Cataphract Camels

[Patrick Waterson]

Treat Keegan's conclusions with care and a pinch of salt, and look carefully for his implicit assumptions.

Don't worry I do.  But taking as literal truth a pile of dead 15 ft high?  Needs a whole sack full.  As to urging camels up a slope of dead camels 4 deep.......

The circumstances of these particular battles were special.  The heap of dead Scots at Dupplin Moor was measured (after a fashion), but one point to bear in mind is that they were attacking up a narrow valley.  They seem to have occupied the entire width of the valley, so the theoretical limit to the height of that particular deadpile is the height of the slopes on both sides of the valley.  This would also help to explain why spear-length-depth piles of bodies do not accumulate on just any battlefield.

Herodian's wall of dead fauna (and riders) served to prevent further interaction between the participants.  Whether this requires a depth of three camels, or five, at the sharp end, I have no idea.  But unless we consider the account fictitious (which I would not), it makes sense to accept the basic premise and then argue over the details.  My guess about how they ended up stacked may be wrong, but the effect was there.

Hang on.

What the above indicates (at least to me) is that one should perhaps be careful about taking Herodian's wording at face value.

So we are all agreed, aren't we? We are all treating Herodian's words with care and a pinch of salt, and looking carefully for his implicit assumptions. If not, we should be.

What I wished to emphasise was that we should be careful about drawing conclusions from taking his wording too literally, e.g. that if he mentions cataphracts on horses and camels we should not conclude that he is specifically stating the mounts are unarmoured.  If he says a wall of bodies cut off view of the enemy, bear in mind he was writing from a Roman (and hence presumably an infantryman's) perspective as opposed to that of a Parthian cavalryman.  It halves the height.

Mud is slippery, which militates against tall piles on at least three levels: it becomes hard to climb on top of a budding pile, if you do get on top you're more likely to slide off if you fall, and if you do manage to end up on the top the foundation is more likely to move laterally to make the top sink.

All of which is true in isolation, but when the pile is constantly being fed by an incoming torrent of armoured men under pressure the fact that casualties cannot be extracted will create a pile-up of greater proportions than one would expect in similar circumstances on firm ground.  We are considering a 'pile' perhaps 100 yards wide, so after a few bodies have slid out at the edges and ramped up, sliding off is no longer an option for the majority.  Climbing, or being thrust onto, such a pile is anyway much easier if one is getting a lot if involuntary help from one's friends pushing en masse from behind.

[Erpingham]

Just for a sense of perspective, 15ft is the height of a double-decker bus.  I have no issue with heaps of dead in these battlefields but lets try to keep a sense of proportion and imagine what we are dealing with and how it might have got there. 

To return to Herodian, what is motivating our camel cataphracts?  Even if it is possible to urge a camel to climb a pile of several dead camels 5-6ft high, why would they do so?  They are described as prodding with long spears, not desperately trying to come to hand strokes.

[RichT]

Yes, "taking his wording too literally" is exactly what goes on in this and so many other cases. It comes down to the same old philosophical (or historiographical) question as always - is a battle account in a writer such as Herodian a detailed, precise and complete description of all the tactical details of everything that took place everywhere across the battlefield? Or is it an impressionistic, anecdotal list of incidents that occurred, or something like what occurred, and which happen to have been passed on to our author? Or is it indeed largely a fabrication, designed to match the author's, and his readers', view of what a big battle should be like, or to make a dramatic read? I'm strongly inclined to the second possibility, with a dose of the third (and to be fair, elements of the first). 

Someone who was at the battle might have noted that there were so many dead camels that the armies were impeded from contacting each other. How many camels would this be? For close order infantry, keen to keep formation, and mounted troops, awkward on broken ground, a liberal scattering of camels would be more than enough - no need for them to be stacked on top of each other - not even a continous 1-deep carpet. Just lots - the sort an old soldier would describe (with some glee no doubt) as 'heaps of enemy dead'.  This then gets passed through a process of Chinese whispers to our source, who hears that heaps of dead camels impeded the armies, and suddenly we have a camel wall several feet high. We don't have to conclude that Herodian's account is totally untrue, simply that it isn't the whole story, or a particularly precise telling of the story. It's an impression of an incident passed on at second, third or however many hands. This is what history is.

[Patrick Waterson]

Just for a sense of perspective, 15ft is the height of a double-decker bus.  I have no issue with heaps of dead in these battlefields but lets try to keep a sense of proportion and imagine what we are dealing with and how it might have got there. 

I thought I had.

To return to Herodian, what is motivating our camel cataphracts?  Even if it is possible to urge a camel to climb a pile of several dead camels 5-6ft high, why would they do so?  They are described as prodding with long spears, not desperately trying to come to hand strokes.

Again, I had mentioned this, but perhaps it would be best to let Herodian tell the full story.  If detailed reading of history is not one's thing, the bare essence can be cleaned from the passages in bold.

"[4.10.1] [216] Not long after this, Caracalla, desirous of gaining the title Parthicus and of being able to report to the Romans that he had conquered all the Eastern barbarians, even though there was peace everywhere, devised the following plan. He wrote a letter to the king of Parthia (his name was Artabanus [IV]) and sent to him an embassy laden with gifts of expensive materials and fine workmanship.

