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This might have been discussed elsewhere, but I can't find a post dedicated to it, so here goes.

Recoil is virtually the lynchpin mechanism of DBx and it features prominently in other gaming systems. It is assumed that any troop type that feels it is getting the worst of a fight will fall back, to be followed up or not by its opponent. But is this true? My impression is that historical recoil was a very variable thing: on some occasions one line fell back an impressive distance, on other occasions the two sides slogged away without moving at all until one side broke.

So, what troop types did recoil, when was it voluntary or involuntary, and how far did they recoil? To narrow things down, I'm specifically interested in Republican Roman, Carthaginian, Gallic, Hoplite Greek, Macedonian, Persian and Successor armies, but of course this thread can look at any army.

At Agincourt, the English men-at-arms were pushed back "a spears length" initially by the French men-at-arms.  After that, the melee became static, with the build up of bodies on the front line (which wouldn't have happened if the lines had moved about a lot).  The English were noted to be in quite a shallow formation (perhaps 4 deep), which may (or may not) have some significance.

Well first of all, you need to decide whether you think men engage in continuous melee contact or not.

And you may consider cannae a good example of 'recoil'

The main initial Gallic line at Bibracte was pushed back an impressive distance, at least until the Boii arrived on the Roman right to stabilise things somewhat.

The clash of phalanxes at Sellasia:

Quote from: Polybius II.69Then a fierce struggle arose: the Macedonians sometimes slowly giving ground and yielding to the superior courage of the soldiers of Sparta, and at another time the Lacedaemonians being forced to give way before the overpowering weight of the Macedonian phalanx.

Thinking on Mark's point, there is a difference between forced back in contact and giving ground by breaking (or attempting to break) away from your opponent.  I'm not sure that non-continuous combat automatically leads to ceding ground - there could be separation and re-contact over the same ground - but this could be one of the mechanisms involved.

We then need to consider what the rule writers intend when they include recoil as a result.  Is it a physical push-back or does it cover the act of retreating (temporarily or permanently)?

Livy on Zama:

QuoteWhen the infantry lines closed, the Carthaginians were exposed on both flanks, owing to the flight of the cavalry, and were losing both confidence and strength. Other circumstances, too, seemingly trivial in themselves but of considerable importance in battle, gave the Romans an advantage. Their cheers formed one united shout and were therefore fuller and more intimidating; those of the enemy, uttered in many languages, were only dissonant cries. The Romans kept their foothold as they fought and pressed the enemy by the sheer weight of their arms and bodies; on the other side there was much more agility and nimbleness of foot than actual fighting strength. As a consequence, the Romans made the enemy give ground in their very first charge, then pushing them back with their shields and elbows and moving forward on to the ground from which they had dislodged them, they made a considerable advance as though meeting with no resistance. When those in the rear became aware of the forward movement they too pressed on those in front thereby considerably increasing the weight of the thrust. This retirement on the part of the enemy's auxiliaries was not checked by the Africans and Carthaginians who formed the second line.

Clearly a recoil, possibly in game terms several successive recoils, in circumstances where one might normally expect "non-continuous" combat - that is, Roman hastati against Gauls and Ligurians. However in this case the initial Roman advantage may have been such that they had no need for the usual piecemeal charges and pauses, but "their very first charge" was enough.

So, plenty of justification for one side pushing the other back - othismos style.
But that's not necessarily recoil, where a clear break in contact is evidenced.

Hence my point about non continuous melee, which presupposes breakoffs and standoffs over a broadly static line, and into which it becomes much easier to include a push back and recoil situation.

For the continuous melee luddites, there is a mechanism gap - how does a recoil happen without a follow up if melee is continuous and the recoil is not a predicate to a break?
Hence my point on first principles.

Quote from: Mark G on June 30, 2014, 01:44:54 PM
So, plenty of justification for one side pushing the other back - othismos style.
But that's not necessarily recoil, where a clear break in contact is evidenced.

Which is relatively rarely.

QuoteHence my point about non continuous melee, which presupposes breakoffs and standoffs over a broadly static line,

Does it? It presupposes successive charges and breakoffs, but it does not seem necessary to me that the two sides line up post-breakoff in the same places as before.

Quoteand into which it becomes much easier to include a push back and recoil situation.
For the continuous melee luddites, there is a mechanism gap - how does a recoil happen without a follow up if melee is continuous and the recoil is not a predicate to a break?
Hence my point on first principles.

Some rules already allow for recoils to which a follow-up is either optional or in various circumstances forbidden. It's hardly a major mechanism problem.

IMHO, recoil is one of those mechanisms that can be anything the rules' author cares it to be.  It can simply indicate that one side has an advantage in the subsequent melee round or, as others have suggested, a prelude to break off or rout.  A couple of random observations...

I remember under one version of DBA having my chariots recoil from Steve Neate's Blades, which because of the former's great base depth, put them outside the latter's charge distance.   8)

The 'Agincourt spear length' is indistinguishable from being stationary under most rules.  Also, one might question whether the French had the advantage over the English at this stage of the battle.  Incidentally, my demented software suggests 'Encouraging' as the correct spelling of this epic battle.   ::)

Recoiling is sort of an attritional disadvantage in DBx since it breaks up a line, allowing overlap advantages in the next round of combat, and if there are enough recoils the player at the receiving end may not have enough pips to repair his line in time.

Blade vs doubled pike for example: if 2 pike force recoils on either side of a blade they will supply double overlap modifiers in the next round of combat, changing 6 vs 5 to 6 vs 3, with a real chance of doubling against and killing the blade, something virtually impossible (well, a 1:36 chance) when the two lines are straight.

Of course since the pikes have to follow up, that inflicts overlaps on them, worst-case scenario 4 vs 5 with a smaller chance of being doubled.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on June 30, 2014, 04:58:32 PM
Recoiling is sort of an attritional disadvantage in DBx since it breaks up a line, allowing overlap advantages in the next round of combat, and if there are enough recoils the player at the receiving end may not have enough pips to repair his line in time.

But is this the effect the author designed for -and the recoiling is only an abstract to make it happen - or is the recoil a reflection of the authors' view of ancient combat - it was full individual bits to-ing and fro-ing which came disorderly over time and local advantages were the key factor?  If the former, it doesn't matter if it happened like that on an ancient battlefield, it is just to achieve a higher level result.  Not to say we shouldn't discuss the topic and how to model it in wargames, just a tad unfair to criticise DBx on detail if they are abstracted for effect.

Quote from: Erpingham on June 30, 2014, 06:03:33 PM
Not to say we shouldn't discuss the topic and how to model it in wargames, just a tad unfair to criticise DBx on detail if they are abstracted for effect.

No criticism meant at all.  :) DBx's recoil can be seen as an ingenious way to avoid bookkeeping since it creates incremental disadvantages for the recoiler without the player having to mark step losses on the units or a piece of paper. As a gaming mechanism it works fine, question is, to what extent does it represent reality? (accepting of course that no wargame is expected to represent reality 100% or even 90%)

I think non-continuous combat really deserves its own thread and discussion as it appears to be muddying the waters here.

Thucydides VI.70

Quote
The armies now came to close quarters, and for a long while fought without either giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps of thunder with lightning and heavy rain, which did not fail to add to the fears of the party fighting for the first time, and very little acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries these phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much more alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. [2] At last the Argives drove in [osamenon = thrust back, push back] the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians routed the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus cut in two [parerregnunto = broken] and betook itself to flight. [3] The Athenians did not pursue far, being held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan horse, who attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom they saw pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the victors followed so far as was safe in a body, and then went back and set up a trophy. [4] Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the Helorine road, where they reformed as well as they could under the circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures there. The rest returned to the town.

