Rereading Chaeronea, Issus and Gaugamela, is it possible that the Macedonian army tried a cavalry-infantry combination to crack the enemy left flank and punch through it? Specifically:
1. At Chaeronea Alexander leads the charge against the Sacred Band on horseback, and punches through them along with his friends:
QuoteLikewise he, the first of a number of good men who fought with him, broke through the continuity of the enemy's battleline, and striking them down, he crushed the numbers of those drawn up in order near him. His comrades with him achieving the same thing, the continuity of the battleline kept being broken. - Diodorus: 16.86
This is very different from the phalanx vs hoplite action on the other flank:
QuoteThen the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory. - Ibid.
After the battle Philip marvels at the dead Sacred Band whose wounds from sarissas are all in front. One can argue that the sarissas were carried by Alexander's cavalry, (maybe the
sarissaphoroi) but another explanation is possible, namely that Alex and the cavalry deployed in front of the Macedonian phalanx's left wing and then punched through the Sacred Band, followed by the phalanx that finished them off.
2. At Issus Alexander leads the charge against the Persian Kardakes followed by the phalanx:
QuoteHe set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it. He himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops. – Diodorus Siculus, Library: 17.33.
QuoteAt first he still led them on in close array with measured step, although he had the forces of Darius already in full view, lest by a more hasty march any part of the phalanx should fluctuate from the line and get separated from the rest. But when they came within range of darts, Alexander himself and those around him being posted on the right wing, advanced first into the river with a run. – Anabasis: 2.10.
QuoteFor the Macedonian phalanx had been broken and disjoined towards the right wing; because Alexander had charged into the river with eagerness, and engaging in a hand-to-hand conflict was already driving back the Persians posted there – Ibid.
3. The same arrangement at Gaugamela:
QuoteAlexander wheeled round towards the gap, and forming a wedge as it were of the Companion cavalry and of the part of the phalanx which was posted here, he led them with a quick charge and loud battle-cry straight towards Darius himself. – Anabasis: 3.14.
This wouldn't be the first use of cavalry to soften up enemy infantry by charging through them followed by a decisive attack by friendly infantry, as we have seen a couple of examples of Republican Roman cavalry doing just that.
Is this reconstruction plausible? Any way of recreating it on the wargaming table?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 25, 2021, 10:52:29 AM
1. At Chaeronea Alexander leads the charge against the Sacred Band on horseback, and punches through them along with his friends:
I recall Adrian Goldsworthy writing recently that there is no actual evidence about which troops Alexander led at the battle and whether they were mounted or foot, and that he was leading the Companions is an assumption based on his later activity after he became king (and has no doubt become wargamer fact). It may have been in his book on Philip & Alexander - he also has some interesting comments on Issos IIRC.
Quote from: nikgaukroger on August 25, 2021, 11:11:46 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 25, 2021, 10:52:29 AM
1. At Chaeronea Alexander leads the charge against the Sacred Band on horseback, and punches through them along with his friends:
I recall Adrian Goldsworthy writing recently that there is no actual evidence about which troops Alexander led at the battle and whether they were mounted or foot, and that he was leading the Companions is an assumption based on his later activity after he became king (and has no doubt become wargamer fact). It may have been in his book on Philip & Alexander - he also has some interesting comments on Issos IIRC.
I recall a similar point being made by Duncan Head in the original KTB farrago.
Adrian Goldsworthy no doubt says that, because it is true. A number of us have said the same thing on this forum, numerous times.
Everyone else who has ever examined Issus and Gaugamela has the Companions to the right of the phalanx, not in front of it.
When trying to establish a new interpretation it's more effective to acknowledge the existing consensus than to ignore it. Continued repetition of a theory without addressing the counter arguments is more likely to irritate than to persuade.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 25, 2021, 11:34:15 AM
Quote from: nikgaukroger on August 25, 2021, 11:11:46 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 25, 2021, 10:52:29 AM
1. At Chaeronea Alexander leads the charge against the Sacred Band on horseback, and punches through them along with his friends:
I recall Adrian Goldsworthy writing recently that there is no actual evidence about which troops Alexander led at the battle and whether they were mounted or foot, and that he was leading the Companions is an assumption based on his later activity after he became king (and has no doubt become wargamer fact). It may have been in his book on Philip & Alexander - he also has some interesting comments on Issos IIRC.
I recall a similar point being made by Duncan Head in the original KTB farrago.
This is not an attempt to resurrect KTB, promise! What I'm looking at is an explanation for Chaeronea that accords with Macedonian tactics at Issus and Gaugamela, both of which seem quite clear: Alex leads the Companions and is followed by the phalanx ,and it works. Or are we still at the point where cavalry never, ever charge infantry?
Quote from: RichT on August 25, 2021, 11:42:51 AMEveryone else who has ever examined Issus and Gaugamela has the Companions to the right of the phalanx, not in front of it.
He set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it. He himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops. – Diodorus Siculus, Library: 17.33.
How does the consensus explain that?
QuoteOr are we still at the point where cavalry never, ever charge infantry?
As we have shed loads of evidence to the contrary, I don't think we were ever there. I think we are still thinking that cavalry don't charge formed elite infantry with impunity, though.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 25, 2021, 11:46:05 AM
He set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it. He himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops.[/i] – Diodorus Siculus, Library: 17.33.
How does the consensus explain that?
By reading Arrian. As you know full well.
Quote
What I'm looking at is an explanation for Chaeronea that accords with Macedonian tactics at Issus and Gaugamela
It appears you want an explanation of Chaeronea that has the same tactics as Issus and Gaugamela. That seems unlikely to me, because at Chaeronea the army was different (core Macedonian army without allies), the opponents were different (Greek hoplites, not Persians), the commanders were different (Philip, not Alexander), the terrain was different (plain bounded by hills, not river crossing or open plain), and what little we know about the tactics were different (attacks on both left and right, not decisive attack on right).
Quote
Alex leads the Companions and is followed by the phalanx ,and it works.
Depends what you mean by 'is followed by'.
Quote
Or are we still at the point where cavalry never, ever charge infantry?
We have never, ever been at that point. Everyone is quite happy that cavalry could and did successfully charge infantry.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 25, 2021, 11:34:15 AM
I recall a similar point being made by Duncan Head in the original KTB farrago.
I'm with Joseph Conrad on this one.....
QuoteAs we have shed loads of evidence to the contrary, I don't think we were ever there. I think we are still thinking that cavalry don't charge formed elite infantry with impunity, though.
QuoteWe have never, ever been at that point. Everyone is quite happy that cavalry could and did successfully charge infantry.
Good. I was getting worried there for a second. :)
So putting aside any rehash of the mechanics of KTB, one can accept as feasible that Companion cavalry could get through enemy infantry as Roman cavalry did.
QuoteBy reading Arrian. As you know full well.
I quoted him. What the cavalry-phalanx combo does is reconcile him with Diodorus. If Alexander leads the phalanx "with measured step" but in front of them, on horseback, with the rest of the Companions, then Diodorus makes perfect sense. In any case why would Alex takes pains to avoid "a more hasty march [lest] any part of the phalanx should fluctuate from the line and get separated from the rest" if he is
part of the phalanx? A phalanx advances as a single entity, at one speed. But if Alex is on a horse he might be tempted to go a little faster, which would oblige the phalangites behind him to pick up the pace and get separated from the rest of the phalanx. He has to keep his cavalry moving at a slower pace than normal to accommodate the speed of the phalanx. Everything fits. I like it when everything fits. :D (yeah, yeah, I know: "Everything fits for you...")
Quoteone can accept as feasible that Companion cavalry could get through enemy infantry as Roman cavalry did.
I don't think there was an issue with this. The issue was more under what circumstances (disordered, open order, poor quality?) rather than the absolute possibility. Thankfully, having abandoned ktb wedges, we don't have to go to silly extremes.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 25, 2021, 11:43:59 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on August 25, 2021, 11:34:15 AM
Quote from: nikgaukroger on August 25, 2021, 11:11:46 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 25, 2021, 10:52:29 AM
1. At Chaeronea Alexander leads the charge against the Sacred Band on horseback, and punches through them along with his friends:
I recall Adrian Goldsworthy writing recently that there is no actual evidence about which troops Alexander led at the battle and whether they were mounted or foot, and that he was leading the Companions is an assumption based on his later activity after he became king (and has no doubt become wargamer fact). It may have been in his book on Philip & Alexander - he also has some interesting comments on Issos IIRC.
I recall a similar point being made by Duncan Head in the original KTB farrago.
This is not an attempt to resurrect KTB, promise! What I'm looking at is an explanation for Chaeronea that accords with Macedonian tactics at Issus and Gaugamela, both of which seem quite clear: Alex leads the Companions and is followed by the phalanx ,and it works. Or are we still at the point where cavalry never, ever charge infantry?
This is circular reasoning. We have no evidence at Chaeronea for Alexander leading the Companion cavalry.
And whilst the phalanx advance with the cavalry, they advance alongside the cavalry they do not advance behind it
And nobody said (that I can recall) cavalry never ever charge infantry. Indeed I could quote several examples, most failures
What some people disputed was that infantry stood in mathematically defined files and let cavalry knock them down like ninepins. And every Greek general was too stupid to realise that actually you could defeat cavalry by offsetting files when facing cavalry
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 25, 2021, 12:42:04 PM
[omitted stuff] A phalanx advances as a single entity, at one speed [more omitted stuff]
Er, well. OK. Sometimes these discussions have rather the feel of discussing quantum physics with a kitten.
endless tail chasing and an obsession with fish?
Quote from: RichT on August 25, 2021, 03:12:00 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 25, 2021, 12:42:04 PM
[omitted stuff] A phalanx advances as a single entity, at one speed [more omitted stuff]
Er, well. OK. Sometimes these discussions have rather the feel of discussing quantum physics with a kitten.
Moderatorial guidance - Play the ball, not the man - no
ad hominem arguments.
how about Ad Felidae attacks?
I should have added a smiley face. Or would that have made it worse?
I didn't intend an ad hominem argument - more an observation that the world views and concepts of reality of Justin and myself are so far apart that it is impossible for us to discuss any topic (well we haven't exhausted the possibilities of all topics, but all so we've far attempted) with any sort of meeting of minds whatever. I should have used a better simile, and would have if I had thought of one.
Thanks Richard. Moderator hat removed.
For the curious, the moderator hat is a white painted Brodie helmet with a black letter M stencilled on the front. Like the rest of the issued moderator uniform, it seems based on that of WWII Air Raid Wardens.
Quote from: RichT on August 25, 2021, 03:12:00 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 25, 2021, 12:42:04 PM
[omitted stuff] A phalanx advances as a single entity, at one speed [more omitted stuff]
Er, well. OK. Sometimes these discussions have rather the feel of discussing quantum physics with a kitten.
I have to admit I'm a little bewildered. A pike phalanx was composed of trained professionals. Phalanxes were very strong on the front but vulnerable on the flanks and rear. In any case (in my kitty universe ;) ) it was a golden rule never to allow an infantry line to fragment. The only exception I can think of is a Spartan army, in which the allied hoplites might charge the enemy at a run whilst the Spartans advanced at a steady walk and there was nothing the Spartans could do about it. To defeat an infantry line you outfought it frontally or - easier - got on its flanks or punched a hole in it and rolled up both ends (hence the purpose of a wedge). Alexander's phalangites would have learned as lesson 101 of pike drill
always to advance together in a continuous line. So the bit about Alex reining in his speed doesn't - to me at least - make any sense unless Alex is leading a cavalry unit in front of the phalanx.