[4.10.2] He wrote to the king that he wished to marry his daughter; that it was not fitting that he, emperor and son of an emperor, be the son-in-law of a lowly private citizen. His wish was to marry a princess, the daughter of a great king. He pointed out that the Roman and the Parthian empires were the largest in the world; if they were united by marriage, one empire without a rival would result when they were no longer divided by a river.

[4.10.3] The rest of the barbarian nations now not subject to their authority could easily be reduced, as they were governed by tribes and confederacies. Furthermore, the Roman infantry were invincible in close-quarter combat with spears, and the Parthians had a large force of highly skilled horse-archers.

[4.10.4] The two forces, he said, complemented each other; by waging war together, they could easily unite the entire inhabited world under a single crown. Since the Parthians produced spices and excellent textiles and the Romans metals and manufactured articles, these products would no longer be scarce and smuggled by merchants; rather, when there was one world under one supreme authority, both peoples would enjoy these goods and share them in common.

[4.10.5] At first the Parthian king did not approve of the proposals in Caracalla's letters, saying that it was not proper for a barbarian to marry a Roman. What accord could there be when they did not understand each other's language and differed so radically in diet and dress? Surely, the king said, there are many distinguished Romans, one of whose daughters he could marry, just as for him there were the Arsacids;note it was not fitting that either race be bastardized.

[4.11.1] [216] The Parthian's initial replies were of this type, and he declined Caracalla's offer of an alliance. But when the emperor persisted and with many gifts and oaths swore to his enthusiasm for the marriage and his good will toward the Parthians, Artabanus [IV] was won over; addressing Caracalla as his future son-in-law, he promised him his daughter in marriage. When the news was made public, the barbarians prepared for the reception of the emperor of the Romans and rejoiced in the hope of permanent peace.

[4.11.2] Having crossed the rivers unopposed, Caracalla entered the barbarians' land as if it were already his. Sacrifices were offered to him everywhere; the altars were decked with wreaths, and perfumes and every kind of incense were scattered in his path. Caracalla pretended to be delighted by the barbarians' attentions and continued his advance. He had now completed the greater part of his journey and was approaching the palace of Artabanus. The king did not wait to receive the emperor but came out to meet him in the plain before the city, welcoming his son-in-law, the bridegroom of his daughter.

[4.11.3] All the Parthians, crowned with the traditional flowers and wearing robes embroidered in gold and various colors, celebrated the occasion, dancing wildly to the music of flutes and the throbbing of drums. They take delight in such orgiastic dancing, especially when they are drunk.

[4.11.4] Abandoning their horses and laying aside their quivers and bows, the whole populace came together to drink and pour libations. A huge mob of barbarians gathered and stood about casually, wherever they happened to be, eager to see the bridegroom and expecting nothing out of the ordinary.

[4.11.5] Then the signal was given, and Caracalla ordered his army to attack and massacre the spectators. Astounded by this onslaught, the barbarians turned and fled, wounded and bleeding. Artabanus himself, snatched up and placed on a horse by some of his personal bodyguards, barely escaped with a few companions.

[4.11.6] The rest of the Parthians, lacking their indispensable horses, were cut down (for they had sent the horses out to graze and were standing about). They were unable to escape by running, either; their long, loose robes, hanging to their feet, tripped them up.

[4.11.7] Naturally they did not have their quivers and bows with them; what need for weapons at a wedding? After slaughtering a great number of the enemy and taking much booty and many prisoners, Caracalla marched away from the city unopposed. En route he burned the towns and villages and permitted his soldiers to carry off as much as they could of anything they wanted.

[4.11.8] Such was the nature of the disaster which the barbarians suffered when they were not anticipating anything of the kind. After harassing most of the Parthian empire, Caracalla, since his troops were weary by now of looting and killing, went off to Mesopotamia. From there he sent word to the Senate and the Roman people that the entire East was subdued and that all the kingdoms in that region had submitted to him.

[4.11.9] The senators were not unaware of what had actually happened (for it is impossible to conceal an emperor's acts); nevertheless, fear and the desire to flatter led them to vote the emperor all the triumphal honors. Thereafter, Caracalla spent some time in Mesopotamia, where he devoted himself to chariot-driving and to fighting all kinds of wild animals.

[4.12.1] [216/217] Caracalla had two generals in his army: [Marcus Oclatinius] Adventus, an old man, who had some skill in military matters but was a layman in other fields and unacquainted with civil administration; and [Marcus Opellius] Macrinus, experienced in public affairs and especially well trained in law. Caracalla often ridiculed Macrinus publicly, calling him a brave, self-styled warrior, and carrying his sarcasm to the point of shameful abuse.

[4.12.2] When the emperor learned that Macrinus was overfond of food and scorned the coarse, rough fare which Caracalla the soldier enjoyed, he accused the general of cowardice and effeminacy, and continually threatened to murder him. Unable to endure these insults any longer, the angry Macrinus grew dangerous.

