Command and Control

[Duncan Head]

Sabinus' legion in V.24.4 consists of 'a legion ... 'and five cohorts' [et cohortes V] - five cohorts from where?  Caesar does not say. 

All of this suggests low-profile Gallic auxiliaries to me.

One thing to bear in mind, though, is that "Gallic auxiliary cohorts" may not necessarily be wild tribesmen: Caesar also recruits cohorts in the existing Province of Transalpine Gaul, from Gallic tribes who've been Roman provincials for two generations or so. Some of these cohorts, it seems, became the "vernacular legion" V Alaudae - but probably only after a few years in service. When Caesar confronted his first emergency, the migration of the Helvetii in 58, he "ordered as many troops as possible to be raised in the Province" (BG I.7). In 52, during the great Gallic rising, the rebels threatened the old Transalpine Province of Gaul, and we hear of a "garrison" (praesidia) of 22 cohorts raised from the Province itself by Lucius Caesar (BG VII.65).

So how Gallic, and how Roman, were such militia cohorts when first raised?

[dwkay57]

Interesting discussion on Caesar's Gallic auxiliaries (or non auxiliaries), but a little off thread perhaps.

Coming back to the original discussion, have we learnt anything that we are now applying to our wargames?

Personally:
- I've restructured some of my armies (Greek) so that the army commander has more troops under his direct control.
- Commanders now can't send messages or instructions when their division is engaged in melee.

[Patrick Waterson]

That would make sense, David.

Do you find any anomalies arising because of the hex grid?  One feature of hex-grid wargames is that the 'grain' - the orientation of the hexes to the flow of play - can make a big difference to the game.  Earlier games tended to have play 'down the rows' to permit straight-line advances, but this ran into the problem that one could find three hexes of opponents concentrating on one hex of friendly troops.  Later games usually opted to have play 'through the corners', which permits armies to function in straight lines and encourages single-hex vs single-hex combat except on open flanks, but meant that armies had to advance zig-zag fashion.

The latter can actually be turned to advantage with Greek armies, as requiring them to shift right (or right more often than left) during an advance can replicate Thucydides' famous right-hand drift if this is relevant at the scale being used.

[Erpingham]

- Commanders now can't send messages or instructions when their division is engaged in melee.

I think this last is a question of abstraction/simplification.  We had examples of messages being sent to Alexander by divisions in combat above.  However, I'd suggest (mainly from my reading of medieval command and control) that it depends on a number of things e.g.
1. Situational awareness - how well is the divisional commander aware of what's going on (both in his own part of the battle and the rest of it?)  This is in part going to reflect on the skills of the commander, part on his physical situation.
2. Personal involvement - how personally engaged is the commander.  If he's fighting in the front rank, sword in hand, he may have little time to be thinking about messages, but if he's sitting on his horse at the back it might be easier

For simplicity, I think I would do the same as you.  However, if you wanted added complexity, dicing to send and receive messages based on factors like the above may be the way to go.

[dwkay57]

To answer to Patrick's question about anomalies arising from the use of hexes, I think it is "not that I've spotted". This could be partly because my opposing sides have tended to be roughly even in terms of divisions (one division occupies one hex) if not in manpower or fighting power. It has only been on the flanks where I can recall any evidence of ganging up.

It may also be that my armies are largely based on close order infantry which tends to place a focus on maintaining a cohesive battle line so gaps haven't really opened up.

I use the faces for direction which seems to work well and have built in a couple of rules to prevent units in a hex from lapping round in melee if that exposes their rear to enemy in an adjacent hex (following the discussion of offset units and gaps in lines in Slingshot a while back) and also to limit the opportunities for a flank or rear charge unless the attackers are really behind their opposition front and not just offset to it.

Not too sure if this makes sense but can explain further if needed.

[Patrick Waterson]

Seems fine to me - the basic question was whether a change of 'grain' would benefit the system, but there is no need to fix what is not broken. 

[aligern]

I agree with you David. Flank and Rear attacks are all too easy because we know that there is nothing behind the enemy line or over the next rise. It must actually have been very difficult to get a unit to turn and present its own flank  or even rear to a potential enemy who might have a reserve or a camp guard that could intervene.
Roy

[dwkay57]

I've noted that my army commanders have a tendency to die off in battle. This may be just my rules or that their bodyguards are the only high quality troops in their army they tend to be used offensively (probably at the wrong time). The loss of their army commander tends to reduce the morale of the troops under his command, but recent comments to my posted battle reports suggest there may be cases where this might be the reverse.

At present commanders' characteristics affect their reaction to circumstances and have an influencing effect on their troops morale. Is there any case for introducing another characteristic - potentially called "inspirational" - that would influence troops enthusiasm in battle (i.e. actually make them fight better or worse)? If so how would you classify the gradings in that characteristic and what would their effect be? And how would the loss of the commander affect troops?

At present I have a "loyalty" characteristic for commanders but this reflects the degree of support for the next person up the chain of command (e.g. the commander of my Persian Immortals is very loyal towards Xerxes) but their isn't anything similar to represent a link between troops and their commander except for a general morale classification.

[Erpingham]

I've noted that my army commanders have a tendency to die off in battle.

