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By popular request, herewith a thread to look at Gallic armies, weapons, tactics and general methods of fighting.  Please feel free to be the first to contribute.  :)

Thanks Patrick.

First question: when moving into close contact with enemy, were Gallic warriors impetuous? i.e. would they not bother about gaps in lines but just run into them pell mell to get at the Romans, or would they keep the phalanx-like formation intact which they did adopt in several historical battles? Primary sources in either direction?

Well here is Livy's description of the Allia which is sometimes cited as an example of impetuosity overwhelming the Romans, but reads to me more like a flank attack by the Gauls and a subsequent Roman panic. Livy bk 5 ch 38
Roy
[5.38]The consular tribunes had secured no position for their camp, had constructed no entrenchments behind which to retire, and had shown as much disregard of the gods as of the enemy, for they formed their order of battle without having obtained favourable auspices. They extended their line on either wing to prevent their being outflanked, but even so they could not make their front equal to the enemy's, whilst by thus thinning their line they weakened the centre so that it could hardly keep in touch. On their right was a small eminence which they decided to hold with reserves, and this disposition, though it was the beginning of the panic and flight, proved to be the only means of safety to the fugitives. For Bennus, the Gaulish chieftain, fearing some ruse in the scanty numbers of the enemy, and thinking that the rising ground was occupied in order that the reserves might attack the flank and rear of the Gauls while their front was engaged with the legions, directed his attack upon the reserves, feeling quite certain that if he drove them from their position, his overwhelming numbers would give him an easy victory on the level ground. So not only Fortune but tactics also were on the side of the barbarians. In the other army there was nothing to remind one of Romans either amongst the generals or the private soldiers. They were terrified, and all they thought about was flight, and so utterly had they lost their heads that a far greater number fled to Veii, a hostile city, though the Tiber lay in their way, than by the direct road to Rome, to their wives and children. For a short time the reserves were protected by their position. In the rest of the army, no sooner was the battle-shout heard on their flank by those nearest to the reserves, and then by those at the other end of the line heard in their rear, than they fled, whole and unhurt, almost before they had seen their untried foe, without any attempt to fight or even to give back the battle-shout. None were slain while actually fighting; they were cut down from behind whilst hindering one another's flight in a confused, struggling mass. Along the bank of the Tiber, whither the whole of the left wing had fled, after throwing away their arms, there was great slaughter. Many who were unable to swim or were hampered by the weight of their cuirasses and other armour were sucked down by the current. The greater number, however, reached Veii in safety, yet not only were no troops sent from there to defend the City, but not even was a messenger despatched to report the defeat to Rome. All the men on the right wing, which had been stationed some distance from the river, and nearer to the foot of the hill, made for Rome and took refuge in the Citadel without even closing the City gates.

And here is Dionysius' account of Camillus trying to get some backbone into the Romans so that they would face the Gauls again:

9. Upon learning of this state of affairs the Roman dictator, Camillus, assembled his men and addressed them, using many arguments that incited them to boldness, among which were the following: "Better arms than the barbarians possess have been fashioned for us — breastplates, helmets, greaves, mighty shields, with which we keep our entire bodies protected, two-edged swords, and, instead of the spear [logkhes], the javelin [hussos = pilum], a missile that cannot be dodged — some of them being protective armour, such as not to yield readily to blows, and others offensive, of a sort to pierce through any defence. But our foes have their heads bare, bare their breasts and flanks, bare their thighs and legs down to their feet, and have no other defence except shields; as weapons of offence they have spears and very long slashing blades. The tern also in which we shall fight will aid us as we move downhill from higher ground, but will be adverse to them as they are forced to advance from the level to higher ground. And let no one of you stand in dread either of the enemies' numbers or of their size, or, from looking at these advantages on their side, become less confident of the contest. On the contrary, let everyone bear in mind, first, that a smaller army which understands what must be done is superior to a large army that is uninstructed; and, second, that to those who are fighting for their own possessions Nature herself lends a certain courage in the face of danger and gives them a spirit of ecstasy like that of men possessed by a god, whereas those who are eager to seize the goods of others are apt to find their boldness weakened in the face of dangers.  Nay, not even their attempts to frighten their foes and terrify them before coming to blows should cause us any dread, as if we were inexperienced in warfare. For what harm can be done to men going into battle by those long locks, the fierceness of their glance, and the grim aspect of their countenances? And these awkward prancings, the useless brandishing of their weapons, the many clashings of their shields, and all the other demonstrations of barbarian and senseless bravado, whether through motions or through sounds, indulged in by way of threats to their foes — what advantage are they calculated to bring to those who attack unintelligently, or what fear to those who with cool calculation stand their ground in the midst of danger?  Do you, then, with these thoughts in mind, both those of you who were present in the earlier war against the Gauls and those of you who had no part in it by reason of your youth, the former in order that you may not, by cowardice now, bring shame upon the valour you then displayed, and you others in order that you may not be behind your elders in the display of noble deeds, go, noble sons, emulators of brave fathers, go intrepidly against the foe, having not only the gods as your helpers, who will give you the power to exact from your bitterest foes such vengeance as you have been wishing for, but also me as your general, to whose great prudence and great good fortune you bear witness.  A blissful life from this time forth those of you will lead to whom it shall be granted to bring home for your fatherland its most distinguished crown, and a splendid and imperishable renown in place of your mortal bodies those of you will bequeath to your infant children and your aged parents who shall fulfil thus the end of your lives. I know of nothing more that needs to be said; for the barbarian army is already in motion, advancing against us. But be off and take your places in the ranks."

10. Now the barbarians' manner of fighting, being in large measure that of wild beasts and frenzied, was an erratic procedure, quite lacking in military science. Thus, at one moment they would raise their swords aloft and smite after the manner of wild boars, throwing the whole weight of their bodies into the blow like hewers of wood or men digging with mattocks, and again they would deliver crosswise blows aimed at no target, as if they intended to cut to pieces the entire bodies of their adversaries, protective armour and all; then they would turn the edges of their swords away from the foe.  On the other hand, the Romans' defence and counter-manoeuvring against the barbarians was steadfast and afforded great safety. For while their foes were still raising their swords aloft, they would duck under their arms, holding up their shields, and then, stooping and crouching low, they would render vain and useless the blows of the others, which were aimed too high, while for their own part, holding their swords straight out, they would strike their opponents in the groins, pierce their sides, and drive their blows through their breasts into their vitals. And if they saw any of them keeping these parts of their bodies protected, they would cut the tendons of their knees or ankles and topple them to the ground roaring and biting their shields and uttering cries resembling the howling of wild beasts.  Not only did their strength desert many of the barbarians as their limbs failed them through weariness, but their weapons also were either blunted or broken or no longer serviceable. For besides the blood that flowed from their wounds, the sweat pouring out over their whole bodies would not let them either grasp their swords or hold their shields firmly, since their fingers slipped on the handles and no longer kept a firm hold. The Romans, however, being accustomed to many toils by reason of their unabating and continuous warfare, continued to meet every peril in noble fashion. - Dionysius of Halicarnassus XIV chapters 9 and 10

Very contrasting accounts.  The description of the Allia doesn't give much of an impression of how the Gauls fight but, contrary to the second passage, does suggest the Gauls have a battleplan - they are going to secure their flank then steamroller the Romans on the plain.

Stripping away the hyperbole, the second passage seems very clear that the Romans are to exploit the weakness of slashing sword tactics, which expose the attacker.  The author ridicules the way the enemy use their swords, slashing and using their whole strength in blows as if it is evidence of their wild nature, contrasted against the cool, economic Roman style but doesn't seem to have thought through the implications of using a slashing sword against an armoured enemy - you wont make much impression poking delicately.  It may be the Gauls were showy fighters, with lots of swash buckling moves designed to demonstrate their prowess.  Or they may have belonged to the "hard blows" school that Roy has ascribed to the Vikings before - relatively few massive blows, which if they connect smash shields, helmets, skulls.  It is less clear on how the barbarians use their spears - have they "chucked and charged" or perhaps there has been some exchange of throwing weapons (Roman pila aren't mentioned in Ch. 10 either).

Very interesting cite indeed Anthony..... I feel a Society book on Celts or generic wild barbarians coming up!
The Celts of Dionysius are not mentioned as charging in uncontrollably. They chant, leap and beat rhythmically on their shields as  Plutarch describes in the life of Gaius Marius, but nothing implies that they run forward in a disorganised and wild manner or that they cannot manoeuvre because they are too ill disciplined. As Anthony so wisely says Dionysius (or his source) makes no allowance for how a man with an edged but not pointed sword must fight.  I would cite Rome's long development of neck and shoulder protection in legionary helmets and armour as evidence that the Romans took this threat seriously.

The quote als provides evidence of another couple of threads of thought, one is the exhaustion of the barbarians who become tired and sweaty through over exertion, this is also a tops, but clearly the Romans had a tactic for dealing with great blows from giant Celts of allowing the opponent to exhaust himself whilst the Roman defends and then stabbing at the worn opponent. The other point reflects upon the interesting question that Patrick raised about  tiredness. If you cannot replace the front rankers they will become exhausted.  There is a description of Ariovistus' Germans becoming too exhausted to resist and that would give a consistency to the accounts.

Perhaps what scholars have taken to be the impetuous gallic charge is really more about the style of their fighting once the two lines have closed and that Gauls don't really rush in, they advance more cautiously and then go wild when attempting to batter down the Roman defence??

Roy

Quote from: aligern on January 04, 2013, 09:57:57 AMPerhaps what scholars have taken to be the impetuous gallic charge is really more about the style of their fighting once the two lines have closed and that Gauls don't really rush in, they advance more cautiously and then go wild when attempting to batter down the Roman defence??

Roy

I noticed that. The Gauls seem to indulge in a lot of pre-fight posturing: yells, shield-banging, and the rest, followed by an attempt to quickly hack their opponents to pieces, armour and all, in hand-to-hand combat. I'm not sure I see anything adding up to a frenzied charge.

Fighting between primitive tribes like those in the Amazon and New Guinea generally seems to involve a lot of display and not too much bloodletting, rather like male animals that avoid causing too much injury to each other when they fight over the females . The Gauls were perhaps similar, wanting to frighten their opponents into a retreat rather than indulge in a reckless and costly all-out assault in which both sides would suffer heavy casualties. When it came to the actual fighting they seem to have wanted to get it over with as soon as possible.

Any other sources on the subject?

Dionysius also suggests out that the Gauls were drawn into Italy by the delicacies of the region:

10  The reason why the Gauls came into Italy was as follows. A certain Lucumo, a par of the Tyrrhenians, being about to die, entrusted his son to a loyal man named Arruns as guardian. Upon the death of the Tyrrhenian, Arruns, taking over the guardianship of the boy, proved diligent and just in carrying out his trust, and when the boy came to manhood, turned over to him the entire estate left by his father. For this service he did not receive similar kindness from the youth.  It seems that Arruns had a beautiful young wife, of whose society he was extremely fond and who had always shown herself chaste up to that time; but the young man, becoming enamoured of her, corrupted her mind as well as her body, and sought to hold converse with her not only in secret but openly as well. Arruns, grieving at the seduction of his wife and distressed by the wanton wrong done him by them both, yet unable to take vengeance upon them, prepared for a sojourn abroad, ostensibly for the purpose of trading.  When the youth welcomed his departure and provided everything that was necessary for trading, he loaded many skins of wine and olive oil and many baskets of figs on the waggons and set out for Gaul.

11 The Gauls at that time had no knowledge either of wine made from grapes or of oils such as is produced by our olive trees, but used for wine a foul-smelling liquor made from barley rotted in water, and for oil, stale lard, disgusting both in smell and taste. On that occasion, accordingly, when for the first time they enjoyed fruits which they had never before tasted, they got wonderful pleasure out of each; and they asked the stranger how each of these articles was produced and among what men.  The Tyrrhenian told them that the country producing these fruits was large and fertile and that it was inhabited by only a few people, who were no better than women when it came to warfare; and he advised them to get these products no longer by purchase from others, but to drive out the present owners and enjoy the fruits as their own. Persuaded by these words, the Gauls came into Italy and to the Tyrrhenians known as the Clusians, from whence had come the man who had persuaded them to make war.

and once they had what they wanted they became soft and unfit (a similar process is said to have affected Hannibal's men wintering in Campania in 216/215 BC).

The Gauls, having made an expedition against Rome for the second time, were plundering the Alban district. There, as all gorged themselves with much food, drank much unmixed wine (the wine produced there is the sweetest of all wines after the Falernian and is the most like hone-wine), took more sleep than was their custom, and spent most of their time in the shade, they gained so rapidly in corpulence and flabbiness and became so womanish in physical strength that whenever they undertook to exercise their bodies and to drill in arms their respiration was broken by continual panting, their limbs were drenched by much sweat, and they desisted from their toils before they were bidden to do so by their commanders. - Dionysius XIV.8

This might be why the vaunted Gallic charge was not in evidence in Dionysius' account of Camillus' battle.  On the other hand, Livy's account states:

[Camillus] then drew up his line, as well as the ground permitted, on the naturally uneven surface of the half-ruined City, and saw to it that his soldiers had every advantage in choice of position and in preparation which the art of war suggested. [5] The Gauls were taken aback; they armed, and, with more rage than judgment, charged the Romans. - Livy V.49.4-5

This is more like what we would expect: a jolly good charge with plenty of rage behind it.  Dionysius may simply have omitted the charge from his retelling in order to concentrate on the details of the bloodletting.  If so, he definitely missed a chance to promote a 'topos' (literary stereotype), which rather argues against the 'topos' school of thought.

I am not sure that Dionysius 'ridicules' the Gallic method of fighting: he simply describes it.  Granted that one can read in a tacit assumption that the 'civilised' Roman way is better, but if the Roman way was indeed better for the reasons given then the historian would be doing his subject a disservice were he not to point this out.

Patrick

Quote from: aligern on January 04, 2013, 09:57:57 AM
I would cite Rome's long development of neck and shoulder protection in legionary helmets and armour as evidence that the Romans took this threat seriously.