[4.12.3] This is the way the affair turned out; it was, at long last, time for Caracalla's life to come to an end. The emperor, always excessively curious, wished not only to know everything about the affairs of men but also to meddle in divine matters. Since he suspected everyone of plotting against him, he consulted all the oracles and summoned prophets, astrologers, and entrail-examiners from all over the world; no one who practiced the magic art of prophecy escaped him.

[4.12.4] But when he began to suspect that these men were not prophesying truthfully but were flattering him, Caracalla wrote a letter to Materianus, to whom he had entrusted control of affairs at Rome. This Materianus he considered the most trustworthy of his friends, the only one with whom he shared the imperial secrets. He ordered Materianus to locate all the most highly skilled prophets and to make use of their magic arts to discover whether anyone was plotting to seize the empire.

[4.12.5] Materianus obeyed the emperor's orders to the letter, and whether because the spirits actually revealed these things to him or because he was eager to remove Macrinus, he sent Caracalla a dispatch informing him that Macrinus was conspiring to seize control of the empire and must be eliminated.

[4.12.6] [Spring 217] Sealing this letter, he gave it routinely with the other dispatches to the couriers, who did not, of course, know what they were carrying. Completing the journey with their usual speed, the messengers approached Caracalla after he had already donned his racing uniform and was about to climb into the waiting chariot, and gave him the whole bundle of dispatches, including the letter concerning Macrinus.

[4.12.7] Caracalla, about to drive off, and intent upon the coming race, ordered Macrinus, who was standing nearby alone, to examine the dispatches and, if they contained anything urgent, to inform him. If, however, there was nothing pressing in them, he was to handle them himself in the usual manner, in his capacity as praetorian prefect. The emperor frequently ordered Macrinus to do this.

[4.12.8] After giving these directions, Caracalla turned to his race. Macrinus withdrew and opened the dispatches in private; when he found the one containing his own death sentence, he saw clearly the danger which threatened him. Knowing the emperor's nature, and realizing that the death sentence contained in the letter would give the emperor legitimate cause for putting him to death, Macrinus removed this letter from the pile and reported that the rest were of the routine sort.

[4.13.1] [Early April 217] The prefect, fearing that Materianus might send this information to the emperor a second time, decided to act now rather than wait and suffer the consequences. This is what he did. In Caracalla's bodyguard was a centurion named Martialis, who was always in the emperor's escort. A few days earlier, Caracalla had executed the centurion's brother on an unproved charge. Moreover, the emperor continually insulted the man, calling him cowardly, effeminate, and Macrinus' darling.

[4.13.2] Learning that Martialis was exceedingly grieved by his brother's death and could no longer endure the emperor's insults, Macrinus summoned the centurion (in whom he had confidence because the man had served him before, and had received many favors from him). The prefect persuaded Martialis to be on the watch for a suitable opportunity to carry out a plot against the emperor. Won over by Macrinus' promises, Martialis, since he hated the emperor and was eager to avenge his brother, gladly promised to do the deed when the proper occasion arose.

[4.13.3] [8 April 217] Not long after they made this agreement, it happened that Caracalla, who was spending the time at Carrhae in Mesopotamia, conceived a desire to leave the imperial quarters and visit the Temple of the Moon, for Selene is the goddess whom the natives particularly adore. The temple was located some distance from Carrhae, and the journey was a long one. Therefore, to avoid involving the entire army, Caracalla made the trip with a few horsemen, intending to sacrifice to the goddess and then return to the city.

[4.13.4] At the halfway point he stopped to relieve himself; ordering his escort to ride off, he went apart with a single attendant. All the horsemen turned aside and withdrew for some distance, respecting the emperor's modesty.

[4.13.5] But when Martialis, who was looking for just such an opportunity, saw Caracalla alone, he ran toward him as if the emperor had summoned him by a gesture to question him or receive some information. Standing over Caracalla after he had uncovered himself, Martialis stabbed the emperor from behind with a dagger he had concealed in his hand. The blow under the shoulder was fatal, and Caracalla died, unsuspecting and undefended.

[4.13.6] When the emperor fell, Martialis leaped upon his horse and fled. Those favorites of Caracalla, the German cavalry who served as his bodyguard, were closer to the scene than the rest, and hence were the first to realize what had happened. These horsemen set out in pursuit of Martialis and cut him down.

[4.13.7] When the rest of the army learned what had occurred, they hurried to the spot, and Macrinus was the first to arrive; standing over the body, he pretended to wail and lament for the emperor. The whole army was grieved and distressed by the affair; they felt they had lost a fellow soldier, a comrade-in-arms, rather than their emperor. And yet they never suspected that it was a plot of Macrinus; they believed that Martialis had done it because of his personal hatred for the emperor.

[4.13.8] Then the soldiers retired, each to his own tent. After burning the body on a pyre and placing the ashes in an urn, Macrinus sent it for burial to the emperor's mother in Antioch. As a result of these similar disasters which befell her two sons, Julia died, either by her own hand or by the emperor's order. Such was the fate suffered by Caracalla and his mother Julia, who lived in the manner I have described above. Caracalla had served as emperor without his father and brother for eleven years.

