File recoil

[Justin Swanton]

Which then raises the question of why infantry lines were so deep.

D - to provide greater resilience against retreat, by providing a mass of men behind with forward pressure

D - is what Polybius and others say and also explains why deep formations were also useful in other periods of history, when we know (or believe we know) only the front rank or three actually fought

If A, B and C are ruled out, then only the front rank of a line did any serious fighting, and only the front rank would want to run if things began to get too hot. That being the case, three ranks behind it would be quite enough to keep it in place. No need for 5, or 7, or 15. We still need an explanation for the depth of a typical infantry battleline.

[Jim Webster]

I think that for hoplites (or at least troops armed with shorter weapons than pikes) the man who recoils back might break contact because anybody following is going to be a target for the 'spare' men in the second rank.

My guess is that files didn't advance as such, but that the man who killed his opponent might get a chance to take a crafty stab under the shield at the enemy who was fighting his mate to the right before the gap was filled by the second man coming forward. (Or perhaps there was a gap in time when the second man, rather than stepping onto the body beneath his feet held his shield to screen while men behind pulled the wounded/dead guy back?)

I think one problem is that historians seem to have moved away from the 'rugby scrum' but we're not entirely sure how the two front lines did interact

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

This brings us to the question of what the men not in melee contact were doing.

In a hoplite formation, the use of 9' or longer spears held presumably at or near the mid point would confer 4 1/2 feet of reach, or enough to allow the second rank to contribute with their points against the enemy first rank.  Ranks 6-8 of the typical 8 deep hoplite formation seem to have participated by adding their weight and pushing once the initial attempts at spear-work had got nowhere, or at least not very far.

In a Roman formation, they seem to have been doing nothing: Polybius XVIII.30.10 notes that "the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight [to their charge], or active use of their swords."  Conversely, the Romans were noted for their line relief by backwards movement (Polybius' epi poda; Livy's retro cedentes) which seemingly has to be a movement in reverse by entire files in coordination (in fact by the whole line, but the files need to be working in unison or a mess will result).

In a Gallic formation, they seem to have been cheering, brandishing weapons and/or waiting their turn to get in and hack.  This need not prevent whole Gallic formations from pulling back when in action if they had been briefed and prepared to do so, cf. the Helvetii against Caesar and the Eburones against Sabinius, but ct. the Nervii against Caesar and the Insubres in 223 BC, who evidently had not been so briefed and hence died where they stood.

One thought:

Of course the passage could refer to the mobility of a Roman soldier fighting a foe to his front, moving his shield up and down as his opponent's blows come high or low.

Not really, since this is given as a reason why a Roman needed more space to either side, not above and below (the ground will always be a problem below, and the sky pretty much maximizes the space above).

Not so much to either side as (that marvellous word) summetatithemenous, which essentially means to shift from place to place as opposed to specifically from side to side - perfectly consistent with blocking the attacks of a single frontal opponent, especially one using his weapon in the fashion described by Dionysius of Halicarnassus XIV.10.1-2:

"Now the barbarians' manner of fighting, being in large measure that of wild beasts and frenzied, was an erratic procedure, quite lacking in military science. Thus, at one moment they would raise their swords aloft and smite after the manner of wild boars, throwing the whole weight of their bodies into the blow like hewers of wood or men digging with mattocks, and again they would deliver crosswise blows aimed at no target, as if they intended to cut to pieces the entire bodies of their adversaries, protective armour and all; then they would turn the edges of their swords away from the foe. 2  On the other hand, the Romans' defence and counter-manoeuvring against the barbarians was steadfast and afforded great safety. For while their foes were still raising their swords aloft, they would duck under their arms, holding up their shields, and then, stooping and crouching low, they would render vain and useless the blows of the others, which were aimed too high, while for their own part, holding their swords straight out, they would strike their opponents in the groins, pierce their sides, and drive their blows through their breasts into their vitals."

While not specifying individuality, Dionysius does give the impression of singularity of opponents.  Hence I think Justin may have the right idea here.

Meanwhile ...

Justin's basic hypothesis appears to be that the file acted, or could act, as a shock absorber.  If the man in front was having a hard time he could pull back a bit to get his breath and/or bearings and his file would conform, giving the semi-successful enemy file leader the chance of staying put or sticking his neck out by following up.

Against a Macedonian phalanx the Roman file appears to have done exactly this, albeit the whole formation tended to find itself under the necessity of retiring at the same time on account of the ubiquity and homogenity of the serried array of pike points faced by each legionary.

Against other formations and opponents it is less clear that individual file leaders had discretion for a tactical step back or that their file comrades would expect them to do so.  Hoplites in particular seem to have valued forward progress and 'one more step' could be enough to crack the foe.

This is starting to lead us towards an as yet undefined model or concept of close combat.  As Jim notes:

I think one problem is that historians seem to have moved away from the 'rugby scrum' but we're not entirely sure how the two front lines did interact

So can we be any clearer on what may have happened once the lines closed for action?

[Dangun]

Maybe we are exaggerating how rigid and compressed the formations were in the first place?