But I can always learn something new I suppose...
Quote from: Erpingham on August 25, 2021, 05:13:15 PM
Thanks Richard. Moderator hat removed.
For the curious, the moderator hat is a white painted Brodie helmet with a black letter M stencilled on the front. Like the rest of the issued moderator uniform, it seems based on that of WWII Air Raid Wardens.
a la Dad's Army
Quote from: Holly on August 26, 2021, 07:28:02 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on August 25, 2021, 05:13:15 PM
Thanks Richard. Moderator hat removed.
For the curious, the moderator hat is a white painted Brodie helmet with a black letter M stencilled on the front. Like the rest of the issued moderator uniform, it seems based on that of WWII Air Raid Wardens.
a la Dad's Army
(https://i.imgur.com/8xOsfxZ.jpg)
Quote from: Holly on August 26, 2021, 07:28:02 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on August 25, 2021, 05:13:15 PM
Thanks Richard. Moderator hat removed.
For the curious, the moderator hat is a white painted Brodie helmet with a black letter M stencilled on the front. Like the rest of the issued moderator uniform, it seems based on that of WWII Air Raid Wardens.
a la Dad's Army
Indeed - Hodges is my role model :)
For Justin's information, I believe US-based moderators (if we recruit any) would be issued with something similar to the US civil defence uniform, with white OCD pattern helmet, with a red M in the triangle of the badge.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 26, 2021, 07:00:24 AM
I have to admit I'm a little bewildered.
Are you bewildered at the idea that large linear formations of infantry will tend to become dislocated if they advance cross country over a considerable distance? I could quote passages from ancient sources that would make this point, but they are well known passages and I'm sure you must already be familiar with them (but you have perhaps already reckoned them as not applicable to this case, or to Macedonians, or to professionals, or to pike phalanxes). Or I could point you to modern accounts that make the same point (often quoting the same ancient sources), including my... gnn.. you know.... (but you perhaps have no interest in the views of any modern authors). Or I could point you to the experience of numerous periods of military history since antiquity, such as the 17th to 19th Centuries in Europe, where contemporary accounts also make the same observation (but you perhaps hold that ancient military history was unique and the experience of subsequent ages has no relevance).
So there we are. You have offered your tactical theory and we can all mull it over as we wish, and decide to agree or disagree based on its merits and our own knowledge and understanding. I see no prospect of persuading you that it is implausible, and no need to do so.
Now, "put that light out!".
Quote from: RichT on August 26, 2021, 10:03:47 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 26, 2021, 07:00:24 AM
I have to admit I'm a little bewildered.
Are you bewildered at the idea that large linear formations of infantry will tend to become dislocated if they advance cross country over a considerable distance? I could quote passages from ancient sources that would make this point, but they are well known passages and I'm sure you must already be familiar with them (but you have perhaps already reckoned them as not applicable to this case, or to Macedonians, or to professionals, or to pike phalanxes). Or I could point you to modern accounts that make the same point (often quoting the same ancient sources), including my... gnn.. you know.... (but you perhaps have no interest in the views of any modern authors). Or I could point you to the experience of numerous periods of military history since antiquity, such as the 17th to 19th Centuries in Europe, where contemporary accounts also make the same observation (but you perhaps hold that ancient military history was unique and the experience of subsequent ages has no relevance).
So there we are. You have offered your tactical theory and we can all mull it over as we wish, and decide to agree or disagree based on its merits and our own knowledge and understanding. I see no prospect of persuading you that it is implausible, and no need to do so.
Now, "put that light out!".
Try me on the passages. I'd be curious to see their contexts - do they match those of Alex's phalanx that advances a considerable distance in open order, then pauses to redress ranks and double to intermediate order, then a little later pauses again to redress ranks and double to close order before completing the final distance to the Greek mercenaries and Persian kardakes.
Actually it's an excellent thread topic: "Did infantry lines fragment when advancing against enemy?
Coming back to this topic in search of the one on fragmenting infantry lines, I realise it stopped dead. Does this mean that the idea of the "Macedonian Double Whammy" was discarded?
We took off time to see if advancing infantry lines reached the enemy line piecemeal and if so to what extent. The hypothetical/possible/desirable consensus seems to be that less trained infantry like Mediaeval foot tended to fragment when advancing, especially if they advanced at speed, but it was known not to be a desirable state and efforts were made to counteract it. The presumption is that well-drilled infantry could avoid fragmenting during an advance and would certainly try to avoid fragmenting.
From this one can conclude that a Macedonian pike phalanx probably did not normally fragment when advancing against enemy, especially as it did not advance at a run like Mediaeval infantry. Thus Alexander would not need to take excessive care not to advance ahead of the rest of the phalanx if he was part of the phalanx, but he would if he was part of the Companions in front of the phalanx, since cavalry would tend to move faster than phalangites. Hence the likelihood that the Macedonian right wing at Issus consisted of cavalry in front of infantry and the double whammy becomes a plausible hypothesis with perhaps a not-very-scholarly name.
::)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on September 06, 2021, 05:50:56 PM
The presumption is that well-drilled infantry could avoid fragmenting during an advance and would certainly try to avoid fragmenting.
Yes, OK.
Quote
From this one can conclude that a Macedonian pike phalanx probably did not normally fragment when advancing against enemy,
No, one can conclude that they would certainly try to avoid fragmenting; that is, they would where possible take the necessary steps to avoid fragmenting (I'd prefer 'becoming disordered' to 'fragmenting' but too late now).
Now what might those steps have been, at Issus? You quoted the relevant passage yourself at the start of the thread:
"At first he still led them on in close array with measured step, although he had the forces of Darius already in full view, lest by a more hasty march any part of the phalanx should fluctuate from the line and get separated from the rest." Arrian, Anabasis 2.10.3
If you look a few sentences earlier, you find the same thing:
"His forces thus marshalled, Alexander led them on for some time with halts, so that their advance seemed quite a leisurely affair." Arr. Anab. 2.10.1
The phalanx advanced slowly and with halts (to redress the line, we can assume) so as to avoid becoming fragmented.
In the end though they did become fragmented because:
"the Macedonian centre did not set to with equal impetus, and finding the river banks precipitous in many places, were unable to maintain their front in unbroken line; and the Greeks attacked where they saw that the phalanx had been particularly torn apart." Arr. Anab. 2.10.5
No need to have cavalry in front of the phalanx (which is impossible anyway if we are to follow Arrian's account). No need to invoke the higher speed of cavalry as a reason for the measured advance of the phalanx. The measured advance of the phalanx was precisely how the phalanx avoided fragmenting (until it met the broken terrain of the river banks).
So yes the idea of the "Macedonian Double Whammy" was discarded, or rather it was never picked up by anyone in the first place.
Quote from: RichT on September 06, 2021, 09:42:02 PM
Quote
From this one can conclude that a Macedonian pike phalanx probably did not normally fragment when advancing against enemy,
No, one can conclude that they would certainly try to avoid fragmenting; that is, they would where possible take the necessary steps to avoid fragmenting (I'd prefer 'becoming disordered' to 'fragmenting' but too late now).
Now what might those steps have been, at Issus? You quoted the relevant passage yourself at the start of the thread:
"At first he still led them on in close array with measured step, although he had the forces of Darius already in full view, lest by a more hasty march any part of the phalanx should fluctuate from the line and get separated from the rest." Arrian, Anabasis 2.10.3
If you look a few sentences earlier, you find the same thing:
"His forces thus marshalled, Alexander led them on for some time with halts, so that their advance seemed quite a leisurely affair." Arr. Anab. 2.10.1
The phalanx advanced slowly and with halts (to redress the line, we can assume) so as to avoid becoming fragmented.
In the end though they did become fragmented because:
"the Macedonian centre did not set to with equal impetus, and finding the river banks precipitous in many places, were unable to maintain their front in unbroken line; and the Greeks attacked where they saw that the phalanx had been particularly torn apart." Arr. Anab. 2.10.5
No need to have cavalry in front of the phalanx (which is impossible anyway if we are to follow Arrian's account). No need to invoke the higher speed of cavalry as a reason for the measured advance of the phalanx. The measured advance of the phalanx was precisely how the phalanx avoided fragmenting (until it met the broken terrain of the river banks).
Fine. One can posit that keeping the line of a phalanx unbroken during an advance required care, regardless of whether the wing was being led by a cavalry unit or not. But what is impossible about Alexander leading cavalry in front of the phalanx? Arrian places Alexander at the right wing but is not specific about where exactly he was positioned at the right. He is however clear that Alexander was on horseback just before the battle began and during the pursuit of Darius:
Quote"But when the armies at length met in conflict, Alexander rode about in every direction to exhort his troops to show their valour" - Anabasis: 2.10.2
Quote"But as soon as the left wing of Darius was terrified and routed by Alexander, and the Persian king perceived that this part of his army was severed from the rest, without any further delay he began to flee in his chariot along with the first, just as he was. He was conveyed safely in the chariot as long as he met with level ground in his flight; but when he lighted upon ravines and other rough ground, he left the chariot there, divesting himself of his shield and Median mantle. He even left his bow in the chariot; and mounting a horse continued his flight. The night, which came on soon after, alone rescued him from being captured by Alexander; for as long as there was daylight the latter kept up the pursuit at full speed."- Anabasis: 2.11.4-6
And don't forget Diodorus, who explicitly puts Alexander on a horse in front of the infantry, and keeps him on the horse before, during and after the battle:
Quote"He set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it. He himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops." - Library: 33.2-3
Quote"Alexander cast his glance in all directions in his anxiety to see Dareius, and as soon as he had identified him, he drove hard with his cavalry at the king himself"- Library: 33.5
Quote"The Persian Oxathres was the brother of Dareius and a man highly praised for his p213 fighting qualities; when he saw Alexander riding at Dareius and feared that he would not be checked, he was seized with the desire to share his brother's fate." - Ibid: 34.2
One can either reject Diodorus (and initiate a hypothesis about how Macedonian commanders hopped on and off horses during a battle in order to explain Arrian) or one can understand this passage in Arrian as referring to cavalry and infantry advancing together:
Quote"But when they came within range of darts, Alexander himself and those around him being posted on the right wing, advanced first into the river with a run, in order to alarm the Persians by the rapidity of their onset, and by coming sooner to close conflict to receive little damage from the archers."
Unless I'm not following you and you are proposing that Alexander deployed with the Companions to the right of the phalanx? But that would still mean rejecting Diodorus.
Edit: looking at your earlier post I see you maintain just that (thread's been around for a bit and I have the memory of a goldfish).
Quoteespecially as it did not advance at a run like Mediaeval infantry.
This is rather misleading. Medieval infantry tended to advance "
a pas" or "
a petit pas" because they were trying to avoid disorder. They may close the last part of an attack at the run - by that point, they won't disorder too much. The defender would then usually close ranks to receive them. Perhaps things were confused in the other discussion because we were discussing Verneuil, where, unusually, both sides advanced on each other.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on September 07, 2021, 12:21:26 AM
Unless I'm not following you and you are proposing that Alexander deployed with the Companions to the right of the phalanx? But that would still mean rejecting Diodorus.
Arrian, Callisthenes, Curtius, Diodorus and Plutarch all have Alexander leading cavalry on the Macedonian right, so it's as certain as anything can be in ancient history that this is what he did. This is how every modern account of Issus that I have ever read understands it too.