Roy

Gallic forms of helmet with good protection for the neck and the mailshirt with the reinforced shoulder pieces suggest that blows from above were a threat both cultures were aware of.  It is tempting to relate this to slashing sword armed opponents.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 04, 2013, 11:42:19 AM


I am not sure that Dionysius 'ridicules' the Gallic method of fighting: he simply describes it.  Granted that one can read in a tacit assumption that the 'civilised' Roman way is better, but if the Roman way was indeed better for the reasons given then the historian would be doing his subject a disservice were he not to point this out.

Patrick

Maybe it's the translation but the tone I am hearing is one of racial or cultural superiority.  Our enemies are animals, fierce and dangerous, but incapable of real skill at arms.  He is a good enough historian to use his source material to describe the two combat styles (and I think his basic description is credible) but his analysis starts from a point of not being able to credit his opponents' skills or tactical choices, so any reason behind their battlefield behaviour is lost on him.

Dionysius regrettably degenerates into fragments just as he is getting interesting, so our next piece comes from Livy, narrating a Gallic incursion in 359-358 BC.

At first the Gallic leaders supposed that the Romans would not come down into the plain; then, when they saw that they had suddenly begun to descend, they also, being themselves eager for the combat, rushed into battle, and the fighting began before the signal could be given by the generals. - Livy VII.14.10

Eagerness and rushing into combat seems to be characteristic of Gauls in this period when left to their own default mentality.  Their impetuosity is confirmed by the next sentence:

The right wing of the Gauls attacked fiercely, and it would have been impossible to stop them, if the dictator had not happened to be there. - Livy VII.15.1

A combination of Roman courage and timely commitment of cavalry saw off this particular attack once the dictator had delivered an impassioned oration to his quailing troops (at least Livy would have it this way, though how the troops would have heard their leader's pretty speech amid the din of battle is not explained).

At Sentinum in 295 BC:

The Romans with Fabius were rather defending themselves than attacking, and were trying to prolong the struggle to as late an hour in the day as possible.  This was because their general was persuaded that both Samnites and Gauls fought fiercely at the outset of an engagement, but only needed to be withstood; when a struggle was prolonged, little by little the spirits of the Samnites flagged, while the physical prowess of the Gauls, who could least of all men put up with heat and labour, ebbed away, and, whereas in the early stages of their battles they were more than men [plus quam virorum], they ended with being less than women. - Livy X.28.2-4

The initial impact of the Gauls is contrasted with the rapid waning of their stamina in a prolonged fight.

These extracts all seem consistent with a preferred Gallic style of battle that involves a furious rush and mighty weapon strokes - and which also seems nonplussed about what to do if this fails to cause the enemy to collapse.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 04, 2013, 06:59:02 PM

These extracts all seem consistent with a preferred Gallic style of battle that involves a furious rush and mighty weapon strokes - and which also seems nonplussed about what to do if this fails to cause the enemy to collapse.

And yet there seem to be other battles where this doesn't happen.  Looking at battles covered by the Battles thread elsewhere, the Gauls at Bibracte don't seem to do anything impulsive - they plod around in big close-order phalanxes or skulk on hills.  The battle of Mons Graupius, the British infantry skulk on a hill then slowly descend.  I remember there are other examples where the gauls (or maybe Galatians, or Celt-Iberians) are much less inclined to throw themselves into a screaming charge.  Why might this be?  Could we be seeing an attempt to match tactics against Roman activity, which would suggest an understanding of the military art.

At Telamon in 225 BC the Gauls suffered a serious defeat and seem never to have been the same again afterwards.  Telamon is also the last time (in the west) that we encounter Gauls clad for combat in their birthday suits (their eastern cousins, the Galatians, maintain this naturist battlefield sartorial approach until they themselves are decisively smitten in similar circumstances in 189 BC).

The Telamon campaign saw (according to Polybius) a more impressive lineup than the Romans had ever faced before.

These arguments made the leaders so eager for the expedition, that there never at any other time came from that part of Gaul a larger host, or one consisting of more notable warriors. - Polybius II.22

The Romans concentrated two main armies against the Gallic incursion.  As fortune or destiny would have it, one army ended up ahead of the Gauls and one behind them.  The Gauls, unsure what to do, concentrated on some rising ground (a more sensible course of action would have been to commit rapidly and weightily against one of the Roman forces).

The Celts had stationed the Alpine tribe of the Gaesatae to face their enemies on the rear, and behind them the Insubres; on their front they had placed the Taurisci, and the Cispadane tribe of the Boii, facing the legions of Gaius. Their waggons and chariots they placed on the extremity of either wing, while the booty they massed upon one of the hills that skirted the road, under the protection of a guard. The army of the Celts was thus double-faced, and their mode of marshalling their forces was effective as well as calculated to inspire terror. The Insubres and Boii were clothed in their breeches and light cloaks; but the Gaesatae from vanity and bravado threw these garments away, and fell in in front of the army naked, with nothing but their arms; believing that, as the ground was in parts encumbered with brambles, which might possibly catch in their clothes and impede the use of their weapons, they would be more effective in this state. - Polybius II.28

The Gauls' problem was that they were facing two opponents in two different directons and in addition were losing a cavalry fight on one of their flanks.  This seems to have dampened their enthusiasm for their usual have-at-em charge.

Telamon had been preceded by an action near Faesulae a few days earlier.  Here the Gauls had the initiative and behaved in characteristic fashion once committed to battle.  Note however the care they took to lead the Romans into an ambush.

The two armies came in sight of each other about sunset, and encamped for the night a short distance apart. But when night fell, the Celts lit their watch fires; and leaving their cavalry on the ground, with instructions that, as soon as daylight made them visible to the enemy, they should follow by the same route, they made a secret retreat along the road to Faesulae, and took up their position there; that they might be joined by their own cavalry, and might disconcert the attack of the enemy. Accordingly, when at daybreak the Romans saw that the cavalry were alone, they believed that the Celts had fled, and hastened in pursuit of the retreating horse; but when they approached the spot where the enemy were stationed, the Celts suddenly left their position and fell upon them. The struggle was at first maintained with fury on both sides: but the courage and superior numbers of the Celts eventually gave them the victory. - Polybius II.25

One gets the impression that where the Gauls felt they were at an advantage they would fall on enthusiastically without let or hindrance.  When things looked trickier, they seem to have been hesitant and indecisive.  This seems to have happened at Telamon and much more after 225 BC.

Thanks again Patrick.  Three points of note to me :

Another army skulking on a hill.  If I remember correctly, Galatians had a similar tendency to make stands on hills (a battle is won by velites pelting them with javelins IIRC).  Is this because hills are an obvious place to defend (and for that matter rally to in a time without OS maps and GPS) or is there more to it?

Secondly, the ambush has both sides fighting furiously - I'm guessing here we have a short, sharp action, in which the Roman long game for which they trained doesn't come into play.

Thirdly, the pragmatic explanation for men "getting naked" (as the modern idiom has it).  True, or is our author rationalising the irrational and there is some ritual purpose here?  That's a whole other debate of course (I'm not suggesting we set about it now) but my purpose for raising it is that we do lack anthropological insight into how the Gauls work.  To go back to our Isandhlwana example (which I suspect was in another thread), if we didn't have the knowledge of Zulu society, would we see the British as being outmanoeuvered or just swamped by a tide of "savages"?  While I think that the topos of the fierce onset, lack of staying power has some truth in it (not least in that the Romans seam to have made efforts with economic combat technique, endurance training and line relief to be able to play the long game - you don't take real steps to counter a literary salon invention), the gloss about animal like behaviour and lack of military art is a failure to understand how Gallic military organisation worked.  Anyway, looking forward to more examples :)

Patrick generally has an adventurous humour in this sort of debate.  I see that we advance from some Gauls charging to  them fighting fiercely and that both types of citation are used to characterise the Gallic eagerness to charge and 'impetuosity.'  However, I suggest that Anthony has some good logic here in that we are seeing a Roman Or Greek< account that  misunderstands the Gauls  and is then bought into by the wargaming myth makers.
Firstly, Gauls are not the only people who make fierce charges. The Romans seem to do the same, sometimes resulting in an inability to throw pila.  Against Ariovistus for example.
The cite where the Romans move down the hill and trigger a Gallic charge is just as likely to reflect a Gallic commander seizing an opportunity when he thought that the Romans had been disordered by their descent and only the commanding presence of the dictator  saves the Romans and converts the action to a victory.
Secondly, ambushes don't work if you cannot control your troops. In the case patrick cites and at the Sambre and in some of those defeats by Gauls that we get very little detail about that occur in the North of Italy, one rather expects that the Gallic general has waited until the point of advantage to release his men.
Thirdly, seductive though Patrick's argument is, we should not confuse fierce fighting with an impetuous charge.  Are we to believe that the Samnites are fierce and uncontrolled chargers?  I think not and I don't think that the proponents of Gallic impetuosity think that that Samnites are the same, yet the quote that has both of them fighting fiercely at first is often used selectively to justify a penalising effect on Gauls.
Lastly , Patrick and Anthony have both pointed us to the likelihood that Gallic tactics develop , or at least are modified by, time and the lessons of defeat, though interestingly they never abandon their long swords and inadequate shields. maybe their fighting style is just too wedded to their culture, maybe it is a matter that mostly they fought other Gauls or tribes that they were not so disadvantaged against?/

Patrick, any chance of lumping into this thread the examples from Plutarch's life of marius and your comments upon those descriptions?/
Roy

I am running through our sources' Gallic listings in more or less historical order so that interested readers can see trends for themselves (in addition to inserting my own pointers  ;) ).  What I think wll emerge is how Gallic tactics and battlefield approaches have what we might consider a 'default procedure', namely the fierce impetuous charge exemplified by the Nervii and their allies, but that there is more to the picture than just this (as Roy and Anthony are picking up on).  Did anyone notice Dionysius' reference to Gauls getting in some military training, or at least combat practice?

whenever they undertook to exercise their bodies and to drill in arms their respiration was broken by continual panting, their limbs were drenched by much sweat, and they desisted from their toils before they were bidden to do so by their commanders - Dionysius XIV.8

This is also interesting in light of previous discussions on battlefield stamina, as these out-of-condition Gauls do conform to the modern accepted standard, but this seems to have been an exception and the default condition seems to have been otherwise.

Onward.  We move east for our next expose.

Setting the scene: 189 BC.  Antiochus III has just been defeated at Magnesia.  The Romans move to hunt down his Galatian allies, or at least the Galatian tribes who did not side with Rome's ally, Pergamum.

The chiefs of these three tribes at this time were Ortiago and Combolomarus and Gaulotus. They had adopted this plan particularly for conducting the war —that, when they had occupied the highest peaks in the region, conveying everything there which would be sufficient for their use over however long a period, they would wear down the enemy by exhaustion; [4] for, they were convinced, the Romans would neither venture to climb over such steep and difficult ground, and, if they did attempt it, they could be stopped even by a small force or pushed back, nor would they sit quietly at the foot of cold mountains and endure chill and hunger. [5] And, although the very height of the place was a defence, they also threw a ditch and other fortifications around the summits which they had occupied. [6] They took little forethought for a supply of missile weapons, because they believed that the very roughness of the terrain would furnish stones in abundance. - Livy XXXVIII.19.3-6

So why not try the usual procedure of kit off, sword in hand, charge?  One can write one's own reasons, but lack of confidence against an army that has just thrashed the most powerful monarchy in the Near East may have been a factor.  Or this may have been a standard Galatian response to a punitive expedition, as the Roman consul knew or had been told exactly what to expect, suggesting that someone local predicted the Galatian course of action on the basis of past experience.

The consul, because he had foreseen, as a result of reflection [praeceperat animo = opinion prepared or received in advance], that the fighting would not be done hand to hand but by making attacks from a distance, had prepared a vast quantity of javelins [pilorum], skirmishers' spears [velitarium hastarum], arrows, bullets and stones of suitable size which could be discharged from slings, and equipped with this supply of missiles he led the army towards the Olympus mountain and encamped about five miles away. - Livy XXXVIII.20.1-2

In the event the Galatians were shot to pieces.

Arrows, sling-bullets, darts, coming from all sides wounded them unexpectedly, nor did they see what to do, as their minds were blinded by rage and fear, and they were involved in a kind of battle for which they were very ill-adapted. [8] For, as in hand-to-hand fighting, where they can receive and inflict wounds in turn, passion inflames their minds, so when they are struck by light weapons, coming from unseen and distant sources, and when they have no place at which they can charge with blind violence, like wounded animals they rush headlong upon their own friends. [9] The fact that they fight naked makes their wounds conspicuous and their bodies are fleshy and white, as is natural, since they are never uncovered except in battle; so that both more blood flowed from their abundant flesh and the wounds stood out to view more fearfully and the whiteness of their skins was more stained by the black blood. [10] But they are not much disturbed by open wounds; indeed, sometimes they cut away the skin, when the gash is broad rather than deep, and think that thus they gain greater glory in the fight; the same men, when the sting of an arrow or of a bullet that has buried itself in the flesh torments them, having caused a wound small to look at, [11] and, as they search for a way to extract the missile, it does not come out, turning to madness and shame at being destroyed by so small a thing, throw their bodies upon the ground. So in this instance they lay prostrate here and there; some, rushing against the enemy, were wounded from every side, and when they had come to close quarters they were slain by the swords of the skirmishers.

This pretty much summarises the picture of the Gaul that has come down to us: naked, furious and disdaining wounds (provided they look bloody and impressive) - all qualities that impressed themselves heavily upon classical minds - but not too good in an unexpected situation.

Next we shall look at a couple of instances of Roman and Gallic guile from northern Italy in 223-216 BC.  We shall get to the Cimbri and Teutones (105-101 BC) ere long, and (according to Appian) their lineal descendants the Nervii (57 BC).

