Antigonus vs Eumenes

[Chris]

Antigonus vs Eumenes

It would be fair to remark that for the past few months, I have been rather preoccupied with the 317 BC battle of Paraetacene. With the possible - emphasis on possible - exception of "Companions, Elephants, and Phalanxes - Part 1 (see http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=2060.0), this preoccupation resulted in several unsuccessful attempts to stage either portions of the historical engagement or the complete contest on my 6 by 4-foot table top using either Rick Priestley's colourful and popular Hail Caesar rules or Simon Miller's colourful, innovative, and quite popular To the Strongest! rules.

In addition to being preoccupied by the historic clash between two of Alexander's successor generals, I was also rather puzzled by the chronology and details of the battle provided by Diodorus Siculus. (See http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/19B*.html, especially Chapters 27-30.) In brief overview, I was scratching my head trying to figure out the numbers of elephants on Eumenes' side of the field, and I was scratching my head trying to figure out the numbers of "two-horse men" riding with Pithon's contingent on Antigonus' left wing. In addition to these problems, I was trying to figure out why Antigonus started the battle with his left when he had arranged his army in echelon by pushing his right wing (the wing in which "he  had the most confidence") forward. Finally and perhaps most intriguing, I was wondering how Eudamus was able to break contact with the enemy and move a portion of his command - or perhaps a substantial part of it - all the way over to the right in order to assist the hard-pressed Eumenes.

In this report, it is not my intention to review or analyze the campaign or events leading up the November battle between two of Alexander's successor generals. Background information is readily available on the Internet. I would suggest the following links for as possible starting points:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Paraitakene
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_diadoch_2nd.html.
https://processwire-karwansaraypubli.netdna-ssl.com/assets/files/2761/paraetacene.pdf
http://fanaticus.org/DBA/battles/Paraetacene/
In the course of my research, I found "The fight for Alexander's Asia - The Battle of Paraetacene," an article written by a Mr. Sidney E. Dean in Ancient Warfare IX.5. I also ran across the contents of Slingshot 233. In this issue, a Mr. Scott Robertson wrote a report about the clash between Antigonus and Eumenes.

Being very much an amateur historian as well as atypical historical miniature wargamer, my focus was on the battle itself. My intention with this forum submission is to describe how I corrected and modified the scenario created by Mr. Stephen Phenow (see https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/ARMATI/conversations/messages/34858) so that I could successfully stage an Armati version of the historic contest on my smallish table top.

Mr. Phenow begins his order of battle on the left wing of Antigonus' army, with the cavalry contingent under the command of Pithon. Since Diodorus starts his wargamer-friendly description with a consideration of the enemy left wing under Eudamus, this is where I shall start my proposed order of battle.

The Eumenid Left
Eudamus - Commander or Sub-General (+1 melee modifier, +1 morale modifier)
01 unit of HC 5[0]0 +1 various [veteran] KEY / a combination of Eudamus' squadron of 150, the "two troops of selected mounted lancers," and some of the cavalry under Stasander
02 units of HC 4[0]0 +1 various KEY / the majority of the contingent under Stasander
01 unit of HC 4[0]0 +1 various  & bow [veteran] KEY / the Mesopotamian horse under Amphimachus
01 unit of LC 2[0]0 +1 javelins [veteran] / the horsemen from Arachosia under Cephalon
01 unit of LC 2[0]0 +1 bows / the cavalry from Paropanisadae
01 unit of LC 3[1]0 +1 javelins / the Thracians "from the colonies of the upper country"
03 units of EL (elephants) 5[3]2 +1 various KEY
02 units of SI (skirmishers) 2[1]1 +2 bows
02 units of SI (skirmishers) 3[1]2 +2 slings
02 units of SI (skirmishers) 3[1]2 +2 javelins

Notes -
Given the approximate unit scale suggested in the Armati 2nd Edition rules (400-1500 men depending on type), it is not possible to represent or model the squadron of Eudamus and its advanced guard. However, if these formations are combined with the cavalry under Stasander and then deployed as  3 "regiments," one can get very close to the low end of the aforementioned approximate unit scale. With regard to the variation in numbers (600 per contingent versus 400 per contingent, for example), I opted to address the difference by making the stronger formation a veteran unit, thereby giving it an extra unit breakpoint. The Thracian light cavalry were given a better FFV (frontal and flank fighting value) as I have this idea or notion that Thracian horsemen were light cavalry of good quality. For the elephant screen of this wing, I established an approximate stand to animal scale of 1 stand represented 15 pachyderms. Curiously, in his order of battle, Mr. Phenow only has 2 stands of elephants on this wing. Diodorus reports that there were 45 elephants on this part of the field in front of Eudamus' command. Diodorus also reports that there were "a suitable number of  bowmen and slingers" working in conjunction with the elephants. This mixture is reflected in my interpreted order of battle. Mr. Phenow did not include any slingers in his skirmisher screen. With regard to command and control, initiative and "army" break point, I modified Mr. Phenow's excellent work so that Eudamus had 2 heavy division control points and 4 light division control points. The initiative rating of his command or wing was 4. His command would rout when 4 key units were lost.

The Eumenid Center
Anonymous - Commander of Sub-General (+1 melee modifier, +1 morale modifier)
08 units of PH 6[1]1 +1 spears KEY / the mercenaries
06 units of PH 7[0]0 +1 pikes KEY / the men "equipped in the Macedonian fashion"
04 units of PH 9[1]0 +1 pikes [veteran] KEY / the Silver Shields
04 units of PH 8[2]1 +1 pikes [veteran] KEY / the Hypaspists
03 units of EL (elephants)  5[3]2 +1 various KEY
04 units of SI (skirmishers)  2[1]1 +2 bows
04 units of SI (skirmishers)  3[1]2 +2 slings
04 units of SI (skirmishers) 3[1]2 +2 javelins

Notes -
Mr. Phenow places Peucestes is overall command of the phalanx. I could find no direct mention of this in the studied chapters of the Diodorus narrative. Peucestes and Antigenes did have a squadron of horse on the right wing, however. But Diodorus informs that Antigenes and some fellow by the name of Teutamus were in charge of the Silver Shields and Hypaspists. Given this command structure, I do suppose it would be possible to deploy these personalities as "group" leaders. This is only a suggestion, though. With regard to unit scale, I based my calculations on an approximate scale of 1 infantry formation represented 800 men. The unusually high FV for the Silver Shields was established in order to separate them from the Hypaspists and the "run of the mill" troops armed like Macedonian phalangites. In terms of elephants, Diodorus explains that there were 40 of the animals arranged in front of the phalanx. Forty-five is obviously more than 40, but I feel the numbers of close enough to permit the placement of 3 stands. Diodorus does not detail the weapons carried by the "light armed soldiers" deployed between the elephants, neither does he report the numbers of skirmishers present. Mr. Phenow contends that Eumenes enjoyed a fairly significant advantage with respect to Persian/Median subjects screening his center. So, I decided to "inflate" the number of skirmisher stands available to screen Eumenes' phalanx. As for command and control, initiative, and "army" break point, I permitted the center of this assembled army 4 heavy division control points and an equal number of light division control points.
The initiative rating for this portion of the army was 4. Its break point was calculated at 12 key units.

