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http://www.historyextra.com/article/bbc-history-magazine/battle-of-hastings-aftermath-consequences-harrying-of-the-north?utm_source=Twitter%20referral&utm_campaign=Bitly&utm_medium=t.co

a nice summary of the next few years after the Battle of Hastings

Good for those doing a history exam with the question "How decisive was the Battle of Hastings?".  And of course for those planning wargames campaigns :)

especially the wargame campaigns bit  ;)

Another interesting find by Holly! Keep it up!

Only a pity it doesn't also touch on the resistence led by Hereward the Wake.

It's interesting to me how popular writing about these events reveal what Peter Rex in his book, 'The English Resistence' called "subconscious pro-Normanism in much writing about the Conquest" - which is very evident here.

There is a lead on, at the bottom, to an article by David Bates about William. Have just bought a review copy of his tome of a book on the subject - hope it is better written than this scrappy article, and not so willfully and loudly revisionist in intent, merely to concede that things are either probably much as previously thought, or unprovable either way.

It might be interesting to air our own thoughts on alternate history: what if the Normans had lost at Hastings, and William had received six feet of English earth for his portion?  What then for Harold and England?

we'd probably continue to have been linked more closely to Denmark and Norway rather than France. which might have given more weight to Northern Europe in European history

I think this would be the jump off point.  Instead of developing interests in France, with consequential wars, we would probably have been part of a series of consequential wars in Scandinavia, where there were already dynastic interests.

Maybe I should be grateful that the Bastard won, because else succeeding English kings might've spent following centuries devastating around here, rather than in France.

Of course, it's no given that a continuing "Saxon" England would've been the sort of centralized and expansionist kingdom that Norman England turned out to be.

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 11, 2016, 03:39:02 PM
Maybe I should be grateful that the Bastard won, because else succeeding English kings might've spent following centuries devastating around here, rather than in France.

My admittedly limited reading of Scandinavian history suggests you didn't really need much help with the devastation - when the Scandinavian countries weren't invading each other, they were suffering from Baltic pirates or fighting civil wars. :)

Quote from: Erpingham on November 11, 2016, 03:51:29 PM
My admittedly limited reading of Scandinavian history suggests you didn't really need much help with the devastation - when the Scandinavian countries weren't invading each other, they were suffering from Baltic pirates or fighting civil wars. :)

Yeah, but there's an extra humiliation in being devastated by Englishmen :P

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 11, 2016, 03:53:02 PM

Quote from: Erpingham on November 11, 2016, 03:51:29 PM
My admittedly limited reading of Scandinavian history suggests you didn't really need much help with the devastation - when the Scandinavian countries weren't invading each other, they were suffering from Baltic pirates or fighting civil wars. :)

Yeah, but there's an extra humiliation in being devastated by Englishmen :P

But I suspect the English might have become more Norse/Danish in the circumstances  ;)

Quote from: Jim Webster on November 11, 2016, 03:56:20 PM

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 11, 2016, 03:53:02 PM

Quote from: Erpingham on November 11, 2016, 03:51:29 PM
My admittedly limited reading of Scandinavian history suggests you didn't really need much help with the devastation - when the Scandinavian countries weren't invading each other, they were suffering from Baltic pirates or fighting civil wars. :)

Yeah, but there's an extra humiliation in being devastated by Englishmen :P

But I suspect the English might have become more Norse/Danish in the circumstances  ;)

Much better to be devastated by one of your own :)

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 11, 2016, 03:53:02 PM
Yeah, but there's an extra humiliation in being devastated by Englishmen :P

British historians seem to regard it as almost an honour. ;)

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 11, 2016, 03:39:02 PM
Of course, it's no given that a continuing "Saxon" England would've been the sort of centralized and expansionist kingdom that Norman England turned out to be.

We have the evidence of Edward (the Confessor)'s reign to suggest that it would not, and Harold Godwinsson's reign to suggest that it would.  I think it would have depended mainly on the monarchs.

Quote from: Jim Webster on November 11, 2016, 01:10:46 PM
we'd probably continue to have been linked more closely to Denmark and Norway rather than France. which might have given more weight to Northern Europe in European history

Inclined to agree.  The Scandinavian connection would be an obvious one to develop, perhaps mainly through dynastic alliance rather than devastation, and the emergence of an Anglo-Norwegian rather than an Anglo-Norman kingdom seems a distinct possibility.  One wonders whether such a realm would have been naval and expansionist, and if so where it would have expanded.

One notable loose end would have been Normandy, deprived of its duke and most of its fighting strength.  Would it have recovered under a new lord, or been absorbed by the Kingdom of France?  And what effect might this have had on Norman expansion elsewhere and, for that matter, participation in the Crusades?

Yes the Norman angle is interesting. I can imagine that they might have been re-absorbed into the Northern world, but there again, they'd actually expanded well into Italy before the conquest of England, and it might be that without England to distract them we'd have seen even more Normans heading south into Italy and Sicily.
Once you've got them, Byzantium looks like an obvious target  8)

I suspect that the French would try to re-absorb Normandy  at some point and there would doubtless be Breton interest in making the most of the situation (although they too would be weakened by their losses at Hastings).  England with a strong king would be quite a well organised and wealthy player in Anglo-Scandinavian developments and could probably face down the Danes (who seem rather luke warm in their English ambitions in 1069-70).  Dynastic alliances both toward France and toward Scandinavia I'd guess, which always risks military intervention.  The channel area is likely to throw up piracy and raiding issues.  English designs on Scotland and Wales predate William (IIRC he claims overlordship of Scotland as King of England, not as a bit of freelance agression) so I'd expect early friction in those areas.  If moving in a Scandinavian orbit, I'd expect the English to be interested in the affairs of Kingdom of Man and the Viking towns of Ireland too.

So all in all, assuming Harold had a reign of reasonable length and the Witan found a capable successor (Edgar Atheling would be well of age by then), we might see England expanding to acquire Wales and Scotland at least as dependencies, become involved in Norway and/or Denmark perhaps as an ally and conceivably as overlord, and tidying up Man while perhaps also becoming involved in Ireland.

Anglo-Saxon kings seem to have been less abrasive than Normans in their style of rule, so one might expect a softer approach with more indirect rule gradually shading into an overlordship and alliance of the rowed-by-seven-kings variety as opposed to a under-heels-of-marcher-lords approach.  This would make for slower progress in empire-building, but perhaps surer.

Medium-term, there is indeed the still-existing French Connection, with cousins here and there, so there might still be the potential for a Henry II-style marriage dowering England with a substantial French (and/or Flemish) inheritance.  Geopolitics has a tendency to intrude on history, and some form of continental entanglement may well have arisen, albeit - and this may be significant - without the feudal subordination which proved such a bone of contention and led to the Hundred Years War.  This is not to say wars would not have occurred, but one suspects they would have been conducted with less venom.  The Anglo-Saxon army would have been able to field good infantry but would need to pull its socks up quite drastically in the cavalry department.

Quote from: Jim Webster on November 11, 2016, 08:32:10 PM
Yes the Norman angle is interesting. I can imagine that they might have been re-absorbed into the Northern world, but there again, they'd actually expanded well into Italy before the conquest of England, and it might be that without England to distract them we'd have seen even more Normans heading south into Italy and Sicily.

Could well be: if Normandy managed to avoid being ruled by Philip I of France (or for that matter Robert Curthose), or for that matter even if it ended up as a French province, disappointed ambition would doubtless have collected around the opportunities presented by the Guiscard campaigns and the First Crusade.

And Alexius would have had to find someone other than Englishmen for his Varangian Guard.  This might provide another historical paradox: assuming he acquired mostly traditional Varangians, perhaps they would not have been so keen to pursue the Normans at Durazzo, conceivably handing Alexius victory in that battle.  If he could improve that into a comprehensive defeat of Guiscard as opposed to just wearing him down as per history, it might even have allowed him to get by without calling for the First Crusade ...

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 12, 2016, 11:11:56 AM
So all in all, assuming Harold had a reign of reasonable length and the Witan found a capable successor (Edgar Atheling would be well of age by then),

Given Harold had two sons, Harold and Ulf by Edith who survived into adult hood, and at least six children by Edyth Swannesha who might not have been accepted as legitimate, why would Edgar Atheling even get a look in?

Jim

Quote from: Jim Webster on November 12, 2016, 12:31:56 PM

Given Harold had two sons, Harold and Ulf by Edith who survived into adult hood, and at least six children by Edyth Swannesha who might not have been accepted as legitimate, why would Edgar Atheling even get a look in?

Jim

We also have his brothers, who may not, in this alternative reality, died at Hastings.   The Godwinsons could have had the makings of a dynasty.

Harold was an immensely charismatic and gifted leader, as is obvious from his earlier campaigns in Wales, the events leading up to Hastings including the victory at Stamford bridge against the mighty Harald 'Hardradi', the marches up and down the country et al.... Yes, with his brothers alive as well as his progeny, I think a powerful dynasty would have been likely (although that may have been a good set up for internecine scrapping, after his eventual death, as well.)

The Scandinavian links were well established, but it is no wonder that that there was a lack of lustre in northern ambitions in these isles after the major defeat suffered, which would have been reinforced by the projected Godwinson dynasty.

The really significant effects that have not been suggested so far would have been in identity, language and culture. Also because of its great wealth, unplundered, this would have been a very different nation, and  I think it would have developed in its already very particular and independent strain of thought and creativity, without the impositions of early Feudalism and the horrible and extreme Cluniac strain of Christianity brought in by the Normans.

I know we are talking armies and territories here primarily, but all that is an outcome of thought, which is formed by language and identity and cultural bias. English (or Anglisch as it might have been) would have been more straightforward, but less idiosyncratic and flexible. This in itself would have changed everything in ways that can't really be guessed.

The unique strain of animistic art that had developed here from earliest times, through the Celts, survived the Romans and been richly developed by the Anglo-Saxons, would have continued in combination with a less harsh and combative Christianity. The thought of that survival is thrilling, and this more independent and unbrutalised society would have had a less utilitarian relationship with the environment. Think what this might have meant long term, for  industrialism and in relation to the British Empire! It might not have existed at all, and via that we might be free of all that post colonial ennui and guilt, as well as the mucked up and plasticised world of climate change and Nuclear threats..... this is from the point of view of someone who recognises that the endless desire for 'growth' and nationalised security has led us to the crisis point of having to find a way out of both.

So I am dreaming - but once again, let's not get too snagged on just our relationship with Europe.

taking the Crusade element a bit further......the Byzantine Empire might have survived longer too

Quote from: Jim Webster on November 12, 2016, 12:31:56 PM

Given Harold had two sons, Harold and Ulf by Edith who survived into adult hood, and at least six children by Edyth Swannesha who might not have been accepted as legitimate, why would Edgar Atheling even get a look in?

And, as Anthony mentions, a pair of brothers.  Good point.  Realistically, we are probably looking at a Godwinson dynasty, as although Edgar Atheling had a better theoretical claim, unless something happened to take the Godwin heirs out of play he would probably have ended up on Crusade or being elected King of the Romans or something.

Quote from: Darklinger on November 12, 2016, 01:56:10 PM
The really significant effects that have not been suggested so far would have been in identity, language and culture. Also because of its great wealth, unplundered, this would have been a very different nation, and  I think it would have developed in its already very particular and independent strain of thought and creativity, without the impositions of early Feudalism and the horrible and extreme Cluniac strain of Christianity brought in by the Normans.

The legal system, and the way it is run, would probably have been very different, too.

Quote
I know we are talking armies and territories here primarily, but all that is an outcome of thought, which is formed by language and identity and cultural bias. English (or Anglisch as it might have been) would have been more straightforward, but less idiosyncratic and flexible. This in itself would have changed everything in ways that can't really be guessed.

The unique strain of animistic art that had developed here from earliest times, through the Celts, survived the Romans and been richly developed by the Anglo-Saxons, would have continued in combination with a less harsh and combative Christianity. The thought of that survival is thrilling, and this more independent and unbrutalised society would have had a less utilitarian relationship with the environment. Think what this might have meant long term, for  industrialism and in relation to the British Empire! It might not have existed at all, and via that we might be free of all that post colonial ennui and guilt, as well as the mucked up and plasticised world of climate change and Nuclear threats..... this is from the point of view of someone who recognises that the endless desire for 'growth' and nationalised security has led us to the crisis point of having to find a way out of both.

I think the main impact of this would have been on relations with immediate neighbours: the Welsh, Scots and Irish; among other things, nobody would have felt a desire or need to carry a Papal banner into Ireland to 'convert' the inhabitants (and acquire slices of their land as a reward).  If such things as Henry the Navigator's trading voyages and Martin Luther's protest against Catholic corruption had gone ahead as historically, we would still have had highly competitive trading empires painting the world in various colours, which itself was a considerable improvement (as far as the locals were concerned) on the Spanish approach to expansion.  Britain had no particular monopoly on attitudes or resources, so I suspect our alternate present day might still have a broadly similar situation (too many people, too few resources, etc.).  That said, for the past couple of centuries the world has pretty much taken its cultural cues from Britain, so a less pecuniary and more holistic mentality would have had substantial influence - assuming Britain had become enough of a world power to wield such influence!

If we look at the various stages of English history up to about AD 1500, we might speculate about how an Anglo-Saxon kingdom would have handled each of them (1066-1100 should be free of major domestic upheavals, at least).  The big question mark is of course the Hundred Years War, but the Scandinavian connection brings in other aspects, e.g. relations with Denmark and Sweden and ultimately the Teutonic Order, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy.

Quote from: Holly on November 12, 2016, 02:14:48 PM
taking the Crusade element a bit further......the Byzantine Empire might have survived longer too

If England had avoided a massive mediaeval entanglement in France, might it have developed a relationship with the Empire via its Scandinavian connections?  Would this perhaps have allowed the Empire to, say, hire an effective English army instead of covetous Catalans in the early 1300s?  This might have significant implications for the existence of the Ottoman Empire.

Yes Patrick and maybe the disastrous 4th crusade would not have happened which significantly weakened the empire (Manzikert aside)

The Norman kings did not conquer Wales or Ireland.mThis was done by Norman nobles on a freelance basis and kings, fearful of the barons getting too big for their boots regularised relationships after the fact.the nature of Norman aggression into these areas was that barons would seize land, build a castle, sub infeudate knights abd then move the frontier forward. The Normans were land hungry in a way the English were not. I think that this carries over into tge attitudes of the English upper class unto today and is very likely behind the several Empires that England held. Simikar greed drove the Normans in Italy and the attacks on the Byzantine Empire and Palestine. There is a mechanism to this conquest which, without castles and the turbulent barons lijely would not gave happened. Without that particular social organopisation I doubt that England would have developed a longbow based army, or sought continental adventure.  Denmark and Sweden are complete backwaters after 1100, with virtually no history at all,monly local news so to speak and I rather think that a non Norman, non continental England would have been much the same. Without an avaricious nobility I doubt that there would have been an industrial revolution, more an evolution and the world map  would not have been painted red in the same way. Most lijely England would have colonised North America because the drive to outflank the Ottoman Empire would have been the same for Western Europe.

Remember that six kings rowed the barge of King Edgar 1 on the river Dee as a sign of Homage. So Scotland, Strathclyde and Wales would doubtless have been regarded as legitimate parts of the Kingdom, from an English perspective  :)

True Jim. As one of the six kings was Magnus of Man, "King of many islands", later English kings (or at least their propagandists) chose to interpret this submission as recognising their right to all islands in the Irish Sea, including Ireland.

Cheers
Mick

Quote from: Mick Hession on November 12, 2016, 10:00:59 PM
True Jim. As one of the six kings was Magnus of Man, "King of many islands", later English kings (or at least their propagandists) chose to interpret this submission as recognising their right to all islands in the Irish Sea, including Ireland.

Cheers
Mick

an easy mistake to make  :-[

Quote from: aligern on November 12, 2016, 08:49:33 PM
Denmark and Sweden are complete backwaters after 1100, with virtually no history at all,monly local news so to speak

Various Wends, Estonians, and Finns might disagree.

England may have gone into the Scandinavian political orbit but geographically, it isn't in Scandinavia.  Trading and political connections with France in particular would have kept the kingdom in touch with mainstream Europe in a much greater way.  These ties may have led to dynastic marriages, which led to contental territorial entanglements. 

As to the model of territorial ambition, we would be very much in the mindset of the Scandinavians, who were certainly not a bunch of mild-mannered stay-at-homes.  As Andreas says, they were busy heading Eastwards.  They were also very lively in the Irish sea.  So backwater status can't be taken for granted.

Which brings us to military systems.

Quote from: aligern on November 12, 2016, 08:49:33 PM
Without that particular social organisation I doubt that England would have developed a longbow based army, or sought continental adventure.

Well ... to cut a long story short, historically the longbow-based army derived from the use of Welsh archers and observations on their effectiveness plus the fact that the feudal system could not be called upon to supply troops for wars in France (the barons regarded the King's French possessions as his own, not the country's, and so felt no obligation to defend them).  Continental adventure would be an option once the home islands were deemed secure, but motive would be lacking unless there was a dynastic connection somewhere (given the arrangements as of AD 1066, this seems quite a likely state of affairs).  If and when our hypothetical Godwinson dynasty involved itself overseas, it would have found the fyrd inadequate to its needs and hence would have to create a more professional, or at least longer-serving, army.  Unless it wanted to be defeated on a regular basis (and if up against the Swedish leidang this would be a distinct possibility) it would need to reconfigure itself as a 'blades and bows' army, perhaps mainly huscarles and longbowmen with a small but increasing cavalry contingent.

If longbowmen impressed the Anglo-Normans they would presumably impress our hypothetical Anglo-Norwegians/Anglo-Godwinsons, and I would suggest that the inability of the fyrd to provide an army capable of serving overseas would have forced the creation of a tighter, leaner, more effective army that could.

The big question to my mind is the extent to which our alternate England would have been interested and involved in seaborne activity, especially exploration.  Any continued interaction with Scandinavia would probably have resulted in Norwegian and/or Danish captains prepared to undertake voyages to new lands on behalf of the King of England; whether the Crown would have shown any interest in following these up is another question.  If nothing else, monastic orders would probably have been interested in colonising the new lands (and occasionally being martyred by the locals) and this would have drawn a degree of trade and settlement with them.

QuoteMost likely England would have colonised North America ...

And conceivably somewhat earlier than historically, if there is any substance to the foregoing.  The basic pattern might have been similar: a combination of resource hunters and religious settlers, with fitful, gradual emergence of towns and very little if any intermarriage with the locals, but it may have led to a major foothold across the Atlantic well in advance of our notional alternate Columbus, who would have to discover something else.  How much of the national energy would have been absorbed by North America is another question: would these new lands with their strange new peoples be seen as just another place to put monasteries and trade for furs, or would they have been seen as a Manifest Destiny for the expansion of the Anglo-Norwegian people?

The Scandinavians not mild mannered stay at homes eh? After 1100 they are pretty well all sitting by log fires through their three month night and enjoying some hygge and the occasional sauna.
History in Mediaeval Europe happens in France  and Italy. Progress elsewhere depends upon your relationship to those centres of culture. England got a head start in this through its Norman connection. Take that away and the lijekihood is that England is relatively remote and not very influential. France is the centre of civilisation and  has four to five times England's potential. Tgere is a high likelihood that Sweyn of Denmark would have given the Godwinssons real problems through to 1085.  I lije Patrick's flights of fancy, but they are greatly dependent upon an English king arising who had a huge amount of initiative.nPerhaps one would have tried to conquer Scotland, though none had for 350 years. I cannot see an English king making headway in Europe, partly because they did  not have the bridgehead that the Angevins French lands provided and partly because the Anglo Saxons never bothered. Why did no Anglo Saxon king build a fleet, sail to Denmark and burn the Vikings homesteads (except for the Dane Canute, of course)  England was large, rich and certainly had ships.... Now as to longbows, there is considerable doubt that they are from a Welsh model. The Norman kings regularly use significant numbers of archers, they are unlike the Anglo Saxons in this.bThe poor old A/S can barely manage the odd sniper at Hastings and have no pressing need for archers against their normal enemies. There are later plenty of men with bows in England and it may well be these that form the longbow force in the 14th century, but one wonders whether , without the Anglo Norman background the English would have bothered with massed archers. Certainly, as I pointed out, they had 500 years to conquer Wales and did not. Whereas tge Nirmans started pushing the frontier withinn a few decades of the Conquest because they had a societal structure that was highly acquisitive.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on November 13, 2016, 06:24:02 PM
The Scandinavians not mild mannered stay at homes eh? After 1100 they are pretty well all sitting by log fires through their three month night and enjoying some hygge and the occasional sauna.

Or, as Wikipedia puts it:

"The period between 1100 and 1400 was characterised by internal power struggles and competition among the Nordic kingdoms. In the years 1150-1293 according to the legend of Eric IX and the Eric Chronicles and Swedish kings made first, second and third crusade to pagan Finland against Finns, Tavastians and Karelians and started conflicts with the Rus with who no longer had any connection with Sweden. The Swedish colonisation of the coastal areas of Finland started at the same time in 12th and 13th century. In 14th century Swedish colonisation of coastal areas of Finland began to be more organised and in the end of the century several of the coastal areas of Finland were inhabited mostly by Swedes."

Quote
History in Mediaeval Europe happens in France  and Italy. Progress elsewhere depends upon your relationship to those centres of culture. England got a head start in this through its Norman connection. Take that away and the likelihood is that England is relatively remote and not very influential. France is the centre of civilisation and  has four to five times England's potential.

But only when unified: one of the effects of Anglo-Norman existence was to spur the unification of France.  Left to itself, France would probably have remained fragmented and factionalised with an occasional strong king pulling everyone together for the odd short-term venture, not unlike Germany of the period.  And the more fragments one has, the more likely one or more of them will seek a dynastic connection with England, and hence provide some manner of continental entanglement, albeit not a direct challenge for the French crown.  It is probably realistic to expect a sustained Flanders connection which expands into a Burgundian one.

Quote
There is a high likelihood that Sweyn of Denmark would have given the Godwinssons real problems through to 1085.

He seemed to lose interest in England after AD 1069 (when he abandoned Edgar Atheling), although he tried again briefly before his death c.1074.  He was certainly prepared to dabble while Norman power remained unconsolidated; if he had tried conclusions with Harold, he would very likely have won himself six feet of English earth.

Quote
  I like Patrick's flights of fancy, but they are greatly dependent upon an English king arising who had a huge amount of initiative. Perhaps one would have tried to conquer Scotland, though none had for 350 years.

There had been an interim Viking problem.  With that removed, Scotland would probably soon have come within England's orbit, more along the lines of a dependent kindgom than an outright conquest, as Jim pointed out concerning Edgar being rowed by six kings as a sign of homage.  That said, Aethelstan did try the direct approach in AD 934, although there again the end result was Constantine's submission, not Aethelstan planting his own posterior on the Stone of Scone.

Quote
I cannot see an English king making headway in Europe, partly because they did  not have the bridgehead that the Angevins French lands provided and partly because the Anglo Saxons never bothered.

Certainly true as of AD 1066; however a continental marriage would have given such a bridgehead, which would leave the king honour-bound to defend his dowry.  I think he would have.  Agreed that any continental aggrandisement would probably have been mainly by marriage and inheritance rather than direct conquest; in this regard, Aethelstan set something of a precedent in "a flurry of dynastic bridal activity unequalled again until Queen Victoria's time".

Quote
Why did no Anglo Saxon king build a fleet, sail to Denmark and burn the Vikings homesteads (except for the Dane Canute, of course)  England was large, rich and certainly had ships....

Why indeed?  The Saxons seemed to have largely forgotten their maritime traditions, but Aethelstan did build a fleet for the conquest of Scotland, and the main limitation on using it against Denmark and Norway seems to have been its 40-day service.

Quote
Now as to longbows, there is considerable doubt that they are from a Welsh model. The Norman kings regularly use significant numbers of archers, they are unlike the Anglo Saxons in this. The poor old A/S can barely manage the odd sniper at Hastings and have no pressing need for archers against their normal enemies.

But they can pick up an available weapons system, as did the Normans.  While the need against their standard opponents was indeed not pressing, new opponents would provide more of an impetus for change.

Out of interest, if English longbows were not Welsh-inspired, where did the idea/design come from?

Quote
There are later plenty of men with bows in England and it may well be these that form the longbow force in the 14th century, but one wonders whether , without the Anglo Norman background the English would have bothered with massed archers. Certainly, as I pointed out, they had 500 years to conquer Wales and did not.

Referring again to Aethelstan, Wales already counted as 'conquered' in Anglo-Saxon terms: he took four Welsh kings (Hywel Dda of Deheubarth, Idwal Foel of Gwynedd, Morgan ap Owain of Gwent, and Tewdwr ap Griffri of Brycheiniog - I do love those names) with him on his AD 934 campaign in Scotland.  Harold Godwinson, while still a noble rather than a king, mounted an effective series of campaign in North Wales (AD 1062-3) leading to the death of Gruffydd ap Llywelyn.  Wales was by no means beyond Anglo-Saxon reach, and it took the Normans almost a couple of centuries to get to the point reached by Aethelstan, and another to get to the point reached by Harold.

I think Anglo-Saxon England and its kings were more dynamic than we give them credit for, and barring a run of Ethelreds and/or Edward the Confessor types would probably continue to be so.

what about the spectre of internal/dynastic strife. The North was a law unto itself, Scotland, Wales, Ireland, Scandinavia were always looking for an opportunity. I am not entirely convinced that the Anglo-Saxon kingdom as an entity was bound to succeed if the Normans hadnt turned up.

QuoteOut of interest, if English longbows were not Welsh-inspired, where did the idea/design come from?

Probably the Vikings, who had six foot yew longbows.  But they are hardly relevant to a discuss of the development of an Anglo-Danish army...Oh, hang on .... :)

QuoteThe period between 1100 and 1400 was characterised by internal power struggles and competition among the Nordic kingdoms.

Much like the preceeding era, then.

Roy's judgment is particularly weird applied to Sweden: he apparently finds the incessant civil wars of the 11th century more dynamic than the intermittent civil wars with external expansion of the following period. Let's keep in mind that areas acquired were bigger than the British Isles.

