A MAKESHIFT MODEL OF MANTINEA

[Chris]

To celebrate my recent purchase of ARMATI 2 and return to the familiar folds of this well-fortified and world-wide camp, I thought it might prove engaging and entertaining to attempt a refight of the Second Battle of Mantinea.

At the acknowledged risk of being taken to task by academics, I relied solely upon the map, order of battle, and summary explanation found on page 65 of WARFARE IN THE CLASSICAL WORLD. At the accepted risk of being verbally tarred and feathered by miniature enthusiasts, I fielded two-dimensional cardboard armies designed on my computer [1].

In very little time, I had a functional and fairly colorful battlefield set up on my six by four-foot tabletop. Granted, I would never win any awards for the look on my table, but that was not my purpose. I wanted to get reacquainted with ARMATI. I was also interested in testing a scenario-specific rule concerning the depth and impetus of the Theban phalanx commanded by Epaminondas.

Late on the morning of 15 February, I sat back and admired my "work." The steep ridge lines which served as bookends for the Allied hoplites were quite evident, as were the woods behind the Allied position. The majority of the tabletop was unremarkable. I decided not to represent the road that ran along the Theban right and then through the Athenian hoplite formations. I also decided against including the small river or stream (it is not named in the referenced diagram) as this terrain feature evidently did not have any impact on the historical engagement. I do wonder about this though, as it appears that the massive Theban phalanx crossed this "obstacle" on its way into the Allied right and the stream does intersect the line formed by the 7,000-strong contingent of Mantinean hoplites. 

With regard to initial deployments, I tried to replicate Phase 3 of the aforementioned diagram on my table. Standing with the Spartan king (behind the Spartan contingent of course), from left to right, the Allied line consisted of: 6 units of Athenians, 2 units of Achaeans, 2 units of Elians, 3 units of Spartans, and 7 units of Mantineans. (A scale of  1 unit represents 1,000 hoplites was established for this project.) The flanks of the Allied position were screened/guarded by cavalry and light troops. (These units were based on a scale of 1 unit equals approximately 500 men.) On the far left flank, there was a unit of peltasts, a unit of light cavalry, and a unit of heavy cavalry. The right flank hosted the same units of horse but replaced the peltasts with a unit of skirmishing slingers.

In terms of control ratings and break points, I decided to give the Allies 5 heavy divisions and 4 light divisions. As to break points, I did not count any of the cavalry or light troops as key units. The Mantinean contingent was allotted a break point of 3 key units. The Spartans were given a break point of 2 key units. The Athenians and other contingents were granted a break point of 4 key units.

On the other side of the flat field of Mantinea, the Thebans were also assigned 4 light  divisions. To better reflect and represent the echelon approach of the heavy infantry, the Thebans and their allies were awarded 8 heavy divisions. In contrast to the Allied army, the Theban and Thessalian heavy cavalry in the employ of Epaminondas were classed as key units. In further contrast, I decided to treat the Thebans and their allies as a single army and not an alliance of various city states. Epaminondas would be defeated with the loss of 10 key units (any combination of hoplites and heavy cavalry).

The atypically deep Theban phalanx was deployed approximately 42 centimeters from the Mantinean hoplites. Five units of hoplites were arranged in depth, followed by five more units directly behind. Epaminondas was attached to the center unit in the first line. To the left of this impressive formation there was a four-unit formation of skirmishers and peltasts. Further to the left was a unit of light cavalry. About 6 centimeters behind the light infantry and slingers/javelinmen, there was a two-unit line of heavy horse. A similar deployment was found on the far right flank of the battle line. The main difference here was that the Argive contingent of hoplites were not deployed in depth. These 5,000  heavy infantry had the greatest distance to cover before reaching the enemy line. Proceeding right to left - up the staircase as it were - the Locrians were next in line. These hoplites marched along with the contingents from Euboea and Malis. Sicyonese hoplites were to the left of this group, with 2,000 Thessalian hoplites completing the line before the massive formation of Boeotian hoplites.

