Ilipa 206 BC

[Duncan Head]

Battle: Ilipa, 206 BC

Roman Republic (Publius Cornelius Scipio the younger) vs Carthage (Hasdrubal Gisgo)

Background
During the Second Punic War, Rome countered Hannibal's invasion of Italy by attacking his base in Spain. After taking New Carthage in 209, the young Roman general Scipio set out to clear the Carthaginians from Spain. He defeated Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula in 208. In 207-06 the Carthaginian generals Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago Barca were recruiting troops in the west of Spain when Scipio marched against them.

Numbers reported
Rome 45,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry
Carthage 50-70,000 infantry, 4-5,000 cavalry, 32-36 elephants

Sources
1. Polybios, Histories
2. Livy, From the Founding of the City
3. Appian, Spanish Wars
4. Frontinus, Stratagems
5. Polyainos, Stratagems

Source 1:
Polybios XI.20-24

(20.1) Hasdrubal, collecting his forces from the towns in which they had passed the winter, advanced and encamped not far from the town called Ilipa, entrenching himself just under the hills with a level space in front favourably situated for giving battle. (2) He had about seventy thousand infantry, four thousand horse, and thirty-two elephants. (3) Scipio sent off Marcus Junius to Colichas to take over the forces that the latter had got ready for him, which consisted of three thousand foot and five hundred horse. (4) The rest of the allies he took with himself and advanced marching to encounter the enemy. (5) When he drew near Castalon and the neighbourhood of Baecula and there joined Marcus and the troops sent by Colichas, he found the situation a very embarrassing one. (6) For without the allies the Roman troops at his disposal were not sufficient for him to risk a battle, while it seemed to him dangerous, and far too risky, to rely on the support of the allies in what promised to be a decisive engagement. (7) However, though he hesitated, he found himself forced by circumstances and was reduced to employing the Spaniards, using them for the purpose of impressing the enemy by an imposing show but leaving the actual fighting to his own legions. (8 ) With this purpose he left with his whole army, consisting of about forty-five thousand foot and three thousand horse. (9) When he got near the Carthaginians and was in full sight of them he encamped on certain low hills opposite to the enemy.

(21.1) Mago, thinking it a favourable occasion to attack the Romans as they were forming their camp, took most of his own cavalry and Massanissa with his Numidians and charged the camp, being convinced that he would find Scipio off his guard. (2) Scipio, however, had long foreseen what would happen, and had stationed his cavalry, who were equal in number to those of the Carthaginians, under a hill. (3) Surprised by this unexpected attack many of the Carthaginians as they wheeled sharply round at the unexpected sight, lost their seats, but the rest met the enemy and fought bravely. (4) Thrown, however, into difficulties by the dexterity with which the Roman horsemen dismounted, and losing many of their numbers, the Carthaginians gave way after a short resistance. (5) At first they retired in good order, but when the Romans pressed them hard, the squadrons broke up and they took refuge under their own camp. (6) After this the Romans displayed greater eagerness to engage and the Carthaginians less. (7) However, for several days following they drew up their forces on the level ground between them, and after trying their strength by skirmishing with their cavalry and light infantry, finally resolved on a decisive action.

