Mons Graupius 84 AD

[Mick Hession]

Battle of Mons Graupius, 84 AD

Opponents: A coalition of Caledonian tribes under Calgacus (30,000 men) V Romans under Gnaeus Julius Agricola (3,000 cavalry, 8,000 auxiliaries and more than one legion – probably about 20,000 men).

Summary:
The Caledones deployed with their vanguard, including their chariots and cavalry, on low ground whilst the bulk of their infantry remained on high ground to the rear. Agricola deployed with auxiliary infantry flanked by cavalry and the legions in reserve. The Caledonian vanguard skirmished effectively but when Agricola ordered the auxiliaries forward the Caledonian cavalry fled whilst their swordsmen proved poorly equipped for close combat. The chariots came into the fight but were ineffective as the ground was rough. The remaining Caledonian infantry now advanced off the hill but was attacked from the flanks by Roman cavalry and routed. They rallied on reaching woods and killed some of the foremost pursuers, but were finally broken when attacked by ordered units of auxiliaries and cavalry. 10,000 tribesmen were killed for the loss of 360 Romans.

Source: Tacitus "Agricola", 1:35-37
http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/tac/ag01030.htm

35 While Agricola was yet speaking, the ardour of the soldiers was rising to its height, and the close of his speech was followed by a great outburst of enthusiasm. In a moment they flew to arms. He arrayed his eager and impetuous troops in such a manner that the auxiliary infantry, 8,000 in number, strengthened his centre, while 3,000 cavalry were posted on his wings. The legions were drawn up in front of the intrenched camp; his victory would be vastly more glorious if won without the loss of Roman blood, and he would have a reserve in case of repulse. The enemy, to make a formidable display, had posted himself on high ground; his van was on the plain, while the rest of his army rose in an arch-like form up the slope of a hill. The plain between resounded with the noise and with the rapid movements of chariots and cavalry. Agricola, fearing that from the enemy's superiority of force he would be simultaneously attacked in front and on the flanks, widened his ranks, and though his line was likely to be too extended, and several officers advised him to bring up the legions, yet, so sanguine was he, so resolute in meeting danger, he sent away his horse and took his stand on foot before the colours.

36. The action began with distant fighting. The Britons with equal steadiness and skill used their huge swords and small shields to avoid or to parry the missiles of our soldiers, while they themselves poured on us a dense shower of darts, till Agricola encouraged three Batavian and two Tungrian cohorts to bring matters to the decision of close fighting with swords. Such tactics were familiar to these veteran soldiers, but were embarrassing to an enemy armed with small bucklers and unwieldy weapons. The swords of the Britons are not pointed, and do not allow them to close with the foe, or to fight in the open field. No sooner did the Batavians begin to close with the enemy, to strike them with their shields, to disfigure their faces, and overthrowing the force on the plain to advance their line up the hill, than the other auxiliary cohorts joined with eager rivalry in cutting down all the nearest of the foe. Many were left behind half dead, some even unwounded, in the hurry of victory. Meantime the enemy's cavalry had fled, and the charioteers had mingled in the engagement of the infantry. But although these at first spread panic, they were soon impeded by the close array of our ranks and by the inequalities of the ground. The battle had anything but the appearance of a cavalry action, for men and horses were carried along in confusion together, while chariots, destitute of guidance, and terrified horses without drivers, dashed as panic urged them, sideways, or in direct collision against the ranks.

37. Those of the Britons who, having as yet taken no part in the engagement, occupied the hill-tops, and who without fear for themselves sat idly disdaining the smallness of our numbers, had begun gradually to descend and to hem in the rear of the victorious army, when Agricola, who feared this very movement, opposed their advance with four squadrons of cavalry held in reserve by him for any sudden emergencies of battle. Their repulse and rout was as severe as their onset had been furious. Thus the enemy's design recoiled on himself, and the cavalry which by the general's order had wheeled round from the van of the contending armies, attacked his rear. Then, indeed, the open plain presented an awful and hideous spectacle. Our men pursued, wounded, made prisoners of the fugitives only to slaughter them when others fell in their way. And now the enemy, as prompted by their various dispositions, fled in whole battalions with arms in their hands before a few pursuers, while some, who were unarmed, actually rushed to the front and gave themselves up to death. Everywhere there lay scattered arms, corpses, and mangled limbs, and the earth reeked with blood. Even the conquered now and then felt a touch of fury and of courage. On approaching the woods, they rallied, and its they knew the ground, they were able to pounce on the foremost and least cautious of the pursuers. Had not Agricola, who was present everywhere, ordered a force of strong and lightly-equipped cohorts, with some dismounted troopers for the denser parts of the forest, and a detachment of cavalry where it was not so thick, to scour the woods like a party of huntsmen, serious loss would have been sustained through the excessive confidence of our troops. When, however, the enemy saw that we again pursued them in firm and compact array, they fled no longer in masses as before, each looking for his comrade; but dispersing and avoiding one another, they sought the shelter of distant and pathless wilds. Night and weariness of bloodshed put an end to the pursuit. About 10,000 of the enemy were slain; on our side there fell 360 men, and among them Aulus Atticus, the commander of the cohort, whose youthful impetuosity and mettlesome steed had borne him into the midst of the enemy.

Commentary:

We see the battle from Tacitus' perspective: a fairly typical victory of organised and well-equipped Romans over greater numbers of disorderly barbarians who deploy badly and are beaten in detail. Yet the Caledones seem to have chosen the position deliberately, so why did they choose ground that was too rough for their chariots to be effective, and why did the bulk of their army sit idly to the rear, contributing nothing until the battle was well on its way to being lost? As a tribal coalition the Caledonians were probably unlikely to adopt a novel way of fighting so there must have been some logic to the way they fought, albeit one that we may find strange from the perspective of military efficiency. 

