Agricola vs Calgacus: Interpreting Tacitus, Modeling Mons Graupius - Part 2

[Chris]

Specific Rules for the Refight
1. Britons Block Missiles - Each translation of Tacitus was quite clear: The barbarians, due to their "steadiness and dexterity" were able to avoid and or block the javelins and other missiles thrown by the Romans. To replicate this on the table top, each barbarian unit would be allowed to roll 2d6 when fired upon and take the higher result (die roll plus listed protection factor) as their final score.

2. The Impact of Driverless Chariots - The following is taken from the translation provided by Professor Campbell: "And stray chariots, with their horses panic-stricken without a driver, often went plunging into the flanks or front."
a. If a light chariot suffers a casualty from missile fire or melee, an additional d6 is rolled.
b. A result of 2-6 has no effect.
c. A  result of 1 means that the driver has "shed his mortal coil" and the horses panic.
d. Panicked horses/driverless chariots must be resolved before continuing with the melee direction for the current turn.
e. Chariots pulled by panicked horses will roll 2d6 to see what direction they run.
f. The result of the 2d6 roll is treated as the hour on the face of traditional clock. (Twelve midnight or Noon will be the front of the chariot stand; six o'clock will be directly to its rear.)
g. Chariots pulled by panicked horses will also throw 2d6 to determine how far they will gallop/run.
h. If the panicked move results in contact with a friendly or enemy unit, the contacted unit rolls a 1d6.
i. If the contacted unit is cavalry, subtract 1 from the die roll.
- On a result of 1, the hit unit suffers a casualty and is marked as disordered.
- On a result of 2, the unit is marked as disordered.
- On a result of 3 or 4, the unit is marked as "un-dressed."
- On a result of 5 or 6, the panicked horses have been dispatched by the soldiers of the attacked unit.
i. If the panicked horses survive, the process starts over again with another 2d6 roll to determine which direction the frightened and frothing horses drag the chariot.

3. Who's in Charge? - Governor Agricola and the identified chieftain Calgacus were the respective overall commanders of the opposing armies. The Roman general would have  the assistance of three subordinates, while Calgacus would "benefit" from working with five subordinate chieftains.
a. Both Agricola and the commander-in-chief of the Caledonians would have a key unit value of 3. Each would also have a melee modifier of +2 and a morale modifier of +2.
b. Each subordinate commander, whether civilized or barbarian, would have a key unit value of 1 or perhaps 2 if a "right hand man" along with a +1 or better modifiers for melee and morale.

These specific rules were in addition to the numerous amendments I have either adapted or adopted for Armati 2nd Edition over the years. For example, movement rates and missile ranges were increased. Further, missile ranges were divided into three range brackets allowing for positive or negative modifiers depending on range. Units were able move obliquely and or "slide to the side" but would suffer a degree of disorder as a result. Friendly formations were also permitted to interpenetrate provided the active unit had the movement rate necessary. Here too, there was a chance that the involved elements would become disordered as a consequence of this "passage of lines." The impetus rules were revised so that targeted units would not be "wiped out" in the first round of melee but "wounded" and disordered instead. The distance which a victorious unit could breakthrough was also increased slightly. The rout path was extended to 18 centimeters for all "massed" units, and the impact of friends breaking resulted in more testing that just for those friendly units directly behind the routed formation. The abilities and key unit values of commanders varied depending on their position and the scenario. Finally, a more complete terrain effects table was created. This allowed the representation of more varied types of terrain such as light woods, patches of scrub, orchards/vineyards, fields, and areas of soft sand.   

Deployments and Summary of the Refight
The table top was set up on the evening of 20 May so that the refight could commence on the weekend. To the extent that it was possible, the Roman deployment of late spring 2016 mirrored that of mid fall in 83. Roman and auxiliary cavalry guarded the flanks of  the first line of Agricola's army. Here, six divisions of light-heavy and heavy infantry auxiliaries were positioned within long javelin range of the roiling masses of Briton and Caledonian warriors. Governor Agricola, having ordered his aides to take his horse, stood in front of his veteran cohorts. These experienced soldiers formed the center of the legionary line which formed his main reserve. Squadrons of cavalry protected the flanks of this shorter second line of infantry.