(22.1) On this occasion we see Scipio employing two different stratagems. (2) Observing that Hasdrubal always brought his troops out of camp at a late hour and drew them up with the Libyans in the centre and the elephants in front of the two wings, and having himself been in the habit of delaying until a later hour (3) and of opposing the Romans to the Libyans in the centre and stationing the Spaniards on his wings, he acted on the day on which he had decided to deliver the decisive battle in a precisely opposite manner, and thus much contributed to the victory of his own army and the discomfiture of the enemy. (4) For as soon as it was light he sent a message by his aides-de‑camp to all the tribunes and soldiers to take their morning meal and arm themselves and march out of the camp. (5) When this was done, all showing great zeal in carrying out the order, as they suspected what was in the wind, he sent on the cavalry and light infantry with orders to get close up to the enemy's camp and shoot at him boldly, (6) while he himself with his infantry advanced just as the sun was rising, and when he reached the middle of the plain, formed in order of battle, disposing his troops in an order contrary to that which he had previously used, as he placed the Spaniards in the centre and the Romans on the wings. (7) The Carthaginians, upon the enemy's cavalry coming suddenly up to their camp and the rest of his army forming up in full view, scarcely had time to arm themselves. (8 ) So that Hasdrubal, with his men still fasting, was obliged on the spur of the moment and without any preparation to send off his own cavalry and light infantry to engage those of the enemy on the plain and to draw up his heavy infantry on the level ground at no great distance from the foot of the hill, as was his usual practice. (9) For a certain time the Romans remained inactive, but when, as the day advanced, there was no decisive advantage on either side in the engagement of the light-armed troops, those who were hard pressed always retreating to the shelter of their respective phalanxes and then issuing forth again to resume the combat, (10) Scipio receiving the skirmishers through the intervals between his cohorts distributed them on his wings behind his infantry, placing the velites (tous grosphomakhous – Polybios' standard equivalent of the Latin velites) in front with the horse behind them. At first he made a direct frontal advance, (11) but when at a distance of four stades from the enemy he ordered the Spaniards to continue advancing in the same order but the infantry and cavalry on the right wing to wheel to the right and those of the left wing to wheel to the left.

(23.1) Then taking, himself from the right wing and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius from the left, the leading three troops of horse and placing in front of them the usual number of velites and three maniples (this body of infantry the Romans call a cohort), (2) he advanced straight on the enemy at a rapid pace, wheeling in the one case to the left and in the other to the right, the rear ranks always following the direction of the front ones. (3) When they were not far away from the enemy, while the Spaniards, who continued their direct advance, were still at some distance, as they were marching slowly, he fell, as he had originally intended, directly on both wings of the enemy with the Roman forces. (4) The subsequent movements, which enabled the rear ranks to get into the same line as the leading ones and place themselves in a position to attack the enemy, were in contrary directions both as regards the right and left wings and as regards the infantry and cavalry. (5) For the cavalry and light infantry on the right wing wheeling to the right attempted to outflank the enemy, while the heavy infantry wheeled to the left. (6) On the left wing the maniples wheeled to the right and the cavalry and velites to the left. (7) The consequence of this was that the right of the cavalry and light-armed troops on both wings had become their left. (8 ) But the general, regarding this as of small importance, devoted his intention to the really important object — outflanking the enemy — and he estimated rightly, (9) for a general should, of course, know the actual course of events, but employ those movements which are suited to an emergency.

(24.1) In consequence of this attack the elephants, assailed by the missiles of the cavalry and velites and harassed on every side, were suffering much, and doing as much damage to their own side as to the enemy. (2) For in their wild rush they destroyed all, friend or foe, who came in their way. As for the infantry the wings of the Carthaginians were broken, and the centre, where stood the Libyans, the flower of the army, was of no service, (3) as they could neither leave their original position to help those on the wings, for fear of attack by the Spaniards, nor, remaining where they were, could they operate effectively, as the enemy in front of them would not come to blows. (4) The wings, however, kept up a gallant struggle for some time, as each side was aware that all depended on the result of this battle. (5) But when the heat of the day was at its height, the Carthaginians grew faint, as they had not left their camp on their own initiative and had been prevented from preparing themselves properly, (6) while the Romans began to exhibit superior strength and spirit, chiefly because, owing to the foresight of their commander, their choicest troops encountered here the least efficient of the enemy. (7) At first Hasdrubal's men, yielding to the pressure, retired step by step, but later they gave way in a body and retreated to the foot of the hill, and when the Romans pushed their attack home with more violence they fled in rout to their camp. (8 ) Had not some deity interposed to save them they would have been at once driven out of their entrenchments, (9) but now arose an unprecedented disturbance in the heavens, and such heavy and continuous torrents of rain fell, that the Romans with difficulty made their way back to their own camp.