First we have a Roman cunning plan, the details of which suggest that the powerful Gallic swordstrokes, whose influence on helmet and armour design has been alluded to, were indeed something to be avoided or ameliorated if at all possible.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 04, 2013, 05:29:55 PM

Quote from: aligern on January 04, 2013, 09:57:57 AM
I would cite Rome's long development of neck and shoulder protection in legionary helmets and armour as evidence that the Romans took this threat seriously.

Roy

Gallic forms of helmet with good protection for the neck and the mailshirt with the reinforced shoulder pieces suggest that blows from above were a threat both cultures were aware of.  It is tempting to relate this to slashing sword armed opponents.

The year is 223 BC, and Rome is at war with the Insubres, a Gallic tribe in northern Italy.  These were settled Gauls, and were deemed to have lost something of their edge (and they apparently went into battle fully dressed rather than sky-clad) but were Gauls nonetheless.

The Romans are thought to have shown uncommon skill in this battle; the Tribunes instructing the troops how they were to conduct themselves both collectively and individually. They had learned from former engagements that Gallic tribes were always most formidable at the first onslaught, before their courage was at all damped by a check; and that the swords with which they were furnished, as I have mentioned before, could only give one downward cut with any effect, but that after this the edges got so turned and the blade so bent, that unless they had time to straighten them with their foot against the ground, they could not deliver a second blow. The Tribunes accordingly gave out the spears of the Triarii, who are the last of the three lines, to the first line, or Hastati: and ordering the men to use their swords only, after their spears were done with, they charged the Celts full in front. When the Celts had rendered their swords useless by the first blows delivered on the spears, the Romans close with them, and rendered them quite helpless, by preventing them from raising their hands to strike with their swords, which is their peculiar and only stroke, because their blade has no point. The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them. And this was due to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements for this battle. By drawing up his men along the very brink of the river, he rendered impossible a manœuvre characteristic of Roman tactics, because he left the lines no room for their deliberate retrograde movements; for if, in the course of the battle, the men had been forced ever so little from their ground, they would have been obliged by this blunder of their leader to throw themselves into the river. However, the valour of the soldiers secured them a brilliant victory, as I have said, and they returned to Rome with abundance of booty of every kind, and of trophies stripped from the enemy. - Polybius II.33

The trick here is the way the Romans avoid the first - lethal - Gallic swordstrokes.  By extending spears ahead of them they induce the Gauls to chop down through the spear-shafts and then, before the Gauls can raise their swords for another stroke, the Romans push in to close quarters drawing their own dinky but handy blades while trapping the Gauls' swords and sword arms in an unserviceable position (this makes more sense than the assumption that the Gallic blades would bend and be blunted from one chop at a spear-shaft and fits with the insistence on rapid closure by the Romans).  They then just keep pinking their helpless opponents until the latter expire.

Now for the Gauls' revenge.  Not direct revenge, as it is the Boii rather than the Insubres, but effective nonetheless.  The yeart is 216 BC: Rome has just lost an army at Cannae.  The only remaining Roman army in Italy is currently marching through Boii territory to keep this Gallic tribe in subjection.

While busily occupied with these matters, intelligence arrived of a fresh disaster —fortune crowding into this year one calamity after another —that Lucius Posthumius, consul elect, himself with all his army was destroyed in Gaul. [7] He was to march his troops through a vast wood, which the Gauls called Litana. On the right and left of his route, the natives had sawed the trees in such a manner that they continued standing upright, but would fall when impelled by a slight force. [8] Posthumius had with him two Roman legions, and besides had levied so great a number of allies along the Adriatic Sea, that he led into the enemy's country twenty-five thousand men. [9] As soon as this army entered the wood, the Gauls, who were posted around its extreme skirts, pushed down the outermost of the sawn trees, which falling on those next them, and these again on others, which of themselves stood tottering and scarcely maintained their position, crushed arms, men, and horses in an indiscriminate manner, so that scarcely ten men escaped. [10] For most of them being killed by the trunks and broken boughs of trees, the Gauls, who beset the wood on all sides in arms, killed the rest, panic-struck by so unexpected a disaster. A very small number, who attempted to escape by a bridge, were taken prisoners, being intercepted by the enemy who had taken possession of it before them. [11] Here Posthumius fell, fighting with all his might to prevent his being taken. The Boii, having cut off his head, carried it and the spoils they stript off his body, in triumph into the most sacred temple they had. [12] Afterwards they cleansed the head according to their custom, and having covered the skull with chased gold, used it as a cup for libations in their solemn festivals, and a drinking cup for their high priests and other ministers of the temple. [13] The spoils taken by the Gauls were not less than the victory. For though great numbers of the beasts were crushed by the falling trees, yet as nothing was scattered by flight, every thing else was found strewed along the whole line of the prostrate band. - Livy XXIII.24.6-13

The planning and execution of this ambush speaks for  itself.  It also points to Posthumius' complete lack of reconnaissance, a failing the Gauls were swift to take advantage of.

On the subject of bendy Celtic swords, it might be useful to reproduce something on the topic from our old friend wikipedia

Polybius (2.33) reports that the Gauls at the Battle of Telamon (224 BC) had inferior iron swords which bent at the first stroke and had to be straightened with the foot against the ground. Plutarch, in his life of Marcus Furius Camillus, likewise reports on the inferiority of Gaulish iron, making the same claim that their swords bent easily. These reports have puzzled some historians, since by that time the Celts had a centuries long tradition of iron workmanship.[2] In 1906 a scholar suggested that the Greek observers misunderstood ritual acts of sword-bending, which may have served to "decommission" the weapon.[3] Such bent swords have been found among deposits of objects presumably dedicated for sacred purposes. The speculation has been repeated since.[2] Radomir Pleiner, however, argues that "the metallographic evidence shows that Polybius was right up to a point. To judge from the swords examined in this survey, only one third could be described as conforming to the quality which he ascribed generally to Celtic swords. Even so, it is quite possible that even some of the better quality swords would have failed in battle."[3] Nevertheless he argues that the classical sources are exaggerated. Plutarch's claim that Celtic swords would bend completely back is implausible, as only a slight bending would be likely.[3] Pleiner also notes that metallurgical analysis performed on Celtic swords suggests that they were only work hardened and only very few were quench hardened, even though they frequently contain enough carbon to be hardened (in particular the swords made from Noric steel). Quench hardening takes the full advantage of the potential hardness of the steel, but leaves it brittle, prone to breaking. Quite probably this is because tempering wasn't known. Tempering is heating the steel at a lower temperature after quenching to remove the brittleness, while keeping most of the hardness.

The references (for this wikipedia article is in my good books for having some) are
[2] Buchwald Iron and Steel in Ancient Times 2005
[3] Pleiner The Celtic Sword 1993

Everything about Gallic swords suggests to me that they were annealed, probably to ensure they never broke in action.  Annealing iron or steel makes it softer, more ductile and less brittle, all qualities which seem to be reflected in accounts of how Gallic swords performed and which appear to be consistent with the metallurgical analyses cited.

Annealed metal can often be cold-worked successfully, which may account for the swords apparently being 'work-hardened'.

It would seem that Gallic smiths faced a dilemma - make the steel hard and it is prone to shattering; anneal it and it becomes prone to bending.  The latter was evidently considered the lesser evil in most cases, on the basis that a bent sword could again be rendered serviceable with a bit of strength and footwork while a broken one could not.

Accounts of Gallic swords bending in battle seem to dry up ater the 3rd century BC (e.g. one does not find it in Caesar).  This may coincide with Hannibal's and Hasdrubal's passage across the Alps, in which the former is noted as having new equipment made for his men by the Gallic tribes he passed through.  The experienced and capable Carthaginian metallurgists probably had a few pointers for their Gallic counterparts, and this knowledge probably diffused across the Gallic world is subsequent decades.  If it were possible to date Gallic sword samples with accuracy we might be able to explore this hypothesis, as later blades would make better use of their carbon qualities than earlier ones.  It is conceivable that the few blades referred to as being 'quenched' are later blades.  Studies unfortunately seem to lump all samples together and statisticise them with insensitivity to time periods.

I have serious doubts about the Greeks misunderstanding ritual sword-bending because a) it is unlikely Greeks would be present at such a ritual or that they would subsequently uncover the bent swords, and b) the idea that it was possible to straighten the blades with the help of the foot would not have originated from knowledge of such rituals.

Meanwhile, another illustration of how Gauls could exploit poor reconnaissance in wooded country, albeit far less dramatically and effectively than the Boii in 216 BC.  The date is 218 BC and Hannibal is daily expected in Italy.

When word arrived of this affair of the envoys, and Mutina and its garrison were in danger, Lucius Manlius, the praetor, blazing with resentment, set out for Mutina with his army in loose marching order [effusum agmen = a column pouring out, i.e. hurrying along rather than in loose order]. In those days the road led through a forest, as the country was not, for the most part, under cultivation, and Manlius, advancing without reconnaissance, plunged into an ambush, and after sustaining heavy losses, managed with difficulty to get through into the open fields. There he entrenched a camp, and since the Gauls lacked heart to assail it, the soldiers recovered their spirits, though it was no secret that as many as five hundred men had fallen. Then they began their march again, nor, so long as the column advanced through open country, was the enemy to be seen; but when they had once more got into the woods, the Gauls attacked their rear, and throwing the whole column into terror and confusion, slew seven hundred soldiers and carried off six standards. The alarming onsets of the Gauls and the panic of the Romans ended when they got clear of the trackless woods and thickets. Thereafter, marching across open ground, the Romans had no difficulty in protecting their column. - Livy XXI.

Again, a combination of woods and absence of Roman reconnaissance gives the Gauls the initiative and a tactical advantage.

It seems, reading the accounts of the battles, that the savage reputation of the Gauls rests on their style of hand-to-hand fighting, which consists of using their swords virtually as cudgels, after which their weapons got bend and they themselves got tired.

Is there anything though that would show they were impetuous in the charge? I can see in the charge descriptions a dash up to close proximity followed by a halt and combat, as opposed to swarming recklessly over the enemy. The first kind of charge might just stop short of entering the gaps in a chainsaw-tooth formation, the second obviously would not.

And now let me resume my seat with the popcorn.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 06, 2013, 08:59:34 AM
It seems, reading the accounts of the battles, that the savage reputation of the Gauls rests on their style of hand-to-hand fighting, which consists of using their swords virtually as cudgels, after which their weapons got bend and they themselves got tired.

It is a historical inconvenience that we don't have details of the Gauls v.  other tribal groups to see if these tactics were in fact effective in other contexts.  The fact of their long persistence in the historical record (and the long archaeological timeline for the swords) doesn't suggest that, after meeting the Roman system, they fled back to their forests and said "there has to be a better way".

I also think that separating ferocity from uncontrollability is a good idea.  All these ambushes seem to suggested their commanders could keep them in check before contact.  It is less clear what level of control they had once into combat.

I think ferocious in combat, but controllable up that point has merit as a general description of their style. I think it would be right to say that the Romans describe their fierce fighting style and eventual exhaustion as the same even when the Gaius are standing still to receive.

Lets take a huge risk here. It sounds rather like rugby games between the English and some of our Celtic neighbours. These games are characterised by a very fierce onset from the 'Celts' who either bully the English into making errors and thus win or fail to do so, lose heart and thus lose.  No , of course I don't subscribe to a thread of Celticness running from 400 BC to today, its just that the behaviours match.  What the Romans have is the advantage of better kit as well as better training and a better system of manouvre and drill  so they maximise the advantage of their 'civilised' approach.  It would be akin to the English rugby team having armour, specialised run on the field kickers and hiring New Zealand coaches.

Mark G... in this comparison New Zealand are the Spartans.

Roy

I'm struggling to remember when the Spartans weer last fed dotored food before a game... or had to travel quite so far and fight for such a long season.

One thing I have noted so far in the tale is how monochrome Gallic armies appear to be - they have some cavalry, who seem to have an auxiliary role, but everyone else seems to be tall, white bodied, with a sword and shield.  I believe this will change as we come closer to present in Patrick's timeline and we will get more nuances. Patrick has already hinted that we might be able to trace tactical evolution through time but will we be seeing growing sophistication/specialisation in gallic armies or a more informed set of historians?

 

Patrick, How about asking Mick Hession if he has any data on Irish warfare that talks about largish battles rather than individual heroic combats?
Roy

Gallic shields certainly change over time with the winged bosses getting bigger. The sword suspension method also develops. That gives some indication that there is progress in weaponry.

In terms of cavalry we should look at the trimarcisia to which Pausanias refers. I sometimes wonder if the system of having servant support is carried over into Roman auxiliary cavalry, hence the servant carrying javelins who appears behind some Roman cavalry on some tombstones.

I am not sure about the adoption of thrown weapons. Do the Celts go for more javelins etc or pilum equivalents on a systematic basis.  Plutarch refers to the Cimbri, I think,  as carrying two spears which implies a throwing spear single or pair.
There is also the question as to whether the poorer troops in a Celtic army could afford swords. Generally barbarian societies are metal poor and yet the suggestion of Roman authors is that the Romans are facing armies of 20-50,000 sword armed men

Roy

A sword is also damn difficult to make (any one else had a good laugh at the idea of pouring them in moulds in LoTR?) and not really suitable for anything else (with a spear you can go hunting).

Irish accounts date from later though elements of the Red Branch cycle of tales, such as the Tain, are thought to have Iron Age origins. There are no descriptions of pitched battles and instead we see a series of heroic duels by dismounted chariot warriors whose drivers wait nearby. The mass of the army - the lower class infantry - keep well back. These are rarely mentioned as fighting, being of no interest to the upper classes who sponsored the bards composing the praise poems, but presumably once one side's heroes had gained an ascendancy their infantry would feel emboldened to join in, their opponents fleeing in pretty short order. Mons Graupius reads like that sort of battle: the cavorting of the first Caledonian line has the flavour of the feats of arms described in the Tain being executed by the Irish heroes. Of course, the Romans didn't play by the same rules  :)

However these tactics don't seem to have much in common with continental armies (and at least some southern British tribes) so I don't think we can glean much useful information from the Irish sources.

