As suggested by Justin in the topic on the so-called Macedonian Double Whammy, something of a broader nature to allow that topic to continue to focus on the Macedonian phalanx.
I'll kick off :
"Once an army is on the march, it is weakened and cannot keep rank - something as minor as a bush can disrupt things"
Jean de Bueil Jouvencel
"on the march"
On the battlefield?
Actually it's something I've wondered about for a while, watching those RTW videos where the infantry pass right through rocks and bushes. Since few battlefields were as featureless as football fields, to what extend were infantry incommoded by terrain features and how did they compensate for them?
Quote"on the march"
On the battlefield?
From the context, he clearly means advancing on a battlefield.
Isnt Jouvencel the one who believes that the tactical defensive always wins because the attacker becomes disordered as he advances? I can see tgat beingga particular problem for medieval armies, , less so if the troops were say Roman legionaries, less densely packed and reliant upon forward movement to give impetus to their pila.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on August 26, 2021, 03:33:14 PM
Isnt Jouvencel the one who believes that the tactical defensive always wins because the attacker becomes disordered as he advances? I can see tgat beingga particular problem for medieval armies, , less so if the troops were say Roman legionaries, less densely packed and reliant upon forward movement to give impetus to their pila.
Roy
You remember your French literature correctly Roy. Jean de Bueil does indeed make a strong case for fighting on the defensive because armies are disordered by advancing. It wasn't a novel thought - IIRC, Chandos expressed a similar view a century or so earlier. Both were experienced soldiers, which may suggest there was something in it.
As to Romans and other regular types, I'll let the better versed in the sources comment. There may be a case for saying that the problem was more acute among less regular troops.
Is it perhaps less an issue of discipline/training, more a question of contemporary equipment? Given Jean's period, he is operating against heavily armoured men at arms and English longbows. If you are operating against melee troops - as say the Romans usually did - there is time and space to pause and sort out your dressing before the final advance to close the enemy. The Romans, or hoplites, may be well armoured, but probably still have better situational awareness than a man at arms in a visored helmet. And stopping to sort out your dressing a hundred yards from a bunch of English archers is probably sub optimal. Conversely, if you sit and wait for the enemy to come to you, said English archers are not going to be behind carefully emplaced stakes for a start; either they leave them behind, or put themselves at a disadvantage trying to hammer them in just in front of you. Discipline will certainly help, but may not be the primary factor.
It clearly wasn't an insurmountable problem because infantry lines did advance against enemy.
A phalanx is divided up into syntagma of 16x16. You need (small) gaps between each syntagma to allow them to get around trees, bushes or other obstacles. No gaps and everyone starts bumping into each other and chaos ensues. If the gaps get too large, the result is possibly Pydna where the legionaries can exploit the gaps and slaughter the phalangites.
Too many obstacles and clearly you don't advance and fight - you find somewhere more suitable.
Richard
Out in the real world how many open spaces without features like trees, bushes and rocks are there that would be suitable as battlefields?
Why ask that a Justin, when you simply refused to understand all of the explanations given when you put up a thread on it years ago?
If you really want to comprehend the answer to that question, I repeat my offer to get you started on tactical reading for the well documented Napoleonic period.
But I warn you, there are no useful video shortcuts, you have to read multiple books.
Quote from: Mark G on August 27, 2021, 07:42:44 AM
Why ask that a Justin, when you simply refused to understand all of the explanations given when you put up a thread on it years ago?
If you really want to comprehend the answer to that question, I repeat my offer to get you started on tactical reading for the well documented Napoleonic period.
But I warn you, there are no useful video shortcuts, you have to read multiple books.
Can you get a little more specific, Mark? For example, which of my posts is this a reply to?
My apologies to you Justin.
I saw you asking about spaces and thought you were linking to the discussion on phalanxes and had returned to your questioning the gaps between units vs a single continuous line.
You were not, and I mis read through inattention and assumption.
