The Macedonian double whammy

[RichT]

Unless I'm not following you and you are proposing that Alexander deployed with the Companions to the right of the phalanx? But that would still mean rejecting Diodorus.

Arrian, Callisthenes, Curtius, Diodorus and Plutarch all have Alexander leading cavalry on the Macedonian right, so it's as certain as anything can be in ancient history that this is what he did. This is how every modern account of Issus that I have ever read understands it too.

Arrian, Callisthenes and Curtius all have the Macedonian infantry phalanx in the centre and the cavalry on the wings. So does Diodorus, the rest of whose account broadly matches the others ("[Alexander] himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops. The Thessalian horse was on the left"). Just this one sentence ("He set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it") suggests the cavalry were in front and the infantry behind. So it's as certain as anything can be in ancient history that this sentence is an error.

Having conflicting accounts in sources is not unusual, and it's not unusual having to prefer some over others, or several over one.

[Justin Swanton]

Unless I'm not following you and you are proposing that Alexander deployed with the Companions to the right of the phalanx? But that would still mean rejecting Diodorus.

Arrian, Callisthenes, Curtius, Diodorus and Plutarch all have Alexander leading cavalry on the Macedonian right, so it's as certain as anything can be in ancient history that this is what he did. This is how every modern account of Issus that I have ever read understands it too.

It's as certain as anything that Alexander was on the right, but where exactly he was on the right is what is up for discussion. Nowhere do the sources explicitly state that all the cavalry was stationed alongside and to the left and right of the infantry.

Arrian, Callisthenes and Curtius all have the Macedonian infantry phalanx in the centre and the cavalry on the wings.

Arrian has the cavalry in front of the infantry on the left wing: "On the left wing the infantry consisting of the Cretan archers and the Thracians under command of Sitalces were posted in front; and before these the cavalry towards the left."

On the right wing Arrian affirms Alexander has only two squadrons of the Companions to the right of the infantry: "When he perceived that the phalanx towards the right was too thin, and it seemed likely that the Persians would outflank him here considerably, he ordered two squadrons of the Companion cavalry, viz. the Anthemusian, of which Peroedas, son of Menestheus, was captain, and that which was called Leugaean, under the command of Pantordanus, son of Cleander, to proceed from the centre to the right without being seen."

Notice that the squadrons came from the centre, i.e. they would have been in front of the phalanx as Diodorus describes (they would serve absolutely no purpose behind the phalanx). To shift to the right without being seen they would have withdrawn through the phalanx (which would have doubled files to let them through) and then gone right.

So does Diodorus, the rest of whose account broadly matches the others ("[Alexander] himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops. The Thessalian horse was on the left"). Just this one sentence ("He set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it") suggests the cavalry were in front and the infantry behind. So it's as certain as anything can be in ancient history that this sentence is an error.

Having conflicting accounts in sources is not unusual, and it's not unusual having to prefer some over others, or several over one.

Much better IMHO to try and reconcile the sources rather than snip out sections that don't fit a theory. Placing the cavalry in front of the infantry as Diodorus describes also fits with Arrian's description of the Macedonian phalanx's right wing at Gaugamela: "Alexander wheeled round towards the gap, and forming a wedge as it were of the Companion cavalry and of the part of the phalanx which was posted here, he led them with a quick charge and loud battle-cry straight towards Darius himself."

A cavalry-infantry wedge makes sense as the cavalry forming a wedge in front of the infantry that act as the base of the wedge. Cavalry next to infantry simply do not add up to a wedge.

[RichT]

Much better IMHO to try and reconcile the sources rather than snip out sections that don't fit a theory.

Coming from you that's rich. But whatever, believe what you like.

[Erpingham]

From a non-specialist point of view, moving from centre to right without being seen suggests the formations are out of sight throughout and move behind the phalanx.  Carrying out an unmentioned complex manouever to withdraw through the phalanx in full sight of the enemy doesn't fit "without being seen" very well. 

[Justin Swanton]

From a non-specialist point of view, moving from centre to right without being seen suggests the formations are out of sight throughout and move behind the phalanx.  Carrying out an unmentioned complex manouever to withdraw through the phalanx in full sight of the enemy doesn't fit "without being seen" very well.