There is a change in the Norse after the great days of going a Viking. Maybe its because the world toughens up and gets irganised to fight them, but we do not see the establishment of the Danelaw, Russia or  Normandy again. They move on to state organised invasions such as Sweyn , Canute and Hardrada. Of course I buy that the establishment of kingdoms and the nature of Scandinavian geography pitted kings against one another, but the original question was about England and 1066. IMO and wierd as it may seem I see the Scandinavian realms as essentially receiving Frankish cultural and military influence rather than exporting their own. Sure they Crusaded in the Baltic, but is it really an important area in the sense of a growing Europeanness which England joined in with post Conquest and would not have accessed if it had stayed Anglo Scandinavian.
As to the longbow, Of course the Welsh influence is important, but there are significant archer contingents, especially from the Danish heritage recruiting area of Yorkshire, that appear at The Standard and when the king finally gets around to requesting archers they appear everywhere quite rapidly. There is a plausible line for the Welsh origin, via fighting in Wales and Ireland and then Scotland but I wonder if it isn't just that bit too plausible and has been leapt upon by Nationalists to show that the English longbow is in effect Welsh. Its probably some sort of hybrid and the key is the sandwich of woods and mass deployment.
Please don't accuse me of national bias, as I have stated that the A/S state was actually rather sluggish, particularly in military matters.
Cheers
Roy

Quote from: Holly on November 13, 2016, 10:07:57 PM
what about the spectre of internal/dynastic strife. The North was a law unto itself, Scotland, Wales, Ireland, Scandinavia were always looking for an opportunity. I am not entirely convinced that the Anglo-Saxon kingdom as an entity was bound to succeed if the Normans hadnt turned up.

I wondered about that, and ended up thinking this would be largely a matter of the strength or weakness of the monarch.  The Anglo-Norman kingship was not entirely free of such phenomena, and these difficulties were still going strong well into Plantagenet times (albeit the Scandinavians had settled for fighting one another by then) and, Wales apart, were still troubling the Tudors (Pilgrimage of Grace (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pilgrimage_of_Grace) and all that).  We can probably take them as constants which would have surfaced in periods of weakness, although if our putative Godwinson (or Godwinsson) dynasty is anything like Alfred's it will have achieved a great deal before the women of the court start stabbing heirs in the back.

All in all, the Anglo-Normans made a rather poor job of dealing the underlying problems, mainly suppressing rather than addressing.  The Anglo-Saxons would have faced the same problems, but a combination of (comparatively) mild treatment overall and effective campaigning against troublemakers would most probably have ameliorated local feelings and resulted in local princes more or less happily turning up as part of the army for campaigns.  As Nigel (Darklinger) in particular has pointed out, the Anglo-Saxons seem to have had a different ethos and approach to life than the Normans - not that they were incapable of playing rough, but that they did not seem to regard it as particularly necessary or even desirable.

Quote from: aligern on November 14, 2016, 11:23:20 AM
As to the longbow, Of course the Welsh influence is important, but there are significant archer contingents, especially from the Danish heritage recruiting area of Yorkshire, that appear at The Standard and when the king finally gets around to requesting archers they appear everywhere quite rapidly. There is a plausible line for the Welsh origin, via fighting in Wales and Ireland and then Scotland but I wonder if it isn't just that bit too plausible and has been leapt upon by Nationalists to show that the English longbow is in effect Welsh. Its probably some sort of hybrid and the key is the sandwich of woods and mass deployment.

This thoughtfully provides two likely routes for longbow acquisition, so if and when our hypothetical  Anglo-Norwegian monarchy decided that massed longbow archery was a good idea (perhaps for much the same reasons as the Anglo-Normans) it should not be too hard to make it happen.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 14, 2016, 11:47:11 AM

Quote from: aligern on November 14, 2016, 11:23:20 AM
As to the longbow, Of course the Welsh influence is important, but there are significant archer contingents, especially from the Danish heritage recruiting area of Yorkshire, that appear at The Standard and when the king finally gets around to requesting archers they appear everywhere quite rapidly. There is a plausible line for the Welsh origin, via fighting in Wales and Ireland and then Scotland but I wonder if it isn't just that bit too plausible and has been leapt upon by Nationalists to show that the English longbow is in effect Welsh. Its probably some sort of hybrid and the key is the sandwich of woods and mass deployment.

This thoughtfully provides two likely routes for longbow acquisition, so if and when our hypothetical  Anglo-Norwegian monarchy decided that massed longbow archery was a good idea (perhaps for much the same reasons as the Anglo-Normans) it should not be too hard to make it happen.

There is a caveat to Welsh longbow origins.  Traditionally, Gerald of Wales descriptions of powerful Welsh bows and the mass employment by the English have been related and the explanation has been obvious - a super weapon.  But what if the real reason was Wales was full of competent archers who would work for poor pay?  The bow itself was peripheral - no better than those some English troops had.  Archaeology certainly suggests bows using heavy arrows existed in early medieval England, even if they weren't a majority (the nature of the evidence is such concrete assessments aren't presently possible).  Also, massed archery doesn't seem to be a feature of Welsh troops until they were formed into big bodies by Edward I.   Its certainly doesn't disprove Welsh longbow origins but it is a little less clear cut and a bit more complex than Morris and Oman led us to believe.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 14, 2016, 11:47:11 AMAs Nigel (Darklinger) in particular has pointed out, the Anglo-Saxons seem to have had a different ethos and approach to life than the Normans - not that they were incapable of playing rough, but that they did not seem to regard it as particularly necessary or even desirable.

With the exception of killing your political opponents. I recall from Marc Morris' Norman Conquest (https://www.amazon.co.uk/d/cka/Norman-Conquest-Marc-Morris/0099537443/) that one of the differences he sees introduced by Norman political culture is a decline in political murders and executions - he cites the number of times that William forgave rebels, even repeat offenders, or only punished them lightly, and contrasts this with a number of Anglo-Danish killings. Of course the Harrying may suggest that this benevolence had its limits, or extended only to fellow members of the upper classes; but even that was a response to repeated rebellions, not a weapon of first resort.

(The other "beneficial" change that Morris sees under Norman rule is a decline in slavery - William banned the export of slaves from England, and slave-status seems to have gradually vanished in the century or so after the Conquest.)

Is there any evidence in scandanvia of regular links to the established Norman state?

I.e. Can it be shown that a settled feudal Normandy exerted an influence on scandanavia?

I'm assuming after it was fully established and identifiably deff er ent from other biking settlements.

Quote from: aligern on November 14, 2016, 11:23:20 AM
IMO and wierd as it may seem I see the Scandinavian realms as essentially receiving Frankish cultural and military influence rather than exporting their own.

That's hardly controversial. The Viking Age brought more change, as far as culture and technology goes, in Scandinavia itself than in western Europe (Russia is arguably a different case). It's Scandinavia ending up Christianized and vaguely "feudal", not England or France going pagan or something. The Bastard's Normandy is more Frankish than Scandinavian, and even the Islemen quickly adopt many Celtic ways.

What I objected to was the characterization of post-Viking medieval Scandinavia as a peaceful backwater. It wasn't peaceful, it remained expansionist - albeit mostly into areas that Anglophone historiography tends to ignore, such as Germany - and culturally it became much more part of Europe than it had been before. St Birgitta made more of a European splash in her day than any Viking skald or Icelandic saga-writer made before the 17th century.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 14, 2016, 12:39:31 PM
There is a caveat to Welsh longbow origins.  Traditionally, Gerald of Wales descriptions of powerful Welsh bows and the mass employment by the English have been related and the explanation has been obvious - a super weapon.  But what if the real reason was Wales was full of competent archers who would work for poor pay?  The bow itself was peripheral - no better than those some English troops had.  Archaeology certainly suggests bows using heavy arrows existed in early medieval England, even if they weren't a majority (the nature of the evidence is such concrete assessments aren't presently possible).  Also, massed archery doesn't seem to be a feature of Welsh troops until they were formed into big bodies by Edward I.   Its certainly doesn't disprove Welsh longbow origins but it is a little less clear cut and a bit more complex than Morris and Oman led us to believe.

When Henry II sent/allowed Strongbow (interesting name, sadly perhaps not quite what it seems) over to Ireland, what was the composition of the de Clare forces?  I seem to remember army lists with Anglo-Norman knights and bodies of Welsh (longbow) archers.  Or was this just Phil Barker stretching Gerald of Wales?

In any event, it looks as if our hypothetical  Godwinson sovereigns would not necessarily have had to depend upon a Welsh connection should they have felt a need to popularise the longbow.

In terms of speculating on events after a Norman defeat at Hastings, I rather wonder what that would have meant for events in Scotland? Malcolm III had his wrist metaphorically slapped by William for raiding into northern England after the conquest, after all (harried from both sides in the north...), and Scottish kings previously had long "dabbled" in English politics too, including a certain namesake. Plus into the early 12th century, various later Scottish monarchs enjoyed Norman support to gain or maintain their thrones. What would David have been like as essentially a king brought up in England, but under Saxon rulers, not Norman ones, say? Would any of those 12th century events have happened at all - maybe the Scottish border would have been at Durham, or even York, by then!

Not forgetting the Northern (Norse-owned) and Western Isles (loosely Norse finally from almost the end of the 11th century), and what that might have meant for any speculative-future attempts on the English throne by the Scandinavian royal houses.

Then on the other side of the world, a butterfly flaps its wings too smartly, and renders it all moot anyway... ;D

QuoteWhen Henry II sent/allowed Strongbow (interesting name, sadly perhaps not quite what it seems) over to Ireland, what was the composition of the de Clare forces?  I seem to remember army lists with Anglo-Norman knights and bodies of Welsh (longbow) archers.  Or was this just Phil Barker stretching Gerald of Wales?

The Anglo-Norman armies did indeed have quite a proportion of Welsh archers.  These are the archers Gerald has the stories about powerful bows about.  But longbows?  Gerald doesn't mention longbows.  Geralds bows are made of elm, rough finished, powerful but with a short range but no mention of length.  His archers carry only a handful of arrows, so no fast shooting  volleys for them.  As has been said before, Welsh archers were good and, to Norman Welsh lords, available.  If you operate a Norman tactical system of knights and archers, why go anywhere else for your shootists?  Ok, their bowyery is a bit rough round the edges, but its war not a poxy parade, eh Miles?

Quote from: Sharur on November 14, 2016, 09:20:43 PM
Then on the other side of the world, a butterfly flaps its wings too smartly, and renders it all moot anyway... ;D

Cue the sourceror with the butterfly net ...

QuoteIn terms of speculating on events after a Norman defeat at Hastings, I rather wonder what that would have meant for events in Scotland?

The general idea seems to be that the defeat of the Bastard would have greatly enhanced English prestige and that Harold's triumph would have given him and his descendants a unified realm with an unharried north, which would have little difficulty in taking things to roughly where they had been in Aethelstan's time.  My own suspicion/feeling/judgement is that the 'Godwinson dynasty' would have brought Welsh, Scots and Islanders alike into a state of subordination in relatively quick time, judging by Harold's general standard of campaigning and past Anglo-Saxon successes (and assuming that the likes of Ralph the Timid would not be leading armies ;)).

QuoteWhat would David have been like as essentially a king brought up in England, but under Saxon rulers, not Norman ones, say?

David is of course famous for Normanising/feudalising Scotland, so might he have instead 'Saxonised' it, albeit still instituting burghs and monasteries as per history?  My reading of Saxon-style nobility is that, while by no means trouble-free, it tended to be less contentious than its Norman counterpart, and might - albeit with the caveat of Scots temperament - have saved the realm considerable trouble in future.

The essential question would seem to be how far Scotland would maintain or retain subordination to England.  My  own suspicion is that England would have a strong hand in determining the Scots succession, and hence would exercise considerable influence over the realm (anyone named McBeath - or MacBeth - would indeed be familiar with the concept of English support for a preferred candidate!).  Equally, I would posit that because such influence existed, the Anglo-Norwegian/Godwinson successors would not feel it necessary to attempt to impose any form of direct rule (which, realistically, they would know would be resisted tooth and nail).

QuoteWould any of those 12th century events have happened at all - maybe the Scottish border would have been at Durham, or even York, by then!

We are positing an absence of anything (or anyone) resembling King Stephen, so probably not.  The Godwinson dynasty would have its ups and downs, but I would tend to assume it would be similar in nature to Alfred's and hence possessed of more ups than downs.  Complications introduced by possible overseas marriage connections could bring in a new pair of trousers of time, but I think England would remain the dominant partner and ultimately the British Isles would become something of a cooperative venture, with Scots and Welsh supplying good troops and Islemen a useful navy.

One pertinent question is the extent to which our hypothetical England would be subject to civil war: Alfred's dynasty showed a marked lack thereof apart from the occasional revolting noble; the introduction of the Danish ruling house popularised civil strife until Cnut's sons were tumbled off the throne, but thereafter the existence of the Witanagemot seems to have avoided rival claims being backed by armed force, at least within England (the aspirations of Norse leaders and Norman dukes being another matter).

Quote from: Erpingham on November 14, 2016, 10:26:18 PM
The Anglo-Norman armies did indeed have quite a proportion of Welsh archers.  These are the archers Gerald has the stories about powerful bows about.  But longbows?  Gerald doesn't mention longbows.  Gerald's bows are made of elm, rough finished, powerful but with a short range but no mention of length.  His archers carry only a handful of arrows, so no fast shooting  volleys for them.  As has been said before, Welsh archers were good and, to Norman Welsh lords, available.  If you operate a Norman tactical system of knights and archers, why go anywhere else for your shootists?  Ok, their bowyery is a bit rough round the edges, but its war not a poxy parade, eh Miles?

Thanks: in other words, size doesn't matter. :)  My understanding of the Norman tactical system was that it included a significant component of fighting foot in addition to the knights and archers, and this part was missing from, or only very lightly represented in, Strongbow's army, making it in appearance at least a prototype for the kind of army fielded by Edward III in his French wars.

Can we trace the appearance of the longbow in English armies?  Falkirk in AD 1298 seems to be the point at which the English longbow sprang fully-armed from the thigh of history, but Edward I's insistence on banning all sports except longbow archery on Sundays suggests a weapon already in existence among a significant proportion of the population.

The composition of Strogbow's army is similar to that of the later expeditions of Edward 111 for a reason.bEdward at first took spearmen across to France, but must have realised that when you can dismount knights you can have very good infantry and that the money for shipping and food was best spent on archers and knights. The Irish were mostly unarmoured and thus very vulnerable to bowshots. . The original Slingshot article about the Norman Conquest of Ireland ( or rather part of Ireland) showed the Welsh archer with a larg axe, a bit like a a renaissance Streltsi! .
Patrick, we really ought to have rules for alternative history. How far can one diverge from the historical trends that appertain at the time . Does pretty well anything become possible? It is certainly allowable to have William killed at Hastings , because that only needs a horse to stumble, but major changes such as a Godwinsson dynasty that projects power in a way that the English have not historically done, well that is stretching things.  Athelstan and his successors sought submission from their neighbours rather than cession of land or sovereignty. To assume that the Godwins , who may well have had to cope with internal dissension and Scandinavian invasion would be willing or able to project such piwer is pushing the envelope. Similarly with the longbow. The Norman and Plantagenet kings have a long tradition of combining knights and bowmen, ir in Edwatd 1's case knights and crossbowmen. They therefore find that an easy tactical combination to refine and develop.  A good idea such as extending the use of a powerful bow would occur easily to them. Lers face it the Late Anglo Saxon state did not even have decent cavalry. Had a Godwinson inspired invasion of Ireland taken place it would most likely have been composed of solid infantry, not necessarily ineffective there  as the Norse had proven.
I suggest that the key to all this is the mindset of the ruling group concerned. The effect of the Norman Conquest after the rebellions and dispossessions, was to place not just a Norman line on the throne, but a complete class or community in power who have a different way of thinking from the previous elite. The Anglo Danish nobility had strong traditions of operating as solid melee infantry. They had flexibility, such as Harold's use of 'LHI' in Wales, but its a stretch to see them adopting the social system and the technology of the knight, the bow and the castle without being conquered by it. A victory for Harold at Hastings would simply prove to a conservative minded military caste that there way was the best way. To get that thinking to change would require a major shock.
When the English intervened in Scotland under Siward they proved that  they were militarily superior and that  they had no intention of conquering the Scots, similarly in Wales against Gruffyd.  The Godwin's main concern would be a Danish invasion because that would be the most likely threat .

QuoteThey had flexibility, such as Harold's use of 'LHI' in Wales, but its a stretch to see them adopting the social system and the technology of the knight, the bow and the castle without being conquered by it.

The Danish parallel is possibly helpful here - they were never conquered by a Frankish power, but they eventually adopted the mounted knight anyway. Of course, they had an influx of German nobles and longstanding involvement in northern German politics that a Godwinsonian England would not necessarily have an equivalent of.

(In Sweden, knightly equipment was also adopted by the aristocracy, but, judging by the late medieval evidence - there is hardly any of how high medieval Swedish battles were actually fought - shock cavalry never became dominant. This may have something to do with an awful lot of Sweden being covered with wooded hills - the high point of cavalry in Swedish military history is the early 17th to early 18th century, when most wars were fought in more open terrain in Balticum, Poland, and Germany.)

Andreas, do you know when scone adopted the horse as its symbol?

That might indicate something.

If Scone = Skåne/Scania, I confess to being unaware of the horse as a symbol for it. It's modern coat of arms has a Griffin's head, and some googling fails to bring up any mention of the horse being used as an earlier blazon or the like.

It probably wouldn't indicate anything anyway - horses are common in pre-Christian Scandinavian art, and nobles rode long before they started aping continental chivalry.

(It's been suggested that the fact that Odin rides his eight-legged horse when most other Norse gods travel in wains reflects that he's a relative newcomer in the pantheon.)

QuoteCan we trace the appearance of the longbow in English armies?  Falkirk in AD 1298 seems to be the point at which the English longbow sprang fully-armed from the thigh of history, but Edward I's insistence on banning all sports except longbow archery on Sundays suggests a weapon already in existence among a significant proportion of the population.

This is a complicated one and really deserves a thread of its own.  My guess would be that the archers of 1298 were a mixture of types.  The Welsh type was probably fairly coherent in style and technology from their own traditions but were fighting in an alien way.  The English had archery traditions which would include some skilled men (Foresters, Parkers etc were prized) and a lot of semi-skilled.  Everyone brought his own kit, and semi-skilled men probably carried weaker bows than those who did it for a living.  Its only when the state starts both pushing practice and ordering standard kit, thus developing markets and supply chains, that the longbow "comes together" as the standard product and military thinkers in Edward II and Edward III's reign can work out some viable tactics to use the new resource effectively.

Quote from: aligern on November 15, 2016, 10:18:59 PM
Patrick, we really ought to have rules for alternative history. How far can one diverge from the historical trends that appertain at the time . Does pretty well anything become possible? It is certainly allowable to have William killed at Hastings , because that only needs a horse to stumble, but major changes such as a Godwinsson dynasty that projects power in a way that the English have not historically done, well that is stretching things.  Athelstan and his successors sought submission from their neighbours rather than cession of land or sovereignty.

Agreed, although Aethelstan was projecting power in a way no King of Wessex had done before, and he arguably achieved more than the Normans managed to achieve prior to the reign of Edward I (coincidentally the first Anglo-Norman king with an Anglo-Saxon name).  My basic assumption would be that the rest of the world evolves/runs pretty much as it did historically, the major changes being how and when parts of it interacted with England (how's that for an Anglocentric view of the universe?).  The basic Anglo-Norwegian or Anglo-Godwinssonian ethic would be to hold what one has rather than being expansionist, acting primarily as a large fish in a small pond, but acting reactively when others enter the pond, as seems to have been the historical Wessex approach: the Danish incursions stimulated Wessex to take over the whole of England; trouble with the Welsh and Scots stimulated the subjection of those areas, and simply by extending this principle one could expect that repeated Danish/Norse interference (Hardrada, Sweyn) would lead to counter-pressure, i.e. English involvement in Scandinavia.

Involvement on the continent would, as I see it, be principlly a matter of being dragged in by marriage commitments.  The degree of commitment and the results would depend upon which marriage and when: a Flemish connection seems most likely, but dynastic development could evolve in strange ways, as happened when Henry II married Eleanor of Aquitaine.  Suffice to say this one is a bit of a wild card, but I do not see our Anglo-Godwinssonians abandoning a territory or ally that is dropped into their lap.

Quote
To assume that the Godwins , who may well have had to cope with internal dissension and Scandinavian invasion would be willing or able to project such piwer is pushing the envelope. Similarly with the longbow. The Norman and Plantagenet kings have a long tradition of combining knights and bowmen, ir in Edwatd 1's case knights and crossbowmen. They therefore find that an easy tactical combination to refine and develop.  A good idea such as extending the use of a powerful bow would occur easily to them. Lers face it the Late Anglo Saxon state did not even have decent cavalry. Had a Godwinson inspired invasion of Ireland taken place it would most likely have been composed of solid infantry, not necessarily ineffective there  as the Norse had proven.

The role of archers in Norman armies seems to me to be somewhat overstated: yes, they were there, but they were hardly the arm of decision (unless they could, for example, land a shot in the eye of the enemy C-in-C).  While archery proved useful against rhe unarmoured Galwegians at Northallerton in AD 1138, it is the decline rather than the increase in importance of archery that is the most noticeable feature in subsequent years. Slightly more than a century after Hastings, the 1181 Assize of Arms (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assize_of_Arms_of_1181) is notable mainly for its lack of mention of archers.  At Lewes in AD 1264 and Evesham in AD 1265 archers may as well not have been resent for all the effect they seem to have had.

The major change seems to have come with Edward I's conquest of Wales; from this point, archers seem to assume a greater importance in Anglo-Norman armies and appear to be fielded in significantly larger numbers.  There is also the intangible of battlefield control: Edward's archers concentrate their shooting power where it is needed and weaken and attenuate formations.  This is something new and not part of the usual Norman repertoire, or at least it seems so to me.  My conclusion is thus that the later English archery system, subsequently reintroduced with such effect at Dupplin Moor, was the invention of an individual and not part of the Norman tactical system, the corollary being that our putative Anglo-Godwinssonian culture could have developed the system as and when it felt a need.

Quote
I suggest that the key to all this is the mindset of the ruling group concerned. The effect of the Norman Conquest after the rebellions and dispossessions, was to place not just a Norman line on the throne, but a complete class or community in power who have a different way of thinking from the previous elite. The Anglo Danish nobility had strong traditions of operating as solid melee infantry. They had flexibility, such as Harold's use of 'LHI' in Wales, but its a stretch to see them adopting the social system and the technology of the knight, the bow and the castle without being conquered by it. A victory for Harold at Hastings would simply prove to a conservative minded military caste that there way was the best way. To get that thinking to change would require a major shock.

As Andreas has pointed out, this need not have been a barrier to the adoption of heavy cavalry; the principal hurdle to surmount would have been the lack of an equestrian class.  Given that Anglo-Normans habitually dismounted their knights to act as infantry in battle, and Anglo-Saxons habitually mounted their huscarles and, if one may use the term for lack of a better, their select fyrd, dismounting them to fight, the main difference would seem to be the knightly ethos, or lack of it.  The Anglo-Norman or Plantagenet knight, often fighting dismounted, would seem to be in effect a 'missing link' between the huscarl and the billman as much as a new arm of service.

Hastings was, of course, a major shock: had Harold won, it would still have been a major shock, representing as it did the first encounter with an effective cavalry opponent.  The flexible and inventive Harold Godwinson would have been quite capable of raising an equestrian force of his own, but the challenge would have been to avoid it falling into disuse without a clear battlefield role.  Of the trilogy of the knight, the bow and the castle I would see our Anglo-Godwinssons adopting the bow with little cogitation or difficulty, the knight only when up against opponents who used the same and the castle probably not at all, much to the disappointment of English Heritage.

Quote
When the English intervened in Scotland under Siward they proved that  they were militarily superior and that  they had no intention of conquering the Scots, similarly in Wales against Gruffyd.  The Godwin's main concern would be a Danish invasion because that would be the most likely threat .

Agree entirely, and this is what would have sooner or later brought them into Scandinavia as kingmakers or allies of one or another ruler or pretender, and ultimately (unless they received a thorough drubbing) as overlords.

There is one other aspect of English expansionism (or non-expansionism) and culture to consider: religion.  Following Harold's hypothetical victory at Hastings, the Papacy would have been regarded with a certain coolness.  In any subsequent English entanglement with Ireland, nobody would have thought it worth inflicting Catholicism on the Irish.  Matters may have been patched up at some point, but perception of Normans as the 'Pope's pets' would have coloured any English attitudes to crusading and the memory of the Papal blessing and banner for William's failed invasion would have left a visceral bad taste.  Most importantly, we would probably have to choose a different battle for our upcoming Battle Day. ;)

Quote from: Erpingham on November 16, 2016, 10:01:44 AM
Its only when the state starts both pushing practice and ordering standard kit, thus developing markets and supply chains, that the longbow "comes together" as the standard product and military thinkers in Edward II and Edward III's reign can work out some viable tactics to use the new resource effectively.

That makes eminent sense: I see this as the development of a new military system in its own right rather than as a natural progression of the standard Norman 'combined arms' army.  Would this be a fair judgement?

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 16, 2016, 12:21:25 PM
The role of archers in Norman armies seems to me to be somewhat overstated: yes, they were there, but they were hardly the arm of decision (unless they could, for example, land a shot in the eye of the enemy C-in-C).  While archery proved useful against rhe unarmoured Galwegians at Northallerton in AD 1138, it is the decline rather than the increase in importance of archery that is the most noticeable feature in subsequent years. Slightly more than a century after Hastings, the 1181 Assize of Arms (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assize_of_Arms_of_1181) is notable mainly for its lack of mention of archers.  At Lewes in AD 1264 and Evesham in AD 1265 archers may as well not have been resent for all the effect they seem to have had.

I don't think the absence of archers in 1181, 115 years after the Conquest, is good evidence that their importance in Anglo-Norman armies has been overstated. Apart from Hastings and Northallerton, don't forget that Anglo-Norman archery broke up a knightly charge at Bourgtheroulde in 1124. I would say rather that there was a Norman style of warfare that included tactical co-operation between milites and archers, and that went into decline  or transition around the mid-12th century with greater emphasis on the knights and less on the archers. Why the change I'm not sure: increased weight of armour?

Quote from: Duncan Head on November 16, 2016, 01:38:54 PM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 16, 2016, 12:21:25 PM
The role of archers in Norman armies seems to me to be somewhat overstated: yes, they were there, but they were hardly the arm of decision (unless they could, for example, land a shot in the eye of the enemy C-in-C).  While archery proved useful against rhe unarmoured Galwegians at Northallerton in AD 1138, it is the decline rather than the increase in importance of archery that is the most noticeable feature in subsequent years. Slightly more than a century after Hastings, the 1181 Assize of Arms (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assize_of_Arms_of_1181) is notable mainly for its lack of mention of archers.  At Lewes in AD 1264 and Evesham in AD 1265 archers may as well not have been resent for all the effect they seem to have had.