:)
QuoteIs it perhaps less an issue of discipline/training, more a question of contemporary equipment
The quote comes just after a description of what went wrong at Agincourt.
Chamblay (the wise advisor Jouvencel is listening to) says
"[the French] had spent the night up to their knees in mud and then, the following morning, they'd had to struggle across a long stretch of wasteland to engage the enemy, which meant by the time they did so, they were out of breath and in disorder, when they did engage the enemy it was piecemeal and so were defeated"
So, he's not highlighting (or even mentioning) archery as a factor. The risk of getting out of breath is perhaps related to the weight of equipment, though, and is a repeated theme.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 27, 2021, 09:47:35 AM
QuoteIs it perhaps less an issue of discipline/training, more a question of contemporary equipment
The quote comes just after a description of what went wrong at Agincourt.
Chamblay (the wise advisor Jouvencel is listening to) says
"[the French] had spent the night up to their knees in mud and then, the following morning, they'd had to struggle across a long stretch of wasteland to engage the enemy, which meant by the time they did so, they were out of breath and in disorder, when they did engage the enemy it was piecemeal and so were defeated"
So, he's not highlighting (or even mentioning) archery as a factor. The risk of getting out of breath is perhaps related to the weight of equipment, though, and is a repeated theme.
What's interesting is that doesn't seem to be the norm - Chamblay gives details as to why the French contacted the English piecemeal, as if it was something unusual worth dwelling on.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 27, 2021, 09:50:54 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on August 27, 2021, 09:47:35 AM
QuoteIs it perhaps less an issue of discipline/training, more a question of contemporary equipment
The quote comes just after a description of what went wrong at Agincourt.
Chamblay (the wise advisor Jouvencel is listening to) says
"[the French] had spent the night up to their knees in mud and then, the following morning, they'd had to struggle across a long stretch of wasteland to engage the enemy, which meant by the time they did so, they were out of breath and in disorder, when they did engage the enemy it was piecemeal and so were defeated"
So, he's not highlighting (or even mentioning) archery as a factor. The risk of getting out of breath is perhaps related to the weight of equipment, though, and is a repeated theme.
What's interesting is that doesn't seem to be the norm - Chamblay gives details as to why the French contacted the English piecemeal, as if it was something unusual worth dwelling on.
Each Chamblay anecdote is followed by a general lesson - we've quoted the one for Agincourt above. So the format suggests this is a general point drawn from a specific example.
Wasn't it one of the reasons for the en haye thing the french had through the Renaissance, that only by enforcing a rule of honour that no one could get ahead of the king (or king appointed commander), that they could ensure that charges arrived at the same time and not piecemeal?
There is certainly a frequent rule that no-one should advance ahead of the banner, which was with the commander (one of Charny's questions - III.6 - is whether it should be in front or behind the commander as he leads the advance). Whether this is just about honour or the rather more practical effect of regulating the speed of advance may be debated.
I don't think it's a debatable question at all.
You cannot order nobles to do things, but you can convince them that failing to behave honourable is bad.
So if you make it a mark of honour to stick to the most effective formation, you have ordered the unorderable
Quote from: DBS on August 26, 2021, 11:58:21 PM
And stopping to sort out your dressing a hundred yards from a bunch of English archers is probably sub optimal.
So maybe the advantage of English archers was not the casualties they caused, but that they forced the opposition to attack at the run?
Quote from: Cantabrigian on September 02, 2021, 10:38:26 AM
Quote from: DBS on August 26, 2021, 11:58:21 PM
And stopping to sort out your dressing a hundred yards from a bunch of English archers is probably sub optimal.
So maybe the advantage of English archers was not the casualties they caused, but that they forced the opposition to attack at the run?
Although we lack evidence of that. In our previous discussion of the effect of medieval archery, I managed to find one poetic reference to archery slowing an advance and one of cavalry charging to make contact in order to avoid archery. Nothing on archery causing infantry to run.
