Arab Conquest vs Early Byzantines

[Chris]

"Introduction":
An apology is in order. My last post to the "game last played" thread - read and remarked upon by one member of this august group (thank you!) - was overly wordy. A "random" sample of other posts reveals word counts of 493, 273, and 198, respectively. (Then again, the lovely picture included with the last post might count for 1,000 words.) Given that this planned post is already at 661 words (not counting this introductory paragraph) and I have yet to describe the action let alone comment on it, it seems that the prudent course of action is to post it here in "battle reports".

Opponents:
Early Byzantine and Arab Conquest, from the Triumph of Cavalry section of the ARMATI 2nd Edition rules.

Rules:
ARMATI 2nd Edition.

Modifications:
As per my usual practice (or practise), I borrowed and or adapted rule amendments and variations from a variety of sources. I referenced the long list of rule changes found at http://warflute.org/playtest_rules_en.php. I also used some of the scenario specific rules provided in "Chalons 451 AD - With Epic Armati", an excellent Battle Day report published in the July/August 2013 issue of Slingshot. In addition to the above, I also stumbled across an old post (from early May of 2008 actually) from 'rodger1uk' wherein he described a Huns vs Late Romans engagement that incorporated some extra rule tweaks. Acknowledging that there might be some redundancy, I thought I would consider, at least, the following ideas: a) missile fire into the flank or rear of heavy units is at +1to the attacking unit; b) light cavalry "back off" [which seems like a variation of the evade rule, though I cannot be completely certain], and c) assigning a -1 missile modifier to heavy units armed with bows, such as Byzantine Skutatoi. Measuring was done with copies of the provided 15 mm Intro Scheme ruler. Rather than increase the control points for each army by a factor of four, I limited each army to double the control points.This adjustment gave the Byzantines 10 heavy divisions and 8 light divisions. The Arabs had 8 divisions of each troop class.

Scale:
Epic Unit Sizes for 15 mm figures, but the footprints of the various units were reduced by 50%.
A unit of heavy infantry, such as Skutatoi, had a frontage of 4 cm and a depth of 2.25 cm. A unit of heavy cavalry had a depth of 4 cm and a depth of 3 cm. Light infantry, would be deployed on a double-frontage (just like Skirmishers) and so, have a frontage of 4 cm and a depth of 2 cm.

Points:
Each army was four-times the usual size. Each army had quadruple the number of units provided in their core formations. Each army was given 400 points for the purchase of bonus units. As the armies were four-times the usual size, each army could purchase and deploy four units of veteran troops.

Terrain:
To the extent that I was able, I decorated my table top so that it would look like the ancient field of Pharsalus (48 BC). I studied the diagrams found on page 171 of Warfare in the Classical World. Given that this was a choice for a Battle Day event, I believe the nature of the landscape should be fairly familiar.

Deployment:
Lacking an available opponent, I let the dice determine, for the most part, how each army would arrange itself.

The Arab army deployed with its left flank secured by the river and marshy ground. This wing included 11 units of light cavalry, all of the camel troopers, and 8 units of light infantry archers.
The Ghazis and Tribesmen formed in the centre, and were screened by an impressive line of skirmishers. The Persian cavalry were assigned the right flank. These horsemen were screened by additional units of light cavalry. All of the Arab nobles were drawn up as a reserve on this wing.

Some forty-five scale inches across the field, the Byzantine army drew itself up and prepared for battle. All of the Huns (6 units of light horse and 2 units of heavy horse) and a strong contingent of Kavallari (10 units) were posted on the left wing. The heavy infantry held the centre. An impressive 16 units of Skutatoi were arranged in one large formation and were screened by a variety of psiloi. Two small formations of heavy cavalry acted as a reserve for the centre. The right wing (near the river bank) was the responsibility of some light infantry, the Lombard heavy cavalry, and the Boukellari "regiments".

Summary by Sector:
First blood of the day was scored on the Byzantine left wing, when some Bedouin light horse got the better of a group of Hun light cavalry in an exchange of missiles. Overall, things would not go well for the Huns in this sector. Their light and heavy units were subjected to pointed attention by Arab cavalry and then the much heavier Persian horse. By the end of Turn 12, there were only 2 units of Huns left and both were evading Persian pursuers, who had managed to nab a forgotten sub-general. In other parts of this sector, Byzantine cavalry faced off against another group of Persians, some Ghazis, and very near the end of the engagement, just a portion of the Arab Nobles. There were more missiles flying back and forth than slashing and stabbing. Both sides suffered losses.