This action, shortly after the Athenians landed at Syracuse in 415 BC, appears to show an absence of recoil ("for a long while [the armies] fought without either giving ground").  Once a contingent was forced back, rout soon followed; it looks as if being forced back was an effect rather than a cause of being overcome.

It would be interesting to narrow down, if possible, a set of general conditions/circumstances that cause a line to recoil.

Though we have a limited sample, significant physical recoil seems to be rare.  The really decisive movements seem to be related to withdrawal or attempting to rally and reform further back.  Dependent on the morale state of the participants, this could lead to rout.  Do we have further detail of the circumstances e.g. of a successful re-establishment of a line further back or is being forced back in melee usually a prelude to retirement or rout?

Quote from: Erpingham on July 02, 2014, 10:01:42 AM
Though we have a limited sample, significant physical recoil seems to be rare.

I'm not sure that's true - we seem to me to have come up with plenty of examples of recoils, and fewer cases where there is no recoil.

Unless that's because we're using different definitions. I've only just noticed that Mark said:

QuoteSo, plenty of justification for one side pushing the other back - othismos style.
But that's not necessarily recoil, where a clear break in contact is evidenced.

Why does "recoil" need "a clear break in contact"? As the word is used in those rules mechanisms I am familiar with, a recoil just means one side going back a short distance, unbroken and still facing the enemy; the other side may follow up and continue contact, or may not. What Mark suggests with "a clear break in contact" is a little more like the DBMM concept of "repulse" (though in DBMM that involves going back further than a "recoil"). 

Now, I'm not sure what Justin meant when he initially asked about recoiling, nor exactly what Anthony means when he suggests it's rare!

Quote from: Duncan Head on July 02, 2014, 10:34:07 AM

Now, I'm not sure what Justin meant when he initially asked about recoiling, nor exactly what Anthony means when he suggests it's rare!

What I feel is rare in the accounts is evidence of a significant distance of physical pushing back.  Only the Agincourt example seems to quantify this, and, as Nick said, within the scope of most rules, its a bit neither here nor there.  In the first few seconds, pushed back 12 feet then for remainder of melee remain static?  Some of the others may involve a physical push back but aren't clear on that.  They could also mean "forced to give ground" in some morale or rally back sense.  To pick up Mark's comment about non-continuous combat, we could just be seeing two sides separating, with one falling back each time and the conflict renewing further back.  So, to try and be clear, I'm separating a rugby scrum push back (rare or short distance) from controlled withdrawal from combat.  I don't know if Justin is doing the same, however.

Yes. To take DBM, the large scale ruleset I'm most familiar with, 25mm = 50 yards (or "paces"). A base is required to recoil its depth, which varies from 15mm (30 yards) to 50mm (100 yards). This affects all troop types. To what extent do these distances conform to the historical reality? Did all troop types recoil? Seeing as there were quite a few slogging matches where neither side recoiled a significant distance, ending only when one side broke, what circumstances favoured recoil?

That's the thing though Justin, did the 'quite a few' slogging matches where neither side gave ground actually mean that they were face to face and fighting for hours?

or did they mean both sides stuck to their relative lines, and made localised attacks into each other which failed to produce a material change, but which did feature lots of localised too and fro?

Consider a trench raid, it comes over, enters the trench, takes the captive / knocks out the sniper position, then pulls back.
Relative front lines unchanged, but push and pull exhibited.
The raid is too small to describe in sources, but locally it has an effect.

That is much closer to how i see fighting.  They are engaged, but not physically face to face
  sub units make flurries into face to face contact, they are brief, the may or may not push the other back, but they will not individually break the line or cause a bend in overall position, and the small attack will also pull back.
A non continuous melee model.

If you don't buy into that, and see combat as face to face and fighting until one side runs, then pushback and recoil become much harder to explain, as you require immediate follow up and you have an issue with formed men recoiling in contact (well all the pro historians i could find do anyway, as they disbelieve non continuous for those reasons)


Which is why i think questions like this need a lot more stating of terms in advance of the question.

In db rules terms though, i recon recoil is a mechanism to enable the Carthaginians to perform a convex - concave manoeuvre ala Cannae, something on a much bigger scale than the small unit flurry i described.

This is the model of the envelopment that makes a lot more sense to me than frankly unbelievable notions of African veterans marching past and turning in on the Romans line, all they need do is stay stationary, as the romans are pulled into the centre and expose their own flanks in the process.  Much easier to do that in dba than most other rules too, i note.

Quote from: Mark G on July 02, 2014, 12:34:37 PM
That's the thing though Justin, did the 'quite a few' slogging matches where neither side gave ground actually mean that they were face to face and fighting for hours?

At Syracuse (Thucydides VI.66-71) the armies came together without either yielding ground for some time, and as both were hoplite armies with melee weapons only one is inclined to conclude they spent the time fighting toe-to-toe.

Quote
or did they mean both sides stuck to their relative lines, and made localised attacks into each other which failed to produce a material change, but which did feature lots of localised too and fro?

Consider a trench raid, it comes over, enters the trench, takes the captive / knocks out the sniper position, then pulls back.
Relative front lines unchanged, but push and pull exhibited.
The raid is too small to describe in sources, but locally it has an effect.

That is much closer to how i see fighting.  They are engaged, but not physically face to face
  sub units make flurries into face to face contact, they are brief, the may or may not push the other back, but they will not individually break the line or cause a bend in overall position, and the small attack will also pull back.
A non continuous melee model.

This seems to equate to what is traditionally considered 'skirmishing', not close combat between close formation infantry formations.  One might look at Caesar, Civil War I.44, in which the Pompeians use a related form of in-and-out attack, which Caesar considers not unusual for mountain peoples, whereas Caesar's own forces very definitely stand their ground and are used to continuous combat, and so find the Pompeian approach strange and offputting, at least to begin with.

Quote
If you don't buy into that, and see combat as face to face and fighting until one side runs, then pushback and recoil become much harder to explain, as you require immediate follow up and you have an issue with formed men recoiling in contact (well all the pro historians i could find do anyway, as they disbelieve non continuous for those reasons)

Why do pushback and recoil become harder to explain in the face of physical pressure?  Face to face combat would start to be decided when one side weakened, was pushed back, and unless somehow rallied and reinvigorated would be broken, cf. Sertorius at the Sucro, Plutarch, Sertorius 19.3-6.

"When the fighting was at close quarters, it happened that Sertorius was not himself engaged with Pompey at first, but with Afranius, who commanded Pompey's left, while Sertorius himself was stationed on the right. Hearing, however, that those of his men who were engaged with Pompey were yielding before his onset and being worsted, he put his right wing in command of other generals, and hastened himself to the help of the wing that was suffering defeat. [4] Those of his men who were already in retreat he rallied, those who were still keeping their ranks he encouraged, then charged anew upon Pompey, who was pursuing, and put his men to a great rout, in which Pompey also came near being killed, was actually wounded, and had a marvellous escape. For the Libyans with Sertorius, after getting Pompey's horse, which had golden decorations and was covered with costly trappings, were so busy distributing the booty and quarrelling with one another over it, that they neglected the pursuit. [5] Afranius, however, as soon as Sertorius had gone off to the other wing with aid and succour, routed his opponents and drove them headlong into their camp; and dashing in with the fugitives, it being now dark, he began to plunder, knowing nothing of Pompey's flight and having no power to keep his soldiers from their pillaging. But meanwhile Sertorius came back from his victory on the other wing, and falling upon the straggling and confused soldiers of Afranius, slew great numbers of them."