Presuming that Diodorus is in fact correct, Alex places all his cavalry in front of his infantry. Telling Peroedas and Pantordanus to move their ilae without being seen seems a bit odd if they were already behind the phalanx since they wouldn't be seen in any case. Cavalry passing through infantry is a pretty standard procedure for drilled troops. One question: why would Alex put cavalry in front of the the infantry in the centre as well as the flanks? The answer may be to disguise his point of attack. He intends to leave the mercenaries alone and go for the kardakes, but concentrating his cav in front of them would telegraph his intentions and give the Persians time to come up with a counter plan. Spreading the cavalry across the front and then concentrating them on the right at the last minute (cavalry wedges have no problem rapidly redeploying) adds the element of surprise and gives the Persians no time to react.

[Erpingham]

Not wanting to labour the point but it is very hard to withdraw through a phalanx without being seen.  I can only presume that the manouever is, as you say, a common one for Macedonian cavalry, as I don't know the evidence.

Also, as I understand Richard, Diodorus is alone among our sources in placing the cavalry in front of the phalanx and the redeployment of the Companions comes from the account of Arrian, who doesn't say this, so perhaps he is envisioning the battlefield differently.  Does Diodorus mention the cavalry redeployment and, if so, to his envisage it as overt or covert?

[Justin Swanton]

Not wanting to labour the point but it is very hard to withdraw through a phalanx without being seen.  I can only presume that the manouever is, as you say, a common one for Macedonian cavalry, as I don't know the evidence.

Sure, withdrawing through a phalanx is quite visible, but the Persians would have no idea where the ilae would go after they were behind the phalanx. Doubling files from interemediate to open order (which would leave enough space between the files for the horses to pass through) is in the manuals and it should have been a standard manoeuvre for Macedonian phalangites. Republican Roman legionaries, who were not professionals like the Macedonians, routinely let Roman cav through their ranks.

Also, as I understand Richard, Diodorus is alone among our sources in placing the cavalry in front of the phalanx and the redeployment of the Companions comes from the account of Arrian, who doesn't say this, so perhaps he is envisioning the battlefield differently.  Does Diodorus mention the cavalry redeployment and, if so, to his envisage it as overt or covert?

Diodorus doesn't mention the redeployment of the ilae to the right, but it fits well with him affirming that Alexander deployed "the cavalry along the front of the whole army" whilst Arrian affirms two ilae from the centre made their way with stealth to the right flank. The overall picture hangs together with different sources supplying different details. No need to heave anything overboard.

Edit: Alex pulled the same trick at Gaugamela of confusing the Persians about his point of attack by shifting the entire army to the right.

[Prufrock]

Justin, can I ask what you mean exactly by a 'Macedonian double whammy'?

I don't want to put words into your mouth, but if you mean horse coordinating with foot to break through an enemy line, I think that would accord with the sources and our understanding of how the Macedonians fought under Alexander. If you mean an attack of two successive waves in which a first wave of cavalry punch through a line like - shall we say -  an arrow through cheese, followed directly by a formation of phalangites which then engages and shatters the infantry now disordered by the cavalry penetration, I think you are on rather shakier ground.

[Justin Swanton]

Justin, can I ask what you mean exactly by a 'Macedonian double whammy'?

I don't want to put words into your mouth, but if you mean horse coordinating with foot to break through an enemy line, I think that would accord with the sources and our understanding of how the Macedonians fought under Alexander. If you mean an attack of two successive waves in which a first wave of cavalry punch through a line like - shall we say -  an arrow through cheese, followed directly by a formation of phalangites which then engages and shatters the infantry now disordered by the cavalry penetration, I think you are on rather shakier ground.

I mean the latter: cavalry charge through enemy infantry who are then finished off by the friendly infantry. It wasn't all that unusual a tactic:

"P. Sulpicius with his cavalry broke the enemy's centre. He could have got back to the main body before the enemy reformed their broken ranks, but he decided to attack from the rear, and would have scattered the enemy in a moment, attacked as they were in front and rear, had not the cavalry of the Volscians and Aequi, adopting his own tactics, intercepted him and kept him for some time engaged." - Livy, History: 3.70.4

"The cavalry made repeated charges but failed to break through the massed force opposed to them, and acting on the advice of L. Cominius, a military tribune, they removed the bits from their horses and spurred them on so furiously that nothing could withstand them. Riding down men and armour they spread carnage far and wide. [7] The infantry followed them and completed the disorder of the enemy." - Ibid: 8.30.6-7

[Mark G]

Back to the notoriously unreliable Livy for your basic premise.