[4.14.1] [8 April 217] After Caracalla's death, the bewildered soldiers were at a loss as to what to do. For two days they were without an emperor while they looked for someone to fill the office. And now it was reported that Artabanus was approaching with a huge army, seeking a legitimate revenge for the Parthians whom Caracalla had murdered under a truce and in time of peace.

[4.14.2] The army first chose Adventus as their emperor because he was a military man and a praetorian prefect of considerable ability; he declined the honor, however, pleading his advanced age. [11 April 217] They then decided upon Macrinus, influenced by their tribunes, who were close friends of the general and were suspected of having been involved in the plot against Caracalla. Later, after Macrinus' death, these tribunes were punished, as we shall relate in the pages to follow.

[4.14.3] Macrinus thus received the office of emperor not so much because of the soldiers' affection and loyalty as from necessity and the urgency of the impending crisis.

While these events were taking place, Artabanus was marching toward the Romans with a huge army, including a strong cavalry contingent and a powerful unit of archers and those mail-clad soldiers who hurl spears from dromedaries.

[4.14.4] When the approach of Artabanus was reported, Macrinus called the soldiers together and addressed them as follows: "That all of you regret the passing of such an emperor, or, more accurately, fellow soldier, is hardly surprising. But to endure misfortunes and disasters with equanimity is the part of intelligent men.

[4.14.5] Truly the memory of Caracalla is locked in our hearts, and to those who come after us will be handed down this memory, which will bring him everlasting fame for his great and noble deeds, his love and affection for you, and his labors and comradeship with you. But now it is time for us, since we have paid the last of the prescribed honors to the memory of the dead and have performed his funeral rites, to look to the present emergency.

[4.14.6] You see the barbarian with his whole Eastern horde already upon us, and Artabanus seems to have good reason for his enmity. We provoked him by breaking the treaty, and in a time of complete peace we started a war. Now the whole Roman empire depends upon our courage and loyalty. This is no quarrel about boundaries or river beds; everything is at stake in this dispute in which we face a mighty king fighting for his children and kinsmen who, he believes, have been murdered in violation of solemn oaths.

[4.14.7] Therefore let us take up our arms and our battle stations in the customary Roman good order. In the fighting, the undisciplined mob of barbarians, assembled only for temporary duty, may prove its own worst enemy. Our battle tactics and our stern discipline, together with our combat experience, will insure our safety and their destruction. Therefore, with hopes high, contest the issue as it is fitting and traditional for Romans to do.

[4.14.8] Thus will you repel the barbarians, and by winning a great and glorious reputation you will make it clear to the Romans and to all men - and you will likewise confirm that previous victory - that you did not deceive the barbarians by fraudulently and treacherously breaking your treaty with them, but that you conquered and won by force of arms."

After this speech the soldiers, recognizing the necessity of the matter, took up battle stations and remained under arms.

[4.15.1] [Summer 217] Artabanus [IV] appeared at sunrise with his vast army. When they had saluted the sun, as was their custom, the barbarians, with a deafening cheer, charged the Roman line, firing their arrows and whipping on their horses. The Romans had arranged their divisions carefully to insure a stable front; the cavalry and the Moorish javelin men were stationed on the wings, and the open spaces were filled with light-armed and mobile troops that could move rapidly from one place to another. And so the Romans received the charge of the Parthians and joined battle.

[4.15.2] The barbarians inflicted many wounds upon the Romans from above, and did considerable damage by the showers of arrows and the long spears of the mail-clad dromedary riders. But when the fighting came to close quarters, the Romans easily defeated the barbarians; for when the swarms of Parthian cavalry and hordes of dromedary riders were mauling them, the Romans pretended to retreat and then they threw down caltrops and other keen-pointed iron devices. Covered by the sand, these were invisible to the horsemen and the dromedary riders and were fatal to the animals.

[4.15.3] The horses, and particularly the tender-footed dromedary, stepped on these devices and, falling, threw their riders. As long as they are mounted on horses and dromedary, the barbarians in those regions fight bravely, but if they dismount or are thrown, they are very easily captured; they cannot stand up to hand-to-hand fighting. And, if they find it necessary to flee or pursue, the long robes which hang loosely about their feet trip them up.

[4.15.4] On the first and second days the two armies fought from morning until evening, and when night put an end to the fighting, each side withdrew to its own camp, claiming the victory. On the third day they came again to the same field to do battle; then the barbarians, who were far superior in numbers, tried to surround and trap the Romans. The Romans, however, no longer arranged their divisions to obtain depth; instead, they broadened their front and blocked every attempt at encirclement.

[4.15.5] So great was the number of slaughtered men and animals that the entire plain was covered with the dead; bodies were piled up in huge mounds, and the dromedaries especially fell in heaps. As a result, the soldiers were hampered in their attacks; they could not see each other for the high and impassable wall of bodies between them. Prevented by this barrier from making contact, each side withdrew to its own camp.

[4.15.6] Macrinus knew that Artabanus was making so strong a stand and battling so fiercely only because he thought that he was fighting Caracalla; the barbarian always tires of battle quickly and loses heart unless he is immediately victorious.

