Why would non-flanked formations rout?

[Justin Swanton]

There are plenty of cases of an infantry line fighting an opponent and finally (or suddenly) deciding to turn and flee. Question is, why would it do so? A typical battleline is probably at least 6 ranks deep and usually more. Only the front rank is actually putting its life on the line; the other ranks are there to supply support and prevent the front men precisely from running. The individuals who might feel things weren't going their way had to be the front rankers, and they were the ones who couldn't make a run for it. So what would motivate the rear ranks to bolt, allowing the front ranks to follow suit? There must have been some psychological signal that conveyed the message "We're not going to win." What was that signal? It wouldn't be a pile of corpses as battleline losses were very low until one side actually broke and was pursued.

This is different from a line that is flanked or rear-ended in which the back ranks, who can easily start running, realise it's all over for their unit and more importantly for them if they don't leg it.

I don't have a prefab answer ready to go BTW. I've been curious about this question for some time.

And to the floor.

[Imperial Dave]

one possibility is 'ripple effect' combined with lots of experience or very little experience of the troops turning to flee

if something bad happens on another side of the battlefield eg a breakthrough charge into a unit of infantry, there can be the transmission of a kind of shock wave that travels rapidly through the press of bodies especially if closely formed. Add to that shouts of dismay and the effect can be quite unnerving. If this happens and the unit is very experienced it could 'know' what was about to happen and choose to flee  before trouble finds them. OR if the unit is very inexperienced it could just perceive something bad had happened and just didnt want to hang around to find out what it was

[Duncan Head]

Any number of reasons, depending whether the break is sudden or comes after steadily losing - losing men and/or losing ground - for a while. But one obvious reason is losing a commander and/or a unit standard - the  tribune of the cataphracts at Argentorate is one example specifically picked up in a written source.

[Patrick Waterson]

Would it be worth looking for this phenomenon in particular battles and seeing if we can work out the likely contributory causes?

I can generalise about fear, fatigue and lack of enthusiasm/training/cohesion/esprit de corps, but looking at some historical examples might put things into better perspective.

[evilgong]

Also ask re-enactment people.

db

[Prufrock]

Phil Sabin's "Mechanics of Battle in the Second Punic War" suggests the following:

The sources highlight a wide range of factors which might trigger flight despite this paradoxical logic. Livy cites several instances where armies fighting desperately against odds finally panicked when they suffered the psychological shock of their general being killed. An even more powerful trigger for flight was the surprise caused by an unexpected enemy attack. At all three of Hannibal's great initial victories, a key role was played by concealed ambushers or pretended deserters taking the Roman forces by surprise. This could bypass the initial stand-off which I discussed earlier, and allow the attackers to charge straight in and begin butchering their unprepared opponents. Even where such complete surprise was not attained, the shock of an unexpected enemy attack could leave no time for troops to gird themselves for prolonged resistance.

This leads on to a further cause of flight in Punic War battles, namely loss of formation cohesion. Undisciplined bodies of men incapable of forming a proper battle order melted away at the first shock as at Victumulae and Herdonea, even if they had previously seemed eager to engage. More disciplined troops caught before they could form up properly, as at Lake Trasimene and Baecula, were at a similar disadvantage, though they might be able to resist for a while in small improvised groups. Even formed troops were liable to panic if their formation was disordered by retreating comrades or rampaging  elephants. Disrupting enemy cohesion was a key aim during the initial contest between formed bodies, and Scipio took care to recall his pursuing hastati and principes at Zama lest they run into Hannibal's veterans while in a disordered state.

Du Picq wrote that in ancient battles between troops of similar morale, 'the least fatigued always won'. Livy and Polybius do indeed repeatedly highlight exhaustion and physical suffering as contributing to an army's defeat, whether it be due to crossing a freezing river while the enemy sat around camp fires as at the Trebia, going without breakfast as at the Trebia and Ilipa, or forced marching and drunken carousing as at the Metaurus. What is interesting is that the battle accounts do not give much sense in practice of the theoretically greater endurance which Roman armies enjoyed due to their line relief system. Instead, it is the Roman forces which are often said to have suffered from greater fatigue, even at Zama where the tired hastati and principes had to face Hannibal's veterans who had hitherto been held in reserve.

The final factor which could break the resistance of troops is one which I have already highlighted at some length, namely attacks in flank and rear.

[Erpingham]

Part of the answer must be whether the battle appears to be going according to expectation (with the obvious aside that inexperienced troops don't know what to expect).  Appears because the actual understanding of what is happening at the rear of a formation is limited.  You can't see much (except maybe your standard above everyones heads) but you can hear stuff, because battles were noisy.  But what does all that shouting, screaming and clashing of arms mean?  Perhaps some wounded men are falling back through the formation - are there more than we expect?  What are they saying - are we winning or being slaughtered?  In this sort of information vacuum, sudden happenings of any sort can cause panic. 

Take for example this occurence at the Fight at Re (1164), where King Erling's army had a solid core of royal troops and a less enthusiastic local levy

Erling told his men to sing a Paternoster, and beg God to give them the victory who best deserved it. Then they all sang aloud "Kyrie Eleison", and struck with their weapons on their shields. But with this singing 300 men of Erling's people slipped away and fled.