The Eumenid Right
Eumenes - Commander and General (+2 melee modifier, +2 morale modifier)
02 units of HC 4[0]0 +1 various KEY / the Carmanians under the satrap Tlepolemus
02 units of  HC 5[0]0 +1 various [veteran] KEY / the Companions
01 unit of HC 4[1]0 +1 various KEY / the squadron of Peucestes and Antigenes
01 unit of HC 5[1]0 +2 various [veteran] KEY / the squadron of Eumenes (Agema)
01 unit of LC 2[0]0 +1 javelins / the ad-hoc unit of slaves and selected horsemen
01 unit of HC 4[0]0 +1 various KEY / "the 300 men selected from all cavalry commands"
02 units of EL (elephants)  5[3]2 +1 various KEY

Notes -
In contrast to the 6 units of cavalry in Mr. Phenow's interpretation, I have prepared 8 units of horse to represent the formations on Eumenes' right wing or flank. There were no skirmishers mentioned in the description by Diodorus, so Mr. Phenow and I did not create any screen to work with the pachyderms on this cavalry-heavy wing. With regard to command and control on the right flank, the formations under Eumenes had 3 heavy division control points and 1 light division control point. Its initiative rating was 5. Eumenes' command would break and flee when 5 key units had been destroyed.

Having drawn up an order of battle for one successor general, I turned my attention to the other side of the field. Once again, I relied upon the narrative written by Diodorus. At the same time, I referred to the original work completed by Mr. Phenow.

The Antigonid Left
Pithon - Commander or Sub-General (+1 melee modifier, +1 morale modifier)
01 unit of LC 2[0]0 +1 lances [veteran] / the men from Media
02 units of LC 1[0]0 +1 bows / the horse archers from Parthia
05 units of LC 2[1]0 +1 javelins / the "Tarentines"
02 units of HC 4[0]0 +1 various KEY / the riders from Phrygia and Lydia
04 units of LC 1[0]0 +1 bows / the contingent directly under Pithon
01 unit of LC 3[0]0 +1 lances KEY / the troopers riding with Lysanias
02 units of HC 3[0]0 +1 various KEY / the 800 colonists
01 unit of EL (elephants)  5[3]2 +1 various KEY

Notes -
Instead of dividing the Medians and Parthians evenly, I established strengths of 400 and 600, respectively. The Parthian horse archers were organized into two smallish units containing 300 men each. I adopted the slightly improved FV for the "Tarentines" from Mr. Phenow's order of battle. The composition of the rest of this wing was essentially guesswork, although I gathered that Pithon's contingent may have been mostly light horse armed with bows. (Here again, I was borrowing from Mr. Phenow's original work.) As Diodorus provides no further information about the mysterious "two-horse men," I did not include these in my order of battle. The colonists were made heavy cavalry but with a lower frontal fighting value. I elected to place 1 stand of elephants (representing 15 real animals) even though the narrative informs that there were "but a few with the cavalry on the left wing." Pithon's command has 2 heavy division control points and 7 light division control points. Its initiative rating is 4. Pithon and his surviving troopers will rout when 3 key units are broken.

The Antigonid Center
Anonymous - Commander or Sub-General (+1 melee modifier, +1 morale modifier)
12 units of FT 6[0]0 +1 spears KEY / the mercenaries
04 units of LHI 4[1]2 +1 spears KEY / representing the Lycians and Pamphylians
11 units of PH 7[0]0 +1 pikes KEY / the "mixed troops" in Macedonian equipment
09 units of PH 7[0]0 +1 pikes [veteran] KEY / the Macedonians from Antipater
02 units of EL (elephants)  5[3]2 +1 various KEY
02 unit of SI (skirmishers)  2[1]1 +2 bows
02 unit of SI (skirmishers)  3[1]2 +2 slings
03 units of SI (skirmishers) 3[1]2 +2 javelins

Notes -
According to Mr. Phenow's interpretation, a young man by the name of Demetrios was in command of the center. The narrative of Diodorus explains that Demetrius (the son of Antigonus) was over on the right flank, riding into battle with his father for the first time. The lad was charged with commanding the 1,000 Companions. For the several types of infantry present, the previously established approximate scale was used. Instead of arming the Lycians and Pamphylians with javelins, I gave them spears. My general thinking was that if troops are going to take their place in a phalanx or collection of phalanxes, then they would be armed with weapons for close combat. In his narrative, Diodorus informs that 30 of the strongest elephants were positioned as a screen for the right wing, while about the same number were deployed in front of the phalanx. In my reconstruction, I am giving Antigonus 5 stands of elephants. There will be 2 stands on the right, 2 stands in the center, and 1 stand over on the left wing. So, added all together, he will actually have 10 more of the animals present on the table top than he reportedly did in late 317 BC. The phalanx has 6 heavy division control points and 3 light division control points. Its initiative rating is also 4. To reflect the reported "brittle" nature of the troops comprising the phalanx, this command will rout when 12 key units have been lost.

