Marathon 490 BC

[Jim Webster]

I'm afraid your grasp of naval architecture is a little weak Patrick
Triremes were shallow draught ships, rather than being "deep-ish, narrow-ish, flattish-bottomed" they are shallow, narrow and flat bottomed.
This is not an inherently sable configuration.
Remember they are very vulnerable to instability, because is the weight on top shifts (not a problem in a normal boat because virtually everyone sticks to their bench) then suddenly one line of oars might not bite the water and the boat starts to turn (three rows biting on one side, two on the other and you're heading in that direction)

It might well be that the Athenians had a number of triremes where the benches were hoplites enjoying the cruise, but the underlying issue is that you are postulating all sorts of ways for Persian fleets to carry inordinately large numbers of men, purely on the strength of them 'greatly outnumbering' 11,000 city militia at the far end.
Without carrying a man more than normal, they would have 24,000 fighting men on 600 ships which is greatly outnumbered enough for anyone. You don't need to postulate 50 or 60,000 persians

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

You don't need to postulate 50 or 60,000 persians

Jim

Oh, but I do.    The problem with the 40-marines-per-ship-makes-up-the-army idea is that Herodotus VI.95 specifies a "land army" (pezon straton) being embarked on board the fleet.

"When these appointed generals on their way from the king reached the Aleian plain in Cilicia, bringing with them a great and well-furnished army, they camped there and were overtaken [epelthe = approached, joined] by all the fleet that was assigned to each [i.e. levied from each contributing state]; there also arrived the transports for horses, which in the previous year Darius had bidden his tributary subjects to make ready. [2] Having loaded the horses into these, and embarked the land army in the ships, they sailed to Ionia with six hundred triremes."

Patrick

[Jim Webster]

No because all that has to happen is what the Carthaginians did. The fleet turns up without any marines per ship. Safe enough the far side of Cilicia.
Then the Land army is embarked, at the rate of 40 men per ship and it sails.  The cavalry use the transports.
The Carthaginians did this in Sicily with Hamilcar's infantry acting instead of marines if memory serves.

"Great and well furnished" is a subjective term, certainly the 'well furnished' might be taken as meaning it wasn't all that big (as the really big armies had a lot of very poorly equipped troops in them)

[Patrick Waterson]

This Hamilcar?

Now that we have described at sufficient length the events in Europe, we shall shift our narrative to the affairs of another people. The Carthaginians, we recall, had agreed with the Persians to subdue the Greeks of Sicily at the same time and had made preparations on a large scale of such materials as would be useful in carrying on a war. And when they had made everything ready, they chose for general Hamilcar, having selected him as the man who was held by them in the highest esteem.  He assumed command of huge forces, both land and naval, and sailed forth from Carthage with an army of not less than three hundred thousand men and a fleet of over two hundred ships of war, not to mention many cargo ships for carrying supplies, numbering more than three thousand. Now as he was crossing the Libyan sea he encountered a storm and lost the vessels which were carrying the horses and chariots. And when he came to port in Sicily in the harbour of Panormus he remarked that he had finished the war; for he had been afraid that the sea would rescue the Siceliotes from the perils of the conflict. - Diodorus Siculus XI.20.1-2

The time period is right (5th century BC), but we lack loading data for men per ship.  Reading Diodorus literally, we might suppose that Hamilcar put 300,000 men on 200 ships ...

Patrick

[aligern]

Great debate  and very true to say that is essentially a matter of faith. Do we believe that ancient armies are in the 20,000 to 50,000 range or thay armies of 100, 300, 500,000 and more are feasible?

I am trying to remember how many Mem made up Trajan's Dacian expedition or any major Roman effort or any expedition that because we have the names, numbers or number of legions present, we can be reasonably confident of the numbers present?

For the avoidance of doubt , whilst in awe of the breadth of Patrick's scholarship I am firmly delbruckian about numbers.

Roy

[Jim Webster]

No  Hamilcar Barca, if not actually his army, that war. We have the better accounts for then. If I ever get time I'll find chapter and verse 

Jim

Found it
http://www.livius.org/ps-pz/punic_war/polybius_1_60.html#60
Book 1, chapter 60
[241 BCE] When the unexpected news reached Carthage that the Romans were at sea with a fleet and were again disputing the naval supremacy, they at once got their ships ready, and filling them with grain and other provisions, dispatched their fleet on its errand, desiring that the troops at Eryx should be in no need of necessary supplies. Hanno, whom they had appointed to command the naval force, set sail and reached the Holy Isle from whence he designed to cross as soon as possible to Eryx, unobserved by the enemy, and, after lightening the ships by disembarking the supplies, to take on board as marines the best qualified mercenaries together with [Hamilcar] Barca himself and then engage the enemy.

Jim

[Mark G]

Chaps, would you care to update the ancient sources / battles portion of the wiki with these excerpts in full.

I rather gathered that was the intention of the area, and as these passages are fresh in your heads (and presumably freshly thumbed or cached in your reference material), it seems a shame to let the opportunity slip.

