to in short form.
Quote
The process in Southern Gaul was slower, because there was still more order and control
Not from where I sit - after Aetius northern Gaul looks relatively untroubled whereas after Majorian southern Gaul starts to be troubled by what we might politely call questions of imperial succession.
Quote
As for there being no evidence to the contrary that there was order in North gaul, have you ever bothered looking at the archaeology?
It's not that we're arguing from silence, it's that your stance is only possible if you ignore the archaeology
I posted a bit about the villas which just happen to be taken from books I have about. But Drinkwater uses the archaeology as do a lot of the other historians. G Halsall has a fascinating paper on 'The Origins of the Reihengraberzivilisation forty years on' which might explain a lot about the aristocracy in the north.
Yes, unfortunately at the end of the day this comes down to interpretation and I feel that while we can conclude that late 5th century northern Gaul was not the same sweet and sunny land with wide-spreading peaceful estates as 1st-2nd century AD Gaul, we can not conclude that it was too impoverished to support a modest (say 10,000 or so) standing army and a Roman administration - Illyria, which had received a rather more thorough combing than Gaul during the 5th century at the hands of Alaric and Attila, was still able to support a Roman administration and army up to AD 480.
Quote
There is a large amount of work that has been done on the issue, and you're just ignoring it.
Not so much ignoring it as questioning the conclusions being advanced under its shadow. ;)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 20, 2014, 12:13:15 PM
All well and good, but would local aristocrats in northern Gaul have become honorary Franks, so to speak, before the Franks took over?
I think the point is the wealthy and powerful morph into what they need to be. The shapers have ceased to be the central authorities and have become individuals making up allegiances which will best advance/secure their position. Eventually, they help shape their new world order (unless we believe in some pure blooded barbarian takeover, which Halsall clearly doesn't).
On the other points, I'll happily let Roy and Jim reply, as they are better informed :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 20, 2014, 12:13:15 PM
I have not been giving Roy the attention he deserves, so ...
Quote from: aligern on January 20, 2014, 11:28:43 AM
The Empire was always a negotiation between the military power, generally the emperor or. his representatives, and the landowners. I think it is a complete flight of fancy to think that A Magister Militum could just set himself up as dictator and set the tax rates he liked. Whatever they did would have to be in conjunction with the people who controlled big agriculture.
One must ask why, given that Aegidius or Syagrius was the ultimate authority in his domain. The theoretical chain of command had ceased to operate at the highest level once Ricimer had Majorian murdered.
This one is very simple to answer, where do you thing the officers who controlled the units you assume Aegidius or Syagrius commanded came from? At the very least they were the potential sons-in-law of the local nobility if not their sons. If Aegidius or Syagrius alienated them then they'd simply manouevre one of his officers into his place. It is hardly an unprecedented thing to do.
Jim
Quote from: Erpingham on January 20, 2014, 12:36:14 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 20, 2014, 12:13:15 PM
All well and good, but would local aristocrats in northern Gaul have become honorary Franks, so to speak, before the Franks took over?
I think the point is the wealthy and powerful morph into what they need to be. The shapers have ceased to be the central authorities and have become individuals making up allegiances which will best advance/secure their position. Eventually, they help shape their new world order (unless we believe in some pure blooded barbarian takeover, which Halsall clearly doesn't).
On the other points, I'll happily let Roy and Jim reply, as they are better informed :)
This we see in Sidonius's letters as he remonstrates with 'Romans' who have become 'Visigoths'. He was merely one of the last to realise that the Empire in Gaul was dead and to finally move across to regarding the Visigoths as the legitimate rulers.
In the north, if you can support a bodyguard of a score of cavalry and raise 300 useful infantry from your estates, the Franks would doubtless be happy to accept you as one of their allies/subordinates.
Jim
One of the conundra of the Anglo Saxon takeover of lowland Britannia is that there are relatively few of them invading yet they have had a huge effect upon culture and the gene pool. the same is true of the Arabs in N Africa and Spain. one key driver of this is discriminatory laws and practices. People move to new identities that have power and rights. In Vth century Gaul this was facilitated for the rich Romans because they already had a lifestyle that fitted with the top Franks and vice versa. For liwer class Romans the impoverished situation would hit their birthrate as I believe it did in Britain. Thus as the Franks spread in the North they crowd out the Romans and better off Romans join the winning cause. This process is certainly beginning in the fourth century as the Franks and others take over the lands at the mouth of the Rhine that were once Romanised and then spread South.
As to tax receipts, I still hold to the view that the main call on harvests is the producer, not the military as the rate of return on lands falls and the army ceases to offer effective defence the landowner provides his own protection, not so much for theoretical likelihood of an army of barbarians passing through as for the much greater danger of small bands of barbarians or the Bagaudae and runaway soaves. In 452 Attila has a Bagaudic leader in his entourage and one of Aetius chief concerns beforehand and reasons for the settlement of barbarians in the interior of Gaul is the need to control groups who have abandoned the Stalinist harshness of life as coloni.
That sort of thing augurs badly for the birth rate and economic productivity. Landowners do not pay their taxes when the extra land needed to do so is abandoned. Landowners do not pay up when they are having to pay their own military forces, though as Jim says they may well then send a son with this military force to a muster in return for protection.
Patrick seems to see Late Roman Gaul as like Britain in the Socialist sixties and seventies...it is not, it is much more like the Thatcherite eighties with privatisation of military function the norm.
Roy
Are aegidius and Syagrius 'the ultimate authority in their domain' as. Patrick thinks? I wonder if that is not a misreading of the extent of their power. Far more likely that they are simply primus inter pares with other leaders, effectively just the guy with the most buccellarii with the bolster of an imperial title, now unrecognised. In so far as he could coerce others he probably but as Rodger showed us this power might not be effective much further than a days march from his camp.
When Syagrius is defeated by Clovis, there is no further resistance, it is not as if he headed a state with resources that are commensurate with Justin's map. Given that Clovis is just one Frankish king with one ally it is odd that an area that is the size of England and apparently well run on teaditional imperial lines with walled cities and a functioning tax system just falls into Clovis hands.
Roy
Certainly we see in the later empire a lot of comments from various places about 'peasant' flight. In Egypt there are records of appeals from people who were the only ones left in the village but were being forced to pay the assessment for the entire village.
On problem the Empire had was that large landowners refused to release men for the Army, Stilicho boasted he'd beaten barbarians without asking for recruits. This is one reason why I find the idea of a locally recruited field army 10,000 strong in north gaul so improbable.
From the landowners point of view they needed their coloni, if numbers fell, they lost production and income
From the states point of view,if you got this fall in production, you got a fall in revenue, which is probably one reason why the state didn't press too hard for recruits.
You must remember that even on large estates, Roman agriculture was labour intensive and not particularly efficient.
They struggled with heavy land, valley bottoms were often to wet and even if drained the soil could be too heavy, they preferred the terraces half way up the side of the valley.
With regard on who has the main call on production, it is always the producer. If the army takes too much the produce hasn't got seed corn and you don't get a crop next year. 25% to 30% of the crop might be kept for seed!
It's easy to reduce yield and efficiency, run off the plough oxen and areas planted will plummet, and they can take years to replace.
Lose too many men and women in their twenties and thirties and yields will plummet as well.
Jim
Quote from: aligern on January 20, 2014, 04:25:06 PM
When Syagrius is defeated by Clovis, there is no further resistance, it is not as if he headed a state with resources that are commensurate with Justin's map. Given that Clovis is just one Frankish king with one ally it is odd that an area that is the size of England and apparently well run on teaditional imperial lines with walled cities and a functioning tax system just falls into Clovis hands.
Roy
It did not fall into his hands. Clovis, as Procopius makes clear, did not gain control of Syagrius's territory until his baptism ten years (at least) after his victory at Soissons. One can argue about who the Arborychi were (though I cannot see them being anything other than the Gallo-roman inhabitants of Armorica), but one cannot argue about the fact that they fought Clovis to a standstill - a bit odd if they were just one element in a polyglot ragtag army Syagrius persuaded to follow him, or of one of the local minor bigwigs who consented to give him some help.
It's only odd if you make the unfounded assumption that in 486 Clovis had a major military force. We've been through this before. At this period he was one amongst a group of petty chieftains jostling for power.
Clovis wins Battle of Soissons 486
At some point after this he has the Frankish king Chararic imprisoned and executed.
"A few years later," he killed Ragnachar, the Frankish king of Cambrai, along with his brothers.
In 491 he defeated some of the Thuringians and had united all the Franks west of the River Maas except for the Ripuarian Franks
In 496 with his Frankish subkings he beat the Alamanni in the Battle of Tolbiac
Around this point he makes Paris his capital
In 500 Clovis the Burgundians at Dijon but couldn't subdue them.
He campaigned against the Visigoths with Armorican support and defeated them at Vouille in 507
In 507 he needed the Armoricans to defeat the Visigoths, without them in 500 he cannot overcome the Burgundians.
In 486 he was not a major power. He didn't even control all the Franks
Jim
QuoteHalsall's view IIRC is that local aristos become Franks and compete to be more Frankish than the Franksand there could be a lot of useful truth there. in Spain it looks like the local landowners find it useful to become Goths, because the upper classes of any groups in close proximity have more in common than with each other than they do with the lower classes of their parent culture and language. That all makes a lot of sense, especially when there is no competing way of advancement via imperial service and you are having to defend yourself and your land with forces raised from that land
A lot of sense if you're a Gallo-Roman aristocrat looking to gain preferential treatment - rather less if you're already a Frank and asked to share. I tend to find Heather more convincing than Halsall on this point.
Note that if Romans were turning into Goths in Sidonius' day, they'd remained Romans in up to 2-3 generations.
(But yeah, sure, assimilation eventually takes place. By 1800 or so they're all French.)
But are the Franks being asked to 'share'. It appears that they take over land with a fair degree of legal formality. So imperial land becomes the kings to dispose of, plus any that has been taken from those being openly resistant. The rest has legal Gallic landowners who Clovis is keen to woo. At the very least it enables him to run some imperial systems and to keep on the right side of the bishops in the fortified towns and generally Merovingians are keen to have episcopal support.
The people who got land were Frankish nobles who received estates, there was not Imo a general handing of land to all Franks, with one exception, that is in the Belgic provinces where it appears that Frankish settlement was en masse.
So generally Frankish optimates got land and kept their groups of followers. That left plenty for those Roman landowners who accommodated.
The difference in England was that the Saxons took over an empty land with the cities in ruins and did not maintain traditional structures. In Gaul the land was studded with fortified cities and they surrounded by cultivated land. Sensibly the Franks kept this going and needed men who knew how to run the local economy.
Roy
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 20, 2014, 04:52:55 PM
Clovis, as Procopius makes clear, did not gain control of Syagrius's territory until his baptism ten years (at least) after his victory at Soissons. One can argue about who the Arborychi were (though I cannot see them being anything other than the Gallo-roman inhabitants of Armorica), but one cannot argue about the fact that they fought Clovis to a standstill
The significance of the Arborychi fighting Clovis to a standstill depends on a couple of variables. Firstly, how powerful was Clovis? Secondly, how intensive was this ten year war? Do we have records of towns besieged and falling, pitched battles etc.? Without them, we might just have some annoying skirmishing between small bands. Jim suggests Clovis is not too powerful at this time. Justin presumably has contrary evidence and details of the war?
However, what did strike me was that the Arborychi were only finally subdued (or brought into the political sphere of Clovis) after his conversion to catholicism. Maybe the Arborychi were catholics or their leaders were and Clovis' willingness to convert enabled the sides to conclude a peace? Politically astute conversion wasn't unknown at this time.
There is a problem with the Arborychi/Armorici linking. That is that the Armorici are Romans. Why would they be described as once working for the Romans f they always were such?
Roy
Quote from: Erpingham on January 20, 2014, 12:36:14 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 20, 2014, 12:13:15 PM
All well and good, but would local aristocrats in northern Gaul have become honorary Franks, so to speak, before the Franks took over?
I think the point is the wealthy and powerful morph into what they need to be. The shapers have ceased to be the central authorities and have become individuals making up allegiances which will best advance/secure their position. Eventually, they help shape their new world order (unless we believe in some pure blooded barbarian takeover, which Halsall clearly doesn't).
Does this mean that a) northern Gaul lacked central authority (never mind that contemporaries referred to Syagrius as a 'rex', a king, one with unitary overall civil and military power over his domain) and b) the local Athanasian notables rushed to turn themselves into pagan Franks rather than Arian Visigoths? I do not quite follow the cultural argument here.
Quote from: aligern on January 20, 2014, 04:25:06 PM
Are aegidius and Syagrius 'the ultimate authority in their domain' as. Patrick thinks? I wonder if that is not a misreading of the extent of their power. Far more likely that they are simply primus inter pares with other leaders, effectively just the guy with the most buccellarii with the bolster of an imperial title, now unrecognised.
We can point to the title of 'rex' given to Syagrius by contemporaries as a clear indication that he was firmly in charge, and not just chasing a transient purple dream like the ephemeral 'emperors' in southern Gaul.
Quote from: aligern on January 20, 2014, 04:12:48 PM
Thus as the Franks spread in the North they crowd out the Romans and better off Romans join the winning cause.
But how does one reconcile this belief with the Franks being a subordinate collection of disunited tribes prior to AD 486 (as Jim has so kindly pointed out), not a 'winning cause'?
Quote
As to tax receipts, I still hold to the view that the main call on harvests is the producer, not the military as the rate of return on lands falls and the army ceases to offer effective defence the landowner provides his own protection, not so much for theoretical likelihood of an army of barbarians passing through as for the much greater danger of small bands of barbarians or the Bagaudae and runaway soaves. In 452 Attila has a Bagaudic leader in his entourage and one of Aetius chief concerns beforehand and reasons for the settlement of barbarians in the interior of Gaul is the need to control groups who have abandoned the Stalinist harshness of life as coloni.
That sort of thing augurs badly for the birth rate and economic productivity. Landowners do not pay their taxes when the extra land needed to do so is abandoned. Landowners do not pay up when they are having to pay their own military forces, though as Jim says they may well then send a son with this military force to a muster in return for protection.
There are several assumptions here.
1) That the lot of coloni became worse, not better, under Aegidius and Syagrius.
2) That Bacaudae continued to be a problem.
3) That land in the Domain was abandoned.
4) That regular military units were no longer maintained.
And would it be possible to explain what is meant by "the main call on harvests is the producer"?
Underlying the assumption of economic collapse and non-maintenance of a regular force is the flawed idea that the abandonment of villas signifies a loss of agricultural production. To me it suggests precisely the opposite: a landowner decides after a number of barbarian raids in the 4th century to blow this for a game of farmers and so moves to the town. He now has an abandoned villa with several hectares of no-longer-idyllic parkland, so what does he do with it? The obvious answer is to turn it into productive land and actually
increase his revenues. Sooner or later the nice understanding gentlemen who collect money for the government will become aware of this and tax receipts will, if anything,
increase along with overall production.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 20, 2014, 05:13:26 PM
It's only odd if you make the unfounded assumption that in 486 Clovis had a major military force. We've been through this before. At this period he was one amongst a group of petty chieftains jostling for power.
That was a short three days; welcome back, Jim. Actually I would beware underrating Clovis' military power, as although his triumphant progress through Gaul took years and seemed hesitant and prone to the occasional setback, so was Julius Caesar's!
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 11:39:57 AM
Does this mean that a) northern Gaul lacked central authority (never mind that contemporaries referred to Syagrius as a 'rex', a king, one with unitary overall civil and military power over his domain) and b) the local Athanasian notables rushed to turn themselves into pagan Franks rather than Arian Visigoths? I do not quite follow the cultural argument here.
I think some threads are diverging a bit here. You asked what the fluid ethnic identification question had to do with non-Frankish areas then we drift back to Franks again. Also, according to Justin, by the time the Franks consolidate their power they are at least nominally catholic - an ideal time to throw in your lot with them if you are a catholic Roman who can spot a winner :) As to your question about central authority, I think we do have enough evidence of at least a nominal Roman kingship (was rex an Imperial rank? If not are contemporaries seeing Syagrius like all those other barbarian "kings" scattered around). The debate seems to be around the nature of this central authority. Was it quite like the barbarian kingdoms about or like a fully functional Roman bureaucracy, with taxes, fabricae and elite drilled regular soldiery in large numbers? Did its authority rest on official sanction or on other Roman successor elements like Church and the traditional aristocracy, now with armed followings?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 11:39:57 AMWe can point to the title of 'rex' given to Syagrius by contemporaries as a clear indication that he was firmly in charge, and not just chasing a transient purple dream like the ephemeral 'emperors' in southern Gaul.
Surely one of the reasons that E James and others challenged the whole "Kingdom of Soissons" idea is that we don't actually have any
contemporary references to Syagrius as "rex"? It's only
later chroniclers who call him by that title. In fact, we simply don't know what
contemporaries called him.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 21, 2014, 11:54:56 AM
As to your question about central authority, I think we do have enough evidence of at least a nominal Roman kingship (was rex an Imperial rank? If not are contemporaries seeing Syagrius like all those other barbarian "kings" scattered around). The debate seems to be around the nature of this central authority. Was it quite like the barbarian kingdoms about or like a fully functional Roman bureaucracy, with taxes, fabricae and elite drilled regular soldiery in large numbers? Did its authority rest on official sanction or on other Roman successor elements like Church and the traditional aristocracy, now with armed followings?
This is an excellent shortlist of the essential points of the discussion. The designation 'rex' for Syagrius is probably best understood as being similar to the designation' rex' adopted by Odoacer when he deposed Romulus Augustus and took over supreme power in Italy. He seems to have taken over the still-existing Imperial administration as a going concern, although to get to power he had destroyed the last regular Roman units in Italy, a consideration inapplicable to Aegidius and Syagrius.
A dearth of definite information makes it hard if not impossible to provide definite answers to these questions, but so far the indicators we have from southern Gaul point to a continuity of both imperial-style administration and regular troops in Roman service and I would be very surprised not to find the same operating in northern Gaul, which had to all appearances unitary rule and continuous firm authority under Aegidius and Syagrius. I would see the Aegidian family's rule of the Domain of Soissons as being similar to the Nepos family's rule of Illyria, one of the few modest success stories of the closing decades of the Late Empire period.
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 21, 2014, 12:05:34 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 11:39:57 AMWe can point to the title of 'rex' given to Syagrius by contemporaries as a clear indication that he was firmly in charge, and not just chasing a transient purple dream like the ephemeral 'emperors' in southern Gaul.
Surely one of the reasons that E James and others challenged the whole "Kingdom of Soissons" idea is that we don't actually have any contemporary references to Syagrius as "rex"? It's only later chroniclers who call him by that title. In fact, we simply don't know what contemporaries called him.
Then again, it was clear that Syagrius was in charge, as opposed to, say, a council of assorted landowners running the show. We have the cities of Britain writing to Aetius or Aegidius, not to the concatenated landowners of Gaul.
Surely Odovakar is rex of the Scirian and Herulian soldiery in Italy and Patricius of the italians.
If Syagrius is a rex then that might refer to him being accepted as king by some Franks.
Where are these regular roman units in southern Gaul Patrick??
roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 12:16:34 PMQuote from: Duncan Head on January 21, 2014, 12:05:34 PM
Surely one of the reasons that E James and others challenged the whole "Kingdom of Soissons" idea is that we don't actually have any contemporary references to Syagrius as "rex"? It's only later chroniclers who call him by that title. In fact, we simply don't know what contemporaries called him.
Then again, it was clear that Syagrius was in charge, as opposed to, say, a council of assorted landowners running the show. We have the cities of Britain writing to Aetius or Aegidius, not to the concatenated landowners of Gaul.
It suggests he was the figurehead, but not
necessarily any more than that. "Rex" is at least as compatible - perhaps more so? - with "prim
us inter pares with the largest
comitatus" as it is with "small-scale Emperor with a standing army".
(And of course, if the cities of Britain were writing to Aetius, it tells us nothing about Aegidius or Syagrius.)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 11:39:57 AM
Underlying the assumption of economic collapse and non-maintenance of a regular force is the flawed idea that the abandonment of villas signifies a loss of agricultural production. To me it suggests precisely the opposite: a landowner decides after a number of barbarian raids in the 4th century to blow this for a game of farmers and so moves to the town. He now has an abandoned villa with several hectares of no-longer-idyllic parkland, so what does he do with it? The obvious answer is to turn it into productive land and actually increase his revenues. Sooner or later the nice understanding gentlemen who collect money for the government will become aware of this and tax receipts will, if anything, increase along with overall production.
If raids were frequent enough to cause
en masse abandonment of villae, one'd think they'd by themselves have a significant negative impact on production.
On another point, if Frankish aristocrats didn't have to share anything with Romans who succeeded in turning themselves into Franks, what, then, was the point in turning Frankish? The status must've been privileged for Romans to've had a systematic incentive to try to attain it - and privileged groups generally don't share their privileges too happily. They may recognize allowing outsiders in is sometimes necessary for various reasons, but are hardly likely to open-armedly receive everyone who wants to join in the fun.
But did any Romans turn Frankish prior to AD 486?
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 21, 2014, 02:16:00 PM
"Rex" is at least as compatible - perhaps more so? - with "primus inter pares with the largest comitatus" as it is with "small-scale Emperor with a standing army".
Please explain. :)
Quote
(And of course, if the cities of Britain were writing to Aetius, it tells us nothing about Aegidius or Syagrius.)
But if they were writing to Aegidius, it does. And do we have any reason to assume that one Magister Militum ruling northern Gaul was any less in charge than another?
One thought on this topic: a
primus inter pares relationship is not known for generational continuity. Aegidius seems to have unilaterally passed his realm to his son, which suggests he had clear power to do so.
Quote from: aligern on January 21, 2014, 12:35:58 PM
Surely Odovakar is rex of the Scirian and Herulian soldiery in Italy and Patricius of the italians.
My understanding is that he took the title Rex (or was awarded it by his troops) following the deposition of Romulus Augustus, which followed the defeat of Orestes and his Roman troops (the last in Italy) at Placentia in AD 476. The Roman senate then sent the insignia of Imperial rule to Zeno (the Eastern Emperor), who accepted them, theoretically reuniting the two empires, and then in order to exercise the semblance of imperial authority awarded Odoacer the title of Patricius (patrician). This legal fiction was transferred to Theodoric the Ostrogoth when Zeno induced him to invade Italy to replace Odoacer in AD 486, and continued up to the days of Justinian, constituting the theoretical legal basis for the reconquest of Italy.
It is actually interesting to tie in the events of Zeno's reign with the happenings in the west. In 475 Zeno is temporarily deposed and flees to Isauria with the Roman treasury: his nominee Julius Nepos has his throne usurped by Orestes. In 476 Zeno is back, though by now Odoacer has overthrown Orestes. Zeno patricianises Odoacer to make the best of a bad job (reinstating Nepos being a non-option after Zeno became the notional sole emperor).
Ten years later, the Ostrogoths threaten the Eastern Empire (now theoretically the reunited empire) and by a narrow margin Zeno succeeds in diverting them to take Italy instead - meanwhile, Clovis makes his move against Syagrius.
The first (events of AD 475-6) is definitely cause and effect, but in AD 486 does the Ostrogothic threat to the remainder of the Empire embolden Clovis to proceed with his schemes?
All of which is beside the point but perhaps interesting.
Quote
Where are these regular roman units in southern Gaul Patrick??
At the sharp end of the pay scale mentioned in Sidonius' Letter V.7 (to Thaumastus) where he comments on corrupt and malignant officials who "grudge ... the soldier his pay".
Quote from: aligern on January 21, 2014, 12:35:58 PM
If Syagrius is a rex then that might refer to him being accepted as king by some Franks.
Well, they did the same to his father:
'The Franks, after he was driven out, with one accord selected as king Egidius'
Gregory II, 12.
patrick, I am happy to see Sidonius 'soldier his pay' but if we take it as evidence then how about it refers to limitanei garrisoned in Provence. Alternatively, if course it could refer to Visigothic soldiers recieving their hospitalitas in the form of One third of the value of production on lands allocated to pay for them, or it could refer to a town garrison paid for by local taxation.
As I did say earlier, I just do not accept that there is a linkage between the collection of taxes and a regular Roman army of comital status.
I'd like to bet that the Burgundian polity ( the most Romanised of the successor kingdoms) had units of both Burgundians and former Romans paid for by taxes as well as the buccellarii of leading Burgundians and Gallo Romans, but I very much doubt that they are regular Roman mobile units even though Gundobad was a legitimate magister militum after Ricimer.
Roy
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 21, 2014, 02:16:00 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 12:16:34 PMQuote from: Duncan Head on January 21, 2014, 12:05:34 PM
Surely one of the reasons that E James and others challenged the whole "Kingdom of Soissons" idea is that we don't actually have any contemporary references to Syagrius as "rex"? It's only later chroniclers who call him by that title. In fact, we simply don't know what contemporaries called him.
Then again, it was clear that Syagrius was in charge, as opposed to, say, a council of assorted landowners running the show. We have the cities of Britain writing to Aetius or Aegidius, not to the concatenated landowners of Gaul.
It suggests he was the figurehead, but not necessarily any more than that. "Rex" is at least as compatible - perhaps more so? - with "primus inter pares with the largest comitatus" as it is with "small-scale Emperor with a standing army".
(And of course, if the cities of Britain were writing to Aetius, it tells us nothing about Aegidius or Syagrius.)
They wrote to 'Agitus', which could be either Aetius or Aegidius, no conclusive proof either way. The name is closer to Aegidius, though.
Interesting discussion which I will be able to rejoin properly hopefully by the end of the month.
On the subject of the abandonment of villas in northern Gaul, Wickham makes the point that the Gallo-roman aristocracy of that region gave up the villa existence, not because their estates were being regularly devastated by barbarian raids, but because their role had become far more military than was the case with their southern colleagues. The landowning class in the south lounged around in magnificent villa buildings, strolled through magnificent gardens, wrote refined Latin to each other and did anything else they could think of to keep boredom at bay - because they had nothing else to do. The traditional civil and military posts of the empire were gone. In the north it was a very different kettle of fish. The senatorial class were a good deal more busy with the defence of the realm, spending their money and time maintaining a state army and private troops, and the constant threat of barbarian invasion (as opposed to barbarian raids) made the idle villa lifestyle distinctly passe.
All to say that the lack of villa buildings is no proof of the abandonment of villa estates.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 21, 2014, 07:00:27 PM
On another point, if Frankish aristocrats didn't have to share anything with Romans who succeeded in turning themselves into Franks, what, then, was the point in turning Frankish? The status must've been privileged for Romans to've had a systematic incentive to try to attain it - and privileged groups generally don't share their privileges too happily. They may recognize allowing outsiders in is sometimes necessary for various reasons, but are hardly likely to open-armedly receive everyone who wants to join in the fun.
I think we need to put aside the fact that Clovis and his team are the eventual winners and see them to begin with a faction with an ambitious and shrewd leader. The Frankish aristocracy aren't being so much asked to share their cake but grow the cake by conquest or, if its an easier option, by co-opting wealthy and powerful people, their resources and networks into the Frankish project.
Anyway, as we are agreed that there is some sort of native "kingdom" or authority - the Domain of Soissons - these Gallo-Roman movers and shakers could just as well be aligned to that when it exists. If, however, we go with the idea that this is a time of fluid allegiance and identity, Syagrius or any other leaders authority grows or shrinks according to his success, not his titles and possession of a fully functional state bureaucracy. But, as always the caveat, in the situation we are dealing with, we are looking for models that fit the scraps of evidence we have and exploring their fit.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 22, 2014, 08:20:37 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 21, 2014, 07:00:27 PM
On another point, if Frankish aristocrats didn't have to share anything with Romans who succeeded in turning themselves into Franks, what, then, was the point in turning Frankish? The status must've been privileged for Romans to've had a systematic incentive to try to attain it - and privileged groups generally don't share their privileges too happily. They may recognize allowing outsiders in is sometimes necessary for various reasons, but are hardly likely to open-armedly receive everyone who wants to join in the fun.
I think we need to put aside the fact that Clovis and his team are the eventual winners and see them to begin with a faction with an ambitious and shrewd leader. The Frankish aristocracy aren't being so much asked to share their cake but grow the cake by conquest or, if its an easier option, by co-opting wealthy and powerful people, their resources and networks into the Frankish project.
There's a difference between throwing one's lot with the Franks (or Goths or ...) and turning oneself into a Frank (or Goth or ...). Sidonius' report of Romans turning themselves to Visigoths implies a lag of a couple generations between the two.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 22, 2014, 11:57:23 AM
There's a difference between throwing one's lot with the Franks (or Goths or ...) and turning oneself into a Frank (or Goth or ...). Sidonius' report of Romans turning themselves to Visigoths implies a lag of a couple generations between the two.