Cheers
Mick

The Tain, coupled with the Mons Graupius description and Caesars chariot description do suggest a warrior elite in warfare in the British Isles, though, unlike the so far undifferentiated mass in the descriptions Patrick has taken us through. 

I think that's correct - I perceive two distinct styles of Celtic fighting, which I'd dub Insular and Continental. The Insular style is based on a heroic elite of noble chariot warriors with a supporting cast of common folk who don't have much of a role. On the Continent, despite strong cultural similarities in other fields, all classes seem to have had an active role in warfare. Perhaps that is because Insular Celts were fighting each other hence shared the same cultural norms and assumptions; Continental Celts had to evolve methods of warfare that could cope with a range of non-Celtic opponents, or face the fate of the Caledones at Mons Graupius.

Nevertheless, there are some echoes of that Insular thinking in decriptions of Continental Celts: Gallic and Galatian noble horsemen (having forsworn chariots at some point) were often accompanied by lower-class mounted attendants who don't appear to have had primarily a combatant role, though they might join the fighting to rescue their chief if he was under pressure. To us, this seems to be a dreadful waste of two thirds of the army's horsepower but it clearly made sense to the Celts, in the same way that any form of conspicuous consumption makes sense to those practicing it.

Cheers
Mick       

I think I'd see the Tain as being similar in concept to the chansons de Geste. The deeds of heroes are concentrated upon and the mass of the army ignored. That's necessary for a literary genre in which aristocrats are the subject.  Its not that different from Froissart. I'm not sure that means that only the heroes mattered, but rather that  only they mattered to the bards.   At Mons Graupius there are substantial  numbers of footmen and they do fight albeit not well against the Batavi and other spear armed Roman auxilia.. The chariots in Caesar are apparently trying to isolate and disorganise Roman  units, but presumably they are then normally followed up by warriors on foot or what is the point?
I just wondered if there are any Irish accounts of massed combat or even hints at it like the Clan Calatin?

Roy

Can Mark G remember anything of Maori Warfare. I attended a presentation by Maoris in NZ and the way the heroically tattooed chief described it was that individuals would come out, do a haka , tell the other chap how mighty they were and how he wasn't the shit on their shoes and then fight.   After a while they would all join in. Having your top toff lose would be bad for morale, but not necessarily fatal to your hopes as these chaps were basically fearless.

Roy

At Mons Graupius there were two bodies of Caledonian foot, the first group (leaping about, dodging missiles and generally showing off) and the main body (more restrained souls) back on the hill with the chariots between the two groups. I think it's possible to interpret the first line of Caledonian infantry at Mons Graupius as dismounted chariot warriors - their behaviour is certainly reminiscent of descriptions of the "shield-feats" performed by the Irish heroes of the Tain. 

Massed infantry combat is described in some Irish texts of the Red Branch poem cycle, e.g. the Battle of Cumar, but these tend to be of rather late composition - Viking age, rather than Iron Age - so of little value for this discussion. For what it's worth, they emphasise spear fighting, and the early textual evidence has a similar emphasis on spearcraft: the Irish word for a hero is gaisce, formed from the root gai [spear] + sciad [shield] whilst the Tain notes one formidable body of non-noble infantry called the Gailenga (again with the Gai- root) and these are possibly a body of professional warriors similar to the Gaisati (the Gai- root again) at Telamon.  In other words, nothing to suggest the primary tactic was to slash at an opponent with a sword. Spears are also emphasised in the Tain, though heroes possess swords (pretty essential equipment for headhunters). Those depicted in later art are short (possibly adapted from Roman models - the Irish word for a sword, claidheamh, derives from gladius, IIRC). 

The Clan Calatin tale is very interesting, but hard to interpret. Many years ago, Phil Barker suggested it was some sort of folk memory of Roman intervention; I was initially quite sceptical of that, but Calatin is not an Irish name (or at least doesn't obey standard Irish orthography) and it could conceivably be a Q-Celtic form of Palatin(a). At any rate, I don't think it tells us much about Irish infantry warfare.

Cheers
Mick   

I don't see much relevance at all from Maori warfare.

tribal warfare is (or was when I last checked) an area of almost no sources, even oral, appropriate for what we are looking for until the introduction of muskets.  There is likely to have been a growth in oral hstory being recorded in print over the last 15 years, but I doubt it has much tactical input, and is certain to not meet the criteria of men necessary to be classed as more than a large skirmishes and raiding.

Warfare against europeans is almost entirely a history of siege warfare, with a few musket based ambushes added.  Any comparisons therefore are pretty much only relevant in the context of asymetrical colonial era warfare.

put sumply, the population dispersal is such that the numbers are simply not there to classify it as a battle until the sieges of later colonial period.

Quote from: Mick Hession on January 08, 2013, 09:07:33 AM
I think that's correct - I perceive two distinct styles of Celtic fighting, which I'd dub Insular and Continental. The Insular style is based on a heroic elite of noble chariot warriors with a supporting cast of common folk who don't have much of a role. On the Continent, despite strong cultural similarities in other fields, all classes seem to have had an active role in warfare. Perhaps that is because Insular Celts were fighting each other hence shared the same cultural norms and assumptions; Continental Celts had to evolve methods of warfare that could cope with a range of non-Celtic opponents, or face the fate of the Caledones at Mons Graupius.

It is an interesting speculation to see insular warfare as perhaps more formalised.  One reading of this insular warfare is to see it as primarily small scale raiding and personal challenges, with lots of display, by an elite.  Every now and again, however, as mass mobilisation and a larger scale conflict would occur (for whatever reason).  The elite have a starring role, even in the big picture.   In mainland Britain, one might ask where the cavalry fit in, if the charioteers are the elite?   

As warfare in the British isles didn't provide a description of tactics that was based in a non Roman tradition can we get back to the sweet spot where Patrick was chewing through the sources and quoting the extant descriptions of Celtic battle deployment and tactics as I at least was finding that very useful??

Roy

Yessir.

Next I shall crib freely from Julian Lorriman's useful article (After Hannibal) in Slingshot 283 for a coherent and sequential list of engagements (if you are reading this, Julian, take a bow - and feel free to join the discussion).  Following the Second Punic War, Roman armies marched into northern Italy (Cisalpina) with varying fortunes.

201 BC
In Gaul, about this time, the consul, Publius Aelius, having heard that, before his arrival, the Boians had made inroads on the territories of the allies, levied two occasional legions [legionibus subitariis = hastily-raised legions, emergency legions] on account of this disturbance;  and adding to them four cohorts from his own army, ordered Caius Oppius, the prefect, to march with this tumultuary band through Umbria, (which is called the Sappinian district,) and to invade the territories of the Boians. He himself led his own troops thither openly, over the intervening mountains. Oppius, on entering the same, for some time committed depredations with tolerable success and safety.  But afterwards, having pitched on a place near a fort called Mutilum, convenient enough for cutting down the corn, (for the crops were now ripe,) and setting out without having reconnoitred around, and without establishing armed posts of sufficient strength to protect those who were unarmed and intent on their work, he was suddenly surrounded, together with his foragers, by an unexpected invasion of the Gauls [improviso impetu Gallorum = a sudden/unexpected Gallic attack].  On this, panic and flight seized even on those who were furnished with weapons.  Seven thousand men, dispersed through the corn fields, were put to the sword, among whom was the commander himself, Caius Oppius.  The rest were driven by terror into the camp; from whence, in consequence of a resolution of the soldiers, they set out on the following night, without any particular commander; and, leaving behind a great part of their baggage, made their way, through woods almost impassable, to the consul, who returned  to Rome without having performed any thing in his province worth notice, except that he ravaged the lands of the Boians, and made a treaty with the Ingaunian Ligurians. - Livy XXXI.2

Once again, a Gallic army takes advantage of poor (or nonexistent) Roman reconnaissance.  A surprise attack catches the Romans in a compromised position, foragers are slaughtered and the C-in-C slain, and thereafter the rest of the army decamps in no good order, but the Gauls do not manage to mount a pursuit.  They seem to exhibit pre-battle control but not post-battle control or planning.

The following year, the Gauls became more ambitious:

200 BC
The Insubres, the Cenomani, and the Boii had roused the Celines, the Ilvates and the other Ligustini, and these tribes, under the leadership of Hamilcar the Carthaginian, who had remained in that region, a survivor of Hasdrubal's army, had attacked Placentia.2 [3] After plundering the city and burning most of it in their fury, they had left barely two thousand men alive among the flames and ruins, and then had crossed the Po and gone to destroy Cremona. - Livy XXXI.10.2-3

This comes just after the local Roman praetor has disbanded his army on instructions from Rome.  An army was made available and a new commander appointed, and after expiating dreadful portents (including a five-legged colt, a lamb with a pig's head, a pig with a man's head and, worst of all, a hermaphrodite) they marched against the Gallic alliance.  The Gauls, under Hamilcar, showed some initiative, combining a rapid attack with an attempt to envelop a Roman flank.

There was an excellent chance for a victory if he had attacked their camp immediately after his march; the Gauls had scattered through the neighbourhood without leaving a strong guard on duty.  But Furius spared his weary troops because he had made a strenuous march.  The Gauls, called back by the shouts of their comrades, dropped the booty which they had in hand and hurried back to their camp. The next day they moved out in battle-array, nor did the Roman refuse the engagement.  But the Romans had barely time to form in line, with such speed did the enemy advance to the attack.  The right squadron [ala = wing] — he had the allied army divided into squadrons — occupied the front line, with two Roman legions in reserve. Commanders were designated: Marcus Furius of the right squadron, Marcus Caecilius of the legions, Lucius Valerius Flaccus of the cavalry —all were lieutenants.  The praetor kept with him two lieutenants, Gaius Laetorius and Publius Titinius, by whose aid he  planned to watch the whole engagement and meet all sudden attacks of the enemy.  At first the Gauls hoped, concentrating the mass of their force on one place, to be able to overwhelm and destroy the right squadron [ala] which was in the van.  When this did not succeed, they tried to outflank and envelop the enemy's line, a plan which seemed easy on account of their great numbers arrayed against a few.  When the praetor saw this, that he too might extend his front, he threw in two legions from his reserves [subsidariis] on the right and left flanks of the front-line force and vowed a temple to Diiovis [Jupiter] if he routed the enemy on that day.  He ordered Lucius Valerius to send the cavalry of two legions to one side against the flank of the enemy and to the other the allied cavalry, and not to allow the enemy to envelop his lines.  Seeing too that the Gallic centre was weakened by the extension of the line, at the same time he gave his men the order to charge in mass formation [signa inferre confertus = advance the standards (i.e. attack) close together] and to break through [ut perrumpere ordines], and the flanks were thrown back by the cavalry, the centre by the infantry.  The Gauls, suffering heavy losses in every quarter, suddenly broke and in complete rout fled to their camp.  The cavalry pursued them in their flight, and presently the legions too followed and stormed the camp. Less than six thousand Gauls escaped;  more than thirty-five thousand were killed or captured, along with seventy standards and more than two hundred Gallic wagons laden with abundant spoils. Hamilcar the Carthaginian general and three noble Gallic commanders fell in the battle.

The use of entire legions in reserve is interesting and unusual, and parallels their use in 203 BC against Mago's Gallo-Ligurian-Spanish-Numidian force.  The initial Gallic attack looked encouraging, but the Gallic army was as usual at a disadvantage in a sustained battle.

199 BC
The year's portents included another five-legged colt and some chicks with three feet.  The victorious Roman army received a new commander, but no details are given for the campaign, only the result.

During the same year, Gnaeus Baebius Tamphilus, who had succeeded Gaius Aurelius, consul of the preceding year, as governor of the province of Gaul, rashly invaded the territory of the Insubrian Gauls and was cut off with almost his entire army; he lost more than six thousand seven hundred men; such a disaster was suffered in a war that no one any longer feared.

One suspects a well-conducted Gallic ambush rather than a stand-up fight.

Discussion time again ...

A few more examples of Gauls in action, or at least the results thereof.  These campaigns all take place in Cisalpina.

197 BC
Consul Cornelius marches against the Insubres, and enlists the covert aid of the Cenomani

On learning this he invited their chiefs to a conference and tried to induce them to break with the Insubres and either return home or go over to the Romans.  He was unable to gain their consent to the latter proposal, but they gave him assurances that they would take no part in the fighting, unless occasion should arise, in which case they would assist the Romans.  The Insubres were kept in ignorance of this compact, but they felt somewhat suspicious as to the intentions of their allies, and in forming their line they did not venture to entrust them with a position on either wing lest they should abandon their ground through treachery and involve the whole army in disaster.  They were accordingly stationed in the rear as a reserve. At the outset of the battle the consul vowed a temple to Juno Sospita in case the enemy were routed that day, and the shouts of the soldiers assured their commander that they would enable him to fulfil his vow.  Then they charged, and the Insubres did not stand against the first shock. Some authors say that the Cenomani attacked them from behind while the battle was going on and that the twofold attack threw them into  complete disorder, 35,000 men being killed and 5200 made prisoners, including the Carthaginian general Hamilcar, the prime instigator of the war. 130 standards were taken and numerous wagons. - Livy XXXII.30.7-12

When it came to treachery, the Romans showed they had nothing to learn from anyone.

Meanwhile ...

Quintus Minucius, they continued, had fought some unimportant battles in Liguria, hardly worthy of mention, and in Gaul had lost a great number of his men; they even mentioned by name Titus Iuventius and Gnaeus Ligurius, military tribunes of the fourth legion, who had fallen in the defeat along with many other brave men, citizens and allies. The surrender of small towns and villages had taken place, but this was fictitious, manufactured for the occasion, and without guarantees. - Livy XXXIII.22.7-8

It is not stated whether Minucius had suffered his losses in a battle or an ambush, or both.

196 BC
In what is starting to become a recognisable pattern, the Gauls win an ambush and lose a battle.  First the ambush.

