"Crazy" for Chaeronea - Part 3

[Chris]

"CRAZY" FOR CHAERONEA - PART 3


Two attempts to stage a Hail Caesar version of the historical battle having proved unsuccessful, I decided to cut my losses, chalk the failed experiments up to experience, and focus on an IMPETVS interpretation of the debut of Alexander. [1]

For my IMPETVS version of Chaeronea, I decided to go with a flat and featureless tabletop. The acropolis would be on the Athenian left but off the table. The river Cephissus and its reportedly marshy banks would be on the Theban right but again, off the actual table. [2] Having addressed concerns about the terrain of the miniature battlefield, I turned to a consideration of the orders of battle. [3]

The army of the Greek Alliance consisted of three commands. The far left flank of the defensive line was held by 4 large units of hoplites. These heavy infantry were assisted by 3 units of skirmishers and 2 units of peltasts. Chares was the general in charge of this group. He was rated as a "fair" general, meaning he gave a +2 leadership bonus to rally attempts as well as helped his formation with passing cohesion tests. The command structure for this group on the left flank of the combined army was "average," which meant that Chares could influence his troops from as far as 30 centimeters away. The Total Demoralization Value of this command was 22 points, which meant that it would be broken and removed from the table when 11 points worth of units were destroyed.

The second command of the Greek Alliance was under the control of Lysicles. He was also a "fair" general and enjoyed the benefits of an "average" command structure. In addition to 4 large units of Athenian hoplites, 2 units of skirmishers and 1 unit of peltasts, he also commanded 5 large units of Allied hoplites. These heavy infantry, drawn from a number of city-states, occupied the center of the line. Though they lacked any skirmisher screen or light infantry support, the hoplites from various city-states were slightly better than their Athenian counterparts. The Total Demoralization Value or TDV of the force under Lysicles was 40 points. It would quit the field when 20 points worth of units had been routed and or destroyed. [4]

The third and final command of the Greek army was composed entirely of Thebans. These tough troops were led by Theagenes, an "expert" general, who also enjoyed the reach of an "average" command structure. An impressive 10 large units of hoplite infantry were joined by 4 units of skirmishers and 3 units of light infantry. The Sacred Band completed this dominated-by-heavy-infantry roster. The TDV of the Theban contingent of the Allied army was 51 points. They would retreat when 26 points of units had been broken by the enemy. [5]

In contrast, the Macedonian army deployed just two commands. The right was under the "genius" leadership of King Philip II, while the left was guided by his "charismatic" son Alexander. The king's wing contained 4 units of light infantry, 4 units of skirmishers, 3 large units of hypaspists, and 12 large units of pikemen. Three of these large units were formed with the hypaspists to create one large group. The other two groups or phalanxes contained 5 large and 4 large units, respectively, of experienced pikemen. [6] King Philip II enjoyed a "good" command structure. He would be able to influence troops within 50 centimeters of his person. The TDV for his command was 74 points, so 37 points worth of Macedonian units would have to be routed before the king would quit the field.

His son Alexander was categorized as a "charismatic" general and was blessed with a "good" command structure to go along with his good looks. [7] He had 12 large units of pikemen in his employ as well as 3 units of heavy cavalry. In addition to these veteran units, Alexander had 1 unit of light cavalry, 3 units of skirmishers, and 2 units of peltasts.
The TDV for the left wing of the Macedonian juggernaut was 64 points. Alexander would quit the field or more likely, die in the process, when 32 points of his force were routed.

SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
Photos of my miniature-less staging of Chaeronea can be viewed at the following site: http://lonewarriorswa.com/currently-playing-on-my-tabletop. A traditional and significantly more visually appealing model of the historical battle is available at this site: http://soa.org.uk/showsblog/index.php?id=3719089004494397052.


The dice appeared to have it in for the Greek army, as in the first couple of turns of the battle, both Athenian generals saw their capability decline from "fair" to "poor." Father and son dominated the early turns of the contest, as their leadership bonus proved too  great for any of the Greek commanders. However, instead of waiting passively for the various phalanxes to roll into contact with their defensive line, the Thebans and the hoplites under Lysicles marched towards the leveled pike points.