We also shouldn't forget the fascination of the Plantagenet kings with the crossbow.  Richard, John, Henry III and Edward I all used mercenary and to a lesser extent militia crossbowmen.  So missile strength to back up the knights can be seen as a theme.  Of course, a key reason is the amount of siege warfare, rather than just a battlefield thing.

If we assume the Anglo-Normans and the Plantagenets were aware of the potential of archers and crossbowmen in their armies, the decision of Edward I to experiment with strengthening this arm fits into a pattern.  The real boost probably comes in the post-Bannockburn period when working out how to beat the all-conquering Scots becomes an issue.

I don't think the absence of archers in 1181, 115 years after the Conquest, is good evidence that their importance in Anglo-Norman armies has been overstated. Apart from Hastings and Northallerton, don't forget that Anglo-Norman archery broke up a knightly charge at Bourgtheroulde in 1124. I would say rather that there was a Norman style of warfare that included tactical co-operation between milites and archers, and that went into decline  or transition around the mid-12th century with greater emphasis on the knights and less on the archers. Why the change I'm not sure: increased weight of armour?

QuoteI suggest that the key to all this is the mindset of the ruling group concerned. The effect of the Norman Conquest after the rebellions and dispossessions, was to place not just a Norman line on the throne, but a complete class or community in power who have a different way of thinking from the previous elite.

Yes - this is the key - and thinking about the Anglo-Saxon power structure that was replaced (though, as Patrick noted, much of the underlying structure of their laws - and eventually their culture including language - wasn't. Domesday was as much an A.-S. piece of thinking as Norman, and William swore, on his coronation, to uphold the specifically A.S. law of Edward the Confessor..... which of course caused much of the friction later with Pope Innocent and the growing sense of the investment in the structure of rule, rather than the individual). The decisive thing here is the continuation of  A-S rule and outlook.

On the narrower point (wah wah waah...)  the disparagement of Anglo-Saxon archery - and use of cavalry - is most likely quite wrong, simply put. Much of this came out of Norman disparagement and scorn, underrating and misunderstanding with a total lack of sympathetic imagination of Harold's predicament, up to and including Hastings.

Simply put there is no decent evidence for the later Anglo Saxons using cavalry. There is plenty of evidence that they bred and rode horses, plenty of evidence that they rode to battle and that they could mount up in a pursuit, but nothing that is safely contemporary that has them fighting effectively from horseback. By 'fighting effectively' I mean operating as cavalry in formations, charging, falling back, rallying, having tactics for attacking formed infantry as the Normans did.
Similarly really with bows. They obviously used them in war, a bow appears  on the Bayeux Tapestry , the story of the Viking  blocking the bridge at Stamford Bridge being shot at ineffectually might be true, and arrows are mentioned in the Maldon poem, but its not evidence for substatial use of the bow, whereas William recruited extra archers for Hastings, no doubt aware that this was an English weakness.
And no, I am not about to roll over  and accept a thirteenth century Icelandic Saga that sounds oh so suspiciously a lift of a description of Hastings.
But if you do have any conclusive evidence for cavalry or significant numbers of bows then please tell us  ;-)). Roy

These things.

http://www.houzz.com/photos/380252/Dala-Horse-by-Mid-Mod-Mom-traditional-decorative-accents

I thought they were skane, seems its all sweden. 

Quote from: Duncan Head on November 16, 2016, 01:38:54 PM
I don't think the absence of archers in 1181, 115 years after the Conquest, is good evidence that their importance in Anglo-Norman armies has been overstated. Apart from Hastings and Northallerton, don't forget that Anglo-Norman archery broke up a knightly charge at Bourgtheroulde in 1124. I would say rather that there was a Norman style of warfare that included tactical co-operation between milites and archers, and that went into decline  or transition around the mid-12th century with greater emphasis on the knights and less on the archers. Why the change I'm not sure: increased weight of armour?

It could be: Orderic Vitalis points out that at Bremule (AD 1119) "in which about nine hundred knights were engaged, only three were killed."  My basic point, which perhaps needed a little refinement, was that archery became de-emphasised for a while prior to the adoption of the longbow, which suggests that the tactical system based on the latter was a divergence from, rather than a development of, Anglo-Norman practice.  The underlying point, that our hypothetical Godwinsonian England could and probably would have adopted the longbow once it saw a need, I deem reinforced by the apparent evidence that archery was consciously revived by Edward I as opposed to being a straight continuation from the state of affairs in the mid-13th century.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 16, 2016, 02:10:35 PM
We also shouldn't forget the fascination of the Plantagenet kings with the crossbow.  Richard, John, Henry III and Edward I all used mercenary and to a lesser extent militia crossbowmen.  So missile strength to back up the knights can be seen as a theme.  Of course, a key reason is the amount of siege warfare, rather than just a battlefield thing.

If we assume the Anglo-Normans and the Plantagenets were aware of the potential of archers and crossbowmen in their armies, the decision of Edward I to experiment with strengthening this arm fits into a pattern.  The real boost probably comes in the post-Bannockburn period when working out how to beat the all-conquering Scots becomes an issue.

Indeed.  However the earlier de-emphasis of archery (with or without crossbows) suggests the pattern was sufficiently loose and irregular for a different hypothetical English culture to be able to adopt it.  Sooner or later, our Godwinsonians would have started to encounter foes against whom missile capability mattered, and it looks as if there were sufficient roots (and routes) to postulate the adoption of the longbow in such circumstances, resulting in something resembling Wars of the Roses infantry, except with axemen in place of billmen.

Cavalry would probably develop as and when it became fashionable among neighbours, and growing awareness of classical texts (and cavalry successes on the continent) prompted a feeling that it should be part of the military repertoire.  The big difference I see is that it would not necessarily have been identified with aristocracy, perhaps having a status more like Navarrese mesnaderos or classical Roman cavalry.

Have just spent longer than I care to admit putting a reply together, all lost by my hitting I do not even know what on this keyboard.... so this is the much shorter version:

Quotethere is no decent evidence for the later Anglo Saxons using cavalry

I have to disagree, tho' this is as you probably know an old chestnut, argued over for about a hundred years.
There is, it is true, no overwhelming evidence, and I will not claim, obviously, that they were as effective as the Norman cavalry, but then an argument over that length of time is unlikely to have that evidence in sight. But there is no possible way that A.S. forces got around the country dealing with both mounted and fast river-borne Viking raiders without extensive use of mounts, and where this stops being cavalry and becomes mounted infantry..... The record of A.S. cavalry at Hereford in 1055 is undisputed, even tho' they were unsuccessful. Is it likely they would only appear, ONCE?
Snorri is subject to Slur again! But at this hour of the night argument over him will have to be set aside, because the slur on the A.S. archer, a commonly believed piece of Normanism, is much worse:
"...he was from a hard kindred of the Northumbrians, his name was Aescferth, Ecglaf's son, he did not shrink back at the war-play; rather he sent forth arrows swiftly - sometimes he hit a shield, sometimes he pierced a warrior; time and again he dealt out wounds while he was able to wield his weapons." Translation by Pollington. Archers are common in A.S. poetry, as they must have been by sight and experience (most men would have trained with bows for hunting, at least). In the Maldon poem as elsewhere there is nothing but appreciation (by the A.S.'s) for the skill and usefulness of their own bowmen, and this is not to be belittled.
Evidence of the effectiveness of bowmen is in art as well as literature - as in The Franks Casket in the British museum, on a panel of which can be seen a lone bowman defending a building against a warband.
As well as being tired, and I would guess in many instances 'traumatised', the force on the hill near the apple tree that fateful day was possibly still assembling and incomplete even as the battle was lost. So the Tapestry and the other sources that make Hastings the most represented of A.S. battles (surviving evidence, anyway) may have been right to show few archers - but it does not mean they were not in common A.S. battlefield use in the late period, or ineffective.
Though, as I said, the evidence itself is not overwhelming, it is in the context of the Norman defeat and apparent complete dismemberment of A.S. England that we should consider these things - and ask what is much the most likely. After all, it is the view of the victor that becomes commonly held belief. Everywhere, the Norman attitude to Saxons before and after the quelling of resistance was scornful, belittling and high handed. It was not the attitude that some other victors have had, of building up their foes to look better themselves.

QuoteWilliam recruited extra archers for Hastings, no doubt aware that this was an English weakness

This is where Normanism becomes clear. I would take it as probable evidence that he was wary of Anglo-Saxon archers, instead.

I think it may be worth reviewing the popular (mis?)conception that the Anglo-Saxon army contained only a scattering of archers.  In fact, I am wondering whether someone (Nigel?) would be prepared to consider doing a Slingshot article on the subject.

There is a bit of a danger we'll get into one of those arguments where the losers (English) have been defamed by the winners (Normans) and so we lack evidence of how things really were.  There is always some truth to this but it can lead to some speculative stuff. 

Nigel has already noted most of the usual evidence, missing only the Brunanburh poem " shot over shield" line.    But I'm not convinced of massed archery by the Saxons and there maybe a parallel with Viking examples, where bows certainly existed but references to archery tend to be more individual.  Too much is made of the lone archer on the Bayeux Tapestry.  Is he a "lone sniper"?  A representation of a skirmish line?  Where in relation to the shieldwall is he actually standing?  Or is he just there to demonstrate there were archers on the English side too?

On cavalry, I'm reasonably certain that the professionals in the English army could fight from horseback if needs be.  But it doesn't mean they were good at it or they would be a match for mounted Normans.  I think the evidence still points to the fact that shieldwall fighting on foot was the prefered tactic.  The idea of Hastings being a triumph of the modern cavalry army over an old-fashioned infantry one is coloured by a backward reading of history emphasising the rise of the knight.  Both sides were using perfectly viable tactical systems and were good at what they did, which is partly why the battle took all day.

As for Snorri's Stamford Bridge being a copy of Hastings, often said but not easy to evidence.  Personally, I suspect that Snorri has padded out his limited sources with contemporary 13th century practice because he can't have the end of Harald Hardrada a damp squib of "The English and the Norwegians fought and the English had the victory" variety.  But that's another discussion :)

Oh no, the archers (and crossbowmen) at Hastings are much more likely an expansion of the numbers that Williamnwould normally field becausevhe knew that the Anglo Danes were likely to be a static infantry block that would seek covered flanks to negate his cavalry.  He was going to have to wear down such a force before breaking in and missilemen were ideal for that. He could, of course, have dismounted his knights and mixed units of them with his spearmen, but that would only produce an infantry force similar to the English, but much less in numbers. 

John of Worcester's description of the English fighting mounted on the battlefield under Earl Ralph, was that   'he is said to have ordered the  English to fight on horseback 'contrary to their custom'.  Strange that this point should be made if the Anglo Danes regularly fought as cavalry??
In effect John is making a point of the onceness of the attempt at cavalry action.
The above is not the only instance of a chronicler, some distance from the event, but half the distance of Snorre Sturlason telling us that the English did not fight on horseback...
The argument that the English must have been able to fight on horseback, but not as well as the Normans is one of those consolation prize statements. There is good written evidence that they fought on foot, but rode to battle, rode in pursuit. There is good pictorial evidence of them riding to the battle and yet fighting dismounted in a context where, if they usually fought mounted, they would be shown fighting mounted.
As to bows I have no doubt that they were used, but in small quantities.  The use of the bow was a commonplace for hunting, but hunting is not war. Having a bow is not turning up in units and delivering showers of arrows. It may well be that you had the best huntsmen on your estate near you so that you, earl or bishop could say 'Pot that fellow Edward!' but its not concentrated archery.  I do think, though that there may have been more archery in Danish settled archery, though with them  the bow is a component of naval warfare and I cannot recall anything referring to bows in an English fleet.
Patrick, re you point of the bow falling out of favour, this was explained. The Plantagenets plumped for crissbows, had. them in droves and bolts by the barrel load as the Welsh found out when they were use in conjunction with pinning cavalry at Orewin Bridge.  As someone here said, that might have had an impact on looking to make bows more powerful and standardised?
Roy

QuoteJohn of Worcester's description of the English fighting mounted on the battlefield under Earl Ralph, was that   'he is said to have ordered the  English to fight on horseback 'contrary to their custom'.  Strange that this point should be made if the Anglo Danes regularly fought as cavalry??

Wasn't this a force from the fyrd rather than the housecarles, though?  Harold and his enourage seem to have had no problem fighting on horseback on their forced stay in Normandy.   As I said previously, I think infantry fighting was their preference but mounted fighting was probably in their armoury somewhere.  Tactically, though, I'd expect them to be more like the Welsh than hard-charging Normans if they had to fight on horseback.

The huscarls, of course they must be the Saxons missing cavalry? Just why should a troop of chaps , many hired from Denmark, who are expected to use two handed axe and spear and shield become squadrons of cavalry? Why when they betake themselves to Byzantium after the loss of England do they join the imperial foot guards?
So Harold went to the continent, maybe to convey Edward's offer of the throne to Willam, maybe to negotiate the release of his hostage relatives, Wulfnoth and Hakon....whatever, he was a prisoner, he rode with William to Brittany, he rescued some Frenchmen from  a quicksand, he was present at a siege, he fought no battles. It is not evdence for Anglo-Saxon cavalry.

it is a seductive answer to have the Anglo Danes as cavalry of an inferior sort. I buy the idea that its not much of a leap from pursuit and killing from horseback to amateurish cavalry action, but it is far below charges, hard retreats, breaking and reforming, performing simultaneous turns, throwing javelins from horseback, using the trained horse as a weapon, breaking into infantry formations and all the other detailed tactical things that real cavalry do and, without some real evidence we should be careful of creep where they must be able to take part in limited cavalry action.

Roy

I'm not arguing for the Huscarles being primarily cavalry - the evidence points to the fact they are primarily very good infantry.  But how much had continental influence been felt through Norman contacts?  Andreas pointed out the Danes evolved cavalry in the 12th century through contact with the Germans and the Rus developed cavalry despite a Viking ancestry.  Were Anglo-Danish housecarles completely cut off from this thinking?

But, if they could fight mounted, I'd still be counting them as inferior on horseback and unlikely to fight mounted in normal circumstances.  After all, even German cavalry fought dismounted at Civitate because they felt the tactical situation warranted it.

Anthony , of course we all know that you are not arguing for huscarls being 'primarily' cavalry ;-). However I do take heart from your pointing out that Danish cavalry appear in the twelfth century....a lot later. It is a bit of a leap to describe these Danish and Anglo Danish  warriors as 'the ' Huscarles', as though they have some corporate existence and are looking  at military techniques . Huscarls, who are basically the armed household men of the earls and major landowners are from a Society in which the warrior rides to battle and fights on foot. The warriors they will meet do the same and any that do not..mounted Welsh or Scots do not  pose any threat to formed spearmen, thus why should they pay any attention to cavalry developments in countries with which they do not expect to be at war.

I too have written army lists that have a unit of A/S cavalry in them on the premise that there is armed and aggressive pursuit after Brunanburh , that the warriors rode and could have acted as poor cavalry......but I struggle to find where they actually did , except for the men of Hereford and I dread to think what their fighting value or morale might be!
Roy

I doubt if we really differ much in thinking.  But, looping back to Patrick's alternative reality, it does partly come down to how insular the Anglo-Danish elite were, especially when it cae to continental influences.

Its also a matter of how military change occurred. Alfred made huge changes, but all had antecedents.
Burhs...well there were already fortified places, he just built more.
The navy..he combined Viking and Freisian ship designs, he copied mechanisms for raising a fleet from those for raising an army.
Rotating garrisons and field armies... that appears new, but may rely upon an older system.
Later Huscarls are really only the kings stipendiary warriors and household but with a Danish twist that may involve a corporate body and laws.
The Normans in N France copy the mounted tactics of the Franks, they intermarry and follow their relatives way of war.  I inagine not fighting on horseback would have been social suicide for status hungry Scandinavians?
As Andreas says the Danes follow the precedent of German knights who move there, possibly in the same way that Normans move to Scotland.
Had the English resistance to them jot been so strong under the Godwins and had Ralf of Hereford been a more impressive warrior, maybe the English would have morphed into cavalry. Had the Scots taken in Normans and become formidable maybe that would have provided a model, however, the Satandard does not show a case whereby traditional English foot tactics were in any way inadequate for dealing with the king of Scotland.
Change tends to occur through two methods, borrowing and extending and with cavalry either could have got them there, but neither was a certainty because the existential crusis that stimulates major changes in military practicise was not there. 

In the spirit of cheerful contrariety, chaps, I present a marvellous image !

I don't believe the Anglo-Saxons had a standing cavalry arm, or that they massed archers in some prescience of Crecy and Agincourt - plainly to make those kind of claims would be absurd.

But I do think that they were varied and possibly flexible in their use of mounts, and used archery as a serious arm to influence conflicts in their favour.

Another marvellous thing that has encouraged my outbursts is the great tome published on the 950th anniversary of Hastings, 'William the Conqueror' by David Bates, Yale Uni Press 2016. His thoughts about the Anglo-Saxons and their army are too bound up with the narrative to prise out the telling quote, but it is a wonderful read. (Having said that, 'The Archers' bit is on page 238.)

Great mage of a chap lghting a fire by using one of those friction bows. We can see the pile of twigs beneath it ;-))

Ha ! That's the 'True Vine', - the Vine of Truth, appropriately enough, that you're talking about! Revealed with the image of  - an Anglo-Saxon archer!

Quote from: aligern on November 17, 2016, 10:53:56 AM

Patrick, re you point of the bow falling out of favour, this was explained. The Plantagenets plumped for crissbows, had. them in droves and bolts by the barrel load as the Welsh found out when they were use in conjunction with pinning cavalry at Orewin Bridge.  As someone here said, that might have had an impact on looking to make bows more powerful and standardised?

And then a certain Plantagenet decided that crossbows were not so great after all, and suddenly longbows were in the majority.

The basic point here as I see it is not that the Anglo-Saxons may or may not have fielded less archers than the Anglo-Normans, but that our hypothetical Anglo-Godwinsonians would have been as toxonomically adaptable as the Plantagenets once they felt that mailed infantry with big choppers were not the answer to everything, and they might if anything have been inclined to give the 'foreign' crossbow a miss in favour of home-grown 'proper' bows.  Best guess: the longbow becomes part and parcel of the system alongside the huscarles at around the same time Edwards I-III historically put it to good use.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 17, 2016, 11:25:44 AM

Harold and his enourage seem to have had no problem fighting on horseback on their forced stay in Normandy.   As I said previously, I think infantry fighting was their preference but mounted fighting was probably in their armoury somewhere.  Tactically, though, I'd expect them to be more like the Welsh than hard-charging Normans if they had to fight on horseback.

Interesting observation about Harold's entourage, which suggests that some huscarles at least were not far from being effective cavalry.  Cavalry has two aspects: horsemanship and training, and the widespread use of mounts among Anglo-Saxons suggests that basic horsemanship was already there.  Charlemagne turned his foot-fighting Franks into effective cavalry within a generation, and the Norsemen who settled in Normandy developed the art relatively rapidly, so it is quite likely that the Anglo-Godwinssons could have fielded effective cavalry in a fairly short time had they felt the need.

Its main tactical role would probably have been much as Anthony surmises: a mix of scouting and pursuit, with a likely secondary role of countering enemy cavalry manoeuvres, perhaps by remaining in reserve and then unleashing a charge as mounted attackers fell back from an unsuccessful assault on the infantry.

As I think we generally agree, the arm is unlikely to have developed spontaneously in a vacuum; its adoption and adaptation would depend upon the kind of opponents faced.  As with archery, the basic elements seem to have been there and just needed to be brought together and hammered into definite form by a strong royal initiative.

Quote from: Darklinger on November 17, 2016, 09:36:52 PM

Ha ! That's the 'True Vine', - the Vine of Truth, appropriately enough, that you're talking about! Revealed with the image of  - an Anglo-Saxon archer!

A man hunting with a shortbow in a vinyard?

QuoteA man hunting with a shortbow in a vinyard?

Ye unbelievers - the Truth revealed to ye by thy Darklinger!

Well, it's a piece of Christian symbolism, really. Christ was seen as The True Vine, the giver of the Fruits of Truth. The archer seems to be a metaphor for God and his true aim, spreading His word. It's a large fragment of a cross, 8th century, A.S.

It stands a few feet away from the Frank's Casket (that's after the chappy who found it, not the peoples who gave their name to France).

From 'The Crooked Stick  - A History Of The Longbow' by Hugh D.H.Soar:

" The upper face of a whalebone casket, circa 750 ad, depicting a Saxon householder succesfully defending his property with bow and arrows. Notice the circular shields and the arrows descending from above."

The casket astonishingly combines pagan Germanic, pagan Roman, Christian, Jewish and an unknown foundational myth for the respective peoples. (The Roman one is Romulus and Remus.) The Germanic archer is named Egil, and the story shown is also unknown, but we do know that Egil was the brother of Wayland  (as inthe Wayland's Smithy in Wiltshire). This gives something of the sense of how deep in the Saxon consciousness these things were.

Quote from: Mark G on November 16, 2016, 08:40:08 PM
These things.

http://www.houzz.com/photos/380252/Dala-Horse-by-Mid-Mod-Mom-traditional-decorative-accents

I thought they were skane, seems its all sweden.

Ah. Actually, they're strongly associated with Dalecarlia; the Swedish name is even dalahäst "horse from Dalecarlia". The oldest surviving example is from ca 1560.

They're definitely nothing to do with noble cavalry, since Dalecarlia famously didn't have a nobility. Its peasantry had a reputation for making good soldiers (and for rebelling at the drop of a hat), but fought as infantry.

I agree with Patrick re the cavalry aspect of the Anglo-Saxons post our alternate future William loses Hastings scenario. In britain before the Normans arrived (with their fancy ways and silly haircuts) warfare was not confined to these fair isles exclusively but as an island entity mostly so. In isolation (much as evolution in animals and plants), warfare here becomes 'set' in a certain way. There is no urgent/majo reason to change as such or its a slow progression (much like shield design). the Normans changed all that and brought a well developed cavalry arm in vast numbers (an important point) to these shores the likes of which hadnt been seen for nearly 700 years. Change drives change.

If the Anglo-Saxons (sans Normans) had been left in isolation on this island, progress with cavalry would have been slow but probably continue. If the Anglo-Saxons had decided to go 'on tour' to the continental mainland for whatever reason (booty/marriage alliances/boredom etc) they would have had to develop a cavalry arm a lot quicker bearing in mind what was happening in France etc

I think the cavalry question is a moot one...Anglo-Saxons would have developed one, I just believe its more a case of how quickly this process would have been

Perhaps you lads need to be more systematic in your versioning of history.

The likelihood  is that maritime interventions that involve the A/S would be providing a fleet, harrying coasts and besieging and holding coastal castles. Its not impossible that they foray further inland and it would very likely be in conjunction with allies as the A/S had no bridgehead in Europe. An ally would be expected to provide cavalry cover to any expedition. That might, of course bring foward the 'infantry revolution'  from the fourteenth to the twelft century :-))

What you are both ignoring is the Crusades. It is likely that England would send a contingent and there they would be involved in a transformational experience........especially fighting Saracens without effective cavalry or much in the way of missiles. But again providing good infantry might be the contribution the team needs .
The Crusades are important because we have to assume that the rest of history marches on. Oh and don't assume that A/S England moves on without coming to an accommodation with the Pope. That would be a really difficult position for any kingdom connected into the Western European mainstream for any length of time.
Roy

thats assuming the crusades occur in the same way if at all......Normans and French malcontents are a big reason for the kick off....no Norman conquest = a different timeline for the crusades therefore it isnt a given that the Anglo Saxons get involved.....?

Errr?  The Crusades occur because the Byzantines appeal  for help and are staffed largely by French and Germans who are not related to the situation in Normandy/ England!

yes and my (badly) made point is that no Norman hold on the throne of England means there isnt necessarily any involvement (or very limited) in the 1st crusade? ie England/Britain more insular possibly more infighting between north/south(east/west too!)/dynastic instabilities keeps them all busy...

back to the butterfly methinks :)

Quote from: Holly on November 18, 2016, 09:46:18 PM
yes and my (badly) made point is that no Norman hold on the throne of England means there isnt necessarily any involvement (or very limited) in the 1st crusade? ie England/Britain more insular possibly more infighting between north/south(east/west too!)/dynastic instabilities keeps them all busy...

back to the butterfly methinks :)

Alternatively peaceful and wealthy England could have grown stronger.
1066 brought with it both the end of a Dynasty and the start of another (always a tricky time) which was managed peacefully, but which attracted two foreign invasions.
It could have been a century before the same weakness reoccurred. Normandy could just have kept exporting men south, being gradually drawn more and more into 'France' and we could have seen a Strong united England facing a more united France across the channel.

;)

so instead of disaffected English going to Constantinople it might have been more and more Normans Jim?

So it could have been 1166 France vs England but to put the question in there.....who would invade who?

Quote from: aligern on November 18, 2016, 07:30:36 PM
That might, of course bring forward the 'infantry revolution'  from the fourteenth to the twelfth century :-))

I see much to recommend this suggestion.  Without a knightly ruling class, there would be no particular motive to favour cavalry as the arm of decision unless it actually decided battles.  Typically during the period it did, but only when not up against good infantry.  Given the likely primacy of English infantry in our hypothetical history, enhancing its capabilities to make it effectively cavalry-proof seems a logical line of development.

Quote
What you are both ignoring is the Crusades. It is likely that England would send a contingent and there they would be involved in a transformational experience........especially fighting Saracens without effective cavalry or much in the way of missiles. But again providing good infantry might be the contribution the team needs .
The Crusades are important because we have to assume that the rest of history marches on. Oh and don't assume that A/S England moves on without coming to an accommodation with the Pope. That would be a really difficult position for any kingdom connected into the Western European mainstream for any length of time.

Given the legacy of the Papal banner and blessing, I doubt that England would respond directly to Deus Vult.  Some form of accommodation with the Papacy would be on the cards, but with a different Pope and with a lingering aftertaste of suspicion and dislike, especially as the Normans remained the 'Pope's pets' for quite some time.  So I suspect no English contingent in the First Crusade, or the Second, (but then historically we did not have one anyway*) and it is only around Third Crusade time - assuming events in the Holy Land march as historically - that we might or might not get a Crusading king.