The Antigonid Right
Antigonus - Commander or General (+2 melee modifier, +2 morale modifier)
01 unit of HC 4[0]0 +1 various KEY / the mercenaries of mixed origin
01 unit of HC 4[0]0 +1 various [veteran] KEY / Thracians
02 units of LC 3[0]0 +1 javelins / Thracians
01 unit of HC 4[0]0 +1 various KEY / allies
02 units of HC 5[1]0 +1 various [veteran] KEY / the Companions - Demetrius rides with them as unit contingent commander (+1 melee modifier, +1 morale modifier)
01 unit of HC 5[1]0 +2 various KEY / the squadron of Antigonus (Agema)
01 unit of LC 2[0]0 +1 javelins / the advanced guard of slaves and Tarentines
03 units of EL (elephants) [veteran] 5[3]2 +1 various KEY
01 units of SI (skirmishers)  2[1]1 +2 bows
01 units of SI (skirmishers)  3[1]2 +2 slings
04 units of SI (skirmishers) 3[1]2 +2 javelins

Notes -
On several points, my right wing differs markedly from that proposed by Mr. Phenow. In my order of battle, there are more elephants. They are stronger, too, being classed as veterans. This decision was made to reflect the description made by Diodorus. My order of battle contains no units of "Asian" heavy horse armed with bows. In contrast, I built my model cavalry wing by following the list provided by the ancient historian. Instead of of having just 2 units of Thracians, I split them into a light and heavy formations. The heavy troopers were given veteran status, and the light elements were given an increased fighting value. Due to the reported size of Antigonus' squadron, I did not classify these troopers as veterans. The right wing, under direct command of Antigonus, has 3 heavy division control points and 4 light division control points. His command will have an initiative rating of 5. His command will disintegrate when 5 key units have been lost.

Scenario Rules
Borrowing a page from Mr. Mark Fry's excellent "Chalons 451AD - With Epic Armati" Battle Day Report (see pages 25-28 of the July/August 2013 issue of Slingshot), I should like to outline or present some of the general changes made so that I could stage the full historical battle on my comparatively small table. The "figure" scale was 15mm and the unit formation scale was Epic, with the following modifications:

1. The frontage of all units was reduced to 4.5 centimeters. Unit deployed deep would have a frontage of just  2.25 centimeters.
2. The depth of units depended on the type of the formation. For example, elephants and light-heavy infantry units had a depth of 2.24 centimeters, while heavy cavalry units had  a depth of 3.36 centimeters.
3. Skirmishers were based on double-frontage stands. Units of archers, javelin men, and slingers had a frontage of 4.5 centimeters but a depth of only 1.12 centimeters.

With regard to the rule amendments and variations employed in the reconstruction, these were a blend of ideas adopted and adapted from Mr. Fry's article, the original work completed by Mr. Phenow, and my continued experiments with the Armati 2nd Edition rules. In no particular order, these amendments were:

A. Light cavalry units (whether deployed wide or deep) could interpenetrate other friendly mounted formations - yes, even elephants. This could be accomplished through an evade move or a regular move. The friendly unit being moved through could not move in the same turn, however. The light cavalry formation could fire in the same turn if the move was conducted during the evade phase.
B. If a light cavalry unit - whether by evading or regular move - could not completely clear the friendly formation interpenetrated, then an additional move of up to 10 inches was allowed. However, this extra move to avoid "stacking" or a "traffic jam" would result in both units being marked as disordered (a - 2 melee modifier).
C. Elephant stands were categorized as individual heavy divisions and therefore, had their own control point.
D. To further represent the "strongest" quality of the 30 elephants advancing in front of Antigonus' right wing, each elephant stand on that wing is permitted to roll 2d6 in the initial round of melee. The higher result is the one used to resolve the melee. This is an adaptation of the Warband 2d6 Impetus rule variant.
E. To represent their veteran status and reputation, enemy units engaging in melee with the Silver Shields roll a d6 before the melee rolls are made. On a roll of 1-3, the testing unit is considered slightly disordered (undressed) and so, will fight the melee with a - 1 modifier.
F. Heavy infantry formations (FT or PH) deployed in depth and armed with pikes will have a + 1 melee modifier, even when fighting enemy infantry formations that are wider.
G. For this refight, the +1 melee modifier only applies to cavalry contests.
H. Initiative for an army is determined by adding up the initiative ratings for its 3 commands or wings.
I. Division splits will impact the initiative rating of the "army" or wing involved. That is to explain: If a formation on the left of the line is split by melee, then the initiative for the  command on the left flank will be affected. Division splits will not impact any other friendly commands. Additionally, once a division or wing is at 0 initiative rating, it cannot borrow initiative points from another command.
J. Subordinate commanders/generals were worth 1 key unit if captured or killed. The respective personalities of Antigonus and Eumenes were valued at 3 key units if lost.

This historical refight gave me yet another opportunity to test and tweak other amendments made to the Armati 2nd Edition rules. The following list is a summary of the rule variants used for Paraetacene 2016:

- Missile ranges were extended and divided into bands with protection factor modifiers.
- Hits from skirmisher fire caused fatigue until the unit break point of the target was reached and then effective skirmisher fire resulted in casualties.
- Movement rates were increased but the limitations and procedures for wheeling and executing complex moves remained unchanged.
- The rout paths of broken units was increased depending on unit type.
- Morale impacts were expanded to include slightly disordered in addition to disordered. There was also the possibility of incurring an additional casualty when a morale test was "failed."
- Mr. Phenow's excellent elephant rules were employed. A slight modification was made which provided for the chance that elephants would panic when taking casualties from missile fire.
- The breakthrough rules were tweaked as well. In brief, a victorious unit could move a little farther when making such a move. (Cavalry could move quite a bit more than infantry. Both stood a chance of becoming disordered during the breakthrough.) Victorious units were also permitted to engage in a new melee.

Deployment
Following the account of Diodorus closely, I placed the small squadron under Eudamus on the far left the flat and featureless table top. (The ancient author does not make mention of any terrain features interfering with the arrangement of the armies or having an impact on the course of the battle. The modern treatments of Mr. Phenow and Mr. Backhouse reinforce the conclusion that the field of Paraetacene was unremarkable.) Stasander's regiment and the men under Amphimachus were deployed as one division to the right of Eudamus. The three units of light cavalry were placed on the right wing of the left command. The elephants were arranged in a broad arrowhead formation. The skirmishers were "attached" to the elephant stands as supports or guards. With regard to the phalanx in the center, I positioned the mercenaries in a single division of 8 units. These "blocks" of infantry were deployed wide. The remaining three divisions of the phalanx were deployed in depth. The elephant and skirmisher screen covered the entire phalanx. On the right wing, where Eumenes was stationed, I had to make a quick adjustment with respect to heavy division control points. Four heavy division were allowed on this wing. This modification was made so that the squadron riding with Eumenes could operate on its own. The squadron of Peucestes and Antigenes was grouped with the Companion cavalry. The "reserve" of selected horsemen constituted the fourth heavy division on this flank. Though certainly not as eye-catching or as visually pleasing as a similar staging guided by the professional hands of either Mr. Priestley or Mr. Miller, the improvised and inexpensive half of the battlefield still looked pretty good.