Source 2:
Livy XXVIII.12-15
(Loeb University Press 1949 translation)

[12.9] In Spain the campaign was having an issue in part the same, in part very different: the same in that the Carthaginians, vanquished in battle with the loss of a general, had been forced to the farthest coast of Spain, even to the Ocean; [10] on the other hand different in that Spain, owing to the nature of the [11] country and its people, was better adapted not merely than Italy but than any other part of the world to preparing for another war. [12] In consequence, though the first of the provinces, at least of those on the mainland, to be entered by the Romans, it has been the last of all to be completely conquered, and not until our own times under the command and auspices of Augustus Caesar. [13] There Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, being the greatest and most distinguished general after the Barca family in that war, had at that time returned from Gades in the hope of renewing the war. After conducting levies in Farther Spain with the help of Mago the son of Hamilcar, he armed about fifty thousand infantry and four thousand five hundred cavalry. [14] As to the cavalry forces there is substantial agreement among the authorities, but some writers state that seventy thousand foot-soldiers were brought to the city of Silpia. [15] There in open plains the two Carthaginian generals established themselves, resolved not to refuse a battle.

[13.1] Scipio, when the news reached him that they had got together so large an army, thought that with Roman legions alone he would be no match for such a multitude unless barbarian auxiliaries should confront them, at least for appearance' sake. [2] Yet he felt that these must not compose so large a part of his forces that by changing sides —which had been the cause of disaster to his father and uncle —they might decide the outcome. [3] Accordingly he sent Silanus in advance to Culchas, who ruled over twenty-eight towns, in order to receive from him the cavalry and infantry which he had promised to enlist during the winter. [4] Then Scipio himself set out from Tarraco, and gathering up as he went a moderate number of auxiliaries from the allies dwelling near the road, he arrived at Castulo. [5] Thither Silanus brought auxiliaries, three thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. From there Scipio advanced to the city of Baecula with the entire army, forty-five thousand legionaries and allies, infantry and cavalry. [6] As they were pitching camp Mago and Masinissa with all their cavalry attacked them and would have thrown the men working on the fortifications into confusion, had not cavalry concealed by Scipio behind a hill favourably situated for the purpose unexpectedly charged them in their disorder. [7] These horsemen at the very beginning of the battle put to flight the most active and those who had been the first to ride up close to the earthwork and even among the men at work. With the rest, who had advanced under their standards and in marching order, the battle was more protracted and for a long time indecisive. [8] But when light cohorts at first drawn off from the outposts, and then soldiers withdrawn from work on the fortifications and ordered to take up arms, came up in increasing number, and fresh to assist the weary, while by this time a long column of men under arms was dashing out from camp into battle, Carthaginians and Numidians thereupon faced about in unmistakable retreat. [9] And at first they were retiring by troops, while their ranks were not at all broken on account of fear or haste. Then when the Roman fell more fiercely upon their rear and the attack could not be withstood, no longer mindful of their ranks, they scattered in flight hither and thither, each taking the shortest way. [10] And although the spirit of the Romans was notably higher in consequence of that battle and that of the enemy notably lowered, still for some days following there was never any respite from sudden attacks by cavalry and light-armed.

[14.1] When his forces had been sufficiently tested by these skirmishes, Hasdrubal was the first to lead his troops out into battle-line; then the Romans also went forward. [2] But each of the two lines stood drawn up in front of its earthwork, and when neither side had begun the battle and the day was now nearing sunset, the troops were led back into camp, first by the Carthaginian and then by the Roman. The same thing happened for a number of days. [3] Always the first to lead his troops out of camp, the first to sound the recall for his men weary of standing still, would be the Carthaginian. From neither side was there a charge, or a missile hurled, or any raising of a shout. [4] The centre was held on one side by the Romans, on the other by the Carthaginians combined with Africans, the wings by their allies, and for both armies these were Spanish troops. [5] In front of the wings, in advance of the Punic line of battle, the elephants presented from a distance the appearance of forts. [6] Already it was common talk in both camps that they were to fight in the formation in which they had stood; that the centres, the Roman and Carthaginian troops, between whom lay the cause of the war, would clash, evenly matched in spirit and in arms. [7] When Scipio observed that this was a persistent belief, he deliberately changed everything for the day on which he was to give battle. At evening he passed a written order through the camp that before daybreak the horses should be cared for and the men have breakfast, that the horsemen [8] under arms should keep their mounts bridled and saddled.