Light troops and skirmishers on both flanks were soon engaged, and here too, the dice seemed to favor King Philip and Alexander. However, skirmishers ranged in front of Lysicles' Athenian contingent were able to disorder two units of the king's central division as they approached. The extreme right of the Theban position was in danger of being flanked by enemy peltasts and skirmishers. The Sacred Band moved obliquely to counter this threat and soon found itself harried and hurt by the attention of hundreds of javelin-wielding peltasts.

The first collision of opposing heavy infantry happened in the center of the field. The Allied hoplites under the command of Lysicles were attacked by King Philip's left-most phalanx. This contact was soon followed by the Theban hoplite formation wading into Alexander's pikemen on the Macedonian left. Then, back over on the right-center of the Macedonian advance, King Philip's center division engaged the Athenian hoplites. Only on the far right of the Macedonian line did there seem to be a kind of hesitation. The more experienced hypaspists held their ground; they did not move into melee with the enemy hoplites to their front. The Athenian hoplites under the command of Chares also held their position, deeming it unwise to challenge the veteran formations under the Macedonian king.

Little progress was seen, at least initially, as large unit faced off against large unit and more than several ranks of armored men carrying pikes stabbed at and were stabbed at by more than several ranks of heavily armored men carrying long spears. Over on the Macedonian left, Alexander held back his cavalry for a turn or two before committing them to the charge. Given the length of the Theban line and the presence of a river just off the table, Alexander's companions were not able to swing around the Theban right. Following their leader, these proud horsemen charged the Thebans frontally. Against heavy infantry with long spears, the Macedonian cavalry lost their impetus but were able to hang in there against the deeper formations of enemy heavy infantry. At least for a little while . . .

While the dice may have been with the father and son team at the beginning of the battle, it became more and more apparent that the dice switched sides as the contest continued. The Allied hoplites in the center of the field started to get the better of the pikemen to their front. Lysicles and his Athenian hoplites enjoyed moderate success against King Philip's other phalanxes. Even when Chares and his average-morale hoplites finally joined the battle, they were able to hold their ground reasonably well against enemy veteran formations.

Back over on the Macedonian left, the Sacred Band was embarrassed and then broken by two units of peltasts in the pay of the Macedonians. Having dispatched this famous group of warriors, the light troops - along with a pesky unit of slingers - turned their attention on the exposed right flank of the Theban battle line. The hoplites could only endure the shower of sling stones because a more serious enemy was directly to their front. As it turned out, this harassment and threat against the flank of rear of the right side of the line was too little and too late. As it also turned out, Alexander made the serious error of keeping his cavalry stuck in, attempting to achieve a push back or even a breakthrough. [8] The long spears, depth, and die rolls of the Thebans proved too much.  The unit Alexander was commanding was weakened and then broken. Fortunately, the son of the king was not captured, wounded, or worse, but he was effectively out of the battle. The Macedonian dice seemed to know this, as another unit of cavalry was routed and then stand after stand of pikemen in Alexander's wing succumbed to the pressure of the Theban hoplites.

King Philip II was hotly engaged as well. In fact, Lysicles and a couple unit of Athenian hoplites were able to create a gap between the phalanxes of pikemen on this side of the field. The Allied hoplites gained the upper hand (though at a steep price) versus the phalanx arranged against them. On the right flank, the dice even turned against one unit of King Philip's hypaspists. The pike phalanx on this same flank did as poorly as its brother formations on other parts of the field.

As with previous turns, at the conclusion of turn eight, losses on both sides were added up and checked against the morale limits of each command. King Philip's wing had lost 39 points, which was 2 more than its predetermined limit. This resulted in the retreat of his entire command, which spelled defeat in capital letters for the Macedonian army. On the Greek side of the army morale balance sheet, it was determined that the command of Lysicles had been broken. While the loss of their center was significant, the total value of these hoplites (Athenian and Allied) did not result in the collapse of the Greek Alliance. The Thebans were still very much in the fight and surprisingly, so were the average-morale hoplite units under the command of Chares.