According to page E of ARMATI 2, all Greek armies have an initiative rating of 4. Given that Epaminondas was on the offensive, I increased the Theban initiative rating to 5 and left the Mantinean/Spartan/Athenian alliance at 4.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE REFIGHT
The light troops and cavalry of both sides were quickly engaged and due to their superior numbers (and better dice), the formations under Epaminondas were able to rout their counterparts. However, a unit of pesky enemy slingers was able to inflict some damage on the left-most unit of the large Theban phalanx. On the right flank of the offensive, two units of Thessalian cavalry found themselves trapped between opposing lines of hoplites. (This was a bit of a departure from the historical "script." The Athenian contingent and other allied units stepped off and began marching forward to meet the enemy.) An attempt was made against the advancing Athenian heavy infantry. It did not go well. Soon, it was just hoplite versus hoplite. Here too, things did not go very well for the forces under the overall command of Epaminondas. It was not a pushover for the Athenians, to be sure. Many casualties were suffered by both sides and many units were soon exhausted by the ferocity of the combat.

On reaching the Mantineans, the Theban phalanx did not "crash" into and through it so much as floundered against an unexpectedly stubborn defense. Five deep phalanx units, supported by another five deep units, bumped into four units of Mantinean hoplites. It took three melee rolls before a unit of Mantineans broke and ran. The other  units stood firm against the pressure. (Sidebar: Under ARMATI, heavy infantry phalanx units are not given impetus. For this refight, I granted the deep units of Thebans impetus and gave them a +1 bonus for the extra depth on the first turn of melee. The stationary units of Mantineans did not deny the impetus, but would not be routed if they lost the melee. Instead, the Mantinean hoplite units would lose 3 BPs. [Typically, a heavy infantry unit has 4 BPs.] On subsequent turns of melee, the Thebans could only benefit from extra depth and so, would add 1 to their melee roll.)

While the Thebans continued to struggle with the Mantineans, the units following on the right flank of the massive formation reached the Allied line. Thessalians battled more Mantineans and the Sicyonese hoplites were roughly handled by the Spartans. In broad terms, the fighting extended from one end of the field to the other. Winning the initiative did not really help Epaminondas, as the Argives and other contingents were beginning to fail on the right. Much to his chagrin, the phalanx picked upon by enemy slingers broke in melee against the line of enemy hoplites. Fortunately, the unit directly behind was not carried along in the rout. The Mantinean hoplites finally did give way under the grinding pressure of the Theban formation. The Spartans, even though they had lost one-third of their force, were continuing to beat up on the Sicyonese.

According to the terms established before the first move was made, the loss of another unit of Sicyonese hoplites was the tipping point for the Theban army. Its morale was broken and even though the Matineans were no more, Epaminondas did not have any friends left on his right flank. An argument could be made for a draw, seeing as both armies had destroyed the right flank of their enemy. However, the break point totals could not be ignored. The loss of the Mantineans had been significant but it had not broken the Spartans or the other allied contingents. The destruction of the Theban right and the resistance to the impressive phalanx resulted in a defeat for Epaminondas.

ASSESSMENT
My makeshift model of Mantinea served its dual purpose. I was able to get reacquainted with ARMATI and I was able to test a scenario-specific rule amendment regarding the significant depth of the Theban phalanx. I confess that I was a little rusty at first, but as soon as a few turns were played, I was moving at a fairly rapid pace through the turn sequence and melee areas. The scenario-specific rule amendment functioned well enough, I suppose. The dice prevented the Thebans from completely smashing the Mantinean defenders. There is of course, always room for improvement. Perhaps I should have granted the Thebans a plus 2 modifier on the first round of melee? Then again, I cannot imagine that I will be replaying Mantinea anytime soon.

