Marathon 490 BC

[Patrick Waterson]

Marathon 490 BC

Greeks: Miltiades and nine other Athenian leaders with 9,000 Athenians and 1,000 Plataeans (Nepos).

Persians: Hippias* with a Persian and Persian subject contingent of indeterminate size (possibly 60,000) carried in a fleet of originally 600 triremes (Herodotus)

*Datis and Artaphernes were the expedition leaders, but see Commentary below.

(Other sources: Datis with 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry in 500 ships (Nepos).  The poet Simonides reckons 200,000, Plutarch, Pausanias and the Suda 300,000, Plato and Lysias 500,000 and Justinus 600,000.  60,000 appears to be the most popular modern estimate among scholars who do not try to write the number down to 18,000 or less.)

Principal source: Herodotus VI.101-116 (battle description VI.111-114) Tr. A D Godley
Additional sources: Plutarch, Life of Aristides, chapter 5
Cornelius Nepos, Life of Miltiades, chapters 4-5
Byzantine Suda (10th century lexicon)

Herodotus VI.101-116  [battle description in 110-114 is in bold for those who wish to skip the preliminaries]

101. So they saved themselves by crossing over to Oropus; the Persians sailed holding their course for Temenos and Choereae and Aegilea, all in Eretrian territory. Landing at these places, they immediately unloaded their horses and made preparation to attack their enemies. [2] The Eretrians had no intention of coming out and fighting; all their care was to guard their walls if they could, since it was the prevailing counsel not to leave the city. The walls were strongly attacked, and for six days many fell on both sides; but on the seventh two Eretrians of repute, Euphorbus son of Alcimachus and Philagrus son of Cineas, betrayed the city to the Persians. [3] They entered the city and plundered and burnt the temples, in revenge for the temples that were burnt at Sardis; moreover, they enslaved the townspeople, according to Darius' command.

102. After subduing Eretria, the Persians waited a few days and then sailed away to the land of Attica, pressing ahead in expectation of doing to the Athenians exactly what they had done to the Eretrians. Marathon was the place in Attica most suitable for riding horses and closest to Eretria, so Hippias son of Pisistratus led them there.

103. When the Athenians learned this, they too marched out to Marathon, with ten generals leading them. The tenth was Miltiades ... [Miltiades' family history occupies the rest of this chapter and is omitted here]

104. It was this Miltiades who was now the Athenian general, after coming from the Chersonese and escaping a two-fold death. The Phoenicians pursued him as far as Imbros, considering it of great importance to catch him and bring him to the king. [2] He escaped from them, but when he reached his own country and thought he was safe, then his enemies met him. They brought him to court and prosecuted him for tyranny in the Chersonese, but he was acquitted and appointed Athenian general, chosen by the people.

105. [omitted - a chat between Philippides the runner and the god Pan]

106. This Philippides was in Sparta on the day after leaving the city of Athens, that time when he was sent by the generals and said that Pan had appeared to him. He came to the magistrates and said, [2] "Lacedaemonians, the Athenians ask you to come to their aid and not allow the most ancient city among the Hellenes to fall into slavery at the hands of the foreigners. Even now Eretria has been enslaved, and Hellas has become weaker by an important city." [3] He told them what he had been ordered to say, and they resolved to send help to the Athenians, but they could not do this immediately, for they were unwilling to break the law. It was the ninth day of the rising month, and they said that on the ninth they could not go out to war until the moon's circle was full.

107. So they waited for the full moon, while the foreigners were led to Marathon by Hippias son of Pisistratus. The previous night Hippias had a dream in which he slept with his mother. [2] He supposed from the dream that he would return from exile to Athens, recover his rule, and end his days an old man in his own country. Thus he reckoned from the dream. Then as kategeomenos [leader] he unloaded the slaves from Eretria onto the island of the Styrians called Aegilia, and brought to anchor the ships that had put ashore at Marathon, then marshalled the foreigners who had disembarked onto land. [3] As he was tending to this, he happened to sneeze and cough more violently than usual. Since he was an elderly man, most of his teeth were loose, and he lost one of them by the force of his cough. It fell into the sand and he expended much effort in looking for it, but the tooth could not be found. [4] He groaned aloud and said to those standing by him: "This land is not ours and we will not be able to subdue it. My tooth holds whatever share of it was mine."