ASSESSMENT
According to Diodorus, the Macedonians won the field at Chaeronea, and convincingly at that. Over the course of eight enjoyable turns spread over an enjoyable six days, I managed to rewrite history. On review, this seems to have been a simple matter of luck. The Greeks rolled better dice that the Macedonians. On further review, I may have erred  in allowing the Athenian hoplites a VBU of 5. In large units, this meant that the Athenians enjoyed a "bank account" of 10 points of damage. The Macedonian large units had an "account" of 9 points. Along this same line of thinking, it may have been a mistake to deploy the large formations of pikemen as 2-stand units instead of 3-stand units. Then again, it may also have been a matter of ignoring an opportunity to tinker with the rules. In melee, pikemen have the same depth bonus as units armed with the long spear. It seems to me that the weapon with the longer reach should get a slightly better value in melee as more weapons can be involved in the close combat.

In addition to changing the result of the battle, my tabletop interpretation witnessed two specific episodes that were quite different from the historical record. In this wargame, the vaunted Sacred Band was engaged by and subsequently destroyed by two lowly units of peltasts. The defeat of this famous formation was the result of effective javelin volleys and follow-up charges. [9] The second episode concerned the failed charge of Alexander and his heavy cavalry. As related above, the dice and poor tactical decision making did not help the Macedonian cause. As discussed in the Note Number 8, this particular situation offers fertile ground for additional research and play testing.

Even though I was not able to achieve my stated goal of setting up and playing three versions of Chaeronea, I do not regret making the attempt. Perhaps I will invest in another set of rules (always a distinct possibility) or dig out one from basement storage and have another go in order to break the current 1-1 tie? In the final analysis, I quite enjoyed staging the Armati 2 and IMPETVS reconstructions of this engrossing battle on my tabletop. And isn't that what the hobby is all about, the personal enjoyment derived from the time spent reading, researching, planning, preparing, and playing?




Notes
[1]   For my first failed attempt, I prepared my tabletop and troops according to the diagram found at http://www.livius.org/cg-cm/chaeronea/battle.html. My interest level flagged considerably after six turns of play. I have been unable to pinpoint the exact cause or problem. The most obvious suspect would be yours truly. On reflection, perhaps it was a combination of playing solo, trying to fit Chaeronea on a six by four-foot tabletop, and making use of the well thought out and well written Mutford House Rules. These are courtesy of a Mr. Tim Twineham. I had the good fortune of corresponding with him when I belonged to the Hail Caesar Yahoo Forum (before Yahoo changed everything and became problematic or worse, inaccessible to many) and Tim was generous enough to share a PDF of his gaming group's Hail Caesar amendments, commonly known as the Mutford House Rules.
   The second attempt was a simpler version. I used the same map, terrain, and orders of battle, but rearranged the units so that the number of divisions would be smaller. However, even using the rules as written and deploying only 12 divisions in total proved beyond my abilities as a solo wargamer. This second Hail Caesar staging lasted just four turns. I guess the final straw for me was when a unit of Theban hoplites "charged" a unit of Macedonian cavalry. The horsemen, being disordered from a previous melee, could not countercharge. As they were not in open order, they could not evade. It did not seem very probable that cavalry would stand around while an enemy hoplite formation - armed with long spears - advanced into contact. And yet, there I was, following the rules as written. Then again, neither staging really "felt right." Further evidence, I suppose, that I am the root of the "problem." This subjective assessment should not be taken as a condemnation of the rules - though I fear it will be interpreted as such by some individuals. Rather, it should be taken as an admission that despite a very small number of successes and a significantly larger number of tries, the rules do not work well for me. I am quite certain that Chaeronea could be played using Hail Caesar. To give this historical battle the HC treatment, one only needs a large table, a large collection of miniatures, and about six or eight like-minded individuals with a weekend afternoon to spare. The addition of an umpire or two, gentlemen well versed in the rules, would be ideal.

[2]   I remain intrigued by the schematic found on page 68 of WARFARE IN THE CLASSICAL WORLD. There is just something about arranging a hoplite phalanx versus pike phalanx battle on a field populated by four rivers that appeals to me.
   
   The Wikipedia narrative references Cawkwell's description of the battlefield, but mention is only made of the two anchor points of the Greek defensive line. There is no mention of additional water courses.
   