On reflection, I was definitely engaged by the project. I was not as entertained, unfortunately. Hoplite versus hoplite combat with ARMATI tends to be drawn out and repetitive. (I would hazard a guess that this is the case with many rule sets.) While finding the right mix of rule variations still eludes me and determining the best size of counters remains a work in progress (it was noted that my current hoplite stands became very crowded with casualty and fatigue markers during the game), I am looking forward to conducting more inexpensive experiments (both historical and fictional) with the ultimate goal of finding that right rule mix and perfect counter size.





Notes
[1]   I see that boxes of plastic 28mm hoplites are available from Warlord Games. Some assembly is required, but 42 figures can be obtained for 32 dollars. At a scale of 1:48 (each figure representing a block of heavy infantry 8 across by 6 deep, thereby allowing a 12-deep phalanx of 960 men to be represented by 20 figures arranged in 2 lines of 10), the interested ancients wargamer would need roughly 960 figures to represent the 46,000 hoplites present at the historical battle. This would require an investment of around 730 dollars. This figure does not include cost of paints, brushes, and basing material. Further, the figure does not include the cost of light infantry, cavalry, and skirmishers. Fifteen-millimeter hoplites can be obtained from Tin Solider. These are sold in 8-figure packs. It would cost just over 400 dollars to collect the 960 hoplite figures required to field both armies at Second Mantinea. Again, this estimate does not include the cost of paints, basing material, or additional non-hoplite figures. Baccus offers 96 figures in its Ancients packs. Only 10 packs of hoplites need to be purchased to stage Mantinea in 6mm scale. The financial investment would be around 83 dollars. However, if one wanted to take advantage of the "mass appeal" of these tiny but excellent figures, the scale could be adjusted to 1:24 and so, result in an outlay of about 170 dollars for just the hoplite component of the armies engaged at Mantinea.

For sake of comparison, my cardboard counters were made for about 13 dollars. 

[Mark G]

Hoplite fights are always hard to get going without introducing wierd ingame mechanisms.

Bet it looked great though

[Justin Swanton]

No photos of those 2D cardboard bases? I do the same myself. 

[aligern]

Unfirtunatelyhoplite combat has to be a bit drawn out be ause there is n't that much happening and it is not very satisfa ctiry to have obe side or the other collapse at first contact.


In Armati units or base rlements bo not line up. they always contact on the basis that the lines are slightlyoverlapped on one side. That way, frequently one unit will be fighting two units.

If you deploy the columh as Armati units in deep formation then you will get more units fighting in the same frontage.

It then becomes crucial  as to who wins initiative because the player who wins it will get the choice of melee direction and thus choose where his two units fight one of the enemy. I see that you gave the Thebans better initiative. Frankly I would give them a 6 and the Spartans only a 4.

Where the Theban column is concerned it should have the advantage of having two or maybe three units in contact with one of the enemy. If you add in Epaminondas then that is a +1 for one unit. You should win!


Rodger Williams and I experimented with a technique for replicating othismos: Before combat took place the side that won initiative could go for an othismos push. Both sides throw a die and add their initiative factor. The winner has carried out a successful othismos and gets a +1in the melee on their fighting factors.
If you have rejigged the initiatives as suggested above, you can , if desired, change that ffor  the Othismos initiative to make it fairer or more imbalanced.
You can, if you wish, play the othismos for all hoplites on a side or separately by contingent if these operate apart.  So you could give the Thebans themselves an othismos initiative of 6 and all other hoplite units on both sides a 4. That would give an advantage to the column i make a feature of Epaminondas' 'Give me one more push'.

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

I get the impression that the Mantineans would have been bowled over in short order had it not been for unusual dice results: iIf this was the case, i.e. they would have folded sooner given normal/average dice rolls, then no further adjustment is needed.

To my mind, the reason for the seeming anomaly lies elsewhere.

If the entire Theban phalanx were treated as a single unit rather than as an assemblage of ten units, this would ensure it succeeded or failed (in spectacular fashion) as a single entity.  Treating it as separate units for morale/organisation/combat makes its piecemeal destruction likely.  If Armati has no provision for single enormous units then I suggest writing one. 