If we return again to de Bueil, we find a description of a small skirmish which illustrates the points about defending not advancing. Jouvencel and his troops have been confronted by a much larger enemy force unexpectedly. Jouvencel dismounts his men and takes up a position behind a hedge. His opponents confidentally dismount and "fast march" forward.
"By the time the enemy reached the ranks of Jouvencel and his men, the enemy were out of breath and all in confusion: some of them moved faster than others."As a result Jouvencel defeats the first to reach his lines while the ones slower to engage are demoralised by the fate of the quickest and run away. The defeat is ascribed to arrogance (or over-confidence) brought on by greater numbers. The effect of archery is not highlighted.
Noted this in an article on Verneuil just now. (Michale K Jones 2002)
"Waurin related how the line of men-at-arms moved onto the offensive. Their only chance was to take the battle to the French before the Lombards reappeared. They showed extraordinary discipline. According to Waurin, the entire body went forward, keeping good order. The line would briefly pause, let out a shout, and then continue its advance (footnoted Waurin III .p74). The French also moved forward, hastily or eagerly, as some of the chronicles related, because they believed the battle was now theirs. In fighting between dismounted men-at-arms it was vital to keep formation. In these difficult circumstances hope now arose for the English. All sources agreed that the advancing French got out of alignment, some adding that the Viscount of Narbonne's contingent was ahead of its main battle and reached the English before the others. This was a multinational army, with Scots, Spaniards and Italians all fighting on the French side, and maintaining cohesion in an advance would have been particularly difficult. The English could use their full force in the forthcoming melee as the French units arrived piecemeal."
worth noting however, that the victory was ascribed in the end to great feats of individual heroism, mostly around saving banners which the men were using to guide them on who was winning beyond their immediate vision within the melee itself.
still, the point being that so much of the chronicles gave attention to the importance of maintaining formation into contact as offering a key advantage to the combat itself.
So are we close to concluding that "Did infantry lines fragment when advancing against enemy?" can be answered as "Infantry lines had to make significant efforts not to fragment when advancing against enemy"?
Quote from: Duncan Head on September 06, 2021, 11:37:14 AM
So are we close to concluding that "Did infantry lines fragment when advancing against enemy?" can be answered as "Infantry lines had to make significant efforts not to fragment when advancing against enemy"?
Certainly in the Middle Ages.
One interesting thing about Verneuil is both armies do advance against each other and, indeed, according to Wavrin, the English , as the two sides close, do run at the French after their steady approach.
Quote from: Mark G on September 06, 2021, 11:30:21 AM
Noted this in an article on Verneuil just now. (Michale K Jones 2002)
"Waurin related how the line of men-at-arms moved onto the offensive. Their only chance was to take the battle to the French before the Lombards reappeared. They showed extraordinary discipline. According to Waurin, the entire body went forward, keeping good order. The line would briefly pause, let out a shout, and then continue its advance (footnoted Waurin III .p74). The French also moved forward, hastily or eagerly, as some of the chronicles related, because they believed the battle was now theirs. In fighting between dismounted men-at-arms it was vital to keep formation. In these difficult circumstances hope now arose for the English. All sources agreed that the advancing French got out of alignment, some adding that the Viscount of Narbonne's contingent was ahead of its main battle and reached the English before the others. This was a multinational army, with Scots, Spaniards and Italians all fighting on the French side, and maintaining cohesion in an advance would have been particularly difficult. The English could use their full force in the forthcoming melee as the French units arrived piecemeal."
worth noting however, that the victory was ascribed in the end to great feats of individual heroism, mostly around saving banners which the men were using to guide them on who was winning beyond their immediate vision within the melee itself.
still, the point being that so much of the chronicles gave attention to the importance of maintaining formation into contact as offering a key advantage to the combat itself.
Doesn't that rather make toast of the chequerboard? By definition a collection of piecemeal contingents. ::)
(just a humble suggestion. No desire to stir the pot, no desire at all...)