108. Hippias supposed that the dream had in this way come true. As the Athenians were marshalled in the precinct of Heracles, the Plataeans came to help them in full force. [The rest of the chapter explains how the Plataeans came under Athenian protection.]

109. The Athenian generals were of divided opinion, some advocating not fighting because they were too few to attack the army of the Medes; others, including Miltiades, advocating fighting. [2] Thus they were at odds, and the inferior plan prevailed. An eleventh man had a vote, chosen by lot to be polemarch of Athens, and by ancient custom the Athenians had made his vote of equal weight with the generals. Callimachus of Aphidnae was polemarch at this time. Miltiades approached him and said, [3] "Callimachus, it is now in your hands to enslave Athens or make her free, and thereby leave behind for all posterity a memorial such as not even Harmodius and Aristogeiton left. Now the Athenians have come to their greatest danger since they first came into being, and, if we surrender, it is clear what we will suffer when handed over to Hippias. But if the city prevails, it will take first place among Hellenic cities. [4] I will tell you how this can happen, and how the deciding voice on these matters has devolved upon you. The ten generals are of divided opinion, some urging to attack, others urging not to. [5] If we do not attack now, I expect that great strife will fall upon and shake the spirit of the Athenians, leading them to medize. But if we attack now, before anything unsound corrupts the Athenians, we can win the battle, if the gods are fair. [6] All this concerns and depends on you in this way: if you vote with me, your country will be free and your city the first in Hellas. But if you side with those eager to avoid battle, you will have the opposite to all the good things I enumerated."

110. By saying this Miltiades won over Callimachus. The polemarch's vote was counted in, and the decision to attack was resolved upon. Thereafter the generals who had voted to fight turned the presidency over to Miltiades as each one's day came in turn. He accepted the office but did not make an attack until it was his own day to preside.

111. When the presidency came round to him [Miltiades], he arrayed the Athenians for battle, with the polemarch Callimachus commanding the right wing, since it was then the Athenian custom for the polemarch to hold the right wing. He led, and the other tribes were numbered out in succession next to each other. The Plataeans were marshalled last, holding the left wing. [2] Ever since that battle, when the Athenians are conducting sacrifices at the festivals every fourth year, the Athenian herald prays for good things for the Athenians and Plataeans together. [3] As the Athenians were marshalled at Marathon, it happened that their line of battle was as long as the line of the Medes. The centre, where the line was weakest, was only a few ranks deep, but each wing was strong in numbers.

112. When they had been set in order and the sacrifices were favourable, the Athenians were sent forth and charged the foreigners at a run. The space between the armies was no less than eight stadia. [2] The Persians saw them running to attack and prepared to receive them, thinking the Athenians absolutely crazy, since they saw how few of them there were and that they ran up so fast without either cavalry or archers. [3] So the foreigners imagined, but when the Athenians all together fell upon the foreigners they fought in a way worthy of record. These are the first Hellenes whom we know of to use running against the enemy. They are also the first to endure looking at Median dress and men wearing it, for up until then just hearing the name of the Medes caused the Hellenes to panic.

113. They fought a long time at Marathon. In the centre of the line the foreigners prevailed, where the Persians and Sacae were arrayed. The foreigners prevailed there and broke through in pursuit inland, but on each wing the Athenians and Plataeans prevailed. [2] In victory they let the routed foreigners flee, and brought the wings together to fight those who had broken through the centre. The Athenians prevailed, then followed the fleeing Persians and struck them down. When they reached the sea they demanded fire and laid hold of the Persian ships.

114. In this labour Callimachus the polemarch was slain, a brave man, and of the generals Stesilaus son of Thrasylaus died. Cynegirus son of Euphorion fell there, his hand cut off with an axe as he grabbed a ship's figurehead. Many other famous Athenians also fell there.