This actually raises a wider question: when on the battlefield does unit organisation cease to correspond with morale grouping?  We often see whole armies start to crack at much the same time, or separate wings fold leaving the rest of the army barely affected.  Some sets have rules for commands, which are distinct morale entities, but within these it seems usual that a unit is a unit is a unit with its own morale agenda rather than that a number of units stand or fall together, perceiving themselves as one morale entity.

In the Roman army the morale entity was usually the legion, in that one does not seem to get individual cohorts running off while the legion is still standing, but once the legion as a whole goes it is rare to find any of its component cohorts bucking the trend.  It also seems rare to have individual legions dropping out of the line, so the actual battlefield morale entity may be the wing - one legion plus one ala in a typical Republican consular army, two alae in a double consular army, with the four-legion centre being its own morae entity - while in a late Republican army (Sulla, Caesar, Sertorius) the morale entities seem to be the two wings and the centre.

All of which suggests that the Theban phalanx is perhaps best treated as a single morale entity, its subunits being considered merged into one macro-unit about 5,000 strong.

That is my thinking, anyway.

[Erpingham]

There are a number of problems with treating whole sections of the battleline as a single entity.  Granted, it is, in the circumstances of a hoplite battle a fair simulation but, from a purely gaming angle, it is a bit dull.  Secondly, how do we handle the subtleties within it e.g. the varying qualities of hoplite contingents?

Likewise, how do we follow Patrick's example and base Roman morale on whole legions, if we don't represent the legion as the operational unit?  A legion might not break up by cohorts or maniples but nor do the men at the front continue like robots , dying to the last man, because they have the rest of the legion in support.  I admit, while accepting the effect of the support of others which allows units to continue long after they would have broken if isolated, I really don't know how it works.

[Patrick Waterson]

Sensible and relevant observations.  In real life morale of such super-agglomerations of troops depends upon a spreading perception that things are going well or not well and that it may be time for the individual to look to his own future.  The question is how such perceptions spread through a mass of troops that size.

This in turn ties in with troop orientation, which tends to be fixed on what they can see and hear - the battle-shout, the standard, the cries of the fallen.  If the line is falling back, with shouts of dismay from up front, nerves are going to kick in, and it is at this point that the leader needs to get the standard bearer to raise up the standard, the trumpeters to sound the advance, the uncommitted ranks to raise the war-cry and the focus back on doing unto the foe rather than worrying about him doing unto you.  Failing this the men in the rear begin to flinch back, the standard wobbles as restless and apprehensive men surge against the bearer, and it takes very little for panic to ensue.  If the line is going forward, shouts of victory are coming from ahead, the standard is advancing then the individuals behind the fighting will advance with a right good will.

On the tabletop we lack these cues.  Much will depend upon the morale provisions of the rules system used, but the only cues we usually have are what is happening with the individual units in front - are they doing well or badly, or neither?

DBM(M) can consider the collected contingents as a single command, so that when the 'break point' us reached in terms of lost elements then the whole assemblage goes.

WRG is less able to simulate this, because there are no provisions for units over 50 (or 60) figures, so 5,000 Thebans perforce end up as 250 WRG 6th or 100 WRG 7th figures in two or five units, each of which can be hammered and break separately, though its departure will influence its neighbours, who will have to test for the occurrence.

... how do we handle the subtleties within it e.g. the varying qualities of hoplite contingents?

The theory is that these have different combat ratings but joint morale, usually the morale of the predominant, or in some cases the best, contingent.

A legion might not break up by cohorts or maniples but nor do the men at the front continue like robots , dying to the last man, because they have the rest of the legion in support.  I admit, while accepting the effect of the support of others which allows units to continue long after they would have broken if isolated, I really don't know how it works.