Using the scale ruler for 25mm Intro Scheme games (page 36 of the Armati 2nd Edition rule book), I arranged the "curved line" of strong elephants and accompanying skirmishers in front of Antigonus' command just 25 "inches" from the elephant screen of the enemy. This forward deployment was my interpretation of the narrative. Diodorus informs that Antigonus had the "most confidence" in this particular wing. Approximately 15 "inches" behind the front edge of the cavalry units in this wing, I deployed the numerous elements of the phalanx. The Lycians, Pamphylians, and Mercenary Hoplites were arranged in a double line so that I would have enough space for Pithon and his light cavalry. Even with this arrangement, the phalanx of Antigonus was still wider than the phalanx of Eumenes. Making some educated guesses with respect to the position of units on the left, I deployed the cavalry under Pithon in two lines. Behind a very thin elephant screen (no attached skirmishers), I arranged the Medians, the Parthians, the "Tarentines," and the horsemen from Phrygia and Lydia. The second line contained the Colonists, the lancers, and the contingent under the direct control of Pithon.

The battlefield having been prepared and the various playing aids having been placed, a few photographs were taken to record the occasion. The official commencement of hostilities would have to wait until there was an opening in my schedule.

How Things Transpired on the Table Top
As the second game turn drew to a close, only one-third of Antigonus' "stronger" elephants was living up to its description. These animals had hurt an opposing squadron and sent them running away in a panic. The Arachosians and other light horse were able to withdraw in the face of this friendly threat. However, the same misfortune had befallen a unit on Antigonus' side of the field. As he watched in disbelief, the stampeding elephants headed toward a unit of allied cavalry. These horsemen were stationed right next to his son Demetrius, who was commanding the large unit of Companions. The other group of elephants was engaged with a particularly stubborn unit of enemy pachyderms. The creatures working for Eudamus delivered a succession of damaging attacks, thereby reducing the strength and cohesion of the targeted unit.
In other developments on this flank, some Thracian and mercenary heavy cavalry wheeled and galloped over toward the left side of Eumenes' phalanx. The skirmishers screening these mercenary hoplites were dispersed or ridden down. To counter this  minor setback, the formed heavy infantry advanced to within striking distance of the Thracians and their friends, leaving the cavalry with little room to move and even less options.

Over on the other flank, there was quite a bit of jockeying for position. Pithon ordered his first line forward; their long range arrow fire had proved quite ineffective. Unwilling to sit still and wait for a cloud of enemy light cavalry to envelop his men, Eumenes ordered the Carmanian horse to advance beyond the enemy right. These troopers would "shoot the gap" between Pithon's squadrons and the left of the enemy phalanx. Next, Eumenes wheeled his squadron and advanced on an angle toward the far right edge of the field.
While this move was being completed, opposing light cavalry charged each other. First blood went to the troopers in Eumenes' command. 

In the center of the plain, Antigonus' subordinate general did not move any part of the phalanx. Even the skirmishers and elephants remained in their starting positions. Eumenes, in stark contrast, issued orders to his various commanders, and the separate divisions of the phalanx began marching forward.

By the end of the fourth game turn, Pithon's squadrons were certainly feeling the pressure. Try as his "Tarentines" and other light horse might, they simply could not land effective volleys of arrows or javelins on enemy formations. Being lighter in weight than their enemy counterparts, the horsemen under Pithon turned and evaded. The Carmanians and Eumenes' own squadron kicked their horses hard in the flanks and pursued the enemy troopers. In a series of moves and feints, Eumenes' regiment took a few losses from some Parthian horse archers. Chasing these annoying cavalry away, Eumenes and his squadron charged a stationary unit of enemy Colonists. Sufficed to say, the first round (and all the subsequent rounds) did not go very well for the hapless Colonists. As Eumenes' bodyguard made comparatively short work of the unimpressive enemy unit, they were harassed by a unit of "Tarentines" which had manage to circle around behind them.

In another part of the field on this flank, Pithon's small number of elephants and his  Phrygian and Lydian cavalry moved into contact with the division of Companions supported by Peucestes and Antigenes squadron. The Companions doled out punishment to the enemy ranged against them, but the men riding with Peucestes and Antigenes did not fare very well in the melee versus the elephants. In yet another part of  the field in this sector, Pithon's horse archers had not been engaged. The Carmanian squadrons were very close, however.

Meanwhile, over in the center of the field, the opposing skirmish screens had charged each other. (Evidently, volleys of arrows, javelins, and sling stones - all delivered at "normal" or  short range - had no effect whatsoever.) Being greater in number, the skirmishers employed by Eumenes did better, but it was an advantage won at cost. In the process, another stand of elephants on Antigonus' side of the field panicked and stampeded back toward the packed lines of pikemen and light-heavy infantry. This bunch of pachyderms was in addition to those animals screening Eumenes' phalanx. The infantry formations in this phalanx had separated between left and right "wings" due to the presence of Thracian and mercenary cavalry "interfering" with the mercenary hoplites. These two units of enemy horse were caught flat-footed and then were caught by advancing phalanxes eight to ten-ranks deep. To be certain, the horsemen did not do  well in the subsequent melees.

With regard to developments on the right wing (from Antigonus' perspective), things were going from bad to worse. At this stage in the battle, two-thirds of his "stronger" elephants were panicking and running for the assumed safety of the army encampment. The last group of elephants were still stuck in a losing melee against a surprisingly capable and stubborn unit of enemy animals. Adding insult to injury, one of the panicked units of pachyderms collided with a reserve unit of allied horse and proceeded to cause problems. To prevent his men from suffering the same accident, Demetrius turned the Companions around and started pulling them back. While he was occupied with this maneuver, his father advanced his squadron up the far right edge of the field. These veteran horsemen were screened by a friendly unit of light horse. Though both of these  formations manage to skirt the elephant melee, they soon found themselves facing a large number of enemy horse. Waiting in a line well to the rear of their own elephants was the regiment of Stasander. To his immediate left was the squadron commanded by Eudamus.

The melee involving Phrygians, Lydians, elephants, Companions, and the troopers under Peucestes and Antigenes continued as the sixth turn drew to a close. Closer to the deployment line of Antigonus' army, Pithon's contingent was engaged by the Carmanians. As the Carmanians advanced to contact, several volleys of arrows were fired. Only one flight found its mark, however. To avoid a complete disaster, Pithon evaded forward with half of his men. The rest were left to fight and die against the enemy heavy cavalry. To the right of this confused contest, the "selected 300" of Eumenes' wing were tangled up with some "Tarentines" and the light cavalry lancers under Lysanias. Further to the right of this  swirling melee, Eumenes' squadron broke the outmatched Colonists. These victorious troopers were, however, still being harassed by a roving band of "Tarentines."