Arrian, Callisthenes and Curtius all have the Macedonian infantry phalanx in the centre and the cavalry on the wings. So does Diodorus, the rest of whose account broadly matches the others ("[Alexander] himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops. The Thessalian horse was on the left"). Just this one sentence ("He set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it") suggests the cavalry were in front and the infantry behind. So it's as certain as anything can be in ancient history that this sentence is an error.
Having conflicting accounts in sources is not unusual, and it's not unusual having to prefer some over others, or several over one.
Quote from: RichT on September 07, 2021, 11:04:29 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on September 07, 2021, 12:21:26 AM
Unless I'm not following you and you are proposing that Alexander deployed with the Companions to the right of the phalanx? But that would still mean rejecting Diodorus.
Arrian, Callisthenes, Curtius, Diodorus and Plutarch all have Alexander leading cavalry on the Macedonian right, so it's as certain as anything can be in ancient history that this is what he did. This is how every modern account of Issus that I have ever read understands it too.
It's as certain as anything that Alexander was on the right, but where exactly he was on the right is what is up for discussion. Nowhere do the sources explicitly state that all the cavalry was stationed alongside and to the left and right of the infantry.
Quote from: RichT on September 07, 2021, 11:04:29 AMArrian, Callisthenes and Curtius all have the Macedonian infantry phalanx in the centre and the cavalry on the wings.
Arrian has the cavalry in front of the infantry on the left wing:
"On the left wing the infantry consisting of the Cretan archers and the Thracians under command of Sitalces were posted in front; and before these the cavalry towards the left."
On the right wing Arrian affirms Alexander has only two squadrons of the Companions to the right of the infantry:
"When he perceived that the phalanx towards the right was too thin, and it seemed likely that the Persians would outflank him here considerably, he ordered two squadrons of the Companion cavalry, viz. the Anthemusian, of which Peroedas, son of Menestheus, was captain, and that which was called Leugaean, under the command of Pantordanus, son of Cleander, to proceed from the centre to the right without being seen."Notice that the squadrons came from the centre, i.e. they would have been in front of the phalanx as Diodorus describes (they would serve absolutely no purpose behind the phalanx). To shift to the right without being seen they would have withdrawn through the phalanx (which would have doubled files to let them through) and then gone right.
Quote from: RichT on September 07, 2021, 11:04:29 AMSo does Diodorus, the rest of whose account broadly matches the others ("[Alexander] himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops. The Thessalian horse was on the left"). Just this one sentence ("He set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it") suggests the cavalry were in front and the infantry behind. So it's as certain as anything can be in ancient history that this sentence is an error.
Having conflicting accounts in sources is not unusual, and it's not unusual having to prefer some over others, or several over one.
Much better IMHO to try and reconcile the sources rather than snip out sections that don't fit a theory. Placing the cavalry in front of the infantry as Diodorus describes also fits with Arrian's description of the Macedonian phalanx's right wing at Gaugamela:
"Alexander wheeled round towards the gap, and forming a wedge as it were of the Companion cavalry and of the part of the phalanx which was posted here, he led them with a quick charge and loud battle-cry straight towards Darius himself."A cavalry-infantry wedge makes sense as the cavalry forming a wedge in front of the infantry that act as the base of the wedge. Cavalry next to infantry simply do not add up to a wedge.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on September 08, 2021, 07:11:20 AM
Much better IMHO to try and reconcile the sources rather than snip out sections that don't fit a theory.
Coming from you that's rich. But whatever, believe what you like.
From a non-specialist point of view, moving from centre to right without being seen suggests the formations are out of sight throughout and move behind the phalanx. Carrying out an unmentioned complex manouever to withdraw through the phalanx in full sight of the enemy doesn't fit "without being seen" very well.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 08, 2021, 11:17:10 AM
From a non-specialist point of view, moving from centre to right without being seen suggests the formations are out of sight throughout and move behind the phalanx. Carrying out an unmentioned complex manouever to withdraw through the phalanx in full sight of the enemy doesn't fit "without being seen" very well.
Presuming that Diodorus is in fact correct, Alex places all his cavalry in front of his infantry. Telling Peroedas and Pantordanus to move their ilae without being seen seems a bit odd if they were already behind the phalanx since they wouldn't be seen in any case. Cavalry passing through infantry is a pretty standard procedure for drilled troops. One question: why would Alex put cavalry in front of the the infantry in the centre as well as the flanks? The answer may be to disguise his point of attack. He intends to leave the mercenaries alone and go for the kardakes, but concentrating his cav in front of them would telegraph his intentions and give the Persians time to come up with a counter plan. Spreading the cavalry across the front and then concentrating them on the right at the last minute (cavalry wedges have no problem rapidly redeploying) adds the element of surprise and gives the Persians no time to react.
Not wanting to labour the point but it is very hard to withdraw through a phalanx without being seen. I can only presume that the manouever is, as you say, a common one for Macedonian cavalry, as I don't know the evidence.
Also, as I understand Richard, Diodorus is alone among our sources in placing the cavalry in front of the phalanx and the redeployment of the Companions comes from the account of Arrian, who doesn't say this, so perhaps he is envisioning the battlefield differently. Does Diodorus mention the cavalry redeployment and, if so, to his envisage it as overt or covert?
Quote from: Erpingham on September 08, 2021, 11:51:52 AM
Not wanting to labour the point but it is very hard to withdraw through a phalanx without being seen. I can only presume that the manouever is, as you say, a common one for Macedonian cavalry, as I don't know the evidence.
Sure, withdrawing through a phalanx is quite visible, but the Persians would have no idea where the ilae would go after they were behind the phalanx. Doubling files from interemediate to open order (which would leave enough space between the files for the horses to pass through) is in the manuals and it should have been a standard manoeuvre for Macedonian phalangites. Republican Roman legionaries, who were not professionals like the Macedonians, routinely let Roman cav through their ranks.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 08, 2021, 11:51:52 AMAlso, as I understand Richard, Diodorus is alone among our sources in placing the cavalry in front of the phalanx and the redeployment of the Companions comes from the account of Arrian, who doesn't say this, so perhaps he is envisioning the battlefield differently. Does Diodorus mention the cavalry redeployment and, if so, to his envisage it as overt or covert?
Diodorus doesn't mention the redeployment of the ilae to the right, but it fits well with him affirming that Alexander deployed "the cavalry along the front of the whole army" whilst Arrian affirms two ilae from the centre made their way with stealth to the right flank. The overall picture hangs together with different sources supplying different details. No need to heave anything overboard.
Edit: Alex pulled the same trick at Gaugamela of confusing the Persians about his point of attack by shifting the entire army to the right.
Justin, can I ask what you mean exactly by a 'Macedonian double whammy'?
I don't want to put words into your mouth, but if you mean horse coordinating with foot to break through an enemy line, I think that would accord with the sources and our understanding of how the Macedonians fought under Alexander. If you mean an attack of two successive waves in which a first wave of cavalry punch through a line like - shall we say ;) - an arrow through cheese, followed directly by a formation of phalangites which then engages and shatters the infantry now disordered by the cavalry penetration, I think you are on rather shakier ground.
Quote from: Prufrock on September 08, 2021, 01:30:24 PM
Justin, can I ask what you mean exactly by a 'Macedonian double whammy'?
I don't want to put words into your mouth, but if you mean horse coordinating with foot to break through an enemy line, I think that would accord with the sources and our understanding of how the Macedonians fought under Alexander. If you mean an attack of two successive waves in which a first wave of cavalry punch through a line like - shall we say ;) - an arrow through cheese, followed directly by a formation of phalangites which then engages and shatters the infantry now disordered by the cavalry penetration, I think you are on rather shakier ground.
I mean the latter: cavalry charge through enemy infantry who are then finished off by the friendly infantry. It wasn't all that unusual a tactic:
"P. Sulpicius with his cavalry broke the enemy's centre. He could have got back to the main body before the enemy reformed their broken ranks, but he decided to attack from the rear, and would have scattered the enemy in a moment, attacked as they were in front and rear, had not the cavalry of the Volscians and Aequi, adopting his own tactics, intercepted him and kept him for some time engaged." - Livy, History: 3.70.4
"The cavalry made repeated charges but failed to break through the massed force opposed to them, and acting on the advice of L. Cominius, a military tribune, they removed the bits from their horses and spurred them on so furiously that nothing could withstand them. Riding down men and armour they spread carnage far and wide. [7] The infantry followed them and completed the disorder of the enemy." - Ibid: 8.30.6-7
Back to the notoriously unreliable Livy for your basic premise.
Castles built on sand
Thanks, Justin. Are you able to give some more insight into the evidence you base this view on, and why you see it as compelling?
Quote from: Prufrock on September 08, 2021, 03:51:20 PM
Thanks, Justin. Are you able to give some more insight into the evidence you base this view on, and why you see it as compelling?
It's more a case of proposing a best-fit hypothesis that accounts for everything the sources say about the way Alex's army fought than putting forward compelling evidence. I propose that the double whammy can account for the way Alex fought at Chaeronea, Issus and Gaugamela without having to discard anything in the sources, and it's made more plausible by the fact that the Republican Romans did something similar. Are there any other cases in history of cavalry riding straight through enemy infantry with friendly infantry immediately following up to finish the enemy foot off?
Are there undisputed cases of cavalry riding straight through enemy infantry?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on September 08, 2021, 03:59:28 PM
Quote from: Prufrock on September 08, 2021, 03:51:20 PM
Thanks, Justin. Are you able to give some more insight into the evidence you base this view on, and why you see it as compelling?
It's more a case of proposing a best-fit hypothesis that accounts for everything the sources say about the way Alex's army fought than putting forward compelling evidence. I propose that the double whammy can account for the way Alex fought at Chaeronea, Issus and Gaugamela without having to discard anything in the sources, and it's made more plausible by the fact that the Republican Romans did something similar. Are there any other cases in history of cavalry riding straight through enemy infantry with friendly infantry immediately following up to finish the enemy foot off?
Hmm, well, I think you probably *would* need to present some good evidence and carefully reasoned argument to get any buy-in for it as a theory. It does not seem to be an obvious best-fit hypothesis to me at first glance, but I might be missing something?
Quote from: Prufrock on September 09, 2021, 06:28:51 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on September 08, 2021, 03:59:28 PM
Quote from: Prufrock on September 08, 2021, 03:51:20 PM
Thanks, Justin. Are you able to give some more insight into the evidence you base this view on, and why you see it as compelling?
It's more a case of proposing a best-fit hypothesis that accounts for everything the sources say about the way Alex's army fought than putting forward compelling evidence. I propose that the double whammy can account for the way Alex fought at Chaeronea, Issus and Gaugamela without having to discard anything in the sources, and it's made more plausible by the fact that the Republican Romans did something similar. Are there any other cases in history of cavalry riding straight through enemy infantry with friendly infantry immediately following up to finish the enemy foot off?
Hmm, well, I think you probably *would* need to present some good evidence and carefully reasoned argument to get any buy-in for it as a theory. It does not seem to be an obvious best-fit hypothesis to me at first glance, but I might be missing something?
Well, Diodorus says Alex deployed his cavalry across the front of his infantry. Arrian says only two ilae deployed to the right of the phalanx. Quintus Curtius Rufus affirms that two ilia deployed near the mountains whilst the rest of the cavalry concentrated
"at the main danger point of the battle". Plutarch is not specific about the deployment of the cavalry.
Diodorus says Alex attacked towards Darius with the cavalry, engaging the Persian cavalry and routing them before pursuing Darius. He affirms the battle between the phalanx and the Persian infantry was a separate fight, cut short by the rout of the cavalry.