Although I am a bit late to the thread, I would suggest there is very little to no incentive for one file leader to push into a gap in an opposing formation. Looks a lot like suicide. I think this is also why generals seemed to leave gaps between phalanxs or legions to a greater degree than we do on the table top, because it would just suicidal to run into the gap.

[Patrick Waterson]

Maybe we are exaggerating how rigid and compressed the formations were in the first place?

Although I am a bit late to the thread, I would suggest there is very little to no incentive for one file leader to push into a gap in an opposing formation. Looks a lot like suicide.

Yes, if one is thinking dispassionately - but if one's adrenalin is up and one's immediate opponent has just gone down, one may have a different outlook on what to do next.

I think this is also why generals seemed to leave gaps between phalanxes or legions to a greater degree than we do on the table top, because it would just suicidal to run into the gap.

Curiously enough, my understanding of period battle accounts is that gaps did not exist at all between heavy infantry formations, at least not voluntarily.  Any time a gap appeared, e.g. at First Mantinea in 418 BC (owing to a rare foul-up in Spartan command control which left the Sciritae and Brasidas' returnees separated from the rest of the line) the other side made immediate and devastating use of it and wiped out the exposed contingent - which we also see at Delium in 424 BC when the contingents on either side of the Thespians gave way, creating gaps, and the Thespians were promptly surrounded and killed by the Athenians.

Naturally, this ability to exploit gaps works only if there is adequate frontal pressure on the formations either side of the gap.  A favourite Byzantine ploy was to deploy a meros in a square bracket formation with the open side facing the enemy (from above looking like a reverse ordre mixte) but with a screen of lighter infantry across the open part between the flanking columns.  An obliging enemy would push the lighter troops back to the 'stop line' and then the flanking columns would crunch him.  The front part of the columns would hold against pressure from enemy troops opposing them while the rear portions of the columns faced inward and did the crushing.

Hence a gap could be a snare, but only if prepared; not in the ordinary course of events.

[Erpingham]

Yes, if one is thinking dispassionately - but if one's adrenalin is up and one's immediate opponent has just gone down, one may have a different outlook on what to do next.

But adrenalin can be tempered by training and experience.  While our "wild" barbarians may fling themselves forward with abandon, our veteran Romans may temper his enthusiasm and push forward with much greater awareness, only grabbing an opportunity where they are confident of support.  That said, the Romanophiles will doubtless note that by no means all was discipline and order in the Roman fighting style.  Many "superstar" centurions seem to have gained their reputations through tough fighting and heroic leadership, and being noted in battle was sought after, so there would certainly be men ready to push into the enemy if there was a chance of success.

Curiously enough, my understanding of period battle accounts is that gaps did not exist at all between heavy infantry formations, at least not voluntarily.  Any time a gap appeared,< > the other side made immediate and devastating use of it and wiped out the exposed contingent

How big a gap are we talking about though?  The examples seem to imply a gap wide enough to deploy through en masse, rather than the odd individual to charge into.

[Jim Webster]

My gut feeling is that the loss of a man in the front rank might mean the unit started to 'unravel' as the men on either side of the dead man became more vulnerable, and the gap would have to be filled pretty quickly, or one dead man could soon become three

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

But adrenalin can be tempered by training and experience.

Very much so.  Not to mention familiarity superimposed upon discipline.

While our "wild" barbarians may fling themselves forward with abandon, our veteran Romans may temper his enthusiasm and push forward with much greater awareness, only grabbing an opportunity where they are confident of support.  That said, the Romanophiles will doubtless note that by no means all was discipline and order in the Roman fighting style.  Many "superstar" centurions seem to have gained their reputations through tough fighting and heroic leadership, and being noted in battle was sought after, so there would certainly be men ready to push into the enemy if there was a chance of success.

My impression is that the 'superstar' centurions gained their reputation mainly by holding on and holding things together when the going got tough - 120 arrows in the shield, that sort of thing - though leading the men through a gap in the enemy's palisades and being the first to unseam a Gallic chieftain from the nave unto the chaps would also help.

How big a gap are we talking about though?  The examples seem to imply a gap wide enough to deploy through en masse, rather than the odd individual to charge into.

Indeed: this was considering the implications of gaps between units as posited in Nicholas' post.  With regard to individual-sized gaps, I think Jim accurately notes the implications of these:

My gut feeling is that the loss of a man in the front rank might mean the unit started to 'unravel' as the men on either side of the dead man became more vulnerable, and the gap would have to be filled pretty quickly, or one dead man could soon become three.

[Andreas Johansson]

This brings us to the question of what the men not in melee contact were doing.

In a previous discussion - which I'm too lazy to try and dig out ATM - someone quoted a description of latter (early modern I think) Indian infantry to the effect that the rear ranks shouted "kill! kill!" to the front rank.

I suspect part of the reason for deep formations was psychological - not only did the presence of rear ranks make flight physically difficult, it made it very clear that you'd be seen running away*, and as long as you didn't you'd effectively have your own cheerleading squad (albeit maybe not a very pretty one).