[4.15.7] But on this occasion the Parthians resolutely stood their ground and renewed the struggle after they had carried off their dead and buried them, for they were unaware that the cause of their hatred was dead. Macrinus therefore sent an embassy to the Parthian king with a letter telling him that the emperor who had wronged him by breaking his treaties and violating his oaths was dead and had paid a richly deserved penalty for his crimes. Now the Romans, to whom the empire really belonged, had entrusted to Macrinus the management of their realm.

[4.15.8] He told Artabanus that he did not approve of Caracalla's actions and promised to restore all the money he had lost. Macrinus offered friendship to Artabanus instead of hostility and assured him that he would confirm peace between them by oaths and treaties. When he learned this and was informed by envoys of Caracalla's death, Artabanus believed that the treaty breaker had suffered a suitable punishment; as his own army was riddled with wounds, the king signed a treaty of peace with Macrinus, content to recover the captives and stolen money without further bloodshed.

[4.15.9] The Parthian then returned to his own country, and Macrinus led his army out of Mesopotamia and hurried on to Antioch."

Caracalla's treachery would have incensed anyone who was not a devoted Machiavel, particularly a 'barbarian' with strong ideas of honour.  Every Parthian of rank present would have had slaughtered kin to avenge, and an abiding rage to quench in Roman blood - if they could just get close enough to draw that blood.  I am not surprised they drove themselves to the uttermost.

We may note, incidentally, that they had three days of fighting in which to pile up corpses, not just one.

Yes, "taking his wording too literally" is exactly what goes on in this and so many other cases. It comes down to the same old philosophical (or historiographical) question as always - is a battle account in a writer such as Herodian a detailed, precise and complete description of all the tactical details of everything that took place everywhere across the battlefield? Or is it an impressionistic, anecdotal list of incidents that occurred, or something like what occurred, and which happen to have been passed on to our author? Or is it indeed largely a fabrication, designed to match the author's, and his readers', view of what a big battle should be like, or to make a dramatic read? I'm strongly inclined to the second possibility, with a dose of the third (and to be fair, elements of the first).

Richard, seriously, either read history or give it up.  Do not try to remake it - that is my job. 

Someone who was at the battle might have noted that there were so many dead camels that the armies were impeded from contacting each other. How many camels would this be? For close order infantry, keen to keep formation, and mounted troops, awkward on broken ground, a liberal scattering of camels would be more than enough - no need for them to be stacked on top of each other - not even a continous 1-deep carpet. Just lots - the sort an old soldier would describe (with some glee no doubt) as 'heaps of enemy dead'.  This then gets passed through a process of Chinese whispers to our source, who hears that heaps of dead camels impeded the armies, and suddenly we have a camel wall several feet high. We don't have to conclude that Herodian's account is totally untrue, simply that it isn't the whole story, or a particularly precise telling of the story. It's an impression of an incident passed on at second, third or however many hands. This is what history is.

This kind of agenda-driven speculation is just what we need to avoid when evaluating an incident in a source.  If anyone starts using it as a consistent starting-point, then it can be argued that a battle in which each side suffers a couple of hundred casualties gets pumped up into one which leaves the ground strewn with 10,000 dead Carthaginians and 50,000 dead Romans, the tale having much improved in the telling between the time of the battle and the century or so later when the history was published.

[Erpingham]

Just for a sense of perspective, 15ft is the height of a double-decker bus.  I have no issue with heaps of dead in these battlefields but lets try to keep a sense of proportion and imagine what we are dealing with and how it might have got there. 

I thought I had.

And there was I thinking you were on a flight of fancy

Caracalla's treachery would have incensed anyone who was not a devoted Machiavel, particularly a 'barbarian' with strong ideas of honour.  Every Parthian of rank present would have had slaughtered kin to avenge, and an abiding rage to quench in Roman blood - if they could just get close enough to draw that blood.  I am not surprised they drove themselves to the uttermost.

Isn't this a bit romantic?  There seems to be a lack of any fanaticism in the descriptions, which seems to suggest a three day long inconclusive action, with the Parthians mainly shooting arrows. Where they do close to poke long spears at the Romans, the latter are mainly out of reach behind a screen of caltrops.  I'm not seeing a description of the camel cataphracts as hard charging shock troops who might force their way over a pile of dead camels. 

[RichT]

This kind of agenda-driven speculation

I am mildly curious, very mildly, as to what you think the 'agenda' is in this case. But please don't bother telling me, because come to think of it I really don't care what you think. 

This has left cataphract camels some way behind. But the 'heaps of dead' topic could conceivably make an interesting thread of its own - examples in ancient and medieval battles, comparative examples in other periods, physical realities and limitations, literary tropes or battlefield reality, and so on. If anyone wants to, that might be worth starting. Otherwise, enough of this nonsense.

[Andreas Johansson]

Regarding the original topic, my take away is this: granting that Herodian can be trusted, we're looking at "heavy camelry", with armoured riders who are willing to engage in hand to hand with steady enemy, but we can't tell for sure if they were cataphract in the sense of having armoured mounts. For wargaming, that's a practical problem if the rules you're using forces you come down on the one side or the other on that question.

Another practical issue is that Herodian gives no indication of proportions - how many should lists allow? Do they loom large in his account because they were a big chunk of the army, because they're exotic, or because his informant happened to be in the path of a camel attack?

