Leuctra and the Thebans

[Patrick Waterson]

How to represent this in a set of rules? The way my rules function, Roy's idea of a stack of units (i.e. a very deep formation but with an internal structure) would work well - beat the leading unit, but then you have to deal with the one behind. This may not be exactly how things were historically, but it would perhaps produce the same effect.

That might feel a bit more historical and work more historically than an "I've got 50 ranks therefore I have +5 on the die roll and beat anyone in a single turn" approach.  The one caveat might be that if you do not give the leading unit some sort of bonus for all that potential support, a shallowly-deployed crack opponent might simply chew his way through each part of the 'stack' in turn.  A 'stack' with a mild to moderate bonus for support might cover all eventualities.

[aligern]

No one has so far explored the implications of the depths adopted. What does it do the frontage? Over what frontage is the 25 man depth deployed? What frontage for the 50 man? If the Thebans have an excess of men then I suppise you can match the frontage of the opponent and be deeper . Why would you not deploy wider and go around the flanks?
A slight correction to the impression that I gave Keith. If the 50 man deep formation is only the Sacred Band it is 6 men wide. Is it possible that you put your best 50 men in the front eight ranks and punch through, then make a turn to lef or right into a formation that is now 50 men wide and procede against flank or rear.  I accept that  it might maje sense to break through with six 50 man units which then deploy out.
As I think Richard said, the idea of 50 men pushing on each other is a nonsense, even if they are otganised in blocks eight deep.  Men  would just die in the crush, the sides would bulge out.
To me its a orime consideration that a formationof all the hoplites in the Theban army 25 deep gives them the problem of having one third the frontage and yet not much benefit, 50 would just compound the problem. Wouldn't they be asking for trouble on the flanks?  To me it makes much more sense if the deployment is the mass of Thebans eight deep , with a penetration squad of the best men in a 50 deep formation thst can exploit once its through.
Roy

[Dangun]

As I think Richard said, the idea of 50 men pushing on each other is a nonsense, even if they are organised in blocks eight deep.  Men  would just die in the crush, the sides would bulge out.

I agree. It could go horribly wrong.
Nirvana, live at the Hordern Pavillion, 1992, in the mosh pit - the band appears, a thousand people push forward, about 300 people fall over and twice as many again are suddenly very scared of being crushed to death.

[Erpingham]

The advantage that our 50 strong Theban phalanx has over a mosh pit is internal organisation.  It is in files, keeping station with other files.  With the proper organisation, it can avoid falling into a scrum and crushing itself to death. 

Where we inevitably part company is how the 50 ranks apply pressure and what exactly the effect is.  Earlier in the topic, there was talk of "inertia".  It is hard to stop it trundling forward and, if you do, its hard to get it rolling backward.  This makes sense to me - it is far easier to go with the flow of a crowd as against stopping, going across or backing against it.

I think there is an interesting question out there of if 50 ranks was so good, why didn't everybody do it?  My suspicion would be post-operational analysis showed it wasn't that much better than 25 ranks and, by reducing frontage, added risks.

[RichT]

Well we've had variations on the 'can 50 men push?' discussion often enough, we all know where we stand (like good hoplites), and we all know exactly where it will lead (somewhere I'd rather not go).

The very narrow deep column - just the Sacred Band 50 deep - is an interesting idea, though I'd always thought the fact this just left them a frontage of 6 men rules it out as terribly wasteful of the best men. Plus it does sort of go against the spirit of Xenophon's and Diodorus' accounts - to me, they read as if the Thebans are all deep, not just the Sacred Band. A Sacred Band cutting edge at the front of a much deeper formation seems to avoid some difficulties and still allows the SB to dash forward under Pelopidas. It might also account for the apparent two stage combat described by Diodorus - first Pelopidas + SB kill Cleombrotus, then Epaminondas + heavy column drive the Spartans back - thus also accounting for Xenophon's initial Spartan success allowing Cleombrotus to be borne off. A formation deployed laterally across a different formation would be unusual - but then Epaminondas was an innovator.