115. In this way the Athenians overpowered seven ships. The foreigners pushed off with the rest, picked up the Eretrian slaves from the island where they had left them, and sailed around Sunium hoping to reach the city before the Athenians. There was an accusation at Athens that they devised this by a plan of the Alcmaeonidae, who were said to have arranged to hold up a shield as a signal once the Persians were in their ships.

116. They sailed around Sunium, but the Athenians marched back to defend the city as fast as their feet could carry them and got there ahead of the foreigners. Coming from the sacred precinct of Heracles in Marathon, they pitched camp in the sacred precinct of Heracles in Cynosarges. The foreigners [barbaroi] lay at anchor off Phalerum, the Athenian naval port at that time. After riding anchor there, they sailed their ships back to Asia.

Commentary:
Marathon is a classic battle in which a small force of Greeks (10,000) overthrew a much larger Persian army (60,000?), setting a trend which was to endure thereafter with almost no exceptions.  It reversed the previous trend by which Greeks (in the Ionian Revolt of 496-4 BC) usually lost against Persians, and set a new one which was confirmed at Plataea in 479 BC.

The reasons for the Greek success can perhaps be extracted from clues in Herodotus: the Greeks close with their opponents 'at a run' (dromo) and the Greek centre is thinned out ('oligos taxeis' means 'few formations' rather than 'few ranks deep', but the one suggests the other) and the wings 'strong in numbers', allowing them the depth, breadth or both to envelop and defeat the Persian wings.  The Greek centre is crushed back, Herodotus' choice of words (rhexantes = bursting through; eidokon = drove or pursued) suggesting a collapse in that sector, but the Greek wings, having routed their opponents, changed direction to deal with the victorious Persians and Sacae, broke them and pursued them back to the ships (which were undoubtedly already filling up with routed subject nations).  Interestingly, Herodotus says the heaviest Greek losses were suffered when they tried to seize the Persian ships, not when the centre broke.  This suggests that the Greek centre was forced back by weight of numbers, but the Persian follow-up was slow and deliberate, allowing the victorious Greek wings to change direction and catch them.

Herodotus does not mention Datis and Artaphernes or their cavalry at Marathon, and Herodotus twice states (VI.102 and VI.107) that Hippias led (kategeeto) the force sent to Marathon.  Plutarch is less precise, assuming that Datis himself 'put in' to Marathon, and he also denies the Persians any breakthrough in the centre, merely allowing them to 'hold out longest' there.  Nepos has Datis present with 10,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry (100,000 of Nepos' original force are not accounted for, presumably elsewhere, suggesting he had an inkling that part of the Persian force had remained behind at Eretria), and states that the Athenians were ten times outnumbered.

Herodotus provides a vital clue for understanding who actually commanded at Marathon: in VI.107, Hippias "marshalled the foreigners who had disembarked onto land," which would normally be the duty of the man actually in charge.  Combining this with Herodotus' complete absence of mention of Datis, Artaphernes or Persian cavalry at the battle and mention of Hippias as the 'kategomenos' ordering the unloading of Eretrian slaves onto an island gives a picture of the force defeated at Marathon as being an infantry-only contingent under Hippias while the Persian commanders and their remaining strength (including the cavalry) were still at Eretria.

The Byzantine Suda supports Herodotus in confirming the lack of Persian cavalry, and that the Athenians attacked once they became aware of this.  Herodotus and the Suda appear to be preferable in this respect to Plutarch and Nepos.  Marathon makes sense as an infantry battle, and was the first battle unequivocally won by Greeks against Persians (previous engagements in Asia Minor had not gone well for the Greeks there).  A key tactical point mentioned by Herodotus was that the Athenians were the first to close with the enemy at a run – thus maximising their impact at contact and setting the trend for later hoplite battles.  His phrasing suggests - but does not require - that the Greeks closed the entire eight stadia distance at a run, the key point seeming to be that they charged at a run into the foe.

Herodotus appears to be the most detailed and honest reporter of our sources: he does not estimate the size of the Persian forces, though he gives detailed casualties (192 Greeks and around 6,400 barbarians) in VI.117.  Only Herodotus reports the Athenian centre as giving way; Nepos makes no mention of this, and Plutarch merely allows the Persians in the centre to 'hold their ground the longest'.

