Thracians

[Erpingham]

It may be well-known but I came across this article by accident.  Lots of interesting info and illustrations.

[Imperial Dave]

hadnt actually read this before Anthony and Thracians are a favourite of mine so thanks for the find

[Patrick Waterson]

Also, on the subject of mobilisation potential, one may note the statement that a million Thracians allows an army 100,000 to 200,000 strong (10% or 20% of population).  In this regard, Mr Webber seems to follow what yours truly regards as conventional wisdom.

A useful article, with plenty of information.

[Erpingham]

Thank you Patrick.  I wondered if you would pick up on his fondness for literalism as regards numbers  

[Patrick Waterson]

Actually I was noting his use of the customary military manpower ratio, which he evidently considers sufficiently well established and generally known to use without discussion or reference.

The point of doing this is to reassure members that the calculations of prime military manpower being 10% of population and total military manpower 20% of population are generally accepted and in general use.  We did earlier have some doubts on the matter.

Now that you mention it, he is quite a man for taking his material directly from the primary sources.

That said, my eye was particularly drawn to the illustration on p.543 (fig 11 on p.15 of the pdf) showing a king on horseback while servants hold his weapons.  The spear or lance is held in such a way as to suggest it is counterweighted, while the sword appears from the configuration of its scabbard to be straight (an akinakes?) as opposed to curved and sica-like.  The counterweighted shafted weapon would provide reach in melee and would have interesting characteristics if thrown.

Nice incidentally to see Head D., AOTMAPW* being referenced alongside Arrian, Diodorus, Livy and the like, notably with regard to developments in tactics and technique.  It indicates that one Society member has beneficially influenced the understanding of the period.

*Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars - Must get a copy sometime.

[Erpingham]

Actually I was noting his use of the customary military manpower ratio, which he evidently considers sufficiently well established and generally known to use without discussion or reference.

The point of doing this is to reassure members that the calculations of prime military manpower being 10% of population and total military manpower 20% of population are generally accepted and in general use.  We did earlier have some doubts on the matter.

So, if we repeat it enough, it becomes a fact?  As you say, he gives no reference as to why he thinks this.  To deploy 20% of the population is nearly 100% of male adults, which assumes universal military obligation and no appreciable slave community, unfree labour or other exempt groups (e.g. a priesthood).  To assemble all these people in one place without creating havoc and civil war as tribes lived off the land while marching through "friendly" territory would be an enormous organisational feat.  Does this fit what we know of Thracian society?

[Duncan Head]

As you say, he gives no reference as to why he thinks this. 

Chris quotes Strabo's suggestion that Thrace could field 200,000 foot and 15,000 cavalry; and is also aware of the figure of 150,000 that Thucydides (2.98) gives for Sitalkes' vast army for his invasion of Macedonia. Of course the former is potential resources, the latter a claim for an army actually fielded in one place, and they're centuries apart.

The population from which this is drawn, however, must be much less certain. Since Herodotus 5.1 regards the Thracians as the largest nation of earth except the Indians, a population of one million looks low compared with the figures that we've seen suggested for those parts of Greece and Thrace on Xerxes' route. I don't know where Chris got the idea that Herodotus himself said one million - can't find it in H at the moment - nor how Herodotus would know, since in his time there was no Thracian state to conduct a census.

Too much uncertainty here, I think.

[Patrick Waterson]

So, if we repeat it enough, it becomes a fact?  As you say, he gives no reference as to why he thinks this.

I do not think it became established simply through the Goebbels approach, but because it possessed perceived intrisic validity.  Any susbscriber to Strategy and Tactics in its SPI days would have seen it many a time (S&T folks back then were fond of demographic analysis and used the conventional wisdom for same).  I have never seen any other figure offered for usable military manpower as percentage of population - outside this forum, that is.

To deploy 20% of the population is nearly 100% of male adults, which assumes universal military obligation and no appreciable slave community, unfree labour or other exempt groups (e.g. a priesthood).  To assemble all these people in one place without creating havoc and civil war as tribes lived off the land while marching through "friendly" territory would be an enormous organisational feat.  Does this fit what we know of Thracian society?

