Roosebeke 1382 AD

[Erpingham]

Stepping outside the strict format on this one because what led to this was considering late medieval and renaissance infantry tactics elsewhere. 

The Battle of Roosebeke (or Rosebeke, Rosebecq or Westrozebeke) took place on 27th November 1382.  A French royal army confronted an army of Flemish communal militia led by Philip van Artevelde.  The exact numbers are unknown - perhaps 12-16000 French and 20-40,000 Flemings (though the Flemish wikepedia page put their numbers at 12,000 - less than the French).

The description is taken from The Chronicles of Froissart translated by John Bourchier, Lord Berners, edited by  Macaulay, G. C. , 1904.  This edition is conveniently online, as is the 19th century Johnes translation and even the Geoffrey Brereton Penguin translation from 1968.  I happen to like Berner's style and Macaulay has done his best to correct some mistakes, which I have exchanged for Berners text in what follows.  I've also cross checked for technical terms against the original French (also online at the Online Froissart project).

Froissart's Text

Then Philip d'Arteveld said softly to his captains: ' Let us dress us and make us ready to the battle, for our enemies are near us. I see right well the three knights that have passed and repassed by us have well aviewed our battle.' Then they drew all into one battle, as they went to the hill. Then Philip said aloud: ' Sirs, when we come to the battle, let us think on our enemies, how they were discomfited at the battle of Bruges by reason that we held ourselves close together. Let us be- ware that we open not : Let each bear his staff (baston) straight before him, and interlace your arms, so that none may enter in among you, whereby they shall not enter upon us : and let us go a good pace by leisure, and neither turn on the left hand nor on the right, and shoot our guns all at once and shoot with our crossbows, and thus we shall abash our enemies.'

When Philip d'Arteveld had thus ordered his men and set his battle in array and shewed them what they should do, then He set himself on a wing formed of those of his men in whom he had most trust..... Then he set beside him on a wing forty archers Englishmen, whom he had in wages.

So these three foresaid knights returned to the king and to the battles, the which were ready in good array as they ought to be : for there were many noble and wise men and well expert in arms both in the vaward and in the rearguard and in the king's battle, and they knew right well what ought to be done, for there was the flower of all the good chivalry of the world. ........Then it was ordained, that when they should join to fight, that the king's battle with the Oriflamme of France should be in the forefront, and the vaward should pass by aside on a wing on the one side of the king, and the rearward to pass by a little on the other side of the king, so that all three battles might at once close about the Flemings' battle, who came close together all in one battle.....

And so then the three knights departed from the king and went into the vaward, whereas their rooms were (i.e. where they were stationed). Then incontinent the Oriflamme was displayed, that sir Peter of Villiers did bear, and some say, as they have found written, that it was never before seen displayed against Chris- tian men.

......all the morning there was a great thick mist, that one could scant see another, but as soon as it was displayed and lift up on high, the mist brake away and the sky was as clear as any time in the year before. The lords of France were greatly rejoiced when they saw the sun shine so clear that they might see all about them: this greatly did recomfort them. It was great beauty then to regard the banners and streamers wave with the wind, and [all were silent nor none uttered a word, but] beheld well the great battle of the Flemings, 'And they came on at a good pace all close together, their staves(plançons) all held straight up on high (contremont), and the lances seemed like a little grove of wood, there were so many of them.

.......So thus approached the Flemings and began to shoot guns and arrows feathered with steel. Thus the battle began, the which was right sharp and fierce at the first encountering; for the Flemings set on proudly, thrusting with their spears and shoulders like wild boars, and they held themselves so close together that they could not be opened. There was with the shot of the guns at the first thrust slain of the French part the lord de Wavrin, banneret, Morelet of Halewyn and James d'Ere, and so there- with the king's battle was reculed ; but the vaward and the arearward passed on forth and enclosed about the Flemings and held them strait, I shall shew you how. On these two wings the men of arms fiercely assaulted, with their strong spears well headed with heads of fine steel, wherewith they pierced the Flemings' coats of mail into the hard bones, so that the Flemings were glad to eschew the strokes. So thus these men of arms kept the Flemings so short, that they could not well help them- selves, nor put down their arms to give any strokes ; so there were many that lost their strength and breath and fell one upon another, and so died for lack of breath without striking of any stroke. And there was Philip d'Arteveld wounded and beaten down among his men of Gaunt, .....