   As far as I am able to ascertain, Diodorus offers no description of the terrain in his brief account of the engagement.

[3]   A common and common-sense approach, promulgated by Mr. Featherstone on page 10 of his excellent book, BATTLE NOTES FOR WARGAMERS.

[4]   The rating of both Athenian commanders was guesswork. I took the negative estimation of Chares offered by Diodorus (see Book XVI, Chapter 14) into account.

   In the Wikipedia narrative, reference is made to "strategems" of one Polyaenus. Evidently, the Athenian troops were raw troops. Based on this piece of information, I reduced the morale grade of the Athenian hoplites from B to C. On reflection, it appears that I should have reduced their VBU (fighting value) as well, lowering it from 5 to 4.

[5]   I based the composition and numbers of units in the Greek army on the order of battle provided on page 69 of WARFARE IN THE CLASSICAL WORLD. This was supplemented with information gleaned from the Wikipedia narrative as well as the account provided by Diodorus. I did not calculate the number of points fielded by either  side in this IMPETVS version of Chaeronea. I would estimate that combined value of the opposing armies approached 2,000 points.

[6]    The army list provided in the IMPETVS supplement allows the Macedonian player to increase the VBU (fighting value) of the first rank of a large unit of pike phalanx to 5. The second rank (base) - and third rank, if appropriate, of the large unit has a VBU of 4.

[7]   I grant that it is highly unusual and perhaps even unfair (at least in IMPETVS games) to have a charismatic and a genius leader on the same side of the tabletop. Relying again on the account provided by Diodorus, it could be argued that giving Alexander and his father the best ratings for general officers is historically appropriate.

[8]   On reflection, maybe I should have granted Alexander and his cavalry an exemption on the first round of the melee to represent the élan of their charge. Then again, perhaps a frontal assault into formed heavy infantry carrying long spears is indicative of poor tactics? One of the many diagrams found in a Google search for  "maps of the battle of Chaeronea" showed Alexander leading the Macedonian cavalry on an angle across the front of a part of the enemy line, then into an apparent gap between the Theban and Athenian hoplites. Attacking heavy infantry armed with long spears from the flank or rear seems a much better tactical choice.

[9]   On pages 201 and 202 of THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR, Victor Davis Hanson cites a passage from Plutarch wherein King Philip inspects the killing zone of the Sacred Band. Mention is made of the "long spears of the Macedonians," leading one to think that the Sacred Band expired fighting against a phalanx. On page 19 of THE SOUL OF BATTLE, Professor Hanson attributes the defeat of the Sacred Band to a cavalry charge led by the "murderous eighteen-year-old Alexander." The specifics of this  charge are not provided. One is left to assume that it was a frontal attack.

[Jim Webster]

Certainly under that system the Hoplites would win any battle of attrition assuming average dice.
With Alexander, having him charging frontally into properly formed up hoplites I'd expect him to fail. There doesn't seem to have been any chance of units being pulled out of line to make a gap. With Impetus Alexander's charge might perhaps be represented as having his cavalry as the support unit for a pike unit fighting the hoplites frontally.

Interesting

Jim

[Justin Swanton]

Interesting AARs. Since Optio covers this period (Greece, Macedonia, Republican Rome, Carthage, Spain and Gaul) I'll certainly be trying it out on this battle. Like your counters by the way.

[aligern]

Ny view on which set of rules would give the most likely historical result? That is without extensive reverse engineering to make sure that the right units won.

Roy

[Chris]

Jim, Justin, and Roy,

Thanks for taking the time to read and respond. Appreciate it.

Chris

[Patrick Waterson]

Any view on which set of rules would give the most likely historical result? That is without extensive reverse engineering to make sure that the right units won.

Roy

We shall probably not get a very historical result with any rules presently on the market, as to get the historical result one needs pikes to be consistently more effective than hoplites and, most importantly, Companions to be able to defeat hoplites frontally.  Without both of these elements recreations of the battle will have the Greeks as winners most if not all of the time.