Arrian says Alex led the phalanx forward with a measured step, but without specifying that Alex was himself part of the phalanx. However he says the phalanx was involved in Alex's attack:
"the Macedonian phalanx had been broken and disjoined towards the right wing; because Alexander had charged into the river with eagerness, and engaging in a hand-to-hand conflict was already driving back the Persians posted there" He adds that the right wing regiments outflanked the Greek mercenaries after "perceiving that the Persians opposed to them had already been put to rout" - which implies that it wasn't they that routed them. Whilst they are outflanking the Greeks Alexander pursues Darius. The implication is that he had cleared the way for the right wing contingents of the phalanx but operated separately from them.
Putting it all together, the conclusion is that the right wing Macedonian attack is a combined cavalry-infantry affair with cavalry in front of infantry. There aren't any other detailed accounts of Issus in the sources so this is all we have to go on. I suppose the commonly accepted standard for historical certitude is several unrelated sources all explicitly affirming exactly the same thing in clear terms. Problem is that there are few historical events that have that kind of testimony. The entire first Persian invasion of Greece is described by only one author, Herodotus. Caesar's campaigns in Gaul are described only by Caesar. And so on. Which, if we follow that criteria, leaves us knowing very little for sure about history.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on September 09, 2021, 07:24:54 AM
Well, Diodorus says Alex deployed his cavalry across the front of his infantry. Arrian says only two ilae deployed to the right of the phalanx. Quintus Curtius Rufus affirms that two ilia deployed near the mountains whilst the rest of the cavalry concentrated "at the main danger point of the battle". Plutarch is not specific about the deployment of the cavalry.
Arrian says:
'As soon as Alexander found the ground in front of him opening out a little more he brought his cavalry - the Thessalian and Macedonian divisions, together with the Companions - up from the rear to the right wing under his own personal command....'
So more than two ilae are deployed to the right of the phalanx.
QuoteDiodorus says Alex attacked towards Darius with the cavalry, engaging the Persian cavalry and routing them before pursuing Darius. He affirms the battle between the phalanx and the Persian infantry was a separate fight, cut short by the rout of the cavalry.
Arrian says Alex led the phalanx forward with a measured step, but without specifying that Alex was himself part of the phalanx. However he says the phalanx was involved in Alex's attack: "the Macedonian phalanx had been broken and disjoined towards the right wing; because Alexander had charged into the river with eagerness, and engaging in a hand-to-hand conflict was already driving back the Persians posted there" He adds that the right wing regiments outflanked the Greek mercenaries after "perceiving that the Persians opposed to them had already been put to rout" - which implies that it wasn't they that routed them. Whilst they are outflanking the Greeks Alexander pursues Darius. The implication is that he had cleared the way for the right wing contingents of the phalanx but operated separately from them.
Arrian has:
'Alexander, at the head of his own troops on the right wing, rode at a gallop into the stream' so he was most certainly leading cavalry, not infantry. The effect of the passage you are quoting is to contrast the speed of Alexander's own success with the relative slowness of the centre, which opened up a gap between the cavalry and the main body of the phalanx that Nicanor and his hypaspists were in place to fill.
QuotePutting it all together, the conclusion is that the right wing Macedonian attack is a combined cavalry-infantry affair with cavalry in front of infantry. There aren't any other detailed accounts of Issus in the sources so this is all we have to go on.
I hate to be blunt, but this reading is entirely wrong and not at all supported by Arrian's account of the battle. The cavalry are to the right of the phalanx, with the hypaspists a sort of hinge linking the two.
QuoteI suppose the commonly accepted standard for historical certitude is several unrelated sources all explicitly affirming exactly the same thing in clear terms. Problem is that there are few historical events that have that kind of testimony. The entire first Persian invasion of Greece is described by only one author, Herodotus. Caesar's campaigns in Gaul are described only by Caesar. And so on. Which, if we follow that criteria, leaves us knowing very little for sure about history.
Alexander used combined arms to achieve victory, but not in the way you are suggesting.
Sorry to have sounded so oppositional, Justin.
I certainly agree that the manner in which the cavalry and infantry coordinate is very important in Alexander's battles, but cannot see how a 'double whammy' fits the descriptions in the sources.
Quote from: Prufrock on September 09, 2021, 10:15:11 AM
Sorry to have sounded so oppositional, Justin.
I certainly agree that the manner in which the cavalry and infantry coordinate is very important in Alexander's battles, but cannot see how a 'double whammy' fits the descriptions in the sources.
No worries Aaron. For controversial topics like this one disagreement is the order of the day. And anyway I'm used to being a minority of one. It's a sad and lonely life... :'(
All this talk of Issus makes me realise there isn't an entry for it in the Battles sub forum, so I've made one. Just the sources for now, I'll add a commentary when I'm feeling strong.
Thanks Richard. Useful to have those sources. I look forward to your commentary, especially on Polybius' hatchet job on Callisthenes account :)
I've now had a chance to read through the sources and, I have to confess, had a lot of difficulty seeing any reference to a "double whammy". In none of the accounts do the infantry attack an opponent that has been broken by cavalry. All accounts that mention it imply Alexander delivered a right hook to envelop the Persian centre, not a frontal charge.
I also noted Justin is using a different version of Arrian's account and in particular relies on a couple of passages which are quite different in the version Richard posted. In particular, the positioning of the left wing cavalry in relation to the Cretans etc. (in Richard's version, the Cretans are in front of the infantry and the cavalry are further ahead on their left, rather than them being behind the cavalry) and the passage of the Thessalians (Richard's version has these transfer from the left behind the phalanx, similar to Curtius, rather than from the centre in front of the phalanx).
Justin's translation of Arr. Anab. 2.9.3 (concerning the left wing cavalry) is E. J. Chinnock's of 1884. I quoted P. A. Brunt's of 1976 (itself a revised version of E. Iliff Robson's of 1966). I think Brunt's translation is better.
The Thessalians though, you may be conflating two incidents, the movement of the Thessalians (Arr. Anab. 3.9.1 and QC 3.11.3) and that of the Companions (Arr. Anab. 2.9.3, not mentioned by QC).
Quote from: RichT on September 10, 2021, 02:08:49 PM
The Thessalians though, you may be conflating two incidents, the movement of the Thessalians (Arr. Anab. 3.9.1 and QC 3.11.3) and that of the Companions (Arr. Anab. 2.9.3, not mentioned by QC).
Yes, I see the error - thanks. I would still hold that a covert move is unlikely to have been across the front, or even a withdrawal through the phalanx, but behind it, as explicit in the movement of the Thessalians on a similar mission.
Absolutely, and there is no reason to suppose the Companions were ever in front of the phalanx. Arrian is not totally clear where these two squadrons of Companions moved from or to. If the "two squadrons of Companions" (Arr. Anab. 2.9.3) are the same as the "three hundred horsemen" of 2.9.4 (in QC, "two squadrons" 3.11.2) who were left to watch the flanking force on the hills, then Alexander transferred these two squadrons from the Companions alongside the phalanx ("the centre") out to the far right, freeing up the Agrianians and other cavalry that had initially protected this flank, who were then used to oppose (outflank, according to Arrian) the Persian main line.
All the movements before Issus are complicated by the unclear timeline in Arrian and especially Curtius (Diodorus doesn't bother with a sequence of events). The Macedonian army deployed successively wider as it advanced, not just the infantry reducing depth, but cavalry and other forces deploying out to the wings as the plain opened out. Some of the obscurities - like why moving the Thessalians from right to left didn't leave a Thessalian-shaped hole in the Macedonian line - are no doubt due to this.
I'll come back to this - a little tied up at present. For now I'd be interested in your take on Arrian, Anabasis: 3.14:
"he himself led those with him for a short time further to the right, but when the cavalry who had been sent to help against the Persians who were encircling the right wing had broken their frontline to some extent, he turned through the gap and made a wedge formation with the companion cavalry and the part of the main phalanx stationed there, and then led them at a run with a full battle cry straight at Darius himself."
καὶ ὥσπερ ἔμβολον ποιήσας τῆς τε ἵππου τῆς ἑταιρικῆς καὶ τῆς φάλαγγος τῆς ταύτῃ τεταγμένης
For anyone confused (as I was), Justin has switched the focus to the Battle of Gaugamela.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 11, 2021, 08:35:13 AM
For anyone confused (as I was), Justin has switched the focus to the Battle of Gaugamela.
Not quite. The first post in this thread looked at Chaeronea, Issus and Gaugamela to see if a double whammy hypothesis fits the sources. The one explicit reference to a combined cavalry-infantry attack - with the cavalry in front and the infantry behind - is Arrian's description of Alex's right flank attack at Gaugamela. If one accepts that Alex indeed did create a kind of wedge with the Companions and the part of the phalanx stationed on the right (i.e. the hypaspists) then it becomes plausible that he did exactly the same thing at Issus - where there isn't a black-and-white description of a composite wedge, but where the textual evidence supports the existence of such a wedge. But if Alex never created a composite cavalry-infantry wedge then is one is left with the necessity of providing a plausible explanation for Anabasis 3.14. I imagine one could just say it was erroneous, as Rich affirms Diodorus was erroneous. Any textual source that doesn't fit a preconceived theory is erroneous. Easy way of doing history I suppose... ;)
Quote from: RichT on September 10, 2021, 02:53:42 PM
Absolutely, and there is no reason to suppose the Companions were ever in front of the phalanx. Arrian is not totally clear where these two squadrons of Companions moved from or to. If the "two squadrons of Companions" (Arr. Anab. 2.9.3) are the same as the "three hundred horsemen" of 2.9.4 (in QC, "two squadrons" 3.11.2) who were left to watch the flanking force on the hills, then Alexander transferred these two squadrons from the Companions alongside the phalanx ("the centre") out to the far right, freeing up the Agrianians and other cavalry that had initially protected this flank, who were then used to oppose (outflank, according to Arrian) the Persian main line.
They are not the same squadrons, according to the notes in my Penguin edition, ed. Betty Radice, trans. de Selincourt, intro. and notes, JR Hamilton.
These are not the two squadrons of companions just mentioned, but the 'units of mounted troops' mentioned with the Agrianians above, two squadrons according to Curtius (3.11.2).They were doubtless mercenaries.
QuoteIf one accepts that Alex indeed did create a kind of wedge with the Companions and the part of the phalanx stationed on the right (i.e. the hypaspists) then it becomes plausible that he did exactly the same thing at Issus - where there isn't a black-and-white description of a composite wedge, but where the textual evidence supports the existence of such a wedge.
But beware of the fallacy that the tactics used in one battle were automatically those used in all the others. In medieval military studies this is famously illustrated by Burne's application of what he thought was a standard English deployment to all battles of the Hundred Years War, even though the proposed deployment was only recorded at one of them (and, even then, subsequent writers reckon he misinterpreted it).
We have no evidence for this tactic at Issus, though we have detailed sources, so we must be careful, even if, as you suggest, it may be plausible.
QuoteI imagine one could just say it was erroneous, as Rich affirms Diodorus was erroneous. Any textual source that doesn't fit a preconceived theory is erroneous. Easy way of doing history I suppose...
All interpretation of multiple sources involves a process of reconciliation and, I suppose, we all have methods we deploy. Richard, it seems to me, used a standard method - if you have six sources and five say one thing and the unique source is clearly not your best source, you may well assume errors in it.
And perhaps the old adage about people in greenhouses not throwing stones applies. Your personal methodology does make itself vulnerable to cherry-picking of bits of sources, after all.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 11, 2021, 09:08:53 AM
QuoteI imagine one could just say it was erroneous, as Rich affirms Diodorus was erroneous. Any textual source that doesn't fit a preconceived theory is erroneous. Easy way of doing history I suppose...