Over on the right flank, Antigonus' elephants were proving a complete embarrassment. One group of allegedly "stronger" animals had succumbed in a prolonged melee against  a unit of enemy pachyderms. The other two groups had panicked and were stampeding in a roughly straight line back to their camp. As previously mentioned, the frightened animals ran into and over a group of allied horse. They also forced Demetrius to retreat in a state of disorder with his Companions. The uncontrollable elephants effectively took Demetrius and his men out of the battle. A few moves separated father and son on this flank. Antigonus, his command on the verge of being broken (damn those elephants!) led his squadron in a charge against the cavalry under Stasander while his slaves (light cavalry) sacrificed themselves in a foolish and fruitless attack on the squadron of  Eudamus. 

In the center of the field, there had been no contact - still - between opposing phalanxes. However, elephants from both sides had made contact with the deep formation of pikemen, hoplites, and light-heavy infantry. A unit of pikemen was severely damaged and a unit of light-heavy infantry was routed. A weakened unit of elephants faced three units of "Macedonians" and impaled itself on the wall of pike points. Over on the left wing of Antigonus' phalanx, a group of elephants from Eumenes' command managed to move behind the Carmanians and attack the front and flank of some mercenary hoplites. This charge flattened one unit, but the breakthrough move was stymied by a reserve unit that was unaffected by seeing its front-line friends scattered and squished.

The seventh game turn witnessed the collapsed of Pithon's wing when the lancers under Lysanias were bested by the "selected 300" enemy cavalry. His command did not go quietly into the November 317 BC late afternoon, however. The squadron of Peucestes and Antigenes was broken after battling a group of slightly disordered enemy elephants for over half an hour. The elephants that had  discomforted the phalanx of mercenary hoplites were also broken. Eumenes and his men were attacked from behind by an annoying group of enemy light cavalry. Fortunately, both commander and contingent were unharmed by the javelin-throwing "Tarentines."

The elephant problem in the center of the field was addressed by a number of moves and successful melees. The various groups of  pachyderms were either fatigued or panicked and were no match for the concentrated of formed heavy infantry with pikes or long spears. Curiously, the right half of Eumenes' phalanx was moving forward while at the same time the right side of Antigonus' phalanx was advancing. (Viewed from above, there was just about 10-12 centimeters of open ground separating the formed bodies of troops.)

As these events were transpiring, Eudamus and his men had overcome the enemy light cavalry and were now embroiled in another melee with Antigonus and his bodyguard. Both units of strong cavalry were soon exhausted, having participated in a melee just prior to this new contest. Unable to wheel and join in (the angle was too great), Stasander ordered the rest of this regiment and some additional cavalry to move forward so that they could follow the advance of their elephants and skirmishers. Well to the front of these animals and their escorts, Demetrius had finally sorted out the disorganized ranks of his Companions.

Unfortunately, it would be too little and too late for Demetrius and his father. Just a few minutes into the eighth turn of the battle, one of the stampeding units of elephants lumbered off the field. The "loss" of this key unit was the final straw for the command of Antigonus. With both wings broken, his phalanx could not hope to survive the eventual envelopment by enemy cavalry and, on the one side at least, the attention of a number of elephants. And so, one by one, the component units of the larger phalanx ceased to advance and raised their pikes to indicate their surrender.

Brief Comments
In approximately three hours of gaming (spread over several days), I managed to reverse as well as rewrite history. On my table top, Pithon did not cause problems for Eumenes; there was no bloody and prolonged contest between opposing phalanxes, and Eudamus did not "ride to the rescue" of his swamped commander. On my table top, Antigonus' "stronger" elephants proved a curse as well as a liability; Demetrius' first battle with his father was an embarrassment; the larger phalanx played no part, and Pithon's light cavalry swarm was swatted away by the heavy horse and elephants under Eumenes. It would be fair to remark that these reverses were not the product of poor battle planning but were the result of rather lopsided dice. Indeed, it seemed that from the first panic result for a unit of Antigonus' elephants, that the dice gods had decided how the refight would go. Setting aside the way the dice behaved, I would like to take a few lines to review how the scenario rules and other amendments performed.

In general, I think both the specific rules and work-in-progress amendments worked rather well. Mr. Phenow's elephant rules were really tested in this reconstruction, and I think they held up nicely. I confess, however, that I am considering some kind of rule or rules that would allow crews to recover control of panicked elephants. I am also thinking about making some changes to the current infantry charging cavalry rules. In Armati 2nd Edition, under certain conditions, formed infantry can attack enemy cavalry. This happened during the just-completed contest when mercenary hoplites in Eumenes' phalanx were able to engage enemy Thracian and mercenary horse. It occurred to me (better late than never, I suppose) that this interaction seemed ahistorical if also a bit silly. While there is historical precedent (Caesar's reserve line of cohorts on his right flank taking on the thousands of cavalry led by Labienus at Pharsalus), it still strikes me as quite improbable. Therefore, I am toying with another amendment which would establish a "bubble" - for lack of a better word - of 3 centimeters (or whatever unit of measurement is used) between the attacking heavy or light infantry and targeted cavalry.

I cannot recall having spent so much time on a particular project. Typically, even the larger historical refights do not take so long from idea to planning to playing. To be sure, I do not regret the time that was invested in this preoccupation with Paraetacene. Though I still remain perplexed by certain points of the Diodorus narrative, I should like to think I have a better understanding of the battle and even of the personalities involved. Even though my production was amateurish and atypical, it was, at least in my opinion, an enjoyable, educational, and entertaining experience. Hopefully, readers of this report will also find it enjoyable and entertaining. Perhaps one or two will be inspired to stage their own version using their favorite set of rules? Though I have spent the last few months at Paraetacene, I would not hesitate to read about another historical wargamer's experience with Antigonus and Eumenes.

[Duncan Head]

I am also thinking about making some changes to the current infantry charging cavalry rules. In Armati 2nd Edition, under certain conditions, formed infantry can attack enemy cavalry. This happened during the just-completed contest when mercenary hoplites in Eumenes' phalanx were able to engage enemy Thracian and mercenary horse. It occurred to me (better late than never, I suppose) that this interaction seemed ahistorical if also a bit silly. While there is historical precedent (Caesar's reserve line of cohorts on his right flank taking on the thousands of cavalry led by Labienus at Pharsalus), it still strikes me as quite improbable.