Which raises the question of what we know of Thracian society, and how we interpret it.  They were tribal, raised corn and cattle, and by all acocunts spent most of their spare time fighting each other.  Of logistical details we know little, but Xenophon lifts an occasional corner of the veil.

"After this all the soldiers crossed over to Byzantium. And Anaxibius would not give them pay, but made proclamation that the troops were to take their arms and their baggage and go forth from the city, saying that he was going to send them back home and at the same time to make an enumeration of them. At that the soldiers were angry, for they had no money with which to procure provisions for the journey, and they set about packing up with reluctance." - Anabasis VII.1.7

We may observe the emphasis on procuring provisions in advance.  This is consistent with the general Greek aproach, and perhaps not inconsistent with that of the Thracians.  The Thracians certainly do not seem to have lacked for resources.

"Then Anaxibius called together the generals and captains and said: 'Get your provisions from the Thracian villages; there is an abundance there of barley and wheat and other supplies; when you have got them, proceed to the Chersonese, and there Cyniscus will take you into his pay.'" - idem 13

So it would seem to come down to whether the Thracians had the nous to bring provisions with them when they set out on camapign, and if so, for how long.  Once their initial stocks had run out, they would have little option but to live off the land, and their ability to do this would set the duration of their campaign.  This was doubtless the reason why Greece was never inundated by a wave of unified Thracians.  The 150,000-strong mobilisation under Sitalces was apparently a one-off event, although Herodotus does have 300,000 Thracians joinging Xerxes, which would place the population somewhat above 1 million (perhaps closer to 2 million given that at least one important tribe did not join).

Xenophon's Anabasis VII.3 et seq describes the Greeks' campaigning in service of the Thracian king Seuthes.  One may note that in VII.4.7 a boy 'just in the bloom of youth' is captured in arms, indicating a fairly extensive mobilisation of the available population, and Xenophon's men rarely encountered any Thracians not under arms, the latter being confined to the occasional group of geriatrics.  Economically, the Greeks never lacked for provisions (there were always plenty more well-stocked Thracian villages), but as Seuthes became more successful, largely on account of the Greeks, so more and more Odrysians joined him, which seems to have resulted in specie embarrassments, particularly when the Greeks' payday arrived.

"Thereupon Seuthes said: 'As for ready money, I have only a little, and that I give you, a talent; but I have six hundred cattle, and sheep to the number of four thousand, and nearly a hundred and twenty slaves. Take these, and likewise the hostages of the people who wronged you, and go your way.'" - ibid. VII.7.53

This signalled a parting of the ways, coinciding as it did with the Spartan offer to engage the survivors of the Ten Thousand.  What we see of Thrace through the eyes of Xenophon does appear to uphold the picture of a region with extensive food resources and more or less complete mobilisation of the male populatin for the campaign season.

[aligern]

Two Points from Caesar here.cAnd one from Weliington.
Firstly he gives a figure for  the total of the Helvetii and for their militaru potential which he takes to be a quarter of the total. This is from data found onbtablets in the camp of the defeated Helvetians. We shoukd not necessarily believe Caesar's figures, it is just as lijely that he needed the Helvetians to be. a substantial number to justify his move  from the province and the raising of legions.
Secondly tge Belgae assemble all their men to deal with the Roman threat, hang around for a bit and then have to go hone because their supplies have run out. This is very telling, trival areas might generate a very large number of men, but have no mechanism of comnand and control and no effective logistics. Caesar, by contrast has far fewer men, and worries constantly about the corn supply.
Lastly the adage attributed to Wellington. Spain is a country where large armies starve and small armies get get beaten. I rather think ancient countries are more lije Spain than areas such as Nirthern Italy ir the Liw countries in the middle ages. There is obviously the food around to feed the men that are called  up, but moving the food to the men after they have run out of that which they brought with them requires a lot of organisation. Having 200,000 warriors is meaningless if you cannot feed them and move them . It might work for defence, but would mean that, once assembled, the army must seek battle or it will suffer the fate of the Belgae.
Roy

[Andreas Johansson]

Lastly the adage attributed to Wellington. Spain is a country where large armies starve and small armies get get beaten.