Caledonian tactics in the battle remind me of the heroic combats in the Irish epic Tain Bo Cuailgne (all quotes are from http://www.ucc.ie/celt/published/T301035/index.html), which comes from a closely related culture. Noble warriors usually fight on foot though with their charioteers at some remove with spare weapons (and the means of a quick getaway, though true heroes never flee ignominiously). Heroes demonstrate their prowess in the casting of javelins ("so good was their mutual casting that during that time each of them bled and reddened and wounded the other") and in parrying them ("Despite the excellence of the casting, the defence was so good that neither of them wounded or drew blood from the other during that time") before coming to close quarters with slashing swords ("They wielded their heavy, hard-smiting swords. Each of them began to smite and hew, to slaughter and slay each other"). Combats are individual duels; ganging up on an opponent is considered bad form ("And they came forward to the place where Cú Chulainn was, and when they came, they did not grant him fair play or single combat but all twelve of them attacked him straightaway.") whilst humbler infantry stand aside until the heroic duels have finished. The ineffective Caledonian swordsmen, usually assumed to be members of the infantry warband, may have been dismounted charioteers (more likely to have expensive long swords) makes me suspect the Caledonians believed they were fighting a battle on traditional "heroic" lines but, unfortunately for them, the Romans were a lot less sentimental.

A secondary point relates to sources and how we evaluate them. The on-line edition quoted above refers to Caledonian cavalry twice but according to Phil Barker (Slingshot 194 and elsewhere) the Loeb edition of "Agricola" does not mention this arm at all. I don't have access to the Loeb but if that is the case then how do we as amateurs assess the merits of different versions of the same source texts?

[Mark]

Per the last point, I don't have the Loeb version either, but it does have the merit of having the Latin alongside so you can check it.

The online version reads: "Meantime the enemy's cavalry had fled, and the charioteers had mingled in the engagement of the infantry."

The Penguin Classics version reads "Our [ the Roman, obviously ] cavalry squadrons, meanwhile, had routed the war-chariots, and now plunged into the infantry battle"

The Oxford World's Classics version reads: "Meanwhile - for the charioteers had fled - the cavalry squadrons joined in the infantry battle"

There's a footnote in the Penguin edition pertaining to the translation of "charioteer" in these paragraphs: "the term Tacitus uses here is covinnarius eques, literally 'the covinnus-cavalry'. The term covinnus was Celtic in origin (cf. Old Irish fen, Welsh gwain, 'wagon') and was used by Latin writers to denote the war-chariot of the Britanni and the northern Gauls; according to Mela (3.52), they had scythes attached to the axles."

[Mark]

I should point out:

- Penguin Classics version is tr. Mattingley 1948, revised translation with new introduction by Rives 2009
- Oxford version is tr. Birley 1999

Both available (and search-able!) on Kindle.

[Mick Hession]

Thanks Mark. The on-line version at sacred texts also has the original but unfortunately my latin grammar is way too rusty to work it out for myself .... 

[Patrick Waterson]

Might be able to help out here.

The Latin (translated literally) is:

interim equitum turmae
(Meanwhile of cavalry the troops) [a turma is a 30-man Roman cavalry formation]

ut fugere covinarii
(that caused to flee the chariots)

peditum se proelio miscuere
(with the infantry itself in battle mingled) [miscuere has a secondary sense of throwing into confusion]

The sense of this is that the Roman cavalry first dealt with the chariots (hence the subsequent passage about driverless chariots ploughing through the infantry of both sides) and then found itself in combat with the Caledonian infantry.  Caledonian cavalry are not mentioned.

Th following sentence:
But although these at first spread panic, they were soon impeded by the close array of our ranks and by the inequalities of the ground.
is correct except for one important respect: it was the Caledonian ranks that were 'in close array' and which impeded the Roman cavalry.

densis tamen hostium agminibus
(by the closeness however of the enemy battleline)

Had it been the Roman battleline fending off cavalry, Tacitus would have written densis tamen nostrum agminibus.

The other clue about who is who in this action is the reference to turmae of cavalry: these are, strictly speaking, Roman formations, and imply a degree of organisation and discipline that Caledonians on horseback should not possess.  That said, in Annales XIV.34 Tacitus refers to 'turmas' of Boudicca's cavalry, so this is not an infallible guide.  The labelling of the battleline that beats off the cavalry as 'hostium' seems to confirm it as Caledonian and hence the cavalry as Roman.  Plus the meaning fits better that way.  They put to flight the Caledonian chariots (quite possibly by riding up behind them and shooting the drivers) and then get involved against the Caledonian infantry, which, as Mick points out, tended to be long on heroics but short on organisation and tactics.  The driverless chariots that later panic through the lines indiscriminately are the result of the Roman cavalry's handiwork as well as being a useful clue to who won the clash in the plain.

Patrick

[Mark]

The following sentence:
But although these at first spread panic, they were soon impeded by the close array of our ranks and by the inequalities of the ground.
is correct except for one important respect: it was the Caledonian ranks that were 'in close array' and which impeded the Roman cavalry.

Indeed & good spot: the Romans being in close array doesn't make sense either in the context of Agricola widening his ranks in para 35.

[Patrick Waterson]

That is another good observation.  Everything seems to point to the cavalry mentioned being Roman, and any Caledonian cavalry being absent or non-existent.

Patrick