Group psychology, mainly: normally men see their 'group' as their file or their syntagma/speira/century/maniple/lochos.  Assembled in a battleline they see their 'group' as their legion, taxis, wing of the army or whatever, but only if they have trained with it and in it, know the commander, etc.  Simply throwing together a lot of disparate individuals or contingents and telling them they are now a battle formation does nothing for their cohesion and still leaves them with just their immediate neighbours as their 'group', so that portions of the line will leak away the moment adversity strikes, setting a bad and very contagious example for the rest.

Hence only formations that have practised together should be able to be treated as a single super-entity.  Strangers thrown together would remain so many separate contingents (or individuals) no matter how closely or seamlessly they are packed together.  Achaemenid armies seem to have been particular sufferers from this condition: grouping a mass of Pactyans, Utians, Mycians or Paricanians together with Persians proper does not seem to have added any actual effectiveness to the assemblage as a whole.

[Erpingham]

... how do we handle the subtleties within it e.g. the varying qualities of hoplite contingents?

The theory is that these have different combat ratings but joint morale, usually the morale of the predominant, or in some cases the best, contingent.

OK in theory - the general idea occurs frequently in medieval rules, where you put some dismounted men-at-arms in an infantry block to stiffen morale.  To use old WRG language, if you use the morale of the best, sneaky wargamers will boost hordes of D class to A class by adding a few elites.  If you use the morale of the predominant, you need a force to be over 50% A class.  And, of course, you need to be clear whether it is predominant at the beginning or whether it is an ongoing assessment.  The reason I raise these difficulties is that I did try to work a system based on ongoing assessment of proportions in one of my early attempts and got into a complex mess.  So, I wouldn't recommend a constantly recalculated system.  However, a system where you calculate a composite morale at the beginning and apply it throughout might work better.

[Patrick Waterson]

That makes sense.  To be a bit clearer (I hope) the idea is to use the morale of the most numerous contingent or, if these are equal, the most prestigious contingent (Spartans in a Spartan army; Godfrey of Bouillon's contingent in a 1097-99 Crusader wing) or, if there is no obvious prestige contingent, the best troops (first cohort in a legionary line).

Hence an 800-strong legionary first cohort can set the standard for legionary group morale (it anyway carries the eagle so this is more or less how things were in real life).  In a collection of 200-strong Macedonian ilai, the 300-strong royal ile sets the tone.  In a collection of Hundred Years War Free Companions, the largest contingent or (if numbers are equal) the C-in-C's contingent sets the morale for that sector (or 'battle').

Usually armies set their wings (and centre) with a primus inter pares level of morale: there was not much to choose from between one lot of Spartan hoplites or French gendarmes and the one next to it.  The interesting part comes when players try to use good troops as a crutch for bad troops - the bad ones will stay in line, but they will still be bad.  Hence the good troops are liable to find their flanks suddenly exposed as their less capable brethren are pushed back leaving a carpet of bodies to mark their unavailing attempts to stay in line with their betters.

This kind of approach works best if morale is independent of combat performance, e.g. in WRG 6th.  If the morale rating is the combat rating, this approach simply will not work.

If you use the morale of the predominant, you need a force to be over 50% A class.  And, of course, you need to be clear whether it is predominant at the beginning or whether it is an ongoing assessment.

Indeed.  If a force is predominant at the beginning it can be assumed to stay that way until it cracks (routs and/or disintegrates), at which point the rest of the group will follow suit anyway.

I would further suggest that regulars cannot be used to create a morale group with irregulars; the philosophy and way of life was usually rather different even if they did all follow the same banner.

[Chris]

Thanks to all for taking the time to read and additional thanks to those who took time to comment.

Roy - Appreciate the feedback and the idea about "one more push." It's something I shall consider when I stage hoplite battles in the future.

And I must say that it's always interesting to watch where the discussion leads on this forum. Feels a bit like university, and I don't mean that in a bad way 

Chris

[Mark G]

if only there were more undergraduate women kicking about ...