Calgacus arranged six groups of warriors on the plain to contest the expected Roman advance. Two of these "divisions" occupied the center and left, while three more were placed in a second line. Curiously, the smallest group of warriors in this second line was on the left; the larger two divisions were posted in the center and on the right flank. Another small group of warriors formed what might be called a third line or reserve unit over on the right. The light chariots were not scattered evenly across the front of the mass of warriors. The majority of these primitive battle carts were deployed against the Roman left. There were only three "squadrons" of chariots positioned within the main line of barbarians. The two "packets" of light horse were placed far out on each flank and well away from any enemy counterpart. Eight more groups of warriors and hangers-on were deployed on the various protuberances and slopes of Mons Graupius. Every "division" of levy troops and one of the groups of warriors was marked as "uncontrolled" so that Calgacus could make better use of the limited number of heavy division control points.

After going back and forth on the issue, I decided to roll a 1d6 in order to determine the number of turns the Roman auxiliaries and tribal warriors would engage in a missile throwing competition. A result of 3 informed me that there would be two complete turns of javelin volleys before any offensive movement would be permitted. (Results of 1 or 2  would have required just one turn of preliminary missile exchange; results of 5 or 6 would have required three turns of javelin and dart volleys between the opposing lines.) A subsequent flurry of die rolls produced very little in terms of results. One of the Batavian cohorts "earned" a fatigue marker, and one of the veteran warbands in the left-most group lost some men due to an especially well-aimed and well-timed volley (i.e., lucky die roll). Freed from the constraints of two turns of ineffective javelin throwing, both sides were fairly itching to get to close quarters.

The third turn of the table top battle witnessed similar results with respect to the exchange of missiles. However, given that both sides were a little under 12 centimeters apart, a general action was quickly joined. The Romans won the initiative and so determined the direction of the numerous melees. Things did not start out so very well, as a unit of auxiliary light cavalry was wiped out by a combined effort of light chariots and a warband. It also became fairly clear that the Romans were going to have their flank turned - or at the very least seriously threatened on this flank. Just as quickly, however, things turned in favour of the Romans when the enemy chieftain in this sector was speared from his medium chariot and a different unit of enemy light chariots was routed by a stubborn group of light-heavy infantry. Over on the right flank, the Roman cavalry was hotly engaged by enemy chariots and a mass of warriors. In the center of the field, an uncomfortable total of 7 units of auxiliary infantry were disordered and wounded by the mad rush of the Briton/Caledonian warriors. As a result, these units would fight at something of a disadvantage for the next few turns.

Messengers arrived from both flanks, informing the on foot and at the head of his veteran cohorts Governor that his first line of cavalry was hard-pressed, and that there  were some Caledonian chariots and light cavalry making their way around the Roman left. He issued orders for the reserve cavalry to wheel and advance to each threatened flank. The auxiliaries were also hard-pressed. In fact, two of the Batavian cohorts were disordered and had lost 75% of their strength. In the course of the fighting in the center of  the field, the Romans did manage to break a few warbands and thereby reduce the army initiative of Calgacus and his assembled warriors to zero. Unless they rolled very badly or made unnecessary splits in their ordered lines, the Romans were pretty much assured of having the move option throughout the battle.

As the fight progressed, the advantage stayed primarily with the Britons/Caledonians. To be certain, however, their  corps of light chariots paid a steep price. Before long, only two of the original eight squadrons were still careening around the field, harassing enemy units with javelins or steering the frothing and big-eyed horses straight at the auxiliary ranks. The pressure exerted by the roiling mass of tribesmen was only increasing. Two-thirds of the Batavian cohorts were no more at this stage, and five other units in the first line were on the verge of breaking, of being overwhelmed. The situation on both flanks did not look good, either. While the reserve squadrons were moving into action, they could not hope to keep pace with the lighter and swifter enemy formations. In a matter of minutes, there were three enemy units circling behind the Roman left and rear. Over on the right flank of Agricola's line, a single unit of enemy light horse demonstrated very close to the right flank of the reserve line of legionary infantry.