[Jim Webster]

Remember Corinth against Alexander, depending how you read the accounts, Good hoplites with secure flanks held off pikes and indeed held off relays of Pikes

Also with our accounts, it isn't necessary for the Companions to ride down the Hoplites frontally. We just don't have that sort of detail.

Jim

[Mark G]

Agreed Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

Remember Corinth against Alexander, depending how you read the accounts, Good hoplites with secure flanks held off pikes and indeed held off relays of Pikes

Corinth??    Does Sir mean Thebes, where Perdiccas' men successfully penetrated two successive palisades held by hoplites and were then driven back by a strong Theban column which itself was routed when Alexander "launched an infantry attack in close order"?  (Arrian I.8 )

The Thebans were subsequently chased into their city, and:

"For a short time the Theban forces stood firm by the Ampheum, until, attacked from every side by the Macedonians, with Alexander himself apparently ubiquitous in the field, they broke." - ibid.

This looks to me like another case of Macedonian melee superiority, with Alexander and by implication the Companions yet again defeating the Thebans frontally - assuming of course the latter deployed with all-round facing rather than deliberately letting the Macedonians hit them in exposed flanks and rear.  One can see parallels with the destruction of the mercenaries at the Granicus.

Also with our accounts, it isn't necessary for the Companions to ride down the Hoplites frontally. We just don't have that sort of detail.

Agreed we lack explicit detail, but unless we have rules under which Companions can beat hoplites frontally, re-creations of Chaeronea (and for that matter the latter stages of the Granicus) will not work out according to even the undetailed accounts we have.

[Jim Webster]

Sorry Thebes
Diodorus would beg to differ from Arian  http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/17A*.html#8.3

11 1 Now the king in the course of only three days made everything ready for the assault. He divided p149his forces into three parts and ordered one to take the palisades which had been erected before the city, the second to face the Theban battle line, and the third as a reserve to support any hard pressed unit of his forces and to enter the battle in its turn. 2 For their part, the Thebans stationed the cavalry within the palisades, assigned their enfranchised slaves, along with refugees and resident aliens, to face those who drove at the walls, and themselves made ready to fight before the city with the Macedonian force about the king which was many times their number. 3 Their children and wives flocked to the temples and implored the gods to rescue city from its dangers.

When the Macedonians approached and each division encountered the opposing force of Thebans, the trumpets blew the call to arms and the troops on both sides raised the battle cry in unison and hurled their missiles at the enemy. 4 These were soon expended and all turned to the use of the sword at close quarters, and a mighty struggle ensued. The Macedonians exerted a force that could hardly be withstood because of the numbers of their men and the weight of the phalanx, but the Thebans were superior in bodily strength and in their constant training in the gymnasium. Still more, in exaltation of spirit they were lifted out of themselves and became indifferent to personal danger. 5 Many were wounded in both armies and not a few fell facing the blows of the enemy. The air was filled with the roar of fighters locked in the struggle, moans and shouts and exhortations: on the Macedonian side, not to be unworthy of their previous exploits, p151and on the Theban, not to forget children and wives and parents threatened with slavery and their every household lying exposed to the fury of the Macedonians, and to remember the battles of Leuctra and of Mantineia and the glorious deeds which were household words throughout Greece. So for a long time the battle remained evenly poised because of the surpassing valour of the contestants.

12 1 At length Alexander saw that the Thebans were still fighting unflinchingly for their freedom, but that his Macedonians were wearying in the battle, and ordered his reserve division to enter the struggle. As this suddenly struck the tired Thebans, it bore heavily against them and killed many. 2 Still the Thebans did not concede the victory, but on the contrary, inspired by the will to win, despised all dangers. They had the courage to shout that the Macedonians now openly confessed to being their inferiors. Under normal circumstances, when an enemy attacks in relays, it is usual for soldiers to fear the fresh strength of the reinforcements, but the Thebans alone then faced their dangers ever more boldly, as the enemy sent against them new troops for those whose strength flagged with weariness.