[Patrick Waterson]

He gives the impression that there were enough of them to close off effective access for both sides; whether this was on one major sector of the battlefield (the centre, where we would expect the Roman infantry) or across the entire length is less clear.  My best guess is that the first two days of fighting would have mainly piled the casualties in the centre, where the legionaries (and caltrops) would have been, and this may have been contributory to the Parthian decision to extend the frontage of the fighting on day 3.

Proportions
Herodian has Artabanus field "a strong cavalry contingent and a powerful unit of archers and those mail-clad soldiers who hurl [sic] spears from dromedaries," which was "far superior in numbers" to the Romans.  At least some of these archers were mounted, and he gives the impression that the greater part of the lancers were camel-mounted.  Earlier, Herodian refers to the Parthians having "a large force of highly skilled horse-archers."

Regarding the proportion of camels, do we conclude that Herodian had a camel obsession or that camelry provided the majority of cataphracts?  His account suggests the camelry suffered the majority of the casualties and left many more of its representatives on the field.  I see this proportion-wise as suggesting that camelry provided the major portion of cataphracts.  I would guess this would be somewhere between 60% and 75% of the cataphracted total.

Attempting to focus these various impressions, I would suggest the Parthian army has a fighting core of perhaps 1/3 close-combat troops, with 2/3 mounted and foot archers (the latter could proceed initially ahead of and subsequently behind the shock troops and from there shoot indirectly to support attacks, which would be consistent with the 'showers of arrows' mentioned by Herodian).  Instinct at least suggests the shock troops' mounts would not be unarmoured in a culture to which archery was a way of life and whose opponents could be expected to develop a considerable volume of missiles.

Size
The Roman army of this period seems to have had eight or so legions available for service in a Parthian war, which we would use as a starting-point for Macrinus' army and let him field c.40,000 legionaries.  The usual rule-of-thumb is one auxiliary per legionary, for another 40,000 troops; plus cavalry amounting to perhaps 1/3 of the infantry, so maybe 25,000 cavalry.  We might pare this down for earlier attrition, but not by much, as Caracalla's campaign of looting and slaughter was effectively unopposed.  We might scale it down, but Caracalla appears to me to be the kind of emperor who would want to field a grand army rather than a routine expedition.

If we have Macrinus fielding c.105,000 men - these started out as Caracalla's army, and would have been brought well up to strength and perhaps even overstrength for the campaign - the Parthians must have more.  The question is: how much more?  Herodian has them as "far superior in numbers", which suggests something in the region of 2:1 or 3:1 rather than just 150% or so.

I would suggest tentatively assigning the Parthians double the Roman numbers.  This gives c.210,000 Parthians, consistent with an all-out effort against a hated opponent, and of those 200,000 we get c.70,000 close-fighting troops and c.140,000 archers.  Very crudely, we might have 1/3 cataphracts (camel and horse-mounted), 1/3 mounted archers and 1/3 foot archers, or something like that.

2mm starts to look like a useful scale - but I would not like to have to start painting that lot!

Frontage
Battle frontage for eight legions would normally be 1,600 yards (just under a mile, or about 1.5 km) with auxiliary and cavalry frontage in addition.  However Herodian indicates the Romans deployed in depth and shifted their auxilia around in support of their legions, so the overall frontage might have been about the same as for the legions alone.  When the Parthians tried to expand on the third day, the Romans were well able to counter their efforts.  To effectively block off a 1,600-yard frontage with dead camels/horses and riders would require, assuming a saturation blockage of six camels and four horses per yard of frontage in a tapering mound, only 4,800 horse corpses and 9,600 dead camels, which is well within the figure of 70,000 suggested above.

The numerical estimates above are based on the assumption that Caracalla would have brought together eight legions and proportionate auxiliaries, and that Macrinus would have been able to field essentially the same troops.  If the Roman army was in fact smaller, the Parthian army would reduce in proportion.

[Patrick Waterson]

Caracalla's treachery would have incensed anyone who was not a devoted Machiavel, particularly a 'barbarian' with strong ideas of honour.  Every Parthian of rank present would have had slaughtered kin to avenge, and an abiding rage to quench in Roman blood - if they could just get close enough to draw that blood.  I am not surprised they drove themselves to the uttermost.

Isn't this a bit romantic?  There seems to be a lack of any fanaticism in the descriptions, which seems to suggest a three day long inconclusive action, with the Parthians mainly shooting arrows. Where they do close to poke long spears at the Romans, the latter are mainly out of reach behind a screen of caltrops.  I'm not seeing a description of the camel cataphracts as hard charging shock troops who might force their way over a pile of dead camels.

The Romans are not 'out of reach behind a screen of caltrops', rather:

[4.15.2] The barbarians inflicted many wounds upon the Romans from above, and did considerable damage by the showers of arrows and the long spears of the mail-clad dromedary riders. But when the fighting came to close quarters, the Romans easily defeated the barbarians; for when the swarms of Parthian cavalry and hordes of dromedary riders were mauling them, the Romans pretended to retreat and then they threw down caltrops and other keen-pointed iron devices. Covered by the sand, these were invisible to the horsemen and the dromedary riders and were fatal to the animals.