So the Flemings' battle was enclosed on both sides, so that they could pass no way: then the king's battle came forth again, the which was before a little drawn aback. The men of arms beat down the Flemings on every side : some had good axes of steel, wherewith they brake asunder bassenets, and some had malles of lead, wherewith they gave such strokes that they beat all down to the earth before them : and as the Flemings were beaten down, there were Pages (pillars – pillagers) ready to cut their throats with great knives, and so slew them without pity, as though they had been but dogs. The strokes on the bassenets were so great that no man could hear other speak for noise: I heard reported that though all the armourers of Paris and Brussels had been working together, could not have made so great a noise. There were some that advanced so sore into the press, that they were slain and overcome for lack of breath, as sir Louis of Cousan, a gentle knight of Berry, and sir Floton of Revel and divers other, which was great damage : but so great a battle as the Flemings were could not be overcome without great loss ; for young knights and squires will lightly advance themselves to get honour, and the press was so great and the business so perilous, that when they were in the thick of the press, they could not relieve themselves (relever – get up), but were trodden under foot to death ; and so by that means there were divers of the Frenchmen slain, but to no great number. The Flemings were slain by heaps, one upon another ; and when they that were behind saw the discomfiture of their company, they were abashed, and cast down their pavises and armours and turned and fled away toward Courtray and other places, and had mind of nothing but to save themselves ; and the Bretons and Frenchmen chased them through dikes, groves and bushes, and ever fought and slew them downright :

The nature of the battle

As said, what drew me to look at this battle again was discussions elsewhere about pike tactics.  The Swiss developed very successful deep formation pike/halberd formations during the 15th century.  The Flemish militias mustered similar deep masses but were less successful.  This battle is a fairly open field encounter - the militia advance down a hill in one battle against the French. 

Froissart has conveniently provided a speech explaining what he thinks the Flemish tactics were - form very tight with interlinked arms and head straight forward at the French.  The French, who we might note have sent a recce of senior knights to size up the opposition (pretty standard medieval practice), form in three battles.  It is less clear exactly how they do this.  The main battle is clearly on foot.  Modern commentators are divided on the flanking battles.   Tuchman and Sumption place them both on foot.  Others have them mounted.  Mounted makes sense to me, because the French plan is nice and simple - block the enemy advance with the main battle while enveloping him from flank and rear (another account of the battle has the French getting up the hill behind the Flemings and charging into their rear).

A quick word on the militias weapons.  This force is sometimes described as pikemen but that is not how Froissart described them - they have bastons and plancons - shorter staff weapons, possibly even godendags. 

The description of the militia attack is quite striking.  They advance as their artillery and crossbows and probably other archers provide a preliminary bombardment.  They lunge into the French like wild boars and force them back.  No foyning here.  Several knights go down and the French centre recoils.  This is essentially what happended when a close order an attack went in - compare the descriptions of Dupplin Moor and Agincourt.  The trick was to soak up the impetus and stop it.  Once stopped, the superior equipment and individual weapon skills of the French men-at-arms would tell.  Even from Froissart's French leaning perspective, the French centre had trouble here.  They would only start to push back after their wings had halted the Flemish advance.

The blocking tactics and flank and rear attacks produced one of the most unpleasant of medieval fights - a crush.  The Flemish mass is compressed from all sides to the point where they can't effectively defend themselves and they are slaughtered or crushed to death.  This also happened at Agincourt and Dupplin Moor, as did the pile up of bodies.  However, we should note that the French don't content themselves with shoving - they attempt to break up the enemy ranks wielding their axes and mauls.  Some break in too far, are swamped and killed.  The containment cannot be total - the militia break and flee to be ridden down by the French mounted forces.