I am struck by the time Sertorius has in this situation.  Reports reach him that his men are giving way.  He delegates command, rides over, visits some units standing firm, rallies some others then organises a counter attack.  Whatever push backs/recoils that are going on are gradual.  It also seems to me that the units giving way have broken contact, as they "charge anew".  It is less clear whether the units standing firm are actually still in contact or standing ready to join the counter attack.

men cannot maintain the physical effort of combat for more than ten, fifteen, maybe 20 minutes. Thus there have to be pauses. Either they stop where they stand or they drop back mutually... the effect is the same, I can see it being more difficult for a pike phalanx to fall back than a Republican Roman line, but they must rest and gather breath. So punctuated flurries are highly likely. With repeated attacks and rests it is highly likely that troops who are suffering will move backwards, but not break because the opponent will not have the weight and momentum to cause a rupture, indeed falling back is likely done to avoid opponents breaking through. In the pause period the irregularities and vulnerabilities in the line will be corrected so that vulnerabilities are removed. If you are losing then it is likely that the reorganisation moves your line backwards.

Of course this whole process varies by troop type. perhaps pike phalanxes tired rather less and maybe hoplites were less elastic than Romans, but the mechanics of combat are determined by the endurance, mental and physical, of men.
Roy

I've wondered about pike phalanxes when reading the discussion.
One cannot imagine a small group of Sarissa pikemen surging out from the block to prod and poke at the enemy before scurrying back.

Perhaps that was the strength of pikes, that they were a mechanism for keeping everybody moving forward whether they wanted to or not?

As for pushbacks, we have accounts of Roman armies 'reeling' back in front of the pike's advance, perhaps without a combat even happening.

But we have to remember that 'push back' is also a wargame rulewriter's mechanism.
All this little groups charging out and falling back is subsumed into rolling the dice and so doesn't get overtly displayed on the table

Jim

Quote from: aligern on July 03, 2014, 08:12:39 AM
men cannot maintain the physical effort of combat for more than ten, fifteen, maybe 20 minutes.

A lot depends upon exactly what one does in 'combat' - my impression is that Roman legionaries, after the initial missile discharge, slammed into the opposition and then exerted no more effort than pushing against/leaning on them while pinking them with the gladius, cf. Polybius II.33.6:

"The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them."

This sort of thing would not be any more strenuous than the 'post exercise' described by Vegetius as part of a soldier's training.  Josephus (Jewish War III.70) also notes how:

"Now here one cannot but admire at the precaution of the Romans, in providing themselves of such household servants, as might not only serve at other times for the common offices of life, but might also be of advantage to them in their wars. And, indeed, if any one does but attend to the other parts of their military discipline, he will be forced to confess that their obtaining so large a dominion hath been the acquisition of their valor, and not the bare gift of fortune; for they do not begin to use their weapons first in time of war, nor do they then put their hands first into motion, while they avoided so to do in times of peace; but, as if their weapons did always cling to them, they have never any truce from warlike exercises; nor do they stay till times of war admonish them to use them; for their military exercises differ not at all from the real use of their arms, but every soldier is every day exercised, and that with great diligence, as if it were in time of war, which is the reason why they bear the fatigue of battles so easily; for neither can any disorder remove them from their usual regularity, nor can fear affright them out of it, nor can labor tire them; which firmness of conduct makes them always to overcome those that have not the same firmness; nor would he be mistaken that should call those their exercises unbloody battles, and their battles bloody exercises."

It may also be worth considering that dashing into action, exchanging blows, breaking off and dashing out again is a more exhausting form of fighting than simply standing in line and thrusting away.

Quote
With repeated attacks and rests it is highly likely that troops who are suffering will move backwards, but not break because the opponent will not have the weight and momentum to cause a rupture, indeed falling back is likely done to avoid opponents breaking through. In the pause period the irregularities and vulnerabilities in the line will be corrected so that vulnerabilities are removed. If you are losing then it is likely that the reorganisation moves your line backwards.

This rather tentative style of warfare seems to fit Mesoamericans but not many Europeans (although Irish and perhaps Britons might be happy with it).  Interestingly enough, the original proto-manipular legion investigated by our own Rodger Williams utilised piecemeal reinforcement of shaky parts of the line, though in the manipular legion this was eventually replaced by the line as a whole being relieved before it came apart.  The Roman line relief system allowed even their super-fit troops to fight in 'shifts'.

In hoplite battles there was no question of falling back to prevent opponents from breaking through: the fate of the Thespians at Delium (surrounded and wiped out when the contingents on each side of them gave way) illustrates this.  The Sciritae at First Mantinea suffered a not dissimilar fate for a not dissimilar reason.

Quote
Perhaps pike phalanxes tired rather less

When up against Achaemenids or Romans, they rarely met a foe who could withstand them, the Greek mercenaries in Persian service seemingly being better at this than Roman legionaries.  Up against each other, we either see quality prevailing (the Argyraspids at Paraitakene and Gabiene) or the phalanxes not getting into serious contact at all (Ipsus and Raphia).

Perhaps noteworthy at both Ipsus and Raphia is that the respective phalanxes stood off while the cavalry action was being decided, and in both cases one side's phalanx refused to close because of the threat of enemy cavalry.

My own impression, for what it is worth, is that phalanxes tended to go for short, sharp fights using a decisive push; the limited push-backs seen on one wing at Sellasia appear to have been because both sides were trying to seize a position but not following up once it was taken, whereas on the other wing once ascendancy was obtained it was kept up all the way down the slope and the retreating force was thoroughly broken.

"What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy's lines advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them; thrown their ranks into disorder; and then retired himself, step by step, to continually higher ground into a safe position: for by thus breaking them up and depriving them, to begin with, of the advantages of their peculiar armour and disposition, he would have secured the victory by the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though victory were assured, he kept his original position on the summit of the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was exactly the reverse.

For he left himself no place of retreat, and by allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle on the very summit of the hill; and so, as soon as he was forced by the weight of their heavy armour and their close order to give any ground, it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians; while his own men were obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for manœuvring on the top. The result was not long in arriving: they suffered a repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight." - Polybius II.68

The 'Illyrians' were part of a combined force, principally of phalangites:

"To face the division of the enemy on Evas Antigonus stationed his Macedonian hoplites with brazen shields, and the Illyrians, drawn up alternately [enallax], under the command of Alexander, son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos, respectively. Behind them he placed the Acarnanians and Cretans, and behind them again were two thousand Achaeans to act as a reserve." - ibid II.66

One may note in passing the deployment of archers and javelinmen behind a phalanx.  Indirect shooting?

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 03, 2014, 01:03:08 PM"The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them."

This sort of thing would not be any more strenuous than the 'post exercise' described by Vegetius as part of a soldier's training.

Psychologically it certainly would be.

Also remember we have accounts of Roman Legionaries throwing themselves onto the shields of German/Gallic enemies to bear them down through sheer body weight

Jim

We found a clear description of a phalanx moving backwards out of contact, and cited it in the wmww somewhere.

I recall the amazement, but it was there.

Id also note Sabin, who says that the evidence on hoplites clearly points to their fights being very quick, whereas roman battles are reported as taking hours and can be demonstrated to gave done so by the time needed to cover the ground.

Leaving aside 'national' efforts like plates, most hoplite battles are also tiny compared to punic wars ones

Quote from: Duncan Head on July 03, 2014, 01:22:45 PM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 03, 2014, 01:03:08 PM"The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them."

This sort of thing would not be any more strenuous than the 'post exercise' described by Vegetius as part of a soldier's training.

Psychologically it certainly would be.

This is - if one pardons the observation - a two-edged sword.  On the one hand there is indeed the increased psychological pressure of combat, although this tends to exist in inverse proportion to troops' experience, but on the other there is the enlivening and refreshing sense of achievement and victory when a foe gets hit or goes down.