One can infer from Herodotus' account that Datis, Artaphernes and the Persian cavalry were still at Eretreia when Marathon was fought.  This makes sense on a number of counts: Hippias, sent on to secure a landing-site, would have been waiting for the Persian commanders before proceeding; the Persian force at Marathon would have been less than the full contingent that had set forth on its mission of conquest, and the absence of any mention in any source of Persian cavalry scouting or raiding is consistent with their absence.  It may be asked why the absence of Persian cavalry was not immediately apparent to the Athenians, and this might be explained by the presence of mounted officers among the Persians, which may also be the reason for the depiction of a mounted man in the painting in the Stoa Poikile building, which is held to have been a contemporary representation of the battle.

Concerning the aftermath: the commander of the Persian forces was a quick thinker, and sought to retrieve his defeat by a swift voyage to Athens, hoping to find it bereft of defenders.  This is consistent with a Greek who knew the city and the locality being in charge of operations: Persian commanders were not known for swift initiative.  While only indicative, it is perfectly in accord with Hippias being in command of the Marathon force.

Worth a look: the Battle of Marathon entry in the New World Encyclopaedia:
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Battle_of_Marathon

[Mark]

File Name: Marathon 490BC
File Submitted: August 3, 2012, 3:43:40 AM

Battle of Marathon 490BC (Persian Wars)

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[Patrick Waterson]

Some members will be aware that the current fashion in scholarly circles is to turn this battle through 90 degrees and have both armies drawn up with one flank on the shore - this is a passing fancy which does not accord with source descriptions.  The map given here (taken from Edward Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World) seems accurate in its essentials and, most importantly, in the armies' dispositions and their relationship to the shoreline.

Patrick

[aligern]

Patrick, have you any sage thoughts on the length of the lines against the distance on the ground and the impact of that on deployment depth??
That is to say, how many Persians/ Greeks are there?/
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Thoughts, certainly: not so sure about 'sage'. 

Given 10,000 Greeks (hoplites) in total, and assuming a standard 8-deep deployment, we would have a 1,250-yard (over 2/3 mile) frontage.  Miltiades reinforced his wings at the expense of the centre, and the general assumption is that the one balanced out the other, leaving the frontage at around 1,250 yards.  Creasy's map suggests the Persians would have outflanked the Greeks, but this is one thing Militades would have wished to avoid at all costs, and Herodotus (VI.111) specifically states:

As the Athenians were marshalled at Marathon, it happened that their line of battle was as long as the line of the Medes. The centre, where the line was weakest, was only a few ranks deep [literally: 'had only a few formations'], but each wing was strong in numbers.

The impression Herodotus' account gives is that the Greeks were greatly outnumbered.

The Persians saw them running to attack and prepared to receive them, thinking the Athenians absolutely crazy, since they saw how few of them there were  (Herodotus VI.112)

Given equal frontages, this implies considerable Persian depth.  Just how considerable is a matter for judgement and taste, but given the Persian proclivity for fives and tens, one suspects a multiple of ten or fifty.  If we have a frontage of 1,200 yards, and one man per yard of frontage, then ten men deep gives 12,000 - which is not greatly outnumbering the Athenians - and fifty deep gives 60,000, which does.  30,000 or 40,000 or even 50,000 may be possible, but my best guess would be 60,000.  The fleet that carried them was originally 600 triremes (Herodotus VI.95), and these were being used to transport the army so I would expect each ship was carrying rather more than the 30-40 used in battle as marines: an average of 100 men per ship seems not unreasonable in the circumstances.  There were horses involved, too, and Herodotus does not specifically mention horse transports, but in Thucydides VI.43 the Athenian expedition to Sicily carried 7,150 men in 40 triremes, or about 178 infantry to a trireme - and one transport carried 30 horses: on this basis the 600 Persian triremes could have carried up to 106,800 men without horses, or 18,000 horses without men, so a force with 6,000 horses (using 200 triremes) - probably a high estimate for the cavalry contingent - and 71,200 men (using 400 triremes) is possible, although some triremes would presumably be acting as escorts, with only 30-40 soldiers on board.