[Patrick Waterson]

Great debate  and very true to say that is essentially a matter of faith. Do we believe that ancient armies are in the 20,000 to 50,000 range or thay armies of 100, 300, 500,000 and more are feasible?

Roy

Would it be fair to say faith on the one hand and sources on the other (at least until Hamilcar Barca enters the lists once Jim or I get hold of him)?  Or perhaps faith in sources? 

I suspect we may need to open a new topic if we are going to revive the whole 'ancient numbers' question: meanwhile, Mark's suggestion is excellent.  Should we make a specific 'naval transport' thread?

Patrick

[Jim Webster]

I edited my post above to put Hamilcar in, so that he was nearer the scene of the action for people reading
Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

You were ahead of me with that one, Jim.

Regettably all this demonstrates is that Hanno was putting on board the best troops he could find to serve as marines in a sea fight.  (The battle in question is Aegusa, the last sea-battle of the First Punic War).  The passage alas tells us nothing about triremes' ability to transport troops (as opposed to scrounging around for troops to serve as marines - in Polybius I.49 and I.51 Adherbal and Pulcher do the same for the battle at Drepana, in which the former wipes the ocean with the latter).

Still worth adding to a naval topic, though.

Patrick

[Patrick Waterson]

Chaps, would you care to update the ancient sources / battles portion of the wiki with these excerpts in full.

I rather gathered that was the intention of the area, and as these passages are fresh in your heads (and presumably freshly thumbed or cached in your reference material), it seems a shame to let the opportunity slip.

Made a start with a new thread for Ships and Navies.  http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=430.0

Will copy relevant bits under various battles etc. sooner or later.

Thanks for the suggestion, Mark.

Patrick

[Jim Webster]

You were ahead of me with that one, Jim.

Regettably all this demonstrates is that Hanno was putting on board the best troops he could find to serve as marines in a sea fight.  (The battle in question is Aegusa, the last sea-battle of the First Punic War).  The passage alas tells us nothing about triremes' ability to transport troops (as opposed to scrounging around for troops to serve as marines - in Polybius I.49 and I.51 Adherbal and Pulcher do the same for the battle at Drepana, in which the former wipes the ocean with the latter).

Still worth adding to a naval topic, though.

Patrick

what it shows it that ships could travel without marines but with stores loaded instead. It also shows that troops could be used as marines, but if they can be transported to a sea battle, they can also be transported to a land battle.
So it shows that it is not at all impossible for the Persians to have ships with rowers but no marines sent up the coast to Cilicia where they pick up troops who will act as Marines

Somewhere Herodotus says that the Persians added 30 Saca or Persian infantry to the Marine contingents before Salamis but I've not had time to find out when

Jim

[aligern]

I am no expert, but combining the conservative numbers of the Belisarian expedition with the capacities of triremes I feel that the big thing missing is the space for supplies. These soldiers are going to land in Greece which is bare and rocky in many areas and could have the water supply cut or poisoned and a scorched earth policy applied in front of the Persian army which would face the Greeks who would be on top of their supply bases. It looks to me as though a large logistical tail would be needed. No doubt there were man servants and much in the way of food/fodder/ tents/ supplies of arrows and javelins and cases of armour etc. that  would take up a lot of space on the ships . The likelihood that men can be packed on deck like sardines exposed to the elements does not seem at all likely. They would suffer from exposure in any bad weather or even just strong sunshine for 12 hours a day as the glare at sea is intense with no shade.
Plus the rowers have to be fed and watered. They are more used to the elements, toughened, sinewy and all that, but they still need water/wine and food.
So IMHO lots of carrying capacity (and Jim is correct that it may be weight more than space that is the problem and restricted numbers of soldiers. 40 per ship but with 25% of shipping for horses would seem  fair .

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

In the words of a famous Pompeiian character: The Prologue.  This is the background to the Battle of Marathon, delineating the motivations for and background to the campaign as recorded by Herodotus.  Points of interest in bold.

Herodotus VI.94-100

94. The Persian [i.e. King Darius] was going about his own business, for his servant was constantly reminding him to remember the Athenians, and the Pisistratidae were at his elbow maligning the Athenians; moreover, Darius desired to take this pretext for subduing all the men of Hellas who had not given him earth and water. [2] He dismissed from command Mardonius, who had fared so badly on his expedition, and appointed other generals to lead his armies against Athens and Eretria, Datis, a Mede by birth, and his own nephew Artaphrenes son of Artaphrenes; the order he gave them at their departure was to enslave Athens and Eretria and bring the slaves into his presence.

95. When these appointed generals on their way from the king reached the Aleian plain in Cilicia, bringing with them a great and well-furnished army, they camped there and were overtaken by all the fleet that was assigned to each; there also arrived the transports for horses, which in the previous year Darius had bidden his tributary subjects to make ready. [2] Having loaded the horses into these, and embarked the land army in the ships, they sailed to Ionia with six hundred triremes. From there they held their course not by the mainland and straight towards the Hellespont and Thrace, but setting forth from Samos they sailed by the Icarian sea and from island to island; this, to my thinking, was because they feared above all the voyage around Athos, seeing that in the previous year they had come to great disaster by holding their course that way; moreover, Naxos was still unconquered and constrained them.