Quote from: Jim Webster on July 03, 2014, 01:50:47 PM
Also remember we have accounts of Roman Legionaries throwing themselves onto the shields of German/Gallic enemies to bear them down through sheer body weight

Jim

Quite true: the case in point being Gallic War I.51-53:

"The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard for both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of the enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the number of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that [thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He himself, having drawn up his army in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. Then at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces out of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and surrounded their whole army with their chariots and wagons, that no hope might be left in flight. On these they placed their women, who, with disheveled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went forward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.

Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that every one might have them as witnesses of his valor. He himself began the battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that part of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the signal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins, they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according to their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our swords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the enemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left wing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus, a young man, who commanded the cavalry - as he was more disengaged than those who were employed in the fight - sent the third line as a relief to our men who were in distress.

Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turned their backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the river Rhine , about fifty miles from that place. "

Had the heavy pressure on the Roman right produced a recoil?  As Crassus sent up the third line it would seem that the first line had already been relieved by the second and the latter was showing some signs of distress.  'Pressed heavily' is the translator's rendering of 'premebant', which means "press, press upon, oppress, overwhelm, weigh down; to urge, drive, importune, pursue, to press close or hard, etc." (Lewis lexicon) and one might reasonably conclude that Caesar's intent was to convey that the Roman line was being forced back under pressure.

Said it before , will say it again, in the Caesarian period  goes in very shortly after the first as a second shock into gaps the first line leaves, or it is sent in as an almost automatic reinforcement. IIRC only the third line is described as being used as a reserve in Caesar's accounts.

Roy

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 03, 2014, 08:27:44 PM

Had the heavy pressure on the Roman right produced a recoil?  As Crassus sent up the third line it would seem that the first line had already been relieved by the second and the latter was showing some signs of distress.  'Pressed heavily' is the translator's rendering of 'premebant', which means "press, press upon, oppress, overwhelm, weigh down; to urge, drive, importune, pursue, to press close or hard, etc." (Lewis lexicon) and one might reasonably conclude that Caesar's intent was to convey that the Roman line was being forced back under pressure.

Seems plausible.  Again, the Romans are forced back gradually enough for the fact to be noticed and relief organised.  It would appear that the battle wasn't full on at this stage, as it is "renewed again" when the reserve line is committed.

Quote from: aligern on July 03, 2014, 09:59:46 PM
Said it before , will say it again, in the Caesarian period  goes in very shortly after the first as a second shock into gaps the first line leaves, or it is sent in as an almost automatic reinforcement. IIRC only the third line is described as being used as a reserve in Caesar's accounts.

Yes and no: Julius seems to use his second line in close support of his first, but not as an integral part of it.  He clearly draws up in three lines against Ariovistus, and at Pharsalus two of his lines are exhausted by the time three of Pompey's are.  It looks to me as if his second line is more or less breathing down the necks of the first awaiting its turn to relieve them, whereas after the initial near-upset with the Helvetii Julius seems to have customarily kept his third line as a dual-use reserve, either to support the chaps in front or to deal with any unpleasant surprises on the flanks.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 04, 2014, 10:02:45 AM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 03, 2014, 08:27:44 PM

Had the heavy pressure on the Roman right produced a recoil?  As Crassus sent up the third line it would seem that the first line had already been relieved by the second and the latter was showing some signs of distress.  'Pressed heavily' is the translator's rendering of 'premebant', which means "press, press upon, oppress, overwhelm, weigh down; to urge, drive, importune, pursue, to press close or hard, etc." (Lewis lexicon) and one might reasonably conclude that Caesar's intent was to convey that the Roman line was being forced back under pressure.

Seems plausible.  Again, the Romans are forced back gradually enough for the fact to be noticed and relief organised.  It would appear that the battle wasn't full on at this stage, as it is "renewed again" when the reserve line is committed.

Caesar actually writes: "Ita proelium restitutum est," (Thus the battle was re-established), and his sense may be that it was again brought under control as opposed to everyone finishing their oranges and the whistle going for the second half.  The observation that the decline was gradual enough to be noticed and acted upon is a good one (again).

This is waay out of period but I was once caught in a close ambush in jungle and rapidly recoiled about 200 meters and called in artillery followed by close air support so I suppose you could view that as a recoil. The enemy chose not to follow up and mainain contact because they knew we would put indirect fire on them rikky tick. They actually were able to withdraw before getting hit with the 105s even though we walked the arty out.

Any of you who have been in a rugby scrum will be familiar with the effect of mass in close combat as it were and the "push of pike" is well attested in 17th century warfare. The to and fro in both of those situations might be analogous to a recoil.

Could someone just point out to me, please , where in the description of the battle against Ariovistus Caesar  specifically deploys in three lines and the second line is sent in?
Roy

Quote from: aligern on July 11, 2014, 09:50:28 AM
Could someone just point out to me, please , where in the description of the battle against Ariovistus Caesar  specifically deploys in three lines and the second line is sent in?

I don't see any reference to the second line, but the three-line deployment seems to be clear:

Quote from: Caesar, "Gallic War" I.52Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left wing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus, a young man, who commanded the cavalry - as he was more disengaged than those who were employed in the fight - sent the third line as a relief to our men who were in distress.

Quote from: Dave Beatty on July 11, 2014, 04:37:23 AM

Any of you who have been in a rugby scrum will be familiar with the effect of mass in close combat as it were and the "push of pike" is well attested in 17th century warfare. The to and fro in both of those situations might be analogous to a recoil.

I think we have to be very careful assuming that ancient close combat was like a scrum or for that matter a sealed knot style pike push.  The key difference, to me anyway, is the presence of edged weapons and intent to do damage with them.  Doubtless pressure of bodies was important but, in medieval accounts at least, having enough space to keep a firm footing and use your weapons was paramount.  We could, of course, fall to discussing othismos at this point, although I don't personally subscribe to the rugby-scrum model.

Re the second line in Caesar's battles.

agreed that Publius C takes charge of the third line. However, my contention is that this does not indicate that there are three distinct lines in the initial deployments. It is quite possible that the first two lines are so integrated that sending in the second line is not a decision to be taken, it happens automatically. If the checkerboard layout is the deployment of choice than line two is covering off gaps in line one.  It  may exist for manoeuvre, but immediately upon joining combat line two moves into the gaps and fights in line with line one.
I think this makes sense of their being no mention of sending in the second line, it is just a subdivision of the battle line. Line relief has not taken place, i.e line one has not broken off from the Germans and gone behind line two.
I cannot find descriptions of line two doing line relief in the AD 69 battles of Tacitus or the German wars, mind you this might just be because tactics are assumed as understood by his readership..

Is Pharsalus clearly a case of line two relieving line one? or is it capable of being interpreted as lines one and two acting as one formation with line three as a reserve?
Roy

Interesting notion Roy,

So the first two lines are alternating forward and back as a single fluid body, rather than as descrete formations of their own.