Given these parameters, we can reasonably say that the Persian army at Marathon could have numbered between 50,000 and 70,000 men (although Datis, Artaphernes and the cavalry at least were still behind at Eretria) and 60,000 men or thereabouts conveniently fits a deployment 50 deep that matches (to within 50 yards) the estimated Greek frontage.

Patrick

[Mark G]

60 000 does seem very high as a number for a naval expedition at that time.

your leap from a multiple of 10 men deep to a multiple of 50 men deep is quite a bold one.

[Jim Webster]

I think we ought to look at the route as well. They weren't coasting, and the idea of having 100 extra men on a trireme, given the needs for water etc when you are not able to land every night would worry me

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

Yet for some reason it did not seem to worry the Athenians on their way to Syracuse, and they had nearly double that number of extra men on their transport triremes.

Patrick

[aligern]

What was the size of the fleet that transported Belisarius to Africa as that is an army whose size we can be reasonably confident about??

It is in Procopius.
Roy

[Mark G]

Did those athenian triremes row all the way back to athens after depositing their cargo?

Or were the hoplites also the crew, and the triremes essentially a one way ticket (unintentionally, of course).

And can we therefore say the same about the Persians? (the slave owning - land loving Persians)

If the persian fleet was crewed by sailors and carrying soldiers, it presents an entirely different set of numbers from a fleet of soldiers who were expected to crew their own vessels at the same time.

(not to mention the question of whether the rowers were 'bulking up' the back of the Persian fighting line to create an illusion of massive numbers of fighting men).

Is there any evidence to make a judgement on any of these questions either way?

[Jim Webster]

What was the size of the fleet that transported Belisarius to Africa as that is an army whose size we can be reasonably confident about??

It is in Procopius.
Roy

500 transports and 92 warships to transport 10,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.
Given the size of the Persian fleet, 600 triremes and a few transports lost in the reporting, a Persian force of 10,000 plus infantry and a thousand cavalry seems entirely possible.

The big question is would Persian infantry be prepared to row, as Greek Hoplites would do at times.  If they were prepared to row, and the fleet wasn't really expected to fight when the troops were ashore, then some of the infantry would be oarsmen.
But if the infantry were oarsmen, the fleet couldn't really sail when the troops were fighting, and a lot of ships would have surely been captured in the flight

Jim

[aligern]

Thanks for the  Belisarian comparator Jim, I thought that the fleet size was comparable. I'd go for more than 10,000, more like15,000 with cavalry in the hundreds. After all, the Persians knew that the Greeks would have few cavalry.
I don't think that the Persian troops would row. I am under the impression that the list of troops in Herodotus is of comfiest land lubbers and that training an oarsman takes a considerable time.
Anyway, if the ship types compare then the persiAns do not outnumber the Athenians by much.

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Did those athenian triremes row all the way back to athens after depositing their cargo?

Or were the hoplites also the crew, and the triremes essentially a one way ticket (unintentionally, of course).

And can we therefore say the same about the Persians? (the slave owning - land loving Persians)

If the persian fleet was crewed by sailors and carrying soldiers, it presents an entirely different set of numbers from a fleet of soldiers who were expected to crew their own vessels at the same time.

(not to mention the question of whether the rowers were 'bulking up' the back of the Persian fighting line to create an illusion of massive numbers of fighting men).

Is there any evidence to make a judgement on any of these questions either way?

The evidence, such as it is, is from Herodotus, from whom we get the figure of 600 triremes and the assertion that the Persians scorned the Athenian advance at Marathon because they 'greatly outnumbered' the Athenians.  If Herodotus is indeed the Herodotus son of Basilides mentioned in connection with the embassy visiting the Greek fleet prior to Mycale in 479 BC, he would have been in a position to pick up stories from the Persian side about Marathon, which would add weight to the evidential value of his comments.

