Magnesia peltasts

[Mark G]

Just re reading Luke's wonderful articles on Iphikrates and the evolution of the Peltast.
Part two, on the sucessors.

http://www.ne.jp/asahi/luke/ueda-sarson/Iphikrates2.html

He notes that the Agryaspids were likely dual trained in Pike and Javelin.

this got me wondering about one of the great deployment problems in Magnesia-  the position of the Agryaspids on the 'right of the line'.

The deployments which have come down to us from the ancients place them on the far right of the Seleucid army - past the cavalry and agema and basically facing the bend in the stream, which is quite a silly thing to do with your best infantry when you are attempting a double envelopment and have a fragile quality main phalanx.

Hertofore, I had taken as quite sensible the view which I first saw in Slingshot (I can't remember who made it) that perhaps this just meant 'right of the phalanx' and they had the usual place of honour - even though the orthodox literal translation had them out on the far wing past all the Cataphracts and Agema.

but what if they were deployed as Javelinmen in a cavalry support / follow up role?

they appear to take no significant part in the battle after being deployed - yet had they been facing the Roman legion after the Social legion next to it was bowled over by the Cats charge, so this seems a little surprising.

but if they were all following up the cats - they could well have been 'wasted' here - too weak to try to attack the Roman legion without the cavalry, part of the thwarted attack on the camp which effectively lost the battle for the Seleucids, and thus their disappearance is accountable.

Has anyone got any better opinions on this thought?

[Jim Webster]

It is an interesting idea, the one thing that holds me back is that we have no account of the Seleucids doing this in fixed battles. Then again it might be worth reading the accounts we do have this this in mind to see if they make more sense.

I confess to being a bit skeptical though to be fair

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

This is something of a conundrum, Mark, although I suspect that the name 'Argyraspides' here may refer to the Royal Ile of cavalry and the infantry Argyraspides may be part or the whole of the 16,000-strong phalanx.

Checking out the Latin on Perseus, Livy XXVII.40.7-8 gives:

Ab eadem parte
On [literally 'by'] the same side

paulum producto cornu
a little advanced from the wing

regia cohors erat
was the royal cohort

argyraspides a genere armorum appelabantur
called 'argyraspides' from their kind of arms

These 'argyraspides' are positioned slightly in advance of, or to the side of, the line of cavalry on the right of the phalanx, and they are a 'regia cohors', a royal 'cohort', implying a strength of around 500 men.  We notice that on the left of the lineup (XXVII.40.11) we have a 'regia ala' or royal cavalry unit (which may mean a Roman 'ala' or a Greek 'ile' - Livy confuses the two at Ilipa, and may be doing so here), and as the rest of the lineup is broadly symmetrical, I would suggest that Antiochus' 'regia cohors' of 'argyraspides' are in fact a 512-man cavalry unit with silver shields.

The 'regia ala' on the left, presumably led by Antiochus' son and heir Seleucus, is said to have 'levioribus tegumentis', lighter protection, which may mean a lighter scale of armour or possibly that unlike the 'regia cohors' they were not using shields (and hence may have been using the kontos).

Interestingly enough, Appian also (Syrica 3.31) identifies these Argyraspids as cavalry:

"Besides these the right wing had certain light-armed troops, and other horsemen with silver shields, and 200 mounted archers."

The 'other horsemen with silver shields' are 'heteroi hippeis arguraspides', which seems to confirm, or at least agree, that Livy's 'regia cohors' of Argyraspides are in fact cavalry.

Hope that sheds more light than confusion. 

Patrick

[Mark G]

so two formations of guard cavalry, not one - that would indeed make even more sense, and would explain what they got up to - being in with the general cavalry pursuit.

And I think further enforce Sabin's argument in Lost Battles that the actual phalanx itself was extremely poorly trained, and needed the 32 man depth to bolster it - and hence also using elephants to bost morale (which proved to be a failure).

I'll keep an eye out for any other thoughts on this.  Its always struck me as a battle which we got wrong early on and have used incorrectly as an example of pike vs legion warfare.