We can also note the Battle of laupen in 1339 where the retreat of the Bernese skirmish screen through their main battle caused 2000 men from the rear ranks to flee, thinking that those at the front were running away.

[Justin Swanton]

Certainly the unpleasant and unexpected can unnerve troops and cause them to run: death of general, loss of standard, flank attack, sudden appearance of troops in the rear, even just a big bang. But I'm thinking of those cases where the unexpected doesn't happen, just two infantry lines slogging away at each other until one folds.

Would recoil be the deciding factor? One line is outfought by the other and gives ground. Eventually enough ground is given for the losing troops to realise they aren't going to win this fight and come to a conclusion about the better part of valour.

[aligern]

Soldiers run because:
1) What they expected to happen is not  happening. They may have expected to win and are now losing, they may have thought they were going to have a hard time and now it has suddenly got worse. I wonder if this explains why some flank attacks are devastating, some are not. The Romans do not break at Carrhae or the Crusaders at Arsuf because they expect to be surrounded and factored that in , including taking a lot of casualties from an enemy they cannot hit back at. I'd see the Romans at Gergovia going from over confidence to panic when the Gauls who were running were suddenly fighting back.

2) Loss of the leader. This is somewhat irrational as the army could be doing quite well at the time. It says something about the perceived bond between the soldier and his leader and may represent something very deep in the human psyche.  You can, of course lose a leader and nit notice like the Visigoths at Chalons, or fight on determinedly as the Ostrogoths did at Mons  Lactarius, so we should be careful of what effect we ascribe to the loss of a model general figure.

3) Exhaustion, both physical and mental.  The Germans of Ariovistus were supposedly so done in that they could only stand whilst their Roman opponents ripped away their shields and killed them. I firmly believe that Roman tactics were geared to exhausting and degrading opponents until the opponents lost their edge and becoming exhausted started to suffer disproportionate casualties.
Its not a question of the rear ranks just being spectators whilst the front ranks fight.  The ranks behind the first have roles in the fighting team, certainly the second rank can actually fight, ranks two to four nay give pushing support, will prevent rank one being pushed bak or over, may well supply cover and shields, in a foulkon are clearly part of missile defence.  We should not be led astray by the notion that rank one is fighting whilst the rear ranks watch. Casualties in the early phases of battle are few , but when a side tires its men become vulnerable and the tight teams at the front become disrupted.
Once the rear ranks see that the men in front of them are dying they have a choice to make, to step forward and take on a new role, or to fall back and try and get out of the danger zone. At this point junior leaders will attempt to rally the men and they may well succeed, more likely if it is a disviplined army.  If the troops rally and push firward, but the enemy dies not give then cause (1) will apply .

As others will recall I am very pro the idea that troops fight not as individuals within a a unit with only a relationship to the unit leader and then up the command chain, but in small teams. So a man at the front is getting support from those behind and at either side of him. All are doing their jobs. To an extent others in the team are capable of taking on a more prominent role if the main fighter becomes a casualty. Hoever, this disrupts the team and it will not be as effective as it was. Hence, if the front rank of a unit becomes exhausted before the enemy do, loses edge and gets incapacitated or killed then a reduced team faces an elated enemy team and the likelihood is that one side becomes dominant , drives the oppisition back and men start to disencumber themselves and run.

Roy

[Imperial Dave]

Recoil certainly would have an effect. Like I said earlier there is the possibility of a palpable physical shockwaves that rolls out when something disastrous happens at one end of the line. If you want to see somethng of this ilk in modern terms watch any number of police horse charges into protesters

[aligern]

I agree , Holly, but I suggest that what is important is whether the receivers of the shock are expecting it. If they are they will discount it , if not it might well tip morale to the point where the faint hearted start to leave.
Thus, if an infantry body is charged by cavalry or Justin's favoured chariotry, the infantry will , hopefully be braced and ready. They will expect a transmitted shock and will hope to hold. Only when it becomes obvious that there is a break-through will they have morale drastically lowered.
Of course, if you can arrange for your cavakry to be hidden by your infantry until the last moment then tgere will be a greater surpise effect.
Looking back to 319 and Patrick's elephant article the elephants were much more effective when they soldiers who were not used to them. and so were surprised. Troops who had been briefed, perhaps acquainted and given tactics were able to deal with the elephants even though they were causing casualties.
Roy

[Justin Swanton]

Soldiers run because:
1) What they expected to happen is not  happening. They may have expected to win and are now losing, they may have thought they were going to have a hard time and now it has suddenly got worse. I wonder if this explains why some flank attacks are devastating, some are not. The Romans do not break at Carrhae or the Crusaders at Arsuf because they expect to be surrounded and factored that in , including taking a lot of casualties from an enemy they cannot hit back at. I'd see the Romans at Gergovia going from over confidence to panic when the Gauls who were running were suddenly fighting back.

In the case where one side is not surrounded by another, or is not subjected to a unexpected and clearly noticeable event like a flank attack, what could individual soldiers detect above the general battle noise and mayhem that would tell them they were losing?