Noting that his auxiliary infantry were in trouble, Agricola ordered his legionaries to advance. Being veterans, they moved out smartly and silently, ignoring the various javelins and darts hurled at their exposed flanks by the enemy light horse and light chariots that darted back and forth. The reserve cavalry was soon engaged in a life or death struggle on either flank. The Roman cavalry on the right side fared better than their auxiliary counterparts in the left-most sector. Here, the veteran auxiliary horse attacked three warbands but could not make any progress against the semi-naked mass of men armed with long swords, spears, and small shields. Meanwhile, the raging  combat in the center of the field continued. Calgacus was in the thick of the fray; his unit of medium chariots was exhausted by this time but had only suffered minor losses. Several more warbands had collapsed, but these broken units were quickly replaced by warbands from the second or third lines. Indeed, having noted the shifting progress of the engagement - especially on the flanks - a couple of the "divisions" had started moving down from the slopes of Mons Graupius. The losses to the auxiliary line could not be replaced as quickly. More and larger holes were appearing in the Roman line. In addition to the Batavians "taking a beating," the Tungrian cohorts were starting to feel the stress and pressure. One of these veteran units routed after an extended melee with  two enemy formations.

Agricola advanced with his cohorts and other legionary units closer to the general melee. Calgacus gathered what men he could and moved forward to meet the Roman general and governor. (An interlude in the fighting, at least in the immediate area of Calgacus, had allowed him to rest and rally his warriors and charioteers.) Elsewhere in the center, the pressure exerted by both sides did not let up. More men fell, and here and there, units on both sides disintegrated. The morale of the Roman army finally broke, however, when the veteran auxiliary cavalry on the left flank were overcome in a protracted melee against Briton/Caledonian warriors. The rout of these two units pushed the Romans past the tipping point, and Agricola was forced to recall his legionaries. He was forced to retreat to the comparative safety of his large marching camp. Calgacus, along with his bloodied and tired warriors - those who remained standing anyway - rejoiced in a hard-fought and hard-won victory.

Evaluation
Even though Mons Graupius took up a good portion of my table top, this geographical feature played no part in this first reconstruction of the historical battle. The auxiliaries of Agricola never made it onto the slopes of the hill/ridge; they never had to contend with the difficult nature of this ground. Even though my representation of this central feature was two-dimensional and so, not very aesthetically pleasing on a number of levels, its depiction was nevertheless functional. There was no question as to whether a group of warbands was on the slopes of Mons Graupius or if they were not. There was also no question as to the exact nature of the ground on the slopes of the larger feature. Accepting the fact that there are still questions about the exact location of the ancient battlefield, I think the landscaping of my table top was acceptable if also admittedly primitive and again, functional. I could make a similar "argument" about the troops deployed for this first staging of a planned four refights of the battle.

Acknowledging that I most certainly did not have the composition of the forces completely correct, I think I did a fairly good job with respect to the numbers involved and in translating these into Armati units and formations. Using the "orders of battle" provided by Tacitus and referencing the various academic explanations, I believe I was able to produce a reasonably accurate order of battle for my "miniature" engagement. Having accomplished this, I was able to represent the opposing armies in a functional if  also non-traditional manner. Just as with Mons Graupius, where I had no trouble distinguishing one tier or level from another, with the various formations, I had no trouble telling legionaries from auxiliaries and chariots from cavalry. In fact, I had two counters representing Governor Agricola, as Professor Goldsworthy points out that the Roman general started the battle on foot and then directed the closing stages of the battle from horseback (The Roman Army At War, 100BC - AD200, 150-51 and 166).