The consuls left for their provinces. Marcellus entered the territory of the Boii, and whilst he was entrenching his camp on some rising ground, his men worn out with marching all day long, Corolamus, one of the Boian chiefs, attacked him with a large force and killed as many as 3000. Several men of high rank fell in this tumultuary battle; amongst them Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and M. Junius Silanus, prefects of the allies, and two military tribunes in the second legion-M. Ogulnius and P. Claudius.  The Romans, however, succeeded by great exertions in completing their lines and held the camp against the attacks of the enemy, which his initial success rendered all the more fierce.  Marcellus remained in his camp for some time, in order that his wounded might be cured and that his men might have time to recover their spirits after such heavy losses. - Livy XXXIII.36.4-7

The annoyed Marcellus then manages to bring on a battle.

The Boii —a people intolerant of the tiresomeness of delay —gradually dispersed to their forts and towns.  Marcellus quickly crossed the Po and led the legions into the district of Comum, where the Insubres were encamped after calling the Comenses to arms. The Gauls, encouraged by the success of the Boii a few days before, attacked while still in march formation, and their first charge was so vigorous that it drove in the Roman front line.  When Marcellus observed this and feared that once broken they would be routed, he threw in a cohort of the Marsi and then sent all the squadrons of the Latin cavalry against the enemy.  Their first and second charges dulled the edge of the enemy's spirited attack, and the rest of the Roman line, with renewed courage, first resisted and then charged fiercely. The Gauls did not continue the contest longer, but turned and fled in all directions.  Valerius Antias writes that more than forty thousand men  perished in that battle, and that eighty-seven standards were taken and seven hundred and thirty-two wagons and many necklaces of gold, one of which, of great weight, Claudius says was deposited in the temple on the Capitoline as a gift to Jupiter. The Gallic camp was captured and plundered that day, and the town of Comum was taken a few days later. - Livy idem 8-13

Even at this comparatively late date, we have a Boii charge that is "so vigorous [adeo acriter = 'so much keenly'] that it drove in the Roman front line [antesignanos impulerint]."  So far this seems to be our first clear reference to a 'ferocious charge'.  Driving in the antesignani did more than tumble back the front line: the designation 'antesignani' encompassed the hastati and principes, so things seem to have come 'ad triarios' (down to the triarii) before the Roman cavalry rode to the rescue.  A near-run thing.  One notes that Valerias Antias does not specify how the forty thousand who perished were proportioned between Gauls and Romans.

195 BC
Another campaign against the Boii - a battle, which the Gauls lose.

During the same summer the other consul, Lucius Valerius Flaccus, engaged in pitched battle with a force of the Boii near the forest of Litana and defeated them.  Eight thousand of the Gauls are said to have fallen; the rest gave up the war and scattered to their villages and fields. - Livy XXXIV.22.1-2

Veni, vidi, vici.  The Boii were similarly thrashed in 194 BC, 193 BC, 192 BC and 191 BC, although by way of variety in 194 BC they attacked the Roman camp:

For two days, however, they did nothing more than stand ready to engage if anyone came out to meet them; on the third day they advanced towards the rampart and attacked the camp on all sides at once. The consul immediately ordered his men to take up arms; then he kept them under arms for a while, that he might increase the foolish confidence of the enemy and arrange his forces by the gates through which they would severally make their sally. Two legions were ordered to march out by the two main gates.  But at the actual opening of the gates the Gauls met them in such close array that they blocked the road.  For a long time they fought in these confined spaces; it was a matter not so much of hands and swords as of making their way by pushing against one another with shields and bodies, the Romans trying to force a way out for their standards, the Gauls trying either to enter the camp or to prevent the Romans from leaving it.  Nor could the lines be moved in either direction until Quintus Victorius, a senior centurion, and Gaius Atinius, tribune of the soldiers, the latter of the fourth, the former of the second legion, resorting to a device often tried in desperate encounters, snatched the standards from the hands of their bearers and threw them into the midst of the enemy. In their eager struggle to get back their standard, the soldiers of the second legion were the first to force their way through the gate. - Livy XXXIV.46.7-12

Note the 'othismos' at the gate.  The action continues:

They were now fighting outside the rampart, the fourth legion being still inside the gate, when a new uproar was heard on the opposite side of the camp. [2] The Gauls had broken through the porta quaestoria and after stubborn resistance had slain the quaestor Lucius Postumius, whose surname was Tympanus, and Marcus Atinius and Publius Sempronius, commanders of allied detachments [praefectos socium], and about two hundred of their men. [3] They had gained possession of the camp in that quarter, until an attached cohort, sent by the consul to defend the porta quaestoria, killed some of the Gauls who had entered the camp, drove others outside the rampart, and blocked the entrance against those who were attacking the gate. [4] At almost the same instant the fourth legion with two attached cohorts burst through the gate. So there were three battles at once in different places around the camp, and the confused shouts distracted the minds of the fighters from their own immediate combats to the uncertain fortunes of their comrades. Until noon the battle went on with equal strength and with nearly the same hopes. [5] When fatigue and heat had compelled the Gauls, with their soft and feeble bodies and their small capacity for enduring thirst, to retire from the fight, the Romans charged the few that were left and drove them, broken, to their camp. [6] Thereupon the consul ordered the recall sounded; at this the majority turned back, but part, in their eagerness to fight and their hope of capturing the enemy's camp, pushed on to the rampart. [7] The whole mass of Gauls, in disdain of their small number, rushed out from their camp; the Romans in turn were put to flight and returned to their camp in consequence of their own terror and panic, although they had refused to retire at their commander's order. Thus there were varied fortunes on both sides, now defeat and now victory; yet about eleven thousand of the Gauls fell and five thousand of the Romans. [8] The Gauls retired into the interior of their country, while the consul led his legions to Placentia. - Livy XXXIV.47

In essence this battle, or assault, became a contest of endurance which favoured the Romans.  One gets the impression that in a straight battle the Romans would win simply by outlasting their opponents, an advantage which their multi-line system would accentuate.  The Gauls seemingly needed to win early or they would not win at all.

Very true patrick and it points out a difference in character between the hard training of the Romans and the rather easier regime of the Gauls. what I am not seeing here is gallic impetuosity that renders them uncontrollable by their generals. Theyre rather pointb and click, but the units look as though they are in control until unleashed.
Roy

Valid observation, Roy: once they get the word they go at it with a will, but until then they stay leashed.  This may explain the apparently indecisive behaviour at Telamon: the chiefs intended to stand on the defensive, so the Gaesati suffered because the Romans a) were too intelligent to close uphill against fresh Gauls and b) had plenty of missiles.  Had the Gauls actually been uncontrollably impetuous the result of the battle might have been different!

I am reminded of the Jacobites at Culloden, kept waiting for almost half an hour (to the delight of Cumberland's artillerymen) until the order to advance finally came through.  Once unleashed they performed a characteristic 'ferocious' charge but until then they awaited the signal.  (Actually their patience snapped just before the order was given, but they had stayed under control for nearly 29 minutes of being shot at, which was not bad.)

Hi Patrick, can we, for completeness push on to Plutarch's Marius and to Caesar. We would have all the literature in one place then which would be really useful.

Roy

Indeed: the Cimbri and Teutones are a little outside the usual Gallic mix, but they left behind the Nervii as their descendants and the Nervii count as Gauls (and we shall soon be meeting them) so here goes ...

The year is 102 BC, and the Teutones and Cimbri have destroyed a Roman army at Arausio in Gaul and are marching on Italy by separate routes.

"But the Teutones, since Marius kept quiet, attempted to take his camp by storm; many missiles, however, were hurled against them from the fortifications, and they lost some of their men. They therefore decided to march forward, expecting to cross the Alps without molestation. So they packed up their baggage and began to march past the camp of the Romans. Then, indeed, the immensity of their numbers was made specially evident by the length of their line and the time required for their passage; for it is said they were six days in passing the fortifications of Marius, although they moved continuously." - Plutarch, Life of Marius, 18.1

Marius followed up and matters came to blows.

"Besides, the most warlike division of the enemy, by whom at an earlier time the Romans under Manlius and Caepio had been defeated (they were called Ambrones and of themselves numbered more than thirty thousand), had sprung up from their meal and were running to get their arms.  However, though their bodies were surfeited and weighed down with food and their spirits excited and disordered with strong wine, they did not rush on in a disorderly or frantic course, nor raise an inarticulate battle-cry, but rhythmically clashing their arms and leaping to the sound they would frequently shout out all together their tribal name Ambrones, either to encourage one another, or to terrify their enemies in advance by the declaration.  The first of the Italians to go down against them were the Ligurians, and when they heard and understood what the Barbarians were shouting, they themselves shouted back the word, claiming it as their own ancestral appellation; for the Ligurians call themselves Ambrones by descent. Often, then, did the shout echo and reecho from either side before they came to close quarters; and since the hosts back of each party took up the cry by turns and strove each to outdo the other first in the magnitude of their shout, their cries roused and fired the spirit of the combatants." - idem, 19.2-4

We note the pre-battle noisemaking and posturing, and incidentally that the Ligurians, who differentiated themselves from Gauls and were considered steadier fighters, seemed to share a common ancestry with some of the invaders.

"Well, then, the Ambrones became separated by the stream; for they did not all succeed in getting across and forming an array, but upon the foremost of them the Ligurians at once fell with a rush, and the fighting was hand-to-hand. Then the Romans came to the aid of the Ligurians, and charging down from the heights upon the Barbarians overwhelmed and turned them back.  Most of the Ambrones were cut down there in the stream where they were all crowded together, and the river was filled with their blood and their dead bodies; the rest, after the Romans had crossed, did not dare to face about, and the Romans kept slaying them until they came in their flight to their camp and waggons.  Here the women met them, swords and axes in their hands, and with hideous shrieks of rage tried to drive back fugitives and pursuers alike, the fugitives as traitors, and the pursuers as foes; they mixed themselves up with the combatants, with bare hands tore away the shields of the Romans or grasped their swords, and endured wounds and mutilations, their fierce spirits unvanquished to the end. So, then, as we are told, the battle at the river was brought on by accident rather than by the intention of the commander." - idem, 19.5-7

The invading Ambrones crossed the stream and began to 'form an array', at which point the Ligurians expertly hit them with a 'rush' (meta dromou = with a run), fixing them in place and allowing the Romans to advance and catch the invaders in a compromising position and cut them up in mid-stream.  (Something not dissimilar would happen to the Atrebates attacking Caesar's left in 57 BC.)  This decided the battle, though the unusually determined resistance of both warriors and women added a tailpiece unusual in these battles.

This action was a preliminary to a much more important fight two days later.

"Meanwhile, since the position of the Barbarians was commanded by sloping glens and ravines that were shaded by trees, Marius sent Claudius Marcellus thither with three thousand men-at-arms, under orders to lie concealed in ambush until the battle was on, and then to show themselves in the enemy's rear. The rest of his soldiers, who had taken supper in good season and then got a night's sleep, he led out at day-break and drew up in front of the camp, and sent out his cavalry into the plain.  The Teutones, seeing this, could not wait for the Romans to come down and fight with them on equal terms, but quickly and wrathfully armed themselves and charged up the hill. But Marius, sending his officers to all parts of the line, exhorted the soldiers to stand firmly in their lines, and when the enemy had got within reach to hurl their javelins, then take to their swords and crowd the Barbarians back with their shields; for since the enemy were on precarious ground their blows would have no force and the locking of their shields no strength, but the unevenness of the ground would keep them turning and tossing about. This was the advice he gave his men, and they saw that he was first to act accordingly; for he was in better training than any of them, and in daring far surpassed them all." - idem, 20 4-6

The Teutones use an uphill charge (after 'quickly and wrathfully' arming themselves) while the Romans use their uphill position to crowd their opponents and attenuate the force of their blows.  Also interesting is the expression 'the locking of their shields [would have] no strength', in Greek 'oute rhomen ton synaspismon', literally 'without strength their close ordering of shields'.  This suggests both a shieldwall and the possibility that it was used for coordinated pushing.

Now the Romans sprang their ambush and won the battle.

"Accordingly, the Romans awaited the enemy's onset, then closed with them and checked their upward rush, and at last, crowding them back little by little, forced them into the plain. Here, while the Barbarians in front were at last forming in line on level ground, there was shouting and commotion in their rear. For Marcellus had watched his opportunity, and when the cries of battle were borne up over the hills he put his men upon the run and fell with loud shouts upon the enemy's rear, where he cut down the hindmost of them.  Those in the rear forced along those who were in front of them, and quickly plunged the whole army into confusion, and under this double attack they could not hold out long, but broke ranks and fled. The Romans pursued them and either slew or took alive over a hundred thousand of them, besides making themselves masters of their tents, waggons, and property, all of which, with the exception of what was pilfered, was given to Marius by vote of the soldiers. And though the gift that he received was so splendid, it was thought to be wholly unworthy of his services in the campaign, where the danger that threatened had been so great." - idem, 20.1-2

In essence, the Teutones were forced back, being at a disadvantage fighting uphill, and when they reached level ground and had hopes of sorting themselves out (kathistamenon eis taxin = getting their formations into some sort of order) they were promptly hit from behind by Marcellus' 3,000-man ambush.  It seems a modest number with which to take 100,000+ men in the rear, but if the Teutones' frontage was 1,000 men wide and Marcellus brought his ambushers in three deep it would have been quite sufficient.  The 'sloping glens and ravines shaded by trees' probably constricted the battle frontage (and also allowed fleeing barbarians to get away via the flanks) in addition to allowing Marcellus to get into position unseen.

So much for the Teutones.  The following year Marius would fight a much better publicised battle in Italy itself, against the Cimbri.

Plutarch gives us a fair amount of detail for the Cimbri vs Romans battle at Vercellae in 101 BC.  In some ways it is a very curious engagement, notably because of the huge Cimbri infantry square.  The rather lengthy source account will be split up with hopefully relevant comments.

To summarise the preliminaries ...

Marius changed the legionary pila, taking out one of the two metal pins and replacing it with a frangible wooden one.  This made it strictly a one-use weapon, suggesting that in the previous engagement against the Teutones the Romans had been receiving back what they had thrown, impelled by the greater strength of Teutonic thews.