All interpretation of multiple sources involves a process of reconciliation and, I suppose, we all have methods we deploy. Richard, it seems to me, used a standard method - if you have six sources and five say one thing and the unique source is clearly not your best source, you may well assume errors in it.
And perhaps the old adage about people in greenhouses not throwing stones applies. Your personal methodology does make itself vulnerable to cherry-picking of bits of sources, after all.
Feel free to give an example of my cherry-picking bits of sources and calling other sources that contradict my cherry-picking erroneous. One example will do.
And now I really have to go. See y'all later!
Quote from: Justin Swanton on September 11, 2021, 08:19:21 AM
I'll come back to this - a little tied up at present. For now I'd be interested in your take on Arrian, Anabasis: 3.14:
"he himself led those with him for a short time further to the right, but when the cavalry who had been sent to help against the Persians who were encircling the right wing had broken their frontline to some extent, he turned through the gap and made a wedge formation with the companion cavalry and the part of the main phalanx stationed there, and then led them at a run with a full battle cry straight at Darius himself."
καὶ ὥσπερ ἔμβολον ποιήσας τῆς τε ἵππου τῆς ἑταιρικῆς καὶ τῆς φάλαγγος τῆς ταύτῃ τεταγμένης
Just prior to this quote it states (in my translation) that Alexander was continuing to advance in column. When the gap opens he goes into it 'with his Companions and all the heavy infantry in this sector of the line, drove in his wedge and raising the battle-cry pressed forward at the double straight for the point where Darius stood.'
The cavalry and infantry are coordinating. Are they mixed into a two-waved wedge formation, or are both types of troops (possibly in column when the gap presented itself) going into the gap at the same time in a rush to exploit the hole?
The next passage continues talking about Alexander and the cavalry going in and engaging infierce hand-to-hand combat. Once the phalanx adds its weight, the Persians break.
Is this close coordination between cavalry and infantry a response to the situation presenting itself, with units fighting side by side? Or was it, as Justin seems to be suggesting, a 'doubly-whammy' wedge led by cavalry and expanded with infantry?
I lean towards the former, but am interested to hear Justin's arguments in favour of the latter.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on September 11, 2021, 09:27:34 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on September 11, 2021, 09:08:53 AM
QuoteI imagine one could just say it was erroneous, as Rich affirms Diodorus was erroneous. Any textual source that doesn't fit a preconceived theory is erroneous. Easy way of doing history I suppose...
All interpretation of multiple sources involves a process of reconciliation and, I suppose, we all have methods we deploy. Richard, it seems to me, used a standard method - if you have six sources and five say one thing and the unique source is clearly not your best source, you may well assume errors in it.
And perhaps the old adage about people in greenhouses not throwing stones applies. Your personal methodology does make itself vulnerable to cherry-picking of bits of sources, after all.
Feel free to give an example of my cherry-picking bits of sources and calling other sources that contradict my cherry-picking erroneous. One example will do.
OK
QuotePlacing the cavalry in front of the infantry as Diodorus describes also fits with Arrian's description of the Macedonian phalanx's right wing at Gaugamela: "Alexander wheeled round towards the gap, and forming a wedge as it were of the Companion cavalry and of the part of the phalanx which was posted here, he led them with a quick charge and loud battle-cry straight towards Darius himself."
Here you have taken a passage from Diodorus (which doesn't fit the other sources for Issus) and matched it with another isolated bit from Gaugamela by Arrian to support your double-whammy idea. You ignore other sources and conflate single sentences which describe different stages of different battles as the basis for a theory, which you then apply universally.
I would add that putting an emoticon after a statement doesn't stop that statement being ignorant, disrespectful and rude. Justin, considering you don't have the first clue how to 'do history', you refuse to engage with the extensive literature on these topics, you refuse to understand the basic principles of source criticism, you refuse (above all) to consider the possibility that your being, as you admit, always in a minority of one, is not because the world is always wrong but because you are, I find your constant jibes at people whose understanding of history differs from your own to be tedious at best. ( ;) )
Rant over. Anthony, moderate my post as you think best, but this is becoming annoying.
Now, back to ancient history.
Aaron (on the two squadrons of Companions at Issus):
Quote
They are not the same squadrons, according to the notes in my Penguin edition, ed. Betty Radice, trans. de Selincourt, intro. and notes, JR Hamilton.
Yes, the note does say that - I'm not clear what the basis is for the certainty that these weren't the Companions. So far as the texts (Arrian, QC) go, they might have been. Personally I find it a bit unlikely Companions would have been used for such a task and the mercenary cavalry might be more likely, but if these aren't Companions, it's not clear why the Companions were moved or what they did. Another unknown.
Justin:
Quote
For now I'd be interested in your take on Arrian, Anabasis: 3.14:
"he himself led those with him for a short time further to the right, but when the cavalry who had been sent to help against the Persians who were encircling the right wing had broken their frontline to some extent, he turned through the gap and made a wedge formation with the companion cavalry and the part of the main phalanx stationed there, and then led them at a run with a full battle cry straight at Darius himself."
Chinnock's translation which Justin used previously for Issus says:
"... Alexander wheeled round towards the gap, and forming a wedge as it were of the Companion cavalry and of the part of the phalanx which was posted here, he led them with a quick charge and loud battle-cry straight towards Darius himself."
In one respect Chinnock's translation is better - it includes ὥσπερ, hosper, 'as it were', "and making as it were a wedge of the companion cavalry and the phalanx drawn up nearby". So this isn't a single massive wedge formed of all the Companions and part of the phalanx, it is a formation of Companions and phalanx that is 'like a wedge'. Then, we should consider the meaning of 'wedge' (embolon) itself. As is well known (to anyone who makes the effort to become familiar with the subject before opining on it), 'embolon' does not straightforwardly mean 'wedge'. Xenophon uses 'embolon' to describe the Theban formation at Leuctra, but it is widely agreed that this means not that the Theban infantry formed into a wedge; 'embolon' can mean wedge, but it also means 'ram' (of a trireme for example) and Xenophon's meaning in this case is probably that the Thebans formed a ram-like formation (a column, in practice) to attack the Spartan line. It is similar to Latin usage of 'cuneus' which can mean 'wedge' but can also mean various other bodies of various or undefined shape. So Arrian's statement is not good evidence that the Companions and part of the phalanx formed a single, massive wedge. They might have done of course, but everyone who has studied this question (and that's a lot of people) have found this unlikely and more likely that Arrian is using the idea of a wedge to describe the grand tactical form of the attack, rather than to describe the small unit formations adopted. The Companions themselves would no doubt have been in wedges of individual squadrons. To complicate matters there's the possible role of the Hypaspists as hamippoi charging with, behind or alongside the Companions, but things are complicated enough already.
Quote from: RichT on September 11, 2021, 10:52:02 AM
In one respect Chinnock's translation is better - it includes ὥσπερ, hosper, 'as it were', "and making as it were a wedge of the companion cavalry and the phalanx drawn up nearby". So this isn't a single massive wedge formed of all the Companions and part of the phalanx, it is a formation of Companions and phalanx that is 'like a wedge'.
That's the sense I take from it as well (but with the important difference of not being able to read the Greek!): that it's a kind of wedge; that it acts like a wedge acts, but without being a 'wedge formation' itself (but as I say, I don't read Greek, so hesitate to be too dogmatic).
In Justin's defence, I think he has to a certain extent taken on the late Patrick Waterson's role as provoker of discussions. As I understand it, Patrick was asked to do this by Roy in the early days of the forum, in order to generate conversation, provide material for lively debate, test established wisdom, and generally keep things interesting (please correct me if I've misremembered, Roy!).
Perhaps there is less appetite for these kinds of discussions now. Perhaps we older forum hands all know each other a little too well! At any rate, I'm getting outside my remit, and am probably best just to stick to Gaugamela!
That may be, and I'm all for discussions and for different points of view, although having the same discussions over and over is perhaps wearing thin, but then there's only so much ancient history to discuss.
But if Justin is doing this deliberately then he is doing it extremely badly; just pissing off members should not be anyone's role. It seems to me Anthony does an excellent job of keeping discussions moving and varied, without insulting anybody. Anyway yes, let's all just stick to ancient history if we can.
There is a difference between initiating / provoking a discussion, and demanding unique interpretations are accepted as established fact.
The length of the thread and the number of times a variation on the same "new" idea keeps returning from the same instigator is a good indication.
For my part, I think the central difficulty with Justin's theories is the same as it was with Patrick's.
Both start from a position that any "old" book must be assumed to be literally true unless demonstrably and unquestionably disproven by an equally "old" book, whilst all modern (19th c onward) books are inherently wrong, especially if they have been peer reviewed ( since academia and science cannot be trusted)
I can only assume there is one particular very old book they are desperate to place above all criticism. It's nonsensical otherwise, even as an article of faith.
Gentlemen, I regret my tangent. Patrick and Justin have made in their own ways unique and valuable contributions to this hobby and to the SoA. Let's just stick to Gaugamela.
I'm not going to be particularly moderatorial. Justin is well aware of the stirring he is doing and should be prepared for a certain amount of comeback. Provided it is done in a civil fashion and focuses on techniques and actual history, I am confident that all will be well.
On Justin taking on the role of provocateur, indeed he is. Like Holly and Duncan keep up a steady stream of news items to give us something to talk about. And, as Richard has spotted, I too deliberately try to make sure we fully explore topics rather than let them drop. I don't think we are doing this under presidential remit, unlike Patrick was (but then, I reckon he would have done it anyway :) ).
For what its worth, I think Justin is honest in his engagement - these are genuine theories from someone who likes to explore alternatives. Like others, though, I do wish he's take a broader base of evidence into consideration and a more nuanced approach to sources while developing them.
I've left this thread alone for a while as it required more than an off-the-cuff response and I had other preoccupations.
Let me start with the purpose of the thread (and other threads that I create). Every now and again an idea crops up that seems might be worth exploring further. I don't have the erudition of several other posters on this forum on the topics in question so posting the idea here and seeing what evidence can be brought forward for or against it seems a good course of action. With the 5th century British chronology thread it did indeed prove useful as I had to adjust my original timetable to accommodate the fact that Auxiliaris was prefect of Gaul between 435-7 and Germanus visited him then, and also to accommodate the Gallic Chronicle that recorded a Saxon dominion over Britain in 441. It was an interesting thread - a learning curve that involved seeing several hypotheses set up and disproved, or perhaps confirmed, as additional evidence was brought forward.
In the case of this thread I only recently came up with the idea of a Macedonian double attack with cavalry in front of infantry as applicable to Chaeronea (I had for some time thought it applied to Issus and Gaugamela) - and felt the forum is the perfect place to see if it holds water. What source evidence can be brought forward to either refute or confirm it? My first post laid out the intention of the thread.
This is not "stirring" or "taking on the role of provocateur." I chose the double whammy hypothesis precisely because it is
not something about which there is an academic consensus - to the best of my knowledge no academic has ever considered it, either to support or refute it. If I wanted to be a "provocateur" I could have started a thread on the enormous size of earlier Carthaginian armies, following on from the controversy of Achaemenid armies' sizes. Ditto for the Arthur thread. It was only in the course of that discussion that I became aware that contemporary academic consensus considers Arthur a legend, an individual who may or may not have existed but about whom we can know strictly nothing - it was a discovery to learn that academic agnosticism went that far.
Now a word about methodology.
