Early Carthaginians

[Patrick Waterson]

From a brief discussion in the Currently Reading thread ...

The Early Carthaginian army, although fine at sieges, was traditionally infamously ineffective on the battlefield and usually remains so on the tabletop under most rules systems, although there are those who feel that it can still be 'reasonably effective when used right'.

What does this army consist of, and what are its strengths and weaknesses?  And how can it be made into/used as an effective fighting force?

Thoughts, gentlemen?

[Justin Swanton]

There is of course the question of how big those Early Carthaginian armies were... 

[Mick Hession]

In DBMM it has a core of poor quality Inferior regular spearmen supported by irregular light infantry (skirmishers and peltast types) and a strike force of chariots classed as Kn. It's big and well-balanced so isn't a bad choice for tournaments themed for the pre-500BC period ("Book 1" in DBx). I believe it rarely appears for themes with later dates, or in unthemed compeitions.

Cheers
Mick

[eques]

In Field of Glory they get to Field up to 2 BattleGroups of Superior, Missile Armed Heavy Chariots.

Heavy Chariots are very powerful in Field of Glory (especially if outside the High Biblical Period when everyone had them)

Anyway personally I don't care if an army is easy to win with, only that it is interesting and historically accurate,

[Chris]

Gents,

Recently received ADLG (purchased on Amazon [plug!] courtesy of a gift card from an employer) and have skimmed the rules along with reading the various educational and entertaining reports posted to TMP. Anyhow . . .

The Early Carthaginian list in ADLG contains heavy chariots (impact, can be elite) along with an assortment of foot. There is a "scared phalanx" in this list. While cavalry is present, it does not seem as capable as Punic War list Carthaginians. I cannot offer comments on how this list plays as I've just received the rules.

Generally speaking, the ADLG list seems similar to the list for  Early Carthaginians offered in the supplement for Hail Caesar. There is allowance for  up to 1 unit of Sacred Band heavy infantry with long spears along with other foot. Cavalry is  a mixed bag; players may choose medium artillery bolt throwers, and "up to 25% of the units fielded may be 4-horse chariots." While I have "played" HC, I have not commanded an Early Carthaginian army.

I have previously referenced the  EC list found in Armati 2nd Edition. I have played these rules but again, have no experience  with this particular army.

Off hand, it seems that the center or anchor would be the infantry phalanx of citizens or mercenaries. Perhaps the strike force would be the chariots followed up by cavalry?

I do not think that there is a list for  this army in/for To The Strongest!, though I could be mistaken.

I am certainly no expert on the Greek-Punic Wars. Perhaps I need to do some research and a test battle or  two?

Cheers,
Chris

[Tim]

The Early Carthaginian army, although fine at sieges, was traditionally infamously ineffective on the battlefield and usually remains so on the tabletop under most rules systems

...

Thoughts, gentlemen?

Patrick, while no gentleman, here are my throughts anyway.

I think that ADLG is one of those rules systems given the comments from Chris

'
There is a "scared phalanx" in this list
'

Regards
Tim

[Patrick Waterson]

There is a "scared phalanx" in this list

Which caused me some amusement, too (nicely spotted, Chris).  Perhaps it represents the Sacred Band at the Battle of the Crimisus (340 BC) - where things went wrong for the Carthaginians in so many ways that deities were suspected of foul play.

Plutarch, Life of Timoleon, chapter 25 and following (scroll about half-way down the page) describes the battle.  First, he gives a quick OB for both sides:

"Meanwhile the Carthaginians put in at Lilybaeum with an army of seventy thousand men, two hundred triremes, and a thousand transports carrying engines of war, four-horse chariots, grain in abundance, and other requisite equipment. Their purpose was, not to carry on the war by piece-meal any more, but at one time to drive the invading Greeks out of all Sicily; 2 for their force would have been sufficient to capture the native Greeks, even though they had not been politically weak and utterly ruined by one another. 3 And on learning that the territory which they controlled was being ravaged by the Corinthians, they were furious, and straightway marched against them under the command of Hasdrubal and Hamilcar. 4 Tidings of this coming quickly to Syracuse, the Syracusans were so terrified at the magnitude of the enemy's forces that only three thousand out of so many tens of thousands could with difficulty be brought to pluck up courage, take their arms, and go forth with Timoleon. 5 Furthermore, the mercenaries were only four thousand in number; and of these, again about a thousand played the coward on the march and went back to Syracuse, declaring that Timoleon was not in his right mind, but was more crazy than his years would lead one to expect, and was marching against seventy thousand of the enemy with five thousand foot and a thousand horse, and was taking his force a march of eight days away from Syracuse, so that those of them who fled from the field would find no safety, and those who fell upon it would have no burial. 6 As for these men, then, Timoleon counted it gain that they had shown what they were before the battle; the rest he encouraged and led them with all speed to the river Crimesus, where he heard that the Carthaginians also were concentrating."

[chapter 26 omitted - Timoleon receives some unmistakably good omens]

"Now, the season of the year was early summer, the month of Thargelion was drawing to a close, and the summer solstice was near; 2 the river exhaled a thick mist which at first hid the plain in darkness, and nothing could be seen in the enemy's camp, only an inarticulate and confused noise made its way up to the hill, showing that the vast host was moving forward. 3 But after the Corinthians had ascended the hill, where they stopped, laid down their shields, and rested themselves, the sun was passing the meridian and drawing the vapours on high, the thick haze moved in masses towards the heights and hung in clouds about the mountain summits, 4 while the regions below cleared up, the Crimesus came into view, and the enemy were seen crossing it, in the van their four-horse chariots formidably arrayed for battle, and behind these ten thousand men-at‑arms with white shields. 5 These the Corinthians conjectured to be Carthaginians, from the splendour of their armour and the slowness and good order of their march. 6 After these the other nations streamed on and were making the crossing in tumultuous confusion."

Whatever you do, never maker a river crossing in tumultuous confusion: it is seriously bad for the health.  Note how Timoleon deploys prettuy much as he wishes while the Carthaginians are stuck with their original lineup and cannot effectively redeploy.

"Then Timoleon, noticing that the river was putting it in their power to cut off and engage with whatever numbers of the enemy they themselves desired, and bidding the soldiers observe that the phalanx of the enemy was sundered by the river, since some of them had already crossed, while others were about to do so, ordered Demaretus to take the horsemen and fall upon the Carthaginians and throw their ranks into confusion before their array was yet formed. 7 Then he himself, descending into the plain, assigned the wings to the other Sicilian Greeks, uniting a few of his mercenaries with each wing, while he took the Syracusans and the best fighters among his mercenaries under his own command in the centre. 8 Then he waited a little while, watching what his horsemen would do, and when he saw that they were unable to come to close quarters with the Carthaginians on account of the chariots which coursed up and down in front of their lines, but were forced to wheel about continually that their ranks might not be broken, and to make their charges in quick succession after facing about again, 9 he took up his shield and shouted to his infantrymen to follow and be of good courage; and his voice seemed stronger than usual and more than human, whether it was from emotion that he made it so loud, in view of the struggle and the enthusiasm which it inspired, or whether, as most felt at the time, some deity joined in his utterance. 10 Then, his men re-echoing his shout, and begging him to lead them on without delay, he signalled to his horsemen to ride along outside and past the line of chariots and attack the enemy on the flank, while he himself made his vanguard lock their shields in close array, ordered the trumpet to sound the charge, and fell upon the Carthaginians."

In fact, the Carthaginian infantry turns out to be quite good, but then the gods take a hand.