But the fact is we will never know for sure - we can only offer speculations.

Concerning Theban organisation - a lot is known of the Boiotian army in the 3rd C, but it's doubtful how much of this can be applied to the 4th (probably not much) and anyway IIRC there's not much on low level organisation.

One possibility suggested by the use of 25 and 50 ranks - these are odd numbers in every sense, since we are used to hoplites and Macedonians using multiples of 8, or at least even numbers (like 12) - this allows files to be halved and remain equal, not possible with 25 of course. So maybe Thebans used multiples of 5 ('pempads') - this organisation is applied by Xenophon to his idealised army of Cyrus - multiples of 5 each with their own officer (or NCO), and also was apparently used by the Phliasians (Argives, not Boiotians, but at any rate it shows that variations on 8 were available). Maybe Thebans were organised in pempads, and typically formed a phalanx 5 pempads deep. This would give an NCO every fifth man to maintain order. If this is so, and highly speculatively, the Sacred Band could have formed the front pempad of the phalanx, so 60 men wide, and the regular Thebans 9 pempads, 45 deep, behind (which would need 2700 men to cover the same frontage). 

Despite the dangers of outflanking, the narrow frontage seems to have been the point of the formation, not a handicap, since it allowed the Thebans to concentrate on the Spartan knights around Cleombrotus - smashing the head of the snake.

[Patrick Waterson]

Despite the dangers of outflanking, the narrow frontage seems to have been the point of the formation, not a handicap, since it allowed the Thebans to concentrate on the Spartan knights around Cleombrotus - smashing the head of the snake.

And this was the point of massing '50 shields deep' as Xenophon describes:

"Coming now to the infantry, it was said that the Lacedaemonians led each half-company three files abreast, and that this resulted in the phalanx being not more than twelve men deep. The Thebans, however, were massed not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that if they conquered that part of the army which was around the king, all the rest of it would be easy to overcome."  - Hellenica VI.4.12

It was indeed the main body of the Thebans who formed 50 deep and the purpose was indeed to crush the 12-deep Spartans.  Epaminondas' whole battle plan was a complete departure from previous tradition: he formed his best troops on the left, not the right, and refused his right in order to avoid it being engaged before he had dealt with the Spartans.  Her was helped in this by the reluctance of many of the Spartan allies, who were tardy in advance, reluctant to engage and over-eager to retire, but the key to his formula was to crush a twelve deep formation with a 50-deep formation, this being double the usual already over-deep Theban deployment.

And what of the Sacred Band?  The idea that they formed the front ranks of the Theban mass appears to have a basis in traditional Theban practice, but not at Leuctra.

"Gorgidas, then, by distributing this sacred band among the front ranks of the whole phalanx of men-at-arms, made the high excellence of the men inconspicuous, and did not direct their strength upon a common object, since it was dissipated and blended with that of a large body of inferior troops; but Pelopidas, after their valour had shone out at Tegyra, where they fought by themselves and about his own person, never afterwards divided or scattered them, but, treating them as a unit, put them into the forefront of the greatest conflicts."  - Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas 19.3

(The next section in Pelopidas has an interesting sideline: "For just as horses run faster when yoked to a chariot than when men ride them singly, not because they cleave the air with more impetus owing to their united weight, but because their mutual rivalry and ambition inflame their spirits; so he thought that brave men were most ardent and serviceable in a common cause when they inspired one another with a zeal for high achievement." Do we need to consider revising chariot and cavalry movement rates?)

At Leuctra the Sacred Band appear to have moved up with the rest of the Theban phalanx, but to have broken off on Pelopidas' initiative to intercept the Spartan formation change.  One might envisage them as being six wide and 50 deep adjacent to the extreme left flank of the Theban force, but with discretion to do their own thing under their own commander.

Richard's idea of Theban 'pempads' is an interesting one which might repay further study.