Is there, or are they both part of a process? IIRC, the Franks themselves are hardly an old culture, having evolved from a confederation of older tribes. We could suggest "Frankishness" is a work in progress and it will take a lurch towards "Roman-ness" when they officially become catholics. So, we might have a period of separate but aligned Romans (this seems to happen elsewhere like among the Visigoths) but cultural convergence between the initially separate aristocracies to form one whole, with relatively minor differences showing up only when genealogies are recited.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 07:45:23 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 21, 2014, 02:16:00 PM
"Rex" is at least as compatible - perhaps more so? - with "primus inter pares with the largest comitatus" as it is with "small-scale Emperor with a standing army".
Please explain. :)
Because it's a "barbarian" title - no Roman has been a
rex since Tarquinius Superbus - because it's thought of as a lesser rank than Augustus or Caesar, and because it doesn't necessarily imply very much power. The Alemanni had seven
reges at Argentorate (and ten
regales), so you don't need all that much power to be a
rex, and you certaly don't need absolute or unshared authority.
Thanks, Duncan.
As Rodger has pointed out, Gregory of Tours tells us that Aegidius was elected King of the Franks when they became disenchanted with Childeric (he of the 300 gold coins in his tomb). Aegidius' tenure as ruler of northern Gaul seems to have lasted fifteen years (to AD 464 or 465) and Childeric seems to have returned to his Frankish throne c.462 as he fought jointly with Aegidius against the Visigoths in 463 and additionally campaigned against the Saxons in 464, but Gregory does not mention Aegidius being deposed. Childeric following his return conducts himself like an ally or even a vassal rather than as a rival.
If Aegidius had retained his status as a nominal overking of the Franks and passed this on to Syagrius, it would explain him being considered a 'rex' by future generations. This of course would mean the status does not specifically reflect his standing within his own domain, but it would be hard for him to gain the respect of the Franks if he were not master of his own house.
Quote from: aligern on January 21, 2014, 09:11:36 PM
patrick, I am happy to see Sidonius 'soldier his pay' but if we take it as evidence then how about it refers to limitanei garrisoned in Provence. Alternatively, if course it could refer to Visigothic soldiers recieving their hospitalitas in the form of One third of the value of production on lands allocated to pay for them, or it could refer to a town garrison paid for by local taxation.
I do not think town garrisons and local taxation would merit the crowd of corrupt parasites listed by Sidonius, nor would they unite province-wide to grudge ambassadors their gifts, tax farmers their dues, provincials their farms, or deny towns their truces and municipalities their flamen's dignity; these would be the preserve of a higher level of authority. Sidonius' 'pay' is
stipendia, which is a standard Roman soldier remuneratory noun which probably excludes Visigoths on
hospitalias, and his 'soldiers' are
paludati, literally 'wearers of military cloaks', which may encompass both limitanei and comitatenses but does not look as if it includes barbarians (however see letter IV.20 in which the Frankish prince Sigismer wears a "flame-red mantle with much glint of ruddy gold", although this and the green mantles of his guard do not seem much like Roman military cloaks).
Quote
As I did say earlier, I just do not accept that there is a linkage between the collection of taxes and a regular Roman army of comital status.
As I understand matters, the army was usually the first and foremost item of expenditure, everything else being next in the queue. Furthermore, once one stops having an army tax collection becomes problematic even though the army itself does not do the collecting: tax gatherers tend to have a short life expectancy if everyone knows that retribution for removing them will not be implementable. (Part of the reason for the Bacaudae problem was that the army had its hands full elsewhere in AD 409-417.)
Quote
I'd like to bet that the Burgundian polity (the most Romanised of the successor kingdoms) had units of both Burgundians and former Romans paid for by taxes as well as the buccellarii of leading Burgundians and Gallo Romans, but I very much doubt that they are regular Roman mobile units even though Gundobad was a legitimate magister militum after Ricimer.
I see nothing to fault there, although drawing a parallel between this and the Domain of Soissons would require Aegidius and Syagrius to be barbarians ruling over a realm of fellow barbarians with the notional permission of the Roman emperor, whereas both seem to have been descended from an illustrious Roman (Gallo-Roman) family and ruling without imperial permission a domain that had not been overrun by barbarians. :)
Interestingly enough, Sidonius in Letter V.5, written to one Syagrius, praises his mastery of the German language and skill in interpreting Burgundian law, not to mention fluent oratory that gains the respect of "old Germans bowed with age". It looks as if part of Syagrius' ascendancy over surrounding barbarian tribes was through respect - which helped to reduce the need for force.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 22, 2014, 12:13:52 PM
We could suggest "Frankishness" is a work in progress and it will take a lurch towards "Roman-ness" when they officially become catholics. So, we might have a period of separate but aligned Romans (this seems to happen elsewhere like among the Visigoths) but cultural convergence between the initially separate aristocracies to form one whole, with relatively minor differences showing up only when genealogies are recited.
All of which, while interesting, seems to belong to a period after the Domain of Soissons rather than during it. Syagrius (if indeed it is he in Sidonius' Letter V.5) seems rather to have been using his "Roman-ness" to influence his neighbours in combination with a deep understanding of their culture and customs; I would however hesitate to suggest that he was developing "Burgundish-ness", for all that Sidonius seems to think he spent insufficient time studying literature.
One advantage of discussing this topic is that some of us are learning a lot about the late 5th century AD in western Europe ...
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 22, 2014, 02:59:46 PM
Childeric seems to have returned to his Frankish throne c.462 as he fought jointly with Aegidius against the Visigoths in 463
What prompts you to think Childeric was an ally of Aegidius in 463 Patrick? Where in the sources is this stated? Gregory does not say this.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 22, 2014, 02:59:46 PM
As Rodger has pointed out, Gregory of Tours tells us that Aegidius was elected King of the Franks when they became disenchanted with Childeric
Gregory is replaying Frankish custom from that time.
The rex-warlord achieves election by military prowess and the Chronica Gallica 511 (one of Gregory's sources) ascribes Aegidius' greatest victory (at Orleans) to Frankish troops (not, I might add, Childeric's Frankish troops).
They went for the most recent winner.
Didn't the Ostrogoths also attempt to elect Belesarius as their rex?
Quote from: Erpingham on January 22, 2014, 12:13:52 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 22, 2014, 11:57:23 AM
There's a difference between throwing one's lot with the Franks (or Goths or ...) and turning oneself into a Frank (or Goth or ...). Sidonius' report of Romans turning themselves to Visigoths implies a lag of a couple generations between the two.
Is there, or are they both part of a process?
Er? In some sense, sure, they're both part of the process of turning Gallia into Francia. But that doesn't mean they're the same thing - a processes can have multiple parts after all.
(I'm probably missing your point somehow - I find your remark rather bewildering.)
QuoteIIRC, the Franks themselves are hardly an old culture, having evolved from a confederation of older tribes. We could suggest "Frankishness" is a work in progress and it will take a lurch towards "Roman-ness" when they officially become catholics. So, we might have a period of separate but aligned Romans (this seems to happen elsewhere like among the Visigoths) but cultural convergence between the initially separate aristocracies to form one whole, with relatively minor differences showing up only when genealogies are recited.
Franks are first heard of in the 3rd century I believe. For the rest, we seem to basically agree - initial "alignment" followed by later assimilation. The Franks embracing Catholicism no doubt made assimilation easier. I'd make a a few additional points:
i) The assimilation, as regards ethnic self-identification, was in the Frankish direction - evidently Romans aspired to Frankishness more than Franks to
romanitas. This must suggest than being Frankish was advantageous (hardly surprising under a new regime where the guy at the top of the heap was a Frank).
ii) Assimilation is not a
necessary follow-up to "alignment". Persia didn't turn Arab, frex, despite Persian nobles aligning with the new rulers once the Sassanids were done for.
iii) Re speed of convergence, it might be interesting to look at names. I've read that in Lombard Italy, through-out the 7th century, aristocratic families of Lombard and Roman origin tended to stick to names of respectively Germanic and Latin origin.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 22, 2014, 05:01:31 PM
Quote
Is there, or are they both part of a process?
Er? In some sense, sure, they're both part of the process of turning Gallia into Francia. But that doesn't mean they're the same thing - a processes can have multiple parts after all.
(I'm probably missing your point somehow - I find your remark rather bewildering.)
Apologies for confusion, Andreas. I think you got the drift - I was suggesting that we are seeing two parts of the same process, not two separate processes. However, reading your reply, I had misunderstood what you were saying - we are broadly in agreement as you point out in the remainder of your post.
Quote from: rodge on January 22, 2014, 03:10:00 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 22, 2014, 02:59:46 PM
Childeric seems to have returned to his Frankish throne c.462 as he fought jointly with Aegidius against the Visigoths in 463
What prompts you to think Childeric was an ally of Aegidius in 463 Patrick? Where in the sources is this stated? Gregory does not say this.
The Wikipedia entry for Aegidius (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Aegidius) quotes Hydatius 218 on this point; Hydatius seems to be currently unobtainable online in English translation (though one can buy Richard Burgess' translation for a mere $500 or so) and the only online Latin version has an entirely different system, so either it is in there somewhere or the law that secondary sources will always let one down strikes again.
See also the Wikipedia entry on Childeric (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Childeric_I?qsrc=3044).
Quote from: rodge on January 22, 2014, 03:32:44 PM
Didn't the Ostrogoths also attempt to elect Belisarius as their rex?
Yes, well remembered, though Belisarius ended up having the worst of both worlds by declining the invitation while nevertheless being suspected and stripped of his appointment as general by Justinian. If only he had accepted ...
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 22, 2014, 07:39:26 PM
The Wikipedia entry for Aegidius (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Aegidius) quotes Hydatius 218 on this point;
Hydatius 218 in translation says:
218. Against Aegidius, Count and Master of the Soldiers, a man both recommended by repute and pleasing well the Lord by good deeds, Frederic the brother of King Theodoric had been struggling, with these men against those men in the province Armorica, and having been overcome, was killed.'No mention of fighting with Childeric, in fact no mention of Childeric at all.
I cannot find reference to any cooperation between Aegidius and Childeric in any source.
Quote from: rodge on January 22, 2014, 11:29:27 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 22, 2014, 07:39:26 PM
The Wikipedia entry for Aegidius (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Aegidius) quotes Hydatius 218 on this point;
Hydatius 218 in translation says:
218. Against Aegidius, Count and Master of the Soldiers, a man both recommended by repute and pleasing well the Lord by good deeds, Frederic the brother of King Theodoric had been struggling, with these men against those men in the province Armorica, and having been overcome, was killed.'
No mention of fighting with Childeric, in fact no mention of Childeric at all.
I cannot find reference to any cooperation between Aegidius and Childeric in any source.
Which, if true.....needs double-checking....leads to the question: who were 'those men in the province Armorica' who, without help from anyone else, were able to beat the Visigoths and kill the brother of the king?
Do I see a R _ _ _ _ F_ _ _ _ A _ _ _ ?
Personally I don't trust secondary sources at all, especially not for this period, something which makes my life difficult. :(
We do not necessarily see a Roman Field Army.
In fact we probably see Aegidius leading an army that is largely Frankish according to the Gallic Chronicle 511.
It's odd that if he was so strong (Roman Field Army or another more diverse military force) that in May 464 or 5 he asks for help from the Vandals.
Hydatius 224. In the month of May ambassadors pass over the Atlantic Ocean to the Vandals with words, said in advance by Aegidius, and they return to him by the same voyage in the month of September.
This suggests another major competitor in the ring. It coincides with 'king' Childeric's returning from his exile.....and Aegidius is the current Rex.
Perhaps they were less chummy than everyone thinks?
Not sure what you mean about secondary sources here Justin.
I assume you refer back to the Wiki article? Hydatius is as primary as Procopius or Agathias; in fact he was closer to the action in a) location and b) time.
Quote from: rodge on January 23, 2014, 07:10:56 AM
We do not necessarily see a Roman Field Army.
In fact we probably see Aegidius leading an army that is largely Frankish according to the Gallic Chronicle 511.
It's odd that if he was so strong (Roman Field Army or another more diverse military force) that in May 464 or 5 he asks for help from the Vandals.
Not really: he has to leave someone behind to mind the shop, and who better than his reliable troops? If he can get the barbarians to take losses fighting against each other on his behalf (a policy the intact Roman Empire had previously habitually followed by playing off German tribes and princelings against each other) so much the better - and he would anyway want to talk to the Vandals on the basis that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Besides, if he really were weak what chance of success would an embassy to the Vandals have in the first place? It would just be a waste of good presents (and possibly diplomats) and leave him open to the scorn of rejection. Had he really been weak and without an army he would have gone in person (cf. Aetius after the Battle of Ravenna going to the Huns and Syagrius after the Battle of Soissons going to the Visigoths) to try his all to bring one back with him (it worked for Aetius with the Huns).
Rodger, now that you are on the hunt, have you found anything relating to Aegidius' forces and/or military operations during Majorian's campaigns?
Quote
Hydatius 224. In the month of May ambassadors pass over the Atlantic Ocean to the Vandals with words, said in advance by Aegidius, and they return to him by the same voyage in the month of September.
This suggests another major competitor in the ring. It coincides with 'king' Childeric's returning from his exile.....and Aegidius is the current Rex.
Perhaps they were less chummy than everyone thinks?
Perhaps. If so, it argues for Aegidius being strong enough to carry on a campaign on two fronts (against the Visigoths and against Childeric) so the implications of this conjecture are interesting.
Quote
Not sure what you mean about secondary sources here Justin.
I assume you refer back to the Wiki article? Hydatius is as primary as Procopius or Agathias; in fact he was closer to the action in a) location and b) time.
'Twas indeed the Wikipedia articles on Childeric and Aegidius, which Justin perhaps wisely eschewed.
Quote from: rodge on January 23, 2014, 07:10:56 AM
We do not necessarily see a Roman Field Army.
In fact we probably see Aegidius leading an army that is largely Frankish according to the Gallic Chronicle 511.
The text refers to 'the men of Armorica province', which would exclude the notion they are Franks since chroniclers of this period tended to name the barbarian tribes that served under/alongside the Romans. We are looking at a Gallo-roman force that fights for Aegidius. It ties up nicely with Procopius's Arborychi that begin to fight for the Romans by the time the Visigoths have conquered Spain.
Quote from: rodge on January 23, 2014, 07:10:56 AMIt's odd that if he was so strong (Roman Field Army or another more diverse military force) that in May 464 or 5 he asks for help from the Vandals.
Actually, if he has a good army that puts him in a position to play the big politics game. Someone who can write to Vandals on the assumption they would take him seriously is someone who had a little more at his command than a little band of town militia from Soissons with perhaps a few barbarian stragglers and bucellarii, and the uncertain help of a minor tribe of local Franks.
Quote from: rodge on January 23, 2014, 07:10:56 AMHydatius 224. In the month of May ambassadors pass over the Atlantic Ocean to the Vandals with words, said in advance by Aegidius, and they return to him by the same voyage in the month of September.
This suggests another major competitor in the ring. It coincides with 'king' Childeric's returning from his exile.....and Aegidius is the current Rex.
Perhaps they were less chummy than everyone thinks?
I just see Aegidius doing politicking here. One can't really read Childeric into the scenario. In any case the Vandals were hardly in a position to help Aegidius maintain his power against possibly hostile Franks. If Aegidius could not take care of himself he would need to get troops from somewhere - the Burgundians for example.
Quote from: rodge on January 23, 2014, 07:10:56 AMNot sure what you mean about secondary sources here Justin.
I assume you refer back to the Wiki article? Hydatius is as primary as Procopius or Agathias; in fact he was closer to the action in a) location and b) time.
I'm thinking of contemporary writers and articles (as Patrick mentioned) who sometimes do quite spectacular violence to the original sources.
My growing impression is that this period is not well documented but is sufficiently documented that by taking some trouble to reconcile the scattered primary sources one can draw some general conclusions, e.g. the fact that there was a 10 year war between the Battle of Soissons and the final peace after Clovis's baptism. I'm no historian, but it seems to me that this job of reconciliation has not yet been done. It is not helped by approaching the primary sources with an
a priori scepticism, discounting or distorting them when they do not fit a favourite theory.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 11:32:04 AM
It is not helped by approaching the primary sources with an a priori scepticism, discounting or distorting them when they do not fit a favourite theory.
I think Justin, we are demonstrating it is very difficult not to approach the problem with assumptions or prior theories. I am still baffled as to why we should assume, if troops come from Armorica, they should be considered elite forces of regular field army, or why only powerful field armies can fight ten year wars. It is perfectly possible to consider a ten year war indicates a low intensity conflict, with neither side having the resources or will to land the knockout blow.
Patrick and Justin, I will respond to your points....but not right now as I'm a tad under the cosh.
Hopefully later today or at the w/e.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2014, 12:18:23 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 11:32:04 AM
It is not helped by approaching the primary sources with an a priori scepticism, discounting or distorting them when they do not fit a favourite theory.
I think Justin, we are demonstrating it is very difficult not to approach the problem with assumptions or prior theories. I am still baffled as to why we should assume, if troops come from Armorica, they should be considered elite forces of regular field army, or why only powerful field armies can fight ten year wars. It is perfectly possible to consider a ten year war indicates a low intensity conflict, with neither side having the resources or will to land the knockout blow.
True, it is difficult. I have held and discarded a number of hypotheses on this period, and having been wrong often in the past I'm quite prepared to be wrong again.
On the field army question, I keep in mind the terminus ad quem: Procopius's 'other Roman soldiers', who were held in high regard by the Gallo-romans and Franks, were very particular about their Roman identity, and were not town garrison troops: they 'carry their standards into battle', i.e. if Procopius is to be believed they were
field troops, belonging to former legions of the field army. I made a case earlier for one of these residual legions being the II Britannica, which was not a limitaneus legion, even less a garrison or militia unit.
Aegidius and Syagrius used these troops. They must have been involved in Aegidius's beating of the Visigoths and Saxons, and Syagrius's confident offensive against Clovis, and later in an effective border defence against the Visigoths along the Loire.
To argue a patchwork army for Aegidius and Syagrius means necessarily discarding this passage from Procopius, but nothing supports the notion that Procopius was making it up or listening to old wives' tales.
The difficulty that we have in believing that there is a LRFA in Northern Gaul is that there is no clear neat reference to it and just when it should be there it vanishes from the chronicled accounts.
If historical truth is defined by being the explanation that best fits all the reasonable evidence then the idea of Aegidius and Syagrius having polyglot armies from varied sources is the cear winner.
Lately The proponents of Aegidius LRFA Have fallen back on identifying this force with the Aremorici or Arborychi. These are the heroes who, after Syagrius' flight, hold back the Franks for ten years. They are identified as the Romans of the Tractus Armoricanus which according to some, has to be the core of the Syagrian realm or rather what gves it the scale to support a field force.
There are some inconveniences in this view. Rodger kindly sent me this article :
http://www.persee.fr/web/ouvrages/home/prescript/article/efr_0000-0000_1993_act_168_1_4349
It suggests that the Aborychi of Procopius that the Franks take over are not Gallo Romans, but the 'Grands Bructeri', a nearby German tribe of federates that are incorporated into the Salii as they grow. The case is aided by them being on the frontiers of Gaul whereas the Armorici are not and so does have conformity with Procopius to its advantage.
That may or may not be, but if the Arborychi are indeed Armorici there is a problem for those using them to provide the LRFA and that is that they also appear as allies in the army listed for Aetius at Chalons.
This is the list that Jordanes gives;
'warriors from everywhere to meet them on equal terms. Now these were his auxiliaries: Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones (once Romans soldiers and now the flower of the allied forces), and some other Celtic or German tribes. (192) '
I have said before that, if there were this Gallic LRFA that descends from troops available in the Notitia, then it should join Aetius and we should hear of it resisting Attila in its homeland. However, Armoricans that are listed as joining Aetius as allies cannot be a LRFA, they are clearly another contingent of the type of federates, laeti, limitanei and allies that join the coalition against the invader.
So , if the Arborichi are not the German tribe of the Bructeri, but are Armorici then they are Gallo Romans like the Arverni , who have their own locally raised buccellary and town garrison forces and local militias based upon fortified towns are just the sort of challenge that might take the Franks ten years to subdue.
Further, whoever the Olibriones are they are the flower of the allied force and they were Once Roman soldiers. If anyone is a candidate to be the Ancestors of those wearing Roman costumes in Procopius it is these Olibriones who are, even in 452, former Roman soldiers, so not the elusive Late Roman Field Army.
Roy
Sorry Justin, but the patchwork army case does not rest upon discarding the passage from Procopius, it merely means that there were very few of these decayed Roman troops, not an army of them. If they have survived 60 years from the collapse of Syagrius then somebody is feeding them, most likely the towns whose garrisons they provide. Are we to believe that within the Merovingian realm a large force of tax paid troops is still being maintained in units that is not in garrisons??
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 23, 2014, 02:22:04 PM
The difficulty that we have in believing that there is a LRFA in Northern Gaul is that there is no clear neat reference to it and just when it should be there it vanishes from the chronicled accounts.
If historical truth is defined by being the explanation that best fits all the reasonable evidence then the idea of Aegidius and Syagrius having polyglot armies from varied sources is the cear winner.
How about listing the 'reasonable evidence' and seeing what we get?
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Lately The proponents of Aegidius LRFA Have fallen back on identifying this force with the Aremorici or Arborychi. These are the heroes who, after Syagrius' flight, hold back the Franks for ten years. They are identified as the Romans of the Tractus Armoricanus which according to some, has to be the core of the Syagrian realm or rather what gves it the scale to support a field force.
There are some inconveniences in this view. Rodger kindly sent me this article :
http://www.persee.fr/web/ouvrages/home/prescript/article/efr_0000-0000_1993_act_168_1_4349
It suggests that the Aborychi of Procopius that the Franks take over are not Gallo Romans, but the 'Grands Bructeri', a nearby German tribe of federates that are incorporated into the Salii as they grow. The case is aided by them being on the frontiers of Gaul whereas the Armorici are not and so does have conformity with Procopius to its advantage.
That may or may not be, but if the Arborychi are indeed Armorici there is a problem for those using them to provide the LRFA and that is that they also appear as allies in the army listed for Aetius at Chalons.
A problem yes, but not an insoluble one if they grew closer to the Domain under Aegidius than they had been with Aetius. It is not hard to consider them exchanging an arm's length relationship for a shoulder-to-shoulder one as the Visigoths grew more menacing.
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I have said before that, if there were this Gallic LRFA that descends from troops available in the Notitia, then it should join Aetius and we should hear of it resisting Attila in its homeland. However, Armoricans that are listed as joining Aetius as allies cannot be a LRFA, they are clearly another contingent of the type of federates, laeti, limitanei and allies that join the coalition against the invader.
This is mixing things up a bit: Jordanes does describe a Roman contingent at Chalons, pinpointing it in the speech he puts in Attila's mouth. Armoricans were allies at Chalons but once Riothamus had had his mishap they may well have drawn closer to the Domain of Soissons for mutual protection.
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So , if the Arborichi are not the Bructeri, but are Armorici then they are Gallo Romans like the Arverni , who have their own locally raised buccellary and town garrison forces and local militias based upon fortified towns are just the sort of challenge that might take the Franks ten years to subdue.
But Arverni are Arverni whereas Armorica is effectively a self-ruled separate entity since the 440s. I am not sure such a comparison is of any value.
Quote from: aligern on January 23, 2014, 02:27:01 PM
... there were very few of these decayed Roman troops, not an army of them. If they have survived 60 years from the collapse of Syagrius then somebody is feeding them, most likely the towns whose garrisons they provide. Are we to believe that within the Merovingian realm a large force of tax paid troops is still being maintained in units that is not in garrisons??
This has some merit, but I do not see it being retrospectively applicable to the Domain of Soissons before the Franks took over - otherwise we could argue on the basis of the muster of Norman England that Saxon kings could not possibly have had huscarles ... ;)
I think you are wrong on all counts Patrick.
I hand others, have listed the reasonable evidence several times, it supports the case that the armies of Aegidius and Syagrius are composed of contingents from various sources. I won't bore everyone with reciting the contingents again, suffice it to say that the army of Aetius and of Majorian the model for a multi contingent force.
It is grasping at straws to claim that Jordanes pinpoints a Roman force at Chalons. His description can either be seen as pure rhetoric or as describing the formation of the Olibriones and Riparenses and limitanei. there are enough Roman style units there to form a shieldwall.
As Jordanes says
warriors from everywhere to meet them on equal terms. Now these were his auxiliaries: Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones (once Romans soldiers and now the flower of the allied forces), and some other Celtic or German tribes.
Those plus the buccellarii that come with Aetius are enough , when added to the Goths and Alans to stand up to Attila.
No sign of a LRFA there.
Roy
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 02:08:25 PM
On the field army question, I keep in mind the terminus ad quem: Procopius's 'other Roman soldiers', who were held in high regard by the Gallo-romans and Franks, were very particular about their Roman identity, and were not town garrison troops: they 'carry their standards into battle', i.e. if Procopius is to be believed they were field troops, belonging to former legions of the field army. I made a case earlier for one of these residual legions being the II Britannica, which was not a limitaneus legion, even less a garrison or militia unit.
Others better read than me are offering a more evidence based rebuttal here but I think how we view these 6th century Romans is a key difference. I personally have some time for Procopius (I tend to like unfashionable historians like Froissart too :) ) but I don't think we can assume the old divisions of field and garrison still held. I also don't think that town militia or garrison units were automatically rubbish. As to the II Britannica, the possibility that it established itself somewhere and faded into a garrison or transformed itself into military-political entity controlling its own home territory must be there. What happened to the legions elsewhere - did they retain elite infantry status?
Quote from: aligern on January 23, 2014, 04:09:58 PM
As Jordanes says
warriors from everywhere to meet them on equal terms. Now these were his auxiliaries: Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones (once Romans soldiers and now the flower of the allied forces), and some other Celtic or German tribes.
Those plus the buccellarii that come with Aetius are enough , when added to the Goths and Alans to stand up to Attila.
No sign of a LRFA there.
Roy
I really need time to go into this in depth. Just briefly for now: notice that Jordanes in this passage does not give a complete inventory of the forces available to Aetius. He leaves out the Visigoths and Alans who together formed at least half of Aetius's line. He makes the point that this is a list of Aetius's auxiliaries, and reinforces that by making the Olibriones the flower of the auxiliaries. In other words he is describing those extra contingents that Aetius gathered to confront the Huns on equal terms, and then only those that were under his direct control.
Nothing suggests that all these contingents were numerically significant. The army assembled under Narses had one contingent numbering only 400 men, and Narses could be picky, choosing only those barbarians that were a real asset to him. Aetius was not picky: anyone who could bear arms was invited. Of Aetius's contingents, the only ones we know as being significant in their own right were the Franks (which includes the Riparians), Burgundians, Armoricans and to a lesser extent Saxons. The Sarmatians (if I'm right) had been part of the Roman army for some time, and we never hear of the other groups outside this battle. The implication is that they were not sizeable barbarian tribes, but small bands of fighting men from barbarian or Roman backgrounds. This leaves plenty of room for a regular army which is not mentioned because it is identified with Aetius himself.
Jordanes uses an individual to signify a force elsewhere, for example when he describes the son of the Visigothic king helping Aetius beat off the Huns:
| Attila sent his men to take the summit of the mountain, but was outstripped by Thorismud and Aëtius, who in their effort to gain the top of the hill reached higher ground and through this advantage of position easily routed the Huns as they came up. |
That doesn't mean that Thorismud trotted over to Aetius's wing by himself and then cheered the Romans on. He clearly had a force with him, mounted probably, which would have supplied the cavalry guard on the left flank.
As regards there being enough Roman style units to create a shieldwall without need of regular troops, one needs to keep in mind that this shieldwall defeated the Huns so thoroughly that Attila decided to cease attacking it and concentrate his efforts on the Visigoths and Alans instead. Rather impressive for a polyglot gathering of ex-Roman or sub-Roman troops.
Quote from: aligern on January 23, 2014, 04:09:58 PM
... suffice it to say that the army of Aetius and of Majorian the model for a multi contingent force.
Here we have what I consider to be the nub of the problem: Aetius and Majorian were mobilising every warm body of whatever nationality they could command or ally with, and as they could bring together quite a few (Aetius especially) they of necessity have a multi-contingent force. However to assume that every Roman army of whatever size necessarily follows this pattern or template is inaccurate: we can point to Orestes' 'pure' Roman regular contingent at Placentia (where Odoacer defeated him) as evidence to the contrary, albeit this was an unusual concentration on account of the revolt of the foederati under Odoacer. I would suggest that when not repelling a major Hunnic invasion Aetius would routinely mobilise only the troops from his Gallic domain plus any handy nearby tribe or tribes he could persuade to come along, as somebody had to do the dying.
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Jordanes ... description can either be seen as pure rhetoric or as describing the formation of the Olibriones and Riparenses and limitanei. there are enough Roman style units there to form a shieldwall.
Or as describing the formation of Roman regular infantry on the field, which it would fit more simply and more easily.
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As Jordanes says
warriors from everywhere to meet them on equal terms. Now these were his auxiliaries: Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones (once Romans soldiers and now the flower of the allied forces), and some other Celtic or German tribes.