In the centre of this "Pharsalus" field, the opposing lines of skirmishers engaged in a protracted contest of archery. When the distance closed between the two long lines, slingers and javelin-armed light troops joined in. The advantage went to one side and then the other. As the following bodies of heavy infantry drew nearer, the Byzantine skirmishers were the first to withdraw. This action left their heavier brothers exposed, as the Byzantine army command and control was very strained, so the annoying enemy skirmishers could not be swatted away. After showering the Byzantine foot regiments with missiles, the Arab infantry (Tribesmen) launched an attack. A desperate slog resulted, with plenty of casualty and fatigue markers placed on units of both sides.
At the end of Turn 12, the Byzantines had managed to punch a couple of small holes in the Arab line (making up for the damage done by some Ghazis earlier), but again, without any real command and control, these gaps could not be exploited.

Over on the Arab left, the light cavalry and light infantry archers had a difficult time of it, at least initially. The Isaurian light infantry, attending Lombards, and Boukellari were making fairly good progress until they ran up against a wall of camel flesh and a smaller wall of Ghazis. Disordered by the smelly camels, the Lombards and light infantry were wounded and then routed. (Sidebar: In this sector, the Arab light infantry archers found themselves facing a probably charge by Byzantine  heavy horse. As the archers were not key units, the "gamey" thing to would have been to have them stand up to the horse and hopefully delay if not cost the enemy cavalry a fatigue marker. Instead, I decided to have the archers run away (evade), which resulted in some units of light cavalry (key units) being sacrificed. On further reflection, I should have made the LC evade as well, but this might have caused a huge problem for the Arab left - a scramble of evading troops, some don't run fast enough, the enemy is among them, disorder ensues, etc. Anyhow. Something to think about.) The Boukellari made a few valiant attempts against the fanatic Ghazis but were stymied. As the Byzantine right wing started to fall apart, an accelerating process, a line of camel troops was able to move forward and effect the capture of the Byzantine army general. At the risk of making a poor play on words, it might be remarked that he was spitting mad. (In the confusion of the larger action, he had been forgotten until the error was recognized and nothing could be done.) This embarrassment brought the Byzantines to their breaking point. It had been a costly win for the Arabs, as they had lost 22 key units out of a total allowance of 28.

Comments & Notes:
Does bigger necessarily mean better? I suppose it depends on context. For example, a bigger bank account, a bigger name recognition, and a bigger number of followers on Instagram or Youtube is better. A bigger laceration or a bigger investigation by a state agency? Definitely not better.

The preceding action was bigger compared to most, I would dare say. That does not mean it was better, of course. For its size, I think it was OK. I assign that middle-of-the-road rating as I think I may have made a mistake or two with respect to limiting command and control. Once each army had nothing left in its initiative rating "bank", there was not a lot that could be done with the larger divisions on the board.

While my table top looked a little like the historical field of Pharsalus (if one had a very good imagination and squinted their eyes), the terrain did not feature at all in the contest. On the one  hand, this seems sensible enough as both forces were rather "shooty" in their compositions. On the other hand, the lack of any role for terrain got me to thinking more about terrain in ancient warfare. (Possible article idea in here somewhere, especially when one looks at the selections for Battle Day.) 

As my terrain was more functional than appealing, so were my troops. To be certain, my finished table looked nothing like a typical production posted by Keith McNelly. That much admitted, the opposing lines and units were still identifiable. The placement of casualty, fatigue, and or disorder markers did not detract from the way in which units and formations were represented.

Generally speaking, I think the rule variants worked quite well in this fictional battle. The warband rule (throwing an extra d6 on first contact vs the enemy) helped the Ghazis a little. The penalties on missile fire over a certain distance or if disordered helped both sides. The fatigue rule for hits inflicted by skirmishers was useful and, in my opinion, rather realistic, especially in the fighting in the centre. I was not able to use the aforementioned light cavalry "back off" rule. For the purposes of the game just completed, the evade procedure worked well enough. To be sure, both the Huns and the Bedouins suffered in the engagement. I put this down to the dice, poor generalship on my part, and the inherent fragility of light cavalry in Armati.