And a third line is much rarer, presumably, and needs commanding

It would also make sense of the lack of intermediate command structure between legion and cohort

 Absolutely Mark.  The Romans would have moved to using the first two lines together which would have made the line of  battle twice as deep as previously . It may be that this was preferable  to two thinner lines interchanging. Would this fit with a move to a cohort being the smallest manoeuvre unit. This would not prevent deployment in three lines and it might allow for two major shocks to the opponent as first line one went in threw and charged and then line two did the same through the gaps left by line one.  This would also tie in with a move from a missile based  operation with lots of sequential javelin throwing before hand to hand to one where the pilum starts the engagement.
By removing the velites the Romans have not just moved to a situation in which foreign specialists take over the skirmishing role . That is, I believe, because the mercenary auxiliaries do a different job from the Velites. I am not doubting that both the old skirmishers and the new are operating to clear away opposing skirmishers and protect their own heavy infantry, but that the velites were a part of the pre clash grinding down of the opponent with light javelins before the first line of legionaries moved forwards, threw pila and charged.  The opponent would then fight line one of the legion and then that wluld withdraw as necessary to be replaced by line two. If that all failed the third line would act as a reserve and defensive barrier.
Removing the velites is a sign that Rome was moving to a system whereby the light javelin phase was abandoned and the strength of the legion devoted to pila followed by a sword charge by a much denser and deeper line.

Maybe someone is going to come up with a description of the second line of a late Republican or Early Imperial legion being ordered to do something which would indicate that it had a role in replacing line one?

Roy

I have just been and checked out the Bohn translation of Caesar 's Civil War. i cannot find there the point about two of Caesar's lines being exhausted by the time that three of Pompey's are? (that's at Pharsalus) .  The whole inference of the battle description is that Caesar's attacking men, apart from his reserve third line act as one body! They go to throw as one, stop when Pompey's men do not advance and then come on again as one.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on July 11, 2014, 06:47:34 PM
I have just been and checked out the Bohn translation of Caesar 's Civil War. i cannot find there the point about two of Caesar's lines being exhausted by the time that three of Pompey's are? (that's at Pharsalus) .

"Whereupon Caesar, perceiving the victory so far advanced, to complete it, brought up his third line, which till then had not engaged. Pompey's infantry being thus doubly attacked, in front by fresh troops, and in rear, by the victorious cohorts, could no longer resist, but fled to their camp." - Civil War III.94.1-2

(Eodem tempore tertiam aciem Caesar quae quieta fuerat et se ad id tempus loco tenuerat, procurrere iussit. [2] ita cum recentes atque integri defessis successissent, alii autem a tergo adorirentur, sustinere Pompeiani non potuerunt atque universi terga verterunt.)

Pompey's troops are noted as being 'defessis', wearied or exhausted.  The designation 'tertiam aciem', the third battle-line, rather requires the existence of a second as a discrete entity.

I think the main question here is tactical: was the second line merely a gap-coverer for the first, or was it another entire line whose role was to relieve the first once the latter had lost its edge?  The central question seems to be whether the legion fought with gaps in its front line, and the only reference we have to a legion doing so is at Zama, where Scipio deliberately left lanes for the Carthaginian elephants to run through (in fact he packed them with velites, so they were 'soft spots' rather than gaps).  Every other description I can recall suggests or requires continuous lines.

Our accounts of battles tend to emphasise the points at which significant developments occurred.  Unless the enemy runs off when the second line was committed, we will not see an account specifying the commitment of the second line.  If the third line is otherwise engaged, the second line may be mentioned, as in Gallic War I.49.2:

"He ordered the first and second lines to be under arms; the third to fortify the camp."

( Primam et secundam aciem in armis esse, tertiam castra munire iussit.)

'Secundam aciem' distinctly means 'second battleline'.

May I propose this definition of recoil:

One of the engaged lines steadily gives ground whilst maintaining its structure and cohesion. This occurs when the troops of the line are outfought by their adversaries. In this process individual soldiers here and there back away from superior opponents. The soldiers behind them back up to maintain the necessary fighting space between one rank and the next, and the soldiers alongside back up to keep a continuous line facing the enemy and prevent their flanks becoming exposed.

This is distinct from a voluntary disengagement of the line (as for example done by cavalry), from the back and forth movement of two lines of roughly equal fighting ability, and from the momentary giving of ground when a charge slams home and physically bowls men backwards.

Examples of recoil as defined above:
Cannae
Bibracte
Zama (following Livy)
The Sucro
Sellasia
Caesar vs Ariovistus (possibly)

Examples of a momentary giving of ground to a charge:
Agincourt

Examples of back and forth movement:
Sellasia

Examples of a deliberate disengagement:
Chaeronea (the Macedonian phalanx on the right wing)

Examples of no recoil at all:
Syracuse

Any other examples, and does any pattern emerge from this?

I am not at all sure that your example proves what you assume it does Patrick.
Clearly the lines are tactical sub divisions of the army. So a general could  order lines one, two and three to carry out tasks. At Pharsalus Caesar creates a fourth line. In the last battle around Dyrrachium Caesar orders a force to advance in two lines. Does this mean the third line was separately tasked or does it indicate that the whole force was organised so that cohorts that might have fought in line three were put into the first two lines?

The action at Pharsalus does not indicate that Caesar's two lines had done the deed on Pompey's there because there is Caesar's fourth line to consider. Had that drawn away Pompey's third.
I really do take your point that the second line would only be mentioned if it did something, but one would have thought that there was plenty of opportunity in all the battle narratives to have an incident occur that would generate such a mention? I would expect to see something that indicated a first line falling back? I would expect to see that an enemy had run away after only the first line had fought, I would think that just one time the second line had suffered some problem that would be remarked upon, but no, nada!

As to the Romans attacking and leaving gaps I think I have been clear that the gaps are not there long. In goes line one, throws pila and then charges in with the sword, line two then does the same into the gaps, or line two closes into the gaps and the the whole battle line charges which would fit with Pharsalus.  As for why the Romans should bother with two lines if one is the fighting formation, then I suggest that it is for manoeuvre , after all that appears to have been the way in the early seventeenth century with battalions covering off gaps in a first line, but then moving up to fight. A quincunx layout  is much better placed to turn to the right and move off as opposed to a solid line.

As usual, if someone cam give us an example that shows that in Late Republic/Early Empire line one fought and then retired through line two it would be illuminating.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on July 12, 2014, 11:11:23 AM
As to the Romans attacking and leaving gaps I think I have been clear that the gaps are not there long. In goes line one, throws pila and then charges in with the sword, line two then does the same into the gaps, or line two closes into the gaps and the the whole battle line charges which would fit with Pharsalus.

One question: how would gaps form in the first place? If one section of the line recoils surely the adjacent sections would naturally recoil in sympathy, to avoid getting their flanks exposed? The worst thing that can happen to a soldier is to find himself fighting two opponents who attack him from two directions at once. I can't imagine the troops to his right recoiling whilst he calmly stays where he is to be hit from the side as well as front.

Punching a hole in a line at speed is a different matter since it gives the troops on either side of the hole no time to react. This seems to have been the case at Chaeronea. A natural recoil however is a much slower affair as the examples in the thread indicate. Plenty of time for the troops on either side of an incipient gap to decide what they are going to do about it.

Quote from: aligern on July 12, 2014, 11:11:23 AM
In the last battle around Dyrrachium Caesar orders a force to advance in two lines. Does this mean the third line was separately tasked or does it indicate that the whole force was organised so that cohorts that might have fought in line three were put into the first two lines?

"The place was about five hundred paces distant from Pompey's new camp. Caesar, desirous to repair the loss he had sustained, and hoping he might be able to surprise this legion, left two cohorts in his intrenchments, to prevent any suspicion of his design; and with thirty-three more, amongst which number was the ninth legion, which had lost many centurions and soldiers, marched in a double line [duplici acie], against the legion which Pompey had lodged in the lesser camp." - Civil War III.67.3-4

Caesar was quite flexible with his cohort-based battlelines, and the duplex acies used here is unusual in that Caesar customarily specifies his forces being in triplex acies, three battle-lines.  Here they are in two.

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The action at Pharsalus does not indicate that Caesar's two lines had done the deed on Pompey's there because there is Caesar's fourth line to consider. Had that drawn away Pompey's third.