* Modern studies of what keeps soldiers fighting seemingly invariably cite the need to be seen as a man among men; to maintain your image as not a coward. I'm expect the same effect applied in our period.

[Patrick Waterson]

In a previous discussion - which I'm too lazy to try and dig out ATM - someone quoted a description of latter (early modern I think) Indian infantry to the effect that the rear ranks shouted "kill! kill!" to the front rank.

I remember it.  And it seemed as natural to the Indians as it appeared wastefully absurd to the every-man-fighting Europeans.

I suspect part of the reason for deep formations was psychological - not only did the presence of rear ranks make flight physically difficult, it made it very clear that you'd be seen running away*, and as long as you didn't you'd effectively have your own cheerleading squad (albeit maybe not a very pretty one).

* Modern studies of what keeps soldiers fighting seemingly invariably cite the need to be seen as a man among men; to maintain your image as not a coward. I expect the same effect applied in our period.

I think psychology was indeed a very important consideration in the use of of deep formations: yes, it would be very hard to make one's way to the rear, and there would be a great many people in a position to point out the error of one's ways.  Unless a man was completely without shame he would feel bound by the expectation of several hundred or thousand others to do his best with them, for them and most of all in front of them.  (If he was completely without shame, one of the officers at the rear or in an Achaemenid army one of the Persian whip-men would make his life a misery.)

One might go so far as to suggest that psychology was of at least as much importance as the metal-and-flesh physical contact aspect of two formations meeting.  Throughout history, the deeper the formation (as opposed to mob or crowd) the steadier it seems to have been.  Hence our eight-to-ten man deep classical formations were probably considered ideal for combining efficient use of manpower with steadiness of the formation which was a prerequisite to allow the manpower to be applied in the first place: a necessary overhead, so to speak.

[Erpingham]

Attempting a bit of a summary of the plot so far :

Isolated file penetration wasn't what was sought - if an individual created a gap by killing an opponent, the attackers would look to exploit the gap by widening with several files working together, looking to create a larger breakthrough.  The defenders would be working together over the similar frontage to stop this from happening.

A degree of depth aided both in reinforcing breakthrough or stiffling it.  How many ranks was a safe number is yet to be discussed (I'd guess about four, based on hoplites being able to fight like this, it was remarked the English at Agincourt were thinly spread at 4 ranks yet they held and there is a Norse battle where an army had to spread thin to prevent overlap and ended up only 5 deep)

Most close order infantry drew up deeper than the minimum.  This gave them a safety cushion in terms of ranks, the ranks' presence provided the formation a certain physical inertia (exactly how uncertain), the deeper formation provided a psychological advantage (possibly in a number of different ways) and it was harder for those at the front to run away (psychologically and physically).

[Patrick Waterson]

Good summary.  The hoplite and pike tradition also utilised the coordinated push in which rear ranks added their 'weight' - and later Hellenistic pike formations tended to be 16 deep rather than the earlier 8 deep perhaps because they found the extra 'weight' decisive.  Of course when the other chap also goes to 16 deep you are back to square one but in the meantime you can win at Sellasia ...

One wonders how far the provision of inertia in non-othismotic infantry systems may have been partly psychological restraint on the attacker: if you are facing a two-deep line, one good shove will get you through and it is worth a try.  If facing a line 8-10 deep then no matter how good your shove you are just going to get yourself surrounded and into trouble.

There are other factors that might give one pause and dampen impetus when taking on an opponent: here is a Republican Roman lined up behind his scutum: where do you begin?

[Duncan Head]

Good summary.  The hoplite and pike tradition also utilised the coordinated push in which rear ranks added their 'weight' - and later Hellenistic pike formations tended to be 16 deep rather than the earlier 8 deep perhaps because they found the extra 'weight' decisive. 

Hoplite armies seem to have favoured depths of 12 or 16 at least as often as 8 in the 4th century, so I am inclined to wonder whether the standardisation on 16 ranks actually had anything to do with the adoption of the pike:

These, who were drawn up eight deep, thinking that the wing of the phalanx was too weak, attempted to perform an anastrophe (to double its ranks).

[Andreas Johansson]

Another point re depth and psychology: if formations break from the rear, having more ranks means that the guys in the last one are farther from the enemy's weapons, and pressumably feel less need to get out of harm's way.

[Erpingham]

Another point re depth and psychology: if formations break from the rear, having more ranks means that the guys in the last one are farther from the enemy's weapons, and pressumably feel less need to get out of harm's way.

It's a thought.  The deeper in the formation a soldier is, the more insulated he is from the reality of the action.  Yes, there may be arrows falling but much of the battle is just a series of "noises off".  This could be a disadvantage too.  At Laupen, the retreat of the Bernese skirmishers through the main body caused the rear ranks to believe those ahead of them had been routed, so they ran away.  It may be significant that this was an allied army only recently assembled, so recognising who was who may have been confusing.  It is hard to imagine a legion running away as its velites fell back, for example.  It certainly didn't prevent the Swiss from using very deep formations after Laupen.