3 So the Theban spirit proved unshakable here, but the king took note of a postern gate that had been deserted by its guards and hurried Perdiccas with a large detachment of troops to seize it and penetrate p153into the city.36 4 He quickly carried out the order and the Macedonians slipped through the gate into the city, while the Thebans, having worn down the first assault wave of the Macedonians, stoutly faced the second and still had high hopes of victory. When they knew that a section of the city had been taken, however, they began immediately to withdraw within the walls, 5 but in this operation their cavalry galloped along with the infantry into the city and trampled upon and killed many of their own men; they themselves rode into the city in disorder and, encountering a maze of narrow alleys and trenches, lost their footing and fell and were killed by their own weapons. At the same time the Macedonian garrison in the Cadmeia burst out of the citadel, engaged the Thebans, and attacking them in their confusion made a great slaughter among them.


Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

One can see Arrian's account reflected in Diodorus' 12.1:

Arrian:
"Perdiccas was wounded while he was trying to break through the second palisade; he was carried back ... His men, joined by Alexander's archers, boxed the Thebans up in the sunken road which runs down the Heracleum, pressing on them hard so long as they retreated towards that temple; but the moment came when they turned to face their pursuers with a yell of rage, and then it was the Macedonians who gave ground.  About seventy of the archers were killed, together with their commander, Eurybotas the Cretan; the rest hurriedly sought the protection of Alexander's guard [agema] and the remainder of the guards [tous hypaspistas tous basilikous].

The sight of his men in full retreat, with the Thebans straggled out in chase of them, soon brought a counter-blow from Alexander, who launched an infantry attack in close order [suntetagmene to phalaggi], and drove the enemy inside the city gates.  The rout became a panic - so much so, indeed, that they failed to shut the gates behind them in time."

One gets the impression that the Theban attack hit the archers, and that Perdiccas' leaderless phalanx was bundled out with them.

Diodorus:
"At length Alexander saw that the Thebans were still fighting unflinchingly for their freedom, but that his Macedonians were wearying in the battle, and ordered his reserve division to enter the struggle. As this suddenly struck the tired Thebans, it bore heavily against them and killed many ... the king took note of a postern gate that had been deserted by its guards and hurried Perdiccas with a large detachment of troops to seize it and penetrate into the city.."

Much of Diodorus' account is pure pro-Theban rhetoric, perhaps reflecting a Theban apologist source(?); contrariwise, Arrian had access to the eyewitness accounts of Aristobulus and Ptolemy.  I would be inclined to take Diodorus' expostulations about Thebans repulsing 'waves of Macedonians' cum grano salis.  We may note that Diodorus has Perdiccas leading the assault through the gate at a time when Arrian has him back in camp laid low by a near-fatal wound; one suspects Diodorus' account of being somewhat confused.

Curiously enough, concerning Macedonian cavalry defeating hoplites frontally, the extract below is from Diodorus' description of Chaeronea (XVI.86.3-4):

"Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. 4 Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight."

As this is Book XVI and Perseus only has the Greek for Books I-V and XVIII-XX, I cannot check the Greek.  Alexander and his 'companions' winning 'the same success' and 'rupturing the solid front of the enemy line' does however look promising.  Interestingly, Diodorus has Philip on the other flank doing the same, which would suggest that the 2,000+ cavalry he assigns to the Macedonians as part of their 30,000+ strong lineup were split between the wings and not, as seems to be the popular representation, all gathered under Alexander.

As a side note, the Macedonian habit of dividing cavalry into two more or less equal contingents, one on each wing, is exemplified by Alexander's operations against the Taulantians with a force including a cavalry contingent 400 strong (Arrian I.5).  For battle, he deployed 200 cavalry on each wing, sending them through concealing terrain to make a surprise attack while his infantry occupied the enemy's attention by performing a number of intricate drill movements.  The point is that each wing was given a cavalry contingent, and the contingents were equal in size - this was characteristic of Alexander, and Diodorus' description of Chaeronea suggests that it might also have been characteristic of Philip - perhaps a point to consider for future refights of Chaeronea.

[Duncan Head]

As this is Book XVI and Perseus only has the Greek for Books I-V and XVIII-XX, I cannot check the Greek.

No, Perseus does actually have the Greek of Diodoros XVI. If you're going in from the front page, try the third link; or load the Greek from the translation page.

Alexander and his 'companions' winning 'the same success' and 'rupturing the solid front of the enemy line' does however look promising.