This is something I wondered, but this 'fourth line' consisted of only six cohorts and would be hard put to handle an estimated 33 cohorts in Pompey's third line.

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I really do take your point that the second line would only be mentioned if it did something, but one would have thought that there was plenty of opportunity in all the battle narratives to have an incident occur that would generate such a mention? I would expect to see something that indicated a first line falling back? I would expect to see that an enemy had run away after only the first line had fought, I would think that just one time the second line had suffered some problem that would be remarked upon, but no, nada!

This may depend upon the author as much as anything else: Tacitus, for example, does not refer to lines at all, but to the activities of individual legions (cf. Histories II.25 and II.43).  The writer of the African War and Spanish War similarly does not make reference to lines.  We are left with Caesar as our primary 'line manager'.

Perhaps the most explicit dispositions in Caesar's Civil War are when he is matching up against Afranius in Spain in I.83:

"Afranius' first two lines were made up of five legions, while in the third he had auxiliary cohorts as reserves.  Caesar had a threefold line: in the first line he had four cohorts from each of his five legions, while the second and third had three cohorts in reserve from each of the legions."

This suggests that there may have been no single overriding method of deploying: Caesar is using a model 4-3-3 deployment in three distinct lines, but Afranius is using a 5-5-0 (with the third line consisting of auxiliaries) arrangement.

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As to the Romans attacking and leaving gaps I think I have been clear that the gaps are not there long. In goes line one, throws pila and then charges in with the sword, line two then does the same into the gaps, or line two closes into the gaps and the the whole battle line charges which would fit with Pharsalus. 

I cannot reconcile the idea of gaps with the assumed or likely deployment frontages, not to mention the absence of these gaps in any of our surviving sources.  If we consider Caesar's 4-3-3 deployment above, one presumes the frontage of each line would be the same, so the first four cohorts would deploy eight deep and the three in each of the second and third lines six deep, without gaps.  If there are gaps in the lineup then the third line would either have to deploy only three deep to match the frontage of the preceding lines or it would itself cover half or less of the legion's frontage.

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As for why the Romans should bother with two lines if one is the fighting formation, then I suggest that it is for manoeuvre , after all that appears to have been the way in the early seventeenth century with battalions covering off gaps in a first line, but then moving up to fight. A quincunx layout  is much better placed to turn to the right and move off as opposed to a solid line.

While one can see some truth in this, there remains the problem that our sources write as if dealing with solid lines.  Tacitus (Histories III 18) writes of the opening stage of Second Bedriacum (AD 69):

"At the fourth milestone from Cremona glittered the standards of two legions, the Italica and the Rapax, which had been advanced as far as that point during the success achieved by the first movement of their cavalry. But when fortune changed, they would not open their ranks, nor receive the fugitives, nor advance and themselves attack an enemy now exhausted by so protracted a pursuit and conflict."

We have here two legions which have not yet been in action.  If they were deployed in quincunx, the fleeing cavalry would not have had any problem slipping between the spaced cohorts, but the need for the legions to 'open ranks' (laxare ordines) if they were to 'receive the fugitives' (recipere turbatos) indicates their front formed a solid, not a gapped, line.

I would take the logic if your last statement, Patrick, as meaning that the lines had closed up already.
There is plenty of time in those Tacitan battle descriptions for the two lime system to operate and be commented upon. Like you say there is no such comment. Are we then to assume that the deployment is one thick line.

The frontage question is no problem, it simply means that all cohorts deploy to the same frontage and that what varies is depth.

Interesting that  4 up three back deployment allows the three to fill in the three spaces left when the four are deployed.
I don't know that you can argue that there are no gaps because they are not mentioned when my whole contention is that the second line does not perform line relief because the sources do not mention it!
There is a further problem with your reconstruction, Patrick. That is that the second line of your 4:3:3 has only three cohorts. If they are to perform line relief they will suddenly be facing an opponent who has driven back one Roman line with only 60% of the troops that line one had. If they are deployed in some way as standard cohorts the opponent will be round the flanks of the three.
When we see the third line used it is to go to where there is trouble and the Romans are being pushed back. This is not line relief, it is adding more men to a melee .
Again, none of your examples fail to fit with there being two lines for manoeuvre and just the one (lines one and two combined) for the fighting with line three as a reserve that moves to either wing.

Roy

Quote from: aligern on July 12, 2014, 03:57:57 PM
I would take the logic if your last statement, Patrick, as meaning that the lines had closed up already.

A thought: if the Italica and Rapax in Tacitus' account had 'closed up already', i.e. before they met enemy forces, this seems to invalidate the idea that the first line charges (with gaps) and then the second line charges into those gaps, so that closing up only occurs on contact (assuming I have understood this correctly).

Thinking about the possible operation of the suggested 'gap system', keeping cohort-sized gaps between cohorts while advancing is going to be tricky unless someone has been out and set up a row of pegs for the troops to orient their movement upon.  Furthermore, if the principle of attacking in quincunx is sound, why not have the first line quincunx its centuries without the second line needing to be involved?  Centuries would be more manageable than cohorts and the smaller intervals easier to maintain.

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There is plenty of time in those Tacitan battle descriptions for the two line system to operate and be commented upon. Like you say there is no such comment. Are we then to assume that the deployment is one thick line.

I would rather not assume anything.  Tacitus' reticence on this point is one reason why so much of our understanding (if we can call it that) of the Early Imperial Roman army's method of operation depends upon Vegetius and surmise.  Even Josephus neglects to fill in details of deployment for battle, perhaps because of a dearth of pitched battles in Judaea, perhaps because he did not know, having never seen the Roman army deployed for battle.

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The frontage question is no problem, it simply means that all cohorts deploy to the same frontage and that what varies is depth.

Indeed.

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Interesting that  4 up three back deployment allows the three to fill in the three spaces left when the four are deployed.

Although Afranius' 5-5-0 deployment would not fit this pattern at all.

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I don't know that you can argue that there are no gaps because they are not mentioned when my whole contention is that the second line does not perform line relief because the sources do not mention it!

What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander!  ;)

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There is a further problem with your reconstruction, Patrick. That is that the second line of your 4:3:3 has only three cohorts. If they are to perform line relief they will suddenly be facing an opponent who has driven back one Roman line with only 60% of the troops that line one had. If they are deployed in some way as standard cohorts the opponent will be round the flanks of the three.

We seemed to be in agreement earlier that the lines were of the same frontage but a four-cohort first line would be deployed in greater depth.  Assuming, of course, that all cohorts were the same size.

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When we see the third line used it is to go to where there is trouble and the Romans are being pushed back. This is not line relief, it is adding more men to a melee .

Not at Pharsalus: there it is simply taking over from the first two lines and giving the weary Pompeians the cold steel.  And they do not like it.  Against Ariovistus, committing the third line allowed Caesar to bring the battle on that wing back under control, and although he does not specify whether this was achieved by line relief or by crowding tired troops with fresh ones Adrianople-style, I know which I would do in the circumstances.

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Again, none of your examples fail to fit with there being two lines for manoeuvre and just the one (lines one and two combined) for the fighting with line three as a reserve that moves to either wing.

Although to see this system in our sources seems to require a leap of faith beyond the descriptions we are actually given.  Absence of evidence may not be evidence of absence, but a patchwork combination of first and second lines acting as a single formation in a quincunx pattern should leave clues like successive charges, e.g. at Pharsalus, where a charge to contact is described, but the impression Caesar gives is of one coherent line charging, casting missiles and closing to melee together.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 12, 2014, 07:22:33 AM
May I propose this definition of recoil:

One of the engaged lines steadily gives ground whilst maintaining its structure and cohesion. This occurs when the troops of the line are outfought by their adversaries. In this process individual soldiers here and there back away from superior opponents. The soldiers behind them back up to maintain the necessary fighting space between one rank and the next, and the soldiers alongside back up to keep a continuous line facing the enemy and prevent their flanks becoming exposed.