I think there is an interesting question out there of if 50 ranks was so good, why didn't everybody do it?  My suspicion would be post-operational analysis showed it wasn't that much better than 25 ranks and, by reducing frontage, added risks.

As earlier indicated, the Thebans seem to have cared less about subjecting their allies on the 'short flank' to increased risks through the Thebans' own reduced frontage, at least until Epaminondas' novel deployment at Leuctra.  One may note from Plutarch's description (Life of Pelopidas 23) that the Spartans had a simple counter for this sort of arrangement: they extended their wing and began to use the extension to outflank the Thebans.  Six ranks in front and six on the flank and wrapping round the rear were evidently considered a better bet for dealing with a 50-deep opponent than improvising a 48-deep counter-mass.  This in itself is interesting: if a 50-deep formation merely added extra casualty replacements, why not get your own 12-deep files into 48-deep combinations and match the Thebans more or less man for man?  To me, this indicates the Thebans were trained to push as a mass, using their practice-acquired cohesion and momentum in great depth, whereas the Spartans, even with their training to improvise cooperation, did not consider that they would be able to oppose this cohesive formation with an improvised one of their own.

Pelopidas ruined the Spartan counter by racing off with the Sacred Band and catching the Spartans in mid-manoeuvre.  If his 300 men started out six wide and 50 deep, they would have formed a very narrow 'spear'.  They could have reconfigured either before moving or on the move in order to arrive with more frontage and less depth, but if Epaminondas managed to bring on the main body as quickly as Plutarch implies then he would have engaged before the Spartans could sort themselves out and start wrapping up the Sacred Band, who might thus have been viable in either formation (whether still in 6x50 or in a shallower configuration, 30x10 or even 50x6).  I am tempted to think that Pelopidas might have wheeled them off sideways at first, moving parallel to the Spartan extension, then faced right and slammed a six-deep Sacred Band into a six-deep Spartan line, temporarily paralysing them on a 50-man frontage.

[Erpingham]

I am tempted to think that Pelopidas might have wheeled them off sideways at first, moving parallel to the Spartan extension, then faced right and slammed a six-deep Sacred Band into a six-deep Spartan line, temporarily paralysing them on a 50-man frontage.

This would have messed up their internal cohesion, giving you most files with no leaders and closers.

[Patrick Waterson]

This would have messed up their internal cohesion, giving you most files with no leaders and closers.

Quite true, but as this is the Sacred Band, the heroes of Tegyra, the best-trained and most intimately interconnected unit the Thebans fielded, they would anyway have very high inherent 'two-man-file' internal cohesion, such that Pelopidas might have judged it acceptable to commit them to action 'sideways on' against an opponent who was himself still in the middle of an evolution.  The Sacred Band would not have been expecting to win a straight fight by themselves, but to arrest or impede the Spartan motion long enough for the Theban deep phalanx to come up and smack into its target.  After that, the Sacred Band could be expected to win against its immediate opponents, given its own very high inherent (as opposed to purely organisational) internal cohesion and the fact that by this time Thebans were on the whole individually physically stronger than Spartans.

[Erpingham]

I shall ultimately leave it to the classicists to determine the right of it but I think I would make some observations

Reading secondary accounts, we can't be sure where the Sacred Band started the fight but most suggest they were separate from the line phalanx (in front, to the left or behind).  This gives us the possibility they weren't in the same formation.

We don't know the internal organisation of a Theban phalanx.  If the pempad idea is right, we need to reconcile it with the one certain thing we have about Sacred Band organisations, that it was organised in pairs.  Is it organised in paired files (which pempads would work with) or pairs within the file (which it wouldn't)?  This is, of course, a completely different topic to depth and ought to be considered separately (e.g. Army Research Theban army).