And Jordanes does not add "By the way, he also brought along the Roman army under his command as Magister Militum", leading one to wonder if the office was actually redundant or alternatively that it would be taken for granted that he would bring them anyway. Unfortunately Jordanes is no Polybius to summarise composition and numbers, and is, as Roy points out, a writer in quest of effect, in this case either showing the greatness of Aetius that so many allies would flock to his banner or the greatness of the occasion where so many turned up as Aetius' auxiliaries. I do not believe it appropriate to conclude from Jordanes' exhausting but non-exhaustive listing of 'auxiliaries' that there was nothing substantial for them to be auxiliary to.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2014, 04:31:33 PM
As to the II Britannica, the possibility that it established itself somewhere and faded into a garrison or transformed itself into military-political entity controlling its own home territory must be there. What happened to the legions elsewhere - did they retain elite infantry status?
My impression is that the Illyrian units remained good up to AD 480, after which they seem to have been absorbed into the Eastern Empire. The legions in the East are harder to pinpoint as at some time between AD 480 and 530 they seem to have adjusted to being predominantly long spear-armed anti-cavalry types (curiously a similar change seems to have taken place in sub-Roman Britain around the end of the 5th century but I have no idea if the two were in any way related). They do seem to have remained in service, although writers cease to refer to them by designation, suggesting some form of reorganisation had taken place.
Cavalry became the elite arm of the Eastern Empire in the 6th century, but good disciplined infantry were a feature of Eastern Empire armies right up to Manzikert in AD 1071, which may allow us to suggest that where Roman administration survived reasonably good regular infantry could be found, too.
The puzzle in this case is the formations that seem to survive the demise of the Domain of Soissons; unless we suppose that Clovis and his successors retained a Roman administration to pay for them, their terms of service must have altered when he took over. Exactly how may form the basis of numerous speculative studies if the period ever becomes one of major academic interest, though the persistence of use of coinage may be indicative (or it may not, but let us allow that it could be). Procopius thinks that these troops perserved their arms, customs etc. unaltered and were recognisably Roman, which suggests either that he recognised them as having some similarity to the Roman infantry of his day or that he recognised earlier Roman usages. Either way, I think we would be unwise to write off his testimony (and we would certainly emerge no better informed) despite the fact that his observation is hard to explain under current thinking.
Quote from: aligern on January 23, 2014, 02:27:01 PM
Sorry Justin, but the patchwork army case does not rest upon discarding the passage from Procopius, it merely means that there were very few of these decayed Roman troops, not an army of them. If they have survived 60 years from the collapse of Syagrius then somebody is feeding them, most likely the towns whose garrisons they provide. Are we to believe that within the Merovingian realm a large force of tax paid troops is still being maintained in units that is not in garrisons??
Roy
If we take Procopius in his obvious sense, nothing suggests that these troops were either decayed or very few. They are significant enough to make a stir that reaches the ears of Procopius. And this is 60-odd years after the final peace of 496. The implication is that they were an important force under Syagrius.
The Gallo-roman aristocracy of northern Gaul was certainly in a position to maintain them as bucellarii after the departure of Syagrius, paying them in kind rather than by tax. The fact that these units handed over their standards
and the lands they had been guarding to the Franks/Gallo-romans suggests that their commanders
were the landowners.
They would have joined the Franks for any major battles after 496, otherwise being left alone.
The reference to the' legio bretonum', by the way, does not mention it being in a town, just north of the Loire/Loir. Rather curious if it was a town garrison/militia.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 05:26:47 PM
The reference to the' legio bretonum', by the way, does not mention it being in a town, just north of the Loire/Loir. Rather curious if it was a town garrison/militia.
Not really. I'd expect a mention if it was a peripatetic entity living under canvas but if it was based in a town or towns, it would seem unremarkable.
Unfortunately Justin a case built upon 'may have been' and 'could have done ' is insufficient.
Sidonius tells us that Aetius brings with him few troops from Italy. He then desperately starts to build a coalition against Attila to make a sizeable enough force to take Attila on and he only moves when the Visigoths arrives. Even when all these contingents arrive the Aetian army is not enough to take on the Hun forces without the Goths.
Read Jordanes and Sidonius. It is so important to get the Goths that Attila sends Avitus twice.
The big Roman contribution to Chalons is logistical. What the Empire can do is keep its polyglot army fed..
As to Orestes in Italy his Roman troops ( which may well include foederati) are too few to challenge Odovakar. That strongly suggests that the regular army, even in Italy is of no great significance and Italy is in a lit better financial situation than Gaul!
The Procopian Romans need not be many. in Herodotean tradition they just need to be an interesting curiosity and by 540 AD it is highly unlikely that they are running any territory. Gregory and others do not mention them and they would be unlikely to have an independent jurisdiction. The normative organisation for Gaul in this period is civitates, city states with dependent lands, run by a count and a bishop. There also peoples, such ad the Taifali and the Sarmatians who have territories. We hear of these, but we don't hear of independent enclaves of Roman legions running their own territories.
Saying that these Romans might be running a. city for themselves is not enough, we would need to know which city.
I have some sympathy with Roman frontier troops being maintained as buccellarii, however, that is not beinfg a regular Roman field army. it is being in a situation in the 430s and 40s where imperial pay stops so the officers find other paymasters, the local landowners who take in a hundred or so men each. that is not being a Notitia style army of comitatenses with legions and sagitarii and Illyricani and scutarii cavalry now is it? it?
And Justin, if you read Jordanes you will see that he does not list the Visigoths as with Aetius because he has already described them and they are not in the army of Aetius, but in the army of their own king.
Aetius arrives with few firces and then all these treaty troops come in and give him an army. No mention of him picking up the Roman field army at X or Y place. Maybe, as Patrick suggested he left it somewhere to guard something that Attila was not attacking:-))
For me the killer puece of evidence is that the Olibriones are former Roman soldiers. They are 'former' because there is no longer a Roman army to belong to, even in 452. v If we look for your Procopian Romans anywhere it is with them, the firmer Roman soldiers.
Of course soldiers who were no longer Romans , are indeed ex parrots , or rather expatriates, and cannot be members of the mythical Late Roman Gallic Field Army that you so desire.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 23, 2014, 06:26:14 PM
Unfortunately Justin a case built upon 'may have been' and 'could have done ' is insufficient.
This would indeed be true, had such expressions been relied upon rather than 'the implication is' and 'would have joined'. However I trust we are looking at evidence rather than building cases: cases only contain what can fit within their restrictive dimensions.
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It is so important to get the Goths that Attila sends Avitus twice.
Presumably Aetius is meant rather than Attila?
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As to Orestes in Italy his Roman troops ( which may well include foederati) are too few to challenge Odovakar. That strongly suggests that the regular army, even in Italy is of no great significance and Italy is in a lit better financial situation than Gaul!
Nevertheless they exist, and in Italy, which has lagged behind Gaul and Illyria as a recruiting area for centuries by the time in question.
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The Procopian Romans need not be many. in Herodotean tradition they just need to be an interesting curiosity and by 540 AD it is highly unlikely that they are running any territory.
To paraprase an eminent member of this Society, a case built upon 'highly unlikely' is insufficient. ;)
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The normative organisation for Gaul in this period is civitates, city states with dependent lands, run by a count and a bishop. There also peoples, such ad the Taifali and the Sarmatians who have territories. We hear of these, but we don't hear of independent enclaves of Roman legions running their own territories.
Procopius conveys an awareness that the situation he described was not a normative organisation. To argue that the average result is the norm therefore all other results must be wrong is fallacious.
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I have some sympathy with Roman frontier troops being maintained as buccellarii, however, that is not beinfg a regular Roman field army. it is being in a situation in the 430s and 40s where imperial pay stops so the officers find other paymasters, the local landowners who take in a hundred or so men each. that is not being a Notitia style army of comitatenses with legions and sagitarii and Illyricani and scutarii cavalry now is it? it?
The source for the stopping of Imperial pay in the 430s/440s being??? (I would like to know.)
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For me the killer puece of evidence is that the Olibriones are former Roman soldiers. They are 'former' because there is no longer a Roman army to belong to, even in 452. v If we look for your Procopian Romans anywhere it is with them, the firmer Roman soldiers.
The source for this assertion that there is no longer a Roman army being??? (I shall be interested to see this in view of the existence of Orestes' regulars and the continuation of the office of Magister Militum.)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 07:45:23 PM
At the sharp end of the pay scale mentioned in Sidonius' Letter V.7 (to Thaumastus) where he comments on corrupt and malignant officials who "grudge ... the soldier his pay".
The good bishop may merely be quoting scripture
Does any soldier ever go to war at his own expense? (1 Corinthians 9:7)
Jim
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 22, 2014, 01:56:32 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 07:45:23 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 21, 2014, 02:16:00 PM
"Rex" is at least as compatible - perhaps more so? - with "primus inter pares with the largest comitatus" as it is with "small-scale Emperor with a standing army".
Please explain. :)
Because it's a "barbarian" title - no Roman has been a rex since Tarquinius Superbus - because it's thought of as a lesser rank than Augustus or Caesar, and because it doesn't necessarily imply very much power. The Alemanni had seven reges at Argentorate (and ten regales), so you don't need all that much power to be a rex, and you certaly don't need absolute or unshared authority.
S Fanning has an interesting article 'Emperors and Empires in 5th century Gaul' in 5th century Gaul, a crisis of identity
It seems Rex did come in in the late Empire. St Augustine in 'The city of God' apparently refers to the Emperor Hadrian as 'rex hominum' and regnum is used regularly, along with imperium, for the Roman Empire
Apparently Ammianus refers to Julian as rex (23.5.8 ) which I haven't checked.
Tertullian apparently equates imperium and regnum and SHA also uses the title rex for emperors.
Hilary of Poitiers calls Valentinian 1 as sanctus rex as well as just rex.
It looks as if by the 4th century the old fear of kings had broken down. With Christianity it might be that 'king' and 'king of kings' had taken on a different feel.
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 05:44:01 AM
Which, if true.....needs double-checking....leads to the question: who were 'those men in the province Armorica' who, without help from anyone else, were able to beat the Visigoths and kill the brother of the king?
Do I see a R _ _ _ _ F_ _ _ _ A _ _ _ ?
Personally I don't trust secondary sources at all, especially not for this period, something which makes my life difficult. :(
If so it was a Roman field army that funded itself by luring slaves away from respectable friends of Sidonius
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 02:08:25 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2014, 12:18:23 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 11:32:04 AM
It is not helped by approaching the primary sources with an a priori scepticism, discounting or distorting them when they do not fit a favourite theory.
I think Justin, we are demonstrating it is very difficult not to approach the problem with assumptions or prior theories. I am still baffled as to why we should assume, if troops come from Armorica, they should be considered elite forces of regular field army, or why only powerful field armies can fight ten year wars. It is perfectly possible to consider a ten year war indicates a low intensity conflict, with neither side having the resources or will to land the knockout blow.
True, it is difficult. I have held and discarded a number of hypotheses on this period, and having been wrong often in the past I'm quite prepared to be wrong again.
On the field army question, I keep in mind the terminus ad quem: Procopius's 'other Roman soldiers', who were held in high regard by the Gallo-romans and Franks, were very particular about their Roman identity, and were not town garrison troops: they 'carry their standards into battle', i.e. if Procopius is to be believed they were field troops, belonging to former legions of the field army. I made a case earlier for one of these residual legions being the II Britannica, which was not a limitaneus legion, even less a garrison or militia unit.
You are making too many assumptions.
There is nothing to stop town militia or limitanei or whatever having standards and carrying them into battle. The transfer of units into the pseudo-comitatensis was well known (the Gallic field army in the notitia had ten such legios. Similarly town militias were later to become the core of armies in Italy.
Jim
Apologies Patrick, of course it is Aetius who sends Avitus twice to request Visigoth help.
That there are Roman troops in Italy I have stated several times. and you know this. I have referred to the Roman complaint that their own troops in Italy were too few to stand up to the. barbarians hired in from the 460s onwards. I also pointed out that there are still limitanei on the frontiers of Italy in Theoderic the Great's reign.
However, Italy is something of a special case , it is where the emperor is and has to be. defended not only against invasions such as that of Radagaisus in 405' but against Eastern intervention. Italy is. also a cash economy. the senate will pay barbarians out of taxes, but it will not give them land. (Of course in the 4th century Barbarians had been settled in Northern Italy, but then they were surrendered barbarians who then broken up and. settled in small groups. the senatorial objection was , no doubt, the settlement od unsurrendered barbarians in tribal units under their own leaders as had been the case with the Visigoths in Gaul.
In Gaul, the situation is such that barbarians are routinely settled to guard against other barbarians. As in Spain the Empire is firced to come to terms with barbarian groups that it cannot coerce. There the Visigoths and some imperial troops are used , but the Romans cannot apply enough force, it is the Goths who crush the Alans and the Siling Vandals.
The third century saw a large increase in the numbers if the army in both East and West, but this was so expensive that it led. to economic crisis , depopulation and economic decline. In the West the. armies of Africa and Spain are quite modest. The provinces are ravaged by barbarian invasion and by internal diversion and Bagaudic rebellion. Even relatively peaceful provinces like Spain suffer from the Bagaudae. When the Vandals take Africa around 430 the granary and paychest of the empire is cut off.
So the Roman situation is that the money has run out. Because they have lost Africa. I just don't accept that somehow a barter economy can suppirt the number of troops that Rome once had. If all the evidence of agricultural disruption were not enoughthen we also have the evidence of their own actions. Aetius and Litorius are forced to use Huns against the Goths, because there is no mobile field army. Aetius has to bring Burgundians across the Rhine to garrison the frontiers. Alans are settled , probably in two places. Saxons settle in Normandy and the mouth of the Loire. whether they are federates there to defend against their own kind or pirates that cannot be removed is irrelevant, the Romans in Gaul cannot remove them or provide for their own defence because there is no mobile field army.
The Romans in Gaul cannot coerce these barbarians and the settlement of barbarians that is meant to protect the empire is eating up the local revenues that might have paud for Roman armies. But then of course Rome.s system of agriculture has so depressed the farming population that it does not provide recruits.
Patrick, it is up to you to prove the existence of this ghostly Roman field army, not that it might have been there, but that it was there. So far, we do not have any hard evidence fir its existence and everything in the wider picture points to it having faded away.
Quote from: aligern on January 23, 2014, 10:53:17 PM
Apologies Patrick, of course it is Aetius who sends Avitus twice to request Visigoth help.
That there are Roman troops in Italy I have stated several times. and you know this. I have referred to the Roman complaint that their own troops in Italy were too few to stand up to the. barbarians hired in from the 460s onwards. I also pointed out that there are still limitanei on the frontiers of Italy in Theoderic the Great's reign.
However, Italy is something of a special case , it is where the emperor is and has to be. defended not only against invasions such as that of Radagaisus in 405' but against Eastern intervention. Italy is. also a cash economy. the senate will pay barbarians out of taxes, but it will not give them land. (Of course in the 4th century Barbarians had been settled in Northern Italy, but then they were surrendered barbarians who then broken up and. settled in small groups. the senatorial objection was , no doubt, the settlement od unsurrendered barbarians in tribal units under their own leaders as had been the case with the Visigoths in Gaul.
In Gaul, the situation is such that barbarians are routinely settled to guard against other barbarians. As in Spain the Empire is firced to come to terms with barbarian groups that it cannot coerce. There the Visigoths and some imperial troops are used , but the Romans cannot apply enough force, it is the Goths who crush the Alans and the Siling Vandals.
The third century saw a large increase in the numbers if the army in both East and West, but this was so expensive that it led. to economic crisis , depopulation and economic decline. In the West the. armies of Africa and Spain are quite modest. The provinces are ravaged by barbarian invasion and by internal diversion and Bagaudic rebellion. Even relatively peaceful provinces like Spain suffer from the Bagaudae. When the Vandals take Africa around 430 the granary and paychest of the empire is cut off.
That is a substantive point, and it would be interesting to be able to quantify it as I believe not all troops in the Western Empire depended directly on Africa for support - Aetius seemed able to put a fair-sized army in the field against Bonifacius despite not being able to access any revenues except those of Gaul (and not all of Gaul at that).
My understanding is that imported corn from Africa (and Sicily and to an extent Baetica in Spain) was important for feeding the still-swollen population of Rome rather than being necessary for supplying the army, and even this requirement dropped off after AD 410 and perhaps even more so after AD 455.
Quote
So the Roman situation is that the money has run out. Because they have lost Africa.
This I cannot agree with: money is where the mines and mints are. What I believe you are trying to say (and please correct me if I am wrong) is that the loss of tax revenue from Africa would cause a balance of payments crisis which would result in an 'austerity programme' of noticeable dimensions. What I seriously doubt is that even an emperor like Valentinian III would deliberately cut military expenditure before all other expenditure categories had been severely trimmed. Given that assumption, which seems not unreasonable as the power of the emperor rested on the army and had done so since the 3rd century AD, if we find massive cuts in funds for civilian projects (roads, harbours, aqueducts etc.) we can assume the Imperial treasury was finding it hard to make ends meet, but we should not assume that military expenditure was necessarily being cut, or that it would be cut ahead of expenditure on civilian projects and upkeep.
Quote
I just don't accept that somehow a barter economy can suppirt the number of troops that Rome once had.
But I have seen no evidence that we would be looking at a barter economy: Sidonius' letters give quite the contrary impression.
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If all the evidence of agricultural disruption were not enough
So far this seems to rest on the idea that abandonment of villas means the land ceases to be owned or usefully worked, which I consider a very questionable assumption. Having barbarians traverse the territory would certainly depress revenues for a year or two, but once they had passed on the land and population would recover given time and security. I have seen nothing to suggest that the Domain of Soissons was repeatedly invaded or even raided between AD 455 and 486.
Quote
then we also have the evidence of their own actions. Aetius and Litorius are forced to use Huns against the Goths, because there is no mobile field army.
Aetius lost one in his battle against Bonifacius, but seems to have rebuilt one by the time of Attila's invasion.
Quote
Aetius has to bring Burgundians across the Rhine to garrison the frontiers. Alans are settled , probably in two places. Saxons settle in Normandy and the mouth of the Loire. whether they are federates there to defend against their own kind or pirates that cannot be removed is irrelevant, the Romans in Gaul cannot remove them or provide for their own defence because there is no mobile field army.
I thought they by and large brought themselves, and this kind of 'squatting' by barbarians is not
per se evidence of lack of a field army: if we look at Gaul when Julian was appointed Caesar we see much the same situation with tribes raiding and even settling in Roman territory. We also see the occasional incursion with the connivance of the emperor in Constantinople. There was a field army but it was simply not being used until Julian put it to work. (Magnentius' revolt and the eunuchs' framing of Sylvanus had done nothing for its command chain.)
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Patrick, it is up to you to prove the existence of this ghostly Roman field army, not that it might have been there, but that it was there. So far, we do not have any hard evidence fir its existence and everything in the wider picture points to it having faded away.
Let us begin by asking: with what did Aetius fight Bonifacius and Bonifacius Aetius? We can take things from there.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 23, 2014, 08:55:43 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 07:45:23 PM
At the sharp end of the pay scale mentioned in Sidonius' Letter V.7 (to Thaumastus) where he comments on corrupt and malignant officials who "grudge ... the soldier his pay".
The good bishop may merely be quoting scripture
Does any soldier ever go to war at his own expense? (1 Corinthians 9:7)
Not in this case, methinks: Corinthians has nothing to say about couriers, ambassadors, flamens or controllers of revenue. The funny thing about Sidonius is one hardly ever catches him quoting scripture. Greek mythology, yes. Scripture, very rarely.
In any event, in I Corinthians 9 Paul is trying to justify his conduct after being caught with his fingers in the till, and although one can see a certain applicability to the officials Sidonius is describing, the latter's listing of the various occupations affected does not look like a scriptural quote or even allusion.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2014, 06:13:16 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 05:26:47 PM
The reference to the' legio bretonum', by the way, does not mention it being in a town, just north of the Loire/Loir. Rather curious if it was a town garrison/militia.
Not really. I'd expect a mention if it was a peripatetic entity living under canvas but if it was based in a town or towns, it would seem unremarkable.
I mean, its location is 'beyond the Loire' but not in any town in that region, although the author does name towns elsewhere in his narrative. The impression is that the legion was not quartered in a town, hence was not a town garrison. The text is rather vague, admittedly, and hence not conclusive.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 23, 2014, 11:40:24 PM
Let us begin by asking: with what did Aetius fight Bonifacius and Bonifacius Aetius? We can take things from there.
It's a battle I've tried to track down. As far as I can make out the two generals may merely have had their Bucellarii, in the case of Boniface his seem to mainly have been Vandals, and in the case of Aetius, Huns.
Rebuilding the army for Aetius was easy. He just fled to the Huns
Jim
edited to add that Boniface wasn't the first to invade from Africa, see 'The Revolt of Heraclian',
Stewart Irvin Oost Classical Philology, Vol. 61, No. 4. (Oct., 1966), pp. 236-242.
But considering the size of force that Boniface could raise, it is unlikely that regular soldiers, born and serving in Africa for their entire careers, are going to abandon their homes, land, families in the face of constant vandal encroachment. That is one reason why I'm happy with the suggestion that he just brought his Bucellarii
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 23, 2014, 11:50:27 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 23, 2014, 08:55:43 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2014, 07:45:23 PM
At the sharp end of the pay scale mentioned in Sidonius' Letter V.7 (to Thaumastus) where he comments on corrupt and malignant officials who "grudge ... the soldier his pay".
The good bishop may merely be quoting scripture
Does any soldier ever go to war at his own expense? (1 Corinthians 9:7)
Not in this case, methinks: Corinthians has nothing to say about couriers, ambassadors, flamens or controllers of revenue. The funny thing about Sidonius is one hardly ever catches him quoting scripture. Greek mythology, yes. Scripture, very rarely.
In any event, in I Corinthians 9 Paul is trying to justify his conduct after being caught with his fingers in the till, and although one can see a certain applicability to the officials Sidonius is describing, the latter's listing of the various occupations affected does not look like a scriptural quote or even allusion.
Literature of the period has a fine tradition of allusion, and I suggest that this is just another allusion, after all, you can call the dawn rosy-fingered and refer to the sea as wine-dark without intending to describe the weather. Among his contemporaries the allusion would merely be a way of displaying erudition, it's far too slight a thing to build a field army on.
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 24, 2014, 06:05:30 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2014, 06:13:16 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 05:26:47 PM
The reference to the' legio bretonum', by the way, does not mention it being in a town, just north of the Loire/Loir. Rather curious if it was a town garrison/militia.
Not really. I'd expect a mention if it was a peripatetic entity living under canvas but if it was based in a town or towns, it would seem unremarkable.
I mean, its location is 'beyond the Loire' but not in any town in that region, although the author does name towns elsewhere in his narrative. The impression is that the legion was not quartered in a town, hence was not a town garrison. The text is rather vague, admittedly, and hence not conclusive.
It may just be that Procopius couldn't remember the name of the town it garrisoned. The vagueness generally gives the impression it's something Procopius might have heard about, perhaps when he was in Italy, but his informant didn't know the name anyway, but merely knew of the existance of such men and the claims they made.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 24, 2014, 08:17:32 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 24, 2014, 06:05:30 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2014, 06:13:16 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 05:26:47 PM
The reference to the' legio bretonum', by the way, does not mention it being in a town, just north of the Loire/Loir. Rather curious if it was a town garrison/militia.
Not really. I'd expect a mention if it was a peripatetic entity living under canvas but if it was based in a town or towns, it would seem unremarkable.
I mean, its location is 'beyond the Loire' but not in any town in that region, although the author does name towns elsewhere in his narrative. The impression is that the legion was not quartered in a town, hence was not a town garrison. The text is rather vague, admittedly, and hence not conclusive.
It may just be that Procopius couldn't remember the name of the town it garrisoned. The vagueness generally gives the impression it's something Procopius might have heard about, perhaps when he was in Italy, but his informant didn't know the name anyway, but merely knew of the existance of such men and the claims they made.
Jim
The reference to the legio bretonum is from the
Vita Sancti Dalmatii, by an unknown author writing in Gaul some time in the middle of the 6th century:
'Naturally, after the realm of the Franks [who were] pious and illustrious and devotees of the Christian religion, had subjugated the city of Rodez (the people themselves conspiring in their [the Franks'] favour), the priest [Dalmas], filled with desire, strove to look upon the presence of the Christian king Theudebert. As the devout one [Dalmas] was tirelessly hurrying to him [Theudebert] in the region beyond-Loire [or: beyond-Loir], it is said he enjoyed an evening's hospitality in a certain place where some sort of Breton [or: Brittonic] legion (so to speak) nearby was stationed [or: was waiting].'
Notice that the legion is stationed
near (and not at) the undefined place where Dalmas enjoyed an evening's hospitality. At a first impression it seems to be a fort of some kind.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 24, 2014, 09:16:50 AM
The reference to the legio bretonum is from the Vita Sancti Dalmatii, by an unknown author writing in Gaul some time in the middle of the 6th century:
'Naturally, after the realm of the Franks [who were] pious and illustrious and devotees of the Christian religion, had subjugated the city of Rodez (the people themselves conspiring in their [the Franks'] favour), the priest [Dalmas], filled with desire, strove to look upon the presence of the Christian king Theudebert. As the devout one [Dalmas] was tirelessly hurrying to him [Theudebert] in the region beyond-Loire [or: beyond-Loir], it is said he enjoyed an evening's hospitality in a certain place where some sort of Breton [or: Brittonic] legion (so to speak) nearby was stationed [or: was waiting].'
Notice that the legion is stationed near (and not at) the undefined place where Dalmas enjoyed an evening's hospitality. At a first impression it seems to be a fort of some kind.
It could be a detachment of a town militia that was covering a crossing place within the town's territory, as you say, it might be a fort, or a fortified dwelling of some sort) it could even be the town itself.
But we needn't be talking of more than a handful of men, remember in the Late Empire units were often split up in penny packets guarding a number of places.
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 24, 2014, 06:05:30 AM
I mean, its location is 'beyond the Loire' but not in any town in that region, although the author does name towns elsewhere in his narrative. The impression is that the legion was not quartered in a town, hence was not a town garrison. The text is rather vague, admittedly, and hence not conclusive.
Apologies Justin that I misunderstood you. I think you yourself have the answer, re-reading the piece as you quoted it suggests uncertainty on the author's part. He doesn't feel confident in his details and can only commit to an area in which this happened, rather than knowing the exact place. I don't think we can conclude that the "legion" doesn't have a base from it. In fact, wouldn't it be an odd unit not to have a base? The most likely base for it, as I understand the economic and political geography, would be a town, though as Jim says, it could easily have detachments securing strategic points (whatever one judges them to be).
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 24, 2014, 10:03:33 AM
It could be a detachment of a town militia that was covering a crossing place within the town's territory, as you say, it might be a fort, or a fortified dwelling of some sort) it could even be the town itself.
But we needn't be talking of more than a handful of men, remember in the Late Empire units were often split up in penny packets guarding a number of places.
It is the designation rather than the order of battle which stands out, and similarly with Procopius' Arborychi.
When dealing with these single-source mentions, there are always plenty of casual explanations for the unusual phenomenon, but what for me stands out is the fact that the phenomenon attracted the special notice of the author in the first place. Procopius was undoubtedly familiar with city militias which had their own standards, but he takes the time to comment upon the curious fellows in northern Gaul who preserved Roman military traditions, or what Procopius understood to be such. This deserves reflection on our part.
Jim, I checked out Ammianus XXIII.5.8 and yes, Julian is referred to as a king (you were right) though admittedly only in the sense of an omen foretelling doom for someone in high places:
Obitus enim regis portendebatur, sed cuius, erat incertum.(for the death of a king was foretold, but of which king was uncertain)
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 24, 2014, 08:10:52 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 23, 2014, 11:40:24 PM
Let us begin by asking: with what did Aetius fight Bonifacius and Bonifacius Aetius? We can take things from there.
It's a battle I've tried to track down. As far as I can make out the two generals may merely have had their Bucellarii, in the case of Boniface his seem to mainly have been Vandals, and in the case of Aetius, Huns.
Rebuilding the army for Aetius was easy. He just fled to the Huns
Jim
edited to add that Boniface wasn't the first to invade from Africa, see 'The Revolt of Heraclian',
Stewart Irvin Oost Classical Philology, Vol. 61, No. 4. (Oct., 1966), pp. 236-242.
But considering the size of force that Boniface could raise, it is unlikely that regular soldiers, born and serving in Africa for their entire careers, are going to abandon their homes, land, families in the face of constant vandal encroachment. That is one reason why I'm happy with the suggestion that he just brought his Bucellarii
Bonifacius may well have brought only his bucellarii from Africa, but prior to the battle he had been appointed Magister Militum and was in a position to collect and use the Army of Italy. It is inconceivable that he did not do so.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 24, 2014, 08:15:05 AM
Literature of the period has a fine tradition of allusion, and I suggest that this is just another allusion, after all, you can call the dawn rosy-fingered and refer to the sea as wine-dark without intending to describe the weather. Among his contemporaries the allusion would merely be a way of displaying erudition, it's far too slight a thing to build a field army on.