We are recreating a period where commanders were expected to get "hands-on" in combat and where the number becoming casualties (killed, wounded,captured) was high.  It is, though, a question of looking at at what stage of a fight are casualties happening.  Most leader casualties probably come from when the fight has turned against.  If you are losing a high proportion leading successful combats, you may need to tweak a bit.

On the subject of what morale effect the loss of a leader should have, there is much more to be said.  At some points in a battle, it may be catastrophic, at others much less noticeable.  We can see in the Medieval period a distinct tactic to aim an attack at the enemy standard, which will signify the enemy commander's position.  Is this a heroic mode of warfare,  a tactic aimed at breaking enemy morale or a tactic aimed at removing leadership so that the enemy army doesn't operate effectively?   The loss of a commander within the context of the battle as a whole is worth more detailed consideration, to clarify how to model the effect.

[aligern]

In general the loss of the commander is a huge blow. I suspect that it is because only he can give ordersand there is no pre agreed devolution of command unless you are rRepublican Romans with two consuls on the field. In most mediaeval battles, when led by the king, a chain of command could be taken as indicating who would be king if the king fell, or perhaps who would be regent. That's not such a problem if the king and his heir are on the field and the succession is already regulated, but at Hastings, for example, the loss of William would have left no clear leader and I doubt that he was interested in creating a succession crisis by elevating someone, even Odo.

Roy

[Erpingham]

at Hastings, for example, the loss of William would have left no clear leader and I doubt that he was interested in creating a succession crisis by elevating someone, even Odo.

Roy

Hastings is a good example of how the loss of leaders effects morale.  The rumour of the death of William causes panic, and he has to show himself to restore calm.  As you point out, leadership succession may have been an issue, as may the fact that William was the cause - without him, what were they doing there?  And maybe, as William had made much of the divine sanction of his campaign, a fear that God had changed sides?  However, Harold apparently becomes a casualty (is seriously wounded) without having a huge effect - the English fail slowly, not in a surge of panic.  What seems to happen is that they lose all their leaders and suffer really heavy casualties so at the end of the day, they have no will to combat left.  Yet they don't rout (or not all of them) - hasty Norman pursuit comes across some troops at least still prepared to turn and fight a rearguard action. 

[aligern]

I wonder if Harold's banner does not fall??  Running from a mounted opponent might be a very bad idea, even if you were on a hill so the guys around Harold may have kept his standard flying til the end. Of course if he was wounded in an ocular fashion first command and control might have gone , but technically he was still there??
Roy

[Erpingham]

I wonder if Harold's banner does not fall?? 
Roy

Possible.  If he is shot, we can assume his comitatus/familia/hearthmen close round him.  With the standard still flying, they keep the truth from the army?  But the general point is how do we model this stuff - a panic caused by a rumour on one side, no immediate effect when commander is disabled on the other.  Do we represent this by a random chance, or is there something more about the state of the armies morale when the incident happens that we need to account for?

[Justin Taylor]

I think that there is a comparison between Napoleonic wars command and ancients.

Similar technology and notice how the abilities of the man on the spot matter, because of the difficultly of communication with people not so far away.

Then you have the ability of the troops; Persian levies vs Roman legionaries. So training makes a difference, to either a Spartan or a Macedonian.

[Patrick Waterson]

In general the loss of the commander is a huge blow. I suspect that it is because only he can give orders and there is no pre-agreed devolution of command unless you are Republican Romans with two consuls on the field. In most mediaeval battles, when led by the king, a chain of command could be taken as indicating who would be king if the king fell, or perhaps who would be regent. That's not such a problem if the king and his heir are on the field and the succession is already regulated, but at Hastings, for example, the loss of William would have left no clear leader and I doubt that he was interested in creating a succession crisis by elevating someone, even Odo.

Roy

This seems to vary with culture: at Chalons, the loss of the Visigothic king seems to have mattered not one jot, and his heir did not even know he was the new king until the day ended.  Similarly, in Greek hoplite battles generals fell even when leading victorious armies (Epaminondas at Second Mantinea) and their men carried on to victory.

In fact, I find it hard to point to any hoplite engagement where the death or incapacitation of the C-in-C actually affected the outcome of the action.

Conversely, at Heraclea and Hastings, one side only has to think something has happened to their C-in-C and their morale plummets.  There do seem to be important cultural factors at work here, most notably the king being on the battlefield.  I would suggest that the loss of a royal general (other than a Spartan; they kept a 'spare' king at home just in case) or prestigious barbarian chieftain would have a deleterious morale effect but the loss of an appointed 'regular' C-in-C would not.

Note that in civil war actions, e.g. Marius v. Sulla or Caesar vs Pompey, where the head of a faction is C-in-C his death could have a significant impact - although funnily enough it never happened between Republican Romans.  Even Cassius at Philippi survived the battle, albeit not his own post-mortem analysis of it.

Perversely, the Romans had a way of turning the equation around - devotio.  If things were not going well, an eligible consul would dedicate himself and the opposing side to the infernal gods and rush among the enemy ranks to be slain.  The gods would then give the Romans the victory, or at least strike the enemy with a morale disadvantage equivalent to losing their own C-in-C.  (The question that naturally arises is if devotio was really so effective, and consuls consistently virtuously self-sacrificing, why did the Romans ever get beaten?)