Boeorix king of the Cimbri and Marius then agreed the date and place of the battle by pre-arrangement.

"When, therefore, the appointed time had come, the Romans drew up their forces for battle. Catulus had twenty thousand three hundred soldiers, while those of Marius amounted to thirty-two thousand, which were divided between both wings and had Catulus between them in the centre, as Sulla, who fought in this battle, has stated.  He says also that Marius hoped that the two lines would engage at their extremities chiefly and on the wings, in order that his soldiers might have the whole credit for the victory and that Catulus might not participate in the struggle nor even engage the enemy (since the centre, as is usual in battle-fronts of great extent, would be folded back); and therefore arranged the forces in this manner." - Plutarch, Life of Marius, 25.4-5

The comment about the centre 'folding back' (kolpoma = bulging) in 'battle-fronts of great extent' is an interesting one.  The battle front in this action certainly promised to be unusually wide.

"As for the Cimbri, their foot-soldiers advanced slowly from their defences, with a depth equal to their front, for each side of their formation had an extent of thirty furlongs; and their horsemen, fifteen thousand strong, rode out in splendid style, with helmets made to resemble the maws of frightful wild beasts or the heads of strange animals, which, with their towering crests of feathers, made their wearers appear taller than they really were; they were also equipped with breastplates of iron, and carried gleaming white shields. For hurling, each man had two lances [dibolia = a double-pointed lance]; and at close quarters they used large, heavy swords." - idem 25.6-7

Thirty furlongs equates to around 6,000 yards, making this one of the most unusual deployments in the history of warfare.  A solid square 6,000 x 6,000 would contain 36 million men, so it is reasonable to suppose this was a hollow square, but how hollow?

Jumping ahead a bit, the Romans (who won) took 60,000+ prisoners and slew about 120,000.  If we add these numbers we are probably close to the actual combatant strength, which would thus be c.180,000.  Dividing this by four (one contingent for each side of the square) gives c.45,000 men per side on a 6,000-man frontage for a depth of 7-8.  Eight is a fairly standard depth, which would give 48,000 per side and a total of 192,000 infantry.

Using this basic guideline we see two things: 1) the rear was over three miles away from the front, so could not support it - and coordination between flanks and centre would not be easy to achieve; 2) there is a huge amount of empty space within the square, even if the Cimbric cavalry starts therein.  Was the Cimbri baggage-train in the middle of the square? (Answer: no, as we shall see later.)

Meanwhile we have the Romans, who would normally deploy on a frontage no greater than 1,600 yards, facing a 6,000-yard deployment.  What follows is puzzling.

"At this time, however, they did not charge directly upon the Romans, but swerved to the right and tried to draw them along gradually until they got them between themselves and their infantry, which was drawn up on their left. The Roman commanders perceived the crafty design, but did not succeed in holding their soldiers back; for one of them shouted that the enemy was taking to flight, and then all set out to pursue them.  Meanwhile the infantry of the Barbarians came on to the attack like a vast sea in motion." - ibid 26.1-2

I suspect a mistranslation here.  Without going into technicalities, I think Plutarch is describing the Cimbri gradually collapsing their square to a much narrower frontage from left and right towards the centre, after which 'the infantry of the Barbarians came on to the attack like a vast sea in motion'.  This interpretation makes sense of what happened next.

"After the attack had begun, however, an experience befell Marius which signified the divine displeasure, according to Sulla. For an immense cloud of dust was raised, as was to be expected, and the two armies were hidden from one another by it, so that Marius, when he first led his forces to the attack, missed the enemy, passed by their lines of battle, and moved aimlessly up and down the plain for some time. Meanwhile, as chance would have it, the Barbarians engaged fiercely with Catulus, and he and his soldiers, among whom Sulla says he himself was posted, bore the brunt of the struggle." - ibid 26.3

Bearing in mind that the Cimbri are stated to have deployed on a c.6,000-yard frontage, Catulus alone would have to cover 6,000 yards with 20,300 men, i.e. deploy less than four deep unless the Cimbri front has substantially contracted.  Also, one cannot imagine Marius setting out to charge empty space - the reason he missed the Cimbri would seem to be that they contracted out of his way, creating a deep column with defended flanks to burst through the Roman centre.  Because of the dust, by the time Marius got to where they had been, he missed them.

However, the best-laid plans gang aft agley, especially when one fails to take account of the effects of climate change.  Or rather a different climate.

"The Romans were favoured in the struggle, Sulla says, by the heat, and by the sun, which shone in the faces of the Cimbri. For the Barbarians were well able to endure cold, and had been brought up in shady and chilly regions, as I have said.  They were therefore undone by the heat; they sweated profusely, breathed with difficulty, and were forced to hold their shields before their faces. For the battle was fought after the summer solstice, which falls, by Roman reckoning, three days before the new moon of the month now called August,  but then Sextilis.  Moreover, the dust, by hiding the enemy, helped to encourage the Romans. For they could not see from afar the great numbers of the foe, but each one of them fell at a run upon the man just over against him, and fought him hand to hand, without having been terrified by the sight of the rest of the host. And their bodies were so inured to toil and so thoroughly trained that not a Roman was observed to sweat or pant, in spite of the great heat and the run with which they came to the encounter. This is what Catulus himself is said to have written in extolling his soldiers." - ibid 26.4-5

So when it came to the crunch, the Cimbri, despite having by accident or design removed Marius' legions from the equation, simply could not muster the impetus to break Catulus' line.  The significant difference in acclimatisation and fitness levels - plus the fact that Catulus' men simply could not see how outnumbered they were (as they would have been had the original (presumed) 8-deep 6,000-yard Cimbri front condensed to 60-deep and 800 yards) so piled in with happy abandon.

"The greatest number and the best fighters of the enemy were cut to pieces on the spot; for to prevent their ranks from being broken, those who fought in front were bound fast to one another with long chains which were passed through their belts. The fugitives, however, were driven back to their entrenchments [kharakoma - palisaded or entrenched camp], where the Romans beheld a most tragic spectacle. The women, in black garments, stood at the waggons and slew the fugitives—their husbands or brothers or fathers, then strangled their little children and cast them beneath the wheels of the waggons or the feet of the cattle, and then cut their own throats. It is said that one woman hung dangling from the tip of a waggon-pole, with her children tied to either ankle; while the men, for lack of trees, fastened themselves by the neck to the horns of the cattle, or to their legs, then plied the goad, and were dragged or trampled to death as the cattle dashed away. Nevertheless, in spite of such self-destruction, more than sixty thousand were taken prisoners; and those who fell were said to have been twice that number." - ibid 27.1-3

The chained together front ranks are to say the least unusual: was the motivation to prevent Romans breaking in or to stop Cimbri enthusiasts breaking out of the battleline?  Was it a way of preventing parts of the line from getting ahead of or behind the rest?  It cannot have helped with redeployment, although it does suggest that the Cimbri did not go in for individual relief of men in the front line.

The 'kharakoma' (fortified camp) suggests that the hollow square did not contain baggage and families, but was a contrivance to get the Romans to deploy on a wide frontage and then let the Cimbri infantry slip into a deep column to batter down (and/or through) part of their army.  Those who would have made it back to the camp would presumably not include any of the chain-linked front rankers.  Judging by the reaction of the women and fugitives, by the time the survivors reached the camp things were basically all over: there was none of the sharp defiance exhibited by the women of the Teutones.

Catulus and Marius engaged in some mutual loathing after the battle, including a dispute over keeping score.

"Now, the enemy's property became the booty of the soldiers of Marius, but the spoils of battle, the standards, and the trumpets, were brought, we are told, to the camp of Catulus and Catulus relied chiefly upon this as a proof that the victory was won by his men. Furthermore, a dispute for the honour of the victory arose among the soldiers, as was natural, and the members of an embassy from Parma were chosen to act as arbitrators. These men the soldiers of Catulus conducted among the dead bodies of the enemy, which were clearly seen to have been pierced by their javelins; for these could be known by the name of Catulus which had been cut into the shaft." ibid 27.4

From this we can surmise that Marius' men, having missed their opponents on the field, nevertheless found the Cimbric camp and numbers of fugitives heading therein.  Catulus' legions (presumably four in number, given their total of 20,000 men) effectively won the battle.

This battle is so non-typical in so many ways as to be worthy of study in itself.  Curiously, neither side's cavalry seems to have played much part in the battle.

I'd be very cautious of the idea of a literal square 30 furlongs square.  I don't know the latin word translated by furlong but can it mean something else?  Could thirty by a copist error?  Because, as you say, when the fighting breaks out, the Roman front seems longer, allowing them to flank the Celts (either by accident or design - as most of this account comes from a source hostile to Marius, an actual plan for a double envelopment might be hidden).

Turning to the Celtic tactics, they seem the opposite of wild.  The story of the men chained together implies an intention to stand their ground and not attack at all.  All in all, if I read this without the bit about the numbers and the square, I'd be thinking the Romans probably had a numeric advantage in combatants, with the Celts bulked out by women, children and men so ill equipped they don't even have a sword to fall on.

And what do the cavalry, who seem well equiped, do other than raise dust?

The Greek word used is 'stadion' which means about 600 feet, and is often translated 'furlong' (although the latter is 660 feet).  Naturally, if the Cimbri frontage (and sideage and rearage) actually stretched to 6,000 yards per side they would have had major problems keeping it straight, which might account for the chains.

There were several different stadia, as seen here: http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Stadion_%28unit_of_length%29?qsrc=3044 (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Stadion_%28unit_of_length%29?qsrc=3044)  Plutarch and his source probably used the Attic stadion of 200.4167 feet.

The Roman deployment would seem from the numbers involved to put about ten legions (six for Marius - 30,000 men - and four for Catulus - 20,000 men) in line, which given the standard frontage of 200 yards per legion would make a 2,000 yard infantry frontage.  That said, the Romans would almost certainly have had more than 2,300 cavalry (the number remaining if we deduct ten 5,000-man legions).

If we rate the legions as 4,800 men each, this releases another 2,000 men for the cavalry, though the new total of 4,300 still looks diminutive against the Cimbri's 15,000.  And they would have to deploy two deep at most to cover the balance of the Cimbri frontage.

I suspect that Marius may have fielded a higher proportion of cavalry.  If the legions were, say, 4,200 strong (the typical strength under the pre-Marian or Polybian system) then Marius would have had 12,000 cavalry.  This is more than the Republic fielded in any other known action, and would probably require contingents from the by then 'tame' Gallic tribes of northern Italy.

So ...

A better way to account for a larger number of cavalry would be to reset the legions to 5,000 men each but give Catulus and Marius four legions apiece (a total of 8, not 10).  This would be eminently in keeping with standard Roman practice, each consul having two Roman legions and two legions of socii, allies.  It also conveniently leaves Marius with 12,000 men to represent possible cavalry.

These cavalry would be deployed 6,000 per wing.  Each wing would usually deploy ten deep and cover about 1,200 yards if frontage.  Hence the total Roman frontage would be 2x1,200 (cavalry) + 8x200 (infantry), or 2,400 + 1,600, a total of 4,000 yards.  Being outflanked by 1,000 yards on each wing does not seem to have inhibited Marius' confidence: it is noteworthy how Marius' battle planning is said to have emphasised not survivial but being in a good position to grab the glory.  He may in fact have deployed his cavalry at reduced depth, which would add anything up to another 2,400 yards of frontage and actually leave him outflanking (or rather outwinging) the Cimbri square.

If the Cimbri did indeed collapse their frontage down from 6,000 yards to 800 yards, one can see their manoeuvres making a sort of sense: the cavalry rides out to face its Roman counterparts (who are perhaps mainly Gallic), raising a lot of dust to obscure visibility as it does so, the infantry marches its right and left in towards the centre, 'gradually' as Plutarch states.  It would have to be 'gradual' as each side of the square had about a mile to go to get the frontage narrowed down to 800 yards or so.  If Plutarch is right about their numbers (and if the rear was catching up at the same rate) the Cimbri could have ended up with a column 800 wide and 225 deep - which would 'come on to the attack like a vast sea in motion' against Catulus.  Meanwhile Marius' forces march hopefully on ... and on ... and on, into the recently-vacated space, until they chase off the Cimbri cavalry and sight the camp.

This all suggests to me that Boeorix had his own individual and unusual ideas about how a battle should be conducted, but for all his unconventionality it did not work, at least this time.  As I am sure Phil Barker would advise, he might have done better with a standard deployment and historical tactics.  ;)

The women and children are mentioned only in connection with the Cimbric camp, and as their mention is in the same breath, or at least paragraph, as disenchanted Cimbri warriors comitting suicide by the laborious expedient of using the cattle as accessories, I rather doubt that they (or the cattle) would have been anywhere near the front line.  The suicide-bent gentlemen could easily have abandoned their weapons on the battlefield (along with their standards and trumpets), which would explain why they neither fought to the death nor used weaponry for self-destruction.

Any thoughts from anyone at this point, or shall we move on to Caesar?

The chaining together of the Cimbri front ranks is distinctly unusual, and it is not clear whether it is meant to keep Romans out or Cimbri in.  One suspects that only about 800 would be chained, this equating to the front rank of the condensed formation once the hollow square finished its slow-motion implosion.  Given the unusual (as far as we know) nature of the manoeuvre, having a set number of men chain-linked together meant they would have acted as 'front markers' for everyone else.

They would also have imposed a more deliberate, steady advance on the whole mass, keeping cohesion.  This suggests that the Cimbri's natural mode of advance was not quite so deliberate, and probably more in keeping with the furious onset of the Teutones.  A chain-linked front rank goes at the speed of its slowest member, so it is a device for keeping men back rather than urging them forward.

Plutarch's description of the Cimbri infantry coming 'on to the attack like a vast sea in motion' shows they were not standing to receive, but if they had hoped that the depth of their column would make the Romans quail they rather undid the effect of that by kicking up masses of dust in the first place.  Catulus' infantry saw only the Cimbri front ranks and rushed into the attack themselves, not a whit dismayed.  Catulus, being mounted, from his vantage point probably had a better idea of the depth of the Cimbri formation, hence the description that has come down to us of 'a vast sea in motion'.  He must have been gratified to see his troops not only go in keenly but also cut their way effortlessly through masses of sweating, puffing barbarians.