Why do you think infantry charging cavalry is either ahistorical or silly?

...but on the fourth day the cavalry of the enemy came up. [22] And their commander told the leader of the baggage-train to cross the Pactolus river and encamp, while the horsemen themselves, getting sight of the camp-followers on the side of the Greeks, scattered for plunder, killed a large number of them. On perceiving this Agesilaus ordered his horsemen to go to their aid. And the Persians, in their turn, when they saw this movement, gathered together and formed an opposing line, with very many companies of their horsemen. [23] Then Agesilaus, aware that the infantry of the enemy was not yet at hand, while on his side none of the arms which had been made ready was missing, deemed it a fit time to join battle if he could. Therefore, after offering sacrifice, he at once led his phalanx against the opposing line of horsemen, ordering the first ten year-classes of the hoplites to run to close quarters with the enemy, and bidding the peltasts lead the way at a double-quick. He also sent word to his cavalry to attack, in the assurance that he and the whole army were following them. [24] Now the Persians met the attack of the cavalry; but when the whole formidable array together was upon them, they gave way, and some of them were struck down at once in crossing the river, while the rest fled on.

[Jim Webster]

The first time I came across 'infantry being unable to charge cavalry' was when I fought my first Napoleonic game. I was used to WRG5th and 6th ancients. It came as something of a shock

In Ancients cavalry were always in danger of being charged by infantry if they came too close and didn't themselves charge.

From memory, in one of the Sassanid v Late Roman battles the entire infantry line charged the enemy cavalry

Jim

[Imperial Dave]

fantastic study and write up Chris. You've put a huge amount of effort into this and it shows. However you feel personally about the outcome, I think its a superb piece of 'work'

[Chris]

Gentlemen,

Thanks very much for taking the time to read and comment.

To answer Duncan's question (and thanks very much for the historical evidence and source reference):
I do suppose that this estimation is simply the product of reading - not enough apparently - and of wargaming. Formed heavy infantry "charging" mounted opponents who are  not otherwise engaged seems an exercise in futility. The horsemen can simply turn the animal and trot away while the heavily-armed infantry huff and puff to catch up.

One very recent influence for my assessment (admittedly amateur in its quality) was reading Mr. Lockwood's Battle Pack for next week's Battle Day event. On page 42 of  the November/December 2015 issue he writes:
"Quite how this  attack was successful is one of the mysteries of  ancient  warfare. Infantry charging cavalry has no right to  succeed, the cavalry can draw off, they can circle round, attack flanks and avoid any contact that does not favor them."

A second reading of the provided excerpt informs that while the phalanx did advance, it appears to be the peltasts - the light infantry - leading the sudden rush upon the enemy horse. So, perhaps the Armati rules allowing LI to engage enemy horse  is  OK; there should be something very rare about HI making contact. I shall have to do more  reading and research. Thank you again for your comments.

To Jim: thanks for your reply and recollection. If memory serves, I ran into something similar many years ago while  playing a game wherein Ancient British light horse were  tangling with Caesar's legionaries.

To Holly: Thanks for your kind words. Ideally, I should like to be able  to rerun this using different rules, but am skeptical of the process/outcome given prior experience. I understand that Simon Miller is planning to stage this battle with his rules sometime in the future. That should be a spectacle, and it should allow for Eudamus to  shift  over to the right  flank as he  did historically.

Cheers,

Chris

[Imperial Dave]

I think TtS could be a good ruleset to use for this battle so will be interesting to see how Simon Miller gets on

[Patrick Waterson]

That would have made a good article, Chris.

On the subject of infantry vs cavalry, horsemen can usually evade an infantry charge provided they have nobody in the way and nothing else to do.  At Pharsalus Pompey's cavalry appears to have been in two lines, or 'task forces', the first of which was busy driving back Caesar's cavalry while the second was preparing to face right and trot behind Caesar's line preparatory to administering the coup de grace.  As we know, instead of an empty space behind Caesar's line they found themselves facing six strong cohorts, the right of Pompey's cavalry was thrown back on the centre and unsurprisingly the whole confused mass panicked and ran.  Caesar's surviving cavalry would have delightedly seen them off the field.

Against the Parthians, Mark Antony executed a combined cavalry-infantry attack in Plutarch, Life of Antony 38.3-4

"After advancing a single day's march, he saw that the Parthians were enveloping him and seeking to attack him on the march. He therefore displayed the signal for battle in his camp, and after taking down his tents, as though his purpose was not to fight but to withdraw, he marched along past the line of the Barbarians, which was crescent-shaped. But he had given orders that when the first ranks of the enemy should appear to be within reach of his legionaries, the cavalry should charge upon them. [4] To the Parthians in their parallel array, the discipline of the Romans seemed to beggar description, and they watched them marching past at equal distances from one another, without confusion, and in silence, brandishing their javelins. But when the signal was given, and the Roman horsemen wheeled about and rode down upon them with loud shouts, they did indeed receive their onset and repel them, although their foes were at once too close for them to use their arrows; when, however, the legionaries joined in the charge, with shouts and clashing of weapons, the horses of the Parthians took fright and gave way, and the Parthians fled without coming to close quarters. "

The subsequent pursuit was rather a non-event, but this is a clear demonstration of cavalry being routed by an infantry charge.  What is also interesting is that the entire manoeuvre seems to have taken place well within bowshot without a single Parthian apparently loosing a shaft.

[Duncan Head]

On the subject of infantry vs cavalry, horsemen can usually evade an infantry charge provided they have nobody in the way and nothing else to do.

And of course provided they react in time. Perhaps light horsemen might be able to wheel round and ride off more easily than heavies; possibly regular cavalry might be more likely to do so in good time and good order than irregulars; possibly some cavalry being charged by heavy infantry and not being given the right orders in good time to carry them out might break and run instead.

How close do the infantry have to get before they are too close for a safe response? In the old WRG 6th cavalry had to be moving for a quarter-bound to disorder moving foot, so if the infantry could get within 1/4 of the cavalry move plus 1/4 of their own move, they could contact safely, and if the cavalry didn't have orders to evade.... All a bit artificial, but it makes the point that stationary cavalry is a good target for infantry.

One more example: Zizhi Tongjian says that in 547 "Hou Jing ordered all his troops to wear only upper body armour, without the usual skirting, and wield short blades, bending low and charging into the Eastern Wei lines to chop at the legs of enemy soldiers and horses."