The loading data for the Athenian expedition to Syracuse are taken from Thucydides, whom we regard as reliable, and the triremes of the late 5th century BC seem to have been pretty much the same as triremes of the early 5th century BC, so it seems reasonable to use them for 'ballpark' figures.  For the record, the ships accompanying the Syracuse expedition stayed with it (and shared its fate) but were all committed to battle when required, indicating that their crews were not part of the infantry contingent, and the ships accompanying the Persian expedition of 490 BC also stayed with the troops they brought (and evacuated them back home after Marathon and a little detour to try the back door at Athens) but lost very few at Marathon, indicating that crews were available to man the ships as opposed to caught up in the fighting.  To me, it seems eminently reasonable to draw direct comparisons, and to assume that basically similar loading practices were followed, so if 40 triremes can carry 7,000 soldiers from Athens to Syracuse, with a few stops along the way, then at least to my mind it follows that 400 triremes can carry 70,000 soldiers from Ionia to Marathon with a few stops along the way.

The crews would not be Persians, but would be Phoenicians, Cilicians, Lykians, Ionians and similar seafaring peoples (as per the later navy summoned by Xerxes when he got to 480 BC).  The Persians and other landlubber troops would just sit back and enjoy the view.

The ships themselves were gathered in Cilicia and the Persian force initially embarked there before rebasing itself in Ionia (Herodotus VI.95).  And contrary to my earlier mistaken statement that horse transports were not specified, in fact they are: Herodotus specifically mentions that Darius had the previous year commanded them to be made ready, and they were furnished.  This may well allow more than 30 horses per vessel intended for the purpose, releasing more to carry infantry or allowing a higher proportion of cavalry.  Given that the Greeks (of Greece as opposed to Ionia) had practically no navy at the time (Athens could only muster 20 galleys c.498 BC) the Persians would not have needed more than about 50 galleys (if that) in 'combat mode' as escorts, allowing the remainder to serve as transports.

So I stick with c.60,000 in the Persian army at Marathon.

Patrick

[Jim Webster]

The problem is, your argument for 60,000 or thereabouts seems to hang on the phrase 'greatly outnumbered'.

This is an entirely subjective measure, and an army outnumbered 2:1 or even 1.5:1 can claim it was 'greatly outnumbered'.
If we take the Athenians as 11,000, then they could happily regard themselves as 'greatly outnumbered' if the Persians had 15,000 infantry and 1,000 horse. (Especially if they included in the Persian force the 100,000 plus oarsmen and sailors)

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

The problem is, your argument for 60,000 or thereabouts seems to hang on the phrase 'greatly outnumbered'.

This is an entirely subjective measure, and an army outnumbered 2:1 or even 1.5:1 can claim it was 'greatly outnumbered'.
If we take the Athenians as 11,000, then they could happily regard themselves as 'greatly outnumbered' if the Persians had 15,000 infantry and 1,000 horse. (Especially if they included in the Persian force the 100,000 plus oarsmen and sailors)

Jim

Actually it hangs on the carrying capacity of the Persian fleet.  That the Persians (according to Herodotus) regarded themselves as greatly outnumbering the Greeks is consistent with this Syracuse-expedition-derived carrying capacity but not consistent with a force of 15,000 or so, who would not consider themselves to be 'greatly outnumbering' 10,000 hoplites.  What the Persian officers would be judging by - as frontages were the same - was depth; they knew their own, and they could see what was coming at them.  Would 15,000 men have thought an attack by 10,000 to be 'mad' because of the scale of the discrepancy - six ranks instead of four; twelve ranks instead of eight?

The problem with arguing from subjectivity is that it cuts both ways: let us boost the Persians to 120,000 or so: they still 'greatly outnumber' the Greeks, who would certainly regard themselves as 'greatly outnumbered'.   This is why I tried to work out empirically what the fleet could/would have carried, and this gives us a figure of around 70,000 give or take a few cavalry, of which some (the cavalry and perhaps a few others) stayed behind with Datis and Artaphernes at Eretria while Hippias led the bulk of the army to Marathon (Herodotus VI.102 and 107 specify Hippias as being in charge of the Marathon force, indicating that Datis and Artaphernes were still looting Eretria at the time of the battle - which is consistent with the Byzantine Suda statement that the Persian cavalry were absent).

So everything still points to a Persian army of c.60,000 at Marathon.

Patrick