Did the Parthians stand off and poke?  No ...

[4.15.3] The horses, and particularly the tender-footed dromedary, stepped on these devices and, falling, threw their riders.

The Parthian attacks were definitely pressed home, otherwise they would not have managed to lose many animals (and, indirectly, riders) to the caltrops.  There also seems to be nothing half-hearted about the following:

[4.15.6] Macrinus knew that Artabanus was making so strong a stand and battling so fiercely only because he thought that he was fighting Caracalla; the barbarian always tires of battle quickly and loses heart unless he is immediately victorious.

The action (near Nisbis, AD 217) lasted three days because two large armies met on a narrow frontage with stereotyped tactics, which created a battle of attrition.  Herodian admittedly does not fill his sentences with descriptions of sanguinary injuries or wild-eyed shrieking warriors or men fighting on when impaled or with bits lopped off, but must we conclude that the absence of such phrasing necessarily means a tame affair on the battlefield?

[Erpingham]

Herodian admittedly does not fill his sentences with descriptions of sanguinary injuries or wild-eyed shrieking warriors or men fighting on when impaled or with bits lopped off, but must we conclude that the absence of such phrasing necessarily means a tame affair on the battlefield?

I'm no expert on Herodian but, from the passage quoted, he seems a fond of his cliches or topoi.  It is surprising if he wanted to describe frenzied fighting, he didn't roll out a few more set phrases.  It is rather difficult to see this as a full blooded set to, given it happens over three days and then everyone goes home.  But in many ways, this is a deviation on the main subject.  Perhaps more important is the impression of the tactics of the camel cataphracts.  yes, I overstated the case about them only poking at the Romans.  But how do we see what they do?  They don't charge and impact, because they are hampered by the caltrops.  They either hurl or push with their long spears, again fitting with struggling to make a solid contact.  This doesn't mean of course they wouldn't in other circumstances be impact troops - medieval men-at-arms were known to throw lances and hand weapons at forces they could break and they were we know normally hard charging types.

[Patrick Waterson]

I had a look at Herodian's other battle descriptions, disappointingly few though they are.  Unlike Diodorus and Appian, he is not given to the limbs-flying-around school of narrative, but can summon up buckets of blood when the mood takes him.

[3.4.4] The armies of Severus and Niger not only met at that historic spot but the outcome of the battle was the same. The armies pitched camp opposite each other toward evening, and spent a sleepless night, anxious and afraid. [31 March 194] With each of the generals urging his men on, the armies advanced to the attack at sunrise, fighting with savage fury, as if this were destined to be the final and decisive battle and Fortune would there choose one of them as emperor.

[3.4.5] After the battle had continued for a long time with terrible slaughter, and the rivers which flowed through the plain were pouring more blood than water into the sea, the rout of the forces of the East began. Driving Niger's battered troops before them, the Illyrians forced some of the fugitives into the sea; pursuing the rest as they rushed to the ridges, they slaughtered the fugitives, as well as a large number of men from the nearby towns and farms who had gathered to watch the battle from a safe vantage point.

That said, his style seems rather dry for such a gore-fest, and the whole demeanour of his history seems to be of a scholar who must note regrettable details rather than a hack-writer who sees another excuse for describing a maelstrom of bloodletting.

I'm no expert on Herodian but, from the passage quoted, he seems a fond of his cliches or topoi.  It is surprising if he wanted to describe frenzied fighting, he didn't roll out a few more set phrases.

He seems to slip through battle descriptions as swiftly as possible: definitely no Froissart or Le Baker.  His account of Lugdunum in AD 197 shows exactly where his priorities lie:

[3.7.2] When the army of Severus came to Gaul, a few minor skirmishes occurred here and there, but the final battle was fought near the large and prosperous city of Lugdunum. [19 February 197] Albinus shut himself up in that city, remaining behind when he sent the army out to do battle. A major engagement developed, and for a long time each side's chances of victory were equal, for in courage and ruthlessness the soldiers from Britain were in no way inferior to the soldiers from Illyria. When these two magnificent armies were locked in combat, it was no easy matter to put either one to flight.

[3.7.3] As some contemporary historians recorded -saying it not to curry favor but in the interests of accuracy- the division of the army stationed opposite the sector where Severus and his command were fighting proved far superior; the emperor slipped from his horse and fled, managing to escape by throwing off the imperial cloak. But while the soldiers from Britain were pursuing the Illyrians, chanting paeans of praise as if they were already victorious, they say that Laetus, one of Severus' generals, appeared with the troops under his command fresh and not yet committed in the battle.

[3.7.4] The historians accuse Laetus of watching the progress of the battle and deliberately waiting, holding his troops out of the fighting and appearing only after he was informed that Severus had been beaten. The aftermath of the affair substantiates the charge that Laetus coveted the empire himself. Later, when Severus had set everything straight and was living an orderly life, he gave generous rewards to the rest of his commanders, but Laetus alone he put to death, as seems reasonable under the circumstances, considering the general's past performances.