QuoteEveryone else who has ever examined Issus and Gaugamela has the Companions to the right of the phalanx, not in front of it.
When trying to establish a new interpretation it's more effective to acknowledge the existing consensus than to ignore it.
QuoteJustin, considering you don't have the first clue how to 'do history', you refuse to engage with the extensive literature on these topics, you refuse to understand the basic principles of source criticism, you refuse (above all) to consider the possibility that your being, as you admit, always in a minority of one, is not because the world is always wrong but because you are, I find your constant jibes at people whose understanding of history differs from your own to be tedious at best.
Quotebut you perhaps have no interest in the views of any modern authors
Rich's point is clear: one has to read the contemporary authors (and by implication agree with them when they agree with each other) or forget about doing history in any form - bearing in mind this is a wargaming forum, not a doctorate examination room. I've already given my take on the value of academic study. Let me repeat it here:
Let's start with academic study. For the record I consider it invaluable. Let me repeat that: I consider academic study invaluable. Academics are in a position to assemble data that people like myself are not. You pointed out earlier the importance of having a good knowledge of the various versions of MSS if you want start from a position of trusting the sources Academics are specialists who spend years collating every relevant piece of information on a specific topic and there is simply nothing that can replace that.My problem is the interpretation of the data. I've not read as much contemporary literature as Rich, but I've read quite a bit, and my experience is that many academics are strong on erudition but weak on analysis. There is an attempt to make history work like the empirical sciences, and it fails. The scientific method requires that one constantly increase the amount of raw data by observation, then analyse the data by repeated experimentation until one reaches conclusions that are certain. But you can't do this with history. The data - the written record - is fixed. Archaeology adds a bit, but not much, and not enough to substantially alter or augment the written sources. Academics compensate for this by increasing the amount of speculation. But speculation isn't data as the theories might be plausible but cannot be certain since there isn't the additional evidence to make them so. And you can't perform experiments on written records. You can only evaluate the reliability of the writers, which is a human thing: you don't attach numbers to it. You use common sense and a good knowledge of human nature. So IMHO academic consensus on, for example, the historicity of Arthur is reached more by tacit agreement on speculation than by any new evidence. Since the raw data for a topic like Issus is limited and easily accessible to an ordinary Joe and not just academics (though thanks to academics for bringing together every relevant document), that means the ordinary Joe can come to his own conclusions about it without being obliged to trust the academics. He couldn't do that for nuclear physics, astronomy or higher mathematics. There he has to trust the experts.
I therefore don't fall into overawed silence when the words "academic consensus" are uttered, at least not for history. I want to know what exactly the academics say and the proofs/arguments for what they say. I warmly encourage Rich to quote academics - with their reasoning - next time he cites academic consensus.
Let me take a closer look at the sources on the cavalry deployment at Issus in a later post.
Oh really, do we have to do this? OK, one last try. I will express myself freely since I think the situation requires it, but this is not by way of a personal attack on anyone. This is just a forum for a small group of like minded (in some respects) people to talk about wargames and related stuff, and we shouldn't be fighting each other. Everything is meant in a spirit of good will, though some thoughts may be expressed with a certain lack of tact.
Justin - you say that the purpose of these sorts of threads is just for you to test out new ideas and for it to be a learning curve for you. That is not how they come over. They come over as you coming up with a theory, which is often based on ignorance and an incomplete or inadequate understanding of the evidence, and then defending that theory against all comers, while at the same time denigrating the work and the opinions of anyone who does not agree with you. This may not be your intention; but it is the result. The reason you are called a contrarian and a provocateur is not because we are all exceptionally ill tempered or dismissive of non-mainstream views, it is because this is how you come over in your posts. Your posts are, after all, all we have to go on.
Given that there is this serious mismatch between your intentions and how you are perceived, I think you need to look very closely at how you express yourself in these sorts of discussions. You asked the question in the first post to this thread "Is this reconstruction plausible?", to which the overwhelming response has been "No", for the reasons given - and giving reasons, collecting the evidence for and against your theories, is time consuming. Fortunately (or unfortunately) a lot of us have time on our hands right now, but offering a critique of your theories is really doing you a favour. It is frustrating when, having gathered evidence and arguments, we find that, not only do you show no sign of being interested in learning anything and instead doggedly defend your theory, you also sneeringly dismiss (albeit with a friendly emoticon) the views of all those who disagree with you. You come over as if you are either a contrarian and a provocateur who delights in conflict and deliberately stirs up arguments for their own sake (a troll, in other words); or a delusional crank who is oblivious of his own inadequacies (see Dunning-Kruger). If neither of these characterisations is fair then I do not think we are entirely to blame - this is the way you sometimes come across in these threads (not every time).
I don't want to say too much about historical method, so just a few points.
Quote
Rich's point is clear: one has to read the contemporary authors (and by implication agree with them when they agree with each other) or forget about doing history in any form
What do you mean 'contemporary'? If you mean the ancient authors then broadly yes, you are right. If you mean modern authors, then no, that is a gross mischaracterisation of my views and of the way that history is done. Incidentally, I assume you have no qualifications in history? You have had no formal historical education, and neither learned nor been taught anything about historical method? While history, it is true, is not quite like nuclear physics and it is certainly easier for anyone to just 'have a go' at writing history than at building a nuclear reactor, it is also not the case that no skills are required at all. The reason people spend years studying history is not just so they can be students for the longest possible time (though that is a factor), and the time isn't spent just learning lists of dates. Doing history is a craft, and one with skills and techniques that can be learned and acquired and honed and perfected. The idea that this process can be sidestepped by a short cut ('just reading the sources') is simply wrong.
So - what is the point of being familiar with the work of modern historians? Two things - one is as you recognise, they have done a lot of the hard graft and collected the evidence. We can benefit from that by using their findings to fill in gaps in our own knowledge. Take the case of the 'wedge' at Gaugamela. You set a lot of store by the use of the word 'embolon', but you are not familiar with the ways in which this word was used in antiquity. Others are, have studied the question, and have made their findings available, in writing. Reading their work can inform how we (including you!) understand the 'wedge' at Gaugamela. Of course you don't have to read their work, you can trawl the ancient literature yourself, but it's a whole lot easier if you do ('standing on the shoulders of giants' and all that).
The other reason others' work is valuable is more fundamental. Your view is that, for antiquity at least, all you need to know is included in 'the sources' (which for you mostly means online texts and translations), supplemented by a few bits and bobs from archaeology. 'The sources' to you are a monolithic, indivisible, infallible set of texts, not infallible in that they can never be wrong - I know you acknowledge that ancient authors could sometimes be mistaken, but as you say, "The data - the written record - is fixed." This is your fundamental mistake. The words in the written record are fixed (assuming we can sort out the manuscript traditions, which is not always the case) but their meaning, their interpretation, what we should understand it is that they are saying, is not. This can change as interpretations change, and interpretations change not just when new facts become available, but when new arguments are proffered that convince us that the new interpretations are an improvement on the old. When sufficient people are convinced by a new argument or a new interpretation, this is what constitutes an academic consensus. This does not guarantee that the new interpretation is 'right', and it does not guarantee it is better; it just tells us that more informed people who have studied the question are convinced than are not, and as many of these people will be better informed, more intelligent and better at history than we are, then their collective opinion should carry some weight. (Though they could still be wrong!)
I would also add that if you think my view is that one should always agree with what other modern historians say, then you have obviously never read anything I have written.
OK I don't want to discuss historical method with you any more, Justin, so I'm going to ask you to drop this topic. If you want to discuss, strictly factually, cavalry deployment at Issus then that's fine and I might be able to contribute something (though, frankly, I do have better things to do).
Thank you Justin and Richard for laying out methodological viewpoints. While i think it was important for you to lay out your approaches, as Richard says, perhaps time, for the sake of other members, to get back to discussing the battles of Alexander.
Moderator hat off.
From an ordinary non-classicist, can I suggest that other members don't turn off because they don't have the in-depth knowledge of Richard and Justin. I always find it valuable in an area I don't know to ask questions of the more learned and sometimes force them to spell out and explain their assumptions. This gets you into the debate and you end up learning more. It can also lead the to pauses in the melee, for those who follow a non-continuous combat model :) .
Back to the constructive controversy .......
And now let's look at the cavalry lineup at Issus. I'll use the translations Rich kindly posted in the Battles section, occasionally checking the Greek and Latin.
Diodorus affirms that the cavalry - all of it - formed up in front of the infantry:
He set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it. (2) He himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops. The Thessalian horse was on the left, and this was outstanding in bravery and skill.Rich claims Diodorus is wrong and that the other sources placed the cavalry on the wings:
QuoteJust this one sentence ("He set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it") suggests the cavalry were in front and the infantry behind. So it's as certain as anything can be in ancient history that this sentence is an error.
QuoteArrian, Callisthenes and Curtius all have the Macedonian infantry phalanx in the centre and the cavalry on the wings.
But what exactly do the other sources say?
CurtiusAlexander had stationed the phalanx, the strongest part of any Macedonian army, in the van. Nicanor, son of Parmenion, guarded the right wing; next to him stood Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Ptolemaeus, and Amyntas, each in command of his own troops. On the left wing, which extended to the sea, were Craterus and Parmenion, but Craterus was ordered to obey Parmenion. The cavalry were stationed on both wings; the right was held by Macedonians, joined with Thessalians, the left by the Peloponnesians. Before this battleline he had stationed a band of slingers mingled with bowmen. Thracians also and the Cretans were in the van; these too were in light armour. But to those who, sent ahead by Darius , had taken their place on the ridge of the mountain he opposed the Agriani lately brought from Thrace. Moreover, he had directed Parmenion to extend his line as far as possible towards the sea, in order that his line of battle might be farther away from the mountains on which the barbarians were posted. But they, having dared neither to oppose the Macedonians as they came up nor to surround them after they had gone past, had fled, especially alarmed by the sight of the slingers; and that action had made safe the flank of Alexander's army, which he had feared might be assailed from above. The Macedonian army advanced in thirty-two ranks; for the narrow place did not allow the line to be extended more widely. Then the folds of the mountains began to widen and open a greater space, so that not only could the infantry take their usual order, but the cavalry could [also] cover their flanks.Notice that the left wing of the phalanx extends to the sea (Rufus is talking about the phalanx at this point and doesn't yet mention the cavalry). Notice also that the cavalry could cover the flanks of the infantry only
after the ground was wide enough for the infantry to take up their usual order. The English translation accurately reproduces the sense of the Latin:
Paulatim deinde laxare semet sinus montium et maius spatium aperire coeperant, ita ut non pedes solum pluribus in ordinem incedere, sed etiam lateribus circumfundi posset equitatus.So if the cavalry couldn't cover the flanks of the infantry before the ground widened out, then where were they? They were "stationed on both wings" so weren't in column behind the phalanx. Only answer is that they were deployed in line before the phalanx (that was "in the van" in the sense of before the rest of the infantry, notably the Greek mercenaries). They may have extended beyond the flanks of the phalanx and were probably in two parts, one before the left wing of the phalanx, one before the right wing. The point is that they weren't alongside the phalanx.
ArrianThis is replicated by Arrian:
His cavalry so far had been ranged behind the infantry, but when they moved forward into open ground, he at once drew up his army in battle order; on the right wing towards the mountain ridge he placed first of the infantry the agema and hypaspists under Nicanor son of Parmenio, next to them Coenus' battalion, and then that of Perdiccas. From right to left these regiments stretched to the centre of the hoplites. (4) On the left, Amyntas' battalion came first, then Ptolemaeus', and next Meleager's. Craterus had been put in command of the infantry on the left and Parmenio of the entire left wing, with orders not to edge away from the sea, for fear the barbarians should surround them, since with their great numbers they were likely to overlap them on all sides.