To return to the original topic for a moment, this does seem to be were some of the evidence leads.  But what is its significance?  Justin started the thread with comments on the push backs in DBx.  It seems to me this process would be gradual enough for units either side of the unit falling back to conform and maintain a line, without exposing themselves piecemeal to flank attacks.

This is where we tread the border between recoil and rout: at Delium in 424 BC, the Athenian right routed its opponents except for the Thespians, who stood their ground and were promptly surrounded and wiped out (the over-excited Athenians suffering a bit of 'friendly spear' into the bargain).  Much the same happened to the Spartan left at First Mantinea in 418 BC.  Some actions - notably with Roman armies, which seem to have been custom-designed for controllable retirements - show recoil happening slowly and not necessarily progressively, allowing a general with ability and/or reserves the chance to do something about it.  The Battle of Ilipa in 206 BC demonstrates the Spanish wings of a Carthaginian army, which by that date seems to have been using the Roman system, 'recoiling' in similar fashion.  Some combats, however, especially hoplite actions, suggest a brief period of recoil leading to sudden collapse.

I would therefore suggest that the controllability of recoil, or more accurately the duration of non-collapse recoil, is related to the type of troops involved, both in organisation and training and in quality.

To an extent the answer to the question depends, as was said, upon the difference between  a push back and a longer fall back. I suspect that the WRG rules are modelling a push back where the consequence is to give a minor advantage to the winner of each phase. This advantage can be overturned, but if it goes on through the phases of fighting then one side will become the winner.
That looks a fair way of representing a combat where units fight for around 15 minutes and then need a rest and mutually back off. There is then the possibility that the side that is doing least well steps back further and that when combat resumes the winners advance but the losers cannot motivate themselves to advance or to advance as far.
This is not a new suggestion, I think it goes back to Keegan or even beyond and is based upon an understanding of human physiology, that is that hand to hand combat is so intense that it cannot be maintained for longer than around 15 minutes, perhaps 30 minutes. I suppose it depends upon how energetically they go at it. Once this physiological 'truth' is accepted the reconstruction proceeds with a logic of its own. The soldiers must either win within this period or they must stop by mutual consent  and if they stop then separation is logical. I suppose the opponents could slow down to give a more sustainable rate of action or perhaps men behind the front rank could filter through to take the place  of fighters, though descriptions of Gauls and Germans being tightly packed does not suggest that would be easy to accomplish.
We may well be in one of those areas where the process of combat is so well understood by the writer and his audience that it is not something to excite comment unless there is a specific reason for the comment which could be literary style, some unusual occurrence or perhaps in Caesar's account of the pila pinning Helvetian shields together a knowing wink at the traditional effectiveness of Roman weaponry.
If the advance, fight, pause and fall back sequence is perfectly normal then we will not find much specific evidence if it occurring.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on July 13, 2014, 03:23:23 PM

We may well be in one of those areas where the process of combat is so well understood by the writer and his audience that it is not something to excite comment unless there is a specific reason for the comment which could be literary style, some unusual occurrence or perhaps in Caesar's account of the pila pinning Helvetian shields together a knowing wink at the traditional effectiveness of Roman weaponry.

I do feel Roy is right about this: even in our own living memory, accounts of combat rarely detail the tactical systems or the procedures taught, concentrating instead on significant occurrences - especially those which do not go to plan - and results.

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I suspect that the WRG rules are modelling a push back where the consequence is to give a minor advantage to the winner of each phase. This advantage can be overturned, but if it goes on through the phases of fighting then one side will become the winner.

This makes sense to me.  WRG 6th rules base collapse through recoil on how good or bad a unit's quality was, with good quality units able to take continuous recoil for longer.  Veterans ('B' class) can stand two successive recoils but go on the third, while 'D' class melt away as soon as they are pushed back, making them not the troop quality of choice.  WRG 7th dispense with this, so recoil can go on for quite some time before a unit breaks through becoming exhausted and/or taking double its opponent's losses and three casualties per figure.

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I think it goes back to Keegan or even beyond and is based upon an understanding of human physiology, that is that hand to hand combat is so intense that it cannot be maintained for longer than around 15 minutes, perhaps 30 minutes. I suppose it depends upon how energetically they go at it.

I shall eschew the customary quotes of Josephus etc. indicating that Roman soldiers at least were up to much longer periods of continuous combat.  If one thinks of hand-to-hand combat as the kind of energy-wasting flourishes seen on films, then one can imagine people thinking it cannot go on for more than a few minutes.  Battlefield veterans would however tend to know what worked and use it with a minimum of fuss and energy - Spartans in particular seemed able to outlast anyone else in the hoplite era.  Mutual pauses are attested, particularly in mediaeval battles (the occasional notable getting himself shot while resting with his helmet off), but we also have numerous accounts which give the impression of a battle fought out continuously from start to finish over several hours, e.g. Cannae, where Hannibal's men appear to maintain continuous pressure on the Romans and do not allow them a pause to recover.

Hence, in addition to the WRG 6th recoil tolerance by troop quality, I would propose recoil tolerance by troop type, some being more breakable than others (does anyone know of a scythed chariot unit which survived even a single recoil?).

 Seriously I don't think a scythed chariot which actually hit an enemy unit could recoil. It had three options, it veered off, conquered, or died

Jim

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 13, 2014, 07:14:20 PM
even in our own living memory, accounts of combat rarely detail the tactical systems or the procedures taught, concentrating instead on significant occurrences - especially those which do not go to plan - and results.

In fact, it is sometimes only through reporting what went wrong that we get a glimpse of what right looked like.  The example given of men being shot while taking a breather is an example of this

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This makes sense to me.  WRG 6th rules base collapse through recoil on how good or bad a unit's quality was, with good quality units able to take continuous recoil for longer. 

A simple mechanism.  I can't remember whether there were conditions for a push back (e.g. casualties per figure) or whether it was just killing more than your opponent.

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If one thinks of hand-to-hand combat as the kind of energy-wasting flourishes seen on films, then one can imagine people thinking it cannot go on for more than a few minutes.  Battlefield veterans would however tend to know what worked and use it with a minimum of fuss and energy - Spartans in particular seemed able to outlast anyone else in the hoplite era. 

While agreeing about the Hollywood style (although the Romans had a literary trope that this was exactly what barbarians did) the idea of full on combat lasting more than 15-30mins does stretch the limits for human endurance, as Roy says.  Better trained and battle-fit would fight intensely for longer, of course.  But I can't see battles lasting for hours unless there was some kind of variation in intensity.  The Roman military system, as you say, really rated battlefield endurance high on its list of success factors.  Not only were individuals trained to fight longer but the entire tactical system was designed to give the army operational endurance.  It is almost like the football pundits going on about the fitter team having to absorb the attacks in the first 45 minutes and rely on their superior legs to overrun the opponent in the second half :)

Quote from: Erpingham on July 14, 2014, 08:05:49 AM

I can't remember whether there were conditions for a push back (e.g. casualties per figure) or whether it was just killing more than your opponent.

A bit of both: in WRG 6th, if one side killed even one more than the other side the latter was pushed back ('recoiled') provided the loser took at least one casualty per figure.  Large units in deep columns could get their front ranks salami-ed (although figures were removed from the back ranks, which favoured mixed units with the rubbish at the back) without having to budge, so if the player happened to be one of those masochists who fielded large quantities of 'D' class, deploying them in great depth could hold up almost anything for long enough for his battlewinners to do something useful elsewhere.