As referenced above, the wargame took 12 turns. It was played over the course of a few days. Forgetting where their commanders were and to move them cost the Byzantines several key unit points. Setting this embarrassment aside, it seemed that the Byzantines were in trouble anyway, as their right flank was in tatters, and their left flank was being pushed around by the Persian heavy horse. In addition, the Arab Nobles had yet to really get involved in this sector. Had the "miniature" battle continued, I should think that the occupied Byzantine foot would have found themselves attacked from both flanks and possibly from the rear. Definitely not a good thing!

Overall, the wargame was fairly enjoyable. It was, as per usual, a distraction from other, more serious things.

[Patrick Waterson]

A good effort, Chris, and interesting game.

Hopefully this time you will get some comments from regular Armati players; my own observations are limited by a lack of knowledge of the system.

On each wing, the action saw the demise of the associated general; in the case of the Arabs, this was a mishap; in the case of the Byzantines it was the C-in-C and lost them the game.  Historically the Byzantine C-in-C tended to put himself in the centre or the reserve; in either location he might have been able to provide the command control so evidently lacking in the Byzantine centre.

The situation in the centre was interesting because it showed what happens - or should happen - if a line of skirmishers withdraws prematurely.  The obvious counter - rapid closure with the heavy infantry - lacked a commander to make it happen.  Maybe there was a reason the C-in-C went in the middle.

Anyway, Chris, keep up the good work.

By the way, we in the UK use 'practise' (verb) and 'practice' (noun), so it is, for example, good practice to practise one's shooting techniques.  Hope that helps.

[Erpingham]

By the way, we in the UK use 'practise' (verb) and 'practice' (noun), so it is, for example, good practice to practise one's shooting techniques.  Hope that helps.

Chris is American.  I don't think we can complain about him using American English

More interesting to me was the comment about terrain.  The actual effects of terrain on battles as opposed to the wargame effect is an area which might be considered with advantage.

I liked the idea of using an actual battlefield as a model because it represents real geography rather than terrain placement rules.  That said, we often can't be sure of exactly what any given battlefield was like. 

[RichT]

Though in this case, as Chris wrote "As per my usual practice (or practise)", 'practise' would be wrong in both American (-ice for noun and verb) and British (-ice noun, -ise verb) English. So keep practicing, Chris! I love pedantry.

More interesting to me was the comment about terrain.  The actual effects of terrain on battles as opposed to the wargame effect is an area which might be considered with advantage.

I liked the idea of using an actual battlefield as a model because it represents real geography rather than terrain placement rules.  That said, we often can't be sure of exactly what any given battlefield was like.

Yes I've been thinking about terrain recently, with reading the Battlefields book for review and looking at battlefields virtually. As you say even where we know pretty clearly where a battlefield was (eg Marathon), which is rare enough, we can't be sure how armies were oriented (eg Marathon) or precisely which bit of ground they were on.

But the thing that's been striking me is whether terrain (topography, usually meaning hills etc) is less important than ground cover, and in the case of ground cover unless it is clearly described by some source (rare), we have pretty much no idea what it might have been in antquity. Greek battlefields now, even the pancake flat plains, are covered in trees, vineyards, olive groves, farms, fences etc - stuff it must be very hard to manoeuvre a phalanx across. But the impression from literary accounts is always of smooth grassy swards devoid of features.

Pharsalus in fact is relatively bare though modern agricultural practice will be different from ancient. Rivers like the Enipeus are quite trivial obstacles compared to standing crops, say, or trees.

[Erpingham]

Greek battlefields now, even the pancake flat plains, are covered in trees, vineyards, olive groves, farms, fences etc - stuff it must be very hard to manoeuvre a phalanx across.

I am reminded of the words of Jean de Bueil

A formation on foot should never march forward, but should always hold steady and await it enemies on foot.  For, when they march, they cannot maintain their order.  It only takes a bush to break them up.


OK, phalanxes were probably better at this stuff than HYW MAA, but it is interesting how he considered the smallest items of terrain a potential hazard.

[Andreas Johansson]

Pharsalus in fact is relatively bare though modern agricultural practice will be different from ancient. Rivers like the Enipeus are quite trivial obstacles compared to standing crops, say, or trees.