[9] It was not yet quite daylight when he sent all his cavalry with the light-armed against the Punic outposts. [10] Immediately afterwards he himself with the heavy column of the legions went forward, and contrary to the fixed idea of his own men and of the enemy, he formed strong wings of his Roman soldiers, while the allies were taken into the centre. [11] When Hasdrubal, who was aroused by the shouts of the horsemen, sprang out of his tent and saw the uproar outside his earthwork and the excitement among his men, and in the distance the gleaming [12] standards of the legions and the plain filled with the enemy, he forthwith sent out all his cavalry against the horsemen. As for himself, he marched out of the camp with the infantry column, and in drawing up his line made no change from the customary order. [13] The cavalry engagement had long been uncertain, and by itself it could not be decisive because when repulsed —and this repeatedly happened almost by turns —they could safely retire into the infantry line. [14] But when the lines of battle were not more than half a mile apart, Scipio sounding the recall and opening his ranks admitted all the cavalry and the light-armed into the centre; and dividing them into two sections he posted them as a reserve behind the wings. [15] Then, when it was now time to begin the battle, he ordered the Spaniards —they formed the centre of the line-to advance at a slow pace. [16] From the right wing —for he was himself in command there —he sent a message to Silanus and Marcius that they should prolong their wing towards the left, just as they [17] had seen him pressing to the right, and with the light infantry and cavalry should engage the enemy before the centres could come together. [18] Thus extending the wings, with three cohorts [15.1] of infantry and three troops of cavalry on each wing, and with skirmishers in addition, they led at a rapid pace against the enemy, while the rest followed them obliquely. [2] In the centre was a curve where the Spanish units were more slowly advancing.

[3] By this time the wings were already engaged, while the main strength of the enemy's line, the veteran Carthaginians and Africans, had not yet come within range, and did not dare to dash towards the wings to help the combatants, for fear of exposing the centre to the enemy directly advancing. [4] The wings were being hard pressed by a double attack; cavalry and light-armed and skirmishers with enclosing wings were charging into their flanks, while the cohorts were pressing them in front, endeavouring to cut off the wings from the rest of the battle-line. And not only was the battle in general far from being evenly matched, but especially because the horde of Baliares and Spanish recruits had been made to face Roman and Latin soldiers. [5] Besides, as the day now wore on their strength also began to fail Hasdrubal's soldiers, who had been surprised by an early morning onslaught and compelled to go out into line in haste before they could take food to sustain them. [6] And Scipio had deliberately dragged out the day, in order that the battle might be belated. For it was not until the seventh hour that the infantry units charged the wings. [7] The battle reached the centre of the lines considerably later, so that the heat of the midday sun and the strain of standing under arms, and at the same time hunger and thirst, weakened their bodies before they engaged the enemy. Accordingly they stood resting on their shields [scutis]. By this time, in addition to everything else, the elephants also took fright at the skirmishing tactics of cavalry and skirmishers and light-armed and had shifted from the wings into the centre. [8] Weakened therefore in body [9] and spirit the men retreated, keeping their ranks nevertheless, just as if by order of the general the line was giving way intact.

[10] But when the victors, on seeing that the tide of battle had turned, for that reason charged with more spirit from all sides, and it was not easy to withstand their attack, although Hasdrubal tried to hold his men back and confronted them as they gave way, shouting to them again and again that in the rear there were hills and a safe refuge if they retired slowly. [11] Nevertheless, as fear overcame their respect for him and those nearest to the enemy were falling, at once they faced about and all took to flight. And at first the standard-bearers began to halt at the foot of the hills and to call the soldiers back into their ranks, while the Romans hesitated to advance their line up the hill. Then when the enemy saw the standards coming bravely on, they resumed their flight and were driven panic-stricken into camp. [12] Not far from the earthwork were the Romans; and by such momentum they would have captured the camp if, after a blazing sun, such as shines out in the midst of clouds heavy with rain, there had not been so extraordinary a downpour that the victors with difficulty retired to their camp, and had not some been beset by scruples also against any further attempt that day. [13] The Carthaginians, although night and pouring rain invited them to needed rest, being weak from exertion and wounds, nevertheless, because fear and danger gave them no time to be idle when the enemy would attack the camp at daybreak, [14] raised their earthwork by gathering stones from near-by valleys all round, intending to defend themselves by a fortification, since in their arms they would have no sufficient protection. But the desertion of their allies made flight seem safer than delay. [15] Defection began with Attenes, prince of the Turdetani, who deserted with a large force of his tribesmen. Then two fortified towns were handed over with their garrisons to the Roman by their commanders. [16] And for fear the mischief might spread farther, now that men were once disposed to change sides, Hasdrubal moved his camp in the silence of the following night.