Sidonius does use literary allusion, but when he does so it is evident, e.g. Letter V.7.5:
"
Let them but scent from afar a rusty purse, and you will see them fix on it the eyes of Argus, Briareus' hands, the Sphinx's claws; they will bring into play the perjuries of Laomedon, the subtleties of Ulysses, Sinon's wiles; they will stick to it with the staunchness of Polymestor and the loyalty of a Pygmalion."
When he writes about soldiers and pay he means soldiers and pay.
It may be time to review this thread and see if we can make any further progress or if we are falling into preconceived ruts that will just run in circles.
The issues seem to be:
Did Syagrius have a regular army in AD 486?
Did the Western Empire or any part of it have such an army in whole or in part after AD 429?
I think we have demonstrated that what remained of the Western Empire had an ongoing imperial administrative system right up to AD 475. The point of contention here seems to be whether the Domain of Soissons also had such a system.
Regarding the Arborychi of Procopius, these seem to remain a phenomenon without a wholly satisfactory explanation, although some have been offered.
I suggest we wind the topic down for a few days to give those of us who are researching material a chance to put it all together, then combine what we have and see what (if anything) emerges. This may be more fruitful than trying to impose an interpretation ab initio, whether mine or anyone else's.
In theory this will let us look at the subject with a clean slate.
Feel free to post any replies to may last post first.
This element of any part of the W Empire having a regular army has rather crept in.
There is little doubt that there are regular Roman troops in Italy up to 476 and there may be a field army. What is in doubt for Gaul is whether there is a field army of substantial numbers up to the late 400s . There may well be frontier troops that survive in diminished form and in the new privatised world, but I would not call them, nor the buccellarii of a leader a 'regular Roman field army'
So I wonder if the question should be redrawn?
I also doubt that what remained of the Western Empire had an ongoing imperial administrative system. Some would regard the Visigoth kingdom and Burgundy as part of the W empire then, some not and parts of Gaul and Spain may well be in the Empire faute de mieux, but not running the imperial tax system. What is the status of the Bretons or those tracts of Spain neither Sueve nor Goth dominated?
Patrick's idea is excellent. A number of posters have contributed interesting primary source material and I think we are gradually getting a clearer impression of the period. We need everything that can be found put on the table and carefully compared - in the original language if possible. Plus anything archaeology and numismatology can yield.
I promised earlier to take a closer look at the solidi distribution in Armorica in the latter half of the 5th century and see to what extent it ties up with a paid military. I have the stuff ready so if no-one minds I might as well post it now.
Here is an extract from the article that accompanied the solidi distribution maps I posted earlier. This is my translation from the original French: The italics are mine.
| The 4th and 5th centuries: military gold or a general circulation?
The role of gold in economic and social life changed under Constantine. From 311 the solidus, a 1/72 pounds replaces the aureus at 1/60 pounds as the base of the monetary system. Reece (1975, p 644) suggested that the cycle of gold in the 4th and 5th centuries began and ended outside the province, and could not be linked to economic prosperity or public demand, but to the needs of the army. P. Gaillou (1980 a, p 257-258) cautiously put forward an ingenious hypothesis according to which the solidi of the 4th and 5th centuries were evidence of civil or military functionaries in the first or second degree but also of soldier-peasant colonists installed along strategic routes. It is true that the annual coefficient which increased in the period 364-378 (1.07) could correspond to the establishment or reorganisation, in the 370's (or between 370 -395), of the Tractus Armoricanus et Nervicanus of which the Notitia Dignitatum gives us the picture.
However, this correlation between solidi and points of defence still needs to be confirmed. In fact, the maps showing distribution in the 4th and 5th centuries are not radically different from those of the first three centuries. The primary zones of diffusion of solidi (north of the peninsula, the namneto-venete zone, the gulf of Pictons, Cotentin) are already primary zones in the first century. Furthermore, of the various forts of the Tractus (Nantes, Vannes, Brest, Alet, Avanches, Coutances), only Nantes and the area around Vannes have yielded solidi. It is the same for the garrisons of Letes (Rennes, Le Mans, Coutances...) where Bayeux (cf addendum) constitutes the exception. Among the other possible garrisons, some have yielded gold coins: A Diocletian at Cesson (No. 168), a Maximus at Saint Pol-de-Leon (No. 150), a Constantine II on the road leading to Trouguer in Cleden-Cap-Sizun (No. 126), but these consist precisely of sites where the presence of fortifications is in doubt (Galliou, 1980 a, p 243-245). Furthermore, the most obvious site of Coz-Yaudet in Ploulec'h has shown no trace of gold coins.
These negative remarks, indeed, are not conclusive and I admit that I don't have a substitution hypothesis other than that of a 'normal' level of provisioning under the Antonines or during the period of the Gallo-roman empire. I am convinced that the defence of Armorica in the broad sense (cost of fortifications, maintainence of a defensive girdle, donatives for the troops) favoured the use of money, but the role of this 'military' gold is not determinable, even if I agree with P. Galliou in suggesting that it is most likely more important than in the preceding centuries. |
To put it in plain English, the author cannot see any better hypothesis to explain the coins than the normal system of annonia and other military payments as took place in previous centuries. The absence of coins at Coz Yaudet is not surprising, given that the place was continuously occupied.
Here is a map showing the distribution of solidi and tremissi from the emperors Libius Severus, Julius Nepos and Zenon, i.e. the period 461 - 491. The coins are superimposed on a map showing the borders between Roman Gaul, the Bretons and the Visigoths.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/map%20coins%20armorica.jpg)
There are two things to notice. First the concentration of solidi along the Loire. This is exactly the place one would expect to find Procopius's 'other Roman soldiers' who guarded this frontier against their Arian enemies, the Visigoths to the south.
Secondly, the curious concentration in a small region in the centre-north of the Breton peninsula. Two of the coins were discovered at Castel Kerandroat, in Plésidy, a small Roman fort in which a coin of Vespasian was also discovered.
This is also the area in which the Roman fort of Le Yaudet is located, which recent archeological research shows to have been continuously occupied during the 5th century and into the 6th, the nature of this occupation being most probably military. I have attached a pdf of an article on the excavations of 1991-2002. Unfortunately I don't have the internet link. Besides a siliqua of Arcadius, the site yielded:
| a fine crossbow brooch (no. 1.40) usually dated to the period c.330–410, a buckle pin (no. 1.41) and the loop of a buckle (no. 1.42), both of late Roman type, and an openwork phalera (no. 1.43) dated to the late third or fourth century. Other datable material includes a late Roman cylindrical wound glass bead (no. 6.39), the neck of a glass bottle or flask of a type dated in northern France to the mid-fifth to mid-sixth century, and four body sherds of an amphora or amphorae imported from the east Mediterranean in the late fifth or early sixth century. The remainder of the material culture is limited to a restricted range of coarse pottery, a bone gouge and a few stone weights and a stone spindle whorl. Although the amount of material that can confidently be assigned to this elusive period is not great, given the extensive destruction caused by medieval and later ploughing and the fact that the period was largely aceramic, the collection is all the more remarkable. It reflects a high status occupation throughout the period and a probable military presence, at least in the early stages. |
We are looking a Roman military presence in Brittany which the solidi and tremisses indicate continued during the second half of the 5th century, possibly with the intention of keeping the peninsula subordinate, even if it was not all under direct Roman control.
To sum up, the evidence indicates that paid and professional Roman troops in the Armorica area throughout the 5th century is at least likely.
Nice to see some archaeology making an appearance :)
Like most archaeological material, it is , of course, open to interpretation. This is well summed up in the abstract of the distribution paper. What I'm entirely missing is a reference to a late roman field army. The army mentioned in the abstract seems to be a garrison of militia, the functional descendants of limitanei, which is what the traditional (if we can talk about such) view would expect.
On the second, Breton, note, it refers to some kind of military presence early in the period late 4th to early sixth century. It sounds like the finds for this period are unstratified too, so it would be difficult to get to a more accurate date. I know virtually nothing about Brittany at this point, except it traditionally fills up with British refugees. How radical is it to discover a Roman military presence in the early-mid fifth century?
As we are not in response mode for a while I will hang fire on any comment bar a direct quote from the pdf which is in the conclusion of the section 'The resettlement: from Armorica to Brittany: AD 380–550' and refers specifically to Le Yaudet and then the broader regions:
'Perhaps in this we are seeing, dimly reflected, groups of foederatae, some of British origin, settling among the indigenous population to provide a semblance of order as the old social fabric crumbled.
In this may lie the beginning of the British immigration which was to continue for more than a century transforming Armorica to Brittany.'
and your conclusion
'To sum up, the evidence indicates that paid and professional Roman troops in the Armorica area throughout the 5th century is at least likely'
I may be wrong but I don't think that there is a doubt about some 'Roman' troops being present Justin, nor that they were paid.
It's
a) just how many troops
b) what kind of 'Roman' troops were they (i.e. if foederati did they carry on Roman military customs; so were they once comitatenses type units and are these the troops the passers-on of on tradition/standards etc that Procopius details; were they part of a cohesive Field Army etc.)
c) how good they were
d) and who were their paymasters (administration or private funding).
And thank you, that is a really interesting doc.
Hi Justin, did the author, or has anyone, got a map that shows the distribution of such gold coins for the whole of Gaul or for the Western Empire? I hate asking questions such as that, but it would help to verify whether the distribution told us anything about the military presence or was down to some other cause.
Roy
With regard to the army of Bonifacius attached is a pdf of 'War and Society in the Roman World'.
There is some information in
'The end of the Roman Army in the Western Empire' , Liebschutz
Also of interest is
'Landlords and Warlords in the later Roman Empire' Whittaker.
Both essays cover some of the topics we have been discussing and are useful their overall conclusions (well, at least for discussion) and their bibliography.
Quote from: aligern on January 25, 2014, 10:57:33 AM
Hi Justin, did the author, or has anyone, got a map that shows the distribution of such gold coins for the whole of Gaul or for the Western Empire? I hate asking questions such as that, but it would help to verify whether the distribution told us anything about the military presence or was down to some other cause.
Roy
This book (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Monnaies-d%C3%A9couvertes-France-Ve-VIIIe-si%C3%A8cle/dp/2271061695) should tell us what we need to know.
There remains the unfortunate formality of buying it.
Quote from: rodge on January 25, 2014, 11:13:41 AM
With regard to the army of Bonifacius attached is a pdf of 'War and Society in the Roman World'.
There is some information in
'The end of the Roman Army in the Western Empire' , Liebschutz
Also of interest is
'Landlords and Warlords in the later Roman Empire' Whittaker.
Both essays cover some of the topics we have been discussing and are useful their overall conclusions (well, at least for discussion) and their bibliography.
Thanks, Rodger: Liebschutz' observations have something for everyone.
p.271
"The integration of his [Aetius'] large forces into the palatine army created a problem which
Valentinian hoped that Majorian, who had served with Aetius, would solve (Sid. Ap. Carm. 5. 306–8)."
"In that case, his first group of successful campaigns was fought with an army which had at least a
federate core. We lack the evidence to say more."
"... it was with a force of Huns that he all but destroyed the defeated Burgundians in 436 (Prosper, Chron. 1322; Chron. Gall. 452,
118). In the same period Litorius, Aetius' second-in-command, led a force of Huns. With these he defeated the Armoricans in 435–7
(Sid. Ap. Carm. 7. 246–7), and marched through Auvergne to relieve Narbonne in 437 (ibid. 7. 248). In 439 he attacked the
Goths outside Toulouse, where he was captured by the Goths and his army lost (Prosper, Chron. 1335). Subsequently we are told
that Roman Gaul was defenceless, and Aetius helpless. It looks as if Litorius' mainly Hunnish force had made up a large part of
Aetius' army (Sid. Ap. Carm. 299 ff.).1 Of course, Huns did not make up the whole of Aetius' army in Gaul in the 430s. But this does not mean that the bulk of it consisted of Romans."
Footnote 1:
But Aetius did have sufficient forces to conduct a siege and attack a fortified town (Merobaudes, Panegyric 2, p. 271–2), before negotiating peace (ibid. 272, lines 185–90, with the commentary of Clover 1971, 58–9)."When Avitus took part in Aetius' campaign of 436 against the Burgundians, his military conduct is said to have
surpassed that of Heruli, Huns, Franks, Sarmatians, Salians and Gelonians (Sid. Ap. Carm. 7. 235). Presumably all those barbarians
were federates fighting in recognizable tribal units."
"We have miserably little information about the composition of the armies of Aetius' ceaseless campaigning. Evidence is fullest for
the campaign of 451 and the famous battle of Chalons. Now for the first time we have a reasonably full description of battle and
combatants. The king of the Goths commanded one wing, Aetius commanded the Romans on the other, and in between were Alan
federates."
Liebschutz concludes from the lack of explicit mention of Roman troops at Chalons that "the Roman force too seems to have consisted entirely of federates."
p.273
"Thus it looks as if by 450 the bulk of the field army (or armies) in the West consisted of federates. This does not mean that no regular
units survived. The contrary is likely to have been the case,2 but it may be that they were mostly tied down in garrison duties. But
when a large expeditionary force was needed it seems that it was raised for the duration of the campaign, largely from barbarians."
Footnote 2:
Bachrach 1971, 33–4, suggests that the 'milites who garrisoned fortifications and the laeti who protected fortresses and served as antrustiones in centenae...as well as other remnants of the late Roman military establishment were militarily significant' in sixth century
Merovingian Gaul.p.275
"It was the highest praise for a Roman soldier for his warlike capacities to be compared favourably with those of a barbarian (Sid. Ap. Carm. 5.
238–54, 518–32, 7. 235–40)."
Which at least indicates that there were Roman soldiers around exhibiting warlike capabilities as of the late 5th century. Liebschutz has access to the various Chronicles and makes much use of Sidonius'
Carmina, which seem not to be available online. This latter might be fruitful if obtainable, one way or another.
This source (http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/annor_0003-4134_1964_num_14_2_6723) (for those who can manage French) gives a descriptive list of all silver coins struck in Gaul and Italy during the second half of the 5th century and through the 6th century.
Of interest is a map giving the distribution of the silver coins (siliqua) in Gaul. It lists 4 types of coins: those with the image of an emperor, those that imitated imperial coins, those struck under the Ostrogoths, and those struck under the Burgundians and Franks. These are individual coins, incidentally, not treasure-troves of rich Romans.
Note the overwhelming concentration of imitation imperial coins north of the Seine, substantially in the region controlled by Aegidius and Syagrius. It is this region that Wickham affirms became the economic heartland of post-imperial Europe. The lack of coins south of the Seine is, admittedly, curious.
Silver coins would be used for commercial exchange and military expenditure, in what proportions is uncertain. The very least the map indicates is a thriving economy that saw itself as Roman, to the extent of striking its own Roman coinage when the regular supply failed.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/silver%20coins%20gaul.jpg)
In the second essay I mentioned, when discussing Gaul, Whittaker says (with respect to the formation of Bucellarii and Trustiones)
that:
'While the remnants of the Roman army continued to operate in the towns, just as in the eastern army, the countryside was controlled by these semi-private bands...'
and later
'but it is evident from Procopius that in Gaul some units of the regular army and leati continued to man the towns and forts, simply transferring their allegiance from Romans to Franks.'
He cites James 'The Franks'.
He then draws a comparison (after Thompson) in 5thC Noricum:
'In Noricum, as in Frankish Gaul, its is clear that the control of the countryside was in the hands of what are called robbers. But these bands were under a war leader like Ferderuchus...' (Life of Severinus).
So it may be also be worth looking at James 'The Franks', Thompson 'Romans and Barbarians: the Decline of the Roman Empire' to see what, if any, sources they cite to arrive at their conclusions.
'Life of Severinus' is at
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/severinus_02_text.htm
I have Blockley so will have a look at the any relevant references given by Liebschutz.
Thanks for the site of the Life of St Severinus Rodge. I had cited the Life on the end of the garrison, it is in chapter XX. Most interested to see footnote 67 which I copy below.
Given that the troops are being supplied directly from Africa the loss of that province will have had a very direct effect.
67. 1 Saint Augustine (De Civitate Dei, xviii, 18) tells of the corn, called Retica annona, sent from Italy for the supply of the soldiers in Raetia: "dicebat . . . narrasse quae passus est, caballum se scilicet factum annonam inter alia jumenta bajulasse militibus, quae dicitur Retica, quoniam ad Retias deportatur."
68. 2 The cohors nova Batavorum, according to the Notitia Dignitatum. The town, that is, was a military station, and took its name from the garrison.
Roy
To add to the numismatic evidence we have here is the relevant section from Chapter 8 'Material Evidence for Northern Gaul' in MacGeorge 'Late Roman Warlords' 2002.
There is something for everyone here but how much clearer it makes things I am not sure:
NUMISMATIC EVIDENCE
In general, the numismatic date for late fifth-century Gaul is ephemeral and inconclusive, and problematic due to the practise of imitation and inadequate distribution patterns. Identification of coins also remains somewhat subjective; influenced in particular by opinions on the extent to which Gaul was still 'Roman'.
Official silver coins were no longer minted in Gaul after Jovinus (AD411-13) [Footnote: King]. The imperial mint at Arles continued to mint gold coins into the third quarter of the fifth century AD (the Trier mint ceased regular official production earlier). There are also a small number of groups of unofficial coins, varying widely in quality, and minted sporadically at different dates and places in Gaul throughout the fifth century AD [Footnote: King]. These coins were copied of official issues, using the same types, legends and in some cases also mint-marks. All the unofficial groups consist of small numbers of finds, many of which have no recorded find pot, making identification of the mint by analysis of the distribution patterns difficult [Footnote; However, where available, the distribution patterns of some of these groups of coins are striking. Coins of some groups have been found in eastern and northern France, Belgium, Scandinavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Germany and Britain –on example in Bury St. Edmunds- King; this may support the idea of a new linkage between northern Gaul and the North Sea littoral regions mentioned in Ch 5. The occasional far flung find spots may result from historical accident , or indicate that long-distance contacts and, possibly, trade continued]
One group of the unofficial coins is believed to have been produced by the Visigothic Kingdom of Aquitaine in c. AD 418-23 [Footnote: Kent. King. The basic reason for this attribution is the absence of any other likely, non-imperial, minting authority in Gaul at this date]; and other coins of a later date are also probably Visigothic. Some later unofficial coins, however, may have been minted elsewhere, by other authorities.
These include a group of gold coins (minted in the names of Valentinian III, Avitus, Majorian, Libius Sererus, Anthemius, Julis Nepos, Leo, Zeno and Anastasius) and another group of solidi and tremisses with the same reverse type. Of the second group the solidi were minted in the name of Valentinian III, Majorian and Libius Severus, and the tremisses in the names of Valentinian, Libius Severus, Zeno and Basilicus [Footnote: Kent, King, Grier and Blackburn]. Although the distribution patterns have been seen by some numismatists as evidence of Visigothic origin [Footnote: King citing Depeyrot, Callu and Barrendon] it has also been argued that some, if not all, of these coins were minted by Roman authorities [Footnote: Essentially the interpretations differ because of a disagreement in dating the coins. These coins may be contemporary with the official issues from the mint at Arles, hence dating to 454-65-King. However, the solidi of Severus could have been 'immobilised' in form, with the official series lasting into the mid 470s and therefore distributed in what had, by then, become pro-Visigothic territory- King].
These, it has been proposed, include Aetius, perhaps using the Trier mint and even Aegidius and Syagrius [Footnote: Kent, Grier and Blackburn].
Another group of unofficial coins, but of silver (of substandard workmanship and rather botched lettering), has a distribution pattern pointing to a mint in north-Eastern Gaul, possibly at Soissons [Footnote: Kent, Grierson and Blackburn. There are no mint marks other than an occasional COMOB (sometimes appearing as CONOB) used to designate a palatine mint and used by those at Trier, Arles, and Milan, amongst others].
It has been suggested that these coins might be connected to the Roman army in North Gaul. More specifically they have been associated with Aegidius and Syagrius (possibly following Aetius' practice). Another view is that they may have been produced by 'local remnants of the Roman establishment' [Footnote: King. In this category we could surly include Syagrius]. The coins are minted in the names of Majorian, Anthemius, Julius Nepos, and the eastern emperor Anastasius. (The omission of coins in the name of Libius Severus would fit with Aegidius' political stance, but this may be merely an accident of recovery.)
The group are ancestral to later; very lightweight and fragile silver coins, minted in the names of emperors down to Anastasius, on which the legends are progressively more and more blundered [Footnote: Kent, King]. These coins date to the late fifth century AD. Their distribution is similar to that of the previous group of silver coins, with several find spots along the Rhine, and the most probable origin of these coins is the Frankish kingdoms in north-east Gaul [Footnote: Kent. They may have been produced as small change or to be used as 'largesse'- Grierson and Blackburn].
If Aegidius and/or Syagrius did mint coins in northern Gaul, this would be evidence that they were breaking new ground, becoming more like independent rules [Footnote: It seems unlikely that Aegidius and Syagrius (especially) would have been using the Trier mint by this date]. That they did so is uncertain but somebody seems to have been minting unofficial coins in northern Gaul; and the existence of these coinages testifies, at the very least, to increasing fragmentation and local autonomy [Footnote: The continued imitation of imperial issues perhaps shows a conservative adherence to the old imperial forms, among both Roman and barbarian-unless this was merely the result of inertia and practical constraints.]
The coins may have been used to facilitate the raising of local taxes, payment of military forces [Footnote: King] or of tribute and protection money [Footnote: Although it is difficult to see why payments of this nature would need to be in coin.]. This may also be connected to the need to legitimise the power of new authorities.
Justin would it be fair to say that the map of silver coin finds that you give would. if we acceted their military connection, suggest that Aegidius and Syagrius are operating North of the Seine and not South of it where there appear to be no coin finds?
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 25, 2014, 05:27:55 PM
Justin would it be fair to say that the map of silver coin finds that you give would. if we acceted their military connection, suggest that Aegidius and Syagrius are operating North of the Seine and not South of it where there appear to be no coin finds?
Roy
I doubt it Roy. We have several unconnected sources that put Syagrius's southern frontier on the Loire, and the Seine-Loire region is Armorica. There are plenty of solidi/tremissi north of the Loire from Syagrius's time. There must be a reason for the dearth of silver coins, but what it is I have no idea. It is easier to tie solidi to military use than siliquas, as solidi were used only for big expenditures like buildings (military or civil) and units' pay. Siliquas were of a small enough value to be usable for some commercial transactions.
In my novel, by the way, I have the protagonists using siliquas and follises, but not solidi. A solidus was equivalent to about 2-3 months' pay for a soldier. That's something like 4,000 pounds in contemporary terms. A siliqua was worth 1/24 of a solidus, something like 160 pounds. You could just about take that to the marketplace. Keep in mind that real values and prices of products then and now are not really comparable.
I'm beginning to wonder if we haven't phrased the whole question about a regular Roman army in the wrong way. We are looking for the (non)existence of a field army as proof that the late Roman administration in northern Gaul could or could not keep up a professional military. Field armies, however, were a Constantinian invention. Here is a quote from Wikipedia (for what it's worth):
| The main change in structure from the 2nd-century army was the establishment of large escort armies (comitatus praesentales), typically containing 20-30,000 top-grade palatini troops. These were normally based near the imperial capitals: (Constantinople in the East, Milan in the West), thus far from the Empire's borders. These armies' primary function was to deter usurpations, and they usually campaigned under the personal command of their emperors. |
By the time one gets to Aegidius and northern Gaul, the motivation to have a comital field army is gone. There is no longer an emperor who fears usurpation. Thus the professional troops can go back to what they were doing in the first centuries of the empire - guarding the borders. This means that the 'other Roman soldiers' of Procopius
were the field army, reverted to the frontier duties of its forebears.
This raises the question of who exactly the Arborychi/Armoriciani/men of Armorica province were. I have an idea about that, but perhaps for a later post. (we are, after all, busy taking a break from the thread for a few days ;))
Quote from: aligern on January 25, 2014, 03:46:38 PM
Thanks for the site of the Life of St Severinus Rodge. I had cited the Life on the end of the garrison, it is in chapter XX. Most interested to see footnote 67 which I copy below.
Given that the troops are being supplied directly from Africa the loss of that province will have had a very direct effect.
Um ... actually they are being supplied directly from
Italy.
Quote
67. 1 Saint Augustine (De Civitate Dei, xviii, 18) tells of the corn, called Retica annona, sent from Italy for the supply of the soldiers in Raetia: "dicebat . . . narrasse quae passus est, caballum se scilicet factum annonam inter alia jumenta bajulasse militibus, quae dicitur Retica, quoniam ad Retias deportatur."
68. 2 The cohors nova Batavorum, according to the Notitia Dignitatum. The town, that is, was a military station, and took its name from the garrison.
I like the way we are coming up with useful information: it does look as if we are developing a picture. (My own opinions are purposely on hold as the picture develops - the picture matters more than they do.)
De Civitate Dei is written in the 410s, certainly before the Vandals take Africa. At this point huge amounts of grain are going from Africa to Italy. So, Zi submit the Raetian garrisons. are getting African grain.
Let us suppose they actually got Italian grain. Once Africa was lost that grain would have been held in Italy and o the consequences for supply of the. army would have been the same.
Justin, you make a nice point about the field army becoming a garrison army that can be called out, more like the armies of the 1st century AD. I am not at all sure that the main reason for the creation of mobile armies is the need to have a central force to resist usurpations. I suggest that. they grow out of the third century crisis as a result of the emperors campaigning constantly and thus field armies evolving. By the IVth century they are the norm because the strategy of the Empire is, much as Luttwak says, a strategy of defense in depth in which the field armies were there to riposte to barbarian incursions. In the Eastern Empire the field armies survive so we do not see a change in strategy there. In the West the field army survives in Italy where it is composed largely of foederati.
However, pretty well everyone actively debating here could unite around Aegidius and Syagrius having armies that were composed of soldiers from garrisons, foederati, laeti and, of course his own buccellarii. What that is not is an army of Palatine elite units with mounted Sagittarii, Illyricani,Scutarii etc. as has been suggested.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 24, 2014, 11:27:40 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 24, 2014, 10:03:33 AM
It could be a detachment of a town militia that was covering a crossing place within the town's territory, as you say, it might be a fort, or a fortified dwelling of some sort) it could even be the town itself.
But we needn't be talking of more than a handful of men, remember in the Late Empire units were often split up in penny packets guarding a number of places.
It is the designation rather than the order of battle which stands out, and similarly with Procopius' Arborychi.
When dealing with these single-source mentions, there are always plenty of casual explanations for the unusual phenomenon, but what for me stands out is the fact that the phenomenon attracted the special notice of the author in the first place. Procopius was undoubtedly familiar with city militias which had their own standards, but he takes the time to comment upon the curious fellows in northern Gaul who preserved Roman military traditions, or what Procopius understood to be such. This deserves reflection on our part.
Procopius may have been familiar with city militia but there is no evidence he ever met or saw these people. He is reporting what he has been told, perhaps by someone who was reporting what he has been told.
On the other hand there is no reason why a unit existing as city militia should not keep its name. From memory the limitani in Egypt kept their unit names to the end
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 24, 2014, 08:10:52 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 23, 2014, 11:40:24 PM
Let us begin by asking: with what did Aetius fight Bonifacius and Bonifacius Aetius? We can take things from there.
It's a battle I've tried to track down. As far as I can make out the two generals may merely have had their Bucellarii, in the case of Boniface his seem to mainly have been Vandals, and in the case of Aetius, Huns.
Rebuilding the army for Aetius was easy. He just fled to the Huns
Jim
edited to add that Boniface wasn't the first to invade from Africa, see 'The Revolt of Heraclian',
Stewart Irvin Oost Classical Philology, Vol. 61, No. 4. (Oct., 1966), pp. 236-242.
But considering the size of force that Boniface could raise, it is unlikely that regular soldiers, born and serving in Africa for their entire careers, are going to abandon their homes, land, families in the face of constant vandal encroachment. That is one reason why I'm happy with the suggestion that he just brought his Bucellarii
Bonifacius may well have brought only his bucellarii from Africa, but prior to the battle he had been appointed Magister Militum and was in a position to collect and use the Army of Italy. It is inconceivable that he did not do so.[/quote]
He might have tried, but until he won he was just another general (and doubtless in a lot of peoples eyes a rebel general), so I could declare with equal force that it was inconceivable that they would join him. It is equally conceivable that they joined the equally legitimate Aetius, and equally conceivable that they stood aside and let them fight it out before accepting orders from the victor.[/quote]
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 23, 2014, 11:40:24 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 24, 2014, 08:15:05 AM
Literature of the period has a fine tradition of allusion, and I suggest that this is just another allusion, after all, you can call the dawn rosy-fingered and refer to the sea as wine-dark without intending to describe the weather. Among his contemporaries the allusion would merely be a way of displaying erudition, it's far too slight a thing to build a field army on.
Sidonius does use literary allusion, but when he does so it is evident, e.g. Letter V.7.5:
"Let them but scent from afar a rusty purse, and you will see them fix on it the eyes of Argus, Briareus' hands, the Sphinx's claws; they will bring into play the perjuries of Laomedon, the subtleties of Ulysses, Sinon's wiles; they will stick to it with the staunchness of Polymestor and the loyalty of a Pygmalion."