As I've remarked elsewhere, I think we tend to overrate rivers as obstacles in wargames. Successful river crossings are common enough in period battles - sticking just to Alexander's campaigns, the Granicus, Issus, the Jaxartes, and the Hydaspes all feature them - but wargamers tend to treat having to attack across a river as a death sentence.

Stuff like villages and vinyards tend, or such is my impression, to loom larger in wargames battle reports than in period battle accounts. Evidence that armies "conspired" to avoid fighting around them? They do turn up more often in 18C battles accounts, for whatever reason.  But if we want our battles to resemble period accounts, we should probably have terrain rules that discourage such things in the middle of the field.

(The DBMM terrain rules generally do, forcing most terrain towards the edges, but for some reason the placement rules for BUAs allow them to be pretty reliably placed in the middle of the field, which players sometimes do because they think they'll benefit from a broken up field. Happened in yesterday's game, which was fought around a central village. The real problem may be that there's no command penalty for having your army split in two like this.)

[Erpingham]

From considering medieval battlefields, I'd say rivers and water courses often feature.  How they feature depends a lot on their nature.  Deep rivers usually concentrate the action around bridges and fords for example, whereas shallow rivers are a minimal obstacle if they have don't have steep banks.  A deep river is also often seen as blocking terrain too, forming a natural battlefield edge (just don't have them behind you).

As to the BUA question, I always believed it was the formative influence of playing Waterloo on wargames pioneers.  Everywhere was a potential Hougomont, capable of anchoring the line.  So we developed a wargamers mind set too modern for our period.  Again, as already pointed out, such things, where we know they were there, tend to be peripheral features in field battles.

[Chris]

Where to begin?

Perhaps with an observation about the difference between this post and the last (regarding one-third of Chalons). Interesting to see the ratio of readings and responses here versus the apparently "dead on arrival" modification to Chalons. Ah well.

Thanks to Patrick to starting the proverbial ball rolling. Can always count on this gent for critical and encouraging commentary. Points taken about the command and control issues. I recall reading something similar in Goldsworthy's text about the Roman Army. The Byzantine General was over on the right as this was where all the Boukellari were. His capable subordinate was in the centre. (Much easier to get this British English word correct, like colour, than another word which I will not attempt here )

Thanks to Rich T for taking me to task on my silly mistake  . In future, I think I shall type "As per my usual approach . . ." That should address most of the pedantic problems. 

Appreciate the comments and remarks about terrain. Again, like others, I have been thinking about this subject of late. Surveying the Battle Day selections (both past and future), it appears that the vast majority of the fields were flat and featureless, or, that terrain did not play a significant role. One question is, can this relationship be extended to more ancient/medieval fields? Up against this, is having a pretty table top on which to arrange the troops. A brief mental survey of rulebooks informs that some rules do not identify or acknowledge a certain type of terrain while other rulebooks will spend a paragraph or two on what qualifies as "rough ground".

Somewhat related to this particular topic, I have been reading up on Delium (424 BC). Hanson uses three different words to identify the terrain features on the borders of the field. His diagram does not include the hill or elevation, though his analysis does. Other attempts and explanations do include the hill in their map.

Would Delium ever make the Top 5 list for a future Battle Day. I doubt it. It would be an interesting selection, though.

Thanks again to all for reading and commenting.

Cheers,
Chris

[Patrick Waterson]

Would Delium ever make the Top 5 list for a future Battle Day. I doubt it. It would be an interesting selection, though.

It might, but not as a preferred choice, for one simple reason: the outcome depended heavily on the victorious Athenian right mistaking Pagondas' cavalry (a couple of squadrons trasferred from his right) for a supposed vanguard of an imagined fresh army, and deciding to break and run.  Had the Athenians realised the cavalry had simply been moved over from the Theban right, they would have carried on chewing up the Boeotian centre and - at least in my estimation - would have won the battle.

A circumstance like this is quite hard to model in most rules systems (at least those I know), and quite unfair to force upon a player who knows better.  The event might be achievable under WRG 6th, because if the Theban cavalry managed to get on or behind the Athenian right flank (not hard if the latter is wrapping up the Boeotian centre) and launched a charge, they might cause a very bad reaction result by the right-most Athenian unit, causing the next one to test, and if it also got a very bad result the cumulative penalty for routed units would make the rest of the line likely to break.  The probability is really low, but it could happen, and if it did it would be the result of the standard rules and not a deliberate fix.