I've seen essentially the same line (substituting Sweden for Spain) attributed to a 16C Danish commander. I wonder who first made the quip.

[Erpingham]

  I have never seen any other figure offered for usable military manpower as percentage of population - outside this forum, that is.

I don't want to get into this again but the military potential of a state is not just a simple percentage function of population.  It depends a lot on social organisation and also on things like economy, bureacracy and infrastructure.   I am genuinely surprised you have not, in your extensive reading, come across this concept beyond this forum.

[Patrick Waterson]

  I have never seen any other figure offered for usable military manpower as percentage of population - outside this forum, that is.

I don't want to get into this again but the military potential of a state is not just a simple percentage function of population.  It depends a lot on social organisation and also on things like economy, bureacracy and infrastructure.   I am genuinely surprised you have not, in your extensive reading, come across this concept beyond this forum.

It is surprising how little manpower economy, bureaucracy and infrastructure take up in a tribal society or indeed any society prior to the Roman Empire - provided one uses one's manpower for seasonal campaigning.  It is when you want longer campaigns that the need for someone to mind the shop/farm/fort begins to bite.  We see this under the Plantagenets, notably Edward I, who finds the 40-day service window to be too much of a restriction for offensive campaigns and begins instead moving towards a semi-permanent (and smaller) mercenary army effective enough to take on the opposition (bit of a simplification but it should give the idea).

Roy mentioned the Helvetii and their census listing 25% of the population as eligible military manpower.  One may argue they were a special case, as they were migrating and so left nobody behind to run anything, but they were able to field practically their entire adult manpower, for all the good it did them against Caesar and his legions.  The question now is how far this availability for service applies to, say, Gallic tribes.

Fortunately we have some figures for this.  Folowing Caesar's conquest, which eliminated no small number of Gallic warriors, Gaul mobilised 250,000 men to come to the aid of Vercingetorix's 80,000 trapped in Alesia.  Caesar reckoned the population of Gaul at three million.  Vercingetorix's mobilisation, which was a maximum effort, put 330,000 in the field, and this was after Caesar had been through the length and breadth of Gaul killing tens of thousands of warriors in every engagement.  So even assuming the Gauls were scraping the bottom of their manpower barrel, they were still fielding over 10% of their population, more so as Caesar had by then somewhat reduced that overall population.  The conclusion we can draw, again for a seasonal campaign, is that very few men needed to remain behind.  Another feature to note, as Roy has indicated, is that this large Gallic army could not stay in place for very long: it launched its attacks on Caesar's lines when it did because it was running out of supplies.

Once we get away from seasonal campaigns, the percentage fieldable will tend to drop dramatically, for the simple reason that most of one's manpower is needed to work the land and carry on necessary (and some optional) trades, activities which can be dropped for a few months when a camapign season rolls round.  So if the Roman Republic wants to besiege Veii year round, it has to maintain a rather reduced army over the winter, men whose own farms are going to be neglected and whose families may need support.  This is where the "social organisation and ... things like economy, bureacracy and infrastructure" start to matter, not during the campaign season when one is by and large operating locally with the bulk of one's manpower during a temporary suspension of normal societal activities.  That said, one does need social organisation to get the manpower on campaign in the first place, but the people doing the organising will be campaigning too.

The above generally holds true for tribal societies (and I class early mediaeval Europe as consisting essentially of tribal societies).  City-states seem to have been able to mobilise much of their manpower in a similar way; Thucydides notes that in 431-430 BC Athens fielded 29,000 hoplites and crews for 200 triremes, no small achievement for a single city.  (It did cheat slightly by having 16,000 of those hoplites on part-time soldiering as the city's garrison, but the economy, bureaucracy etc. were run by men who doubled as soldiery when the enemy invaded.)  Once the campaign season was over, everyone returned home (apart from a few thousand unfortunates besieging Potidaea) and ran their lives and economy as usual (except for land ravanged by the Spartans) until the next campaign season, when practically everyone again donned armour or took up the oar.

Does this clarify matters at all?

[Erpingham]

Does this clarify matters at all?