*Apart from the force which, having assembled at Dartmouth in the midst of King Stephen's civil war, got as far as Lisbon (AD 1147) and decided to help out there.

What might be the case is a developing sympathy with the Byzantine Empire.  The Norwegian/Danish connection would have helped to create awareness of the Empire, and it is possible that it could have been seen as a potential counterweight to the Papacy, although doctrinal differences and a lack of Greek would prevent any actual detachment from the Latin way of worship.  More to the point, it could have become a trading partner and source of cultural inspiration: Byzantine fashion may have made its way to our alternate England, and Byzantine military knowledge, too.

If this were to happen, then England might well get into the habit of sending fleets and contingents of volunteers to fight for the Empire when things were quiet on the domestic front.  If nothing else, it would be a good way for experienced warriors to earn gold.  It may also mean that if things did flare up with France, English sea-power might have had an ace up its sleeve.  The Byzantine Connection remains something of a wild card, but I see it as a distinct possibility given that both powers had awareness of each other and bad experiences of Normans.

Quote from: Holly on November 18, 2016, 10:46:27 PM
So it could have been 1166 France vs England but to put the question in there.....who would invade who?

It would presumably depend upon who had 1) the claim and 2) the better navy.

clearly the naval power is the key to it. If, and assuming a myriad of ifs in all the alternate universes we are creating, England/Britain developed its navy and power base unmolested by foreign interference for a century, I fancy it could have been us to them. How we fared against cavalry heavy armies on the continent is then back to the (semi) original point! 

Quote from: Holly on November 18, 2016, 10:46:27 PM
so instead of disaffected English going to Constantinople it might have been more and more Normans Jim?

So it could have been 1166 France vs England but to put the question in there.....who would invade who?

well the drain of Normans south was going on long before 1066, they were involved in the Lombard Revolt in 1009. They were in Byzantine service in 1038 in Sicily, by 1050s they were serving in Asia Minor and in 1072 Roussel de Bailleul was trying to set up his own kingdom there.
With no outlet in England I would suggest that surplus younger sons would have ridden in other directions

Holly, I rather think that in mediaeval times arms decline when there is no threat and no great opportunity. When England was less under threat from Vikings the fleet decayed, as did the burgh system and most likely the rotational fyrd system. People do not like paying taxes, especially when they can see no immediate need. 
Roy

Roy has a point.  England could have stagnated militarily under Harold if there was no threat.  But this wasn't entirely true.  There was still a Danish claim and this may have led to a period of at least military alertness and perhaps even military entanglement in Scandinavia.  In the end, it would come down to the ambitions of the dynasty and whether they settled into a period of peaceful trade and cultural exchange or constant attempts to impose their will on the states around them.

Internal consolidation. Bored Earls = unrest therefore Harold/Godwinson dynasty would have found stuff to do  ;) I suspect Wales, Scotland and eventually possibly Ireland might have found the Anglo-Saxons pushing for more purchase

The North would be an obvious issue.  The Anglo-Scottish border was far from solidified (Strathclyde, anyone?) and pushing the border northwards might have been a way to keep the Northern Earls busy and stop them from getting too chummy with the Danes.

The difficuly with the North is that the border region is a desert.  By that I meannot a great place for basing troops. Thus it is hard to hold land north or south of it unless you are prepared to be there in strength. The difficulty is the same whether you are the Scots or English ruler. The Scots claimed Cumbria, but could not hold it, the English had a good go in the thirteenth century but could not defeat the geography, long term , without an effort that was disproportionate.
Roy

With hindsight, we can see that it was impossible for the English to hold down Scotland.  But breaking parts away from Scotland (like Strathclyde or even Lothian) may have been possible.  Certainly possible enough to be considered.

Strathclyde, Lothian and fife would be pretty much the only bits worth bothering with.

A working navy to ensure supply to the east coast could have made up for the land route problems.

The borders, highlands and islands certainly weren't worth the effort of themselves.

Quote from: aligern on November 19, 2016, 12:46:36 PM
The difficuly with the North is that the border region is a desert.  By that I meannot a great place for basing troops. Thus it is hard to hold land north or south of it unless you are prepared to be there in strength. The difficulty is the same whether you are the Scots or English ruler. The Scots claimed Cumbria, but could not hold it, the English had a good go in the thirteenth century but could not defeat the geography, long term , without an effort that was disproportionate.
Roy

depends what you mean by the Border area. The Eden valley and Solway plain is excellent agricultural land and a lot of it. There's even good land round the south coast of Galloway. On the other side of the country there's good land along the Tweed and up to Kelso and then to Edinburgh

Quote from: aligern on November 19, 2016, 08:44:59 AM
Holly, I rather think that in mediaeval times arms decline when there is no threat and no great opportunity. When England was less under threat from Vikings the fleet decayed, as did the burgh system and most likely the rotational fyrd system. People do not like paying taxes, especially when they can see no immediate need. 

My impression was that the decay actually occurred at the point when the Viking threat was greatest, i.e. during the reign of Ethelred the Unready (Redeless).  This was purely because the monarch was not pulling his weight, and of course it did lead to extra taxes, but not to maintain the system ...

On the basic point of decay, I am not sure that it relates to threat or opportunity: consider the city-states of Italy and the condottieri.  The place was full of threats and opportunities, but the Italians just fell into making war in their own fashion.  The Byzantines were likewise under pretty much continual threat from AD 1071, but their army was if anything declining until the brief revival after AD 1204, the latter being entirely due to Theodore Lascaris and John Vataces.  My observation is that decay accompanies bad sovereigns and development good ones.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 19, 2016, 01:12:15 PM
With hindsight, we can see that it was impossible for the English to hold down Scotland.  But breaking parts away from Scotland (like Strathclyde or even Lothian) may have been possible.  Certainly possible enough to be considered.

Aethelstan in his AD 934 campaign (fleet and all) took the usual Saxon approach of subduing the man in charge, which essentially gave him the lot at one remove.  Naturally, Constantine did not like being subdued, and collected a package of allies to try and reverse the situation, but found himself even more subdued after Brunanburgh (http://historyofengland.typepad.com/documents_in_english_hist/2012/10/the-battle-of-brunanburgh-937.html). 

The English defence system had decayed pre Ethelred the Unraed. One could ask whether the burdens were sustainable long term and certainly they must have seemed a lot less necessary after tge Viking kingdom of York was subdued.
Mediaeval army readiness was crucially dependent on how frequently they fought. If your army got lots of practice, both small scale and in a large formation, it was lijely to be a lot better. When there was peace the military decayed. ( politicians are always raiding the budget for projects such as their own palaces.)
One of the advantages of feudal systems was that social status and land ownership were linked to military performance so, as long as kings insisted on their rights, they could raise a force. That would mean campaigning every year like Charlemagne or the Zulu. What you need for that system is enemies around you whom you do not conquer, but can raid annually.  Of course kings of England moved to using their own retainers and mercenaries because that way you got a more experienced and controllable force .

Quote from: aligern on November 20, 2016, 10:14:08 AM
Of course kings of England moved to using their own retainers and mercenaries because that way you got a more experienced and controllable force .

And the Normans needed such a force to deal with Wales and Scotland, whereas the Anglo-Saxons seemed able to do the job with what they had.  Was the Anglo-Saxon levy more experienced and controllable than its Norman equivalent?  I suspect it was.

QuoteThe English defence system had decayed pre Ethelred the Unraed. One could ask whether the burdens were sustainable long term and certainly they must have seemed a lot less necessary after the Viking kingdom of York was subdued.

The real problem in the decade preceding Ethelred was not the 'burdens' of defence but the ongoing succession problem: too may claimants, none of whom lived long enough to promote stability.  That the country was equal to the 'burdens' of defence is shown by its ability to provide successive Danegelds under Ethelred; these appear to have amounted to considerably more than the standard expenditure on preparations for warfare.

QuoteMediaeval army readiness was crucially dependent on how frequently they fought.

Yes and no.  A good king would call regular musters to ensure the readiness aspect did not slip and that everyone was armed and trained to spec.  The quality which did depend upon how often they fought was experience, but even experienced fighting men could be let down by a commander of the Ralph the Timid variety (what Edward the Confessor saw in him I shall never know).

QuoteWhat you need for that system is enemies around you whom you do not conquer, but can raid annually.

Or at least fight frequently.  Interestingly enough, the Scandinavian connection we posit for out hypothetical Anglo-Norwegians/Anglo-Godwinssonians would do just that: Danes and Swedes could be relied upon to provide a regular diet of combat, not all of it comfortably digestible.

Regarding possible continental connections, the Wikipedia article on Edmund I (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edmund_I) (AD 939-946) is interesting.

"One of Edmund's last political movements of which there is some knowledge is his role in the restoration of Louis IV of France to the throne. Louis, son of Charles the Simple and Edmund's half-sister Eadgifu, had resided at the West-Saxon court for some time until 936, when he returned to be crowned King of France. In the summer of 945, he was captured by the Norsemen of Rouen and subsequently released to Duke Hugh the Great, who held him in custody. The chronicler Richerus claims that Eadgifu wrote letters both to Edmund and to Otto I, Holy Roman Emperor in which she requested support for her son. Edmund responded to her plea by sending angry threats to Hugh. Flodoard's Annales, one of Richerus' sources, report:

    Edmund, king of the English, sent messengers to Duke Hugh about the restoration of King Louis, and the duke accordingly made a public agreement with his nephews and other leading men of his kingdom. [...] Hugh, duke of the Franks, allying himself with Hugh the Black, son of Richard, and the other leading men of the kingdom, restored to the kingdom King Louis."

Anglo-Saxon kings seemed to pull their weight on the continent, albeit principally through diplomacy.  The potential for a continental campaign was, of course there: Duke Hugh took Edmund's threat very seriously.

We may note that Edmund's full sister, Eadgyth, was wife of Otto I, the Holy Roman Emperor.  Arguably, the Norman Conquest actually diminished England's standing, influence and involvement in Europe.

QuoteWe may note that Edmund's full sister, Eadgyth, was wife of Otto I, the Holy Roman Emperor.  Arguably, the Norman Conquest actually diminished England's standing, influence and involvement in Europe.

This is, I think, inarguably right. Previously there had been intermarriage across Europe, cultural influence and exchange everywhere. Again, my favourite room at the British Museum demonstrates this : the Sutton Hoo finds are surrounded by cases of later finds proving that culturally these links were thorough, necessary, common. 
Talk about the Anglo-Saxons being somehow 'insular' is rubbish. Very different from a sense in which military development, latterly, was limited. But in the eleventh century there was the development of a Danish and/or Norse style elite, so if Anglo-Saxon  military thinking was behind, then so was that of the 'Viking' armies.

QuoteMy impression was that the decay actually occurred at the point when the Viking threat was greatest, i.e. during the reign of Ethelred the Unready (Redeless).  This was purely because the monarch was not pulling his weight, and of course it did lead to extra taxes, but not to maintain the system ...

For at least a partial corrective to this, read Levi Roach's 'Aethelred the Unready' published by Yale University Press in September this year. Like many assumptions about the Anglo-Saxons, it overturns them with a summation of recent scholarship.

Patrick, Edward the Confessor suppirted Earl Ralf because Ralf was his nephew and part  Norman and was a natural supporter against the Godwins. Edward was trying to build up a loyal counterbalance to the overmighty Godwin and his family who had inflicted a Queen upon him. By getting his sons appointed as earls Godwin was squeezing Edward into a position where the only succession would be a Godwinsson, be it his grandchild or a son. The political story of the fall of the Anglo-Danish kingdom is of the hubris and ultimate nemesis of the house of Godwin.
Darklinger, I think the military story of 1066 is not so much of an old fashioned military versus a modern one. The Anglo-Danes were well adapted to the normal threats they faced and were capable of resisting the best that the Scandinavians could put against them. The army was inflexible, like later Flemish firces. The Normans were better at combining, missile power, resistant infantry and aggressive cavalry, but that had been the continental norm for centuries, not some  new method. Had the burhs been fully garrisoned, had the fleet had a bit of luck, had Harold sent Gyrth with an army to Sussex  and stayed in London to build a second force, its highly likely that William would have ultimately lost. However, unless the Anglo-Danes made an eventual transfer  to having decent cavalry and missilemen, would they not have fallen victim to a subsequent continental foray such as that of 1216?
Roy

agreed, whichever alternate future we follow, the development of cavalry and missile-men is an inevitable one for an 'unmolested' Anglo-Saxon/Anglo-Danish military force

Indeed.  Continental commitment would have accelerated the process as the principal foe would cease to be Scandinavian and the army would be reconfigured to deal with a new style of enemy.

I am not sure the Normans did achieve success through 'combined arms'.  We may remember that on the day of Hastings they were being uniformly worsted until the Anglo-Saxon right engaged in its chase of the Bretons and was cut up through being unsupported by the rest of the army.  This I see as a command failure (resulting from an eyeful of arrowhead) rather than a failure of the military system.  Harold knew the systems were dissimilar, he knew he had not had time, whether or not he had inclination, to assemble an effective English cavalry and hence he needed to optimise the army he had.  He did.  In many respects, the wrong side won at Hastings.

It was not until near the close of the battle that the Normans adopted - or rather improvised - some combined-arms tactics which allowed them to break the depleted English line.  This was not their standard procedure: they had been trying their standard procedure all day with mostly very unpromising results.  Not to put too fine a point upon, it, until then they were losing.

I wouldn't really differ fundamentally on much of that, and very much agree with Patrick re combined arms and the improvisatory, in-the-moment character of this may have been the most inspired leadership for which William is rightly celebrated. But I think that the pursuit of the Bretons was more to do with the quality of troops Harold had at his disposal, after Stamford Bridge, having done the march again with probably only the core of his army and picked up others on the way.
Also, there is a constant tendency of being rather hard on Harold..... and

QuoteThe political story of the fall of the Anglo-Danish kingdom is of the hubris and ultimate nemesis of the house of Godwin.

I think too pat to be true, Roy.
Obviously theirs was a power seeking clan, but it's important to see their actions, also, in the context of Edward's bringing Norman and other French into key political and church positions, including Robert of Jumieges as Archbishop of Canterbury.....understandably unacceptable to the English, and essential to the crisis. So if Edward hadn't been exiled thanks to the Sweyn and Cnut......

But what is most striking is how what DID happen is endlessly arguable - Holly is right to hint that this is all a little 'off subject' - but how impossibly complicated things become very quickly is very evident, even when some of the 'facts' are known.

Well, I will completely disagree about the combned arms element and indeed with Patrick's description of William being universally worsted,nthough I will agree with Nigel that William improvised on the day and was better at it than Harold. Perhaps most importantly William had an army that was flexible enough to improvise with, whereas Harold, if we assume that he was still alive, could not act with the subunits of his force, being compelled to sit and take it.
William had a plan and it was a better plan than Harold's. Godwinsson had hoped to surprise William, but was hinself surprised. William had Harold fixed on the hill and he knew what to do about that. First he bombarded the English with arrows and quarrels, then an infantry assault, then cavalry attacks. The plan is clearly to wear the Anglo Danes down and that is how it proceeds. Tornented, the English pursue the Normans, but William has  a reserve in hand and after a dodgy moment, uses it to cut off the uncoordinated English advance. Inspired the Normans convert this into a tactic, ( in which they are already trained) luring some English down to be cut off a further two times.  Eventually the archers are brought back and shoot high so that dropping shots will find targets because their opponents are now too tired to hold up their shields. Once securely up on the ridge William designates a troop of knights to penetrate to Harold and bring it to a close. 
Its a highly effective combined arms operation .
As to the house of Godwin, You paint Edward as initiating the movement of Normans into the country and the Godwins reacting to that. However, the family were already overmighty subjects and I have considerable sympathy for Edward, forced into a Godwin marriage and constantly trying to build a counterbalance to the Godwins, who were aiming at the throne. Perhaps the greatest stain on their bloody character was the murder of the Atheling Alfred. At the end they fell out amongst themselves with Tostig rebelling against Harold and aiding and abetting a Norwegian invasion. 
Roy

The last point is a good one Roy in that even without the Norman invasion (or at least even if not successful) the Godwins were already clearly at odds with each other and was a pointer towards future instability

Ha! That is all beautifully constructed and very believable, (surely you were there?) and would lay a good basis for a fictional account, differing from but convincing as in Julian Rathbone's, 'The Last English King', or Paul Kingsnorth's, 'The Wake'.
But the battle part does not convince me because it does not take account of the wider context and preceding events enough, certainly in its summation of Harold's generalship. Also, "highly effective" would not rule out "improvised". It was a very close run thing, dark was closing in, and if it hadn't been for that lucky arrow, things might have been very different.
And though I admit that Godwin himself was hawkish in the way you describe, Edward was bringing in French from the beginning, and uselessly indecisive for the latter part of his reign. It's a bit unfair to say that the Godwins were intent on power and hold it against them in terms of fault on 'The Road To Hastings'- that was the times, and William's bold and lucky bid bears that out - to the winner, very unfortunately for many thousands in this country for many years, went all.
But I would love to wargame the battle with you one day, Roy!

Quote from: aligern on November 22, 2016, 11:39:24 PM
Tormented, the English pursue the Normans, but William has  a reserve in hand and after a dodgy moment, uses it to cut off the uncoordinated English advance.

It was not so much that the English were 'tormented' but that the Normans were fleeing.  The only reason William had a 'reserve' was because the English centre and left did not pursue, and that was a command failure.  Hence William could rally his unpressurised centre and lead it against the flank of the English right.

Quote
Inspired the Normans convert this into a tactic, ( in which they are already trained) luring some English down to be cut off a further two times.

The 'training' seems to have been remarkably rapid, arising as it did during the battle.  Again, the spontaneous uncoordinated English sorties point to a command failure at Harold's level, which would seem to be explained by his injury.  As Nigel mentions, Harold's previous record was very good - and he was quite familiar with the Norman army from two years previously.

Quote
Eventually the archers are brought back and shoot high so that dropping shots will find targets because their opponents are now too tired to hold up their shields.

But would this not have been just as effective at the outset of the action, when the opponents had their shields wattled together in front of them and hence could not hold them up anyway?  And if your foes are too tired to hold up shields, why not just cut them down in melee anyway?  Or for that matter shoot directly into their faces?

Quote
Its a highly effective combined arms operation .

It is an all-day fumble against an unaccustomedly resilient opponent, with 'effective combined arms' appearing only toward the end of the day.  Had Harold remained unwounded, and hence able to control his army, I do not think William would have had a chance.

Quote
As to the house of Godwin, You paint Edward as initiating the movement of Normans into the country and the Godwins reacting to that. However, the family were already overmighty subjects and I have considerable sympathy for Edward, forced into a Godwin marriage and constantly trying to build a counterbalance to the Godwins, who were aiming at the throne. Perhaps the greatest stain on their bloody character was the murder of the Atheling Alfred. At the end they fell out amongst themselves with Tostig rebelling against Harold and aiding and abetting a Norwegian invasion. 

Except this was not 'the end', but a potential new beginning with the bad blood out of the family.  If we are to consider dynastic disturbance as a funeral shroud for a new-made ruler, the Duchy of Normandy should have had brass handles attached to its coffin ere the end of William's reign.

Quote from: Darklinger on November 23, 2016, 11:38:55 AM
But I would love to wargame the battle with you one day, Roy!

That sounds like an excellent idea: I suggest refighting it twice, once each with each participant's favourite rules.

QuoteIt is an all-day fumble against an unaccustomedly resilient opponent, with 'effective combined arms' appearing only toward the end of the day.  Had Harold remained unwounded, and hence able to control his army, I do not think William would have had a chance.

Wow, best description, ever!
And,

QuoteI suggest refighting it twice, once each with each participant's favourite rules.

I like it....
Would really like to know, though, from ANYONE who was actually there: did William REALLY wear a load of old Christian relics round his neck all day, despite being unhorsed twice or three times according to accounts; and WHAT WAS Harold's 'Fighting Man' war banner - was it based on the kind of designs stamped into the Sutton Hoo helmet or a Dane axe armed geeser (as LBMS postulate), or was it based on the Cerne Abbas Giant chalk figure, erection and all, as Julian Rathbone would, erm, have it? This is ESSENTIAL for the 28mm Anglo-Dane Army - please let me know.

I am still unconvinced by the 'feigned flight' account......I am more inclined to believe that the Bretons (first) followed by the Normans (succeeding waves) just got repulsed and chased by poorly commanded/controlled fyrdmen and that the Normans managed to rally and make advantage of the situation

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 23, 2016, 11:45:42 AM

QuoteInspired the Normans convert this into a tactic, ( in which they are already trained) luring some English down to be cut off a further two times.

The 'training' seems to have been remarkably rapid, arising as it did during the battle.

No need for that. The "feigned flight" had been a standard tactic among West European cavalry, in which they trained as a matter of course, since at least the 9th century, as Nithard makes clear when describing a display at Verdun in 842:

QuoteFor purposes of training, games were often arranged in the following manner. Fighting-men would be deployed in a place where they could be observed. The entire group of Saxons, Gascons, Austrasians, and Bretons were divided into two units of equal size. They charged forward from both sides and came toward each other at full speed. Then [before contact was made] one side turned its back and under the protection of their shields pretended to be trying to escape. Then those who had been engaged in a feigned retreat counter-attacked and the pursuers simulated flight. Then both kings [Louis the German and Charles the Bald] and all of the young men, raising a great yell, charged forward on their horses brandishing their spear shafts. Now one group feigned retreat and then the other. It was a spectacle worthy of being seen as much because of its nobility as because of its discipline.

From http://deremilitari.org/2013/11/caballus-et-caballarius-in-medieval-warfare/ which also mentions German cavalry feigning a retreat in front of the Magyars in 933.

Quote from: Duncan Head on November 23, 2016, 03:11:07 PM
The "feigned flight" had been a standard tactic among West European cavalry, in which they trained as a matter of course, since at least the 9th century ...

Good to know, Duncan, but while we can (and should) acknowledge the existence of the tactic, there seems to have been nothing 'feigned' about the flight which drew the English right from its position and left a Malfosse full of dead Bretons.

We can acknowledge that the later episodes were intended, and assume that the training for such a procedure existed, and in consequence wonder why it was not resorted to earlier.  Or did continental cavalry train only for feigned flight against opposing cavalry?

For those interested, someone else has looked at an alternate history in which Harold wins at Hastings.  Site here. (http://althistory.wikia.com/wiki/1066_And_all_that_%28Battle_of_Caldbeck%29)  He goes on to hypothesise further developments over the next few decades, with some matters we have considered and a few we have not.

Matt and I went through the three best sources for Hastings before he prepared his talk for the Society conference. The prpise was to establish concordance between them, acknowledging that William of Poitiers is producing panegyric, the Tapestry is telling a mral story fr the court of Bishop Zodo and the Carmen is a celebratory song.  The point of looking at these three is that they are published within the lifetime of the participants and were unlikely to contain innaccuracies so great as to render them  incredible.
Matt also looked at other sources including Wace and derived fom there an insight on how the Normans carried out feigned retreat which I hope that he will publish in Slingshot or a Society publication.
There is a democratic element to the web, which allows all of us an opinion, but we should observe some rules of evidence. With feigned flight it is attested at Hastings by independent primary sources and, as Duncan just pointed out is witnessed as a tactic that is within the military culture of the time. You really are not going to get better than that and if you choose to disagree with it you would have to produce a piece of evidence that was pretty convincing.
As to the Godwins, they weakened England at a time of crisis, blinded and provably killed a more legitimate heir, Sweyn was a bad sirt, didn't he murder Beorn? Tosti was a harsh and foolish earl who caused rebellion in the North, conspired with the king of Norway to bring down his brother's  kingdom abd raided along the coasts of his country whilst invasion threatened. Harold had talent...no doubt about that, but overreached himself against William.
The Anglo Danish army could not cope with the Normans..lost at Hastings, lost outside York,  lost at Dyrrachium. Brave, no doubt, but not an all arms force and so very vulnerable to cavalry and archers.

And yes, I would happily game Hastings Nigel.  However, it makes a difficult wargame for the English if they do not cover fromntable edge to. table edge.
Roy

Patrick,
Are you mixing up the alleged Malfosse incident with the retreat of the Bretons after their cavalry attack fails in the first phase? Malfosse happens when the English army is running away after Harold's death.
I suggest Malfosse is a later addition, designed to give the English some dignity in defeat, but it has been suggested that the Norman pursuit met arriving English firces, perhaos even those of Edwin and Morcar abd were rebuffed.
Roy

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 23, 2016, 07:56:21 PM

We can acknowledge that the later episodes were intended, and assume that the training for such a procedure existed, and in consequence wonder why it was not resorted to earlier.  Or did continental cavalry train only for feigned flight against opposing cavalry?

Interesting suggestion.  If they only thought it worked with cavalry, they may not have tried it until an actual rout had shown them it would work on infantry.  Or it may be a question of timing - of when commanders thought it would work.  If they felt, for instance, that a certain amount of cohesion needed to have been lost before they had a chance to succeed.

William of Poitiers here (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=4jvgO9op-igC&pg=PA13&lpg=PA13&dq=william+of+poitiers+hastings+not+a+shameful+flight&source=bl&ots=PozuN6tNoF&sig=SSTSk6CTsGRlarnAuaEaulu18PE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi835fVhMHQAhWFVyYKHV5LAywQ6AEILTAD#v=onepage&q=william%20of%20poitiers%20hastings%20not%20a%20shameful%20flight&f=false) saying that the Normans (he doesn't specifically say Bretons - which source is it that blames them?) genuinely retreated - "not a shameful flight, but a sorrowful withdrawal" - when they thought William was killed, and then, seeing how that lured the English out in pursuit, resorted to feigned flights later on:

Quote... the Normans and their allies turned their backs, pretending to take flight. They remembered how, a little earlier, flight had led to the success they desired.

So the answer to "why it was not resorted to earlier" is, as Anthony suggests, because they didn't realise it would work against this enemy: it cannot have been immediately obvious that such an apparently solid and steady infantry formation could be lured out into rash pursuit.

Though see here (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=4jvgO9op-igC&pg=PA190&lpg=PA190&dq=feigned+flights+at+hastings&source=bl&ots=PozuN6sTkJ&sig=4CmbVNVOE4060Q7ULOaAN0B0cT4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwinpomFg8HQAhUJwiYKHSoQACQQ6AEIGjAA#v=onepage&q=feigned%20flights%20at%20hastings&f=false), another extract from the same book, for Bachrach's article arguing that if the second flight was feigned, the first one probably was as well.