Thanks to Rich T for taking me to task on my silly mistake

I think it was meant more as a kindly pointer, Chris; if you are going to take the trouble to use UK spelling on a UK forum, that is very much to your credit and please do not be ashamed about the occasional learning experience.  And do feel free to ask.  My private message box is always open.

[Erpingham]

I think it was meant more as a kindly pointer, Chris; if you are going to take the trouble to use UK spelling on a UK forum, that is very much to your credit and please do not be ashamed about the occasional learning experience.  And do feel free to ask.  My private message box is always open.

Chris,  don't feel anyone is having a go at you.  And, if it's any consoltation, Patrick PMs me with spelling corrections all the time

More important is discussing what you are doing with your battle experiments.  I'd much rather talk about how we handle terrain in wargames rules or even how we handle the misunderstandings that occur through restricted battlefield awareness in your proposed Delium refight.

[RichT]

If I was taking anyone to task it was Patrick and Anthony for incorrectly correcting Chris... Forums and electronic communication etc are notoriously hard places to express and interpret tone - I don't think anyone was ever being serious nor that anyone is actually upset or offended but if they are, apologies all round.

Delium and terrain (though this is a bit off topic for Arab v Byzantine but here we are). The current best guess for the location  of Delium is here. This is looking down the slope down which the Boeotians advanced - the cavalry hiding 'hill' is presumably over to the right. Note the ground cover - olive groves aplenty. If it wasn't covered in olive groves at that date, the natural ground cover is if anything even harder going such as this). So I wonder what the ground cover was - pasture would be easiest to walk over, but it's not really that sort of country.

[Erpingham]

I can't see how close order troops could have passed through olive groves without disruption.  Their ability to reform quickly would an important factor in how much such terrain caused disruption.  I think you could move through the crops shown - they don't seem to be in deep furrows.  But then would an ancient grain field be the same - medieval wheat stood over four feet high at harvest.   I don't think there are many references to crops impeding advances - does this mean battlefields were sought which weren't cultivated or that it didn't matter?  I must admit, if I deploy my cornfields on the table, it's to look pretty rather than have an effect.

[RichT]

Concerning crops, what springs to mind is Arr. Anab. 1.4.1-2:

"The crossing was made at night where there was a deep corn (wheat) field, and this concealed them the more, as they reached the bank. About dawn, Alexander led the troops through the field, ordering the infantry to smooth down the corn with their sarissas, held obliquely, and so lead the way to untilled ground."

They engaged the enemy (Getae) when they emerged from the tilled ground.

In battles near cities, tilled ground, crops etc must have been quite common. And olive trees. And vines. I'd have thought. Even if both sides wanted open ground (which they did), there must have been some impediments.

[Erpingham]

In battles near cities, tilled ground, crops etc must have been quite common. And olive trees. And vines. I'd have thought. Even if both sides wanted open ground (which they did), there must have been some impediments.

I don't disagree at all.  My consideration of medieval battles tells me the signs of human activity - crops, hedges, ditches, gardens, sometimes buildings - are all around many battlefields.  Sometimes these played a direct part in the battle, others it seems peripheral or only mentioned in passing. 

[Chris]

Gentlemen,
Neither offended nor defensive (understanding that tone is difficult to detect and interpret through this method of communication), simply embarrassed by the error of mistaking one letter for another, a noun for a verb and the other way round . . .

Not surprised that the original post has been left behind for the more interesting tangential discussion about terrain. Many thanks to Rich T for providing the Google Earth links. It is hard to picture what the ground might have looked like some 2,500 years ago, but one can imagine, postulate, or argue.

Have been studying the accounts of Thucydides and Diodorus. The Greek version is much more wargamer-friendly. Professor Hanson's long chapter about Delium in RIPPLES OF BATTLES is also interesting. Some points of his interpretation give rise to questions. For one example, the command and control of Pagondas. If the ground was kind of dusty/dry, and if the struggle of thousands of hoplites produced clouds of dust and such, then how could he have seen what was happening 1,000 yards or so from his position?

Patrick's point about the Battle Day issue is well taken. In addition to the cavalry problem (reminds me a bit of Telamon), there is the incident of Athenians attacking each other in the confusion of battle. Do not think any Athenian player-general would be happy about his miniatures or elements charging into friends and laying about with long spears and swords.

Have a pleasant weekend everyone.

Cheers,
Chris