Yes, that you are actually aware that social organisation has an effect on military mobilisation

Whether all European tribal societies were the same through history is quite a big leap and one we should be cautious of.  I do think you are correct to separate migrating from settled populations though.

City state military potential is another interesting subject.  These tend to be of smaller area and more structured, which allows quite large proportions of the population to be mobilised.  I don't know how many such cities the Thracians had but the population seem to me quite rural and spread over a very large area, rather than heavily urbanised. 

And, finally, I can't resist noting that Edward I operated in a completely different society to the tribal or city state models.  For comparison, though, he doesn't seem to have mustered much more than 30,000 men at once, out of a population of around 3 million.

[aligern]

You make an important point Erpingham, I do wonder if much of the social structure of barbarian societies is just brushed aside by Roman and other commentators. We know that such as Goths and Lombards had noble houses, free men , half free and slaves. 20th cent writers tended to see these societies as mainly of free men who had a democratic duty to serve ,.  Latterly there gas been emphasis on the professional warriors and lordship with oath bound companions and clients. So it may well be that all the men of a tribe were not expected or trained and equipped to turn out. Those who did not come may have been part of some selective system that delivered one in five or six actual warfiors or farners who were just more use onnthe labd, paying taxes, even if in kind. Recruitment might be on the basis of the commitment of men by 'nobles' to a king and the nobles might have agreed for 50 or 100 or 1000 and not taken , more. Perhaps the idea of the free man with spear and shield is just a matter of display and is not lived up to or demanded except as a public statement that X is a free man, owns land,can swear an oath, can be a juror, pays a tax etc. He might nt fight except in extremis.
Wargamers do tend to have a model of tribal warfare as every man being liable and being called and having kit and being good at soldiering. However, providing effective military training tand kit to all would have been very expensive. The population of Gaul has beem guessed at as five millio, I think....my that is only fifteen Helvetii sized tribes. ( of course tha H numbers inclopude two small tribes) . That implies 1.25 million warriors at The divine one's 25% ratio. If everyone is expected to fight and equipped that is a hell of a lot of swords, shields and spears. Its more military kit than Rome provided at is peak!!! ( circa  620.000 thousand Late Roman soldiers)  .  If a sword lasts thirty years then , for the million nan free Gauls , 40,000  swords are needed a year . If it takes a Smith a week to make a sword and its fittings then for Gaul that's 40,000 weeks work so at 40 swords a year per smith that's 1000 sword smiths in Gaul...well that is around  20 smithies per tribe . All these calculations get to be like the Drake equation with a couple of variables drastically affecting the outcome. I suspect that equipping 25% of the population for war is a bit of an ask for an essentially rural society. There is also the weakness that the leadership wants trained, fit young men.

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Anyway, military manpower potential remains a constant at 10% (prime) or 20% (usual total, rising to 25% for Helvetii and perhaps other migrants) of population throughout much of history.  What one does with that manpower can vary from society to society, so it is usually easier just to take the basic figure and then make any necessary adjustments for particular societies (e.g. does a trading society like Carthage or mediaeval Venice field a smaller or larger percentage under arms, or about the same; does a society with a significant slave element field more, less or about the same of its population?), but until the mid-late 20th century a populaton could rely on having up to 20% of its population to commit to war - if it could find the weaponry for them.

Roy's reckoning of perhaps 1,000 sword smiths in Gaul is interesting in that it demonstrates how (assuming a 30-year lifespan for a sword, which may be on the low side) this small number of smiths can keep a million Gallic warriors or would-be warrors in swords.

If everyone is expected to fight and equipped that is a hell of a lot of swords, shields and spears. Its more military kit than Rome provided at is peak!!!

Not necessarily, as the Empire also provided armour and engines of war, the armour being the big consumer of time and materials.  One point to note about migrating populations, including those Rome faced in the late 4th/early 5th centuries AD, is that they have no real reason to leave anyone out of the battle, however poorly armed - and that on their migration they will be looing to make good any deficiency in armaments.

Bringing this back to Thracians, is there any reason to suppose the Thracians held back any significant fraction of militarily-capable manpower when they went to war?  They were essentially tribal and rural, although in Xenophon's testimony their rural settlements appear to have been well-provisioned .