If a feigned flight happened, and thevshieldwall remained unmoved, would anyone report it?


Everything about the length of Hastings suggests many things were tried and it became a battle of discipline.

After hours of pressure, a feign attempt resulted in a pursuit.

Who is to say there had not been many, just as there must have been many incidents of knights teyreating from the shield wall over the previous hours.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 23, 2016, 07:56:21 PM

For those interested, someone else has looked at an alternate history in which Harold wins at Hastings.  Site here. (http://althistory.wikia.com/wiki/1066_And_all_that_%28Battle_of_Caldbeck%29)

very interesting indeed Patrick

On the matter of feigned flight, it would seem logical that it had never before been used against infantry, not least because the Normans are unlikely to have met infantry they could not defeat in the ordinary way of things.  At Hastings they met such infantry, and appear to have been nonplussed about how to deal with it.

Quote from: aligern on November 23, 2016, 08:26:11 PM
Patrick,
Are you mixing up the alleged Malfosse incident with the retreat of the Bretons after their cavalry attack fails in the first phase? Malfosse happens when the English army is running away after Harold's death.

Yes I am, sorry.  Wrong ditch.

Anyway, here is Wace on the key phase of the battle.  Observe please, the sequence of events.

QuoteFrom nine o'clock in the morning, when the combat began, till three o'clock came, the battle was up and down, this way and that, and no one knew who would conquer and win the land[216]. Both sides stood so firm and fought so well, that no one could guess which would prevail. The Norman archers with their bows shot thickly upon the English; but they covered themselves with their shields, so that the arrows could not reach their bodies, nor do any mischief, how true soever was their aim, or however well they shot. Then the Normans determined to shoot their arrows upwards into the air, so that they might fall on their enemies' heads, and strike their faces. The archers adopted this scheme, and shot up into the air towards the English; and the arrows in falling struck their heads and faces, and put out the eyes of many; and all feared to open their eyes, or leave their faces unguarded.

The arrows now flew thicker than rain before the wind; fast sped the shafts that the English call wibetes[217]. Then it was that an arrow, that had been thus shot upwards, struck Harold above his right eye, and put it out. In his agony he drew the arrow and threw it away, breaking it with his hands and the pain to his head was so great, that he leaned upon his shield. So the English were wont to say, and still say to the French, that the arrow was well shot which was so sent up against their king; and that the archer won them great glory, who thus put out Harold's eye.

So Harold is shot: watch what happens next, while he is incapacitated.

Quote
The Normans saw that the English defended themselves well, and were so strong in their position that they could do little against them. So they consulted together privily, and arranged to draw off, and pretend to flee, till the English should pursue and scatter themselves over the field; for they saw that if they could once get their enemies to break their ranks, they might be attacked and discomfited much more easily. As they had said, so they did. The Normans by little and little fled, the English following them. As the one fell back, the other pressed after; and when the Frenchmen retreated, the English thought and cried out, that the men of France fled, and would never return.

Thus they were deceived by the pretended flight, and great mischief thereby befell them; for if they had not moved from their position, it is not likely that they would have been conquered at all; but like fools they broke their lines and pursued.

Wace maintains that the repulse of the Normans which led to the English right pursuing was intentional and was preceded by deliberation.  We may think of this what we may.  The key element is that the English only broke ranks after Harold was wounded and by all accounts (or at least this one) hors de combat and hence unable to exercise command.  In my considered estimation, the feigned or real flight worked only because the English army was out of command.

We may incidentally note Wace's summation: "if they had not moved from their position, it is not likely that they would have been conquered at all," which tells us all we need to know about the effectiveness of standard Norman 'combined arms' tactics.

Anna Comnena's account of the Varangian Guard's action at Dyrrhachium in AD 1081 goes thus ('Nabites' is the leader of the Guard, by now consisting mainly of English):

Quote"Then after a little preliminary skirmishing on either side, as Robert was leisurely following his men, and the distance between the armies was by now fairly short, some infantry and cavalry belonging to Amicetas' phalanx dashed out and attacked the extremities of Nabites' line. These however, resisted the attack very stoutly, so the others turned their backs (since they were not all picked men), threw themselves into the sea, and up to their necks in water, made their way to the Roman and Venetian ships and begged them for protection, which they did not receive.

And now, as rumour relates, directly Gaïta, Robert's wife (who was riding at his side and was a second Pallas, if not an Athene) saw these soldiers running away, she looked after them fiercely and in a very powerful voice called out to them in her own language an equivalent to Homer's words, " How far will ye flee ? Stand, and quit you like men! "And when she saw they continued to run, she grasped a long spear and at full gallop rushed after the fugitives; and on seeing this they recovered themselves and returned to the fight."

Observe that the Norman flight is real, not feigned.  The routers outstrip their infantry pursuers, who in their continuing pursuit lose cohesion, touch with the rest of the army and orientation to the rest of the battlefield.

Quote
"Meanwhile the axe-bearing barbarians and their leader Nabites had in their ignorance and in their ardour of battle advanced too quickly and were now a long way from the Roman lines, burning to engage battle with the equally brave Franks, for of a truth these barbarians are no less mad in battle than the Franks, and not a bit inferior to them. But they were already tired out and breathless, Robert noticed, and naturally so he thought, considering their rapid advance, their distance from their own lines and the weight of their weapons, and he ordered some of the foot to make a sudden attack on them. The barbarians having been previously wearied out, proved themselves inferior to the Franks, and thus the whole corps fell; a few escaped and took refuge in the chapel of Michael, the 'Captain of the Host,' as many as could crowded into the chapel itself, and the rest climbed on to the roof, being likely in this way, they imagined, to ensure their safety. But the Latins started a fire and burnt them down, chapel and all."

Note that victory goes to the Norman infantry, not the cavalry.  There is no continuity of Norman tactics between here and Hastings.

Why is a shield wall unusual to the normans?

Look at their neighbours

The continuity is that the Anglo Varangians pursue and are defeated by the application if a fresh Norman reserve. Alexius originally sets them up with archer support, but they abandon this and chase off in an undisciplined manner.
Two antecedent battles to Hastings are on the continent ( Pontlevoy and Conquereau) and show a development whereby at first an army defends, holds off the enemy, then pursues and is caught by a fresh force. Then in another battle the second force , rather than arriving fortuitously appears to be a pkanned intervention against a foe disordered by pursuit. I am  not sure if these forces, pulled into pursuit , are cavalry , infantry or mixed . What they do show is that the French understood the importance od disordering an oppinent and then hitting him with a fresh force.
I don't think that you can justify statements such as feigned flight never before having been used against infantry. Narses uses it against Franks in Italy in 554. It is more likely a commonplace.

Lastly, I am not impressed by the use of Wace as a source for Hastings. He is writing 100 years after the event  so I would be very suspicious where he introduces new detail. If he sorts out a confusion in the earlier sources then beware that he has done this without evidence, except for those earlier sources, which I would  rather stick with.
Roy

Maybe not everyone knows, 'An Alternative History of Britain - The Anglo-Saxon Age' by Timothy Venning - book form, but not as compelling as Patrick's notice.

and following on from that.....

what if Harald Hardrarda had won at Stamford Bridge....?

Quote from: Holly on November 25, 2016, 10:04:53 AM
what if Harald Hardrarda had won at Stamford Bridge....?

Norwegian-ruled Northumbria, Norman-ruled south. "England" is a historical footnote, an ancient realm that existed briefly in the 10th-11th centuries and was never reconstituted.

Quote from: Duncan Head on November 25, 2016, 10:08:58 AM

Quote from: Holly on November 25, 2016, 10:04:53 AM
what if Harald Hardrarda had won at Stamford Bridge....?

Norwegian-ruled Northumbria, Norman-ruled south. "England" is a historical footnote, an ancient realm that existed briefly in the 10th-11th centuries and was never reconstituted.

That's one possibility, though William was rather attracted to being a king, so would probably have tried to maintain a kingdom with ambitions towards its "ancestral" lands i.e. the North.  Given his drive, his reputation and his new found wealth, launching an Anglo-Norman invasion of the North wouldn't be hard.  Hardrada might have been harder to beat than Sweyn but his Anglo-Norwegians would have been up against it to hold the North.

Also, it depends who survived which victories.  If the Godwinsons had survived both battles, even as exiles, they could have been a thorn in the side of the victors.

Harold's sons had a go and were not very effective. When the initial revolts started the A/S had considerable power and money but could not overcome William. So I would not bet too much on the chances if the Godwinsons. Once they left Norman lords would have been settled on their lands and would have fought to keep them. Once Harold loses the Saxons are deprived of the Anglo Saxon equivalent of the Familia Regis.  So the core of the army is gone.
William would most likely whipped Hardrada.....after all the Norwegians were very similar to the A/S and would have been pinned by castles and outmanoeuvred by cavalry.

Roy

Quote from: aligern on November 24, 2016, 10:49:48 PM
The continuity is that the Anglo Varangians pursue and are defeated by the application if a fresh Norman reserve. Alexius originally sets them up with archer support, but they abandon this and chase off in an undisciplined manner.

But the Varangian attack and pursuit followed by Guiscard's infantry commitment is not a deception plan by the Normans but a rout followed by an improvisation.  Or is this the 'continuity' with Hastings?

Quote
Two antecedent battles to Hastings are on the continent ( Pontlevoy and Conquereau) and show a development whereby at first an army defends, holds off the enemy, then pursues and is caught by a fresh force. Then in another battle the second force , rather than arriving fortuitously appears to be a planned intervention against a foe disordered by pursuit. I am  not sure if these forces, pulled into pursuit , are cavalry , infantry or mixed . What they do show is that the French understood the importance of disordering an opponent and then hitting him with a fresh force.

And we could include Formigny in AD 1450 to adduce the self-same tradition.  I am not sure any of this indicates actual method as opposed to fortuitous occurrence.

Quote
I don't think that you can justify statements such as feigned flight never before having been used against infantry. Narses uses it against Franks in Italy in 554. It is more likely a commonplace.

Not what I would consider an argument: Narses and William were scarcely contemporaries, and against what infantry would Normans be accustomed to using it?

Quote
Lastly, I am not impressed by the use of Wace as a source for Hastings. He is writing 100 years after the event  so I would be very suspicious where he introduces new detail. If he sorts out a confusion in the earlier sources then beware that he has done this without evidence, except for those earlier sources, which I would  rather stick with.

I think Wace is underrated as a source.  As the Wikipedia entry mentions:

"Wace's reference to oral tradition within his own family suggests that his account of the preparations for the Conquest and of the Battle of Hastings may have been reliant not only on documentary evidence but also on eyewitness testimony from close relations—though no eyewitnesses would have been still alive when he began work on the text."

Let us see a few more extracts from Wace's account.

"Harold knew that the Normans would come and attack him hand to hand: so he had early enclosed the field in which he placed his men. He made them arm early, and range themselves for the battle; he himself having put on arms and equipments that became such a lord. The duke, he said, ought to seek him, as he wanted to conquer England; and it became him to abide the attack, who had to defend the land. He commanded his people, and counselled his barons to keep themselves all together, and defend themselves in a body; for if they once separated, they would with difficulty recover themselves. "The Normans," said he, "are good vassals, valiant on foot and on horseback; good knights are they on horseback, and well used to battle; all is lost if they once penetrate our ranks. They have brought long lances and swords, but you have pointed lances and keen edged bills; and I do not expect that their arms can stand against yours. Cleave whenever you can; it will be ill done if you spare aught."

'Enclosed the field' presumably means he ensured he had no open flanks, and this would best be assured by a solid line from cover to cover, which is the impression Wace gives.  That Harold had the manpower to do so Wace appears to confirm:

"Harold had many and brave men that came from all quarters in great numbers; but a multitude of men is of little worth, if the favour of Heaven is wanting. Many and many have since said, that Harold had but a small force, and that he fell on that account. But many others say, and so do I, that he and the duke had man for man. The men of the duke were not more numerous; but he had certainly more barons, and the men were better. He had plenty of good knights, and great plenty of good archers.

The English peasants carried hatchets, and keen edged bills. They had built up a fence before them with their shields, and with ash and other wood; and had well joined and wattled in the whole work, so as not to leave even a crevice; and thus they had a barricade in their front, through which any Norman who would attack them must first pass. Being covered in this way by their shields and barricades, their aim was to defend themselves; and if they had remained steady for that purpose, they would not have been conquered that day; for every Norman who made his way in, lost his life in dishonour, either by hatchet or bill, by club or other weapon. They wore short and close hauberks, and helmets that over hung their garments."

Note the absence of any mention of open flanks.  Harold had prepared as best he could; now he just had to make sure everyone knew what he wanted from them.

"King Harold issued orders and made proclamation round, that all should be ranged with their faces toward the enemy; and that no one should move from where he was; so that whoever came might find them ready; and that whatever any one, be he Norman or other, should do, each should do his best to defend his own place. Then he ordered the men of Kent to go where the Normans were likely to make the attack; for they say that the men of Kent are entitled to strike first; and that whenever the king goes to battle, the first blow belongs to them. The right of the men of London is to guard the king's body, to place themselves around him, and to guard his standard; and they were accordingly placed by the standard, to watch and defend it."

And what he has to say about the initial Norman assault (following Tallifer's 'devotio') is interesting:

"Some wax strong, others weak; the brave exult, but the cowards tremble, as men who are sore dismayed. The Normans press on the assault, and the English defend their post well; they pierce the hauberks, and cleave the shields; receive and return mighty blows. Again, some press forwards; others yield, and thus in various ways the struggle proceeds.

In the plain was a fosse, which the Normans had now behind them, having passed it in the fight without regarding it. But the English charged and drove the Normans before them, till they made them fall back upon this fosse, overthrowing into it horses and men. Many were to be seen falling therein, rolling one over the other, with their faces to the earth, and unable to rise. Many of the English also, whom the Normans drew down along with them, died there. At no time during the day's battle did so many Normans die, as perished in that fosse. So those said who saw the dead."

This event (which yours truly confused with the 'Malfosse') was evidently not part of the Norman plan.  It does however suggest a coordinated English counterstroke, and it is interesting to note that it precedes the point in Wace's narrative where Harold is wounded.  The later, post-Harold's-wounding, occurrence when only part of the line counterattacked the departing Normans, I see as indicative of command confusion: one part of the line is repeating the counterstroke - and does not know when to call a halt - while the rest is not.  Is it too much to conclude that in addition to holding in place, part of Harold's tactical repertoire was to launch short, sharp, whole-line counterattacks against the wavering Normans?  The initial repulse and counterattack described above would seem to suggest so, and it proved dramatically effective.

The inference I draw is that prior to Harold's wounding, he was out-generalling William, operationally and tactically.

Quote from: Holly on November 25, 2016, 10:04:53 AM
what if Harald Hardrarda had won at Stamford Bridge....?

I suspect the Battle of Hastings between Duke William and King Harald, who would have rapidly marched (or sailed) south to be crowned.  Pick your winner, but my money would not be on King Harald.

My money would be on William in a fight with hardrada.

In a situation where there is no home army, but their are two invaders, it is always the invader best able to pull in reinforcements who wins.

And the normans could see england from port.

It also depends on how quickly the showdown comes.  Will the two armies clash within months as the Anglo-Norwegians have pressed south after Stamford Bridge?  Or will they initially consolidate their Northern base?  Will William be welcomed in the South as a more legitimate contender and be facing Hardrada in 1067 with an Anglo-Norman force as King of England?

Tank you for quoting Wace extensively Patrick.  I think you adequately prove the point that he is not a good source for the detail of the battle.
Harold is, according to the nearest sources, 'surprised'. He does not choose the field. The idea that the English make a field fortification is discredited. The description of what they do with their shields looks very like Wace has latched on to a mistranslation of shield wall.
All in all Wace smacks of embroidering up the older sources in an attempt to say something new.
Sources nearer the time that have to be read in front of the actual participants carry more weight than a source three generations later.

As to Formigny, I cited two battles just before Hastings which might well indicate tactical thinking. , you compare that to a battle 400 years later... I can't see the sense in that.

Cheers
Roy

and thus full circle what if Fulford Gate had been an A-S victory rendering Stamford Bridge a non event, would Harold have been an overwhelming favourite for Hastings....?

Quote from: Holly on November 25, 2016, 06:54:38 PM
and thus full circle what if Fulford Gate had been an A-S victory rendering Stamford Bridge a non event, would Harold have been an overwhelming favourite for Hastings....?

I would think so, as he would have had the manpower of the north to call upon, and they would have arrived with their tails up.

Roy seems not to like Wace as a source for Hastings, and appears to prefer William of Poitiers.  However there are problems with William of Poitiers' account, a summary of which I have shamelessly borrowed from Gary Smailes' website (http://garysmailes.typepad.com/gary_smailes/2007/12/primary-sources.html):

Below is a list of the keys events and important points as detailed by William of Poitiers.

    William advanced to battle under the flag of the pope.
    The Normans deployed as follows:
        Infantry armed with bows and crossbows in the vanguard (front).
        These were followed by infantry 'more steady and armed with hauberks' (suggesting the missiles troops were not wearing armour).
        In the rear were cavalry, amongst which William rode.
    In relation to Harold's army William of Poitiers makes two key points. The first is that it was large, even compared to ancient standards. The second was that 'help had been sent from the land of the Danes.' However, William of Poitiers states that the Danes feared Duke William more than the King of Norway and they 'camped on higher ground'. The assumption being that they played no part in the battle.
    William of Poitiers introduces the battle as Duke William's army 'began slowly to climb the steep slope.' There has been a suggestion that the battle may have extended beyond the slope and into the surrounding countryside. This is best explained in this book. However, William of Poitiers gives us no hint that the battle may have raged beyond the slope.
    The battle opens with a Norman missile volley, which William of Poitiers describes as 'provoking the English.' This suggests that the attack may not have intended to disrupt the English shield wall but instead lure them into an attack and off the hill.
    The next phase of the battle is traditionally thought to be an infantry attack, though William of Poitiers makes no reference to this event. Instead he details a cavalry attack explaining that 'disdaining to fight from a distance, they rode into battle using their swords.' To me a clear indication that no infantry melee took place.
    William of Poitiers goes on to detail the fight on the hill. He states that the English were helped by:
        higher ground.
        'they did not have to march to the attack',
        'their weapons penetrated without difficulty shields and other pieces of armour'. This statement leaves us with a problem since it is generally thought that both armies were similarly equipped. It may be that William is referring to the large axes of the housecarls, though this is speculation.
    William then tells us that the ferocity of the English resistance drove 'the infantry and Breton mounted warriors' into retreat. He then expands saying 'with all the auxiliary troops who formed the left wing.' What does he mean by auxiliary troops? Is this a reference to the Roman system or does he mean a collection of lesser (non-Norman) troops?
    The author goes on to mention that 'almost the whole of the duke's army yielded.' Stating that they believed the Duke had been killed. Though William of Poitiers is quick to point out that this is nor cowardly rout but instead a 'sorrowful withdrawal.'
    William then describes the Duke's removal of his helmet and inspiring speech.
    The Normans attack once again, though William gives us no insight into the tactics employed. He does, however, explain that the English extraordinary formation meant that those killed hardly had room to fall.' Does the word extraordinary suggest the formation was something unusual? The Normans would have been familiar with the Saxon shield wall, so it may have been something more that than a traditional shield wall that was deployed on the hill top.
    William now introduces the famed feigned retreat. His words suggest the tactic was planned, explaining that 'the Normans and their allies turned their backs, pretending to take flight.' This not only suggests the plan was preordained but that it involved the whole force, not just a section of cavalry as has been suggested in modern literature.
    The next section is confusing and is presented here in full. It occurs in the moment after the feigned retreat:
        'As before, several thousand [English] were bold enough to rush forward, as if on wings, to pursue those who they took to be fleeing, when the Normans suddenly turned their horse's heads, stopped them in their tracks, crushed them completely and massacred them down to the last man.'
        In the opening part of this paragraph William suggest that the whole army retreats. However, by the end he has isolated it to 'Normans' and cavalry.
    William goes on to say 'having twice used this trick with the same success' the army attacked as a whole. Does this mean twice more or twice in total. Two or three feigned attacks? He also states that the English army was 'very difficult to surround,' but gives no clue as to why. Size, terrain or something else?
    William of Poitiers then goes on to detail an attack by archers. However, he makes no mention of the famous (mythical?) arrow in the eye incident.
    William's next paragraph seems to be a direct nod of gratitude to William. It explains just how great the leader was (in his eyes), makes classical comparisons and explains how William had three horses killed from under him.
    The battle narrative is drawn to a close by a frustrating paragraph. William of Poitiers says that the English realised that they could no longer resist the Normans, stating that the 'King himself, his brothers, and the leading men of the kingdom had been killed.' And that's it! No details of the Kings death, no arrow in the eye, nothing!
    Well almost nothing. After describing the fleeing troops William talks of some Saxon warriors making a last stand in 'a deep valley' with 'numerous ditches.' Duke William is keen to fight these men though Eustace suggest caution, Duke William ignores him and wins the day. Is this event more a literary vehicle to discredit Eustace then historical fact?


Danes at Hastings*???  To my mind, this casts serious doubts on the reliability of William of Poitiers.  His objectivity is a further important consideration, being seriously pro-Norman and pro-William.  While it is unlikely he made up his story from whole cloth, his account nevertheless seems to need the kind of clarifications Wace provides.  I am put in mind of Quintus Curtius Rufus' and Diodorus Siculus' accounts of Alexander's campaigns, and how these are amplified and corrected by the later and more thorough work of Arrian.

*I have seen these explained as 'naturalised Danes', but if so they would not be in a separate, easily distinguishable and independently acting body, but integrated with the rest of the English forces.

Quote from: aligern on November 25, 2016, 04:01:50 PM
The description of what they do with their shields looks very like Wace has latched on to a mistranslation of shield wall.

It is a weakness in Wace's presentation, because on the one hand it is "well joined and wattled in the whole work, so as not to leave even a crevice" whereas on the other Normans and English pass to and fro as if seemingly oblivious of its presence.  This is of course possible if the Normans burst through it during their initial assault and the English pick up the pieces and re-establish it following their successful counterattack, but it still makes one wonder.

Quote
As to Formigny, I cited two battles just before Hastings which might well indicate tactical thinking. , you compare that to a battle 400 years later... I can't see the sense in that.

Pontlevoy (AD 1016) is not 'just before Hastings' but two generations earlier.  The problem with these two is that they involve two essentially separate forces sequentially taking on one opponent as opposed to any sort of planned manoeuvre by a unitary army.  Formigny fits the pattern we see with these actions, which is why it was mentioned.  Hastings does not.

Danes at Hastings?. Harold had plenty of time to hire Danes from abroad and would likely have the permission of Sweyn Estrithsson to recruit in his kingdom. After all Harald claimed the throne of Denmark too, so involving Harold outside Scandinavia was good policy. There is the possibility that the Danes raised were from the Danelaw.  Recently Harold had acted as Edward the Confessor's agent in the North to settle a  rebellion against his brother Tosti and a main demand of these Danes had been to live under Danish Law. Possibly they had raised extra men (beyond the numbers required by the local system for raising a fyrd) to serve Harold as he sought to repair the losses suffered at Stamford Bridge. The most  likely explanation for hired Danes, though, is troops from Denmark , given that there were several methods for hiring troops that were current at the time. In a way Harold would just have been extending his body of Huscarls to hire in more men.
Battles were rare in the 11th century, a point wargamers sometimes miss as the hobby is rather concerned with battles. A battle in the same cultural area even two generations ago is a learning point for the military nobility. Given that they took an interest in tactics and the analysis of what happened in their ancestors time (something very impirtant in a society in which pier was hereditary) then it is very likely that the leaders discussed and understood what had happened in each encounters

Roy

going back to one of our alternate future pasts...

if Harald H had won in the North, William would have landed unopposed or at least with only local fyrdmen to squish....

Assuming (for a moment) he lived through the Northern encounter, would Harold G retreat to traditional homelands ie Wessex and the West, lick his wounds and raise another army? He would have a solid power base to do so although the 'Welsh question' would be interesting. Would he find support or a hostile opportunist enemy at his back?

There are many interplays for this particular scenario but it would be mightily interesting...the country split three ways:

Harald controlling the North with access to reinforcements and a potentially partizan population
William controlling the SE and centre with access to support from the continent
Harold controlling the West and SW with homeland power base
plus a '4th' contingent of the Welsh - an unknown since the 'kingdom' had been plunged back into internal strife after the death of Gruffydd ap Llywelyn
also add a 5th for the Scots

Sounds like a mightily 'interesting' scenario and possibly a good campaign game for wargaming

re the future of the country in that particular set of conditions and what-ifs....I think there would have been much more destructive fighting long term, less unity (politically and socially) - almost a rerun of the 5th-7th Century period

Quote from: aligern on November 26, 2016, 08:07:09 AM
Danes at Hastings?. Harold had plenty of time to hire Danes from abroad and would likely have the permission of Sweyn Estrithsson to recruit in his kingdom. After all Harald claimed the throne of Denmark too, so involving Harold outside Scandinavia was good policy. There is the possibility that the Danes raised were from the Danelaw.  Recently Harold had acted as Edward the Confessor's agent in the North to settle a  rebellion against his brother Tosti and a main demand of these Danes had been to live under Danish Law. Possibly they had raised extra men (beyond the numbers required by the local system for raising a fyrd) to serve Harold as he sought to repair the losses suffered at Stamford Bridge. The most  likely explanation for hired Danes, though, is troops from Denmark , given that there were several methods for hiring troops that were current at the time. In a way Harold would just have been extending his body of Huscarls to hire in more men.

Indeed, although Harold did not exactly have the time to do all of this (or perhaps any of it) between Hastings and Stamford Bridge.  And - the crux of the matter in my estimation - would he really have fielded a separate Danish contingent under apparently independent command and allowed it to stand apart from his main force (where?) and do nothing?

Interesting that Wace has no time for or even mention of this detachment of Danes.  If he had merely been collecting and gluing together a century's worth of fables this one would have been too good to miss.  Had he been 'myth-busting' as part of his researches, I wonder?