[Patrick Waterson]

That blends in nicely with the next example: Lucullus and the Armenian cataphracts at Tigranocerta.  Plutarch, Life of Lucullus 27-28:

When Lucullus held a council of war, some of his officers advised him to give up the siege and lead his army against Tigranes; others urged him not to leave so many enemies in his rear, and not to remit the siege. Whereupon, remarking that each counsel by itself was bad, but both together were good, he divided his army. Murena, with six thousand footmen, he left behind in charge of the siege; while he himself, with twenty-four cohorts, comprising no more than ten thousand heavy infantry, and all the horsemen, slingers, and archers, to the number of about a thousand, set out against the enemy ...

Observe the discrepancy in force, Tigranes' army being reckoned as:

"... twenty thousand bowmen and slingers, and fifty-five thousand horsemen, of whom seventeen thousand were clad in mail, as Lucullus said in his letter to the Senate; also of one hundred and fifty thousand heavy infantry, some of whom were drawn up in cohorts, and some in phalanxes; also of road-makers, bridge-builders, clearers of rivers, foresters, and ministers to the other needs of an army, to the number of thirty-five thousand. These latter, being drawn up in array behind the fighting men, increased the apparent strength of the army."

Their superfluous numbers were balanced by their deficient discipline and Tigranes' complete lack of tactical acumen.

When he [Lucullus] had encamped along the river in a great plain, he appeared utterly insignificant to Tigranes, and supplied the king's flatterers with ground for amusement. Some mocked at the Romans, and others, in pleasantry, cast lots for their spoil, while each of the generals and kings came forward and begged that the task of conquering them might be entrusted to himself alone, and that the king would sit by as a spectator. [4] Then Tigranes, not wishing to be left behind entirely in this play of wit and scoffing, uttered that famous saying: 'If they are come as ambassadors, they are too many; if as soldiers, too few.' And so for the while they continued their sarcasms and jests. But at daybreak Lucullus led out his forces under arms. Now, the Barbarian army lay to the east of the river. But as the stream takes a turn to the west at the point where it was easiest to ford, and as Lucullus led his troops to the attack in that direction first, and with speed, he seemed to Tigranes to be retreating. [5] So he called Taxiles and said, with a laugh, 'Don't you see that the invincible Roman hoplites are taking to flight?' 'O King,' said Taxiles, 'I could wish that some marvellous thing might fall to your good fortune; but when these men are merely on a march, they do not put on shining raiment, nor have they their shields polished and their helmets uncovered, as now that they have stripped the leathern coverings from their armour. Nay, this splendour means that they are going to fight, and are now advancing upon their enemies.' [6] While Taxiles was yet speaking, the first eagle came in sight, as Lucullus wheeled towards the river, and the cohorts were seen forming in maniples with a view to crossing. Then at last, as though coming out of a drunken stupor, Tigranes cried out two or three times, 'Are the men coming against us?' And so, with much tumult and confusion, his multitude formed in battle array, the king himself occupying the centre, and assigning the left wing to the king of the Adiabeni, the right to the king of the Medes. In front of this wing also the greater part of the mail-clad horsemen were drawn up.

In theory, these cataphracts should have been able to sweep away the Romans with a single charge.  In practice, they sat and watched ... and waited ...

As Lucullus was about to cross the river, some of his officers advised him to beware of the day, which was one of the unlucky days—the Romans call them 'black days.' For on that day Caepio and his army perished in a battle with the Cimbri. But Lucullus answered with the memorable words: 'Verily, I will make this day, too, a lucky one for the Romans.' Now the day was the sixth of October.

Saying this, and bidding his men be of good courage, he crossed the river, and led the way in person against the enemy. He wore a steel breastplate of glittering scales, and a tasselled cloak, and at once let his sword flash forth from its scabbard, indicating that they must forthwith come to close quarters with men who fought with long range missiles, and eliminate, by the rapidity of their onset, the space in which archery would be effective. [2] But when he saw that the mail-clad horsemen, on whom the greatest reliance was placed, were stationed at the foot of a considerable hill which was crowned by a broad and level space, and that the approach to this was a matter of only four stadia, and neither rough nor steep, he ordered his Thracian and Gallic horsemen to attack the enemy in the flank, and to parry their long spears with their own short swords. [3] (Now the sole resource of the mail-clad horsemen is their long spear, and they have none other whatsoever, either in defending themselves or attacking their enemies, owing to the weight and rigidity of their armour; in this they are, as it were, immured.) Then he himself, with two cohorts, hastened eagerly towards the hill, his soldiers following with all their might, because they saw him ahead of them in armour, enduring all the fatigue of a foot-soldier, and pressing his way along. Arrived at the top, and standing in the most conspicuous spot, he cried with a loud voice, 'The day is ours, the day is ours, my fellow soldiers!' [4] With these words, he led his men against the mail-clad horsemen, ordering them not to hurl their javelins yet, but taking each his own man, to smite the enemy's legs and thighs, which are the only parts of these mail-clad horsemen left exposed. However, there was no need of this mode of fighting, for the enemy did not await the Romans, but, with loud cries and in most disgraceful flight, they hurled themselves and their horses, with all their weight, upon the ranks of their own infantry, before it had so much as begun to fight, and so all those tens of thousands were defeated without the infliction of a wound or the sight of blood. [5] But the great slaughter began at once when they fled, or rather tried to fly, for they were prevented from really doing so by the closeness and depth of their own ranks. Tigranes rode away at the very outset with a few attendants, and took to flight. Seeing his son also in the same plight, he took off the diadem from his head and, in tears, gave it to him, bidding him save himself as best he could by another route.

Lucullus appears to have fixed the attention of the cataphracts with a flank attack by his cavalry, which may have caused the cataphracts, who could have been unaware of the Roman infantry ahead of them on account of the intervening hill, to turn and face the exiguous Roman cavalry, laying their flank open to Lucullus' downhill infantry charge.  Like Hou Jing, Lucullus orders his men to attack the legs of their opponents, these probably being (as Duncan has elsewhere surmised) equipped with armoured saddle-guards which protect from ahead but not from the flank at infantryman level.

... possibly some cavalry being charged by heavy infantry and not being given the right orders in good time to carry them out might break and run instead.

Which is exactly what happened here.

[Chris]

Patrick - Thanks for assessment. It might prove worth while to spend an afternoon or two (or  an evening or two, for that matter) to play around with Paraetacene and see what would have transpired if payer-generals were allowed a free deployment.