Turning to a critique of the scenario rules, I think the additional rules drawn up for the "panicked chariots" were better than the rules drafted to govern the initial exchange of missiles. Portraying the effects of that initial and reportedly one-sided exchange of javelins and darts should have been a simpler process. For example, instead of "wasting" a couple of game turns, I think it would have been easier and faster to roll a 1d6 for each auxiliary infantry unit in that first line in order to determine how "hurt" it would be by the volume of darts and other missiles delivered by those nimble and dodging Britons/Caledonians. For example: a roll of 1 would produce 3 fatigue markers on the targeted unit; a roll of 2, 3, or 4 would produce 2 fatigue markers, and a roll of 5 or 6 would produce just 1 fatigue marker on the affected unit of auxiliary infantry.

Even though I thought that the additional rules governing "panicked chariots" were pretty good, it seems that there is still room for further tinkering. Given that there were not a lot of cases of "panicked and driverless horses dragging chariots" in this first battle, I am left to wonder if the probability was set too low? Perhaps a state of panic should have resulted on a roll of 1 or 2 instead of just a 1? Thinking more about these chariots and their role in the engagement, I also wonder if I should have designated them as key units. Maybe every two units of light chariots destroyed or routed would equal one official key unit? And I wondered if I should have given these vehicles a kind of impetus. Per the rules, light chariots do not have impetus, meaning they cannot break an enemy unit if the first round of melee is won. If I read my Tacitus correctly (and I welcome correction on this as well as other points), it seems that I could permit these light chariots a chance to cause a degree of disorder if they were purposely driven into a Roman formation. [13]

Broadening my scope to consider other facets of the scenario as well as the pages of "basic" rule amendments, I see that I might have given the Britons/Caledonians too high of an army breakpoint. Perhaps I should have lowered it to 15 key units or even made it the same as the army breakpoint for the Roman forces? I also thought about the issue of support during this first staging of the historical battle. At one point, the Roman center was rather swamped by a large number of Caledonian warriors. Problem was, not all of the warbands could fight. This seems sensible, but under Armati, friendly units are not even allowed to lend support - either in terms of boosting/stabilizing morale or in terms of physical assistance. So, I wondered how this could be addressed. Fortunately, in the middle of this first wargame, my copy of L'Art De La Guerre arrived. [14] Reading bits and pieces of this lovely book in between turns and while breakfasting, I was tempted to tack on some additional amendments. While there is certainly something to be said for the gradual degradation process of an Armati melee between two units of heavy infantry or heavy cavalry, I quite like the idea of determining damage by the final difference in the melee scores. I also found a section that directly answered my concerns about supporting friends - at least in combat. In ADLG, it appears that an engaged unit can be supported by 3 friendly units and thereby, have a +3 modifier to its melee roll. In general, and in reflection, I think "my" amendments worked fairly well. In fact, the changes to the charging with impetus rule saved over half a dozen auxiliary units from disappearing on the turn when both sides came into contact. [15]

As to the wargame itself, it took just 7 turns for Calgacus and his assembled warriors to rewrite history. To be sure, it was not as lop-sided a victory for the Britons/Caledonians as Tacitus reports it was for the Romans. While the exact language differs depending on the translation consulted, the ancient author explains: "About 10,000 of the enemy were slain; on our side there fell 360 men, and among them Aulus Atticus, the commander of the cohort, whose youthful impetuosity and mettlesome steed had borne him into the midst of the enemy." [16] Simple division tells the interested reader and or wargamer that for every Roman soldier who died at Mons Graupius, approximately 28 barbarians  were killed. In the "miniature" contest, the Caledonians lost 13 key units. The majority of these were warbands, obviously. They lost half of their veteran fighters, a unit of medium chariots, a leader (the right flank commander), and most of their light chariots. These last units were not categorized a key, so they did not count toward the total.