One last comment on the Cimbri and Teutones: prior to the fight with the Teutones, Marius had to coddle his troops and sharpen their urge for battle (which started out very blunt indeed - that bit has not been quoted).  By the time he came to take on the Cimbri, Roman morale was sky-high and the only question troubling the Roman commanders was who would get the glory for the victory.

We see something of the same Roman morale process taking shape as Caesar works his way across Gaul.  This conquest will be the subject of the next few posts in this thread.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 24, 2013, 11:41:45 AM

The chaining together of the Cimbri front ranks is distinctly unusual, and it is not clear whether it is meant to keep Romans out or Cimbri in.  One suspects that only about 800 would be chained, this equating to the front rank of the condensed formation once the hollow square finished its slow-motion implosion.  Given the unusual (as far as we know) nature of the manoeuvre, having a set number of men chain-linked together meant they would have acted as 'front markers' for everyone else.

I'm afraid the whole giant hollow square which contracts into a solid column seems highly improbable to me.  That the Cimbri started in a solid block which has been, by Plutarch's error or faulty transmission, made many times too big seems more likely.

On the Cimbri chaining men together in the attack, they were either stupid or in fact advanced and took up a position, which they intended to hold.  Attacking with men chained together will bog down as soon as the chained men take casualties and any impetus from the deep formation will be lost.  This is not a problem if the intention to win or fight where you stand.  Alternatively, the chained thing is a fiction, or a misunderstanding (the Celts used long slave chains, IIRC), and in fact they came on a deep but slow moving column and were met with a Roman counter attack.

Anyway, by all means move to Caesar, who may have had some idea of what Celtic cavalry did in battle :)

Well, Caesar received an early lesson in this when he sent his own cavalry to shadow the Helvetii.

"On the following day they move their camp from that place; Caesar does the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the number of four thousand (which he had drawn together from all parts of the Province and from the Aedui and their allies), to observe toward what parts the enemy are directing their march. These, having too eagerly pursued the enemy's rear, come to a battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in a disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated with this battle, because they had with five hundred horse repulsed so large a body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes too from their rear to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar restrained his men from battle, deeming it sufficient for the present to prevent the enemy from rapine, forage, and depredation. They marched for about fifteen days in such a manner that there was not more than five or six miles between the enemy's rear and our van." - Caesar, Gallic War, I.15

In chapter 21 Caesar catches up with them.

"Being on the same day informed by his scouts, that the enemy had encamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp; he sent persons to ascertain what the nature of the mountain was, and of what kind the ascent on every side. Word was brought back, that it was easy. During the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his lieutenant with praetorian powers, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountain with two legions, and with those as guides who had examined the road; he explains what his plan is. He himself during the fourth watch, hastens to them by the same route by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all the cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to be very experienced in military affairs, and had been in the army of Lucius Sulla, and afterward in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with the scouts. " - idem I.21

Caesar makes a night march (the vigila, or 'watches', each comprised one quarter of the hours of darkness, so his advance force sets out half-way through the night and the main force three quarters of the way) and closes on his opponent's position.

Then he hits a snag.

"At day-break, when the summit of the mountain was in the possession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off than a mile and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterward ascertained from the captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus been discovered; Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by Labienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this by the Gallic arms and ensigns [insignibus]. Caesar leads off his forces to the next hill: [and] draws them up in battle-order." - idem, I.22.1-2

Well, sometimes the flank march dice just do not work out.  However ...

"Labienus, as he had been ordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] own forces were seen near the enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemy might be made on every side at the same time, was, after having taken possession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and refraining from battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced, Caesar learned through spies, that the mountain was in possession of his own men, and that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius, struck with fear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen. On that day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his camp three miles from theirs." - ibid.3-5

And then again sometimes it is just an unreliable general.  Now logistics rear their ugly head - or is it second thoughts?

"The next day (as there remained in all only two day's space [to the time] when he must serve out the corn to his army, and as he was not more than eighteen miles from Bibracte , by far the largest and best-stored town of the Aedui), he thought that he ought to provide for a supply of corn; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and advanced rapidly to Bibracte . This circumstance is reported to the enemy by some deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a captain, of the Gallic horse. The Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans, struck with terror, were retreating from them, the more so, as the day before, though they had seized on the higher grounds, they had not joined battle or because they flattered themselves that they might be cut of from the provisions, altering their plan and changing their route, began to pursue, and to annoy our men in the rear." - idem, I.23

The failed night march may have been destructive to Roman morale.  It seems to have boosted that of the Helvetii, who are prepared to accept battle even though the Romans hold a better position.

"Caesar, when he observes this, draws off his forces to the next hill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy. He himself, meanwhile, drew up on the middle of the hill a triple line of his four veteran legions in such a manner, that he placed above him on the very summit the two legions, which he had lately levied in Hither Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountain should be covered with men, and that meanwhile the baggage should be brought together into one place, and the position be protected by those who were posted in the upper line. The Helvetii having followed with all their wagons, collected their baggage into one place: they themselves, after having repulsed our cavalry and formed a phalanx [phalange facta = a phalanx, i.e. close formation, being formed], advanced up to our front line in very close order. [confertissima acie = 'closest-packed line of battle']" - idem, I.24

The Roman (mainly Gallic) cavalry screened the Roman deployment.  Caesar gives the impression that the Helvetii infantry rather than the cavalry drove off his horsemen, though as we have seen the Helvetii did possess cavalry.  We need not infer from Caesar's reference to a phalanx and very close order that the Helvetii employed the Macedonian art of war: they simply packed themselves close and tight.  Nor did they need a chain fetish to do so.  The sight does, however, seem to have worried the Romans.

"Caesar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, then those of all, that he might make the danger of all equal, and do away with the hope of flight, after encouraging his men, joined battle." - idem, I.25.1

Is Caesar dismounting his possibly skittish cavalry in addition to his officers?  Is this his motive, or are his troops worried that he will ride away and leave them to their fate?  In any event, his dismounting reassures all involved and/or means that his cavalry lose the means to make a hasty exit if things look tough, so with the advantage of position if not morale it is time to open the battle.

"His soldiers hurling their javelins from the higher ground, easily broke the enemy's phalanx. That being dispersed [disjecta = taken apart, opened up], they made a charge on them with drawn swords. It was a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting, that, when several of their shields had been by one stroke of the (Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned fast together, as the point of the iron had bent itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, with their left hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that many, after having long tossed their arm about, chose rather to cast away the shield from their hand, and to fight with their person unprotected." - idem I.25.2-4

The Roman pilum was doing its work.  The Helvetii had made a steady advance in a formation we might describe as a shield wall: the Roman pilum proved to be effective at disrupting that shield wall.

"At length, worn out with wounds, they began to give way, and, as there was in the neighbourhood a mountain about a mile off [mille passuum = 1,000 paces], to betake themselves thither." - ibid.5

Caesar and his army followed up - and received a surprise.

"When the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancing up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men closed the enemy's line of march and served as a guard to their rear, having assailed our men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround them; upon seeing which, the Helvetii who had betaken themselves to the mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle. The Romans having faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions [signa bipertito intulerunt = advanced their standards in two directions]; the first and second line, to withstand those who had been defeated and driven off the field [submotis = shaken, driven back]; the third to receive those who were just arriving." - ibid.6-7

To be continued ...

And finally - the denouement.

"Thus was the contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtful success. When they could no longer withstand the attacks of our men, the one division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to the mountain; the other repaired to their baggage and wagons. For during the whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventh hour [i.e. 12 (noon) 1 P. M.] to eventide, no one could see an enemy with his back turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage till late in the night, for they had set wagons in the way as a rampart, and from the higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they came on, and some from between the wagons and the wheels kept darting their lances and javelins from beneath, and wounding our men. After the fight had lasted some time, our men gained possession of their baggage and camp. There the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix was taken. After the battle about 130,000 men [of the enemy] remained alive, who marched incessantly during the whole of that night; and after a march discontinued for no part of the night, arrived in the territories of the Lingones on the fourth day, while our men, having stopped for three days, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burial of the slain, had not been able to follow them." - Caesar, Gallic War I.26.1-5

We may note in passing that Caesar does not list Roman losses, but the number and nature of his wounded and the conduct of burials were sufficient to stop the Roman army in its tracks for three days.

If prizes were awarded for sheer endurance, grit and determination, the Helvetii would surely be among the leading contenders.  They are about as far removed from the standard mad dash/swift collapse template often associated with Gauls as one can get.  This perhaps reminds us that Gallic tribes, like the German tribes Tacitus describes in his Germania, have exceptions to any general rule.  How valid the general rule is will be the next question, as we shall bypass Ariovistus' Germans and follow Caesar into northern Gaul where he meets the real or supposed descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones: the Belgae.

First, Caesar, like any good general, asks around to find out what he can about his would-be opponents.  He learns the following:

"When Caesar inquired of them what states were in arms, how powerful they were, and what they could do, in war, he received the following information: that the greater part of the Belgae were sprung, from the Germans, and that having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they had settled there, on account of the fertility of the country, and had driven out the Gauls who inhabited those regions; and that they were the only people who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was overrun, had prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering their territories; the effect of which was, that, from the recollection of those events, they assumed to themselves great authority and haughtiness in military matters." - Caesar, Gallic War II.4.1-3

Here, far from being descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones, the Belgae are Germans who saw off the Cimbri and Teutones.  We shall nevertheless look at them in action because Belgae are generally classed with Celts rather than Germans and do not fight quite the same way as Ariovistus' men or Tacitus' Germans.

I omit the Remi estimate of the numbers of the Belgic tribes except to note:

"the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Caeraesi, the Paemani, who are called by the common name of Germans [had promised], they thought, to the number of 40,000." - idem II.4.10

Observe that the Eburones were considered Germans, at least by the Remi.  We shall meet them later.

The Belgae attack Bibrax, a Remi town.

"The Gauls' mode of besieging is the same as that of the Belgae: when after having drawn a large number of men around the whole of the fortifications, stones have begun to be cast against the wall on all sides, and the wall has been stripped of its defenders, [then], forming a testudo [testudine facta], they advance to the gates and undermine the wall: which was easily effected on this occasion; for while so large a number were casting stones and darts [iaci], no one was able to maintain his position upon the wall." - idem II.6.1-3

Gauls are differentiated from Belgae but they share some common techniques, notably for assaulting a town.  Caesar goes to the rescue.

"Thither, immediately after midnight, Caesar, using as guides the same persons who had come to him as messengers from Iccius, sends some Numidian and Cretan archers, and some Balearic slingers as a relief to the towns-people, by whose arrival both a desire to resist together with the hope of [making good their] defense, was infused into the Remi, and, for the same reason, the hope of gaining the town, abandoned the enemy. Therefore, after staying a short time before the town, and laying waste the country of the Remi, when all the villages and buildings which they could approach had been burned, they hastened with all their forces to the camp of Caesar, and encamped within less than two miles of it; and their camp, as was indicated by the smoke and fires, extended more than eight miles in breadth." - idem, II.7

Two miles is close: when one sees camps set up, it is usually five miles away from the enemy (against the Helvetii it was eight miles).  We may note how the Numidians are misidentified as archers (the Latin is: Numidas et Cretas sagittarios, which could be 'Numidians, and Cretan archers' or 'Numidian and Cretan archers'.  A further reference in II.10.1 confirms the former.)

Battle follows, but note how diffident Caesar is until he has tested the opposition, and then how he insures against mishap by putting up some serious fortifications in support of his army.

"Caesar at first determined to decline a battle, as well on account of the great number of the enemy as their distinguished reputation for valor: daily, however, in cavalry actions, he strove to ascertain by frequent trials, what the enemy could effect by their prowess and what our men would dare. When he perceived that our men were not inferior, as the place before the camp was naturally convenient and suitable for marshaling an army (since the hill where the camp was pitched, rising gradually from the plain, extended forward in breadth as far as the space which the marshaled army could occupy, and had steep declines of its side in either direction, and gently sloping in front gradually sank to the plain); on either side of that hill he drew a cross trench of about four hundred paces, and at the extremities of that trench built forts, and placed there his military engines, lest, after he had marshaled his army, the enemy, since they were so powerful in point of number, should be able to surround his men in the flank, while fighting. After doing this, and leaving in the camp the two legions which he had last raised, that, if there should be any occasion, they might be brought as a reserve, he formed the other six legions in order of battle before the camp. The enemy, likewise, had drawn up their forces which they had brought out of the camp." - idem II.8

Meanwhile, both sides draw up to fight, and ...

"There was a marsh of no great extent between our army and that of the enemy. The latter were waiting to see if our men would pass this; our men, also, were ready in arms to attack them while disordered, if the first attempt to pass should be made by them. In the mean time battle was commenced between the two armies by a cavalry action. When neither army began to pass the marsh, Caesar, upon the skirmishes of the horse [proving] favorable to our men, led back his forces into the camp." - idem II.9.1-2

What an anticlimax.  The great battle against the Belgae is a damp squib.

"The enemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Aisne, which it has been; stated was behind our camp. Finding a ford there, they endeavored to lead a part of their forces over it; with the design, that, if they could, they might carry by storm the fort which Q. Titurius, Caesar's lieutenant, commanded, and might cut off the bridge." - idem II.9.3

The Belgae recognise a bad deal when they see one, and move to create a better opportunity for themselves.  However Caesar anticipates them.

"Caesar, being apprised of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalry and light-armed Numidians, slingers and archers, over the bridge, and hastens toward them. There was a severe struggle in that place. Our men, attacking in the river the disordered enemy, slew a great part of them. By the immense number of their missiles they drove back the rest, who, in a most courageous manner were attempting to pass over their bodies, and surrounded with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those who had first crossed the river. The enemy, when they perceived that their hopes had deceived them both with regard to their taking the town by storm and also their passing the river, and did not see our men advance to a more disadvantageous place for the purpose of fighting, and when provisions began to fail them, having called a council, determined that it was best for each to return to his country." - idem II.10.1-4

Numidians, slingers and archers are clearly differentiated here.  They and the cavalry suffice to repel the disadvantaged assault.