Misleadingly so, since his "companions" aren't said to be Companions - merely "to d'auto kai ton parastaton", which means little more than "those stationed next to him".

Interestingly, Diodorus has Philip on the other flank doing the same, which would suggest that the 2,000+ cavalry he assigns to the Macedonians as part of their 30,000+ strong lineup were split between the wings and not, as seems to be the popular representation, all gathered under Alexander.

Or indeed that, since neither king nor prince is actually described as leading cavalry, and the "picked men" with Philip are often thought to be his hypaspists, that both were leading infantry.

[Patrick Waterson]

Alexander and his 'companions' winning 'the same success' and 'rupturing the solid front of the enemy line' does however look promising.

Misleadingly so, since his "companions" aren't said to be Companions - merely "to d'auto kai ton parastaton", which means little more than "those stationed next to him".

Thanks, Duncan; that is the bit I wanted to check: whether or not they were explicitly referred to as 'hetairoi', and they are not.  That said, Diodorus does not identify the troop type Philip and Alexander were stationed with apart from Philip's closest troops being 'epilektoi', picked or chosen.  While they are not described as cavalry, they are not described as infantry either, and most notably not as a 'phalagx', leaving things somewhat in the air on the semantic front.

Tactically, Alexander's attack is described as managing to 'errexe' (sunder, break through) the 'polemion taxeos' (enemy formation).  An infantry/infantry fight, especially between phalanxes, usually results in a push back followed by a collapse and rout, not a sundering of the line.  A cavalry unit in wedge, however, cleaves through, or at least into, an enemy formation rather than pushing it back.  Alexander's 'companions' (parastaton), which seems to mean either those with him or those leading their own formations, also 'parreregnuto' (break, burst through) the enemy line.  These multiple penetrations, leaving heaps of enemy dead (cf. Plutarch's description of the Theban Sacred Band dead at Chaeronea), finally rout their opponents.  Diodorus also has Alexander 'protoi biasamenoi' (first to force his way through) the enemy formation, which looks consistent with his being at the tip of a wedge.

All things considered, Diodorus' description favours a cavalry attack in wedge by Alexander.

His description of Philip's attack is less detailed, although he has the king advance 'prokinduneuōn' (first into danger), which if not rhetorical is certainly consistent with leading a cavalry wedge.

[Mark G]

I'm not sure you can support that pat.
Surely the point is, a wedge penetration does what you describe, not specifically a cavalry wedge.

That phalanxes sought to maintain frontage, and hence uniform-ish push and pull, is significant.  We have nothing to tell us how an infantry wedge would do if successful against a phalanx, although we can guess from other examples against other infantry formations in other periods.

The fact that the wedge was horsed hete doesn't change the relative effect of its penetration over all infantry.

[Jim Webster]

Alexander and his 'companions' winning 'the same success' and 'rupturing the solid front of the enemy line' does however look promising.

Misleadingly so, since his "companions" aren't said to be Companions - merely "to d'auto kai ton parastaton", which means little more than "those stationed next to him".

Thanks, Duncan; that is the bit I wanted to check: whether or not they were explicitly referred to as 'hetairoi', and they are not.  That said, Diodorus does not identify the troop type Philip and Alexander were stationed with apart from Philip's closest troops being 'epilektoi', picked or chosen.  While they are not described as cavalry, they are not described as infantry either, and most notably not as a 'phalagx', leaving things somewhat in the air on the semantic front.

Tactically, Alexander's attack is described as managing to 'errexe' (sunder, break through) the 'polemion taxeos' (enemy formation).  An infantry/infantry fight, especially between phalanxes, usually results in a push back followed by a collapse and rout, not a sundering of the line.  A cavalry unit in wedge, however, cleaves through, or at least into, an enemy formation rather than pushing it back. 

Hang on a minute, we are getting into circular arguments.
This discussion started on whether the cavalry could burst through infantry, and now we're arguing that it had to be cavalry that did the attack because cavalry do burst through infantry.

From memory Infantry can burst through infantry, didn't the Thebans do this when Agesilaus blocked their path (A case when they attacked in a narrow column)

Jim