The Roman defeat was not due to poor tactics, per se, but can be attributed to very poor luck with the dice. Even though the Romans captured and held the move option throughout the table top battle, they did not do as well when it came to shooting or engaging in close combat. As previously mentioned, the line of auxiliary infantry was spared a quick death (and Agricola was spared a quick defeat) due to some tinkering  with the "charges by units with impetus" rules. On further review, it appears that Agricola did not do as good a job managing his cavalry formations as he did in the historical battle. The squadrons in the first line became "trapped" by numerous warbands right away; these units did not attempt any kind of maneuver in order to get around or even  behind the slower moving barbarian divisions. Closer inspection revealed that this might well have been a flaw in the scenario design or at least the initial deployment. The Osprey narrative suggests that Agricola extended or thinned out his first line in order to prevent the enemy chariots from mowing down his men. Evidently, these light-weight vehicles had blades attached to the wheels. Other sources suggest that the auxiliaries were spread out in order to prevent the smaller  Roman force from becoming enveloped. If I had paid more attention to these facts, then perhaps I would have permitted Agricola more command and control over a "thin grey line" of auxiliaries, and perhaps I would have been better able to work with the Roman and auxiliary cavalry against the Briton/Caledonian flanks. The reserve squadrons of heavy horse suffered the same fate. Here again, though, I wonder about the need for or possibility of drafting  a new scenario specific rule or amendment. Could the reserve horse be allowed to "burst through" friends and fall upon the disorganized and tired warbands? Or, should they be allowed a kind of "strategic movement" so that they can move into position faster and then fall on the enemy flanks as they did historically? I am not all that surprised to find that I appear to have even more questions after having wargamed the battle than I had before I manufactured even one unit of auxiliaries.

Overall, I think this first attempt went fairly well. The game was completed over a weekend; the rules were not too complex and though it is an admittedly subjective assessment, they also seemed realistic. Even though history was rewritten and Agricola had to get on his  horse for a completely different reason, I quite enjoyed playing both generals in this map exercise of Mons Graupius. I look forward to the next three refights. I hope that Agricola and his Romans will be able to bounce back.

Recommended Viewing
During the course of my research, I happened across the following Youtube posts which may or may not be of interest to readers of this report. The first link is to a silent but beyond spectacular "film" of a WAB version of the historical battle. The second link is  essentially a television show wherein civilians "take command" of the ancient armies and recreate the battle with the assistance of computers and computer graphics.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKA8-uBSZbY