..........................
Alexander however finding the ground opening outwards a little as he went forward, brought into line his cavalry, the so-called Companions, the Thessalians, and the Macedonians, whom he posted with himself on the right wing while the Peloponnesians and other allies were sent to Parmenio on the left.Notice that the phalanx deploys with its left flank anchored on the sea - "not to edge away from the sea" refers to the phalanx, not the cavalry, as it is the phalanx Arrian is talking about at this point.
It is when the ground opens up "a little" that Alexander deploys the cavalry "in line". Doing some calculations I estimate that the Companions, Thessalians, Greeks, Paeonians, and Thracians
alone would have taken up a frontage of between 900 - 1200 yards. I can give my reasoning for that if anyone wishes. Include the other light cavalry and the cavalry line would have been wider than the phalanx, so the ground would have had to more than double in width to permit the cavalry to move to the flanks of the infantry. Certainly more than "a little".
Arrian mentions a little later that the left flank cavalry were in fact in front of the infantry:
On the left wing of the infantry the Cretan archers and the Thracians under Sitalces had been posted in front [
προετάχθησαν]
, with the cavalry of the left wing further in advance [
πρό = "before" "in front of"].
So the left wing cavalry were in front of the Cretans and Thracians who themselves were in front of the left wing of the phalanx. The cavalry are not positioned on the flank of the phalanx.
PolybiusBut, other things apart, Alexander did not even, according to Callisthenes, send his cavalry on in front when advancing in line over flat ground, but apparently placed them alongside the infantry.The "apparently" isn't in the Greek:
ὁ δὲ χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ τοὺς ἱππεῖς προέθετο, μετωπηδὸν ἄγων τὴν δύναμιν ἐν τόποις ἐπιπέδοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἴσου ποιεῖ τοῖς πεζοῖς. So Polybius definitely affirms that Callisthenes put the cavalry alongside the infantry. However Polybius misunderstands so much else about Callisthenes that it is not unlikely he misunderstands him here. If Callisthenes said something along the lines of "the cavalry deployed in line at the wings of the infantry" that could easily be understood as deploying alongside the infantry rather than in two lines in front of them.
But notice exactly what Polybius is saying. For him Callisthenes is
wrong in affirming the cavalry deployed on the wings when in fact the cavalry deployed
in front of the phalanx. Polybius in rejecting Callisthenes (as he understands him) hence
confirms Diodorus.
Putting it all together, I deduce this:
1. The phalanx emerges from the narrow space south of Issus and deploys into line with the left flank anchored on the sea. The cavalry remains behind it in column.
2. As the ground widens the cavalry deploys into line in front of the phalanx. It seems this line is not continuous but is in two halves in front of the wings of the phalanx. The Companions are originally towards the centre of the infantry frontage.
3. Two ilai of Companions redeploy from the central position to the right beyond the phalanx.
4. As the ground widens further, the two cavalry lines gradually move right and left, getting clear of more and more of the frontage of the phalanx. Nowhere however is it affirmed that all the cavalry moved clear of the phalanx.
This reconstruction harmonises the sources and doesn't oblige me to reject or shoehorn any part of them.
There isn't much I need to say about Richard's last post. He affirms:
Quote from: RichT on September 17, 2021, 05:18:38 PM
I will express myself freely since I think the situation requires it, but this is not by way of a personal attack on anyone. This is just a forum for a small group of like minded (in some respects) people to talk about wargames and related stuff, and we shouldn't be fighting each other. Everything is meant in a spirit of good will, though some thoughts may be expressed with a certain lack of tact.
and then goes on to say:
Quote from: RichT on September 17, 2021, 05:18:38 PMYou come over as if you are either a contrarian and a provocateur who delights in conflict and deliberately stirs up arguments for their own sake (a troll, in other words); or a delusional crank who is oblivious of his own inadequacies (see Dunning-Kruger). If neither of these characterisations is fair then I do not think we are entirely to blame - this is the way you sometimes come across in these threads (not every time).
This is as crass as it is unjust. I will treat this post and future posts like it the same way I treat a YouTube troll - by ignoring them.
I rather presume that the battlefield of Issus has been measured? ( Its probably in Phil Sabin's book) Given tgat we have believable formations for the different types of cavalry and infantry and can thus construct the Macedonian battle line. Particularly so because the line is formed along tge river which is presumably relatively fixed. Of course I understand that features do move, the seas and land rise and fall and the units of an army might be spaced variably or damnably deployed in less or greater depth, but it should be susceptible to calculation.
I am not as dismissive of Livy as some and suggest that Justin made a good point in referring us to occasions where Roman cavalry charged enemies frontally. Its possible that Livy is inventing here, but the story of letting go the reins to increase the velocity of the charge does sound like the sort of detail that gets passed down. We can explain the effectiveness of the charge by describing the opponents as tired and disorganised after several rounds of fighting and may have been deployed in a relatively open order and may have been surprised by a tight column of Roman cavalry suddenly emerging from a parted infantry line.
Justin gas raised the question of ancient elite cavalry charging infantry lines in several different guises. Some years ago it was received wisdom that ancient cavalry could not charge and make contact for fear of being sent flying over the rump of their horse. We now accept that a well trained and motivated man and horse can charge with impact despite lacking stirrups or a high saddle.
There is a wargamer's belief that ancient cavalry could not charge spear armed troops in good order. Where I see Justin as advancing his cause is that the equation is more nuanced . The attacking troops have got to be very highly motivated and well led. They have to have warhorses, not just any old horse, but one trained to fight. The cavalry general has to create the conditions where the opposing spearmen are disordered, fatigued or disheartened to the point where a charge can succeed. The magic of Alexander is his coup d'oeil, his ability to create such a point of access to an opposing formation and suddenly change speed or direction to take advantage. The very rapidity of a cavalry advance allows them to be upon a unit before it can brace and organise itself to fend off the horse.
In later periods cavalry clearly penetrated infantry formations. In the sixteenth century French knights ( albeit on plate armoured horses) pass through Swiss pike formations. French knights were expected to enter Flemish infantry blocks. Arrian clearly expected the charging Sarmatians to be able to penetrate acRoman formation unless itvwas specially prepared. If cavalry could break in to enemy infantry formations then following up with a pike or hypaspist unit might well make sense, for cavalry are a fluid force, they can disappear into an enemy formation as Scarlett's Heavy Brigade did at Balaclava. Infantry take and hold ground and would becwell suited to consolidating a break through.
Whether the above combination occurred in a way that the sources can support is a matter for others more learned. However, we shoukd be perhaps a little more open to the possibility,
Roy
I think somewhere way back in this topic there is a general affirmation that cavalry could, and did, charge infantry. How successful they were depending on the cavalry (as Roy said, quality of men and horses, motivation) and of the infantry (training, cohesion, general ferocity) There was no magic formation that rendered cavalry invulnerable while make infantry queue up to be slaughtered - it was tough and deadly stuff. For example, Almoghavars didn't fight cavalry in blocks, the broke their spears in two to make them more handy, mixed withthe cavalry, disembowelled the horses and despatched the riders who were unseated. Not pretty. So rather than fantasy formation stuff, if we want to see why Alexander's cavalry did well, perhaps more attention to circumstances might work? Could it be their leader used his army to create the circumstances to be decisively exploited by mobile elite strike force?
As to Issus, I'm going on the documents presented but building everything on one sentence from Diodorus which seems at odds with the other accounts does seem weak. Sometimes contradictions in the sources can't be reconciled. I note we are getting into the grammar stages of the argument (what is the subject of this verb etc.) which is way beyond me. But just from all the English tanslations, I would get the idea that Alexander extended his army to the sea, not necessarily his infantry.
I was reading an article today by an academic, Stewart IIRC . It was about Procopius comparison of Belisarius and Witiges. Stewart has written before about this and has deeply analysed the source ( Well Procopius) . It would be very difficult not to see that Procopius was altering and editing to prove the point that Roman coolness and self discipline is key innthe Byzantine victory against barbarian rashness and hot headedness Belisarius moves on to be less volatile where Witiges becomes paralysed as the Roman army moves closer tonRavenna, taking the forts that actually would be in a besieger's rear. Actually its more lijely that Witiges resorts to negotiation once his last hope of a land based relief army evaporates and because the Byzantines control the sea...oh and the grain silos get burnt down. One is keft with the strong impression that the details of the campaign and battles may well have been adjusted to make, what is tobProcopius, a bigger point. Now Procopius is a good historian, as far as we can see and is widely believed. The difficulty with Arrian and Diodorus and co, or rather our analysis of them is that they are not writing with a thematic bias that is being discussed. They are all using sources that themselves have biases and defects due to their sources and the natural bias of their sources. Someone who is a commander in Alexander's army will have belonged tona faction and will have written to please a particilar audience and will have had their own views on causation.
There is an element of Donald Rumsfeld's Known Unknowns and Unknown Unknowns about all history writing. and thus all words cannot be weighed equally.. Plutarch, for example, in writing a speech for Marius before battling the Teutones puts words into great man's mouth that tell us what a true Roman Marius' is and how connected he was to his man. Plutarch almost certainly does not know what Marius actually said and would not have worried because its the sub text that his audience who have opinions about Golden age pleb descended commanders expect to hear.
My take on Issus so far ( Thanks to Richard for collating and presenting the sources) is that the important thing is that Alex must cover the sea flank and wants to stay away from possible outflanking in the foothills on the other flank and that, as the field opens out on the left cavalry are sent to engage the Persian cavalry that are threatening the oeft flank because flank is still opening out and Parmenio can no longer keep moving left without opening up a gap in the centre. These cavalry might well engage ahead of Parmenio's infantry because it is quite normal to do that as the infantry protect the rear of the cavalry. Perhaps its a bit medieval in concept, but it is not outlandish. What I think Justin)s recent post tells us us that the nature of the deployment on the left wing is not sufficiehtly important to be emphasised.
On Alex)s right wing the main aggressive action takes place. Inask the experts here whether the Macedonian cavalry here fight the hoplites frontally.? It seems to me that the likeliest target is Persian infantry or Persian cavalry abd we would find consensus in the Companions charging them? and then taking the hoplites in flank. The hypaspists would then be advancing on the left flank of the cavalry to protect them from being taken in the flank when they are halted.
The jain description of the action is not about the formation that Alexander adopts , its obviously not 'news'. what is worthy to retail to the audience is the fighting between the noblest Persians and Alexander himself. That is presumably because tge conflict is symbolic of the war. The Persians are brave, but not as good at hand to hand as Alexander. They don 't run until Darius does and he will not face the Macedonian king. That conflict may have an element of invention, because the point is the symbolic one. Do the sources wish to say tgat any particular firmation wonntge battle? I think not, their secobdary concentration is how the Macedonian firce expanded to cover tge frobtage on the move which is a tour de force, probsbly catching the opponent whilst redeploying.
aRoy
There is always a danger in our received accounts of reading them as if they were written for modern military historians. Heroic clashes and character-revealing incidents may be more stylistically important to author and audience than precision about formation. Certain words with a common place meaning may be read as technical terms (e.g. wedge, othismos) causing a focus on a passage the author didn't intend and probably couldn't imagine.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 20, 2021, 09:04:29 AM
There is always a danger in our received accounts of reading them as if they were written for modern military historians. Heroic clashes and character-revealing incidents may be more stylistically important to author and audience than precision about formation. Certain words with a common place meaning may be read as technical terms (e.g. wedge, othismos) causing a focus on a passage the author didn't intend and probably couldn't imagine.