Source 3:
Appian, Spanish Wars, V.25-28
(For section numbering of Appian, see https://www.livius.org/sources/content/appian/appian-the-spanish-wars/)

[25] Now this Hasdrubal ordered all the remaining Carthaginian forces in Spain to be collected at the city of Carmo to fight Scipio with their united strength. Hither came a great number of Spaniards under the lead of Mago, and of Numidians under Massinissa. Hasdrubal had the infantry in a fortified camp, Masinissa and Mago, who commanded the cavalry, bivouacking in front of it. Scipio divided his own horse so that [his friend] Laelius should attack Mago while he himself should be opposed to Masinissa.

This fight was for some time doubtful and severe to Scipio, since the Numidians discharged their darts at his men, then suddenly retreated, and then wheeled and returned to the charge. But when Scipio ordered his men to hurl their javelins and then pursue without intermission, the Numidians, having no chance to turn around, retreated to their camp. Here Scipio desisted from the pursuit and encamped in a strong position, which he had chosen, about two kilometres from the enemy. The total strength of the enemy was 70,000 foot, 5,000 horse, and thirty-six elephants. That of Scipio was not one third of the number. For some time, therefore, he hesitated and did not venture a fight, except some light skirmishes.

[26] When his supplies began to fail and hunger attacked his army, Scipio considered that it would be base to retreat. Accordingly he sacrificed, and bringing the soldiers to an audience immediately after the sacrifice, and putting on again the look and aspect of one inspired, he said that the deity had appeared to him in the customary way and told him to attack the enemy, and had assured him that it was better to trust in heaven than in the size of his army because his former victories were gained by divine favour rather than by numerical strength.

In order to inspire confidence in his words he commanded the priests to bring the entrails into the assembly. While he was speaking he saw some birds flying overhead with great swiftness and clamor. Looking up he pointed them out and exclaimed this was a sign of victory which the gods had sent him. He followed their movement, gazing at them and crying out like one possessed. The whole army, as it saw him turning hither and thither, imitated his actions, and all were fired with the idea of certain victory. When he had everything as he wished he did not hesitate, nor permit their ardour to cool, but still as one inspired exclaimed: "These signs tell us that we must fight at once."

When they had taken their food he ordered them to arm themselves, and led them against the enemy, who were not expecting them, giving the command of the horse to Silanus and of the foot to Laelius and Marcius.

[27] Hasdrubal, Mago, and Massinissa, when Scipio was coming upon them unawares, being only two kilometres distant, and their soldiers not having taken their food, drew up their forces in haste, amid confusion and tumult. Battle being joined with both cavalry and infantry, the Roman horse prevailed over the enemy by the same tactics as before, by giving no respite to the Numidians (who were accustomed to retreat and advance by turns), thus making their darts of no effect by reason of their nearness. The infantry were severely pressed by the great numbers of the Africans and were worsted by them all day long, nor could Scipio stem the tide of battle, although he was everywhere cheering them on. Finally, giving his horse in charge of a boy, and snatching a shield from a soldier, he dashed alone into the space between the two armies, shouting: "Romans, rescue your Scipio in his peril."

Then those who were near seeing, and those who were distant hearing, what danger he was in, and all being in like manner moved by a sense of shame and fear for their general's safety, charged furiously upon the enemy, uttering loud cries. The Africans were unable to resist this charge. They gave way, as their strength was failing for lack of food, of which they had had none all day. Then, for a short space of time, there was a terrific slaughter. Such was the result to Scipio of the battle of Carmo, although it had been for a long time doubtful. The Roman loss was 800; that of the enemy 15,000.

[28] After this engagement the enemy retreated with all speed, and Scipio followed dealing blows and doing damage whenever he could overtake them. After they had occupied a stronghold, where there was plenty of food and water, and where nothing could be done but lay siege to them, Scipio was called away on other business. He left Silanus to carry on the siege while he went into other parts of Spain and subdued them. The Africans who were besieged by Silanus deserted their position and retreated again until they came to the straits and passed on to Gades.