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7yu9zjOqvo


Notes
[1] See the opening lines of Chapter 36, specifically, at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0081%3Achapter%3D29. Compare this description with the following translation found on page 116 of Professor Brian Campbell's Greek and Roman Military Writers - Selected Readings: "The battle began with an exchange of missiles, and the Britons displayed  both valour and skill in parrying our soldiers' javelins with their enormous swords or  deflecting them with their  little shields, while they themselves poured volleys on us." Compare or contrast these two translations with this one provided in Joshua J. Mark's 09 January 2015 article (see http://www.ancient.eu/article/776/) where it is explained: "At first the action was carried on at a distance. The Britons, armed with long swords and short targets, with steadiness and  dexterity avoided or struck down our missile weapons, and at the same time poured in a torrent of their own."
[2] See http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=417410.
[3]  See pages 10 through 22 of the introduction, wherein one of the acknowledged "founding fathers" of our hobby explains and explores the process of refighting historical battles in miniature on a table top.
[4] See http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/tac/ag01030.htm, included in a post to The Society of Ancients forum by Mr. Mick Hession on 02 June 2012. [The interesting discussion thread can be viewed at http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=242.0] Again, compare this interpretation with the one found in Mr. Mark's article: "Not the least appearance was left of an engagement of cavalry; since the men, long keeping their ground with difficulty, were forced along with the bodies of the horses; and frequently, straggling chariots, and affrighted horses without their riders, flying variously as terror impelled them, rushed obliquely athwart or directly through the lines." Here is the version offered by Professor Campbell: "The battle now looked anything but a cavalry engagement, while our infantry struggling for a foothold on the slope was jostled by the flanks of the horses. And stray chariots, with their horses panic-stricken without a driver, often went plunging into the flanks or front."
[5] Mr. Featherstone's common-sense guidelines are found at the bottom of page 10 in his Battle Notes for Wargamers: "To refight any historical battle realistically, the terrain must closely resemble both in scale and appearance the area over which the original conflict raged, and the troops accurately represent the original forces."
[6] For these descriptions of the battlefield, I referred to the translation of Tacitus found/used in Mr. Mark's 09 January 2015 article.
[7] See the spreads on pages 64-65 and 72-73, respectively. The artwork in this Osprey Campaign Book is also very well done.
[8] See http://www.fanaticus.org/DBA/battles/monsgraupius.htm.
[9] This figure is a guesstimate and was based on measuring the size of the shape labeled "legions" and comparing it to the much larger shape labeled "8,000 aux. inf."
[10] See, for example, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mons_Graupius.
[11] See again http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/tac/ag01030.htm.
[12] See again http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0081%3Achapter%3D29.
[13] In the translation provided in Mr. Mark's paper, there is a line which reads:
In the meantime the troops of cavalry took to flight, and the armed chariots mingled in the engagement of the infantry; but although their first shock occasioned some consternation, they were soon entangled among the close ranks of the cohorts, and the inequalities of the ground.
To be certain, I don't want to take anything out of context or "spin" the interpretation to my advantage, but I wonder if there is any evidence to be found in "their first shock occasioned some consternation"? Does this mean that the light chariots charged into the Roman ranks and produced some degree of disorder? Or, was it simply the threat of a charge?
[14] I was able to purchase this set of rules and the Osprey book about Mons Graupius with an Amazon gift card given to me by an employer.
[15] The personal pronoun is in quotes because the vast majority of these amendments have been adopted and adapted from other, more experienced and knowledgable players.
[16] I took this translation from the SOA post made by Mr. Hession.

[Patrick Waterson]

Impressive work, Chris: practically a Slingshot article in itself.

If you are interested ...

The initial missile exchange may just have been the two armies 'warming up', which seems to have been the traditional function of a skirmishing period prior to the decisive up close and personal stage.  Having re-read the passage, while Tacitus or his source is impressed by the Britons' dexterity in parrying Roman missiles and delivering their own, there is nothing in his account to suggest that the Britons' copious discharge of missiles did any damage to the auxilia, for whom blocking and parrying opponents' missiles with their own larger and more suitable shields would have been second nature.  Hence neither side's missiles appear to have done any noticeable damage to the other, the surprise for the Romans being that their missiles did not immediately throw the Britons into confusion.

Having a rule for enforced preliminary missile exchanges does add a bit of flavour to the battle.

The Roman defeat was not due to poor tactics, per se, but can be attributed to very poor luck with the dice.

Is it worth rerunning the action and giving both sides average-ish dice results?  One weakness of dice-based wargame systems is that all too often the dice create a result which never happened on a historical battlefield - not a terminal disadvantage if the result could have happened, but rather misleading if it could not.  Given Agricola's confidence in his auxiliaries and Tacitus' comments about their crushing superiority in close combat:

"The swords of the Britons are not pointed, and do not allow them to close with the foe, or to fight in the open field. No sooner did the Batavians begin to close with the enemy, to strike them with their shields, to disfigure their faces, and overthrowing the force on the plain to advance their line up the hill, than the other auxiliary cohorts joined with eager rivalry in cutting down all the nearest of the foe. Many were left behind half dead, some even unwounded, in the hurry of victory."

("... do not allow them to close with the foe, or to fight in the open field ..." seems a poor rendering of "complexum armorum et in arto pugnam non tolerabant," which is better understood as "are useless when space is limited in a close fight")

I suspect the auxiliaries in the Armati lists were seriously underrated or the Britons seriously overrated for close combat against each other.  The fighting values of the auxilia and tribesmen look suspiciously close: I would have expected a clear difference of at least one and perhaps even two to reflect the effortless superiority displayed by the auxilia in close combat.