When he writes about soldiers and pay he means soldiers and pay.
I'm sorry, but you find the 'classical allusion' evident, but you obviously don't find the scriptural allusion evident. :-)
Jim
(At the moment our broadband is playing up, we only have it before about 8am, the minute the rest of the world wakes up and starts using it, ours dies :-()
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 26, 2014, 07:33:40 AM
Procopius may have been familiar with city militia but there is no evidence he ever met or saw these people. He is reporting what he has been told, perhaps by someone who was reporting what he has been told.
On the other hand there is no reason why a unit existing as city militia should not keep its name. From memory the limitani in Egypt kept their unit names to the end
Procopius was Belisarius' secretary, and I wonder if he had been collecting information about territories beyond Italy for future reconquest (prior to the surrender of Ravenna nobody knew that Belisarius would be recalled and the reconquest would effectively stop there). This would suggest he had been collecting material for what we might consider an 'intelligence summary', not just recording idle gossip. He would have been careful to get it right, otherwise he would have some explaining to do to Belisarius once they got that far!
I also rather doubt that he went through the length and breadth of Italy and never met city militia, not even during the siege of Rome. ;)
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 24, 2014, 08:10:52 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 23, 2014, 11:40:24 PM
Bonifacius may well have brought only his bucellarii from Africa, but prior to the battle he had been appointed Magister Militum and was in a position to collect and use the Army of Italy. It is inconceivable that he did not do so.
He might have tried, but until he won he was just another general (and doubtless in a lot of peoples eyes a rebel general), so I could declare with equal force that it was inconceivable that they would join him. It is equally conceivable that they joined the equally legitimate Aetius, and equally conceivable that they stood aside and let them fight it out before accepting orders from the victor.
Regrettably that is factually incorrect: Bonifacius had just been appointed Magister Militum by Valentinian III, the reigning Western Emperor, and you cannot get more legitimate than that!
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 24, 2014, 08:15:05 AM
(At the moment our broadband is playing up, we only have it before about 8am, the minute the rest of the world wakes up and starts using it, ours dies :-()
You have my sympathy on that - for some reason my internet connection breaks up quite a bit these days, but not that badly.
Quote from: aligern on January 25, 2014, 09:45:30 PM
De Civitate Dei is written in the 410s, certainly before the Vandals take Africa. At this point huge amounts of grain are going from Africa to Italy. So, I submit the Raetian garrisons. are getting African grain.
Let us suppose they actually got Italian grain. Once Africa was lost that grain would have been held in Italy and o the consequences for supply of the. army would have been the same.
Sadly have to disagree: the main reason for importation of grain from Africa seems to have been to feed the population of Rome. Following the events of AD 410 there is rather less of a Roman population to feed (and it continues to decline thereafter). Following the loss of Africa there are plenty of vineyards and olive groves in Sicily and Italy that can be put under cultivation to grow corn if it is really needed. By AD 474 or so it is even possible to spare corn to relieve a famine in Gaul (as previously mentioned in a letter of Sidonius).
I think this business of Africa goes and the corn economy goes with it is a red herring, but do we have any actual studies showing corn consumption, importation and use?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 23, 2014, 05:44:01 AM
Quote from: rodge on January 22, 2014, 11:29:27 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 22, 2014, 07:39:26 PM
The Wikipedia entry for Aegidius (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Aegidius) quotes Hydatius 218 on this point;
Hydatius 218 in translation says:
218. Against Aegidius, Count and Master of the Soldiers, a man both recommended by repute and pleasing well the Lord by good deeds, Frederic the brother of King Theodoric had been struggling, with these men against those men in the province Armorica, and having been overcome, was killed.'
No mention of fighting with Childeric, in fact no mention of Childeric at all.
I cannot find reference to any cooperation between Aegidius and Childeric in any source.
Which, if true.....needs double-checking
Justin, I found the Latin for the source references (other than Gregory) for Orleans. They are at the bottom of the wiki article on the battle
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Orleans_(463)
Patrick kindy translated them:
Sources for the Battle of Orleans 463Hydatius:Adversus Aegidium comitem utriusque militiae, virum, ut fama commendat, Deo bonis operibus complacentem, in Armoricana provincia Fretiricus frater Theuderici regis insurgens, cum his cum quibus fuerat, superatus occiditur.Hydatius (longwinded):His opponent Aegidius, both the Count of Soldiers and a man of great reputation [literally: commended by fame], pleasing to God through his good works, defeated and killed the revolting Frederic, brother of Theoderic the king, who was there with his own (?) in Armorica province.Trans. Waterson
(Note: 'cum his cum quibus fuerat' looks nonsensical, literally 'with this with whom [plural] he was'. 'Revolting' (insurgens) means 'rebelling'.)
Gallic Chronicle 511:Fredericus frater Theuderici regis pugnans cum Francis occiditur iuxta Ligerim.Gallic Chronicle 511 (concise)Frederic brother of Theoderic the king was killed fighting with [or against] the Franks near the Loire.Trans. Waterson
Marius AventicensisHis consulibus pugna facta est inter Aegidium et Gothos inter Ligerum et Ligericinum iuxta Aurelianis ibique interfectus est Fredericus rex Gothorum.Marius Aventicensis (straightforward)In this consulship there was a battle between Aegidius and the Goths between the Loir and the Loire near Orleans and there Frederic king of the Goths was killed.Trans. Waterson
The Loir it is a tributary of the Loire, running north of it.
Quote from: rodge on January 26, 2014, 02:17:03 PM
Justin, I found the Latin for the source references (other than Gregory) for Orleans. They are at the bottom of the wiki article on the battle
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Orleans_(463)
Patrick kindy translated them:
Sources for the Battle of Orleans 463
Hydatius:
Adversus Aegidium comitem utriusque militiae, virum, ut fama commendat, Deo bonis operibus complacentem, in Armoricana provincia Fretiricus frater Theuderici regis insurgens, cum his cum quibus fuerat, superatus occiditur.
Hydatius (longwinded):
His opponent Aegidius, both the Count of Soldiers and a man of great reputation [literally: commended by fame], pleasing to God through his good works, defeated and killed the revolting Frederic, brother of Theoderic the king, who was there with his own (?) in Armorica province.
Trans. Waterson
(Note: 'cum his cum quibus fuerat' looks nonsensical, literally 'with this with whom [plural] he was'. 'Revolting' (insurgens) means 'rebelling'.)
Thanks for this Rodge.
I might just add a couple of adjustments to the first translation. The 'Comes utriusque militiae' means literally 'Count of both armies' i.e. supreme commander of both cavalry and infantry. It echoes the title of the former C-in-C West, Stilicho: 'Magister Utriusque militiae'. It effectively means that Aegidius had complete command of all Roman forces in Gaul.
The phrase 'cum his cum quibus fuerat' makes good sense: 'with those with whom he was.'
'Insurgens' can have the meaning of rebelled, but in this context it simply means 'rose up against', i.e. attacked/invaded.
My translation then would be: "Theuderic's brother Frederic, who, attacking Aegidius, Count of Both Armies (a man pleasing to God for his good works as is well known), in the province of Armorica, was defeated and killed along with those who accompanied him."
Quote from: rodge on January 26, 2014, 02:17:03 PMGallic Chronicle 511:
Fredericus frater Theuderici regis pugnans cum Francis occiditur iuxta Ligerim.
Gallic Chronicle 511 (concise)
Frederic brother of Theoderic the king was killed fighting with [or against] the Franks near the Loire.
The parallel text from Gregory of Tours (
History of the Franks, II,18ff):
| Now Childeric fought at Orleans and Odoacer came with the Saxons to Angers. At that time a great plague destroyed the people. Egidius died and left a son, Syagrius by name. On his death Odoacer received hostages from Angers and other places. The Britanni were driven from Bourges by the Goths, and many were slain at the village of Déols. Count Paul with the Romans and Franks made war on the Goths and took booty. When Odoacer came to Angers, king Childeric came on the following day, and slew count Paul, and took the city. In a great fire on that day the house of the bishop was burned.
19.
After this war was waged between the Saxons and the Romans but the Saxons fled and left many of their people to be slain, the Romans pursuing. Their islands were captured and ravaged by the Franks, and many were slain. In the ninth month of that year, there was an earthquake. Odoacer made an alliance with Childeric, and they subdued the Alamanni, who had overrun that part of Italy. |
Unscrambling the course of events would seem to suggest that this happened: the Visigoths, led by Frederic, attack the Roman territories in northern Gaul. In this they are backed by the Emperor Libius Severus (461-465), whom Aegidius does not recognise. Libius sends a senior officer of his army, Odoacer (later to become Magister Militum in Italy) who raises a force of federate Saxons.
The Visigothic army under Frederic crosses the Loire near Orleans and is met by the army of Aegidius, a mixture of Roman troops and Frankish federates. Frederic is killed and his army defeated. Aegidius dies and Count Paulus takes command. It seems then that the Romans advance to Bourges, to the south, occupying it. They suffer defeat there (I propose that the 'Britanni' refers to the II Britannica legion that was in the town and was caught by the Visigoths - Riothamus's intervention came several years later).
On hearing of Aegidius's death, Odoacer takes advantage of the power vacuum and occupies Angers, just north of the Loire, with his Saxons. This occupation is peaceful since Odoacer does not need to do more than take hostages as a surety for the city's loyalty. Paulus, now facing a domestic crisis of authority, returns with his army to Roman Gaul and goes to meet Odoacer at Angers. There Odoacer persuades Paulus's federate ally Childeric to change sides and kill Paulus. Roman Gaul is now part of the empire again.
The Saxons, possibly displeased by the fact that peace has been made without their being able to indulge in a decent bout of pillage and looting, revolt. The Roman troops deal with them swiftly and effectively and the Franks finish the job, possibly in Holland where the Saxons originated from. Tranquillity is definitively restored and coins are struck for the first time in a long time in the name of the reigning emperor.
Does any source contradict this reconstruction?
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/map%20visigothic%20war.jpg)
I recommend Justin's adjustments to the translation: he has a much better feel for Hydatius than I do.
Here is another interpretation of the 'Odovacer' character:
In Gregory's Chapters 18 and 19 the names are spelt differently Adovacrius [ch 18] and Odovacrius [ch.19]
Looking at the English translation I have for chronology:
18. Now Childeric fought at Orleans and Odoacer came with the Saxons to Angers. At that time a great plague destroyed the people. Egidius died and left a son, Syagrius by name. On his death Odoacer received hostages from Angers and other places. The Britanni were driven from Bourges by the Goths, and many were slain at the village of Déols. Count Paul with the Romans and Franks made war on the Goths and took booty. When Odoacer came to Angers, king Childeric came on the following day, and slew count Paul, and took the city. In a great fire on that day the house :of the bishop was burned.
[The Latin says Adovacrius in ch18.]
19. After this war was waged between the Saxons and the Romans; but the Saxons fled and left many of their people to be slain, the Romans pursuing. Their islands were captured and » ravaged by the Franks, and many were slain. In the ninth month of that year, there was an earthquake. Odoacer made an alliance with Childeric, and they subdued the Alamanni, who had overrun that part of Italy.
[The Latin says Odovacrius in ch19]
20. Euric, king of the Goths, in the 14th year of his reign, placed duke Victorius in command of seven cities. And he went at once to Clermont, and desired to add it to the others, and writings concerning this exist to the present. He gave orders to set up at the church of Saint Julian the columns which are placed there. He gave orders to build the church of Saint Laurentius and saint Germanus at the village of Licaniacus. He was at Clermont nine years. He brought charges against Euchirius, a senator, whom he ordered to be put in prison and taken out at night, and after having him bound beside an old wall he ordered the wall to be pushed over upon him. As for himself, since he was over ¬wanton in his love for women and was afraid of being killed by the people of Auvergne, he fled to Rome, and there was stoned to death because he wished to practise a similar wantonness. Euric reigned four years after Victorius's death, and died in the twenty¬ seventh year of his reign There was also at that time a great earthquake.
Aegidius died c.464-6 in ch18.
In ch19 'Odoacer made an alliance with Childeric.' If this is a sequential timeline it would make it c.466/7.
However this is 4-6 years before Odovacar in Italy is appointed leader of the foederati c.470/1 and 9/10 years before he becomes Rex.
So does 'after' in ch19 not mean 'immediately after' but could mean there is a sizable gap of 6-10 years?
I wonder this because of the date gap between ch 19 and ch 20:
Euric was made king in c.466 so ch20 starts in 480 (466 +.' the 14th year of his reign'). So there is a c.14 year gap between Ch 19 and 20.
I think the Adovacrius in Ch18 is a different person to the Odovariucus in ch19.
If this is correct them Childeric could have made an alliance with the Odoacer we know of as King of Italy, when he was King, if the gap between 18 and 19 is wide. Childeric dies 481/2.
This raises some interesting ideas about Childeric's role to me.
This is interesting: if Adovacrius of Book II chapter 18 is the same person as Odovacrius of chapter 19, then Justin's interpretation makes a lot of sense. If Rodger is right about them perhaps being two different people, then chapter 19 would refer to later events in the time of Syagrius.
Under this interpretation, the Saxons with Adovacrius would be raiders attacking the plague-stricken land and, as they were taking hostages, presumably trying to settle. If so, Childeric appears to have made common cause with them against Count Paul, which would at least in theory put the Franks and Saxons on the same side, which would be consistent with the anti-Alemanni alliance between Childeric and Odovacrius in chapter 19 but not with the all-out Frankish war against the Saxons in the same chapter. However Gregory does have the alliance follow the war, making a forgive-and-forget alliance theoretically possible, if one accepts that the Saxons would be happy teaming up with those who had just spent the last few years slaughtering their kinsmen and overrunning their territories.
If we assume a gap of some years between chapters 18 and 19 (Gregory's "His ita gestis" - things having happened thus - is not very helpful for timing), and that Adovacrius was not Odovacrius, then war erupts between the Saxons and the Romans and the Saxons, who have presumably settled around Angers, are defeated and slaughtered by the Romans, Adovacrius not being mentioned, and meanwhile the Franks launch their own anti-Saxon campaign which may be around the Loire or may even be on their north-east frontier, the 'islands' being off the Dutch coast.
The joint campaign against the Alemanni by Odoacer and Childeric could be a very useful fixing-point if we could find any other reference to it.
Childeric's reign began c.457/8 and ended in 481/2. During that time he had an 8-year exile. Since he was actively campaigning c.463, he cannot have been in exile during 457-463. His exile has to beat some point between 465 and 482, and if he has an alliance with Odoacer the Rex that presumably has to be in the period 476-482 as Odoacer was not really in a position to make alliances between 470 and 476 (he had a superior to do it for him). Hence it would seem we could best place Childeric's exile from c.466/7 to c.474/5, which puts an alliance with Odoacer either into a narrow slot around AD 466 or a broader one around 476-481. One point where an alliance would make sense is c.480 when Julius Nepos had just been murdered and Odoacer was invading Dalmatia to add it to his directly-ruled domains. This would be consistent with chapter 19 being rather later than chapter 18 and quite close chronologically to chapter 20.
If on the other hand chapter 19 is a direct follow-on from chapter 18, the joint Childeric/Odovacar campaign has to take place c.466, when Italy is between emperors (Lubius Severus has not yet been replaced by Anthemius, and Olybrius is hovering in the wings). The campaign would thus have needed the sanction of Ricimer, who effectively ran Italy at the time.
What would be really helpful is if we knew when the 'Alemanni' had become ensconced in Italy. The tale of Gibuld being asked to desist from raiding by Saint Severinus (or Lupus) as mentioned here (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Gibuld?qsrc=3044) suggests that the Alemanni had started becoming a nuisance in the 470s, which is consistent with a campaign to evict them in the late 470s or with their building up after recovering from a sharp defeat c.466.
A look at the AD 480 map (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Odoacer_480ad.jpg) suggests that a joint anti-Alemanni campaign c.480 by Odoacer and the Franks would conveniently catch the Alemanni in a sandwich. An Odoacer with a following of Saxons plus Childeric and his Franks heading to Italy c.466 could do so through Roman-held southern Gaul, though getting into Italy would have to be at Ricimer's behest.
I think the jury is still out on this one. Thoughts?
Interesting reflection Rodge. It does seem however more consistent that Gregory was consulting two different sources for this passage and just copied two variants of Odoacer's name (which could also be spelled 'Odovacer'). The two paragraphs are clearly linked - Odoacer is with Childeric in 18, and Odoacer make an alliance with Childeric in 19. Paragraph 20 is a separate event - shown by Gregory indicating when it happened, in the 14th year of Euric's reign.
There was not always consistency in the spelling of an individual's name. Gregory's 'Egidius' compared to the more common 'Aegidius'; 'Siagrius' vs 'Syagrius', and so on.
There is no clear indication how much time elapsed between Paulus's death and the war with the Saxons. Notice however that it is Odoacer who concludes an alliance with Childeric, which would suggest he was still on the scene, before Syagrius took over. This can't have been very long after the incident at Angers.
I think we must agree to disagree on this Justin; I do not have your certainty regarding this passage and do not currently think that 'this can't have been very long after the incident at Angers'. I am aware of the differentiation in the spelling of names in the sources but on this occasion it may well not apply.
It is also possible that Gregory took this from the now lost 'Annals of Angers', the Liber Historae Francorum and another source.
In fact just before this modification to this post I looked again at MacGeorge and she covers this issue in some depth.
I am sad to report that she got there first with the observation I set out yesterday and I was unaware of her ideas (the two spellings and the time difference). Her view (looking at the text) is that in virtually all the manuscripts Ch18 has Adovacrius (or Adovagrius) and all texts for Ch19 'Odovaricus'.
From this she draws the conclusion that they are two different men.
And there was me thinking I had come up with something original......BTW I'm not saying that just because she has made the same analysis and deduction that it is correct, but it is interesting....
Patrick 'the joint campaign against the Alemanni by Odoacer and Childeric could be a very useful fixing-point if we could find any other reference to it.'.
Well.. I have looked and I cannot pin it down but it would be very useful if collectively we could go on a hunt.
Rodger, could you precis McGeorge's findings, or at least assumptions/conclusions and their basis? I assume there is more than you have mentioned, and if she has anything conclusive then all well and good. If not, we need to broaden the scope of the search and perhaps the best way to do this is to set out how events and timelines would march in each case.
If I say "I can see arguments on both sides" I shall probably be strangled. ;) In favour of continuity between chapter 18 and 19 is the presence of Odoacer and Childeric and the fact that we do not have to explain what happened to Adovacrius. Justin's suggestion that Odoacer might have been an officer in imperial service enlisting Saxons who then turned nasty ingeniously removes the sticking-point that nobody thereafter ever referred to him as a Saxon.
Against continuity between the two chapters is the difference in names (as Justin has pointed out, Gregory was not noted for consistency, so this may not be significant) and the question of exactly how Odoacer in c.465-6 would be useful against the Alemanni: would he have marched a Saxon contingent through Frankish territory, or a Frankish contingent through Imperial territory, to get at the Alemanni? Putting this campaign shortly after events at Angers requires a useful force of Saxons to survive the process of being reduced to obedience - this is quite possible, but seems against the tenor of Gregory's "but the Saxons fled and left many of their people to be slain, the Romans pursuing. Their islands were captured and ravaged by the Franks, and many were slain." Needless to say the campaign against the Alemanni seems to be an orphan source-wise.
One additional way of pinning down the date might be: "In the ninth month of that year, there was an earthquake." Earthquakes are not hugely common in Gaul, and it might be worth a search to see if anyone else among our surviving sources noticed it. Dates to try would be 465-7 and 476-480 or 481. (If both periods have an earthquake I shall probably give up on this ...)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 27, 2014, 07:51:27 PM
Rodger, could you precis McGeorge's findings, or at least assumptions/conclusions and their basis? I assume there is more than you have mentioned, and if she has anything conclusive then all well and good. If not, we need to broaden the scope of the search and perhaps the best way to do this is to set out how events and timelines would march in each case.
I can tomorrow...
I suspect we will search in vain for a precise date of the Alamans depredations in Italy. Gibuld and St Severinus were both getting on in years in the 460s, so nothing precludes an Alaman invasion in Italy during that decade.
If Adovacrius was just the chieftain of a band of Saxon raiders, one wonders why he took hostages from Angers and several other places, rather than just grab booty. How does one explain Childeric's behaviour - killing his former ally in the same city Adovacrius occupied? One can theorise that he decided to become a freebooter in league with the Saxons, however this doesn't tally with his subsequent behaviour: he fights the Saxons in their home country and allies with Odovacerus against the Alamans. And if he was confident enough to dispense with his federate status, no longer fearing the Romans - who, incidentally, had just defeated the Visigoths and killed their king's brother - then where did these same Romans find the strength to crush the Saxons later on? Finally, if the Saxons occupy Angers (and other places) as invaders/raiders why is there war between them and the Romans only in 19 - which hypothetically takes place years later. Weren't they at war with each other in 18?
A first lecture gives the impression that Gregory links the events of 18 an 19 closely together - notice how he tries to take care over his chronology in 20, indicating events that are several years apart and fixing their dates with reference to the reigns of the kings. If there was a gap of several years between 18 and 19 it makes sense that he would have said so.
Odoacer is not yet king of Italy or even Magister Militum, but he acts as a plenipotentary in northern Gaul, doing as he sees fit to restore the northern provinces to imperial rule. Since, after Paulus's death, he represented imperial authority in the region, it seems natural that he was able to conclude an alliance with Childeric whom he had coaxed from loyalty to Paulus. Attacking the Alamans was not only the best way to advance his career with Ricimer, it was also his natural route home.
On the Adovacrius-Odovacrius question I don't have access to the original latin, still less to a scholarly analyses of the manuscript families, but a number of scholars maintain that the two names refer to the same person. The least one can say is that it is possible.
Justin, I agree it is possible.
As is the other theory.
There are many possibilities in this discussion as we all agreed on way back in this thread.
But they are fun to pursue and that is what makes this debate so interesting.
MacGeorge:
MacGeorge's case is that identify of the Adovaricus/Odovaricus is problematic but study of the Latin text suggests a solution.
Virtually all the original Latin manuscripts give Adovaricus (or Adovarigus) in Ch.18 and in Ch.19 Odovaricus. This is true of both the major Corbie and the Bruxelles MSS. Amongst the very large number of manuscripts of the Historia (Ormont and Collon/Pourpardin, Krunsch and Levinson) there are only one or two exceptions. In Ch. 18 of the Leiden MS (3rd reference only) read Odovarico. In Ch.19 there is only one exception, the Namur MS having Adovachrius.
Her view is that Ch.18 is a Saxon leader with a name when Latinized is similar to Odovacer.
It is interesting that Gregory divides this into two chapters (the divisions are by Gregory himself, not a later editor). The linking phrase is ambiguous 'his ita gestis' (trans, 'these things having happened') is probably Gregory's own.
He may have used 2 sources, one for Ch.18 and one for Ch.19 the first being part of a chronicle, probably annalistic, from Angers, the second a similar written source from elsewhere. It may be relevant that the Liber Historiae Francorum includes the material in Ch.18 (the proposed first source) but not Ch.19.
Gregory linked them together because the both referred to conflicts in the same region and because both mentioned Childeric; in one source, at a slightly later date, allied or employed by King Odovacer. The pattern of the various spellings supports the theory that there are two separate sources and, if so, the existence of to sources makes it more likely that the two different men appear in them.
Whilst this is not definitive it is possible. The logic holds up in my eyes.
The timescale shift between Ch.18 and Ch.19 referred to in an earlier post is my deduction based on the definite shift between Ch.19 and Ch.20 that immediately follows.
On another issue regarding Ch.18 it is generally assumed that there was one battle at Orleans reported by Gregory or his source:
'Childeric fought a battle at Orleans'
Penguin Classics, The History of the Franks, trans Thorpe 1974
'Now Childeric fought at Orleans and Odoacer came with the Saxons to Angers.'
Brehaut, 1916 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/gregory-hist.asp#book3
'Pugnas' is the plural of 'pugna' suggesting more than one battle, in fact, multiple engagements at Orleans.
Patrick has suggested to me that 'Pugnas egit' presumably means 'pugnas agit', literally he 'did battles', but as 5thC Church Latin is not my strongpoint could we have a view on this?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 27, 2014, 07:51:27 PM
One additional way of pinning down the date might be: "In the ninth month of that year, there was an earthquake." Earthquakes are not hugely common in Gaul, and it might be worth a search to see if anyone else among our surviving sources noticed it. Dates to try would be 465-7 and 476-480 or 481. (If both periods have an earthquake I shall probably give up on this ...)
Patrick, a possible lead:
From Butler's 'Lives of the Fathers, Martyrs, and Principal Saints' 1866.
'Saint Mammertus, Archbishop of Vienne, Confessor'
A.D. 477.
Saint Mammertus, archbishop of Vienne in Dauphiné, in which see he succeeded Simplicius in the fifth age, was a prelate renowned in the church, for his sanctity, learning, and miracles. He instituted in his diocese the fasts and supplications called the Rogations, on the following occasion:
Almighty God, to punish the sins of the people, visited them with wars and other public calamities, and awaked them from their spiritual lethargy by the terrors of earthquakes, fires, and ravenous wild beasts, which last were sometimes seen in the very market-places of cities; such was the desolate state to which the country was reduced.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 27, 2014, 11:46:45 AM
Notice however that it is Odoacer who concludes an alliance with Childeric, which would suggest he was still on the scene, before Syagrius took over. This can't have been very long after the incident at Angers.
18.
Now Childeric fought at Orleans and Odoacer came with the Saxons to Angers. At that time a great plague destroyed the people. Egidius died and left a son, Syagrius by name. On his death Odoacer received hostages from Angers and other places. The Britanni were driven from Bourges by the Goths, and many were slain at the village of Déols. Count Paul with the Romans and Franks made war on the Goths and took booty. When Odoacer came to Angers, king Childeric came on the following day, and slew count Paul, and took the city. In a great fire on that day the house of the bishop was burned.19.
After this war was waged between the Saxons and the Romans; but the Saxons fled and left many of their people to be slain, the Romans pursuing. Their islands were captured and ravaged by the Franks, and many were slain. In the ninth month of that year, there was an earthquake. Odoacer made an alliance with Childeric, and they subdued the Alamanni, who had overrun that part of Italy.One question I have is why the action has suddenly shifted to Italy: the Romans defeat the Saxons, the Franks ravage 'their' (the Saxons') islands, there is an earthquake. Then Odoacer makes an alliance with Childeric (a bit late in the campaign season) and they 'subdue' the Alemanni (as opposed to expelling them?), the Alemanni having overrun
that part of Italy.
When, how and why did everyone suddenly move to Italy?
Quote from: rodge on January 28, 2014, 08:07:09 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 27, 2014, 07:51:27 PM
One additional way of pinning down the date might be: "In the ninth month of that year, there was an earthquake." Earthquakes are not hugely common in Gaul, and it might be worth a search to see if anyone else among our surviving sources noticed it. Dates to try would be 465-7 and 476-480 or 481. (If both periods have an earthquake I shall probably give up on this ...)
Patrick, a possible lead:
From Butler's 'Lives of the Fathers, Martyrs, and Principal Saints' 1866.
'Saint Mammertus, Archbishop of Vienne, Confessor'
A.D. 477.
Saint Mammertus, archbishop of Vienne in Dauphiné, in which see he succeeded Simplicius in the fifth age, was a prelate renowned in the church, for his sanctity, learning, and miracles. He instituted in his diocese the fasts and supplications called the Rogations, on the following occasion:
Almighty God, to punish the sins of the people, visited them with wars and other public calamities, and awaked them from their spiritual lethargy by the terrors of earthquakes, fires, and ravenous wild beasts, which last were sometimes seen in the very market-places of cities; such was the desolate state to which the country was reduced.
Nicely spotted. This would presumably place the earthquake in AD 476, as Gregory has it in the ninth month, allowing Mamertus to institute his Rogations during 477.
However we do note 'earthquakes', which might invalidate my earlier thought that there should be only one to pin down. Excellent detective work nonetheless, Rodge.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 27, 2014, 08:31:23 PM
If Adovacrius was just the chieftain of a band of Saxon raiders, one wonders why he took hostages from Angers and several other places, rather than just grab booty. How does one explain Childeric's behaviour - killing his former ally in the same city Adovacrius occupied? One can theorise that he decided to become a freebooter in league with the Saxons, however this doesn't tally with his subsequent behaviour: he fights the Saxons in their home country and allies with Odovacerus against the Alamans. And if he was confident enough to dispense with his federate status, no longer fearing the Romans - who, incidentally, had just defeated the Visigoths and killed their king's brother - then where did these same Romans find the strength to crush the Saxons later on? Finally, if the Saxons occupy Angers (and other places) as invaders/raiders why is there war between them and the Romans only in 19 - which hypothetically takes place years later. Weren't they at war with each other in 18?