So, comparison with our pike fighting tales.  The similarity of the techniques described by Monluc and Smythe for launching an effective pike attack - close up tight and go in hard - is reflected by what the militia try to do.  The French struggled to stop this but do enough to allow the envelopment to take place, stopping the enemy and allow the French main battle to go back on the offensive.

[Patrick Waterson]

A useful battle for illustrating and analysing infantry tactics and procedures of the period.

What struck me was the precautions the Flemings took against being interpenetrated, as if this was a common occurrence when troops did not stay close enough together to link arms.  I wonder whether Philip d'Artevelde was more concerned about interpenetration by infantry or by cavalry - just a thought from earlier discussiojns about Macedonian cavalry tactics.

Agreed that the French van and rear were most likely mounted; in addition to having the requisite mobility to implement flank attacks, their spears 'pierced the Flemings' coats of mail into the hard bones', which I would imagine is not so easy to do if on foot and without impetus.

Good analysis, at least in my opinion.

[Erpingham]

What struck me was the precautions the Flemings took against being interpenetrated, as if this was a common occurrence when troops did not stay close enough together to link arms.   

Two great evils .... can follow from a disordered formation: one is that enemies can easily break into it; the other is that the formations may be so compressed that they cannot fight. Thus it is important to keep the formation in ranks and tight and joined together like a wall
    — Christine de Pizan: Livre des faits et bonnes moeurs du sage roi Charles V


Christine refers to the battle of Roosebeke elsewhere in her writings so may well have had it in mind here.

Generally, avoiding disorder was high on any medieval army's agenda.

I wonder whether Philip d'Artevelde was more concerned about interpenetration by infantry or by cavalry

I would guess in this case the infantry, as they intended to go straight at them rather than form any kind of anti-cavalry defence.  Their lack of concern about cavalry is interesting.  The impression given by Froissart is that their plans of attack were laid well in advance, yet the battle started with the two armies unable to see each other because of fog.  There is also the implication that they originally intended to hold their position on the hill and let the French attack.  It is possible their plan of attack only came about when they saw the the majority (or all) the French force was dismounted.

[Patrick Waterson]

Seems reasonable.

We may incidentally note the prevalence of 'good axes of steel, wherewith they brake asunder bassenets, and some had malles of lead', perhaps picked up from English usage?  During the first phase of the Hundred Years War (AD 1346-60) French chivalry tended to rely on the sword in close combat, while Englishmen-at-arms used bascinet-penetrating axes to the discomfiture of their French opponents.  A lesson may have been learned.

The lead mauls are interesting, because English archers do not seem to have used these until the continuation war (AD 1415 onwards), so it seems that borrowing could work both ways.

[Erpingham]

Seems reasonable.

We may incidentally note the prevalence of 'good axes of steel, wherewith they brake asunder bassenets, and some had malles of lead', perhaps picked up from English usage?  During the first phase of the Hundred Years War (AD 1346-60) French chivalry tended to rely on the sword in close combat, while Englishmen-at-arms used bascinet-penetrating axes to the discomfiture of their French opponents.  A lesson may have been learned.

The lead mauls are interesting, because English archers do not seem to have used these until the continuation war (AD 1415 onwards), so it seems that borrowing could work both ways.

On lead mauls, they probably derive tools and may have been in ad hoc use for a while.  Mass production for military use seems to be a bit of a novelty in the year of Roosebeke though

     The first insurrection was that of the Paris mob, and was sparked off by a costermonger who, when an official tried to levy a tax on the fruit and vegetables he was selling, began to roar "Down with the gabelle!" At this cry, the whole populace rose, ran to the tax-collectors' houses and robbed and murdered them. Then, since the mob was unarmed, one of their number led them to the Chatelet where Bertrand de Guesclin, a former High Constable, had stored 3,000 lead-tipped cudgels in preparation for a battle which was to have been fought against the English. The rabble used axes to break their way into the tower where these cudgels or mallets (in French, maillets) were kept and, arming themselves, set forth in all directions to rob the houses of the King's representatives and in many cases to murder them. The popolo grasso, or men of substance who in French are called "bourgeois," fearing lest the mob (who were later called Maillotins and were of much the same kidney as the Ciompi in Florence) might rob them too, took arms and managed to subdue them. They then proceeded to take government into their own hands and, together with the Maillotins, continued the war against their royal lords.