Source 4:
Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.1
When Publius Scipio was in Spain and had learned that Hasdrubal, leader of the Carthaginians, had marched out and drawn up his troops in battle array early in the morning before they had had breakfast, he kept back his own men till one o'clock, having ordered them to rest and eat. When the enemy, exhausted with hunger, thirst, and waiting under arms, had begun to return to camp, Scipio suddenly led forth his troops, opened battle, and won the day.

Source 5:
Polyainos, Stratagems 8.16.1
Scipio, when in Spain, having received information that the enemy had advanced to action before they had eaten, drew up his army against them, and delayed them with various manoeuvres; then at about the seventh hour, when the enemy were tired, and were faint for want of refreshment, he vigorously attacked, and easily defeated them.


Commentary
The two main sources are obviously Polybios and Livy. Appian adds little except for the story about the omens and an unconvincingly low estimate of the size of the Roman army. The strategists add less, except perhaps for showing how the battle was remembered for Scipio's stratagems- but not for the precision flanking moves which have attracted modern attention.

Location
Kevin O'Connell's amateur but valuable article on the site of Ilipa is available online at https://www.academia.edu/24671515/THE_BATTLE_SITE_OF_ILIPA_BACK_TO_BASICS

Scullard's 1936 "Note on the Battle of Ilipa" is at https://www.jstor.org/stable/296701 for those with JSTOR access.

Terrain
Regardless of the exact location, we can see from the sources that the Roman camp was on some low hills; and there were other hills behind the Carthaginian lines, to which they retreated at the end of the battle. The main arena of the battle, however, appears to have been a featureless plain – "Hasdrubal ... entrenching himself just under the hills with a level space in front favourably situated for giving battle".

Numbers
Livy says that there were 50,000 infantry in the Carthaginian army, but that some writers described as many as 70,000; those other writers include both Polybios and Appian. It is usually wise to be cautious about higher numbers, especially from a Roman point of view exaggerating the numbers of the enemy; but in this case Polybios is both the earlier and normally the more careful historian, so perhaps 70,000 is credible.

We are not told how many of these infantry were African and how many Spanish. Livy includes "veteran Carthaginians and Africans" in the centre; this is a little problematic because Carthaginian citizen infantry were not normally sent outside Africa at this period. Conceivably they were citizens from "New" Carthage, but Scipio had captured that city three years earlier, and although the garrison reported at its capture was quite small, there is no indication that a force of citizen troops was absent. Perhaps the word is used more loosely for citizens of Gades and other Punic cities in Spain?

Cavalry strengths (Polybios 4,000, Livy 4,500, Appian 5,000) are all different, but not hugely. Polybios' 32 elephants and Appian's 36 are also close. 

Scipio's original army in Spain appears to have been built around two Roman legions. Before the capture of New Carthage in 209, his force numbered 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry (Polybios X.9.6), which would fit with two legions, perhaps of the expanded 6,000-man size, plus the usual matching or larger force of Italian allies. Somehow this expanded to Polybios' total of 45,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry three years later. We hear of Colichas' contribution of 3,000 Spanish infantry and 500 cavalry before llipa, which neatly matches the cavalry total; but while there may have been more Spanish infantry than Colichas' 3,000, to expect 20,000 of them seems excessive and not in accordance with Scipio's caution about having too many unreliable allies. This suggests that there may have been substantial numbers of Roman reinforcements.

Livy reports a Roman total of 45,000, including citizen infantry, auxiliaries and cavalry - cum omni exercitu ciuium, sociorum, peditum equitumque quinque et quadraginta milibus – which sounds like a misreading of Polybios's figure.

[Erpingham]

A lot there to consider in terms of how ancient battles worked.  Plenty of phases, plenty of manoeuver.  Role of cavalry, role of light troops. Certainly, in this fight, the velites do not conform to the Swantonian model of sticking with their initial formations but seem to be brigaded together, first in front, then at the flanks. I also note "receiving the skirmishers through the intervals between his cohorts ", which I suspect is more equivocal in the original from Justin's previous arguments.

Anyway, I hope there will be a parallel discussion on how to do a refight of the battle too.