It is a puzzle, and suggesting that Adovacrius or Odovacrius was in imperial service does open up some possible solutions. If he had been sent with a hired Saxon contingent to reduce the Angers region, and Childeric, who would be some distance from his usual stamping-grounds, had been hired to do the same, this marks the enigmatic Count Paul as a rebel of some description. Were Odoacer (if indeed it was he) and Childeric obeying Libius Severus in eliminating Paul? The Wikipedia entry for Aegidius (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Aegidius?qsrc=3044) has the following:
"
A legendary story known to both Gregory of Tours and Fredegar tells that Childeric had fled to exile with the Thuringians, he arranged with his faithful follower Wiomad to send him a message when to return. Wiomad then provoked the Franks against their new leader, Aegidius, while at the same time tricked the Emperor Maurice into giving Childeric a great treasure for his return to his people."
Although Maurice (ruled 582-602) is an anachronism, the tale may bear the germ of an intrigue that took shape and bore fruit around 464-5. This would incidentally negate my earlier assumption that Childeric's 8-year exile would have to be post-465.
If so, alignments might have changed following Syagrius' assumption of his father's status as ruler of the Domain of Soissons. Odoacer's Saxons would presumably have been attached to the about-to-be-deceased Libius Severus while Syagrius would have been asserting his own authority. Childeric may have decided that realigning himself with Syagrius was the safer option.
This is obviously speculative, and underlines the need for drawing up a timeline of persons and events as accurately as possible in order to have a background that allows isolated elements to be placed in perspective.
Quote
A first lecture gives the impression that Gregory links the events of 18 an 19 closely together - notice how he tries to take care over his chronology in 20, indicating events that are several years apart and fixing their dates with reference to the reigns of the kings. If there was a gap of several years between 18 and 19 it makes sense that he would have said so.
Odoacer is not yet king of Italy or even Magister Militum, but he acts as a plenipotentary in northern Gaul, doing as he sees fit to restore the northern provinces to imperial rule. Since, after Paulus's death, he represented imperial authority in the region, it seems natural that he was able to conclude an alliance with Childeric whom he had coaxed from loyalty to Paulus. Attacking the Alamans was not only the best way to advance his career with Ricimer, it was also his natural route home.
There intervenes the war between the Romans and the Saxons, in which Childeric is very definitely attacking the Saxons. Only after this is the alliance concluded.
I begin to get the feeling something may be missing from the manuscripts. Chapters 18 and 19 are unusually short, though not the shortest in the book (cf. IV.10). Is Gregory actually giving us a joined-up narrative?
Quite possibly G is not giving a joined up narrative, but as Rodger mentioned earlier, gathering information on a subject and then putting it in order. As he is working with annals, saints' lives and official documents , the mix is eclectic.
The mention of Italia makes best sense if Odoacer is in power there or working for Ricimer as an officer there. If he was Ricimer's officer one would expect a mention of R, of course. After 476 it makes eminent sense for Odoacer to organise a two pronged offensive against the Allamans as they were pressing on Italia's Northern frontier.
Roy
This from Eugippius ch Xx cited in Hodgkin Italy and her Invaders Bk III p165
'Per id tempus quo Romanu constabat imperium, multorum milites oppidorum pro custodia limitis publicis stipendiis alebantur.
Which Hodgkin translates as:
'At that time, says Eugippius , when the Roman Empire still held together, the soldiers of many towns , were supported by public pay for the better guardianship of the limes'. This obscure sentence perhaps means that local troops were drafted off to the limes and there received, as was natural, imperial pay and equipments. ' When this custom ceased the squadrons (turmae) of cavalry were obliterated; but the Batavian legion, (stationed at Passau) lasted as long as the limes itself stood. From this legion certain soldiers had gone forth to Italy to bear to their comrades their last pay and these men had been slain on the march by the barbarians, no one knowing thereof.
'Qua consuetudine desinente simul militares turmae sunt deletae, cum limite Batavino utcunque numero perdurante ex quo perrexerant qui quidam ad Italiam extremum stipendium commilitonibus allaturi, quos in itinere peremptos a barbaris nullus agnoverat.
What is really interesting here is, if the translation can be sustained (and Hodgkin is a very good Latinist) a mention of the loss of the cavalry squadrons and the placement of the infantry in towns as garrisons.
Pick at that one :-))
Roy
Eugippius' full
Life of St Severinus is translated at http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/severinus_02_text.htm (http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/severinus_02_text.htm). The Latin is at http://thelatinlibrary.com/eugippius.html (http://thelatinlibrary.com/eugippius.html) and the relevant bit reads:
QuoteQua consuetudine desinente simul militares turmae sunt deletae cum limite, Batavino utcumque numero perdurante.
So it's the
turmae that have disappeared; but while this normally means "troops of cavalry", that's not explicit here, rather Eugippius has
turmae militares.
The Batavian troops are called a
numerus, although Tertullian footnotes:
QuoteThe cohors nova Batavorum, according to the Notitia Dignitatum. The town, that is, was a military station, and took its name from the garrison.
Hodgkin's "legion" looks badly out of place.
And just to tie in to another strand in this well-woven thread:
QuoteCHAPTER VII.
Among such visitants was Odoacer, later king of Italy, then a tall youth, meanly clad. While he stood, stooping that his head might not touch the roof of the lowly cell, he learned from the man of God that he was to win renown. For as the young man bade him farewell, "Go forth!" said Severinus, "Go forth to Italy! Now clad in wretched hides, thou shalt soon distribute rich gifts to many."
(Spelt "Odovacar", for what that may be worth!)
I am following Hodgkin here, but Odovakar may well be nearer the original Gothic than Odoacer.
He. gives a definition something like Bright Watch dog.
The latin of Eugippius is not easy apparently. It is of interest that Eugippius uses both turma and numerus which I think, are current and technically relevant in his time to describe cavalry and infantry. I suspect that we would find Ammianus using such terms without soecifically saying that the unit was cavalry or infantry because it would be understood. These could simply be for literary effect or he could really mean that the turmae disappear and the numeri move into towns, abandoning the limes. Its a very different interpretation from the one at the Tertullian site. Against the Tertullian translation is that it is tautologous., but that would not be unusual.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 28, 2014, 01:22:07 PM
This from Eugippius ch Xx cited in Hodgkin Italy and her Invaders Bk III p165
'Per id tempus quo Romanu constabat imperium, multorum milites oppidorum pro custodia limitis publicis stipendiis alebantur.
Which Hodgkin translates as:
'At that time, says Eugippius , when the Roman Empire still held together, the soldiers of many towns , were supported by public pay for the better guardianship of the limes'. This obscure sentence perhaps means that local troops were drafted off to the limes and there received, as was natural, imperial pay and equipments. ' When this custom ceased the squadrons (turmae) of cavalry were obliterated; but the Batavian legion, (stationed at Passau) lasted as long as the limes itself stood. From this legion certain soldiers had gone forth to Italy to bear to their comrades their last pay and these men had been slain on the march by the barbarians, no one knowing thereof.
'Qua consuetudine desinente simul militares turmae sunt deletae, cum limite Batavino utcunque numero perdurante ex quo perrexerant qui quidam ad Italiam extremum stipendium commilitonibus allaturi, quos in itinere peremptos a barbaris nullus agnoverat.
What is really interesting here is, if the translation can be sustained (and Hodgkin is a very good Latinist) a mention of the loss of the cavalry squadrons and the placement of the infantry in towns as garrisons.
Pick at that one :-))
Roy
Since you suggest it ;)
'Per idem tempus, quo Romanum constabat imperium, multorum milites oppidorum pro custodia limitis publicis stipendiis alebantur. Qua consuetudine desinente simul militares turmae sunt deletae cum limite, Batavino utcumque numero perdurante. Ex quo perrexerant quidam ad Italiam extremum stipendium commilitonibus allaturi, quos in itinere peremptos a barbaris nullus agnoverat.
Better translated as:
'Throughout that time in which the Roman empire endured, the soldiers of many towns were maintained by public taxes for the defence of the frontier. When the custom stopped both the troops of soldiers and the frontier ceased to exist, notwithstanding that a band of men remained at Batavinum. From this band some went to Italy to bring back the last pay to their fellow-soldiers, and no-one knew they had been annihilated on their journey by the barbarians.'
Translators I find do sometimes tend to bring their preconceptions to their task.
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 28, 2014, 02:54:15 PM
QuoteCHAPTER VII.
Among such visitants was Odoacer, later king of Italy, then a tall youth, meanly clad. While he stood, stooping that his head might not touch the roof of the lowly cell, he learned from the man of God that he was to win renown. For as the young man bade him farewell, "Go forth!" said Severinus, "Go forth to Italy! Now clad in wretched hides, thou shalt soon distribute rich gifts to many."
(Spelt "Odovacar", for what that may be worth!)
Handy if we could date this meeting....
Quote from: aligern on January 28, 2014, 03:27:34 PMIt is of interest that Eugippius uses both turma and numerus which I think, are current and technically relevant in his time to describe cavalry and infantry.
I don't think that is the case, quite:
turma always meant a cavalry unit, but we know of cavalry
numeri , so that word was not specifically an infantry term. The problem is that Eugippius'
turmae militares, "turmae of soldiers", rather suggests that he is
not using the term in a technical sense.
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 28, 2014, 04:27:18 PM
The problem is that Eugippius' turmae militares, "turmae of soldiers", rather suggests that he is not using the term in a technical sense.
Assuming Eugippus understood that a
miles was meant to be a footsoldier and not just an armed man - had the distinction become a bit blurred by his time?
Quote from: rodge on January 28, 2014, 07:38:50 AM
'Childeric fought a battle at Orleans'
Penguin Classics, The History of the Franks, trans Thorpe 1974
'Now Childeric fought at Orleans and Odoacer came with the Saxons to Angers.'
Brehaut, 1916 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/gregory-hist.asp#book3
'Pugnas' is the plural of 'pugna' suggesting more than one battle, in fact, multiple engagements at Orleans.
Patrick has suggested to me that 'Pugnas egit' presumably means 'pugnas agit', literally he 'did battles', but as 5thC Church Latin is not my strongpoint could we have a view on this?
Whilst giving my rusty Latin an airing I might have one or two things to say about this passage.
| 18. Quod Childericus Aurilianus et Andecavo venit Odovacrius.
Igitur Childericus Aurilianis pugnas egit, Adovacrius vero cum Saxonibus Andecavo venit. Magna tunc lues populum devastavit. Mortuus est autem Egidius et reliquit filium Syagrium nomine. Quo defuncto, Adovacrius de Andecavo vel aliis locis obsedes accepit. Brittani de Bituricas a Gothis expulsi sunt, multis apud Dolensim vicum peremptis. Paulos vero comes cum Romanis ac Francis Gothis bella intulit et praedas egit. Veniente vero Adovacrio Andecavus, Childericus rex sequenti die advenit, interemptoque Paulo comite, civitatem obtinuit. Magnum ea die incendio domus aeclesiae concremata est.
19. Bellum inter Saxones ac Romanus.
His ita gestis, inter Saxones atque Romanos bellum gestum est; sed Saxones terga vertentes, multos de suis, Romanis insequentibus, gladio reliquerunt; insolae eorum cum multo populo interempto a Francis captae atque subversi sunt. Eo anno minse nono terra tremuit. Odovacrius cum Childerico foedus iniit, Alamannusque, qui partem Italiae pervaserant, subiugarunt. |
Egit is in the past tense and
pugnas is indeed plural, hence 'he fought battles'.
What is interesting is the linking phrase between 18 and 19:
His ita gestis. 'His gestis' is an ablative absolute. It is often used in the present tense with the sense of something happening simultaneously with something else. Gregory uses it in the previous paragraph:
Factum est autem quadam die, ut, sedente ea in basilica ac legente, adveniret quidam pauper ad orationem It came to pass that one day,
whilst she was sitting and reading in the basilica, a certain poor man came in to pray."
Used in the past tense, it has the sense of a direct temporal link between two events, or so my Latin tells me. The use of 'ita' - 'thus' - in 'His ita gestis' reinforces this close temporal link: 'These things, having been done thus, there was war between the Saxons and Romans."
For me, to put a gap of several years between the two events linked by this phrase is to force unreasonably the text and context of the Latin. Maybe there
was a gap of several years, but then one would need to affirm that Gregory was unaware of it.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 28, 2014, 11:41:18 AM
One question I have is why the action has suddenly shifted to Italy: the Romans defeat the Saxons, the Franks ravage 'their' (the Saxons') islands, there is an earthquake. Then Odoacer makes an alliance with Childeric (a bit late in the campaign season) and they 'subdue' the Alemanni (as opposed to expelling them?), the Alemanni having overrun that part of Italy.
When, how and why did everyone suddenly move to Italy?
It was this shift in narrative which initially made me think that there was a long(ish) gap between the episodes
Jim
Horses are expensive to replace and they're not cheap to keep either. It might be that they degenerated into infantry. Certainly in Cyrenia we have the account of the local commander allowing his cavalry with bows to degenerate to infantry with bows (and he pocketed the difference)
Jim
Odovacar's Career
I tend towards a view that Odovacar is the son of Edeco king of the Sciri and younger brother of Hunwulf. i think its John of Antioch who has Odoacer as being born in 433 and thus 60 when he is killed by Theoderic the Great.
The sciri take on the Pannonian (Ostro) goths in alliance with the Suavi under Hunimund. they win an initial victory with a surprise attack, but are then crushed by the Goths who unite their forces. Later at the battle of the Bolia (check Jordanes) an alluance of tribes that opposes the Goths is given a thorough veating and the Sciri disappear. Hunwulf takes service with the Eastern Empire , which employment he leaves later to join Odovacar in Italy.
My belief is that Odovacar goes West when his brother heads East as the Sciri are no more. he thus crosses into Italy , with his followers in late 469 or early 470 to take employment with Ricimer.
It makes good sense that the two brothers head for separate sections of the Empire, it gives a bit of insurance. I think that its at this time that there is migration to the West of others who had previously served Majorian, but this time they bring families and it is this tribal or sub tribal migration that causes the army of Italy to change because, when a warband is hiring out it is composed of single men, but when a tribe migrates it brings its women. Hence, down the line the barbarians wanted land from Orestes, upon which to settle. It is quite different being 20 and drinking and whoring your pay, from being 30 and getting an earful about settling down, the standards of local schools and wanting a nice neighbourhood.
So Odovacar crosses the Alps in travel worn leathers, with followers as he is a prince of the Scirian Royal family. Hence it is not too difficult for St Severinus to predict a good future for him. When the federates grievances come to head he is a natural leader because he is already a German Royal and thus can unite the tribes .
Roy
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 28, 2014, 05:30:18 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 28, 2014, 11:41:18 AM
One question I have is why the action has suddenly shifted to Italy: the Romans defeat the Saxons, the Franks ravage 'their' (the Saxons') islands, there is an earthquake. Then Odoacer makes an alliance with Childeric (a bit late in the campaign season) and they 'subdue' the Alemanni (as opposed to expelling them?), the Alemanni having overrun that part of Italy.
When, how and why did everyone suddenly move to Italy?
It was this shift in narrative which initially made me think that there was a long(ish) gap between the episodes
Jim
There's no 'that', at least in the latin text I have. The line is:
'Eo anno minse nono terra tremuit. Odovacrius cum Childerico foedus iniit, Alamannusque, qui partem Italiae pervaserant, subiugarunt.'
'In that year in the ninth month the earth shook. Odovacrius made an alliance with Childeric, and subjugated the Alamans, who had occupied a part of Italy.'
One needs to keep in mind that for as long as the empire existed the emperors, and in consequence their entourage, continued to think big. There is perhaps the notion of the last emperors trying to cling on to Italy, leaving the rest of the former empire to the outer darkness, but we have a Majorian who just a few years before attempted to reconquer Gaul, Spain and north Africa, and an Anthemus who a few years after this passage would try substantially to do the same thing, bringing in the Eastern Empire against the Vandals and the Bretons/Britons (no, this time I don't think it was the legion!) against the Visigoths.
Communications seem to have remained good and the infrastructure more intact than is commonly supposed. For Odoacer to first sort things out in northern Gaul and then sort things out in Italy is quite normal.
As so often, Jim makes a good point about the relationship to land crops and anumals. Horses are expensive to keep, and they need to be part of a system of supply. To have cavalry units you need studs and farms and stables. You also need a lot of replacements, particularly if there is an outbreak of disease because horses are susceptible to such, particularly when kept together over winter.
Horse keeping friends tell me that , in temperate climates it takes about 1.5 acres to keep a horse, depending upon the local climate, productivity of the land etc and there needs to be a supply of grain for winter months, especially if in a snowy zone.
So, if the tax take and grain shipments declined the cavalry would be under severe threat of disintegration, whereas the infantry would need a lot less support, though locating them in a town and giving them its taxes would be a good way to go.
One point about limes. If the other side of the wall and tower system becomes hostile then a town on the frontier faces the same problem as a seaside town, that is for any given size it needs twice the hinterland on its safe side as a town with hinterland encircling it. So, if it takes say ten miles of land all around a town in the middle of a province then a limes town with a hostile land across the frontier need a half circle with a 20 mile boundary to sustain it and that is harder because ten miles is a walk to to market with your cart and 20 miles is a bit more than that. Those mathematics will keep frontier towns smaller and less viable once the land to the front has been lost. That's not so much of a problem when the Empire is powerful, but when it is receding and the barbarians are raiding into the area on the Roman side too the town will quickly become depopulated. It is fair enough for a garrisoned town to provide a refuge,but to be fed the garrison has to The Romans having regular legionary infantry in the West in 452 is problematic. Aetius must lead some troops out of Italy, but he clearly has not got enough to face Attila without the help of the Visigoths. Aetius has several contingents assembled from Gaul and those are near the battlefield so we can assume that they are not small. That indicates that the force from Italy was small and I suggest, moved fast and was all cavalry. security to the hinterland and if that's a 20 mile frontier it is dimensionally harder than a ten mile circle.
Roy
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 28, 2014, 05:22:13 PM
Used in the past tense, it has the sense of a direct temporal link between two events, or so my Latin tells me. The use of 'ita' - 'thus' - in 'His ita gestis' reinforces this close temporal link: 'These things, having been done thus, there was war between the Saxons and Romans."
For me, to put a gap of several years between the two events linked by this phrase is to force unreasonably the text and context of the Latin. Maybe there was a gap of several years, but then one would need to affirm that Gregory was unaware of it.
Thanks Justin. What form is the Latin you posted from Gregory: Vulgate or Church?
Quote from: rodge on January 28, 2014, 06:37:45 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 28, 2014, 05:22:13 PM
Used in the past tense, it has the sense of a direct temporal link between two events, or so my Latin tells me. The use of 'ita' - 'thus' - in 'His ita gestis' reinforces this close temporal link: 'These things, having been done thus, there was war between the Saxons and Romans."
For me, to put a gap of several years between the two events linked by this phrase is to force unreasonably the text and context of the Latin. Maybe there was a gap of several years, but then one would need to affirm that Gregory was unaware of it.
Thanks Justin. What form is the Latin you posted from Gregory: Vulgate or Church?
Neither really. Church Latin came into existence in the middle ages, in which construction was simplified and word order more closely followed the Germanic languages, of which English. The Vulgate is the Latin translation of the Bible, done by St Jerome. It was based the Itala, a former translation, and was more of a transliteration, closely following the Hebrew and Greek.
Gregory of Tours seems to use a form of late Latin, of which the construction is not as involved as classical Latin. I'm really no erudite, but all I can say is that his syntax seems pretty good although his spelling can be bad: writing 'in the month' - 'mense' as
minse is quite a howler, which is why I'm not too concerned about Odovacrius-Adovacrius.
Come to think of it, the two paragraphs of Gregory are stuffed full of ablative absolutes:
Quo defuncto
multis apud Dolensim vicum peremptis
Veniente vero Adovacrio
interemptoque Paulo comite
Romanis insequentibus
All with the sense of one thing happening at the same time as another, or immediately after another.
Thanks Justin.
Well as I am not a Latin scholar I can't really add to this mini debate.
I'll put it on pause if I may?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 28, 2014, 04:58:06 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 28, 2014, 04:27:18 PM
The problem is that Eugippius' turmae militares, "turmae of soldiers", rather suggests that he is not using the term in a technical sense.
Assuming Eugippus understood that a miles was meant to be a footsoldier and not just an armed man - had the distinction become a bit blurred by his time?
I was actually assuming more or less the opposite of that - "soldiers", not "footsoldiers". And actually "military turmae" might be more accurate anyway, it's not "turmae militum". But using a generic term like militares to modify what should be a technical term like turmae suggests, to me, a non-technical usage.
As does calling the Batavian cohors a numerus, unless of course their title had changed as their numbers and status fell.
Knowing that I cannot continue the debate with Justin on Latin grammar at present, I went looking for more earthquakes in Gaul (where I thought I may be on more solid ground...ahem...).
The earthquake I mentioned in a previous post...
'From Butler's 'Lives of the Fathers, Martyrs, and Principal Saints' 1866.
'Saint Mammertus, Archbishop of Vienne, Confessor'
A.D. 477.
Saint Mammertus, archbishop of Vienne in Dauphiné, in which see he succeeded Simplicius in the fifth age, was a prelate renowned in the church, for his sanctity, learning, and miracles. He instituted in his diocese the fasts and supplications called the Rogations, on the following occasion:
Almighty God, to punish the sins of the people, visited them with wars and other public calamities, and awaked them from their spiritual lethargy by the terrors of earthquakes, fires, and ravenous wild beasts, which last were sometimes seen in the very market-places of cities; such was the desolate state to which the country was reduced.'
...puts Ch 19 in 477 some 8-9 years after Ch.18 (the 'His ita gestis' debate that Justin and I have had).
However I think I have found another reference to an earthquake in Hydatius:
'244. In the middle of the city Tolouse in the same days blood erupted out of the earth and flowed for the whole course of the day. / In the second year of the reign of Antimia in the middle of the city Tolouse blood erupted out of the earth and flowed for a whole day, indicating the domination of the Goths removed by the coming of the kingdom of the Franks.'
[I'm afraid do not have the Latin for this quote]
Now IF 'Antimia' is 'Anthemius', who came to the throne in 467 (and I would welcome views on this), then this places the time of the earthquake to 468 (if it is the same earthquake referred to by Gregory):
Ch 19. After this war was waged between the Saxons and the Romans but the Saxons fled and left many of their people to be slain, the Romans pursuing. Their islands were captured and ravaged by the Franks, and many were slain. In the ninth month of that year, there was an earthquake.
Which means Justin could well be correct in his timeline.
Taking Justin's theory as correct, I therefore believe the 8-13 year gap I mentioned between Ch.18 and Ch.19 is actually in Ch.19 itself and sits here:
19. After this war was waged between the Saxons and the Romans but the Saxons fled and left many of their people to be slain, the Romans pursuing. Their islands were captured and ravaged by the Franks, and many were slain. In the ninth month of that year, there was an earthquake.
[The 8-13 year gap is here]
Odoacer made an alliance with Childeric, and they subdued the Alamanni, who had overrun that part of Italy.
Whilst it is not stated anywhere I can find, it seems logical that Childeric is working in concert with Odovacer between the years 476 and 481 (whilst Odovacer is King of Italy).
Otherwise, if Ch19 is a sequential timeline, then Odovacer and Childeric are fighting Alemanni in Italy between 468-480 (to the 14th year of the reign of Euric that begins Ch.20) and I currently cannot understand how this came to be nor can I find any reference to it.
That makes sense Rodg, if Gregory were gathering together references he might just have stuck in the sentence that related the two.
As to the earlier Adovacrius there is just no confirmation at present thatch is Odoacer.
Mind you, if Odoacer is in Gaul in the 460s with plenipotentiary powers then that would rather fly in the face of the Life of St Severinus, or rather we would have to check the sequence and likely date of their first meeting.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 29, 2014, 11:48:45 AMMind you, if Odoacer is in Gaul in the 460s with plenipotentiary powers then that would rather fly in the face of the Life of St Severinus, or rather we would have to check the sequence and likely date of their first meeting.
Severinus arrived in Noricum "at the time of the death of Attila, king of the Huns", that is c.453. He could have met Odovacar at any time thereafter. Wikipedia cites the
PLRE in giving Odovacar a birth-date of 433, so presumably he woudn't be
adulescens for very long after 453. Mid- or late-450s for the meeting, then?
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 29, 2014, 12:08:49 PM
Quote from: aligern on January 29, 2014, 11:48:45 AMMind you, if Odoacer is in Gaul in the 460s with plenipotentiary powers then that would rather fly in the face of the Life of St Severinus, or rather we would have to check the sequence and likely date of their first meeting.
Severinus arrived in Noricum "at the time of the death of Attila, king of the Huns", that is c.453. He could have met Odovacar at any time thereafter. Wikipedia cites the PLRE in giving Odovacar a birth-date of 433, so presumably he woudn't be adulescens for very long after 453. Mid- or late-450s for the meeting, then?
Yes, that's what I thought. Gives him a few years to get into the good graces of Ricimer before heading out to northern Gaul in the mid 460's.
Note that even if there is a gap between the Roman-Saxon war and the alliance between Childeric and Odoacer (quite possible as the Latin gives no clue as to the time lapse between the two), that still means that Odovacer and Adovacer must be the same person, otherwise Gregory is plopping a totally unrelated person and event into his account of northern Gaul.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 29, 2014, 12:40:17 PM
Note that even if there is a gap between the Roman-Saxon war and the alliance between Childeric and Odoacer (quite possible as the Latin gives no clue as to the time lapse between the two), that still means that Odovacer and Adovacer must be the same person, otherwise Gregory is plopping a totally unrelated person and event into his account of northern Gaul.
I would go for "strongly suggests" rather than "means," on the basis that we have not quite established identity between the two, as
in theory Adovacrius could have perished unremarked in the Saxon war and Odovacrius could then have arrived on the scene as a Ricimer protege charged with subverting the Franks from their Aegidian inclination.
It is looking promising, though. :)
One of the hanging participants in this imbroglio is Count Paul. In Sidonius' Letter I.9, he refers to a Paulus, a nobleman at Rome, who gives him some useful advice about finding friends at court in the aftermath of Ricimer's wedding. If this is the same Paul, then he would be Ricimer's nominee and replacement to Aegidius' office, and Childeric's elimination of him might conceivably have been at the instigation of Syagrius. This is obviously conjecture, but is hopefully consistent conjecture.
The question remains: where and how does Adovacrius (whether or not he is Odoacer) plug into the scheme of events around Angers? Is he a roving raider or a man with an Imperial mission, and if the latter, why is he not cooperating with Paul? This is what currently puzzles me.
And I would say 'suggests' as this is not nailed down yet
Regarding Count Paul I would suggest that he is acting outside of the Empire.
There have been theories put forward that he was the man that took over from Aegidius; Syargrius would have been c.24 years old when his father died if his birthdate (according to wikipedia) is too be believed (but I have never seen a reference to his birthdate anywhere else) so Count Paul may have acted in the senior role as Syagrius could have been deemed too inexperienced?
On the other hand I have also read that he was Count of Angers and could have been operating under Syagrius' command.
Either way I think he was part of the breakaway administration in Northern Gaul.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 29, 2014, 02:32:18 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 29, 2014, 12:40:17 PM
Note that even if there is a gap between the Roman-Saxon war and the alliance between Childeric and Odoacer (quite possible as the Latin gives no clue as to the time lapse between the two), that still means that Odovacer and Adovacer must be the same person, otherwise Gregory is plopping a totally unrelated person and event into his account of northern Gaul.
I would go for "strongly suggests" rather than "means," on the basis that we have not quite established identity between the two, as in theory Adovacrius could have perished unremarked in the Saxon war and Odovacrius could then have arrived on the scene as a Ricimer protege charged with subverting the Franks from their Aegidian inclination.
It is looking promising, though. :)
One of the hanging participants in this imbroglio is Count Paul. In Sidonius' Letter I.9, he refers to a Paulus, a nobleman at Rome, who gives him some useful advice about finding friends at court in the aftermath of Ricimer's wedding. If this is the same Paul, then he would be Ricimer's nominee and replacement to Aegidius' office, and Childeric's elimination of him might conceivably have been at the instigation of Syagrius. This is obviously conjecture, but is hopefully consistent conjecture.
The question remains: where and how does Adovacrius (whether or not he is Odoacer) plug into the scheme of events around Angers? Is he a roving raider or a man with an Imperial mission, and if the latter, why is he not cooperating with Paul? This is what currently puzzles me.
OK, '[strongly] suggests'. :)
If Count Paulus is Ricimer's nominee with the presumed backing of Odoacer, then one wonders why Childeric killed him, having up until then been quite content to be an ally of the incumbent Roman authority. If he was happy enough to fight for Paulus against the Visigoths what would make him change his stance? Syagrius was as yet a nobody - presuming that Sidonius's letter to Syagrius is to this Syagrius, it would appear that he had retired to his villa and was shunning all involvement in public affairs. What could Childeric hope to get out of turning against the Roman authority in northern Gaul? The Roman army in the area was still strong - well able to beat the Saxons without help. Syagrius's subsequent inheritance of his father's mantle shows that Childeric did not in fact get any material advantage.