However, I am not convinced , just because a unit is elite heroes, it will abandon its drill and internal structure to expose its flank to another unit of elite heroes.  Invoking IMP, I think it will follow its drill to expand frontage.  We know from a previous battle that the Spartans were surprised at the drill competence of the Sacred Band.  Expanding frontage while facing the enemy, rather than wheeling out and turning to the flank, would be safer and, in the absence of contrary evidence, a preferred option, IMO.

[RichT]

Anthony:

If the pempad idea is right, we need to reconcile it with the one certain thing we have about Sacred Band organisations, that it was organised in pairs.  Is it organised in paired files (which pempads would work with) or pairs within the file (which it wouldn't)?

Maybe each pempad was two pairs and a gooseberry? I've always assumed the pairs, if it really worked this way, would be side by side. How else to decide who goes in front (and potentially gets killed first)?

However, I am not convinced, just because a unit is elite heroes, it will abandon its drill and internal structure to expose its flank to another unit of elite heroes.  Invoking IMP, I think it will follow its drill to expand frontage.  We know from a previous battle that the Spartans were surprised at the drill competence of the Sacred Band.  Expanding frontage while facing the enemy, rather than wheeling out and turning to the flank, would be safer and, in the absence of contrary evidence, a preferred option, IMO.

I'm not convinced there were any complex manoeuvres of any sort (from the Thebans). All the emphasis is on speed:

Xenophon: "in their flight they [the cavalry] had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, besides, the companies of the Thebans were now charging upon them"
Diodorus: "the Boeotians retreated on one wing, but on the other engaged the enemy in double-quick time".
Plutarch: "But at this point Pelopidas darted forth from his position, and with his band of three hundred on the run ... and since Pelopidas engaged them with incredible speed and boldness".

So the order of the day seems to be a rapid advance and hitting the Spartans while they were still disordered by cavalry (Xenophon) or by their attempted redeployment (Plutarch). Any redeployment by the Thebans would compromise the rapidity of the advance. The aim was to crush the head of the snake before the body can even get involved (and it worked).

We'll never determine the right of it though, just ruminate over possibilities.

[Ade G]

To use a WW2 example is this a "meat-grinder" formation that just keeps feeding men in until the enemy are exhausted?

[Patrick Waterson]

To use a WW2 example is this a "meat-grinder" formation that just keeps feeding men in until the enemy are exhausted?

More of a steamroller, I would say, but one which did not simply swap casualties until the opponent had none standing.  Total losses in the Spartan army (the losers) were 1,000 men out of perhaps 12,000 while the Thebans appear to have lost noticeably less.  The effect of the 50 deep Theban formation was to bundle the Spartans back to their starting line with losses along the way, suggesting a coordinated grind )or push) by everyone as opposed to a mutual grinding away of front ranks.

However, I am not convinced, just because a unit is elite heroes, it will abandon its drill and internal structure to expose its flank to another unit of elite heroes.  Invoking IMP, I think it will follow its drill to expand frontage.  We know from a previous battle that the Spartans were surprised at the drill competence of the Sacred Band.  Expanding frontage while facing the enemy, rather than wheeling out and turning to the flank, would be safer and, in the absence of contrary evidence, a preferred option, IMO.

Could well have been the case.  That said, Pelopidas was not noted for caution or doing things by the book.

I'm not convinced there were any complex manoeuvres of any sort (from the Thebans). All the emphasis is on speed:

Xenophon: "in their flight they [the cavalry] had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, besides, the companies of the Thebans were now charging upon them"
Diodorus: "the Boeotians retreated on one wing, but on the other engaged the enemy in double-quick time".
Plutarch: "But at this point Pelopidas darted forth from his position, and with his band of three hundred on the run ... and since Pelopidas engaged them with incredible speed and boldness".

So the order of the day seems to be a rapid advance and hitting the Spartans while they were still disordered by cavalry (Xenophon) or by their attempted redeployment (Plutarch). Any redeployment by the Thebans would compromise the rapidity of the advance. The aim was to crush the head of the snake before the body can even get involved (and it worked).