Quote from: Holly on November 26, 2016, 10:05:47 AM

Sounds like a mightily 'interesting' scenario and possibly a good campaign game for wargaming

re the future of the country in that particular set of conditions and what-ifs....I think there would have been much more destructive fighting long term, less unity (politically and socially) - almost a rerun of the 5th-7th Century period

It might make a fascinating wargames campaign: one would have to be careful about who could recruit what from where and what external influences might come into play.  Historically, the Normans established themselves quite quickly in the south and began expanding slowly (and on occasion bloodily) across the rest of the country; nobody seemed able to do much about shifting them from areas they had conquered.  Part of the problem seems to have been the inconstancy of the Danes; a surviving Harald might have changed all that.  Add all the various Danish raiding and expeditionary forces to Harald's OB when they turn up.

Harold would probably have the short end of the stick, or at least the worst prospects of the three main contenders.  With Harald in the north and William on his ancestral lands, his best bet would probably be to tuck himself into Wessex and Wales (and generally the West) and wait until Harald and William had fought it out between themselves.  He would have to secure the adherence of Wales one way or another, and he had done it before.  His crown would nevertheless be uneasy to say the least, as the Witan would be where he was not, but by building up his strength while William and Harald fought it out, and perhaps making a judicious alliance with one or the other, he could attempt to improve his position and remove at least one competitor from the scene.

William would be looking over his shoulder at the continent: realistically, it is unlikely anyone would have successfully mounted a major threat against his lands in Normandy, but it is quite likely that someone would have tried, cutting off any reinforcements from that quarter for months or a year at a time.  If this occurred at a point when Harald received one of his tranches of reinforcements, the Danes might for once be in the ascendant.

It has prospects.

Agreed Patrick, as a potential campaign series for wargaming it has much to offer (possibly more than any other postulated outcome of the 3 battles).

I wonder, taking your postulations further, could you envisage an alliance between Harold and William to curb Harald?!

Gadzooks, it has the makings of a fine game

Possible, as long as William does not try to back it with an oath ... ;)

Actually, I see it as much more likely that Harald and Harold would combine against William, because the latter is a) the strongest contender in terms of force at his back, b) the 'outsider' and c) my impression is that Normans were more abrasive negotiators than Danes.  Of course, there is nothing to prevent William going hammer and tongs for one of the two H's and the other deciding to be helpful only up to a point.

Where Harold and William might combine is if Harold and Harald had just thrashed William, but not slain him on the field (or off it, for that matter), and Harald had turned on Harold - or if Harold felt the time was right to turn on Harald.  My gut feeling, however, is that both would be much happier with William well and truly dead, at which point some Norman mercenaries might become available for hire ...

If Harold was going to hire Danes he would do it soon after becoming king. He must have had a good idea where the threats were coming from and where he could get troops. Tosti was in rebellion immediately so hiring professionals who were not liable to go home after a period f servce woukd have made a lot of sense.
Of course, n wargaming terms,bDanish hires are just the same as other huscarls.
Roy

a leaderless mob of Norman knights for hire..... :)

Agree with Roy on the Danes.  In fact, I thought this was a standard interpretation - that Harald had beefed up his professional forces with hires from abroad.  If we view the Housecarles in a similar way to an Anglo-Norman familia regis, there would be an established core which could be boosted for war service.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 27, 2016, 08:50:42 AM
Agree with Roy on the Danes.  In fact, I thought this was a standard interpretation - that Harald had beefed up his professional forces with hires from abroad.  If we view the Housecarles in a similar way to an Anglo-Norman familia regis, there would be an established core which could be boosted for war service.

I take it we mean Harold rather than Harald?

If so, this is how I would see them: as an integral part of his own forces and not as a distinct and separate national contingent which decided to do its own thing on the day of the battle, the latter being how William of Poitiers has it, this being one of my reasons for having reservations about William of Poitiers.

Quote from: Holly on November 26, 2016, 08:45:03 PM
a leaderless mob of Norman knights for hire..... :)

"I shall be your leader!" Pause.  "Oh and by the way, I take it you have no objection to charging axe-armed infantry which can cut you in half with a single blow?  Excellent, then we have a deal.  And could you just swear loyalty on these saint's bones?  A mere formality, of course, but - if you renege on your oath your purses will fall open and your coins drop out." :)

QuoteI take it we mean Harold rather than Harald?

Indeed.

could William have continued to finance his army?
He'd had the force together since about the 12 August, perhaps 10,000 men AND all the ships etc
The battle wasn't until the 14th October

Now assuming that the battle was drawn, or at least very tight, the Normans are going to struggle for supplies in the SE of England in Winter. Cavalry superiority will make foraging easier, but will almost by definition wear out their horses. Forced to forage they'll be at risk from local strikes against their foragers. Fetching supplies from the continent will be more expensive and risky given weather conditions.

So William is going to have to struggle to keep his army together, keep it paid and fed. He could probably do it, but probably not without totally alienating the people of the SE who he'd have to plunder to achieve it.

Jim

Agreed Jim, of all the 3 leaders, William was least able to afford to have a drawn out struggle especially coming into winter

Err No.
People keep forgetting the Norman way of war which was based on castles and cavalry. William pushes inland, building castles as he goes and garrisoning them. The harvest is in so his raiders spread out from their castle bases and feed themselves from the Saxon peasants' stores.
Let us remember that Guthrum's and Sweyn and Canutes armies could subsist in England across the winter, so William will have the same opportunity. Moreover he has his fleet and can slipbacross the Channel if its calm. A lot of his men are fighting for the promise of land , so the expedition is lije a joint stock enterprise with the payoff coming from military success, not necessitating much in the way of cash wages on campaign. In any campaign William's superior ability to hold ground and deny it to an opponent is crucial. Hardrada had come to an agreement with the Danes of York after Stamford Bridge and could likely count on economic support from there, but less likely from  former Bernicia or from East Anglia or the East Midlands unless his army is actually there to enforce cooperation.
Roy


Roy

Quote from: aligern on November 27, 2016, 09:57:15 PM
A lot of his men are fighting for the promise of land, so the expedition is like a joint stock enterprise with the payoff coming from military success, not necessitating much in the way of cash wages on campaign.

I think Roy has a point here (yes, really!) in that William can to a great extent pay in land and promises and thus keep his army together for a couple of years at least.  If by the end of that time he looks like a loser then no amount of promises (or even pay) would really help, but for the crucial period of the campaign he can probably keep going by promising his followers land and concomitant titles while they in turn waste their substance maintaining their men.

Supply is another question, and I am with Jim and Dave here: if William raises supplies with his typical slash-and-burn technique, it will work for one season but after that he will run into scarcity as what is left will be hidden by the surviving (and alienated) population.  Unless and until he is king, it will be hard for him to get supplies by order as he has no sympathetic English lords commanding their populace to provide.  I see this being an increasing difficulty for the Normans if the campaign slips into a second year without a significant shift in their favour.

Castles and the standard Norman methods of rule are unlikely to confer much of a controlling advantage while competitors with armies remain in the field.  Such castles at this stage are just wooden motte-and-bailey affairs which can hold off unorganised locals but are deathtraps against any significant force, not least because of the relative ease of burning down a wooden fortification.

QuoteHardrada had come to an agreement with the Danes of York after Stamford Bridge and could likely count on economic support from there, but less likely from  former Bernicia or from East Anglia or the East Midlands unless his army is actually there to enforce cooperation.

Tend to agree here: Hardrada would have a relatively firm base in the former Danelaw but extending beyond it would be more challenging.  One advantage he would have would be his navy (Harold's had already gone home): if he decided to take on William directly or indirectly, an attempt to seal off William's continental connection should be very much on the cards.  Whether Harald's ships would cruise the Channel looking for fat Norman transports or attempt to burn Saint-Valery-sur-Somme (William's invasion base) or both, William could expect interruptions to his attempts at reinforcement and sustenance.

Quote from: aligern on November 27, 2016, 09:57:15 PM
Err No.
People keep forgetting the Norman way of war which was based on castles and cavalry. William pushes inland, building castles as he goes and garrisoning them. The harvest is in so his raiders spread out from their castle bases and feed themselves from the Saxon peasants' stores. 
Roy

A remarkable achievement, to build castles with an enemy army in the field.
As well as garrisoning his supply lines to link the castles together in the face of an increasingly hostile and desperate population

No,not a remarkable achievement, Jim. The Nirmans had experienced engineers who coukd throw up a castle in a coupke of days . They could take a town...like Exeter and stick a fortification in the corner of the burh walls and then hold it with relatively few men. A couple of castles  and a river crossing such as Wallingford is guarded. Its fine to think that castles can easily be burned, but its not necessarily easy if its been raining for a week, or if the  defence is enthusiastic. After all , if they were too easy to burn they would not have been as effective in England, Wales and Ireland as they obviously were.
I think you overestimate the ability of an army on the march to conduct sieges. After all, a motte and bailey is of the same order of defensibility as a burh and Alfred used those effectively against Danish armies. Burhs could be taken, but it took time and that enabled the Fyrd to be summoned.

Patrick,
You accuse William of slash and burn, but there is evidence to the contrary. Manor valuations on his line of march show both wasting and no effect at all. It is very lijely that, if you agreed to gve supplies, you were not devastated. It may be that devastation was more a matter of punishing hostiles and the property of those in rebellion than foraging.
Also 'An increasingly desperate and hostile population'? The evidence post the Conquest does not bear you out here. Many of the English were very happyto accept William as king, for whatever reason. The fyrd of Devon fought against Harold's sons and if we look back to Canute there were several occasions when English forces fought for the invader or at least gave tacit support. Do not  project back modern nationalism onto the past. very often regionalism, greed or elite rivalry trumps national solidarity .
As to the Danelaw..do not assume unity there. It is the Yorkshire Danes who pledge to Harald and they had recently rebelled against Tostig, moreover Harald had recently beaten them. York had a Nirwegian  king a century before.   Danes in Mercia and East Anglia had their own earls and may not have been so biddable by a king who was, after all an enemy of and claimant to the Danish throne.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on November 28, 2016, 12:16:39 PM
No,not a remarkable achievement, Jim. The Nirmans had experienced engineers who coukd throw up a castle in a coupke of days . They could take a town...like Exeter and stick a fortification in the corner of the burh walls and then hold it with relatively few men.

with an enemy army in the field?
Sticking men into castles as your field army grows weaker

Quote from: Jim Webster on November 28, 2016, 08:34:03 AM
A remarkable achievement, to build castles with an enemy army in the field.
As well as garrisoning his supply lines to link the castles together in the face of an increasingly hostile and desperate population

Building castles quickly wasn't necessarily a problem: Anglo-Norman armies in Ireland did so regularly. They didn't need to be elaborate affairs - a lot of early 13th century castles were simple ringforts that are hard to distinguish from Irish settlements. In 1213  The castle of Coleraine was erected by Thomas Mac Uchtry, and the English of Ulidia; and all the cemeteries and buildings of the town were thrown down excepting only the church to supply materials for erecting this castle. so you didn't even need to cut timber. And A-S England had a lot more towns than Ireland that could be "repurposed" in this way....

You are right that a defender could mass against a newly built castle and overwhelm it - even the Irish, notoriously weak in siegecraft, managed that occasionally - but when invading an area the Normans would ideally build a network of mutually supporting castles whose garrisons could combine to deal with enemy besiegers. So the combined garrisons in a way _are_ the field army.

But the Saxons would also have had ideal strategies for resistance so the view one takes on the "might-have-beens" for this particular thread does rather depend on how you feel each party's strategy would have approached the ideal. 

Cheers
Mick

I think my problem isn't their ability to do this stuff Mick, it's their ability to do this stuff as they go into winter, with tenuous supply lines, an army that needs paying and hasn't experienced any real success, and with a hostile army in the field.

My guess is that the victory William won at Hastings was the one he needed and perhaps the only one that would have served his purpose

going back to the overwintering of Williams army - in our hypothetical alternate timeline where he doesnt win but still has his standing army...

dont forget that horses take around 10kg of feed per day depending on breed and since its winter there wont be much pasture around and/or might be risky to let the horses roam. Therefore to keep his cavalry intact, William need much more food than a similar sized infantry army and he is not at home.

Not saying impossible but I fear that William would find it the hardest to keep his forces (and horses) fed

Quote from: Holly on November 28, 2016, 03:50:47 PM
going back to the overwintering of Williams army - in our hypothetical alternate timeline where he doesnt win but still has his standing army...

dont forget that horses take around 10kg of feed per day depending on breed and since its winter there wont be much pasture around and/or might be risky to let the horses roam. Therefore to keep his cavalry intact, William need much more food than a similar sized infantry army and he is not at home.

Not saying impossible but I fear that William would find it the hardest to keep his forces (and horses) fed

The horses would be a major problem. When you read agricultural history from the period, hay was a rare commodity. The vast majority of livestock was slaughtered, and small amounts of hay of a quality suitable for decent horses would be made for thanes and others who had them. A lot of Norman cavalry could be walking by March

agreed Jim

2000-3000 knights = poss around 10000 horses inc spares = 100000 kg or 100 tonnes of fodder a day to keep them fed plus food for the 2 legged bods

Quote from: Holly on November 28, 2016, 05:19:48 PM
agreed Jim

2000-3000 knights = poss around 10000 horses inc spares = 100000 kg or 100 tonnes of fodder a day to keep them fed plus food for the 2 legged bods

We see with the first crusade how quickly a Norman army can become an infantry force :-)

interesting article on horses and feed here:

https://www.academia.edu/8115899/Feeding_the_Ancient_Horse

Quote from: Holly on November 28, 2016, 05:43:54 PM
interesting article on horses and feed here:

https://www.academia.edu/8115899/Feeding_the_Ancient_Horse

It's interesting, the nutritional data used for feeding German army horses in 1914 is the same as is used now :-)

Jim,
England in 1066 has a lot of horses. There are Royal and noble stud farms. The English thenselves have the capability of putting whole mounted armies, perhaps 15000 men into the field. That would involve  more horses than 1 per man because there will have been mounted servants and pack horses too. Both of us will have read Sawyer on the horsing of the Danes way back when. He makes the point that the Danes of Guthrum's army were able to mount significant forces on landing. The important point there is that they could land from the Humber, The Trent, East Anglia, the South coast, the Severn and get mounts where they put ashore.
Moreover, when William arrives and moves up the Thames via Great Berkhamsted and Wallingford he has no oroblem with supplying his horses.
So . lots if horses in England in 1066, lits of fodder and lots of stires if food for the winter.
First Crusade...yes they lost lots of horses, but still mount a successful cavalry arrack at Antioch with several mounted divisions. England has a much more amenable geography and one doesn!t have the same situation as in Anatolia where the opponent has lots of mounted archers to hem the Crusaders in and prevent foraging....which s a prime cause of the horse loss.
Mick is quite right,you have to understand how aggressively the Normans use castles as a grand tactical device.  They are quite capable of studding a district with fortifications in a short period.  As Mick says they can use existing cut timbers from demolished houses. Their fortifications differ fromnthe Anglo Saxon ones in that the English proceed rather ponderously with burhs that need several hundred men to defend them.
The point about them being in a hostile country with diminishing supplies do not stand. The Danes in at least three invasions overwinter substantial armies in England. It is obviously possible and no one is going to carry an argument that they could not do it. The Normans simply distribute their men, build castles and levy contributions by agreement with their 'hosts'. Just lije the Danes did.

Quote from: aligern on November 28, 2016, 06:37:04 PM
The Normans simply distribute their men, build castles and levy contributions by agreement with their 'hosts'. Just like the Danes did.

Or rather, not like the Danes did.

The Danes seem to have kept their army largely together as an infantry force (cf. Chippenham etc.) rather than distributed it in castles.  The sticking-point I see for the Normans is that their 'hosts' will not be willing to contribute: William opened his campaign by devastating Sussex, which was intended to bring Harold to battle to defend his ancestral lands, William knowing that a protracted campaign would not be in his favour (which is why he sought to entice Harold into battle for a quick decision).  If Harald had beaten Harold and Harold had retired westwards, William's devastation of Sussex would suddenly have looked remarkably stupid, because William would have just destroyed his supply base and warned the rest of England's population to hide their foodstuffs and themselves (in woods, marshes or behind the walls of burghs) whenever he approached.

QuoteMick is quite right,you have to understand how aggressively the Normans use castles as a grand tactical device.  They are quite capable of studding a district with fortifications in a short period.

There are two problems with this in the context of England in AD 1066 with William not being king.  The first is that in order to establish these garrisons he has to drain his field army - probably not a very good move while the other contenders still have their forces intact.  The second is that he is not king and hence is not entitled to divide up lands which are not his: not only are his awards not yet worth the breath used in making them (the promise is that the lands will change ownership when William becomes king), there is also the matter that the local population (when not besieged or in hiding) have their own king and so are not going to part with anything except when confronted with naked force.  And they are going to do their level best to hide their resources and stay clear of William's naked force, in whatever terrain or burghs they can find.  So yes, the Normans could set up a network of castles, but at the price of being most likely defeated in the field - and it would still not solve the looming supply difficulties.  Only keeping on the move could do that, at least for the time being.

Historically, the Men of Kent did compound with William, which is the basis for Kent's motto 'Invicta', but that was when the list of available kings had already been whittled down to 1.5 (Edgar Atheling being still in the process of being chosen), and the prospects of the .5 did not look enticing.

But, as I pointed out,bcastles are a considerable force multiplier require small garrisons for a considerable effect. It might also be a good idea to decide what date you are going to put on the arrival of winter and what effect that will have on campaigning. William is easily established in the Southern shires unless Harold comes and fights him and wins. I can't see much chance of Harold winning, but Patrick can. Harold's power base is where William is sitting so Harold needs the victory or to do an Alfred and retire to Somerset, there to await William and Harald fighting and hopefully weakening one and destroying the other. William does not  have a huge supply problem, the South is rich and fertile. and he has not only the ability, but the mental vision to protect his bases with castles.
The weakness of Godwinsson  is something mentioned by several of the chroniclers that Harold was under strength at Hastings because many of the English chose not to turn up. It might be that, cut ff from his own holdings, Harold does not have the legitimacy that the house of Cerdic gave Alfred.
Roy

as an aside (and taking proper history for a second), do we know if Morcar and Edwin were told to engage the Norse army or to harry them when/if they turned up? Was Fulford too early or against Harold's orders? Was there some opportunistic thought behind the 2 earls bold attempt?

If they hadnt given battle but just 'loitered' would it have made a difference in our alternate future past?

Morcar is earl of Earl of Northumbria, having benefited from the rebellion against Tostig in 1035. We can see Edwin and Morcar as a rival house to the Godwins and as having their own agenda. With Harold's approval, or at least acceptance, as plenipotentiary for Edward the Confessor, they had done a deal with the Englissh Bernicians and Danish Deirans.  Harald Hardrada had invaded Morcar's earldom and if he stood idly by Morcar was not going to be Earl much longer. Remember Tosti was with Harald and if they supported Harald then if he was beaten by Harold the Godwins would most likely finish them off afterwards. So all the motivation is for Edwin and Morcar to fight against Harald and be in Harold G's good books even if they lost. Together they have the forces of Mercia and Northumbria which should be enough , numerically, to take on a Norwegian expedition.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on November 28, 2016, 10:43:05 PM
But, as I pointed out, castles are a considerable force multiplier require small garrisons for a considerable effect.

They are good for holding conquered territory, but even Crusaders were not busy building castles at the sieges of Antioch and Jerusalem - apart from a certain hopeful chap in Edessa, whose absence created problems for the army.  My point is that castles go up in the absence of an opposing army in the field, not while it is heading your way.  Historically, Normans seem to have erected castles only when the land on which they were built was already won, i.e. no serious opponent in the field and/or their side has ample troops and total initiative.

Quote
It might also be a good idea to decide what date you are going to put on the arrival of winter and what effect that will have on campaigning.

Good point.  Do we have any hints in historical sources regarding this?  Effects might also be different in different parts of the country.

Quote
William is easily established in the Southern shires unless Harold comes and fights him and wins.

I would see 'established' as misleading here: William is no more 'established' than Julius Caesar.  He has a base, yes and nobody is going to kick him out of it (yet), but can he maintain it?  Given that he has just laid waste to much of the land in the vicinity, probably not.  He is a bit late in the season to be collecting corn, most of which will by now have disappeared into invisible dene holes, and his fleet faces a presumably stormy winter (if it can put off Hitler it can presumably cause problems for William).

Quote
I can't see much chance of Harold winning, but Patrick can.

As can Wace.

Quote
Harold's power base is where William is sitting so Harold needs the victory or to do an Alfred and retire to Somerset, there to await William and Harald fighting and hopefully weakening one and destroying the other.

Realistically, in our lose-at-Stamford-Bridge scenario, Harold would have to retire westwards and leave Harald and William to fight it out.  Or he could set up around Ely ...

Quote
William does not  have a huge supply problem, the South is rich and fertile. and he has not only the ability, but the mental vision to protect his bases with castles.

The caveats about castles and food I have already mentioned.   We may remember that when Ralph the Timid was operating around Hereford in AD 1055 he built a motte-and-bailey castle to 'protect his base'.  Having fought (mounted) at Hereford and lost, he left the scene and Llewellyn promptly took and burned the motte-and-bailey castle.

Quote
The weakness of Godwinsson  is something mentioned by several of the chroniclers that Harold was under strength at Hastings because many of the English chose not to turn up. It might be that, cut ff from his own holdings, Harold does not have the legitimacy that the house of Cerdic gave Alfred.

I grant his hold on the kingship would be shaky, perhaps akin to that of Edmund Ironside after losing his first battle.  There would nevertheless still be many Englishmen who would prefer him to Harald or William, and unless and until William won a significant engagement very few Englishmen would countenance 'the outsider' at all.  ("Ee don't want 'im, 'e's a baastard!")

One thought about horses: England would have had sufficient horses to remount horseless Normans, but - and this is a rather important but, considering previous discussion - how many of these were trained cavalry horses?

I get your point about trained cavalry horses because its the biggest argument against the Anglo Danes having effective battlefield cavalry. However,training takes place all year and it would be a priority.  At least the Normans would know what they wanted the horse to do.
To cite an example of active castle building on the 1st Crusade at the seige of Antioch  Fulcher of Chartres XVI 9 : Our leaders constructed castles before the city from which they often rushed firth vigirously to keep the Turks from coming out . By this means the Franks took the pastures from their animals (one of the fortresses was constructed on a bridge.)
Its just an example of the aggressive use of castellation by the 'Normans' and shows how forward they could be with fortification.
Let us remember too that William is not necessarily constructing such works with Harald or Harold in his face, he is securing his base of operations. Oh and only a relatively small area of  Sussex in Hastings rape was devastated. William had the rest of Sussex, Kent and Surrey to occupy and live from.
Also I think Patrick is being far too fanciful in his estimation of how the population would take to an occupying army. There is not much evidence of resistance at a grassroots level to the occupation by the Danes, Sweyn and Canute. The warfare was cartied on by an elite group who operated above the day to day concerns of the folk in the countryside. Having visited Hastings recently I was surprised at the partisan reaction of people in the interactive theatre in the visitor centre. I assume that this was something created by or perhaps generative of Brexit feelings, though, logically both Normans and Saxons ( and Danes Welsh and Irish and Scots) were very likely the ancestors of those cheering for Harold .

Roy
'

I think Harold the doomed romantic hero, William the evil tyrant long predates Brexit.  I blame the Victorians.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 29, 2016, 11:37:27 AM

Good point.  Do we have any hints in historical sources regarding this?  Effects might also be different in different parts of the country.

Not specifically winter as such but the general consensus is that the period 1000-1300AD was particularly warm - now whether that translates into hot summers/cold winters or hot summers/warm+wet winters I am not sure

Generally though, things stop growing in the late autumn (ie post October and our 'start' date for a three way tie possibly) plus reading around the subject I get the inference that populations were on the rise and that pressure on most things (foodstuffs especially) was possibly a factor in our period

The for and against seems pretty well set out.

How about setting up a poll and have done with it. (pending legal challenge and the actual deal being out to the house after a manifesto election, of course)

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 29, 2016, 11:37:27 AM
My point is that castles go up in the absence of an opposing army in the field, not while it is heading your way.  Historically, Normans seem to have erected castles only when the land on which they were built was already won, i.e. no serious opponent in the field and/or their side has ample troops and total initiative.

ISTE JUSSIT UT FODERETUR CASTELLUM AT HESTENGA (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayeux_Tapestry_tituli#/media/File:BayeuxTapestryScene45.jpg)

Quote from: Duncan Head on November 29, 2016, 01:41:24 PM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 29, 2016, 11:37:27 AM
My point is that castles go up in the absence of an opposing army in the field, not while it is heading your way.  Historically, Normans seem to have erected castles only when the land on which they were built was already won, i.e. no serious opponent in the field and/or their side has ample troops and total initiative.

ISTE JUSSIT UT FODERETUR CASTELLUM AT HESTENGA (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayeux_Tapestry_tituli#/media/File:BayeuxTapestryScene45.jpg)

Granted, but castellum (singular), as opposed to the network Roy envisages.  Caesar built a fortified camp around his fleet, securing just as much local supply as William's solitary erection.

I take Roy's point about the following:

QuoteTo cite an example of active castle building on the 1st Crusade at the seige of Antioch  Fulcher of Chartres XVI 9 : Our leaders constructed castles before the city from which they often rushed firth vigirously to keep the Turks from coming out . By this means the Franks took the pastures from their animals (one of the fortresses was constructed on a bridge.)

although I would point out that this was not a means of safeguarding territory and/or supply for the besiegers but of denying it to a besieged enemy, which is quite a different matter.  More to the point is that this circumcastellation of the foe did absolutely nothing for the Crusaders' own supplies, which had reached crisis point before Bohemond finally bought his way into the city.  Nor were they of any use when Kerbogha turned up with his army.

QuoteLet us remember too that William is not necessarily constructing such works with Harald or Harold in his face, he is securing his base of operations. Oh and only a relatively small area of  Sussex in Hastings rape was devastated. William had the rest of Sussex, Kent and Surrey to occupy and live from.

Assuming they let him.  The dwellers in Harold's ancestral lands would be particularly inclined to hide their food and themselves, having seen the stamp of their conquerors.

QuoteAlso I think Patrick is being far too fanciful in his estimation of how the population would take to an occupying army.  There is not much evidence of resistance at a grassroots level to the occupation by the Danes, Sweyn and Canute.

But did Sweyn and Canute start their bid for kingship by devastating the lands in which they landed?  Or did they arrive in the potentially sympathetic old Danelaw area and operate from there?

QuoteThe warfare was carried on by an elite group who operated above the day to day concerns of the folk in the countryside.