To me, the only motivation for Childeric suddenly turning against the man he had hitherto fought with side-by-side was the conviction, implanted by Odoacer, that this man did not in fact represent Rome. Presuming that Paulus was one of Aegidius's lieutenants who on Aegidius's death assumed the title of 'Count' even though it had not been granted him by Rome, it becomes clear that his authority was shaky, not helped by the fact that he seems to have suffered military reverses in the region of Bourges. Odoacer has successfully imposed his authority on Angers and the surrounding area. Paulus, quite simply, is politically on his way out. Childeric gets it and switches sides. Killing Paulus puts him in the good graces of Odoacer, Ricimer and the emperor. In this light, it is the natural thing for him to do.
If Adovacrius is just a Saxon war leader then Childeric's action is even more inexplicable. Why kill Paulus at the behest of a man whose force is easily beaten by the Romans, having fought with him against the much more powerful Visigoths? What could Adovacrius, presuming he is a Saxon freebooter, offer Childeric?
Which brings up the question: what would Saxon raiders/conquerors be doing at Angers in the first place? Did they hope to conquer a region of Gaul sandwiched between two powerful nations, either of which could scatter them to the winds? Saxons at that point were acting as mercenaries in Britain, taking advantage of the deep disunity between the British tribes to gradually turn their mercenary status into full independence. But Gaul was a very different proposition. There was nothing weak about the Roman-Frank alliance or the Visigoths. Marching in with a small force of men proclaiming oneself as a conqueror would be tantamount to putting one's head on a block. And indeed when the Saxons did begin to act independently they got the chop.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 29, 2014, 04:54:57 PM
To me, the only motivation for Childeric suddenly turning against the man he had hitherto fought with side-by-side was the conviction, implanted by Odoacer, that this man did not in fact represent Rome. Presuming that Paulus was one of Aegidius's lieutenants who on Aegidius's death assumed the title of 'Count' even though it had not been granted him by Rome, it becomes clear that his authority was shaky, not helped by the fact that he seems to have suffered military reverses in the region of Bourges. Odoacer has successfully imposed his authority on Angers and the surrounding area. Paulus, quite simply, is politically on his way out. Childeric gets it and switches sides. Killing Paulus puts him in the good graces of Odoacer, Ricimer and the emperor. In this light, it is the natural thing for him to do.
This looks like an ingenious and quite plausible reconstruction of motives and events. The one question I would still have is why Childeric then turns on the Saxons when 'the Romans' (whom we assume to be Syagrius' troops) do so. Was he double-dealing and changing sides at the drop of a hat, possibly one filled with gold? And what makes the strongly suggestive Odoacer chum up with him again following the murderous Frankish onslaught on the Saxons?
Quote
If Adovacrius is just a Saxon war leader then Childeric's action is even more inexplicable. Why kill Paulus at the behest of a man whose force is easily beaten by the Romans, having fought with him against the much more powerful Visigoths? What could Adovacrius, presuming he is a Saxon freebooter, offer Childeric?
Good point.
Quote
Which brings up the question: what would Saxon raiders/conquerors be doing at Angers in the first place? Did they hope to conquer a region of Gaul sandwiched between two powerful nations, either of which could scatter them to the winds? Saxons at that point were acting as mercenaries in Britain, taking advantage of the deep disunity between the British tribes to gradually turn their mercenary status into full independence. But Gaul was a very different proposition. There was nothing weak about the Roman-Frank alliance or the Visigoths. Marching in with a small force of men proclaiming oneself as a conqueror would be tantamount to putting one's head on a block. And indeed when the Saxons did begin to act independently they got the chop.
Logical. I still wonder exactly what Odoacer's status was in all this. Do we assume the Saxons rebelled against his leadership following the death of Count Paul? If so, whom did he have as followers to lead to Italy and make alliance with Childeric to turf out the Alemanni? (Some have suggested this could be read as 'Alans', and an Alan incursion into Liguria c.468 is noted by Paul the Deacon in Historia Romana XV.1, or so the Wikipedia entry on Alans (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Alans) tells us.) If we assume he was an officer, perhaps a favoured one, in Ricimer's service, his misadventures with the Saxons might be put down to ill fortune and a new force provided for him.
We then have the problem of whether there were two high-ranking Pauls: one associated with Ricimer, in Rome, and one associated with Aegidius, in Gaul.
Sorry to keep bringing up messy bits, but it would be nice to get them straightened out if possible.
All right, let me have a go.
QuoteThe one question I would still have is why Childeric then turns on the Saxons when 'the Romans' (whom we assume to be Syagrius' troops) do so. Was he double-dealing and changing sides at the drop of a hat, possibly one filled with gold? And what makes the strongly suggestive Odoacer chum up with him again following the murderous Frankish onslaught on the Saxons?
With Paulus dead, the opposition in Roman Gaul to reintegration with the empire collapses. The military and civil authorities in Roman Gaul renew their allegiance to the emperor and submit to his representative Odoacer. Childeric likewise transfers his federate status to the empire and, concretely, to Odoacer.
The Saxons, for whatever reason, don't like the course events have taken. One can hypothesise that their chieftain (not Odoacer but some unnamed individual) calculates that with Paulus dead the Roman forces will scatter and Childeric return to Tournai, and thinks he has a free hand in consequence. Odoacer, however, has successfully gained the support both of Paulus's troops and Childeric, and proceeds to give the Saxons a hiding. Childeric as federate teaches the Saxons to mind their manners in their homeland and then, lending his warriors to Odoacer, gives the Alamans lessons in etiquette as well.
QuoteI still wonder exactly what Odoacer's status was in all this. Do we assume the Saxons rebelled against his leadership following the death of Count Paul?
Yes.
QuoteIf so, whom did he have as followers to lead to Italy and make alliance with Childeric to turf out the Alemanni?
He could have made use of Aegidius's military establishment, now at his disposal. Or just relied on Childeric's Franks, sweetened by the imperial paychest. He would hang around long enough to establish imperial authority in Roman Gaul - possibly offering Syagrius governorship in a conciliatory gesture - and then answer summons from Ricimer or the emperor to move on the Alamans.
QuoteWe then have the problem of whether there were two high-ranking Pauls: one associated with Ricimer, in Rome, and one associated with Aegidius, in Gaul.
Paulus was a common name. It is not unreasonable that they were two individuals.
PLRE is quite interesting on Odovacar.
They buy the idea that he is Gregory's Adovagrius ,occupying Angersafter the battle of Orleans and leading a band of Saxons. They see him in Gaul as an adventurer, with no relation to the Empire.
The Saxons having been defeated by the Romans and lost their islands to the. Franks.
Their account falls apart with the description of Odovacar and Childeric fighting the Allamanni in Italy
as they either have to have the action take place after 476 to be in Italy or have it take place in Gaul. Unfortunately once we start to pick and choose from Gregory's statement the whole passage is in the air.
Given that Odovacar is freelancing in Gaul in the 460s they have him visiting St Severinus in the cave in 469/70 and I have some sympathy with that for my reading of the Life of St Severinus is that he moves to the Danube after Attila's death and then is located in several different towns , building a monastery and running a seminary in one before moving on to a hermit life and that could well take 15 years.
Don't worry abouthim being called adulescens because a man can be calledthat when he is 40! so that could apply to Odovacar up to 473.
Entering Italy in 470 gives us time for his first sensibly recorded action which is in 471/2 when he supported Ricimer in a civil war with Anthemius (John of Antioch).
After that he becomes an imperial bodyguard and then on to the federates revolt of 476.
The most unsatisfactory part of the PLRE entry is the section in Gaul that is dependent upon Gregory of Tours writing a century later than events. If Odovacar was an imperial officer in Gaul then it would be more than helpful to have that mentioned, otherwise why and how would a prince from the Lower Danube end up at the mouth of the. Loire recruiting Saxons?
Roy
The PLRE is less confident over the date of Flaccitheus' death, saying only that it must have been some time before 482 - so it could have been before 470, even. In addition chapter VIII starts before Flaccitheus' death and Feletheus' accession - "before the commencement of his reign began to make frequent visits to the saint" - which could easily have meant a date in the 460s.
And aside from the clear implication that the meeting was before Odovacar went to Italy, it would be a little odd to be calling him a "youth", iuvenis (not "adulescens" as I inexplicably cited from memory earlier) in 475 when he'd be over 40 - though it might fit a date as late as the 460s and an Odovacar in his 30s.
Odovacar is unlikely to have been "on his way to Italy" as late as 475 since John of Antioch describes him in Italy with Ricimer in 472. If (as usually assumed) Odovacar's father was the same Edeko who led the Skiri, Odovacar might have moved south only after dad's defeat by the Goths at the Bolia, in or about 468. So perhaps the meeting was in 468 or 469?
Apologies Duncan,, I looked at my post and disagreed with it because the reference to 472 was in my head from earlier and that is a reasonably secure reference to Odovacar. Ricimer, his boss and Anthemius are in dispute and Odovacar supports Ricimer. That may well say that he has some status in 472, but then he was a Scirian orince and the Romans were quite attuned to barbarian royalty moving straight in as officers.
Anyway , accepting 472 I cannot have him coming into Italy as late as 475, though a do think Severinus has time for career before meeting Odovacar
A juvenes is between 20 and 40 years... that takes Odivacar up until 473 according to my Lewis and short!
I would be very happy with the meeting being in 468 after the Bolia defeat. It gives an excellent reason for Odovacar to be moving West whilst his brother Hunwulf enters the Eastern Empire. That is the sort of decision princely brothers might well come to after the game is up following a crushing defeat and I think the Sciri disappear after that.
That leaves us with Gregory and the likelihood that he finds a story about a Saxon leader attacking Angers during a oeriod of warfare along the Loire and appends to it an occasion after 476 when Childeric is incited to attack the Allamani in the rear to reduce pressure on Italy's frontier.
Anyway apologies for removing and replacing my post within minutes, i had not expected anyone to respond so quickly.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 29, 2014, 10:31:34 PM
A juvenes is between 20 and 40 years... that takes Odivacar up until 473 according to my Lewis and short!
I would be very happy with the meeting being in 468 after the Bolia defeat. It gives an excellent reason for Odovacar to be moving West whilst his brother Hunwulf enters the Eastern Empire. That is the sort of decision princely brothers might well come to after the game is up following a crushing defeat and I think the Sciri disappear after that.
It's also quite possible that Odoacer - presuming he is this Odivacar - offers his services to Ricimer whilst he still has something respectable to be prince of, i.e. before the defeat at Bolia. This would be line with barbarian practice. Odivacar's appeal to Ricimir would be as an important leader in a flourishing barbarian tribe, not as a refugee of a tribe that has been smashed in battle and is about to disappear from history. By the time of Bolia he has shown himself to be a capable and loyal subordinate so Ricimer keeps him.
'Iuvenis' in my dictionary is from 17 to 45, the midpoint being 31 (if you like numbers). The odds are then good that Odoacer met St Severinus before the events of 464-5.
I don't think being prince of something significant is not the qualifier for getting a good job in the Roman structure. The Romans had a good idea of what being a Germanic prince meant and it clearly was not only related to a particular tribe. If you are a barbarian royal then you might have only a few followers, but you would be recieved as a royal and others would expect to be commanded by you. Leaders such as Stilico , Aspar, Ricimer, Sarus are not leading their tribe or, as far as is known, relating to their tribe or exercising any power over it. they are just high status individuals, especially in the military sphere.
Roy
This thread seems to be gradually expanding into a reconstruction of the history of the late Roman empire with particular reference to Gaul. A fascinating subject (don't you just love those Latin grammatical nuances in Gregory?) but perhaps deserving a separate thread.
On the subject of Odoacer one at least sees what appears to be a regular Roman army serving a Roman administration that remains intact through a change of leadership, from Aegidius to Paulus to Odoacer (or some unnamed individual) to Syagrius. This army is well able to beat a strong force of Saxons who, whatever their precise status at Angers might be, were at least capable fighters. The same army however needs the help of Frankish (and possibly Briton/Breton) federates to take on the Visigoths. I think the guesstimate of +/- 10 000 professional troops looks about right.
On the subject of Gregory's Adovacrius-Odovacrius, one needs to take note of how just bad his spelling is, especially of personal names.
Here is how he spells Euric in Chap. 20:
| 20. De Victorio duce.
Eoricus autem Gothorum rex Victorium ducem super septem civitatis praeposuit anno XIIII, regni sui. |
And here is how he spells it just 5 chapters later:
| 25. De Euvarege persecutore.
Huius temporis et Euarix rex Gothorum, excidens Hispanum limitem, gravem in Galliis super christianis intulit persecutionem. |
Given the pig's breakfast Gregory makes of Euric's name, the only thing one can conclude about his spelling of Odoacer is that it is remarkably consistent.
One feature of the story is the way the Armoricans in the 430s and then in the 440s removed themselves from imperial rule: they seem to have taken exception to the pervasive bureaucracy, the one-size-fits-all legislation, the level of monetary contributions, the single currency and uncontrolled immigration from Eastern Europe. So they left. This probably had more impact on the administration and revenues of northern Gaul under Aetius and Aegidius than did the loss of provinces further afield, but the Roman administration in northern Gaul does seem to have survived.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 31, 2014, 12:33:53 PM
they seem to have taken exception to the pervasive bureaucracy, the one-size-fits-all legislation, the level of monetary contributions, the single currency and uncontrolled immigration from Eastern Europe.
sounds mightily familiar today ;)
Hmmmm what do we mean by the Roman administrative system?
Roy
I am coming to agree with you Justin, that Gregory of Tours is very flaky and that his writings on the Vth century should not be trusted. It appears that he is taking from different sources and importing their spellings and their errors without really sorting out the consistent story behind the entries.
Jordanes is as bad , for example having a story of the Visigoth Thorismud fight Attila again after Chalons. We would have to have real corroboration before relying upon either for a definitive statement about a putative Roman army in Northern Gaul, especially as neither actually makes sych a statement.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 31, 2014, 05:50:00 PM
Hmmmm what do we mean by the Roman administrative system?
Roy
"
These are they who grudge quiet folks their peace, the soldier his pay, the courier his fare, the merchant his market, the ambassador his gifts, the farmer of tolls his dues, the provincial his farm, the municipality its flamen's dignity, the controllers of revenue their weights, the receivers their measures, the registrars their salary, the accountants their fees, the bodyguards their presents, towns their truces, taxgatherers their taxes, the clergy the respect men pay them, the nobles their lineage, superiors their seats in council, equals equality, the official his jurisdiction, the ex-official his distinctions, scholars their schools, masters their stipends, and finished pupils their accomplishments." - Sidonius, Letters, V.7.3
"
I know that your brother's honours delight you no less than my own; considering his years, he has attained this one very early; considering his deserts, very late. For he earned the dignity he is now to receive long ago, by service in the field and not by purchase; and though only a private citizen, poured into the treasury no mere contribution, but sums like spoils of war. [2] Julius Nepos, true Emperor in character no less than prowess, has done nobly in keeping the pledged word of his predecessor Anthemius that the labours of your brother should be recognized; his action is all the more laudable for the promptitude with which he has fulfilled a promise reiterated so often by another. In future the best men in the State will feel able, nay, rather, will feel bound, to spend their strength with the utmost ardour for the commonweal, assured that even should the prince who promised die, the Empire itself will be responsible, and pay the debt due to their devotion and self-sacrifice." - ibid. V.16.1-2
"
... there was not a word about officials or taxes, not an informer among us to betray" - ibid. V.17.5
"
It has passed over your administration of the Gauls when they were still at their greatest extent. It has been silent on the efficacy of your measures against Attila the enemy on the Rhine and Thorismond the guest of the Rhone, and on your support of Aetius the Liberator of the Loire. It has not related the dragging of your chariot by cheering provincials, whose fervent applause proclaimed their gratitude for the prudence and the foresight with which you handled the reins of power; since you ruled the Gauls with such wisdom that the exhausted proprietor was relieved from the unbearable yoke of taxes. It passed over the address with which you influenced the savage Gothic king by a language blending grace with gravity and astuteness, a language unfamiliar in his ears, causing him to withdraw from the gates of Arles by a banquet, where Aetius could not have succeeded by force of arms." - ibid. VII.12.3
Quote from: aligern on January 31, 2014, 06:32:26 PM
I am coming to agree with you Justin, that Gregory of Tours is very flaky and that his writings on the Vth century should not be trusted.
I am not sure that is quite what Justin meant. ;)
To me, Gregory of Tours seems to be like the proverbial curate's egg: good in parts. Sadly he is our principal source for certain key events so we have to make the best we can of him. Patient extrapolation seems to be filling out the picture and in this case largely vindicating him (to my surprise).
He is nevertheless not a Wellington's egg, consumed and then described as 'quite rotten'.
Quote from: aligern on January 31, 2014, 06:32:26 PM
I am coming to agree with you Justin, that Gregory of Tours is very flaky and that his writings on the Vth century should not be trusted. It appears that he is taking from different sources and importing their spellings and their errors without really sorting out the consistent story behind the entries.
Jordanes is as bad , for example having a story of the Visigoth Thorismud fight Attila again after Chalons. We would have to have real corroboration before relying upon either for a definitive statement about a putative Roman army in Northern Gaul, especially as neither actually makes sych a statement.
Roy
I get the impression rather that Gregory's Latin spelling can at times be atrocious and that he clearly copies different versions of personal names from different sources without deciding which version is correct. Hence I feel it a mistake to conclude too much from his different variants of Odoacer's name.
Nonetheless in what regards the first Visigothic war of the 460's it seems quite possible to draw a coherent and reasonable picture from his account. He was after all as close to the events as we are to the First World War.
I like Patrick's approach of doing one's best to make sense of a primary source, discarding it only when it is clearly proven to be wrong (as opposed to being affirmed to be wrong by a contemporary trendy opinion).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 31, 2014, 08:11:33 PM
I like Patrick's approach of doing one's best to make sense of a primary source, discarding it only when it is clearly proven to be wrong (as opposed to being affirmed to be wrong by a contemporary trendy opinion).
A weakness of this approach though is it can lead to a a lack of critical analysis of primary sources. Well entrenched academic reviews can be wrong but they can reflect a wider study of a subject that assesses the value of that source in context. That context should include a wide range of comparisons in different disciplines; other sources, official documents, archaeology, palaeogeography, experimental archaeology even analogy. The work of academics can digest these for us - what Roy has referred to a "standing on the shoulders of giants approach", building on past work. So yes, come to sources fresh and with respect but also respect the work others have done and weigh their conclusions carefully.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 31, 2014, 12:33:53 PM
One feature of the story is the way the Armoricans in the 430s and then in the 440s removed themselves from imperial rule: they seem to have taken exception to the pervasive bureaucracy, the one-size-fits-all legislation, the level of monetary contributions, the single currency and uncontrolled immigration from Eastern Europe. So they left. This probably had more impact on the administration and revenues of northern Gaul under Aetius and Aegidius than did the loss of provinces further afield, but the Roman administration in northern Gaul does seem to have survived.
It might be an idea to have another look at the Armoricans from the perspective of the Armoriciani serving as federates of Aetius at Chalons, and the Arborychi who begin to fight for the Romans in the 460's.
Who were the Armoriciani/Arborychi? They were not barbarians or even Bretons as Procopius makes clear:
| Next to these [the Franks] lived the Arborychi, who, together with all the rest of Gaul, and, indeed, Spain also, were subjects of the Romans from of old. |
They were clearly Gallo-romans, living in the area roughly bordered by the Loire and the Seine. By the the 5th century practically all Gallo-romans lived on the huge country estates (latifundia) owned by the powerful Gallo-roman senatorial class. They were not free peasants, but tenants, working land that was not theirs and giving a portion to their landlords as rent. The idea of them rising up of their own accord in a kind of popular movement to fight for the Roman authorities is, quite simply, absurd. Yet this apparently is what happened:
| By that time it so happened that the Arborychi had become soldiers of the Romans.... But the Arborychi proved their valour and loyalty to the Romans and shewed themselves brave men in this war[/i][/b]. |
The only explanation that makes sense to me is that the men who controlled the livelihood of the Armoricans were the same men who used them to fight for the Roman cause - in other words the Gallo-roman aristocracy. We have an example of this in Ecdicius, who raises a small army (rather more than 18 men!) to fight the Visigoths. It is unlikely that Ecdicius's example was unique, and everything indicates that his colleagues in northern Gaul were doing the same thing as a matter of course. Even granted a survival of the Roman infrastructure and economy in Gaul in the 5th century, no-one argues that the Empire could no longer maintain the army at its former size. It would be natural to devolve the military burden onto those who could afford to pay for it. This would explain the Olibriones at Chalons. They were a part of the regular military establishment that had been privatised by wealthy landowners, and now served as Auxilia rather than part of the standing army.
The Armoricans then were military units, formed, equipped and paid/maintained by Gallo-roman notables. They were active before Chalons since Aetius can call on them instantly for the battle. This goes well with the lack of country villas in northern Gaul in the 5th century. The Gallo-roman nobility in that region did not have the time, cash or inclination to idle around in magnificent country estates.
What were the Armorican units like? If the Olibriones were the 'flower of the Auxilia' then the Armoriciani of Chalons would not be quite as good - though it seems they were certainly good enough by the time one reaches Clovis. They would look like Roman troops: the Gallo-roman nobility - immensely proud of their Roman heritage - in training them would follow the Roman military model (a few Olibriones would have come in handy at this point).
That some of these Armorican forces might decide that doing without Roman authority was a better course than fighting for it was inevitable given the changing political situation, and it is likely that there were several switches of loyalty through the 5th century. My reconstruction of Syagrius's fall has the Arborychi dispensing with him after his defeat by Clovis, leaving him no choice but to flee to the Visigoths.
I thought another view on the 'His ita gestis' interpretation may be of use; in such circumstances as we face establishing that one cannot look so closely at Gregory as to make individual words the arbiter of major meanings is, in itself, useful:
'Firstly an ablative absolute does not have to convey a direct temporal link; secondly here it is most likely temporal not causative as Justin implies.
'ita' – 'in this way', does refer back in time since its sandwiched in the absolute, but it the sense of his 'gestis' that is interesting.
It is not 'after these things were done', gero has more of a sense of 'bringing about' 'carrying' 'spending (effort/time'- quite vague.
So if there was a direct close link why would Gregory not go for a more solid 'his ita factis'.
In short it is not a solid linking phrase as it does not refer to anything specific.
'Gero', especially in later Roman authors – and therefore in those who wrote up the old testament in Latin (see http://www.biblestudytools.com/esther/2-1-compare.html) also conveys a sense of spending or passing time. The greek phrase they translated: μετα τους λογους means literally 'after these words/speech/subject matter/account/story.' So by we know it is a temporal phrase and therefore can assume this 'gestis' is also.
'His' could also be stretched to 'His (tempestibus)' if we're reading 'gestis' as referring to passage of time. Other Latin authors have used 'His tempestibus' in ablative absolutes to denote passage of time.
All in all this phrase is very unspecific, could there be missing intervening chapters?
If not I would say there could well be a quite significant passage of time between the chapters, or a short passage of time or some other event(s).
So my translation would read, 'In this way after these things were passed, war was waged between the Saxons and Romans' / in this way after a while... / A time after this..'
Through a glass darkly then gents.....
Quote from: Erpingham on January 31, 2014, 09:36:40 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 31, 2014, 08:11:33 PM
I like Patrick's approach of doing one's best to make sense of a primary source, discarding it only when it is clearly proven to be wrong (as opposed to being affirmed to be wrong by a contemporary trendy opinion).
A weakness of this approach though is it can lead to a a lack of critical analysis of primary sources. Well entrenched academic reviews can be wrong but they can reflect a wider study of a subject that assesses the value of that source in context. That context should include a wide range of comparisons in different disciplines; other sources, official documents, archaeology, palaeogeography, experimental archaeology even analogy. The work of academics can digest these for us - what Roy has referred to a "standing on the shoulders of giants approach", building on past work. So yes, come to sources fresh and with respect but also respect the work others have done and weigh their conclusions carefully.
This is certainly true. The point though is that about 90% of our understanding of the past comes from written primary sources. A discipline like archaeology confirms (or refutes) these sources but adds relatively little historical detail of its own - or so I understand it, not being a historian myself. (by 'detail' I mean an understanding of the events and people. One can of course get plenty of detail about things like the layout of buildings, etc.) Hence the need when doing history to look at the primary sources, in the original language if possible, and be very slow to reject them.
A good example - looked at a few years back on the Lost Battles group - is the size of Achaemenid and early Carthaginian armies as given by the primary sources. All primary sources affirm huge numbers for these armies; contemporary academic fashion just discounts them and makes up smaller numbers of its own. But is this good history? A topic for another thread....
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 01, 2014, 04:52:26 AM
A good example - looked at a few years back on the Lost Battles group - is the size of Achaemenid and early Carthaginian armies as given by the primary sources. All primary sources affirm huge numbers for these armies; contemporary academic fashion just discounts them and makes up smaller numbers of its own. But is this good history? A topic for another thread....
Perhaps not so strangely, the numbers debate was what was going through my head as I wrote :) Recalling an epic Ancmed debate about the army of Xerxes which was a bit like the gallant paladin Sir Patrick battling all comers, it certainly needs its own thread.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 31, 2014, 09:36:40 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 31, 2014, 08:11:33 PM
I like Patrick's approach of doing one's best to make sense of a primary source, discarding it only when it is clearly proven to be wrong (as opposed to being affirmed to be wrong by a contemporary trendy opinion).
A weakness of this approach though is it can lead to a a lack of critical analysis of primary sources.
This may be preferable to the indiscriminate and shameless remoulding of primary sources that is then used as a standpoint to sweep other primary sources under the carpet (I have in mind an approach regarding the 6th century Roman monarchy, but out of respect for the head of the British School at Rome will not mention it here). There is also a problem with critically analysing a primary source which happens to be one's sole source of information on a particular subject.
Quote
Well entrenched academic reviews can be wrong but they can reflect a wider study of a subject that assesses the value of that source in context. That context should include a wide range of comparisons in different disciplines; other sources, official documents, archaeology, palaeogeography, experimental archaeology even analogy. The work of academics can digest these for us - what Roy has referred to a "standing on the shoulders of giants approach", building on past work.
The problem with 'standing on the shoulders of giants' is that the human pyramid can collapse because it is insecurely based. All history revolves around primary sources, and archaeology generally has the thrust of expanding, proving or disproving these (
vide Schliemann and Troy). Because archaeology is itself a highly interpretative discipline the same findings can be used to support different understandings (or misunderstandings). Adding other disciplines often seems to take the form of attempting to confirm a prevailing opinion rather than to establish an independent check on the validity of current interpretation: radiocarbon dating has, since its inception, been reprocessed more to accord with current ancient world chronology than to check it (being anyway a somewhat blunt instrument in the first place).
One side-note on radiocarbon dating: the Shroud of Turin was infamously mis-dated to the middle ages on the basis of a sample - which proved to come from a mediaeval repair. The raw radiocarbon date was in the right range for what it measured, but it measured the wrong thing, with considerable implications for history.
Quote
So yes, come to sources fresh and with respect but also respect the work others have done and weigh their conclusions carefully.
From some work others (http://fmg.ac/Projects/MedLands/BURGUNDY%20KINGS.htm) have done ...
"
There is little evidence to suggest that any of the so-called barbarian peoples organised themselves into states, and imposed their authority on the indigenous populations, when they first migrated into western Europe. In this respect, Jordanes´s History of the Goths makes an interesting comment when naming "...Burgundiones..." among those who provided soldiers to the Roman army ("Franci, Sarmatæ, Armoriciani, Liticiani, Burgundiones, Saxones, Ripari, Olibriones, quondam milites Romani"). This passage suggests that the case of the Burgundians was similar to that of the other peoples who lived on the periphery of Roman jurisdiction and who provided many of the military volunteers who served in the Roman army with the later prospect of acquiring Roman citizenship."
This assessment suggests that Aetius' force at Chalons consisted entirely of regulars embodied in units.
We can undoubtedly counter with other authors/researchers who have come to the unshakeable conclusion that these peoples were independent and turned up on Aetius' side as temporary foederati because it was was a lesser evil than being crunched by Attila.
We could then then enter what seems to be a standard forum repertoire (in other forums, naturally): a pointless, sterile interminable debate in which number of supporting opinions seems to count more than quality, because quality has ceased to be assessable.
This is why I prefer to leave secondary sources aside and concentrate on the primary sources when seeking the answer to something - not because secondary sources are inherently useless or wrong, but because all secondary sources depend upon the interpretation of primary sources, so one might as well cut out the middleman. Rodger and Justin have done us proud with their dedication to investigating primary sources and turning up material that, in my view at least, is actually aiding our understanding of the period - and Duncan has not been entirely idle, either. :)
Quote from: rodge on January 31, 2014, 11:20:04 PM
I thought another view on the 'His ita gestis' interpretation may be of use; in such circumstances as we face establishing that one cannot look so closely at Gregory as to make individual words the arbiter of major meanings is, in itself, useful:
'Firstly an ablative absolute does not have to convey a direct temporal link; secondly here it is most likely temporal not causative as Justin implies.
'ita' – 'in this way', does refer back in time since its sandwiched in the absolute, but it the sense of his 'gestis' that is interesting.