Historically, the Roman cavalry appear to have killed off the chariot crews without difficulty and perhaps without losses.  This in itself may suggest the Caledones lacked cavalry, or if they had any it was not used to support the chariots.  Tacitus simply states:

"interim equitum turmae, ut fugere covinnarii, peditum se proelio miscuere."
(meanwhile the troops of cavalry, as the chariots fled, became engaged in the foot battle)

For some reason translators seem to want to make this simple statement more complicated than it is.  The use of 'turmae' suggests, though not everyone will accept that it proves, that Tacitus is referring to Roman cavalry.  In theory he could be referring to cavalry on both sides getting mixed up in the infantry action as the chariots fled; in practice, disposing of any opposing cavalry would have been an essential preliminary, and one Tacitus does not mention.  Ergo, I suspect the cavalry here are unopposed Romans, particularly as up to this point Agricola has felt no need to commit his own cavalry reserve.

The driverless chariots were probably mainly on the flanks of the action, hence ploughing into the lines of fighting infantry 'transversos ... incursabant' (drove in from the side, literally 'across'), but a few seem to have swerved behind the fighting lines and hence ploughed in 'aut obvios' (literally 'meeting', but here probably meaning at an acute angle from the Roman auxiliaries' rear).

[aligern]

Might I suggest that there is a fundamental flaw in the methodology of constructing the army lists here? The Armati lists copy the WRG canard that 'auxilia' in the Roman army are fundamentally different from the legionaries and so they have a lower breakpoint than a legionary unit (3 versus 4 points) , they throw javelins at a distance, legionaries use pila in contact, htgey cannot form deep to resist an impetus charge from warband.....etc. In the Armati 2 lists auxilia afe LHI,nthey exist to protect a legions flanks and to occupy terrain.
Agricola, however, is doing something entirely different. He is using his auxilia as line of battle infantry. They should be regraded as FT (foot) on a fighting value of 6 for elites like the Batavi and 5 for less tough types. They can then form in deep formation if you want to resist charging warband, though they could happily operate in wide formation and take their chances.
This change is crucially a matter of using the army lists flexibly to represent the abilities of troops in the battle, rather than of deploying an army that is suitably flexible for a competition.
I tend to find that most rule sets Armati, DBM, LAdlG, FoG produce kampfgruppe armies which have a few of each useful troop type so that, for competition purposes the pkayer can cope with most threats, but real life is different as you show in your article Chris and requires that you adjust lists to how the forces operate on the day rather than a list writers rather arbitrary build.
Cheers
Roy

[Chris]

Patrick and Roy -

Thanks for taking the time to read and offer commentary.

Though I am no Latin scholar, I will endeavor to take Patrick's interpretations into account when staging the other contests with different rule sets.

Suggestion duly noted, Roy. In like fashion, I am no expert on armies or army lists, but did see a need for scenario-driven changes. It will/may be interesting to see how using other rule sets and  their accompanying lists handle the reported types of troops involved at this battle.

Thanks again.

Cheers,
Chris

[Mark G]

There may be some chance to make a "list basis" section, where folk can discuss generic features of a list, and the evidence to support it, which could then feed into specific rule forums elsewhere.
Akin to the historical battles section.

But Sans rules, it would soon lose focus, and the subjects would be limited, and I wouldn't really want to spend my time on it.

Rules specifics are for rule forums.

[Patrick Waterson]

Agreed, Mark, though members can always chat about a particular list or two in connection with a specific battle.  It probably will not feed into anything else, but it allows thoughts to be aired which otherwise might not have been.

[Duncan Head]

There may be some chance to make a "list basis" section, where folk can discuss generic features of a list, and the evidence to support it, which could then feed into specific rule forums elsewhere.

I suspect the existing "Army Research" section would do rather than creating a new Forum.

[Patrick Waterson]

Thinking about it, I concur.