But the king in charge of this elite group did react to his own lands being laid waste, which suggests a level of concern in such matters.  I suggest this concern would have been reciprocated.  Historically, the English population in areas other than the south seemed inclined to resist Norman prescence when they had a leader.  The south would almost certainly have followed this pattern.

The root point of discussion about Norman castles seems to be the idea that they can spring up all over south-eastern England as soon as Hardrada wins a hypothetical success at Stamford Bridge.  Even if this is feasible, I can think of no more disastrous course of action for William: dividing his army, complicating his already potentially dire supply situation and allowing his forces to be defeated in detail.

This in turn brings in Hardrada's likely or intended movements after a hypothetical success at Stamford Bridge.  William is now his chief competitor: the final reckoning with Harold can wait until the major threat is dealt with.  Is there any reason for Hardrada not to move against William, perhaps in slightly more leisurely fashion and with more manpower than was done by Harold?

Quote from: Mark G on November 29, 2016, 01:13:05 PM
The for and against seems pretty well set out.

How about setting up a poll and have done with it. (pending legal challenge and the actual deal being out to the house after a manifesto election, of course)

Good idea. Proposed question: "Should England remain an Anglo Saxon kingdom or be some other sort of kingdom?" That would sort everything out.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 29, 2016, 07:33:35 PM

Quote from: Duncan Head on November 29, 2016, 01:41:24 PM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 29, 2016, 11:37:27 AM
My point is that castles go up in the absence of an opposing army in the field, not while it is heading your way.  Historically, Normans seem to have erected castles only when the land on which they were built was already won, i.e. no serious opponent in the field and/or their side has ample troops and total initiative.

ISTE JUSSIT UT FODERETUR CASTELLUM AT HESTENGA (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayeux_Tapestry_tituli#/media/File:BayeuxTapestryScene45.jpg)

Granted, but castellum (singular), as opposed to the network Roy envisages.  Caesar built a fortified camp around his fleet, securing just as much local supply as William's solitary erection.

William built a fortification at Pevensey, to secure the fleet. If the Tapestry's Castellum at Hestenga is actually at Hastings, not a duplicate of the Pevensey fort (opinions differ), then Pevensey is no longer a solitary construction, and the Hastings work is very much built in the face of an oncoming "serious opponent in the field".

Quote from: RichT on November 30, 2016, 08:52:02 AM

Quote from: Mark G on November 29, 2016, 01:13:05 PM
The for and against seems pretty well set out.

How about setting up a poll and have done with it. (pending legal challenge and the actual deal being out to the house after a manifesto election, of course)

Good idea. Proposed question: "Should England remain an Anglo Saxon kingdom or be some other sort of kingdom?" That would sort everything out.

stop paying out Danegeld and put the money into castle building instead?  :P

it is an interesting conundrum. Erecting a castle to pin back an enemy force in the field is seen as an immense difficulty, whereas building a camp in exactly the same circumstances is a mere bagatelle.
William also, in some sources , built and garrisoned a castle at Pevensey, within the Roman walls , before moving on to near Hastings.  Presumably this was to secure a bridgehead for reinforcements should he be trapped on the Hastings peninsula. What it demonstrates is how quickly the Normans can do this!
We should also look at his behavioyr after Yastings. In theory there could have been another English army in the field  with Edwin and Morcar an the Londoners and those arriving who missed  Hastings.
Actually these forces failed to congregate, but William cannot know this. However, he marches off into the blue through Kent, Surrey, Hampshire and Berkshire and is at Wallingford before Stigand arrives and then Berkhamstead where the other grandees make a surrender. Despite having suffered casualties he cuts loose from his base and fleet. This is not a man who is going to be wortied about meeting Hardrada or the Mercians and Northumbrians. Ncdentally this is not a man who worries about meeting the Danes later. William has a huge advantage in hs cavalry. He can pin any Anglo Saxon force, on an open battlefield he can surfound and flank them and turn them out of positions. If they hide in a town he can put castles on the roads around and pen them in whilst they starve within the walls. Once William is in open country it really would be difficult for the Anglo Saxon or Norwegian armies to beat him.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on November 30, 2016, 11:15:30 AM
it is an interesting conundrum. Erecting a castle to pin back an enemy force in the field is seen as an immense difficulty, whereas building a camp in exactly the same circumstances is a mere bagatelle.

Probably because they're very different things. The ratio between the size of the garrison and the perimeter of the walls for a start

Quote from: Duncan Head on November 30, 2016, 09:35:50 AM
William built a fortification at Pevensey, to secure the fleet. If the Tapestry's Castellum at Hestenga is actually at Hastings, not a duplicate of the Pevensey fort (opinions differ), then Pevensey is no longer a solitary construction, and the Hastings work is very much built in the face of an oncoming "serious opponent in the field".

Rather than while said opponent was en route from Stamford Bridge?  Or did William actually build it while Harold was deployed on Senlac Hill?

I think the basic point here is not so much the need to split hairs over semantics as to establish whether Roy's proposed castle networking would have provided a secure base of supplies for William in the presence of an opposing army (leaving aside for the moment whether the Normans could persuade the supplies out of the locals in the first place).  Given the vulnerability of the wooden motte-and-bailey type as demonstrated at Hereford I think they would have been deathtraps against any organised force.

Quote from: aligern on November 30, 2016, 11:15:30 AM
it is an interesting conundrum. Erecting a castle to pin back an enemy force in the field is seen as an immense difficulty, whereas building a camp in exactly the same circumstances is a mere bagatelle.

I see we are back to a castle as opposed to a network of castles over several counties.  Building a camp, in addition to the consideration Jim mentions, does have the advantage of keeping your whole army together.

Quote
William also, in some sources , built and garrisoned a castle at Pevensey, within the Roman walls , before moving on to near Hastings.  Presumably this was to secure a bridgehead for reinforcements should he be trapped on the Hastings peninsula. What it demonstrates is how quickly the Normans can do this!

Quickly enough in the absence of opposition, certainly.  Its value in the presence of opposition remained unproven.

Quote
We should also look at his behavioyr after Yastings. In theory there could have been another English army in the field  with Edwin and Morcar an the Londoners and those arriving who missed  Hastings.
Actually these forces failed to congregate, but William cannot know this. However, he marches off into the blue through Kent, Surrey, Hampshire and Berkshire and is at Wallingford before Stigand arrives and then Berkhamstead where the other grandees make a surrender. Despite having suffered casualties he cuts loose from his base and fleet. This is not a man who is going to be wortied about meeting Hardrada or the Mercians and Northumbrians.

This is how he acts when both his main competitors are dead.  He knows that the key to breaking up any further resistance will be getting to London and saying hello to the Witan before they can place anyone else on the throne and allow the new candidate time to assemble his forces (in fact they managed the one but not the other).

Quote
Ncdentally this is not a man who worries about meeting the Danes later.

But does he actually fight Sweyn?

Quote
William has a huge advantage in hs cavalry. He can pin any Anglo Saxon force, on an open battlefield he can surfound and flank them and turn them out of positions.

Presumably any Danish force, also.  But if they take up a hilltop position with flanks closed by rivers and/or woods, he will have his work cut out.

Quote
If they hide in a town he can put castles on the roads around and pen them in whilst they starve within the walls. Once William is in open country it really would be difficult for the Anglo Saxon or Norwegian armies to beat him.

But not impossible: he still has to find provisions, which means sending off detachments which can be ambushed; he still has to concern himself with what happens if he besieges one opponent and the other turns up; he still has to worry about what an army of Danes or Anglo-Saxons would do to any castle network he does manage to erect in his rear.

It. is rather that Sweyn does not fight William.....too sensible by far.
No William does not know what the outcome of the Saxon leaders meeting in Lndon will be. He has to play it as if the English will come up with a king  and an army as both are within their abilities.

Does Hereford show the vulnerability of castles? No, because the key element is that anyone in the castle and that may have been no one military, would find out that Ralf had gone...departed...left and they would get no relief. Had William built castles at strategic points they would have expected relief from any siege whilst doing their job of holding up an incursion.
Alfred built burhs which did much the same job as a network of castles. These worked until good times led to their neglect. I don't see why William cannot do the same thing.
I can  respond to Patrick's comment on moving from many castles to one by pointing out that the examples of Pevensey and Hastings are there to show how rapidly the Normans can castellate...it appears to take a day or two to put up a fortification , but not much more. That they can do this near the enemy sounds logical to me because an army can produce a fortified camp when the distance is only a mile or so from an active enemy and as I have pointed out several times the Norman advantage of having real cavalry gives them an immense advantage against an advancing infantry army, which , of necessity, has to abandon any position with protected flanks.
Even so, there is no restraint at all upon William building castles to hold the hinterland that has been abandoned to him because there is no enemy army there. Was William sent reinforcements? Historiians have thought that some  of the value decline in manors between the Conquest and 1086 was caused by the track of reinforcements arriving.  To follow The trend of enthusiastic imaginings here, lets assume that William is seen as a success because he has not been repulsed and is now building up a base so reinforcement flow to him, giving him plentiful numbers to garrison castles and secure  the South and a bigger army to fght Harold or Harold who are both based in restricted areas, Harald in Yorkshire and Harold in the West and maybe East Anglia.

Quote from: aligern on November 30, 2016, 05:13:53 PM
It. is rather that Sweyn does not fight William.....too sensible by far.
No William does not know what the outcome of the Saxon leaders meeting in Lndon will be. He has to play it as if the English will come up with a king  and an army as both are within their abilities.

Although this is in the context of his already having eliminated the best king and army they have and without a Harald, not in a situation where two powerful contenders are still in the field.  The existence of these might make him a bit more cautious, especially with the knowledge that an expensive victory over Harald could leave him relatively easy prey for a resurgent Harold.

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Does Hereford show the vulnerability of castles? No, because the key element is that anyone in the castle and that may have been no one military, would find out that Ralf had gone...departed...left and they would get no relief.

But why would the garrison at Hereford have had so little confidence in their Norman-style castle?  I am also puzzled by the idea of a non-military garrison.

QuoteHad William built castles at strategic points they would have expected relief from any siege whilst doing their job of holding up an incursion.

And whence would come relief if the main army was outside the castellated zone (e.g chasing Harald)?  Would the entire network be evacuated for lack of expectation of relief?

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Alfred built burhs which did much the same job as a network of castles. These worked until good times led to their neglect. I don't see why William cannot do the same thing.

Burghs actually did a different job: they sheltered the population, not the occupiers.  They were also significantly larger and usually better manned.

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I can  respond to Patrick's comment on moving from many castles to one by pointing out that the examples of Pevensey and Hastings are there to show how rapidly the Normans can castellate...it appears to take a day or two to put up a fortification , but not much more. That they can do this near the enemy sounds logical to me because an army can produce a fortified camp when the distance is only a mile or so from an active enemy and as I have pointed out several times the Norman advantage of having real cavalry gives them an immense advantage against an advancing infantry army, which , of necessity, has to abandon any position with protected flanks.

We have agreed they can put the things up quickly.  It is their efficacy when an English or Danish army sweeps into the land they are guarding that is in doubt.  And their ability to extort supplies from a reluctant population.

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Even so, there is no restraint at all upon William building castles to hold the hinterland that has been abandoned to him because there is no enemy army there.

None whatsoever.  The problem I think he will discover is that with Harald and Harold still very much in the field, these castles in the hinterland are just small, inflammable deathtraps for his men when an enemy army arrives.  And the men garrisonning them have all been detached from his main army.  He would indeed wish to replace them with additional troops, but assuming these exist and are not tied down with a continental problem, fetching them across the channel in winter could be problematic, because if storms do not sink them the chances are the Danes would.

It may be time to move on to other questions, e.g. how long would it take Harold to pull together another army, and from where?  How soon would Harald want to move south and try conclusions with William, who would be public enemy number one following Harold's hypothetical Stamford Bridge defeat?  William would presumably be heading north rather than staying put at Hastings, so where might they meet, and when?

Hereford. The question is whether there was any garrison left in the castle. Ralf had gone out to fight, would he leave his best men in the castle when they would be more use on the battlefield?

Next Why would the Danes be a threat to William's fleet. The Norwegians might, but then they might not wish to up anchor and head South in the winter. William, on the other hand was so close to base he could slip across on a calm night.
Why would William chase Harald in the winter? He is the most likely to hold London and Winchester and can sit and wait. A situation in which he is king in the South, Harald in the North suits William because the South is richer and in the end will dominate the North. If Harold holds London and Winchester then William has to try conclusions with him ...and we know how that turns out.

Burhs act to hold down the invader. Sheltering the population is no great problem, they hide in the woods. Burhs create a block that the invader cannot ignore. Their siting is about control of routes, not as a hidey hole.
Jim, the castle is likely to built with the whole or half of the army to put them up, which is the same for a camp. A camp can be fortified in a day, so can a castle. BTW , as Mick pointed out earlier, castles in Ireland and probably in England are often no different from Irish ring works. They do not have to have a motte to do the job. What is crucial is the mindset of using castles aggressively to control territory, bottle up an enemy,  hinder a route.
Roy

In basic terms

• The perimeter of a castle is safely  designed to be held by the minimum number of defenders possible. This is important because it means that the amount of stores held in the castle can last for the longest possible time.
  A camp is built to give an army time to put their equipment of if somebody attempts to overrun them at night.

Well some camps are more ermanent and more lijely to be assaulted. However, the purpose of a camp and a castle does not affect the conclusion that both can be built  quite close to the enemy. Caesar typically told off up to half the army to protect the build, whilst the others laboured. A Norman casle requires, at minimum only a ditch and bank of suffcient size and a palisade on top.  If a motte is required then picking a sute with a mound would be the ideal, but even without that it would not take long for say 1000 men to throw up a mound  based on earth, turf and beams. It could be done with an enemy nearby and, as mentioned, it is dangerous for Vikings or Saxons to advance against Norman castle builders because they are so vulnerable to cavalry in open country.
Its also worth pointing out that castellation is a prime way that the Franks saw off the Viking and Magyar threat.
You do have a point that the nature of a camp makes it much easier for an army to all take part in construction because all the units can build a section at the same time.

Roy

Quote from: aligern on December 01, 2016, 09:41:14 AM
Hereford. The question is whether there was any garrison left in the castle. Ralf had gone out to fight, would he leave his best men in the castle when they would be more use on the battlefield?

Given his general grasp of military matters, nothing would surprise me. ;)  Seriously why build the castle if it serves no purpose?  We are after all considering a situation where William, with two strong opponents in the field, puts a substantial number of his men, best or otherwise, in a chain of castles across south-east England.  Does he abandon these when he goes out to fight?

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Next Why would the Danes be a threat to William's fleet. The Norwegians might, but then they might not wish to up anchor and head South in the winter. William, on the other hand was so close to base he could slip across on a calm night.

For the avoidance of doubt, I mean Hardrada's chaps.  If the weather was comparatively mild, and if William was able to make use of the Channel, why would Hardrada not make use of his sea-power?  One obvious reason would be to concentrate his warrior strength, but unless a battle was in the offing he would not feel the need (he left his army and his warrior-manned fleet separated at Stamford Bridge* and would doubtless do so again in our hypothetical campaign) and would be happy to launch a raid against the lands William was trying to control.  This was after all what Vikings did best.

*I suppose the what-if justification for Harald winning would be if an Englishman did not take a boat under the bridge to show that lone Norse defenders do not like it up 'em and hence the bridge was held and Harald was able to unite his army and avoid defeat in detail.

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Why would William chase Harald in the winter? He is the most likely to hold London and Winchester and can sit and wait. A situation in which he is king in the South, Harald in the North suits William because the South is richer and in the end will dominate the North. If Harold holds London and Winchester then William has to try conclusions with him ...and we know how that turns out.

Should we assume that following a success at Stamford Bridge Harald would not head for London himself?  He would be fully aware that William is his chief foe and major problem now that Harold's wings are clipped for the rest of the campaign season.  Harold will be a threat the following year, when he can once again turn out his fyrd for forty days.  William is a threat now, and one who, if he gets to London first, could establish himself as at least a quasi-ruler.  Ergo, Harald has to deal with William as soon as possible.

Does William have to deal with Harald?  Sooner or later he has to, if he is to make anything of his claim.  Would William seek out his foe as soon as possible, or would he attempt a strategy of holding the south and hoping Harald will go away?  I think we are looking at a clash, perhaps in the vicinity of London, either in December 1066 or the spring of 1067 as each contender seeks to deny the Witanagemot to his rival.

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Burhs act to hold down the invader. Sheltering the population is no great problem, they hide in the woods. Burhs create a block that the invader cannot ignore. Their siting is about control of routes, not as a hidey hole.

Yes, to a great extent.  However the manpower to garrison them is often from the locality, so they serve two purposes within their 'zone of control'.

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BTW , as Mick pointed out earlier, castles in Ireland and probably in England are often no different from Irish ring works. They do not have to have a motte to do the job. What is crucial is the mindset of using castles aggressively to control territory, bottle up an enemy,  hinder a route.

But placing a wooden ring work or motte and bailey in an attempt to deny an English or Danish (Norwegian) army a route would seem to be an exercise in optimism rather than constraint.  This 'aggressive control of territory' concept works only in the absence of an enemy army: even Welsh armies managed to pick up castles quite regularly later on, and these were stone, not wooden.  Northern England's stone border keeps could usually fend off a Scottish raid, but even these were no proof against an army (and Edward I's network of castles in Scotland soon fell to the Bruce).  It usually took fortresses of the calibre of Harlech or Caernarvon to be certain of holding off an army, and those represented architecture on a quite different scale.

Hence, aggressive castellation might prove a two-edged sword.

One thing I have been thinking about on this one is the potential for a three way contest being a real 'slug-fest' In the real timeline, William consolidates his hold on power but in the absence of any real unifying major player on the scene and even then it takes him a few years to achieve it. If he has Harald and Harold in the field it potentially weakens him especially if he does try to cover 'all bases' and expand his network. Remember he would be facing 2 tried and tested commanders with potentially large numbers of troops (possibly after a period of regrouping in Harold's case for sure). He has cavalry but essentially Harald and Harold will have mounted troops so movement of forces could be rapid for all three commanders hence William would have to be very careful where he put his castles and concentrations of forces

Why is Harold restrcted to a 40 day term for his fyrd? Fyrds can be called out repeatedly as they were in the time of Ethelred.

Ralf most likely built the castle to protect himself against the local population and in case of a sneaky Welsh raid.nOnce Ralf is out of the castle there is no point in holding up there, better to flee. You don't get called Ralf the Timid for choosing to ge besieged rather than head for Gloucester.
Holly is, of course, correct ,  all the armies are substantially mounted. William!s advantage is that he will win any mounted action . The Hs must choose battlefields with protected flanks otherwise they have a real tactical problem, though both have forces that can hack their way through the Norman infantry.  In the end it comes down to battles and the evidence we have is Harold beats Harald, William beats Harold.
I don't  think William needs the Witan , it s not a formal king making body.  He needs the submission of the Earls and the senior bishops and London. It would make an interesting board game as competing kings  try and collect a set .  Of course , if a claimant holds lands he can create earls in areas he holds. William has papal blessing. That is not the dealbreaker it becomes for John, but it counts for something.
Yes castles can be taken, but they can also resist. Norman castles were not Harlech or Carnarvon or Krak des Chevaliers, capable of holding for years, they are tactical devices, able to hold an area for contribution, or of blocking a river crossing or a herepath. One could turn the argument on its head and question why the Normans and the Franks at large  built so many of them if, as has been suggested, they can so easily be burnt, or escalated, or just ignored.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on December 01, 2016, 08:53:14 PM
Why is Harold restrcted to a 40 day term for his fyrd? Fyrds can be called out repeatedly as they were in the time of Ethelred.

The 40-day limit on continuous service was, if I remember rightly, the reason William was able to get across the Channel at all: Harold's fleet packed up and went home.

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Ralf most likely built the castle to protect himself against the local population and in case of a sneaky Welsh raid.nOnce Ralf is out of the castle there is no point in holding up there, better to flee. You don't get called Ralf the Timid for choosing to ge besieged rather than head for Gloucester.

When Harold took over, he built 'a fortification' and then cleaned up the situation, so I think Ralph's motte-and-bailey was meant to be a base, and only a base fellow would have abandoned it.  While Wikipedia is not long on detail, it states that Llewellyn 'took' the castle and burned it, as opposed to just destroying an abandoned and empty castle.  Can anyone shed further light on this?

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Holly is, of course, correct ,  all the armies are substantially mounted. William!s advantage is that he will win any mounted action . The Hs must choose battlefields with protected flanks otherwise they have a real tactical problem, though both have forces that can hack their way through the Norman infantry.  In the end it comes down to battles and the evidence we have is Harold beats Harald, William beats Harold.

The difficulty with using this as precedent is that William beats Harold only after Harold is wounded; until then, Harold looks like the favourite to win.  Harold vs Harald is a clear case of superior generalship: surprising the opponent and defeating him in detail, although ironically even here the wounding of a single man (the bridge-holder) determined the course and most probably the outcome of the battle.

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I don't  think William needs the Witan , it s not a formal king making body.  He needs the submission of the Earls and the senior bishops and London. It would make an interesting board game as competing kings  try and collect a set .

He felt it was worth getting its approval even with both his competitors dead, and even then he faced a challenge from Edgar Atheling.  How much of England might have supported Edgar had William not been approved by the Witan is an interesting question.

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  Of course , if a claimant holds lands he can create earls in areas he holds. William has papal blessing. That is not the dealbreaker it becomes for John, but it counts for something.

Actually he cannot: only a recognised king can create earls.  He can promise titles and even write charters, but he will end up with Earl of Surrey types who owe allegiance only to their swords.  Titles can be confirmed only when a claimant wears the crown.

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Yes castles can be taken, but they can also resist. Norman castles were not Harlech or Carnarvon or Krak des Chevaliers, capable of holding for years, they are tactical devices, able to hold an area for contribution, or of blocking a river crossing or a herepath. One could turn the argument on its head and question why the Normans and the Franks at large  built so many of them if, as has been suggested, they can so easily be burnt, or escalated, or just ignored.

Because they are useful for frustrating raiders and/or holding down an unhappy local population, which is pretty much 99% of Norman experience.  Against an organised foe in the field they are as straws in the wind, and as of AD 1066 inflammable straws at that.

If William had, in our hypothetical scenario, managed to lose his life and army at a hypothetical battle, perhaps through being surprised by Harold while he was administering a drubbing to Harald, how long would his network of castles have withstood the armed might of England?  Not long, I am thinking.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 02, 2016, 01:35:30 PM

Quote from: aligern on December 01, 2016, 08:53:14 PM
Why is Harold restrcted to a 40 day term for his fyrd? Fyrds can be called out repeatedly as they were in the time of Ethelred.

The 40-day limit on continuous service was, if I remember rightly, the reason William was able to get across the Channel at all: Harold's fleet packed up and went home.

Not sure where you get this from.  They were apparently at sea for four months (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=FXtxRtwyHbQC&pg=PA374&lpg=PA374&dq=%22english+fleet%22+wight+london+storm+1066+four+months&source=bl&ots=jpOhUQZFSl&sig=YZCvyZU9y1ZldW4o_lxislcnT70&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi06Yu169XQAhUGRSYKHXLiBVUQ6AEIJjAC#v=onepage&q=%22english%20fleet%22%20wight%20london%20storm%201066%20four%20months&f=false) or so, not 40 days.

I only recall 40 days as a post-conquest limit on service.

That may be where I got the figure.  Checking around on the internet suggests fyrd service was actually quite variable prior to the Norman invasion.  Apologies if anyone was misled.

The basic point I intended to make was that Harold had a fleet, but it dispersed and let William across.  Had it stayed together William might not even have landed in England.  To quote from the article in the link:

"Had Harold's ships intercepted William's heavily-laden transports or blockaded his beach-head at Pevensey, historians might have been writing not of a Norman military revolution but of the wooden walls of Anglo-Saxon England."

They might indeed, but then its difficult to think of a major naval intervention in the period and geography that stops an invasion. I think Scandinavian naval fights are more by appointment. In the Channel the prevailing winds are South Westerlies  which gives an invader the advantage. Against the Armada the English allowed the Spaniards to pass in order to get the weather guage on them. I suspect that is harder to pull off against an opponent with a short crossing that comes across by night and can land and disembark quite quickly.  Of course its possible that William waited until Harold's ships had dispersed before putting out to sea. That would, by definition, remove the chance of a naval encounter.
Roy

https://content.historicengland.org.uk/images-books/publications/iha-earthwork-castles/earthworkcastles.pdf/

"The only general and extensive account of earthworks castles is Timber Castles, by Robert Higham and Philip Barker (1992)."

Is that the Philip Barker I think it is?

possibly although there is another Philip Barker who wrote

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Techniques-Archaeological-Excavation-Philip-Barker/dp/041515152X/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1480766773&sr=1-2

Worldcat lists the archaeologist Philip A Barker as the co-author.  Philip Barker was famous for his field archaeology and his work on methods of excavation.  History records the WRG Phil Barker and his name sake met at the excavation of Wroxeter, where they discussed plumbata

Thanks, Anthony.

As this thread seems to be gliding to a close, might we air perhaps the least likely of all alternative AD 1066 futures, Harald Hardrada triumphant?  If he had managed to defeat - and this requires a significant slice of suspension of disbelief - both Harold and William, might he have gone on to acquire the throne of Denmark and unite England, Denmark and Norway under a triple crown?

And if so, how long might it have lasted, and with what effect Europe/world-wide?

maybe he would ultimately want to return to Byzantium and conquer that? He left under a bit of a cloud after all and thought that Byzantine society was against him when he was there

Would he perhaps enlist a force of Norman mercenaries and travel under the guise of a crusade? ;)

there would certainly be a few knocking around at a loose end so to speak...!

If Harald did win, would there still be the same influx of English huscarls to the ranks of the Varangian guard or not do we think?

I suspect probably not: English lords and warriors had made their peace with Danes before, so would probably accept Harald provided he left well alone in matters of law and custom.  Following centuries of mutual slaughter, Englishmen and Danes (including Norwegians) were practically family.

Of course, there could be a number of footlose Normans in Byzantine service ...

So of our presumed alternate outcomes, a victorious Harold or his successors would probably develop closer and friendlier connections with Byzantium, whereas a successful Harald would do the opposite.

Any thoughts on what Harald  might have done (if anything) regarding Normandy and indeed France?