It is not 'after these things were done', gero has more of a sense of 'bringing about' 'carrying' 'spending (effort/time'- quite vague.
So if there was a direct close link why would Gregory not go for a more solid 'his ita factis'.
In short it is not a solid linking phrase as it does not refer to anything specific.
'Gero', especially in later Roman authors – and therefore in those who wrote up the old testament in Latin (see http://www.biblestudytools.com/esther/2-1-compare.html) also conveys a sense of spending or passing time. The greek phrase they translated: μετα τους λογους means literally 'after these words/speech/subject matter/account/story.' So by we know it is a temporal phrase and therefore can assume this 'gestis' is also.
'His' could also be stretched to 'His (tempestibus)' if we're reading 'gestis' as referring to passage of time. Other Latin authors have used 'His tempestibus' in ablative absolutes to denote passage of time.
All in all this phrase is very unspecific, could there be missing intervening chapters?
If not I would say there could well be a quite significant passage of time between the chapters, or a short passage of time or some other event(s).
So my translation would read, 'In this way after these things were passed, war was waged between the Saxons and Romans' / in this way after a while... / A time after this..'
Through a glass darkly then gents.....
Impressive, Rodger.
How conscious would Gregory be of this? I find that on top of everything else, individual authors tend to have their own peculiarities of usage - with Tacitus or Cicero, they get written into the grammar books because Tacitus or Cicero used them. Is the same account taken of peripheral authors in peripheral periods? Would Gregory, not the best disciplined of writers, have been aware of these implications of his usage?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 01, 2014, 11:59:07 AM
This is why I prefer to leave secondary sources aside and concentrate on the primary sources when seeking the answer to something - not because secondary sources are inherently useless or wrong, but because all secondary sources depend upon the interpretation of primary sources, so one might as well cut out the middleman. Rodger and Justin have done us proud with their dedication to investigating primary sources and turning up material that, in my view at least, is actually aiding our understanding of the period - and Duncan has not been entirely idle, either. :)
I think this is one where we have to agree to differ Patrick. I don't think plunging into something as if nothing has gone before is a particularly helpful technique and in truth you don't really behave that way - I admire your work on translation of sources but I note how you use the work of classicists who have gone before as you seek meaning. My remarks do not disparage Rodger, Justin or Duncan - their work here on texts has been impressive. I will wait to discover how it improves our understanding when you explain to non-specialists what better knowing the careers of barbarian princes in Roman service tells us about Late Roman Gaul (genuine request).
As to Radiocarbon dating, you have a more jaundiced view of this than most. Most archaeologists would see all the work on calibration not as failure but as refinement of an already useful technique.
The advantage of the secondary sources is that, hopefully, the writers have studied the period in depth and really understand it. That puts them in a good position to fill in the gaps where the sources are inadequate and frankly , in Vth century Gaul the sources just do not give a clear statement as to what the composition of the forces of Aegidius and Syagrius. Personally I am happy to go with the Roman style troops that Procopius mentions as being the 'Ripari Olibriones' of Jordanes , former Roman soldiers mentioned by Jordanes as being the best soldiers in Aetius army. They fit the bill of being Roman soldiers and on the frontiers of Gaul. Moreover, having left Roman pay but retained their effectiveness and cohesiveness we can see that they are in a position to do a deal with the Franks (Procopius Germani ).
I am happy to admit that there is room for an interpretation that the Magister Militum per Gallias has a couple of regular units, but not a large, say 10,000 man army. That is because a small force would not necessarily make an appearance in the sources, but a larger one is conspicuous by its absence.
roy
Quote from: aligern on February 01, 2014, 06:43:27 PM
The advantage of the secondary sources is that, hopefully, the writers have studied the period in depth and really understand it.
The writers have usually studied the period in depth, certainly. Understanding it may or may not follow - and how does one judge?
What secondary sources are really good for is to give one an initial overview and orientation regarding the period's, events, personalities, cultures and geography. One they get onto their favourite hobby-horses the risk of being misled dramatically increases unless the writer is an observer first and metaphorical equestrian second.
Quote
I am happy to admit that there is room for an interpretation that the Magister Militum per Gallias has a couple of regular units, but not a large, say 10,000 man army. That is because a small force would not necessarily make an appearance in the sources, but a larger one is conspicuous by its absence.
But is it? The fmg.ac site I quoted previously (01 Feb 11.59) considers the
entire non-Armorican, non-Alan and non-Visigoth force at Chalons to be regulars, with Jordanes' "once the flower of the army" remark meaning they were no longer around
at the time he was writing (about a century later than Chalons). Denying Aetius any regulars except a token couple of units might be not seeing the wood for the trees.
Oh Dear Patrick, that Burgundian website that you site is not very good at all. For secondary souces I would prefer to go with scholars with some sort of reputation. What it says about the Burgundians is nonsense. The list of peoples that provide contingents to Aetius is a list of contingents. It would be extraordinary to list the peoples who had provided individual recruits and his concept of the Germans not administering the land in Gaul as political units is peurile.
For example, Euric appoints a count, Victorinus, over six Arvernian cities
In Aetius list the Franks are federates, the Sarmatians laeti, the Armoricans are most likely the buccellarii of the Gallo Roman nobility and oerhaps town levies. The Burgundians are federates, the Liticians are either Laeti or they are Limitanei , the Saxons are either laets or federates.
I suppose the writer of the website would suggest that the Franks who fight the Gepids the night before are actually the units of Franci found in the Notitia.
If a secondary source is going to radically reinterpret the primary sources then it needs to put a really sound argument.
Roy
I suppose the only approach we can take here is to look at secondary sources inasmuch as they analyse primary sources, quoting those primary sources and showing exactly how they derived their conclusions about them.
On the subject of Chalons, if you're looking for a field army, it is clear from the Latin that the 'Romans' in Jordanes' description are Aetius's regular troops. Notice how he distinguishes them from the Auxilia:
| dextram partem Hunni cum suis, sinistram Romani et Vesegothae cum auxiliariis occuparunt, relictoque de cacumine eius iugo certamen ineunt.
The Huns with their forces seized the right side, the Romans and the Visigoths with the Auxilia the left, and then began a struggle for the yet untaken crest. |
The Romans are
not the Auxilia, but fight with them and the Visigoths (Thorismud and his flank cavalry guard?) for the heights.
Attila's subsequent speech specifies the 'Romans', describing them in terms that makes sense only as a heavily armed, drilled and primarily infantry force:
| Nota vobis sunt quam sint levia Romanorum arma: primo etiam non dico vulnere, sed ipso pulvere gravantur, dum in ordine coeunt et acies testudinesque conectunt.
You know of how little consequence Roman arms are: they are weighed down, not even by the first wound, but by the dust itself, whilst they form up and join their battlelines and tortoises. |
Note that these are Roman troops he is talking about, not Auxilia. One has the impression of heavily armed infantry that are slow - weighed down by their arms and armour, making them no immediate threat to the Huns if they attack the Alans and Visigoths. Attila does not obviously affirm that the Roman arms are of no consequence in
themselves - the Huns have just been driven off the heights by them.
It always helps to take a closer look at the original Latin. Translators' bias and all that.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 02, 2014, 10:34:55 AM
Attila's subsequent speech specifies the 'Romans', describing them in terms that makes sense only as a heavily armed, drilled and primarily infantry force:
| Nota vobis sunt quam sint levia Romanorum arma: primo etiam non dico vulnere, sed ipso pulvere gravantur, dum in ordine coeunt et acies testudineque conectunt.
You know of how little consequence Roman arms are: they are weighed down, not even by the first wound, but by the dust itself, whilst they form up and join their battlelines and tortoises. |
Note that these are Roman troops he is talking about, not Auxilia. One has the impression of heavily armed infantry that are slow - weighed down by their arms and armour, making them no immediate threat to the Huns if they attack the Alans and Visigoths. Attila does not obviously affirm that the Roman arms are of no consequence in themselves - the Huns have just been driven off the heights by them.
It always helps to take a closer look at the original Latin. Translators' bias and all that.
I know we place little weight on other author's views but this is what Philip Rance says about this passage :
Less still can be made of the rhetorical remarks on
Roman infantry that Jordanes puts in the mouth of Attila at the
battle of Châlons, noting that "they come together in formation
and form a battle line with locked shields" (Get. 39, dum in
ordine coeunt et acies testudineque conectunt). At best this shows
that Jordanes, a mid sixth-century author, could characterise, or
even caricature, Roman deployment as compact formations
fronted by "shield linkage."Noting that we are dealing with a rhetorical passage put into the mouth of a barbarian king and not a realistic description of the actual battle, I think we can say that Jordanes is envisaging a Roman shieldwall of his own time as he writes. In other words, he does think these Romans are like Romans he is used to. Whether he is correct to do so is less certain.
Rance also quotes this :
Agathias' account of a minor action near Rimini in late 553
between Narses' mounted retinue and some marauding Franks.
Faced with the Roman horsemen, the Franks
all massed themselves together, both infantry and cavalry, and
deployed in a compact formation, which though not very deep ...
was nevertheless made strong by linking shields and drawing in
the flanks in good order ... Perfectly protected by their shields,
they stood immovable and unshaken, at no point breaking the
cohesion of their formation.to show that such formations were not solely Roman.
In terms of probabilities, it appears to me we are on fairly safe ground that the Roman infantry are well equipped close order troops. The leap of faith is that they are old-style field army legions and auxilia.
How Jordanes understands 'acies testudinesque' is up for discussion (though I would think some kind of tortoise would be just the right formation to adopt against bow-armed hunnic cavalry). The point though is that for Jordanes the 'Romans' are professional regular troops, not to be identified with the Auxilia or any other group. They have to be the Gallic Field army.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 02, 2014, 11:06:20 AM
In terms of probabilities, it appears to me we are on fairly safe ground that the Roman infantry are well equipped close order troops. The leap of faith is that they are old-style field army legions and auxilia.
And we may be able to demonstrate that they are in fact such from what Jordanes does
not say.
Jordanes' Latin says:
A parte vero Romanorum tanta patricii Aetii providentia fuit, cui tunc innitebatur res publica Hesperiae plagae, ut undique bellatoribus congregatis adversus ferocem et infinitam multitudinem non impar occurreret. Hi enim adfuerunt
auxiliares: Franci, Sarmatae, Armoriciani, Liticiani, Burgundiones, Saxones, Ripari, Olibriones, quondam milites Romani, tunc vero iam
in numero auxiliarium exquisiti, aliaeque nonnulli Celticae vel Germanie nationes. - Jordanes Getica XXXVI
Note that Jordanes refers to the 'tribal' contingents as 'auxiliares', which technically means they are non-legionary regulars. They are not noted as 'foederati' or 'laeti' but 'auxiliares'.
These peoples Jordanes refers to as 'quondam milites Romani', 'quondam' having (usually) the sense of 'at a previous time' ('at some time' or 'at a certain time' in Cicero and Virgil; 'formerly' in Caesar; 'some day' in Horace and Virgil), and this is vague because it does not tell us whether the 'previous time' means previous to Aetius or previous to Jordanes.
The next phrase, however, clarifies matters: 'tunc vero iam in numero
auxiliarium exquisiti', 'then [at that time = basic meaning of 'tunc']) truly [vero] beyond doubt [secondary meaning of 'iam'] the best [exquisiti] in the number of
auxilia [plural]'. Jordanes is quite clear here that as of the time of Chalons the Franci, Sarmatae, Armoriciani, Liticiani, Burgundiones, Saxones, Ripari and Olibriones provided the
best auxilia units of the regular Roman army.
By looking at the primary source, the problem is solved, or at the very worst focussed on one clear issue and narrowed down to differences of interpretation about Latin terminology.
I'm sure you've read Rance Justin, so you will know that he associates the Late Roman testudo with Arrian's earlier anti-Alan formation. If correct, this would be just the formation to face off a pile of Huns. While I quoted his scepticism that we can read too much into Jordanes, he certainly has material you could use to strengthen your case.
For those who haven't read Rance on the Foulkon, you can find him here https://web.duke.edu/classics/grbs/FTexts/44/Rance2.pdf
I hadn't seen him before, Anthony, thanks for the tip.
FYI here is a map giving my tentative deployment of Chalons on the presumption the Romans deploy next to the Alans to keep an eye on them. I've made the Huns wide enough to engage either the Romans or the Alans and Visigoths.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/chalons%20map.png)
Well doesn't Sidonius give Attila a whole host of other tribal contingents.?
I quite like the idea of Thorismud being separate from the main Visigoth force. To me it made sense of him coming to the Hun camp as he tried to make his way to his father.
Second, looking at Jordanes it is possible to read it that Attila is facing the Alans with only the flower of his huns, i.e. with the noblest and best armed Heavies, if you like and that the lighter Huns may be elsewhere, oerhaps on the flanks?
If we are going to uber interpret Jordanes we might as well have everything that is going.
Roy
[quote author=Patrick Waterson link=topic=1088.msg9262#msg9262 date=1391339906
By looking at the primary source, the problem is solved, or at the very worst focussed on one clear issue and narrowed down to differences of interpretation about Latin terminology.
[/quote]
Some minor quibbles,
#1 This was written 100 years after the event so it's not primary.
#2 The work is a summary of Cassiodorus' lost work. It's not primary
#3 It's written in late Latin rather than classical Latin (doesn't affect Patrick's argument much).
#4 Because of his background I would suggest that he is a useful and relatively early secondary source. Though for the later parts of the Getica he is nearly primary, and the best we have.
Tom..
What Tom writes is correct, but Jordanes is as close to primary as we can get for Chalons. From our perspective we cannot get a closer record, so he is primary by default as opposed to primary by definition - less satisfactory, but beggars cannot be choosers.
Otherwise agree 100%.
Jordanes is not very popular with modern historians as he is a collector and compiler, does not always get things right and has a distinct bias to the Goths, so he is not all bad.
There is a passage at 225 he has Attila departing from Italy and attacking Gaul again but being repulsed by the Visigoths under Thorismud.
Nor is Jordanes now thought to be solely copying Cassiodorus. the timescale for producyion if this work of memory seems too constrained and Jordanes himself cites other authors. Like Gregory, he is, for this period secondary source and the likelihood that he had any good. source for. Attila's pre battle speech , for example, is remote.
However, if we are too critical of the sources in this oeriod we will be left with nothing, we just should always accept that an uncorroborated source. could well be wrong.
Roy
Being critical of a source doesn't mean that you don't use it, but it does mean that you have to understand it.
Jordanes is useful because, we have good copies of hie work (from multiple manuscripts) and because some of his works are our best evidence for certain periods. He is also useful to the amateur historian because of the considerable discussion that he evoked amongst the professionals.
A good example (partly because I largely agree with him, and partly because it's freely available on line) is O'Donnell's 1982 article (http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/texts/jordanes.html). Even this view was challenged, on the interesting view that O'Donnell had strongly argued that the 'marxist' school of historians should not be ignored simply because they were 'marxist' (small m, the name was as much a dramatic gesture as a political label for some left leaning theoretical historians). This, it was suggested, made O'Donnell over inclined to dismiss the 'Jordanes was a bishop' concensus. - Academics can be stunningly small minded if left to themselves !
Tom - not an academic thankfully :-)
Quote from: aligern on February 03, 2014, 10:28:15 PM
Nor is Jordanes now thought to be solely copying Cassiodorus. the timescale for producyion if this work of memory seems too constrained and Jordanes himself cites other authors. Like Gregory, he is, for this period secondary source and the likelihood that he had any good. source for. Attila's pre battle speech , for example, is remote.
Attila's speech does at least show what Jordanes' imagined Attila
would have said, i.e. it is Jordanes' knowledge of the composition of Aetius's army that determines Attila's words. In this sense he is very useful.
I would imagine (if I had to bet on it) that Attila did say something, but it is unlikely a scribe was standing next him, parchment and pen in hand, ready to record his words for posterity.
Given that he'd probably have to ride along the front of the army, talking to unit to unit (Remember the cavalry charge at the end of the seige of Minas Tirith to get a feel for scale) Attila probably said a lot of things and probably different ones (or different variations about a common theme) for different units :-)
Jim
Including perhaps:
Fresh faced Hun: 'Why is it us? Why us?'
Attila: "Because we're here lad. Nobody else. Just us..."
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 04, 2014, 05:30:18 AMI would imagine (if I had to bet on it) that Attila did say something, but it is unlikely a scribe was standing next him, parchment and pen in hand, ready to record his words for posterity.
Though we know from Priskos that Attila had Roman secretaries, Constantius and Orestes, so he certainly had people whose job was to write things down ....
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 04, 2014, 09:01:00 AM
Given that he'd probably have to ride along the front of the army, talking to unit to unit (Remember the cavalry charge at the end of the seige of Minas Tirith to get a feel for scale) Attila probably said a lot of things and probably different ones (or different variations about a common theme) for different units :-)
Jim
Attila [to Huns]: O noble, brave and warlike race, show those Alans what true men are!
Attila [to Ostrogoths]: If you don't charge those Visigoths I'll have your skulls for drinking cups!
The main job for the secretary would be to write an appropriate speech for circulation after the event :-) Probably with all the required rhetorical flourishes and classical allusions
I'm not aware of many instances of Greek secretaries riding along the front lines, frantically taking down the speech in shorthand as they go
On a serious note, Attila might well have said, "Yes, I told them this," or one of his men might have remembered Attila saying something in particular, but ancient historians have a long tradition of inventing heroic speeches for generals
Jim
All true, but:
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 04, 2014, 12:25:43 PMI'm not aware of many instances of Greek secretaries riding along the front lines, frantically taking down the speech in shorthand as they go
- would we expect to hear about it if they did?
Can you see them neglecting to mention it :-)
I suspect that given the number of letter writers we have, if 'literary men' were in the habit of doing this sort of thing someone would have commented
Jim
The intertesting thing about Attila's speech in Jordanes is that it is an in-battle speech rather than a pre-battle speech, and the content seems more geared to the needs of the moment, i.e. getting his (Hunnish) troops to attack the Romans, a point on which we can infer some reluctance on the part of the Huns, otherwise why bother with the pep-talk? Just a quick "That way lies victory - CHAAARGE!!!" would have sufficed* - unless there was a noticeable Hunnish disinclination to take on the Roman 'acies contra Alanos'.
*Even if it is not a very literary exhortation.
Hence I would feel inclined to take Jordanes seriously on this point, whether or not he has attained exactitude of wording (presumably from the original Hunnic).
Far be it from me to interrupt this august discussion but is it veering a tad off the subject of this thread?
Perhaps a new thread on this excellent subject may be an idea, before we hurl ourselves once more into the 5thC Gallic brèche?
You know I thought that Attila was purported to have said that his men should 'despise' the Romans and attack the Alan's and Visigoths, particularly the Alansas they are the weak link in the Allied army.
Quote from: aligern on February 04, 2014, 06:03:34 PM
You know I thought that Attila was purported to have said that his men should 'despise' the Romans and attack the Alan's and Visigoths, particularly the Alans as they are the weak link in the Allied army.
Beginning with Getica XXXVIII, last section (pre-battle dispositions have been made, the battle begins; nobody has yet made a speech):
Quote
So then the struggle began for the advantage of position we have mentioned. Attila sent his men to take the summit of the mountain, but was outstripped by Thorismud and Aëtius, who in their effort to gain the top of the hill reached higher ground and through this advantage of position easily routed the Huns as they came up.
(202) Now when Attila saw his army was thrown into confusion by this event, he thought it best to encourage them by an extemporaneous address on this wise: "Here you stand, after conquering mighty nations and subduing the world. I therefore think it foolish for me to goad you with words, as though you were men who had not been proved in action. Let a new leader or an untried army resort to that. (203) It is not right for me to say anything common, nor ought you to listen. For what is war but your usual custom? Or what is sweeter for a brave man than to seek revenge with his own hand? It is a right of nature to glut the soul with vengeance. (204) Let us then attack the foe eagerly; for they are ever the bolder who make the attack. Despise this union of discordant races! To defend oneself by alliance is proof of cowardice. See, even before our attack they are smitten with terror. They seek the heights, they seize the hills and, repenting too late, clamor for protection against battle in the open fields. You know how slight a matter the Roman attack is. While they are still gathering in order and forming in one line with locked shields, they are checked, I will not say by the first wound, but even by the dust of battle.
Strictly speaking, Attila tells his troops to "Despise this union of discordant races!" and then that "You know how slight a matter the Roman attack is," which is not quite an injunction specifically to despise the Romans.
Quote
(205) Then on to the fray with stout hearts, as is your wont. Despise their battle line. Attack the Alani, smite the Visigoths! Seek swift victory in that spot where the battle rages. For when the sinews are cut the limbs soon relax, nor can a body stand when you have taken away the bones. Let your courage rise and your own fury burst forth! Now show your cunning, Huns, now your deeds of arms! Let the wounded exact in return the death of his foe; let the unwounded revel in slaughter of the enemy. (206) No spear shall harm those who are sure to live; and those who are sure to die Fate overtakes even in peace. And finally, why should Fortune have made the Huns victorious over so many nations, unless it were to prepare them for the joy of this conflict. Who was it revealed to our sires the path through the Maeotian swamp, for so many ages a closed secret? Who, moreover, made armed men yield to you, when you were as yet unarmed? Even a mass of federated nations could not endure the sight of the Huns. I am not deceived in the issue;--here is the field so many victories have promised us. I shall hurl the first spear at the foe. If any can stand at rest while Attila fights, he is a dead man." Inflamed by these words, they all dashed into battle.
The Huns are indeed advised to "Attack the Alani, smite the Visigoths!" and "Despise their battle-line," which is either that of the Romans - though there is no concurrent injunction to attack it - or that of the Alani and Visigoths.
My reading of this is that Attila is trying to make the best of a bad job. The Romans and their allies have just shoved his troops off the entire ridge running between the two armies, and this has disconcerted the Huns.
Quote
(197) The armies met, as we have said, in the Catalaunian Plains. The battle field was a plain rising by a sharp slope to a ridge, which both armies sought to gain; for advantage of position is a great help. The Huns with their forces seized the right side, the Romans, the Visigoths and their allies the left, and then began a struggle for the yet untaken crest.
This suggests that the ridge ran north-south across the entire field and each army was deployed north-south, one facing east, the other facing west (Hmmm, maybe Rodger is right and we should move to the Battle of Chalons thread to continue this part of the discussion). Attila seized the eastern slope of the ridge and Aetius and his allies the western. Then, as we have seen:
Quote
Attila sent his men to take the summit of the mountain [i.e. crest of the ridge], but was outstripped by Thorismud and Aëtius, who in their effort to gain the top of the hill reached higher ground and through this advantage of position easily routed the Huns as they came up.
So Attila has been turfed off the high ground, and knows that unless he can regain it he might as well pack up and go home. This is when he gives his speech and tells the Huns what hopeless cases their enemies are.
The curious thing about portrayals of the battle is that nowhere have I seen a reconstruction with a ridge running between the armies, and yet this is what Jordanes' account seems to imply. Aetius and allies took the ridge, and the fact that Attila feels the need to urge his Huns to
charge the Alans suggests the Alans had also gained their sector of ridge and repelled the Huns opposing them. From then on the Huns faced an uphill struggle in every respect.
Has anyone seen/read/got:
Alexander Demandt: 'Magister Militum'
In: Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (RE). Supplementband XII, Stuttgart 1970
Wolfram references it in footnotes in 'History of the Goths' regarding some actions around Arles involving Aegidius and Majorian. I'm curious as to which sources (if any) Herr Demandt got his information from....
Patrick, I think we did consider the possibility that the ridge was between the armies, I am pretty sure that we discussed this for our Armati reconstruction. It was rejected because Attila is retreating and thus very likely on the battlefield first. He could have occupied the ridge in strength if it was trans the field. So that reconstruction fails the Inherent Military Probability test ( no heed to rehearse the pitfalls of that). More likely it is on one flank and the summit is its mid point as one moved along it. The observer would then be looking down on the ridge with Huns to the right, Allies to the left.
If the Ridge s between the two armies and the Huns are on one end, the Allies on the other and they then fight for the centre there is a severe danger of them having to fight flank to the enemy's front which is hard to believe.
Of course the high ground being on one side fits well with the site the Chalons discussion thought best.
there is the possibility that the ridge is somehow rather smaller and more isolated than we are imagining it and that the battle fir it as described is frontal by cavalry forces from both sides and that one wins on one flank, one the other until the Allues finally take the centre.
Of course we should also bear in mind that the Franks and the Gepids have to hack at each other the night before the battle. That argues that the armies are. quite close.
I am pleased that we agree that Attila exhorts his men to charge. none of the proposed actions of Attila involves racing all over the place skirmishing. If that was how they operated then it would make most sense for them to have started days before wearing the Allies down.
As I have said earlier, I have no great belief in the truth of the words that Jordanes gives to Attila, but I suppose that we can treat them as being something that would have been sensible and possible on the day.
Roy
Then again, the ridge would have had no water, which may be the reason Attila's camp was nowhere near it. His army would have started their day in the camp, not on the ridge, so I do not think we can say he would have held it (other than with scouts) on Inherent Military Probability grounds, rather once he realised the pursuit had caught up he knew he was going to have to fight that day, so moved his army out as Aetius and friends moved up and the Huns came second in the struggle to be fustest on the ridge with the mostest, to paraphrase Nathan B-F.
We do have a parallel case with Cynoscephalae, where the Roman and Macedonian armies were camped on opposite sides of a group of hills, only becoming aware of each other when scout parties clashed, leading to a race for the hilltop (which the Romans won on the right flank thanks to their elephants).
On the other hand Jordanes does say that Aetius and Thorismud, along with Aetius's Auxilia, won the fight for the ridge:
| Attila sent his men to take the summit of the mountain, but was outstripped by Thorismud and Aëtius, who in their effort to gain the top of the hill reached higher ground and through this advantage of position easily routed the Huns as they came up. |
If the ridge stretched the length of the battlefield, one imagines there would be mention of the Visigothic king and the Alans.
There is also mention of the fieldworks:
| They seek the heights, they seize the hillocks and, when it is far too late, clamor for fortifications in the level fields. |
Does this mean that the allied army descended from the ridge top to the plains below and built fieldworks in front of the huns? Why seize high ground if you don't intend to use it? Fieldworks are the work of trained troops, in other words of Aetius's regulars. The best sense of the passage seems to be this: The Roman infantry, along with the Auxilia and Visigoth cavalry guard under Thorismud, had successfully seize the ridge. Part of the Roman infantry, however, were on the level ground alongside the ridge - i.e. where the ridge dropped to the plain between the armies. This flat ground the Romans fortify, throwing up a hasty earthen barricade to mitigate the impact of a Hunnic cavalry charge. Which would suggest that the ridge did not cover the entire length of the battlefield.
These hasty defences seem not to have been very effective. Jordanes, writing of the Huns' retreat to their camp, mentions:
| ... there they sought refuge for their lives, whom but a little while before no earthen walls could withstand." |
With the rout of the Alans, the Huns would have had no problem outflanking the Roman earthenwork defences, obliging the legionaries to fight them directly.
Good point, Justin - and it accords with Roy's earlier observations about the ridge on one part of the field according with the best/most likely site.
We may as well shift discussion to a dedicated new Chalons (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1130.msg9401#new) thread.
Patrick, your point at 7:11 suggesting that Attila returned to the hill once he knew that the pursuit had caught up falls apart when you take into account that the Franks and. Gepuds had fought the night before.Attila knew the allues were very close, so if the ridge were between them he would have surely occupied it in strength first thing.
Mind you we. are assuming that Attila is a good general and he might not be. His record is not that good.
Roy
as a suggestion Patrick, can ypu take all the Chalons posts here and append them in sequence to the original Chalons thread as that would be the most elegant answer?
Roy
I would if I could but failing that have created a new Chalons thread in this section rather than under Battle Day which I think should be reserved for Montaperti at present.
Anthony makes an important point here. In the Late Antique period there is a great change in the nature of Romanness and it is a change which causes confusion in the ranks of commentators. The problem is the question as to what extent 'barbarisation' of the army occurs because it has been alleged as a reason for the fall of the Western Imperium. Where I perceive the difficulty is that those who want to see continuity see the successor states adopting, or rather maintaining Roman conventions. Those who see a fracture emphasise the extent to which new forms take over. I would see Rance as emphasising continuity so the foulkon is a traditional Roman formation which was called testudo centuries earlier and is Arrians formation contra Alanos. he also has an article on the cavalry formation 'globus' , which he thinks, I believe goes back to Celtic roots.
The concept of buccellarii is one of those institutions which has been seen as Germanic, surrounding the leader with a number of paid men, dependent upon him and issued horses and weapons by him. This institution too cam be seen as either a matter of a barbarian import such as Gratian's bodyguard of Alans or just the descendant of the bully boys that Roman senators and rich equites maintained. It becomes difficult to sort out the parentage of such a concept because the elements that make it unique and are defined in say the Visigothic laws are probably there earlier. What is different is that the Romans did not make their armies of their retainers in a sort of oyramid sales system as their successors did, but then maybe that has more to do with the collapse of the cash economy.
Roy