2) Loss of the leader. This is somewhat irrational as the army could be doing quite well at the time. It says something about the perceived bond between the soldier and his leader and may represent something very deep in the human psyche.  You can, of course lose a leader and nit notice like the Visigoths at Chalons, or fight on determinedly as the Ostrogoths did at Mons  Lactarius, so we should be careful of what effect we ascribe to the loss of a model general figure.

Sure. This would enter the category of unexpected events like getting flanked - something clearly noticeable by a large number of soldiers that could be taken as an indication they were losing. But in the absence of such indications?

3) Exhaustion, both physical and mental.  The Germans of Ariovistus were supposedly so done in that they could only stand whilst their Roman opponents ripped away their shields and killed them. I firmly believe that Roman tactics were geared to exhausting and degrading opponents until the opponents lost their edge and becoming exhausted started to suffer disproportionate casualties.

Its not a question of the rear ranks just being spectators whilst the front ranks fight.  The ranks behind the first have roles in the fighting team, certainly the second rank can actually fight, ranks two to four nay give pushing support, will prevent rank one being pushed bak or over, may well supply cover and shields, in a foulkon are clearly part of missile defence.  We should not be led astray by the notion that rank one is fighting whilst the rear ranks watch. Casualties in the early phases of battle are few , but when a side tires its men become vulnerable and the tight teams at the front become disrupted.

Once the rear ranks see that the men in front of them are dying they have a choice to make, to step forward and take on a new role, or to fall back and try and get out of the danger zone. At this point junior leaders will attempt to rally the men and they may well succeed, more likely if it is a disviplined army.  If the troops rally and push firward, but the enemy dies not give then cause (1) will apply.

As others will recall I am very pro the idea that troops fight not as individuals within a a unit with only a relationship to the unit leader and then up the command chain, but in small teams. So a man at the front is getting support from those behind and at either side of him. All are doing their jobs. To an extent others in the team are capable of taking on a more prominent role if the main fighter becomes a casualty. Hoever, this disrupts the team and it will not be as effective as it was. Hence, if the front rank of a unit becomes exhausted before the enemy do, loses edge and gets incapacitated or killed then a reduced team faces an elated enemy team and the likelihood is that one side becomes dominant , drives the oppisition back and men start to disencumber themselves and run.

Exhaustion can apply only to the front rank who actually use their weapons to spar and parry. The ranks behind them cannot become exhausted just from watching them and urging them on.

Re casualties, for a line 8 ranks deep you could expect half the front rank to be killed or seriously wounded before a rout, which means only part of the second rank is committed to the fight and none of the ranks behind them. Most of the men will not have to worry about actually fighting the enemy.

This does suggest something though: if the front rank overall is losing the fight - more of one's own side are getting killed than those of the enemy - could that trigger a loss of confidence? The second rankers are reluctant to take the place of those fallen in the first rank and give way, or try to give way. This backward pressure (for sure if you feel you're going to be killed by your opponent you back up against the men behind you whether they're supposed to keep you in place or not) is communicated to the rear ranks who fall back and eventually turn and run.

On the subject of backing up, I've notice that in every single form of combat that involves hand-held weapons one absolutely needs space to fall back in at some point in order to avoid the opponent's blows. Check these videos. It's a constant:

Fencing
Rapier fighting
Saber fighting
Mediaeval swordfighting
Polearm fighting
Polish spear fighting
Masai spear fighting
Quarterstaff fighting

Deprive a man of that space and he is at a critical disadvantage - his opponent can avoid his blows but he can't avoid his opponent's. This suggests that a file is meant to fall back if the file leader needs sparring room. Question is whether too much falling back would necessarily precipitate a rout and - barring unpleasant surprises like getting flanked - it is the only thing that would precipitate a rout?

[Erpingham]

I think there is general agreement that expectation has something to do with it.  Expectation can come from training or experience.  Elephants are less frightening if someone has said "This is what an elephant is like.  This is how they fight. This is how we kill them".  I think there is an example of Romans greeting scythed chariots with derision, because they are prepared for them.

On the matter of leader casualties, reactions seem to vary from panic to unease.  William at Hastings had to show himself to his army to prove that he wasn't dead, yet clearly the army hadn't panicked so much it was beyond his control.  Part of this must be about how things communicate on battlefields.  William is dealing with a rumour he is dead - most people won't have seen what happened but a report ripples outward somehow. 

[Imperial Dave]

Deprive a man of that space and he is at a critical disadvantage - his opponent can avoid his blows but he can't avoid his opponent's. This suggests that a file is meant to fall back if the file leader needs sparring room. Question is whether too much falling back would necessarily precipitate a rout and - barring unpleasant surprises like getting flanked - it is the only thing that would precipitate a rout?

true. Not enough space and file leaders being pushed back violently could start a ripple effect. Too much room and it could allow gaps to be generated and exploited.

[Duncan Head]

On the subject of backing up, I've notice that in every single form of combat that involves hand-held weapons one absolutely needs space to fall back in at some point in order to avoid the opponent's blows.

None of those examples involves a shield. Does having a wall of big shields to block your opponent's blows make a major difference? Is a spear-fighting hoplite expected to fall back?