"But these withstood his first onset sturdily, and owing to the iron breastplates and bronze helmets with which their persons were protected, and the great shields which they held in front of them, repelled the spear thrusts. 2 But when the struggle came to swords and the work required skill no less than strength, suddenly, from the hills, fearful peals of thunder crashed down, and vivid flashes of lightning darted forth with them. 3 Then the darkness hovering over the hills and mountain summits came down to the field of battle, mingled with rain, wind, and hail. It enveloped the Greeks from behind and smote their backs, but it smote the Barbarians in the face and dazzled their eyes, a tempest of rain and continuous flames dashing from the clouds. 4 In all this there was much that gave distress, and most of all to the inexperienced; and particularly, as it would seem, the peals of thunder worked harm, and the clatter of the armour smitten by the dashing rain and hail, which made it impossible to hear the commands of the leaders. 5 Besides, since the Carthaginians were not lightly equipped, but, as I have said, encased in armour, both the mud and the bosoms of their tunics filled with water impeded them, so that they were unwieldy and ineffective in their fighting, and easily upset by the Greeks, 6 and when they had once fallen it was impossible for them to rise again from the mud with their weapons."

Shades of Agincourt here, suggesting the Carthaginian Sacred Band were rather too well-armoured for their own good.  Somehow the Carthaginians never quite managed to get the relationships-with-deities thing really working for them.

"For the Crimesus, having been already greatly swollen by the rains, was forced over its banks by those who were crossing it, and the adjacent plain, into which many glens and ravines opened from the hills, was filled with streams that hurried along no fixed channels, and in these the Carthaginians wallowed about and were hard beset. 8 Finally, the storm still assailing them, and the Greeks having overthrown their first rank of four hundred men, the main body was put to flight. 9 Many were overtaken in the plain and cut to pieces, and many the river dashed upon and carried away to destruction as they encountered those who were still trying to cross, but most of them the light-armed Greeks ran upon and despatched as they were making for the hills. 10 At any rate, it is said that among ten thousand dead bodies, three thousand were those of Carthaginians — a great affliction for the city. 11 For no others were superior to these in birth or wealth or reputation, nor is it recorded that so many native Carthaginians ever perished in a single battle before, but they used Libyans for the most part and Iberians and Numidians for their battles, and thus sustained their defeats at the cost of other nations."

Ten thousand Sacred Bandsmen with a frontage of 400 suggests a depth of 25 (exactly), which may be a useful depth rule-of-thumb for Early Carthaginian infantry.  Once the first rank was down they became a 'scared phalanx' and yet a considerable number of them seem to have got away, armour and all, if 7,000 of the 10,000 bodies on the Punic side were not Carthaginians.

This battle gives us possibly our best description of an Early Carthaginian army in action, and one may note the use of chariots as a vanguard and also the apparent lack of effective cavalry, although the latter may be more the result of an inhibition arising from bad experiences in 480 BC when a vast army ran into a storm while crossing; the infantry made it but the cavalry did not.  Or the Carthaginian cavalry may have been waiting their turn to cross while everyone else traversed the river in order of prestige.  Either way, they appear to have left the Greek cavalry a free hand.

The Carthaginians made a pretty poor showing here, but weather and terrain were seriously against them.  That said, leadership seems rarely to have been a strong point in Early Carthaginian armies, but the 70,000-strong force mustered for this campaign did make almost everyone in Sicily (apart from Timoleon) think that it would all be over.  These armies were evidently not regarded with contempt by their opponents.

[Erpingham]

Interesting to see the role of the chariots in screening.  Given the discussion aboveof them being heavy assault vehicles in most lists, it was a bit of a surprise.  Is there other evidence for the role of the chariots?  Perhaps their role here is abnormal, given the tactical situation?

[Patrick Waterson]

It could be: 1) they were crossing a river and 2) they do not seem to have expected serious opposition from Timoleon's diminutive contingent, or thought there would not be enough of it to matter.  You or I would probably have had the cavalry across first and scouring the countryside ahead of the main body's crossing, but not Messrs Hasdrubal and Hamilcar.

That said, the Carthaginian chariots are described as being 'arrayed for battle', so it looks to me as if the Carthaginian commanders were accustomed to using them as an intimidatory, or at least inhibitory, screen prior to any duty as a shock force.  And, for the first part of the engagement, it was working; when Timoleon sent in his cavalry, they were:

"... unable to come to close quarters with the Carthaginians on account of the chariots which coursed up and down in front of their lines, but were forced to wheel about continually that their ranks might not be broken, and to make their charges in quick succession after facing about again ..."