Thanks, too, for the historical references. Certainly more food for thought. I don't have the Armati rules on my desk at the moment, but I shall make a point of  reviewing that section of the rules pertaining to infantry charging cavalry. If memory serves, I think Hail Caesar and Impetvs cover this event but provide for the infantry to be either disordered or to lose any impetus bonus.

Duncan - Your points about light cavalry and heavy cavalry are well taken. Your question about a "minimum safe distance" is  also worth consideration. Again, I will have to look at the rules. Having developed a recent interest in DBA, I am curious to see how this kind of situation is addressed and or handled by these popular rules. The issue of "stationary" horse is an interesting one, though somewhat difficult to represent on the table  top. Perhaps a marker of some sort to indicate that the squadrons of cavalry in the targeted unit are  standing still, perhaps even grazing on the grass that may or may not be growing in their present location?

Thanks again to all for reading and responding.

Chris

[Patrick Waterson]

The issue of "stationary" horse is an interesting one, though somewhat difficult to represent on the table  top. Perhaps a marker of some sort to indicate that the squadrons of cavalry in the targeted unit are  standing still, perhaps even grazing on the grass that may or may not be growing in their present location?

One way to determine whether cavalry is up to reacting to the proximity of unfriendly infantry is to have an orders system.  Duncan mentioned WRG 6th: there, a unit could be operating under one of three Orders: Attack, Hold or Skirmish.  These were assigned at the start of the game, and it was possible to change some orders (usually to Attack) by use of Signals.  Hence cavalry could be put on Hold to await a favourable opportunity and then signalled to Attack once it occurred - or once the situation became sufficiently desperate to need them!  Of course, leave it too long and they might be charged by advancing infantry while still at the halt - a fairly common occurrence with indecisive players even using Attack orders.

Having developed a recent interest in DBA, I am curious to see how this kind of situation is addressed and or handled by these popular rules.

Well - it is not addressed by DBA rules, at least not directly.  DBA is a very abstract system in which the die roll for each base is assumed to combine a huge number of possibilities and variables.  Hence if your Blades (legionaries) roll a 5 or 6 while your opponent's Cavalry rolls a 1 or 2, the Cavalry will lose embarrassingly and at high speed.  One can rationalise this as their being charged at the halt or similar.  Conversely, if the Cavalry roll 5 or 6 while the Blades roll 1 or 2, the legionaries get trampled and their rationalised epitaph is perhaps that they failed to maintain formation cohesion in the face of the charge.

One learns nothing about warfare from DBA, nor does it represent warfare in any meaningful way.  its advantages are that it is quick, it is fun and the armies required are small enough to be eminently affordable.  And if you already know about warfare, you can usually rationalise what the dice are doing.

[Imperial Dave]

One way to determine whether cavalry is up to reacting to the proximity of unfriendly infantry is to have an orders system.  Duncan mentioned WRG 6th: there, a unit could be operating under one of three Orders: Attack, Hold or Skirmish.  These were assigned at the start of the game, and it was possible to change some orders (usually to Attack) by use of Signals.  Hence cavalry could be put on Hold to await a favourable opportunity and then signalled to Attack once it occurred - or once the situation became sufficiently desperate to need them!  Of course, leave it too long and they might be charged by advancing infantry while still at the halt - a fairly common occurrence with indecisive players even using Attack orders.

guilty as charged m'lud. Happened to me a few times playing 6th and boy did I feel foolish for it.

Being charged at the halt could be as a result of foot emerging from a dust cloud or similar

[Jim Webster]

I did a lot under 6th. When you had infantry mounted struggled with and your opponent dithered it wasn't too difficult to get too close to him. Long spear and javelin peltasts were the best, they used to go out there and mug heavy cavalry 

[Patrick Waterson]

Long spear and javelin peltasts were the best, they used to go out there and mug heavy cavalry 

They did.

People tended to give heavy cavalry either Attack or Hold orders, which meant that when up against a row of sharp pointy spears they dithered and wondered what to do next.  Long spear-armed infantry (and, as Jim notes, LTS+JLS armed peltasts were excellent for this) could conversely stride forward without fear, balancing the certainty of six figures versus three with the cavalry at -1 for first contact with long spears against the not-too-high likelihood of the cavalry going impetuous when charging.

I always gave heavy cavalry and extra-heavy cavalry Skirmish orders (yes, even Macedonian Companions and Nikephorian tagmata) because this allowed them to keep their distance if opposed by spear/pike-armed infantry.  Once the opponent got the idea that he could charge with his infantry and my cavalry would tamely avoid them, the cavalry's orders changed to Attack and they countercharged the very next charge by the infantry, catching it disordered (on occasion being impetuous into the bargain), which rather turned the situation around.

One way to determine whether cavalry is up to reacting to the proximity of unfriendly infantry is to have an orders system.  Duncan mentioned WRG 6th: there, a unit could be operating under one of three Orders: Attack, Hold or Skirmish.  These were assigned at the start of the game, and it was possible to change some orders (usually to Attack) by use of Signals.  Hence cavalry could be put on Hold to await a favourable opportunity and then signalled to Attack once it occurred - or once the situation became sufficiently desperate to need them!  Of course, leave it too long and they might be charged by advancing infantry while still at the halt - a fairly common occurrence with indecisive players even using Attack orders.

Being charged at the halt could be as a result of foot emerging from a dust cloud or similar

More often it seems to have been exactly what it was in WRG 6th - indecision by the 'player'.  Interestingly enough, cavalry may have been able to see over battlefield dust where infantry could not.  Ammianus comments about Adrianople (AD 378):

" The foot-soldiers thus stood unprotected, and their files [manipulis] were so crowded together that hardly anyone could pull out his sword or draw back his arm.  Because of clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen, and echoed with frightful cries. Hence the missiles [tela] whirling death from every side always found their mark with fatal effect, since they could not be seen beforehand nor guarded against."

One gains the impression that the Gothic cavalry were able to perceive their targets but the targets were unable to discern the incoming missiles or those who hurled them.

[aligern]

In Armati 2 infantry can noy charge cavalry that would have imetus against them, if the infantry are within two inches of the cavalry. Normal infantry moves are six inches r nine inches. The cavalry would still have impetus, though there is no special rule that weakens the infantry for contacting cavalry.nLight cavalry do not have impetus and therefore can be charged from six inches or nine inches.mHowever,mthe owner of the light cavalry can elect to evade them at the beginning of the move. So if not blocked in, light cavalry can escape.
I think the author's intention was that cavalry should not be hanging about close to the front of formed infantry and that seems reasonable enough and in line with  other sensible rulesets.
Roy