Castles built on sand

[Prufrock]

Thanks, Justin. Are you able to give some more insight into the evidence you base this view on, and why you see it as compelling?

[Justin Swanton]

Thanks, Justin. Are you able to give some more insight into the evidence you base this view on, and why you see it as compelling?

It's more a case of proposing a best-fit hypothesis that accounts for everything the sources say about the way Alex's army fought than putting forward compelling evidence. I propose that the double whammy can account for the way Alex fought at Chaeronea, Issus and Gaugamela without having to discard anything in the sources, and it's made more plausible by the fact that the Republican Romans did something similar. Are there any other cases in history of cavalry riding straight through enemy infantry with friendly infantry immediately following up to finish the enemy foot off?

[Mark G]

Are there undisputed cases of cavalry riding straight through enemy infantry?

[Prufrock]

Thanks, Justin. Are you able to give some more insight into the evidence you base this view on, and why you see it as compelling?

It's more a case of proposing a best-fit hypothesis that accounts for everything the sources say about the way Alex's army fought than putting forward compelling evidence. I propose that the double whammy can account for the way Alex fought at Chaeronea, Issus and Gaugamela without having to discard anything in the sources, and it's made more plausible by the fact that the Republican Romans did something similar. Are there any other cases in history of cavalry riding straight through enemy infantry with friendly infantry immediately following up to finish the enemy foot off?

Hmm, well, I think you probably *would* need to present some good evidence and carefully reasoned argument to get any buy-in for it as a theory. It does not seem to be an obvious best-fit hypothesis to me at first glance, but I might be missing something?

[Justin Swanton]

Thanks, Justin. Are you able to give some more insight into the evidence you base this view on, and why you see it as compelling?

It's more a case of proposing a best-fit hypothesis that accounts for everything the sources say about the way Alex's army fought than putting forward compelling evidence. I propose that the double whammy can account for the way Alex fought at Chaeronea, Issus and Gaugamela without having to discard anything in the sources, and it's made more plausible by the fact that the Republican Romans did something similar. Are there any other cases in history of cavalry riding straight through enemy infantry with friendly infantry immediately following up to finish the enemy foot off?

Hmm, well, I think you probably *would* need to present some good evidence and carefully reasoned argument to get any buy-in for it as a theory. It does not seem to be an obvious best-fit hypothesis to me at first glance, but I might be missing something?

Well, Diodorus says Alex deployed his cavalry across the front of his infantry. Arrian says only two ilae deployed to the right of the phalanx. Quintus Curtius Rufus affirms that two ilia deployed near the mountains whilst the rest of the cavalry concentrated "at the main danger point of the battle". Plutarch is not specific about the deployment of the cavalry.

Diodorus says Alex attacked towards Darius with the cavalry, engaging the Persian cavalry and routing them before pursuing Darius. He affirms the battle between the phalanx and the Persian infantry was a separate fight, cut short by the rout of the cavalry.

Arrian says Alex led the phalanx forward with a measured step, but without specifying that Alex was himself part of the phalanx. However he says the phalanx was involved in Alex's attack: "the Macedonian phalanx had been broken and disjoined towards the right wing; because Alexander had charged into the river with eagerness, and engaging in a hand-to-hand conflict was already driving back the Persians posted there" He adds that the right wing regiments outflanked the Greek mercenaries after "perceiving that the Persians opposed to them had already been put to rout" - which implies that it wasn't they that routed them. Whilst they are outflanking the Greeks Alexander pursues Darius. The implication is that he had cleared the way for the right wing contingents of the phalanx but operated separately from them.

Putting it all together, the conclusion is that the right wing Macedonian attack is a combined cavalry-infantry affair with cavalry in front of infantry. There aren't any other detailed accounts of Issus in the sources so this is all we have to go on. I suppose the commonly accepted standard for historical certitude is several unrelated sources all explicitly affirming exactly the same thing in clear terms. Problem is that there are few historical events that have that kind of testimony. The entire first Persian invasion of Greece is described by only one author, Herodotus. Caesar's campaigns in Gaul are described only by Caesar. And so on. Which, if we follow that criteria, leaves us knowing very little for sure about history.