What the chariots proposed to do next is academic, because Timoleon led his infantry down in a solid line from the heights, "made his vanguard lock their shields in close array, ordered the trumpet to sound the charge, and fell upon the Carthaginians."  This seems to have been the cue for the chariots to vanish from sight by means unknown, for the very next sentence has Timoleon's men in a close infantry struggle with the Carthaginians.

So where did the chariots go?  Not out to the flanks, because a) Timoleon had redeployed his cavalry there to hit the flanks of the Carthaginians and b) the Greek infantry, if deployed 8 deep as was customary, would have overlapped the 400-yard Carthaginian infantry (and hence presumably also chariot) frontage by 225 yards, or 112.5 yards on either side.  This leaves two options for the chariots: 1) die in place; 2) file back through the Sacred Band.  1) would disorder the Greeks to an extent; 2) would presumably disorder the Sacred Band to a much greater extent.  Neither is mentioned as happening, although much may be concealed in:

"But these withstood his first onset sturdily, and owing to the iron breastplates and bronze helmets with which their persons were protected, and the great shields which they held in front of them, repelled the spear thrusts. 2 But when the struggle came to swords and the work required skill no less than strength, suddenly, from the hills, fearful peals of thunder crashed down, and vivid flashes of lightning darted forth with them. 3 Then the darkness hovering over the hills and mountain summits came down to the field of battle, mingled with rain, wind, and hail. It enveloped the Greeks from behind and smote their backs, but it smote the Barbarians in the face and dazzled their eyes, a tempest of rain and continuous flames dashing from the clouds. 4 In all this there was much that gave distress, and most of all to the inexperienced; and particularly, as it would seem, the peals of thunder worked harm, and the clatter of the armour smitten by the dashing rain and hail, which made it impossible to hear the commands of the leaders. 5 Besides, since the Carthaginians were not lightly equipped, but, as I have said, encased in armour, both the mud and the bosoms of their tunics filled with water impeded them, so that they were unwieldy and ineffective in their fighting, and easily upset by the Greeks, 6 and when they had once fallen it was impossible for them to rise again from the mud with their weapons."

As for what happened to chariots and their crews, chapter 29 notes:

"The rank of those who had fallen was made known to the Greeks from the spoils. For those who stripped the bodies made very little account of bronze and iron; so abundant was silver, so abundant gold. For they crossed the river and seized the camp with its baggage-trains. 2 As for the prisoners, most of them were stolen away and hidden by the soldiers, but as many as five thousand were delivered into the public stock; there were also captured two hundred of the four-horse chariots."

This does not make clear where the chariots were captured: in the mud of the Crimesus or the dubious safety of the camp.  If the latter, they may have offloaded their combatants to fight in the first rank of the Sacred Band and somehow made their way back across the river at the height of the flood against the press of the remainder of the army, which seems quite a task, so I prefer to conjecture that they were overrun by the cohesive Greek infantry advance without noticeable effect on the latter.  Traces would have been cut, crewmen speared and Greek files would have flowed around the temporary obstruction of the chariot body.

Which brings us to the question of what these chariots could do and were expected to do.

In essence, the principal influence and effect of the Carthaginian four-horse chariots would seem to be to cause a morale or cohesion test among opponents which, if failed, prevents closure - and if passed allows the chariots to be assailed without further ado.

One may extend this to suggesting that their effect when attacking would be to cause a morale or cohesion test which, if failed, allows the chariots to interpenetrate or pass through their opponents, perhaps causing the latter to make a further (penalised) morale test to stand against/rout from the chariots or anything following the chariots into action.  Success in the opposition's initial morale/cohesion test would cause the chariots to lose cohesion and not be particularly effective (especially in pelting rain on muddy ground), either aborting their attack or not fighting at full effect.

This more or less corresponds with yours truly's various cogitations about the effect of chariots during the Biblical and Classical periods, when the chariot was for a long while the premier battlefield combat arm but lost its primary position as opposing cavalry became more capable and infantry better trained, motivated and disciplined.  If its main effect was on morale, then as long as most of an opponent's army was of poor or indifferent morale or could be caught on the hop (as at Kadesh), chariotry would rule the battlefield.