Two Memoirs of Renaissance Florence: The Diaries of Buonaccorso Pitt and Gregorio Dati, edited by Gene Brucker

[Patrick Waterson]

Merci beaucoup.  (Intriguingly, this word for 'much' or 'many' en Francais seems to be derived from a good blow or strike.)

Interesting that du Guesclin seems to have initiated lead-tipped 'cudgels' (maillets, small malles?) for French service - presumably in quest of a better anti-armour weapon than the traditional knightly sword.

The reason I go on about this is that up to the Treaty of Bretigny the English seem to have had a very noticeable advantage over the French in dismounted melee, but this advantage seems to lessen or disappear during du Guesclin's time.  I suspect we may be beginning to see why.

[Jim Webster]

Merci beaucoup.  (Intriguingly, this word for 'much' or 'many' en Francais seems to be derived from a good blow or strike.)

Interesting that du Guesclin seems to have initiated lead-tipped 'cudgels' (maillets, small malles?) for French service - presumably in quest of a better anti-armour weapon than the traditional knightly sword.

It may not have been 'better' as in more effective, it may have been 'better' in that it was considerably cheaper. You could have them turned out by the thousand and stockpiled by the thousand ready to issue to mere infantry

[Andreas Johansson]

It might easily have been both. Armour continually improves during the HYW era, and traditional swords must have got progressively less useful. This is also the era were polearms proliferate.

[Erpingham]

The reason I go on about this is that up to the Treaty of Bretigny the English seem to have had a very noticeable advantage over the French in dismounted melee, but this advantage seems to lessen or disappear during du Guesclin's time.  I suspect we may be beginning to see why.

Other than success rate, any particular evidence to share on this superiority, or its technological basis? 

Certainly, there was some axe use in English armies prior to the 1360s (we might note the legendary Sir Hywell of the Axe, hero of Poitiers ), but we might also observe that Philip the fair was using an axe in the melee at the same battle and Du Guesclin himself favoured the axe, according to his biographer.

There does seem to be an increase in illustrations, records and historical references to axes and other pole weapons from the 1370s on though.  The improvement in armour does seem to be the reason.  It required a heavier weapon to break and also allowed the discarding of the shield, allowing that weapon to be wielded in two hands.

We might also observe that the developing of polearms didn't remove the use of other weapons entirely.  Swords (used for two handed thrusting or half-swording) were still there, as was the lance.  I suspect by this time battlefield use of lances on foot was mainly due to troops expecting to fight mounted adapting to the fact they hadn't brought a specialist foot melee weapon to the battle.

[Prufrock]

The Battle of Roosebeke (or Rosebeke, Rosebecq or Westrozebeke) took place on 27th November 1382....

Thanks Anthony, a good read.

[Patrick Waterson]

Other than success rate, any particular evidence to share on this superiority, or its technological basis?

Not a lot, sadly; what I have in mind is principally Henry of Lancaster's AD 1356 Normandy campaign, in which, assuming we can believe the chroniclers, on 11th July:

"Sixty men-at-arms and other soldiers lay in ambush, to do what mischief they might to our people, and with them 15 of our English men-at-arms fought and killed them all, which thing was held for a miracle."

The following day Robert Knollys with seven men-at-arms performed a bigger 'miracle' when they ran into another ambush consisting of 120 Frenchmen and "slew them all except three, which were taken at ransom".

These lopsided results suggest that English armour was fairly impervious to the weaponry wielded by the French whereas English weaponry was highly effective despite French armour.