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 04, 2016, 11:05:24 AM

Any thoughts on what Harald  might have done (if anything) regarding Normandy and indeed France?

knowing Harald's legendary avarice, I suspect he would be looking for a pretext (or not!) to 'support' a Norman ascension to the Dukedom post William's demise and then become overlord to that dukedom potentially.

Taking it further....I wonder if a strong Harald consolidating the sub-artic arc of geographical areas would be persuaded to push into mainland europe with the Rus of the east pushing in likewise?

Quote from: Holly on December 04, 2016, 01:06:12 PM
Taking it further....I wonder if a strong Harald consolidating the sub-artic arc of geographical areas would be persuaded to push into mainland europe with the Rus of the east pushing in likewise?

An ambitious project, certainly.  I suspect the complex situation in and around Russia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Russia#/media/File:Kievan-rus-1015-1113-(en).png) at the time would militate against the march of united Varangiadom because Novgorod, although comparatively powerful and having extensive territories, was in the throes of a succession crisis between the Yaroslavichi (immediate family of Yaroslav the Wise) and the Rostilavichi (immediate family of Vsevolod of Kiev).

That said, if Harald had made himself master of England, Norway and Denmark, I can see him trying to get an army together for a possible attempt on Novgorod.  He may even be torn between Normandy (close but unfamiliar) and Novgorod (further away but he knows it well).  I suspect that he would before long overreach himself and perish on the banks of the Seine professing a claim to France or the Dneipr pressing a claim to Kiev, maybe leaving Edgar Atheling to creep back to the throne of England while everyone shakes their heads over it all and decides that comets are definitely a very bad thing.

Depending on whether Harold and his brothers were relieved of their lives by Harald or not.

What does surprise me is that Edgar manages to live on the very edge of good and bad fortune for another 60 years!

Yes, Edgar Atheling's varied and peripatetic life has been the subject of at least one novel, The Last English King by Julian Rathbone.

In essence, I see two main branches to history following AD 1066:
1) William wins, giving us what we have today.
2) Someone else wins - it probably does not much matter whether this is Harold, Harald or Edgar - and we have a way of life and society which are noticeably different, not to mention the possibility of some novel wargame campaigns.  History being a mix of cultures and geopolitics, with occasional shaping by kings and generals who have an agenda and know what they are doing, there would still be continental entanglements of one sort or another, most probably marriage connections which might bring a tenable territorial dowry, and we could still expect Europe to launch an age of global expansion and England not to want to be left behind.

Hence the main differences I see following a Norman defeat in any of our hypothetical histories are societal: a different aristocracy, a different basis and tradition of law (although a surprising amount of Anglo-Saxon legal tradition has survived) and no hiatus in the development of good quality infantry.  There are doubtless ramifications for the development of finance (not expelling Jews, for example) and the constitution (parliament might not have developed, at least not in the way it did), perhaps industry - and, of course, language.

So what would we have lost?  And what would we have gained?  We did touch upon some of these aspects earlier, before granting Harald his new lease of life, but would we, making due allowance for lost cause romance, now have a better Britain?  And if so, how?

We would be more (far) Northern European centric as opposed to Central/Southern European centric as I see it. What that does for is is uncertain.

Language would develop differently for sure. Probably still an English/germanic type language but potentially with much more Scandinavian loan words and possibly even much more closely aligned.
(good) Infantry development would continue although cavalry development/introduction would permeate into armies (but at a slower rate than with a Norman victory).
Legal institutions would not be vastly different I agree although there would be some oddities
Religious institutions and conventions might be the most affected? Less Norman influence = less papal influence? (happy to be corrected)

Someone else wins and Enland does not have a rapacious Norman aristocracy. So no Empire, no industrial revolution, well not as early, with all the effects that would have on the world. Life would likely be at the  level of 1850  about now.  Material progress is driven by greed and competition and had England followed a Scandinavian path the mindset of the ruling elite would have been very different. Very likely they would never have conquered Ireland and even Waoes might be an independent Welsh speaking principality today.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on December 05, 2016, 02:04:09 PM
even Wales might be an independent Welsh speaking principality today.
Roy

have you been to NW Wales recently Roy...  ;D

Quote from: Holly on December 05, 2016, 05:24:45 PM

Quote from: aligern on December 05, 2016, 02:04:09 PM
even Wales might be an independent Welsh speaking principality today.
Roy

have you been to NW Wales recently Roy...  ;D

I was just surprised anybody would think Wales would be a single entity

Gruffydd ap Llywelyn was nominally King of all Wales until Harold brought about his demise so no reason why a single Welsh polity couldnt exist in one of our alternate futures

Quote from: aligern on December 05, 2016, 02:04:09 PM
Material progress is driven by greed and competition and had England followed a Scandinavian path the mindset of the ruling elite would have been very different. Very likely they would never have conquered Ireland and even Wales might be an independent Welsh speaking principality today.

Not so sure about that: Sweden followed a 'Scandinavian path' and was a major (really major) European power by AD 1650 in addition to being territorially the third largest country in Europe (after Russia and Hapsburg Spain).  Russia followed a path more Scandinavian than Norman (allowing for a generous sprinkling of Mongols) and ended up with a considerable empire.  When it comes to greed and competition, or at least determined aggression, mediaeval Scandinavians are quite hard to beat. :)

Quote from: Holly on December 05, 2016, 06:50:35 PM
Gruffydd ap Llywelyn was nominally King of all Wales until Harold brought about his demise so no reason why a single Welsh polity couldnt exist in one of our alternate futures

And more so than Llwellyn Yr Ail, the final 'Prince of Wales' and darling of Welsh nationalists.  Gruffydd's single polity, assuming it lasted and/or was renewed under his close or distant successors, would of course be strictly subordinate to England.  It may even have become an English crown holding, remembering that Gruffydd's widow became Harold's wife (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ealdgyth,_daughter_of_Earl_%C3%86lfgar).

However we can presumably expect that it would not be dotted with castles, much to the chagrin of today's tourist industry.

indeed, I can hardly move for castles in my neck of the woods here in South East Wales!

Quote from: Holly on December 05, 2016, 09:36:11 PM
indeed, I can hardly move for castles in my neck of the woods here in South East Wales!

South East Wales holds my most castles visited in a day record- Monmouth, White castle, Skenfrith and Raglan.

Quote from: Erpingham on December 05, 2016, 10:27:38 PM

Quote from: Holly on December 05, 2016, 09:36:11 PM
indeed, I can hardly move for castles in my neck of the woods here in South East Wales!

South East Wales holds my most castles visited in a day record- Monmouth, White castle, Skenfrith and Raglan.

But thats means you missed Abergavenny, Chepstow, Usk, Caldicot, Grosmont and Newport for the obvious ones! Add to those the other visible but lesser known ruins and then on top of those the various castle mounds and you get the picture :)

Interestngly there are sgns that England was getting into the castle building habit. I am nt  thinking of the Norman builds in the Confessir's reign here. Recent work has suggested that many of the pist Conquest creations are ring works and that these may go back to earlier roots. Sacon thegns lived in defended enclosures, though more at the level of local security than of the rather substantial building of the Znornans. It is possible that castellation procedes in England for major strategic points and for areas where new labd was being held. However, the biggest bartier to England taking over the Celtic realms is them having the concept of so doing.

Patrick, Scandinavian expansion is hampered by local rivalries. Denmark has a land border with Germany, but that is a hard nut to crack. Easier fir the Swedes in the Baltic which is an area with no natural frontiers and very fragmented political organisation. Empires there bloom and wither. The Swedes have the advantage of tight organisation, but  the population and evonomy is very small. In the 17th century Sweden has a succession of warrior rulers who sweep across the European firmament, but cannot sustain major defeats because of the narrowness of their base. Zi recall that Sweden was one of the first countries to create a census and the govt. was shocked to find that they thought they had 20 million people and found it was 2 million. ( or some such gradient) .
Leaving aside the Scandinavian preference for peace..or not....my case on English non expansion s that they did not do it when they could, being satisfied with submission. Uf we go back to earlier times, in he seventh century Mercia and Northumbria were definitely aggressive, pushing on to Wales, to Edinburgh, across the Pennines, planting colonists and mobasteries. But all this stops in the eigth century and never gets going again.  Why didn't the English in the tenth century, when they were the dominat power, go after the Scottish Lolands ( where there was an Anglian culture ) and the well off bits of Wales where Holly lives?  I think its a matter of ethos. Its the same as why the Byzantines, who clearly have effective armies, do not go aggressively to reconquer Egypt and the Levant?  I think it a matter of world  view? The Normans, in contrast, have a go to attitude. More a sort of 'We'll do it, what is it?' take on life.  There is a tendency to see internal revolt and infighting as weakening a culture or society and so halting expansion and allowing hostile conquest. However, the Normans and the Arabs and generally the barbatians in the West are just as disunited, backbiting and rebellioys as the Byzantines , Saxons or Moslems in syria.
Roy

Roy, is that a pragmatic and conscious approach by the Anglo Saxons in the 8/9/10/11th Centuries re non expansion? ie get overlordship/recognition by fringe/areas (Wales/Scotland/Ireland) rather than waste manpower and resources? Having 'grown up' with those borderlands and seen the trouble and effort it takes to make inroads and espeically in Wales/Scotland which are majority mountainous areas, there is a reluctance? The Normans havent necessarily had that experience of long term border warfare with those areas and potentially come along and say 'why cant we subdue these guys?'

Quote from: aligern on December 06, 2016, 10:05:48 AM
Leaving aside the Scandinavian preference for peace..or not....my case on English non expansion s that they did not do it when they could, being satisfied with submission.

Submission is the traditional means of non-genocidal expansion.

Quote
Uf we go back to earlier times, in he seventh century Mercia and Northumbria were definitely aggressive, pushing on to Wales, to Edinburgh, across the Pennines, planting colonists and mobasteries. But all this stops in the eigth century and never gets going again.  Why didn't the English in the tenth century, when they were the dominat power, go after the Scottish Lolands ( where there was an Anglian culture ) and the well off bits of Wales where Holly lives?  I think its a matter of ethos.

Christianity doubtless had an effect, but the existence of seven kingdoms living cheek-by-jowl with a certain amount of mutual interaction may well have put the brakes on further expansion by any of them.

Quote
Its the same as why the Byzantines, who clearly have effective armies, do not go aggressively to reconquer Egypt and the Levant?  I think it a matter of world  view?

Well ... actually, they did: it is just that their attempts at reconquering Egypt failed as often as the later Crusader attempts to take the place; later on, under Nikephoros Phokas and John Zimiskes, they did reconquer significant portions of the Levant - as far as Antioch - and raided beyond.  The problem they had was on the one hand too many domestic probems (religious controversies, rival emperors) and on the other too many inept and unmilitary rulers.

Quote
The Normans, in contrast, have a go to attitude. More a sort of 'We'll do it, what is it?' take on life.  There is a tendency to see internal revolt and infighting as weakening a culture or society and so halting expansion and allowing hostile conquest. However, the Normans and the Arabs and generally the barbarians in the West are just as disunited, backbiting and rebellious as the Byzantines , Saxons or Moslems in Syria.

Which is essentially true: Norman leaders were fairly consistently cast in the conquistador mould, while Byzantines (and non-Turk Moslems) tended to be more inclined to enjoy what they had.  Anglo-Saxons, however,  once reduced to a single kingdom (Wessex), were quite happy about taking over practically the whole of the British Isles.  Danes were quite happy about taking over practically the whole of the British Isles anyway, except they could not manage it all at once.

QuoteScandinavian expansion is hampered by local rivalries. Denmark has a land border with Germany, but that is a hard nut to crack. Easier fir the Swedes in the Baltic which is an area with no natural frontiers and very fragmented political organisation. Empires there bloom and wither. The Swedes have the advantage of tight organisation, but  the population and economy is very small. In the 17th century Sweden has a succession of warrior rulers who sweep across the European firmament, but cannot sustain major defeats because of the narrowness of their base.

True, and this nicely demonstrates that Scandinavians of the period were quite willing to expand and were not static for want of trying.  17th century Sweden was the Macedon of Northern Europe but their Alexander (Charles XII) conducted one campaign (1708-9) which was more like Mark Anthony in Parthia and that finished the expansion.  The spirit was willing ...

QuoteI recall that Sweden was one of the first countries to create a census and the govt. was shocked to find that they thought they had 20 million people and found it was 2 million. ( or some such gradient).

Interesting to note in view of earlier comments about the effect of the Black Death on the Hundred Years' War that even a 90% shortfall in population seems to allow military activity to continue without noticeable constraints.

Quote from: Holly on December 06, 2016, 06:41:13 AM

But thats means you missed Abergavenny, Chepstow, Usk, Caldicot, Grosmont and Newport for the obvious ones! Add to those the other visible but lesser known ruins and then on top of those the various castle mounds and you get the picture :)

Absolutely.  Leaving aside it was Grosmont rather than Monmouth that should have been on the list (though I saw the bridge at Monmouth that day), there has to be enough time on-site for me to appreciate each one :)  Two is usually my limit, sometimes three if close enough together.

As if been AWOL.

QuoteI can hardly move for castles in my neck of the woods here in South East Wales!

How interesting that you are around there, Holly. (My family are in the Forest of Dean, and tho' my studio is in London, I'm around there a lot.) The section of Offa's Dyke near Ruardean, all that country interests me muchly - and the transition from the Brit tribes to the early A-S kingdoms. Into Mercia and the marvellous Deerhurst. Keep thinking it would be great to take the area, probably split by the Severn, west to Kilpeck or Llantony, Raglan - and campaign it - mostly skirmish level, but fighting in detail over almost every feature. The Forest would be murder.... Perhaps in the prior to Penda period, nicely pagan and Sub- Roman, wonderfully rich. Little kingdoms and tribes......
But apart from Chepstow and the other aforementioned defenses, though many were originally Norman, aren't most of what stands much later?

Hi Nigel,

yes I am a few miles from the start of the Wye Valley and that of course borders the Forest of Dean. As you say a great area for potential wargame scenarios. I have been toying with one on and off for the past 3 years based on the battle of Tintern (of Tewdrig fame) based around the 7th Century ish. I did some groundwork assessment on fording places on the River Wye in the region. Another 'must finish' wargaming project.......

Av possible reason for the continuance of Norman expansion is  the rather different spirit at the core of both societies. Both provide military forces based upon land holding. The agricultural productivity of the land is assessed and a number of warriors agreed upon. The superior lord is responsible for these warriors turning up for military service.  The contrast is that the Anglo Saxons are  organised by shires and summoned by the earldorman. With the Normans a lord might have holdings in several areas and would expect the men owed to report to him when he mustered for service with the king. I am , of course aware that at the top end of Late A/S Society the contingents from an earl's personal following will have looked quite like the immediate circle of a Norman baron.
What the Saxons do not have is the equivalent of a Norman younger son f a lord contracting with a baron to seize land from say the Welsh on the basis that the superior lord will provide support whilst the new lord will  perform service with a number of men on an agreed basis. The Saxons have a state sponsored and organised  system , the Norman system is more private enterprise.
The Normans were obsessed with landowning as bringing status and the frontier nature of Wales , Southern Italy and Ireland absolutely suited small or nedium scale aggression with a lack of overall control by the 'monarchy'

in other words......freebooting

Whereas, at least under the likes of Aethelstan, the resources of the whole country were united behind subdual of the Welsh or Scots. As Roy notes, public service as against private enterprise - and the Anglo-Saxons (and Anglo-Danish, taking Paul's point about Edmund Ironside being the last truly Anglo-Saxon king) seem to have had a better subdual track record.  They had Wales and Scotland under their thumb during Aethelstan's reign and, while the Welsh were about as much trouble under Edward the Confessor as they were under Henry III, Harold Godwinson gave them just as thorough a smacking in AD 1062-3 as Edward I did in AD 1277, and without breaking the bank.  Funnily enough, this was an almost Norman case of a noble being 'subcontracted' to do the king's work - and Harold did add a bit of 'private enterprise' by marrying Gruffydd's widow.

Although Wales and, ultimately, Ireland were subdued - one may use the term 'conquered' - by the Normans, the attempt to incorporate Scotland being overall a complete failure, it was a slow, painful, frog-in-a-well sort of progress.  Curiously, the Anglo-Saxon system seemed to give more rapid and effective results.

As noted elsewhere, the normans did pretty much claim all the bits worth having in Scotland.
And Scots noble culture looks pretty similar fairly soon after they arrived.

So you can view it as fairly successful.

Depending on your criteria, of course.

Of course it may be that the Normans viwed the borders differently because they were not rooted in any one part of the island.  To a Norman lord the English were as foreign as the Welsh or Irish. They were definitely more chotic and rebellious than the English, even when there were external threats the Normans would rebel and have at each other.
I am not at all sure its a matter of freebooting. Surely a freebooter is in it for loot and characteristically leaves after raiding, unkess he is establishing a nest of robbers to orey on an area. The Normans were focussed on holding land because that gave status. Raiding was a tool of oppression, used to destabilise an enemy, perhaps to force him to fight rather than for the loot that might be gathered.
I suppose the big difference between Scotland and the other areas of extemded conquest is that the Scots had a unified state behind the army that responded to invasion, the Irish, Welsh, Southern Italians and Sicilian Moslems were disunited. Also, between Scotland and England is a fairly poor area in terms of resources, whereas in most of the other examples the best land was immediately adjacent to  the Norman jumping off point. Even in Ireland the best land, the few towns and the rivers are in the East and give easy access to a force coming fromSouth West  Wales or Chester.

Aethelstan managed to subdue Scotland quite convincingly in AD 934, although the Scots as usual did not take the result as binding, and were back with allies shortly afterwards to try and reverse the result.  They tried conclusions with Aethelstan at Brunanburgh and were obliged to settle for the result he wanted.  Thereafter, English kings tended to make sure a friendly Scot was on the throne, the last such intervention toppling an existing king to place Malcolm III Canmore on the throne (this is remembered by McBeaths to this day ;) ).

Under the Normans, matters went less smoothly.  Edward I almost achieved conquest, but died too early (the less said about Edward II the better).  Edward III might have completed the job had he not had bigger fish to fry on the continent.  Of course, holding down the Scots may have been another matter, as one would expect rebellions that would have made Owen Tudor look tame. In terms of general international relations the traditional Norman approach of uninhibited devastation tended to increase dislike and to be repaid in kind when opportunity offered (although Scots efforts were by no means confined to reprisal - they were out and about whenever 'spulzie' was to be had).  While the Plantagenets came close to incorporating Scotland, the fact is they did not manage to do so, and the net result was the persistence of the 'auld alliance' into the Renaissance, giving England a difficult frontier for most of the period.  The Anglo-Saxon method of keeping the king friendly and reminding him on which side his bread was buttered seems more painless.

I am not sure the area between Scotland and England, or at least bordering both, was particularly 'resource poor': it was a frequent target for raiders, who seemed happy enough with what they could extract.  With regard to supporting an army and its efforts at conquest, traditionally the most effective means of supplying an English army, Anglo-Saxon or Norman, was by sea.  Aethelstan seems to have made particularly good use of his fleet in AD 934, allowing him a clean sweep of Scotland.

Beating the Scits is relatively easy...do not compare t with conquering them. England has something like ten times the population of Scotland . It is not too difficult to kunt a campaign and outnumber/ outresource tgem, it is hard to hold down what is mostly an agriculturally poor land. Jim will now tell us the rich bits, like Fyfe and he'll be right, but overall it is not a rich country. The strategic geography is constant. The Zromans pull back frombactive defence of the Antonine wall and holding the whole country is not cost effective. Why? well its lijely because there are too few areas attractive to settlers and there were no arptteactive mineral deposits to make a milutary occupation pay. The Romans effectively set Hadrian's wall as the boundary because the next leap costs too much to run.
Similarly with the Anglo Sacons.bThe Northumbrians colonise the area around Edinburgh, but they cannot hold it Why? because the power of a king in Bamburgh is not enough against a king based in or around Perth. The Nirthumbrians can win victories, but they cannot hold the centre of gravity of Scotland and that is the East of the country across the Forth.
So the Later English can go North and win a victory, but they do not attempt to hold the country. maybe that's just sensible. The Edwards have a go, but they fail because the effort of colonisation is too much compared to the returns. Edward II is maybe not the greates general, but he is battling against the geography. Only a very determined effort would conquer and absorb Scotland and,bas you say owning the terroir of Bordeaux was more attractive.

Quote from: aligern on December 08, 2016, 01:27:30 PM
Beating the Scits is relatively easy...do not compare t with conquering them. England has something like ten times the population of Scotland .

More like four to six times: still a big disparity, but much less so than in modern periods (it's about 10:1 now). See for instance http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers3/Campbell122.pdf section VI. 

QuoteThe size of Scotland's population at this date is shrouded in far greater mystery. Recently, historians of medieval Scotland have come to favour a figure of around 1.0 million, on the reasoning that in 1290 the country's population is unlikely to have been much smaller than the 1.1 million it is estimated to have been in 1707. As a rule of thumb, they also reckon Scotland to have possessed about a sixth the agrarian resources and therefore to have been capable of supporting about a sixth the population of England  ....   if the mean populations of Scottish parishes corresponded with those estimated for the province of York, a national population of 0.64 million would appear most credible ... Alternatively, if the estimated mean population densities characteristic of the six northern English counties of Cumberland, Westmorland, Northumberland, Durham, Yorkshire, and Lancashire   ...  were repeated throughout Scotland, after allowance for the country's far greater share of inhospitable upland, a higher total population of 0.94 million would result .... If this were, indeed, the case, on the eve of the outbreak of the War of Independence Scotland would have supported the equivalent of between a fifth and a quarter of the population of England.

As the Romans found out, Scotland isn't worth the effort. Agriculturally there's some decent land along the borders that is probably worth having, but it's a long way from London and from there France always looked more profitable.

IIRC, the English land-grab in the 1330s tried to annex these good bits.  If the English hadn't become distracted by continental affairs, they could possibly have held this.  Much depended on the allegiances of local landowners and whether you disinherited the natives or brought them onside.  Nationalist loyalties were weaker and local loyalties around established relationships were more important to many.  So an Anglo-Scottish regime in which local landowners were confirmed in place on giving allegiance to the King of England may have worked with a king militarily muscular enough to back them up.

Indeed at the time there might have been more commonality of interest between those on the borders and the English than there was between them and the Scots to the north of them.

dont forget the 'Men of the North' or rather the Strathclyde Welsh, its not just 'Scots' and 'Angles'

Quite.  Playing on the divisions in Scotland could have avoided having to take it on as a united whole.  Unfortunately (for those south of the border) the Normans were not up to it.

As to why the Romans never fully subdued Scotland, in fact they did - temporarily.  Septimius Severus really meant to take the place, and vanquished all resistance during his AD 208-210 campaigns, but the conditions he imposed were too harsh and the desperate and hungry tribes revolted in AD 211.  He prepared to crush them utterly, but died the same year, leaving the Empire (and the campaign) to Caracalla.  In a 'preprise' of the Edward I/Edward II situation, the Romans were soon back behind Hadrian's Wall.

here's another twist....

what if Harold had tarried on the South Coast even when Harald had invaded the North and assuming he won at Fulford......what would have happened next? Would Harald consolidate the North and just await events in the South before deciding what to do next.

Could we envisage therefore an eventual face off between Harald and Harold assuming William was repulsed from a ready and waiting reception committee. And more importantly, where and with what forces?

Quote from: Holly on December 17, 2016, 11:41:19 PM
Could we envisage therefore an eventual face off between Harald and Harold assuming William was repulsed from a ready and waiting reception committee. And more importantly, where and with what forces?

We would be getting close to December by this time, so unless both were keen on a winter campaign, Harald would probably consolidate around York while Harold wintered in London and sent out notices for everyone to be in the field as soon as the weather cleared (less those who would be doing the spring planting).  Hence we have the winter campaign option and the spring campaign option.

For a winter campaign, both sides would have pretty much what they had to hand, except that Harold would collect up any contingents which had been heading for Hastings and not reached there in time.  These would probably have replaced most if not all of his losses against the Normans.  Harald would have had everyone who survived Fulford.

Fort a spring campaign, Harold would collect the 'select fyrd' from everywhere he had not been able to muster prior to Hastings while Harald could expect reinforcements from Norway.  Say add 10-15% to both armies.  Harold my also have been able to call in a Welsh IOU and bring a few thousand Welsh allies/auxiliaries.

Harold would probably have favoured the winter campaign option, because he was not given to sitting on his hands when there was an enemy to fight. This would result in A Hastings Anglo-Saxon OB against a Stamford Bridge Norwegian OB, the big question being whether Harold could catch Harald with his army and fleet separated, even if only by a few hours' march.  If he could, the result would be a practically certain English victory.  If on the other hand Harald kept everything together and moved overland, forces would be much more even and the matter would be decided by positioning and generalship.

Assuming that Harald would move on London and Harold would march on York, the two armies would meet at some point between the two, depending on how soon Harald began moving.  Assuming he did not dawdle, we can posit the Battle of Peterborough (https://www.bing.com/maps/?mkt=en-gb&v=2&cp=52.583333~-0.25&lvl=12&sty=o), a river crossing action with shades of Maldon.  If he was slow off the mark, we can hypothesise the Battle of Retford (https://www.bing.com/maps/?mkt=en-gb&v=2&cp=53.31719~-0.942445&lvl=14&sp=Point.53.31719_-0.942445_Retford&sty=s), an English positional defence not unlike Hastings.

Interestingly, in his book on the subject, frank mcglynn wondered about whether Harold would have been better off letting harald and William facing off and then lurking in the background until it was the right time to fight the winner takes all battle. He also very briefly considered Harold staying in the south and letting the Northumbrian earls bottling up harald whilst he dealt with William

One thing that is clear is that there were an awful lot of coincidences as well as strikes of good and bad luck throughout the campaigns and indeed the lead up to those fateful 3 battles

Harold doubtless felt that his credibility would suffer if he abandoned large tracts of the country to the invaders: an Alfred might have done it, and bounced back afterwards, but not a Harold.

This, I think, is also the reason Harold went off to deal with Harald straight away: he wanted to deal with each threat as it occurred rather than let it fester.  He was very much a 'direct action' general, which means that although the option of letting his foes fight it out between them was available, he just would not have taken it.  History is often steered by individual human temperament, for better or worse.

You are right about the coincidences and luck element: it may have been an occupational hazard of campaigning in a Halley's Comet year.  It is also striking that at both Stamford Bridge and Hastings the battle seems to have hung on one man receiving an injury at a critical time.

Naturally, under today's abstracted fast-play systems, this is simply represented by blaming the dice. ;)