Putting less able troops in very deep formations seems to have been a staple of Achaemenid Persian armies, and judging by clues scattered here and there to have been representative of the large armies attested in the Biblical period.  The Greeks occasionally put good troops in very deep formations (e.g. the Thebans 50 deep at Leuctra and 2nd Mantinea) and these seemed always to steamroller the opposition.  They also seem to have done so by keeping up continuous and unremitting pressure until the shallower foe could no longer sustain the push.  Curiously enough, hoplites fighting against deep Theban columns seem rarely if ever to have been broken by them: at Delium the 8-deep Athenian left was pushed back by the 25-deep Theban right while the presumably 8-deep Theban allied left was being routed by the 8-deep Athenian right.  At Leuctra, Xenophon tells us the Spartans were not broken but were forced back all the way to their camp (with the body of their dead king), whereupon the Thebans disengaged and went back to erect a trophy, etc.  The Spartans considered redeploying for another go but their troops were just too exhausted so they called it a day.  (Conversely, Plutarch's Life of Agesilaus suggests the Spartans may have broken, as Agesilaus is on record as carefully avoiding enforcing the punishment for cowardice in action.)

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But I can't see battles lasting for hours unless there was some kind of variation in intensity.

This I think would depend upon the combatants: if your weaponry is light (shortsword), your training intensive and your protection familiar and not over-encumbering, the actual physical effort would be no more than an afternoon of logging (which incidentally seems to be the most calorie-intensive sustained activity available to humans, at 7,000 calories/day) and probably considerably less.  Classical societies drew their military manpower principally form farmers - men who were accustomed to hard manual labour all day, practically every day, and for whom soldiering may even have represented a welcome change of pace.  Plutarch's Life of Marius describes Marius' and Catullus' fight against the Cimbri, a battle of some duration in which not one Roman was even observed to sweat, so good was their training and conditioning.

On the vexed question of intervals or 'rest breaks' in battle, I think this depends upon military systems: classical accounts have plenty of references to tribal troops in general and Gauls in particular being reduced to gasping helplessness while their trained civilised opponents are still fresh; it is tempting to conclude that at least some tribal societies grew up accustomed to what we may call 'non-continuous combat', with an enforced lull after, say, 15-30 minutes of fighting, and found themselves at a severe disadvantage when opposed by armies who had brought continuous fighting to a fine art.  On the whole it would seem that some battle styles, particularly those of civilised armies, were continuous and some, including those of several 'barbarian' cultures, were not.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that the old WRG recoil mechanism has value in representing Justin's defined battlefield recoil.  A unit bested in melee, if suffering sufficient casualties, falls back a distance.  Depending on its morale/quality rating (not its current morale state), and assuming its opponent presses its advantage,  it can endure this for a number of moves before giving way in rout.  A number of questions can be asked  e.g. :
*Should the winner best the loser by a margin or should a simple better score be sufficient?
*WRG went for 5% casualties as the loss level that could precipitate recoil.  Is this an appropriate level?
*Is basing a break on number of continuous push backs and initial quality better than forcing a morale test each time a unit recoils (i.e. using current morale, not base morale as the key criterion)
I'm sure there are others.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 14, 2014, 11:03:55 AM
On the vexed question of intervals or 'rest breaks' in battle, I think this depends upon military systems: classical accounts have plenty of references to tribal troops in general and Gauls in particular being reduced to gasping helplessness while their trained civilised opponents are still fresh; it is tempting to conclude that at least some tribal societies grew up accustomed to what we may call 'non-continuous combat', with an enforced lull after, say, 15-30 minutes of fighting, and found themselves at a severe disadvantage when opposed by armies who had brought continuous fighting to a fine art.  On the whole it would seem that some battle styles, particularly those of civilised armies, were continuous and some, including those of several 'barbarian' cultures, were not.

Tribal armies that went hell for leather most likely were used to very short battles: one side would swing and hack away longer than the other, which broke first. Battle over in 15 minutes. Given their out-and-out combat style, the idea of a sustained fight, even with pauses, was probably foreign to them.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 15, 2014, 08:07:44 PM
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the old WRG recoil mechanism has value in representing Justin's defined battlefield recoil.  A unit bested in melee, if suffering sufficient casualties, falls back a distance.  Depending on its morale/quality rating (not its current morale state), and assuming its opponent presses its advantage,  it can endure this for a number of moves before giving way in rout.  A number of questions can be asked  e.g. :
*Should the winner best the loser by a margin or should a simple better score be sufficient?
*WRG went for 5% casualties as the loss level that could precipitate recoil.  Is this an appropriate level?
*Is basing a break on number of continuous push backs and initial quality better than forcing a morale test each time a unit recoils (i.e. using current morale, not base morale as the key criterion)
I'm sure there are others.

WRG evaluated everything in terms of 'casualties', which if one tries to pin it down seems to have been a bit more nebulous and wide-ranging than simple body count.  The 'casualties' essentially represented a decline in unit effectiveness, or rather the proximity to a step down in effectiveness.  To trigger recoil, a unit had to receive more of an effectiveness decline than its opponent, and this had to be sufficient to shift the unit's stability (i.e. push it back).  Now we come down to numbers.

The 5% across the board criterion looks like a simplification: some very poor units might run when the first man falls, or even before contact (the Persian left at Cunaxa being a case in point) - this is more probably the territory of the Reaction Test of WRG 6th, a morale and disciplinary threshold to be overcome before combat could be joined.  Once joined, in WRG rules the likelihood of an exactly drawn round of combat between well-matched opponents is quite good, and any imbalance (one side inflicts one more casualty than the other) would seem to represent, or be intended to represent, the accrual of sufficient advantage to start forcing a decision.  If this interpretation is correct, then the system is translating sufficient advantage to confer superiority into a 1-casualty lead, so the threshold is acceptable.  One may note in passing that swings in the random factors of both sides might lead to a back-and-forth engagement, although once one side is recoiling the other receives a "following-up" bonus, making it harder for the trend to be reversed.

Using a number of push-backs related to troop quality as the basic criterion for reaching the rout threshold allows a better-quality unit more chances to attempt to reverse the trend (e.g. by adding a general, having another unit interpenetrate and take over or just pinning hopes on the random die roll getting better).  It seems to work for the system: better units have more chances to reverse the trend, and can generally hold on for longer as one might expect from their generally superior cohesion, while less good ones crack soon after they start crumbling.

What strikes me about the way WRG handles this aspect of combat is the way the elements are integrated: each aspect is part of a system and the way they relate gives an effect not unlike the yielding of one side followed by its recovery when joined by a general (or otherwise helped out) - or its collapse if the rot is not stopped - that we see in numerous source accounts.  The individual aspects may look arbitrary and artificial (can the demise of one man more than the opposition make such a difference? Is it really appropriate to have the Theban Sacred Band pushed back through taking a mere 15 casualties?) but it seems to hang together well enough as a whole.

If in quest of deeper realism, we would have to keep in mind the way the various elements of our new system interact.  For example, fresh troops are rarely pushed back except by overwhelmingly superior opposition: in anything resembling an equal fight it seems to be tired troops, or troops who have been fighting for a while, who customarily 'recoil'.  We could thus build in a mechanism which says that it takes a 2:1 'casualty ratio' to force back fresh troops but only simple superiority to force back tired troops.  We then have to look at what this does to the rest of our rules, and if there are no problems then we may have moved one step closer to representing reality.

Then we have to try it on a variety of army types - some may bring unexpected anomalies.  If on the other hand the tabletop troops start behaving like the accounts of their real-life counterparts, we probably have a winner.