Careful about discounting the authors' ability to be precise with their terminology. Arrian uses the term 'wedge' -
embolon (which BTW I knew could mean a ram-like formation as well as a wedge) - when describing Alex's combined cavalry-infantry assault at Gaugamela, and he defines the same term in his
Ars Tactica. Arrian was a military theorist who knew the precise technical terms for formations and tactics, and it is natural to assume that when he said wedge he meant wedge - especially as he says "wedge, as it were" for Gaugamela, implying he knew exactly what a military wedge was and also knew Alex's formation was close to it but not exactly it.
A fair point about Arrian knowing his military terminology better than many others. In this case, though, he is interpreting an earlier source which may, or may not, have been so precise. As you've said, the fact he qualifies his use of the word embolon (wedge/ram) suggests he isn't thinking Alex has created a formal wedge formation but is using the word less formally, in the way we might say "the advance drove a wedge into the enemy line" .
Quote from: Erpingham on September 20, 2021, 09:46:59 AM
A fair point about Arrian knowing his military terminology better than many others. In this case, though, he is interpreting an earlier source which may, or may not, have been so precise. As you've said, the fact he qualifies his use of the word embolon (wedge/ram) suggests he isn't thinking Alex has created a formal wedge formation but is using the word less formally, in the way we might say "the advance drove a wedge into the enemy line" .
Well....Arrian is clear that it was specifically the Companions and the part of the phalanx on the right wing that formed up "a wedge so to speak", which is more specific than unnamed units driving a wedge-shape dent in the enemy line. My take is that the ilai formed up with the Agema, which IMHO (arguments upon request) numbered about 2000 men and deployed 16 deep for a width of 125 yards when in intermediate order. A 200-man regular ila in wedge formation would deploy 60 yards wide at the most; the 300 man royal squadron deployed, when in wedge, about 70 yards wide at the most. Presuming there were 8 ilai at Gaugamela (I'm doing this off-the-cuff so feel free to correct me) then they would probably have deployed 2 ilai wide and 4 ilai deep in front of the Agema. Definitely ram-shaped.
If the Hypaspists were also involved, that would create a frontage of 250 yards (2000 hypaspists + 2000 Agema), with the ilai deployed 4 wide and 2 deep. My take is that only the Agema was under Alex's direct command (Nicanor commanded the Hypaspists at Issus and Gaugamela) and hence meant to work in concert with the Companions, so this option is less likely.
As an idea, here is a suggested rule for implementing the double whammy in a DBM(M) context (this provisionally applies only to Republican Roman cav as the consensus seems to be that they at least did it):
Before executing a whammy attack, attacking cavalry must be directly behind and adjacent to attacking infantry and the attacking infantry must be frontally adjacent to enemy infantry's front or rear edge (not side edges). The attacking infantry accompanied by attacking cavalry can attack enemy infantry in the same turn they move adjacent to it.
The attacking cavalry and infantry swop places, with the cavalry now in front and adjacent to the enemy infantry. The attack is executed with normal factors and modifiers. If the cavalry draws or loses the attack, it stays put or recoils, pushing the friendly infantry back, and that's it for the turn. If the cavalry wins the attack, it passes directly through the enemy infantry to the other side - unless there is something behind the enemy infantry that blocks its passage, in which case it stays where it is. The enemy infantry may be destroyed if doubled but does not recoil if there is a recoil result. Once the cavalry has passed through, the friendly infantry moves up adjacent to the enemy infantry and enemy infantry immediately fights the attacking infantry with a -2 modifier for being disordered by the cavalry. If the enemy infantry loses the combat with a recoil result it cannot recoil and is destroyed instead.
Only veteran class cavalry can take part in whammy attack. Are early Republican Roman cav veteran? They should be.
I'm not seeing anything convincing here, Justin.
To summarise, first you hang your hat on Diodorus being correct when he has the cavalry deployed in front of the infantry all along the line. Then you are happy to revise this to say that actually, the cavalry was deployed on each wing rather than across the whole front, but it was still definitely in front of the phalanx. You also seem to be arguing that the phalanx is anchored on the seashore - presumably so that you have cavalry in front of phalanx on the left too. And then you take what seems to be a metaphorical use of 'wedge' on the right by Arrian very literally.
So you are in fact doing quite a bit of shoehorning.
Alexander's success can be explained quite well without needing to posit a 'double whammy' tactical formation.
Issus is 333BC , Arrian is writing in say 120 AD . we may thus assume he is copying sources, I understand Ptolemy is one. Arrian's ability to name a formation exactly is not at issue, because it depends upon the sources in front of him. To support Anthony, it may be that Arrian is looking at a source that describes Alexander taking the right wing element of the phalanx (;is this the hypaspists? and the Companion cavalry and making an attack with a narrow frontage and a broader rear, a formation, sort of Mirroring an L shape to which the nearest equivalent is a wedge, because it breaks through and then widens that penetration. The actual details are not of interest to Arrian's 350-400 year old source as it hurries on to which princes Alex kills and how he gets wounded.Wouldn't that satisfy everybody??
Roy
Remember there are two battles - Issus and Gaugamela, and the 'like a wedge' formation is at Gaugamela (nothing is said of wedges at Issus).
Arrian's main sources are Ptolemy and Aristobolus.
What you describe Roy is broadly how most people understand the attack at Gaugemela.
It might be an idea to step back a bit and look at the purpose of these historical debates. As I understand it, the SoA's remit is largely centred on pre-gunpowder military history as applicable to wargaming. The Society is not a university and the forum is not a doctorate examination room (thank heavens!). Most of the posters here, including myself, are not professional historians or academically qualified in history. Personally I feel the need to take off four years and read the sources from start to finish plus all relevant academic literature from the past hundred years or so. If anyone wants to finance the project, I'm in. :)
But none of that matters. Ultimately the Society is about wargaming, not history, and what we are looking for is whatever is historically feasible in our gaming rulesets. I realise that the only historical facts that are commonly accepted are those that are clearly and unambiguously expressed in several unrelated primary sources. So everyone agrees that the mid to late Republican Roman legion had three lines. But how the exchange of lines took place is not unambiguously expressed in several sources so there is and always will be disagreement over it. Personally I think it is possible to know how it happened by careful analysis of the source material in the original languages, but whatever any individual comes up with will not convince everybody else if the source material isn't explicit enough to begin with.
Doesn't matter either. What we are interested in is what is plausible enough to be used on the gaming table. Sometimes the historical basis for some things wargamers take for granted is tenuous (Kallapani anyone?) but who cares? They could have been that way and they work in a game so wargamers use them. The Society could do the wargaming community a real service if it used the resources of its members to determine what is feasible for pre-gunpowder armies. Alex did seem to use a composite wedge/ram at Gaugamela. Is it feasible he could have used it at Issus or even Chaeronea? Would it improve gaming experience to introduce it as a tactic? How many other armies might have used it? (cue Romans) And so on.
Bearing in mind that we are talking about feasible, not common-accepted as proven. I think there's a need for it. How many game designers have actually done original historical research since Phil Barker anyway? To what extent does Phil's research stand up today?
Exploring the feasible ends at page 5, usually before.
To keep "exploring" after that is just pushing an agenda or seeking to prolong an argument.
Quote from: Mark G on September 20, 2021, 06:21:33 PM
Exploring the feasible ends at page 5, usually before.
To keep "exploring" after that is just pushing an agenda or seeking to prolong an argument.
Great! Then double whammy, as discussed up to #74 (end of p5) is in the bag. ;)
QuoteIt might be an idea to step back a bit and look at the purpose of these historical debates.
Well, I think of them of ways of improving my knowledge of military history. Therefore, it is quite important that they are based on the evidence. As I've mentioned before, I think one of the problems we have is "wargamer" history which is based on various dated popular books and novels and one of the things we can do with this forum is to bring in more modern thought and evidence (histories, art, archaeology etc.).
That's the historical bit of the society remit. It overlaps with the wargaming bit to various degrees. Quite a lot if trying to refight historical battles, less so if you just want some vaguely historical entertainment. Where you go with that is up to your own preferences/tolerance for anachronism.
I think I would be concerned with an idea that, because we are all (or nearly all) hobby historians and wargamers, we can be satisfied with a poorer quality history. As to the not having the time to spend in years of full time study, the answer is to channel Newton and "stand on the shoulders of giants" (or at least slightly taller people) rather than try to do it all from scratch. Let them do the hard work then read what they write critically.
Anyway, that is where I am coming from.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 20, 2021, 06:36:57 PM
QuoteIt might be an idea to step back a bit and look at the purpose of these historical debates.
Well, I think of them of ways of improving my knowledge of military history. Therefore, it is quite important that they are based on the evidence. As I've mentioned before, I think one of the problems we have is "wargamer" history which is based on various dated popular books and novels and one of the things we can do with this forum is to bring in more modern thought and evidence (histories, art, archaeology etc.).
Absolutely.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 20, 2021, 06:36:57 PMThat's the historical bit of the society remit. It overlaps with the wargaming bit to various degrees. Quite a lot if trying to refight historical battles, less so if you just want some vaguely historical entertainment. Where you go with that is up to your own preferences/tolerance for anachronism.
I think I would be concerned with an idea that, because we are all (or nearly all) hobby historians and wargamers, we can be satisfied with a poorer quality history. As to the not having the time to spend in years of full time study, the answer is to channel Newton and "stand on the shoulders of giants" (or at least slightly taller people) rather than try to do it all from scratch. Let them do the hard work then read what they write critically.
Anyway, that is where I am coming from.
It's not about poorer quality history or doing it from scratch. We can certainly lean on professional historians and apply their research to wargaming-relevant topics. Take for example the fragmenting line thread. Can we deduce to what extent lines that advanced did fragment? Or what kind of lines fragmented, e.g. untrained levies vs professionals? What do the historians say? Once we know what Academia (and possibly some personal research by members - not everything that interests us has necessarily been looked at in depth by professional historians) has to say on the topic, is it worth implementing in wargaming and if so how? One possible idea is to oblige an impetuous line that advances into contact with enemy to throw a die for each base: a 1 or 2 and the movement is slowed (say by half a base width). this presumes the entire line could contact the enemy with a normal move. This rule would oblige a canny player to hold his impetuous troops in check until they are very close to the enemy, and then let them go - the bad die throws wouldn't affect them as they would contact the enemy anyway. Is that historical? Does it affect gameplay?
But maybe this is all taking wargaming too seriously.
It would be taking dice rolling way too seriously, as anyone who has suffered through other rules with variable movement will attest.
Not everything we have a source (however dubious for) is worth modelling, and the more of these "flavour" items you corrupt a base set with, they more open to gamey rules exploitation you end up with.
Focus on getting the basics right every time, and then you can test the latest fanciful notion.
Quote from: RichT on September 20, 2021, 03:59:38 PM
Remember there are two battles - Issus and Gaugamela, and the 'like a wedge' formation is at Gaugamela (nothing is said of wedges at Issus).
Apologies Justin - I did conflate the two.
Quote from: Prufrock on September 23, 2021, 10:51:49 AM
Quote from: RichT on September 20, 2021, 03:59:38 PM
Remember there are two battles - Issus and Gaugamela, and the 'like a wedge' formation is at Gaugamela (nothing is said of wedges at Issus).
Apologies Justin - I did conflate the two.
No problem Aaron. There's been quite a bit of jumping around in this thread. :)