Pelopidas would need to execute some form of redeployment if expanding his frontage, not least because he would have to expand left while advancing at the run.  While this might be possible if the run was not too rapid, he could get to where he wanted to be much faster by yelling "Sacred Band, follow me!" or equivalent, leading them off in a six-wide column at the trot to move parallel to the expanding Spartans (who in order to expand are themselves offering their sides, albeit shielded) and when level with the head of the Spartan extension he yells "Sacred, Band, face right, charge!" or some such brief instruction.  I like the idea because it is rapid and simple in execution and puts the Sacred Band exactly where they need to be in order to interrupt the Spartan redeployment.

It is of course a conjecture.  It is how I would have done it given the circumstances, the men available and the arithmetic of deployment and distance.  What actually was done is, as Richard indicates, something we shall probably never know.

[PMBardunias]

I think though it might be more revealing to ask the question in reverse. Why does the 50 deep phalanx sometimes go backwards? The fact that it ever does get "pushed" backwards, suggests to me that weight is only one of a long list of factors.
Nirvana, live at the Hordern Pavillion, 1992, in the mosh pit - the band appears, a thousand people push forward, about 300 people fall over and twice as many again are suddenly very scared of being crushed to death.

You can see now on the new Othismos thread why these do not happen. 

I think there is an interesting question out there of if 50 ranks was so good, why didn't everybody do it? 

It was great, it was also a one trick pony that failed the second time it was tried because it is essentially a trick.  To understand why it worked at Leuktra, we have to look at what the goal of a taxis in hoplite combat was. In my opinion the phalanx was not a solid line, but a string of taxeis arrayed alongside each other, a parataxeis as Thucydides tells us.  This means that the fate of each unit is not as tightly bound to the whole as many seem to portray. An example that shows what I mean is that in most big battles of the period, you win on the right and lose on the left.  This means that somewhere in the middle, you have a taxis moving forward, while the one right next to it is moving back! The taxis beating your neighbor to the left just chases them off the field. If the Argive 1,000 had bothered to turn left after marching through a great bloody gap in the Spartan allied ranks, Mantinea would have gone much differently. The Thebans had been forming deep, 25 ranks, to achieve local superiority since Pagondas did so at Delium.  That they kept doing so even at the cost of a cyclosis to the line as a whole can be seen in the fact that their allies attempted to bind them to only 16 ranks at Nemea- and failed.
So if we look at Leuktra, the goal was a showcase battle between the Thebans and the Spartiates. Epaminondas knew that if he won this clash the rest were just as irrelevant as any of the times that the left lost in previous battles.  The deep ranks would give a great advantage in othismos, but as I have shown elsewhere it was not a steamroller. The Spartiates were in fact holding their own for some time. The Spartan plan was actually wholly appropriate for this battle. The problem, as was common with Spartan armies, is that the execution was not up to the complexity of the plan.  The Spartans, not the Thebans, launched a cavalry attack on the Theban. This had two purposes. To lock the Thebans in combat and end the leftward veering of their advance. They had been using such veering to move on the enemy flank since Nemea. Also, the cavalry battle would screen the hoplites own movement towards cyclosis, which is the obvious counter-tactic if your enemy forms deep and narrow.  Xenophon's fanciful Thymbara is a replay of this showing how to overcome deep ranks. Both failed due to troop quality.  The Theban horse spanked the poorly manned Spartan, and the quality of Pelopidas and his men was such that they took the initiative to strike when they realized the Spartans were caught in mid-extension. When the Spartiates engaged, the rest of the allies were content to watch the show.
Mantinea was an attempt to replicate this, with both armies jamming their flank against a hill to limit outflanking.  The big difference was that Epaminondas was not "crushing the head" of the Spartan snake, because the Mantineans had formed up against him.  When he beat them, he in turn was taken in the flank, which I think explains why the Thebans could not advance even though the routed the Mantineans, and also how he managed to get killed because he would have formed on the Theban right.
It was never used again simply because it was too easy to counter.