[Jim Webster]

I'm not sure about the poorly trained, from memory hadn't they been under arms for a while because Antiochus had been campaigning in Asia Minor and Thrace.
Obviously there would always be new guys to replace casualties but I would have thought that a macedonian infantryman in Antiochus's reign would have had a fair bit of combat experience

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

Indeed, Appian (assuming we can trust him) extols their skill and veteranity (or is it veteranishness?).  The 32 deep question (if this is in fact what Livy means by 'a fronte introrsus in duos et triginta ordines' rather than 32 files across: the numbers fit if the phalanx units were 32 x 32, so I shall take him as meaning that) seems to be more a matter of deployment for manoeuvre and letting psiloi nip through than a formation for psychological reinforcement.

If we look at Polybius rubbishing Callisthenes in Book XII, he states that Callisthenes has Alexander start his phalanx off 32 deep and then close it up to 16 deep and finally 8 deep as he approached the battlefield at Issus.  Between ourselves, I suspect that Antiochus' 32-deep phalanx at Magnesia was doing just that: the men stood 6' apart when initially deployed, as this allowed the psiloi to drop back when health and safety considerations arose, following which the phalanx would close up to 16 deep (at 3' per man frontage) and ultimately 8 deep at 1'6" per man frontage (making a dense pike hedge that Appian says the Romans dared not approach).

Much as I respect Phil Sabin, it seems to me that he has adjusted his Magnesia Seleucids to lower their Fighting Value, and hence perpetuated or re-enlivened an old chestnut about their pikemen being poor.  If the 'levies' in his lineup are brought up to even 'average' status, the historical quick collapse of the Seleucid left and resultant pinning, envelopment and eventual destruction of the Seleucid centre tend not to happen, which is basically why he assumes them to have been poor troops.  This is of course at variance with Appian's view, and how are we to resolve the matter?

My offering is that the Seleucid troops were good enough, but the circumstances on the day (fog inhibiting perception and communication, plus Eumenes' sneaky upsetting of the scythed chariots, which in their panic ploughed unexpectedly into the Seleucid left with dire results) worked against them, making their morale (as opposed to their troop quality) situationally low.  The sense of isolation conferred by the fog would have left units feeling on their own and disorientated, hence lowering their morale, and the sounds of nearby scythed chariot butchery, shouts of alarm and possibly a Pergamene paean would have left them assuming the worst.  The left wing decamped en masse, the psiloi vanished rearwards, and only the phalanx and elephants were left for the victorous Pergamene and Roman cavalry to use for target practice.

This is of course one person's interpretation, and if accepted would indicate that the phalanx were at least good enough not to run when others of less stout heart did, and that the 32 rank initial deployment would have been a preliminary until they closed up to fighting density rather than an attempt to firm up wobbly troops.

Others are naturally very welcome to air their understanding.

Mark, I think you may be right that this is a phalanx-legion battle we have tended to get wrong, if only because the legions appear not to have got stuck in until the phalangites' formation was already disintegrating from an overdose of panicked elephants running through them.

Patrick

[Mark G]

Perhaps your next article for slingshot could expand on it, Patrick...

There is lots to discuss.

Deployment of the agema (as above here)
Experience and quality of the phalanx - and the 32 man thing
The Fog
The uniqueness of the 'cataphtracts charge' destroying the legion (see also the Fog and the redepeloyment of both armies)
The performance of the legions agianst the phalanx both when steady and when surrounded
The use of missile weapons
why the elephants were in with the phalanx (which makes no sense to me if the phalanx was well trained and experienced)
The cavalry pursuit and defence of the Roman camp
The aftermath - again, I would point to the inability of the Seleucids to attempt to raise another army to keep fighting as indicative of something undiscovered we could look out for.

You even have some interesting modern historiography to look at - the Bar Kochkva, Sabin and pretty much every Seleucid army list every produced by a wargamer are all worht reevaluating, I think.

(and before you ask, I'm still heavily involved on working on the articles Roy and I promised earlier this year)

[Patrick Waterson]

Thanks, Mark: will do my best.

Re your articles: keep up the good work! 

Patrick