QuoteDoesn't that rather make toast of the chequerboard? By definition a collection of piecemeal contingents.
Wavrin, as I understand him, says the two armies make a single battle each (though it would appear he is only talking of the men-at-arms here) , though both battles are in two commands. Where is the chequerboard or even the "piecemeal contingents"?
Quote from: Erpingham on September 06, 2021, 01:01:00 PM
QuoteDoesn't that rather make toast of the chequerboard? By definition a collection of piecemeal contingents.
Wavrin, as I understand him, says the two armies make a single battle each (though it would appear he is only talking of the men-at-arms here) , though both battles are in two commands. Where is the chequerboard or even the "piecemeal contingents"?
I was applying this
QuoteAll sources agreed that the advancing French got out of alignment, some adding that the Viscount of Narbonne's contingent was ahead of its main battle and reached the English before the others. This was a multinational army, with Scots, Spaniards and Italians all fighting on the French side, and maintaining cohesion in an advance would have been particularly difficult. The English could use their full force in the forthcoming melee as the French units arrived piecemeal.
to one of the conventional theories about the triplex acies, i.e. that the separate maniples fought as separate units and didn't form a continuous line. The fact that the English line had an advantage against French contingents of the battle arriving piecemeal suggested it. Admittedly rather off-topic.
I would say rather that the chequerboard was a formation that was designed not to need a continuous line, so was less concerned about fragmenting.
Whatever you think of the triplex acies, checkerboard deployments were used in the musket age, so there's presumably some utility to it.
I refer Justin back to the response I had to withdraw a few days ago
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on September 06, 2021, 01:57:11 PM
Whatever you think of the triplex acies, checkerboard deployments were used in the musket age, so there's presumably some utility to it.
Pike squares which had an anti-cavalry front facing 4 directions within which the musketeers could shelter. Not a fragmented line as such, but now we're really going off-topic. I'm starting to feel guilty.
Quote from: Duncan Head on September 06, 2021, 11:37:14 AM
So are we close to concluding that "Did infantry lines fragment when advancing against enemy?" can be answered as "Infantry lines had to make significant efforts not to fragment when advancing against enemy"?
I would agree with this. I would suggest that the default case was the line fragmenting. Discipline, training, NCOs prodding with their staffs, centurions hitting men with vine staffs, were all there to try and stop or at least delay this process
Quote from: Duncan Head on September 06, 2021, 11:37:14 AM
So are we close to concluding that "Did infantry lines fragment when advancing against enemy?" can be answered as "Infantry lines had to make significant efforts not to fragment when advancing against enemy"?
I hope so, since that was obviously the correct answer from the outset.
I am surprised that, having provoked the topic, Justin has not produced more examples and models.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 06, 2021, 05:19:54 PM
I am surprised that, having provoked the topic, Justin has not produced more examples and models.
Well, no. It wasn't my thread to begin with, though I'm genuinely interested in knowing to what extent infantry line fragmentation is a thing. But I hardly have the erudition to give examples from distant Antiquity to the end of the Middle Ages (and beyond). Thus far the thread has been an interesting learning process.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on September 06, 2021, 05:28:29 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on September 06, 2021, 05:19:54 PM
I am surprised that, having provoked the topic, Justin has not produced more examples and models.
Well, no. It wasn't my thread to begin with,
Your idea though
QuoteActually it's an excellent thread topic: "Did infantry lines fragment when advancing against enemy?
Glad you are learning stuff.
To add a non-medieval example, I noticed this in the collection of sources posted in the battles topic under Issus
"[Alexander] continued to lead on in line, at marching pace at first, though he now had Darius' force in view, to avoid any part of the phalanx fluctuating in a more rapid advance and so breaking apart. Arrian, Anabasis 2.10 (3)
Seems fairly clear that fast advance was the enemy of good order and a potential cause of breaking formation.