96. When they approached Naxos from the Icarian sea and came to land (for it was Naxos which the Persians intended to attack first), the Naxians, remembering what had happened before, fled away to the mountains instead of waiting for them. The Persians enslaved all of them that they caught, and burnt their temples and their city. After doing this, they set sail for the other islands.

97. While they did this, the Delians also left Delos and fled away to Tenos. As his expedition was sailing landwards, Datis went on ahead and bade his fleet anchor not off Delos, but across the water off Rhenaea. Learning where the Delians were, he sent a herald to them with this proclamation: [2] "Holy men, why have you fled away, and so misjudged my intent? It is my own desire, and the king's command to me, to do no harm to the land where the two gods were born, neither to the land itself nor to its inhabitants. So return now to your homes and dwell on your island." He made this proclamation to the Delians, and then piled up three hundred talents of frankincense on the altar and burnt it.

98. After doing this, Datis sailed with his army against Eretria first, taking with him Ionians and Aeolians; and after he had put out from there, Delos was shaken by an earthquake, the first and last, as the Delians say, before my time. This portent was sent by heaven, as I suppose, to be an omen of the ills that were coming on the world. [2] For in three generations, that is, in the time of Darius son of Hystaspes and Xerxes son of Darius and Artaxerxes son of Xerxes,1 more ills happened to Hellas than in twenty generations before Darius; some coming from the Persians, some from the wars for preeminence among the chief of the nations themselves. [3] Thus it was no marvel that there should be an earthquake in Delos when there had been none before. Also there was an oracle concerning Delos, where it was written: "I will shake Delos, though unshaken before." In the Greek language these names have the following meanings: Darius is the Doer, Xerxes the Warrior, Artaxerxes the Great Warrior. The Greeks would rightly call the kings thus in their language.

99. Launching out to sea from Delos, the foreigners [Persians] put in at the islands and gathered an army from there, taking the sons of the islanders for hostages. [2] When in their voyage about the islands they put in at Carystos, the Carystians gave them no hostages and refused to join them against neighboring cities, meaning Eretria and Athens; the Persians besieged them and laid waste their land, until the Carystians too came over to their side.

100. When the Eretrians learned that the Persian expedition was sailing to attack them, they asked for help from the Athenians. The Athenians did not refuse the aid, but gave them for defenders the four thousand tenant farmers who held the land of the Chalcidian horse-breeders. But it seems that all the plans of the Eretrians were unsound; they sent to the Athenians for aid, but their counsels were divided. [2] Some of them planned to leave the city and make for the heights of Euboea; others plotted treason in hope of winning advantages from the Persians. [3] When Aeschines son of Nothon, a leading man in Eretria, learned of both designs, he told the Athenians who had come how matters stood, and asked them to depart to their own country so they would not perish like the rest. The Athenians followed Aeschines' advice.

Points to note on the Persian side are the authorisation of the expedition from the very top, the raising of a land army to be embarked upon the surprisingly large fleet, the advance preparation of horse transports and the curious lack of mention of any sort of storeship to carry supplies.  One observes that Athenian assistance consisted of 'four thousand tenant farmers who held the land of the Chalcidian horse-breeders', probably the result of Miltiades' fiefing in the Chersonesus, but not a man or ship from Athens itself.

Patrick

[Patrick Waterson]

Actually the Persians' first stop after leaving the Empire (they 'blitzed' Naxos and visited Delos en route) was Euboea, which back then was fertile and bountiful (it provided much of Athens' food supply during the Athenian Empire period).  They made a fairly thorough job of stripping the place and then packed off Hippias and the bulk of the troops to Marathon.  It is not as if they were preparing for a voyage to Africa with an estimated journey time reckoned in months. 

Herodotus does not detail the supply arrangements for this expedition, but it may be worth noting that Xerxes, with his huge army, still reckoned to live off supplies to be found in Greece (VIII.50) even after the 'visit' by Datis and Artaphernes ten years previously, although he was warned of likely supply problems by Artabanus (VIII.49) and admittedly hedged his bets with 'vast stores of provisions' (VIII.50) as a safeguard.  To dismiss Greece as barren and incapable of supplying an army would be contrary both to then-contemporary thinking and to the experience of Mardonius, who maintained a very significant force over the winter of 480-479 on Greek (mainly Thessalian and Boeotian) resources.

The Athenian expedition to Syracuse was followed by 30 'ships' [sitagogoi = corn transports] with their supplies for six months plus all requisite materials for siege work and fortification and 100 'boats' [ploia = merchantmen] (Thuc VI.44).  This was of course because they thought the campaign might take six months with little or no chance to resupply.

We can argue until the ocurrence of bovine redomiciliation about how troops were carried on triremes, and how many per ship, but Thucydides VI.43 effectively puts 178 men on each trireme used as a transport, and I am not particularly concerned whether we can explain how it was done, rather that it was done and thus can serve as a yardstick for troop transportation by triremes in the Mediterranean.  Antony's overt (and Jim's implicit) suggestion that they would have reduced crews while acting as transports is one I find not unreasonable.

Patrick