[3.7.5] All this happened at a much later date, however. On this occasion, when Laetus appeared with fresh troops, as has been related above, Severus' soldiers, taking heart, wrapped the emperor in the imperial cloak again and mounted him on his horse.

[3.7.6] But Albinus' soldiers, thinking that the victory was theirs, now found themselves in disorder when this powerful and as yet uncommitted army suddenly attacked; after a brief resistance they broke and ran. When the rout became general, Severus' soldiers pursued and slaughtered the fugitives until they drove them into Lugdunum. Each contemporary historian has recorded to suit his own purpose the actual number of those killed and captured on each side.

Note the asides about 'contemporary historians'.  The central feature, however, is Laetus and his equivocal conduct in quest of his own purple wardrobe: this trivium consumes about half the account of the battle.  The Wikipedia article on Herodian suggests he may have been an apparitor, a scribe or attendant to the emperor, and this seems to suit his concise delivery and hard-to-categorise perspective.  It would also accord with the rationale that Laetus must have been aiming at empire because Severus subsequently had him killed, which to us might look less like reason and more like Severus' cruelty or paranoia.

Perhaps more important is the impression of the tactics of the camel cataphracts.  yes, I overstated the case about them only poking at the Romans.  But how do we see what they do?  They don't charge and impact, because they are hampered by the caltrops.

It looks as if they do charge, but, because of the caltrops, do not impact.  And that is the whole point of caltrops.  Herodian does point out how these were concealed by the sand in which they were dropped, so a tentative attacker would uncover a few the hard way, pull back and then rely on missiles.  The Parthians appear to have gone in hard, found caltrops all over the place, dropped all over the place, and been 'tidied up' by the Romans.  It is hard to see significant numbers of animals going down to caltrops except as the result of some really determinedly-delivered charges: they just would not achieve the penetration of the caltrop field otherwise.  At least, that is how I see it.

They either hurl or push with their long spears, again fitting with struggling to make a solid contact.

As considered earlier in the thread, this may be a translation issue as opposed to tactical tentativity.  Or it may be the actions of men whose mounts are collapsing beneath them and rather spoiling an otherwise decent charge.

[Erpingham]

It looks as if they do charge, but, because of the caltrops, do not impact.

Sort of what I had concluded - tentative poking/hurling would not necessarily be their normal MO, just what they were forced to do by the caltrop situation. 

Given this seems to be the only appearance of camel cataphracts in the historical record, it is hard to say what they would normally have done.

Are there any other examples of close-combat camel troops from their period and area who they might be a development of?  If so, do we know what they did?

[Patrick Waterson]

Given this seems to be the only appearance of camel cataphracts in the historical record, it is hard to say what they would normally have done.

Are there any other examples of close-combat camel troops from their period and area who they might be a development of?  If so, do we know what they did?

This is the only known case of 'camelphracts' being fielded on the battlefield by the Parthians, and the combination of a period of second-rate and/or fragmentary historians with long periods of apparent peace or relative inactivity on Rome's eastern frontier mean that for this period (3rd century AD) we really have nothing with which to compare.  The Romans and some of their eastern clients retained dromedarii in limited numbers, though these were usually for scouting and relied on archery.

The Wikipedia article on camel cavalry mentions in its exiguous Muslim Conquests section:

"The camel was used in this way by many civilizations, especially in Arabia and North Africa. Both camel and rider were sometimes armored like the contemporary late Roman cataphracts."

These 'contemporary late Roman cataphracts' would be Maurikian Byzantines; in WRG parlance EHC rather than SHC.  Maurikians appear to have used shock combat (in conjunction with a lot of missiles) as their principal tactical procedure.  These Islamic camel lancers are probably the closest equivalent in the general geographical area.  Depending on just how equivalent they were, they might also add weight to the idea that the Parthians' camels would also have been armoured.

[Andreas Johansson]

The Wikipedia article on camel cavalry mentions in its exiguous Muslim Conquests section:

"The camel was used in this way by many civilizations, especially in Arabia and North Africa. Both camel and rider were sometimes armored like the contemporary late Roman cataphracts."

The only source cited in that section is The Sealed Nectar, an apparently hagiographic biography of Muhammad, and near as I can find from the Google Books version it doesn't have a word to say about armoured camels. They don't seem to be mentioned as battle mounts at all, although they're clearly used for off-battlefield transportation of fighters. Most mentions are of them as pack animals or booty, or simply as a measure of value.

[aligern]

I'd concur that camels are mainly for transport and incidentally for providing a barrier to mounted assault when tethered. There is a depiction of a camel mounted warrior, which I recall as being on a ceiling at At Palermo, either palace or Monreale  cathedral. There are extant 'camel swords' with long blades so chaps on camels were clearly expected to reach standing opponents with a deadly weapon.
Then there are the mentions of them as gimmick weapons by the Persians against the Lydians and the Arabs ( dressing them as elephants). As Patrick says they appear to be mainly used for patrolling desert roads or guarding caravans.  As relative height is a definite advantage in warfare there must be some reason for there  not normally  being squadrons of camels in ancient armies...perhaps because camels are not easy to train into the disciplined group manoeuvres of cavalry.
Roy