By now readers will be wondering what has happened to the glorious headlong charge of the Nervii that put Caesar's right into dire difficulties and gave him a really tough fight before succumbing.  Patience!  The above sections are included to give a fuller picture of the actions of the Belgae during the campaign, and to show there was rather more to it than a simple I came, I saw, I was fanatically charged, I conquered.

The Belgae agree to reassemble in the territory of whichever tribe Caesar invades.  Meanwhile, Caesar pursues their retiring army and by his account does it noticeable damage.

"That matter being determined on, marching out of their camp at the second watch, with great noise and confusion, in no fixed order, nor under any command, since each sought for himself the foremost place in the journey, and hastened to reach home, they made their departure appear very like a flight. Caesar, immediately learning this through his scouts, [but] fearing an ambuscade, because he had not yet discovered for what reason they were departing, kept his army and cavalry within the camp. At daybreak, the intelligence having been confirmed by the scouts, he sent forward his cavalry to harass their rear; and gave the command of it to two of his lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta. He ordered T. Labienus, another of his lieutenants, to follow them closely with three legions. These, attacking their rear, and pursuing them for many miles, slew a great number of them as they were fleeing; while those in the rear with whom they had come up, halted, and bravely sustained the attack of our soldiers; the van, because they appeared to be removed from danger, and were not restrained by any necessity or command, as soon as the noise was heard, broke their ranks, and, to a man, rested their safety in flight. Thus without any risk [to themselves] our men killed as great a number of them as the length of the day allowed; and at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and betook themselves into the camp, as they had been commanded." - idem II.11

Exit the Belgae.  Caesar then subdues the Suessiones and Bellovaci, and subsequently marches into the territory of the Nervii.

And so Caesar marches.  He begins by questioning some locals and learning that the Nervii, Atrebates, Viromandui and Atuatuci are concentrating.

"Having learned these things, he sends forward scouts and centurions to choose a convenient place for the camp. And as a great many of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar, marched with him; some of these, as was afterwards learned from the prisoners, having accurately observed, during those days, the army's method of marching, went by night to the Nervii, and informed them that a great number of baggage-trains passed between the several legions, and that there would be no difficulty, when the first legion had come into the camp, and the other legions were at a great distance, to attack that legion while under baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-train seized, it would come to pass that the other legions would not dare to stand their ground. It added weight also to the advice of those who reported that circumstance, that the Nervii, from early times, because they were weak in cavalry, (for not even at this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can,) in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbors if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut young trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] on to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye. Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed by these things, the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to be neglected by them." - Caesar, Gallic War II.17

Here we have step 1, the cunning plan.  Were this an extract from Livy, it would probably be limited to: "... and the Gauls attempted an ambush ..."

Meanwhile ...

"The nature of the ground which our men had chosen for the camp was this: A hill, declining evenly from the top, extending to the river Sambre, which we have mentioned above: from this river there arose a [second] hill of like ascent, on the other side and opposite to the former, and open for about 200 paces at the lower part; but in the upper part, woody, (so much so) that it was not easy to see through it into the interior. Within these woods the enemy kept themselves in concealment; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground, along the river. The depth of the river was about three feet." - idem II.18

And now step 2, the deceptive lure (just a few cavalry, honest, Caesar).  This sets the scene for the upcoming battle.

"Caesar, having sent his cavalry on before, followed close after them with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march was different from that which the Belgae had reported to the Nervii. For as he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, according to his custom, led on as the van six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placed the baggage-trains of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train. Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced action with the cavalry of the enemy." - idem II.19.1-4

Caesar has by now learned that the cavalry and missile troops together make a useful combination, especially where rivers are involved.  However this occasion does not go quite like the others.

"While they [the Belgic cavalry] from time to time betook themselves into the woods to their companions, and again made an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare to follow them in their retreat further than the limit to which the plain and open parts extended, in the mean time the six legions which had arrived first, having measured out the work, began to fortify the camp." - idem II.19.5

Now the Nervii spring their cunning plan.

"When the first part of the baggage train of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to our camp, and to those who were employed in the works." - idem II.19.6-8

Like Pharnaces at Zela, the Nervii achieved tactical surprise.  We may note the speed of the onset.  Does this signify keenness, impetuousness, or even fanaticism?  It can hardly signify reluctance.

"Caesar had every thing to do at one time: the standard to be displayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; the signal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers to be called off from the works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of seeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be given. A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy." - idem II.20.1

The Romans formed up under their subordinate officers as Caesar nipped along the line spreading encouragement.

"Caesar, having given the necessary orders, hastened to and fro into whatever quarter fortune carried him, to animate the troops, and came to the tenth legion. Having encouraged the soldiers with no further speech than that "they should keep up the remembrance of their wonted valour, and not be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain the assault of the enemy;" as the latter were not further from them than the distance to which a dart could be cast, he gave the signal for commencing battle." - idem II.21.1

The Roman lineup faced a number of problems.

"The army having been marshalled, rather as the nature of the ground and the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the time, than as the method and order of military matters required; while the legions in the different places were withstanding the enemy, some in one quarter, some in another, and the view was obstructed by the very thick hedges intervening, as we have before remarked, neither could proper reserves be posted, nor could the necessary measures be taken in each part, nor could all the commands be issued by one person. Therefore, in such an unfavorable state of affairs, various events of fortune followed." - idem II.22

On the Roman left ...

"The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been stationed on the left part of the army, casting their weapons, speedily drove the Atrebates (for that division had been opposed to them,) who were breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from the higher ground into the river; and following them as they were endeavoring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of them while impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the river; and having advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battle was renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had returned and were opposing them." - idem II.23.1-2

In the centre ...

"In like manner, in another quarter two different legions, the eleventh and the eighth, having routed the Veromandui, with whom they had engaged, were fighting from the higher ground upon the very banks of the river." - idem II.23.3

And on the right ...

"But, almost the whole camp on the front and on the left side being then exposed, since the twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no great distance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body [confertissimo agmine], with Boduognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastened toward that place; and part of them began to surround the legions on their unprotected flank, part to make for the highest point of the encampment." - idem II.23.4-5

The overlapping Nervii swarmed into the Roman camp.

"At the same time our horsemen, and light-armed infantry, who had been with those, who, as I have related, were routed by the first assault of the enemy, as they were betaking themselves into the camp, met the enemy face to face, and again sought flight into another quarter; and the camp-followers who from the Decuman Gate, and from the highest ridge of the hill had seen our men pass the river as victors, when, after going out for the purposes of plundering, they looked back and saw the enemy parading in our camp, committed themselves precipitately to flight; at the same time there arose the cry and shout of those who came with the baggage-train: and they (affrighted), were carried some one way, some another." - idem II.24.1-3

To the experienced eyes of Caesar's Treveri allies, the battle looked lost.

"By all these circumstances the cavalry of the Treveri were much alarmed, (whose reputation for courage is extraordinary among the Gauls, and who had come to Caesar, being sent by their state as auxiliaries), and, when they saw our camp filled with a large number of the enemy, the legions hard pressed and almost held surrounded, the camp-retainers, horsemen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing on all sides divided and scattered, they, despairing of our affairs, hastened home, and related to their state that the Romans were routed and conquered, [and] that the enemy were in possession of their camp and baggage-train." - idem II.24.4-5

Denouement next post.

Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in consequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collected together in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance to themselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion P. Sextius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable to support himself - Caesar, Gallic War II.25.1

Baculus conveniently snapshots for us the tendency of valiant men to stick it in the fighting line until pain and blood loss render them unable to continue.  Whether they just sink to the ground and pass out, to be found and attended to afterwards, or are dragged out to a temporary 'casualty clearing station' is not clear.

The problem with the twelfth legion seems to be that one standard was lost to the aggressive close-fighting Nervii (which rather suggests ferocity was flourishing undimmed) which caused the legion commander to issue the questionable order to pull back the standards - which meant that the troops also pulled back.  As the standards had been collected in one place, the troops were not unnaturally doing the same.  The casualties among centurions indicate a hard-fighting and aggressive - and competent - opponent.

he likewise perceived that the rest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy [on the other hand] though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were [at the same time] pressing hard on both flanks; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis, and that there was not any reserve which could be brought up ... - idem

'Avoiding the weapons' is tela vitare (for 'tela vitarent') - if javelins and other missiles were coming over from the Nervii, dodging them would be expected rather than remarked upon.  One suspects rather that Caesar meant troops were dropping their own weapons and leaving.

In any event, the 12th Legion is in serious trouble: for once they have found an opponent too hard to handle.  So - Caesar to the rescue.

... having therefore snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear (for he himself had come without a shield), he advanced to the front of the line, and addressing the centurions by name, and encouraging the rest of the soldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and extend the companies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On his arrival, as hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage restored, while every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desired to exert his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a little checked. - Gallic War II.25.2-3

Caesar is un-bunching the bunched troops by ordering the standards to be brought back to their usual positions and telling the centurions to get the troops back into their usual formation.  It would seem that the appearance of Caesar also put a damper on the 'impetuosity' (impetus = attack) of the Nervii, which would have slackened the pressure enough to allow the 12th Legion to sort itself out.  Handy.

Caesar, when he perceived that the seventh legion, which stood close by him, was also hard pressed by the enemy, directed the tribunes of the soldiers to effect a junction of the legions gradually, and make their charge upon the enemy with a double front [conversa signa in hostes inferrent = turned the standards around against the enemy]; which having been done, since they brought assistance the one to the other, nor feared lest their rear should be surrounded by the enemy, they began to stand their ground more boldly, and to fight more courageously. - idem II.26.1-2

Evidently both legions were suffering from having met a rather fiercer and more determined opponent than those to which they were accustomed, but Caesar's appearance provided some anticipatory blunting of the Nervii's effort ("Look out: it's Caesar!") and some effective direction to that of the Romans.

Now Caesar drew - and played - his ace.

In the mean time, the soldiers of the two legions which had been in the rear of the army, as a guard for the baggage-train, upon the battle being reported to them, quickened their pace, and were seen by the enemy on the top of the hill; and Titus Labienus, having gained possession of the camp of the enemy, and observed from the higher ground what was going on in our camp, sent the tenth legion as a relief to our men, who, when they had learned from the flight of the horse and the sutlers in what position the affair was, and in how great danger the camp and the legion and the commander were involved, left undone nothing [which tended] to despatch.  - idem II.26.3-5

Enter the Tenth Legion with all despatch.

By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leaned on their shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, though unarmed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked armed foes; the horsemen too, that they might by their valour blot the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionary soldiers in all parts of the battle. - idem II.27.1

Up to this point, despite the poor to indifferent performance of their allies, the Nervii have been doing really well: they have beaten back two legions, taken two standards and put Caesar's right under what could easily have been terminal pressure had the great man not intervened.  The arrival of the Tenth Legion took the heart out of them, though the surprise is perhaps that they had not thought to provide a force to delay the two-legion Roman rearguard and prevent it from interfering on the battlefield.  Caesar's understanding or belief that they thought it would be his main body makes this the more puzzling.

In any event, the action was now decided, but the Nervii were very hard to convince that they had been beaten.

But the enemy, even in the last hope of safety, displayed such great courage, that when the foremost of them had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought from their bodies; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who survived cast their weapons against our men [thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which had fallen short between [the armies]; so that it ought not to be concluded, that men of such great courage had injudiciously dared to pass a very broad river, ascend very high banks, and come up to a very disadvantageous place; since their greatness of spirit had rendered these actions easy, although in themselves very difficult. - idem II.27.3-5

And that, basically, was that: from 60,000 warriors the Nervii were down to 500, and in Vercingetorix's rebellion contribute or agree to contribute a mere 5,000 - presumably four years' worth of maturing teenagers.  For courage and combat capability the Nervii seem to have been the cream of the Gallic crop, while their allies and cousins the Atrebates and Viromandui, while displaying equal keeness, do not display anything like equal fighting ability or courage.

The hanging question remains: what would have happened on the Roman right had Caesar not moved across to turn the battle around in that sector?  Would the 12th and 7th legions have had their chestnuts pulled out of the fire by the arrival of the 10th, or would they have had their goose cooked rather than just their fingers burnt?  And given that the defending Romans had the advantage of the slope, what would have happened had they met on level ground?

Must look , but aren't the Nervii mentioned as having warriors shortly after the battle??

Isn't this likely to be an example of Caesar bigging up his role a bit. He is here following the example of Sulla who dismounted to put himself into danger, but one just wonders if  Caesar is not taking an opportunity to make the most of his timely intervention.
It looks like a close run thing, but did the Romans really pursue that hard?
Roy

I am sure the noble Julius would not overstate his role in bringing about a victory, particularly if a triumph were at stake.  ;)

In Gallic War II.28, Caesar states that the Nervii told him they had only three councillors left out of fifty, and 'scarcely' 500 warriors remaining out of 60,000.  Caesar's account relies on the veracity of the Nervii, who might or might not have overstated their losses to prevent him looking for any more slaves, but the real test would seem to be Vercingetorix's revolt.

Caesar beat the Nervii in 57 BC and Vercingetorix revolted in 52 BC.  During 56-53 BC four years' worth of Nervii teenagers would have attained warrior status, so the number fielded, or at least promised, in Vercingetorix's mass mobilisation of 52 BC is the key indicator.

In 52 BC the Nervii fielded 5,000 warriors (Gallic War VII.75).  They come way down the scale that the Aedui (and allies) and Arverni (and allies) come top of with 35,000 each.  We might hazard that the Nervii's reduced population added some 900 warriors per year.

Did the Romans pursue the Nervii?  Caesar has them mostly die on the field, which rather negates the need for pursuit.  The Viromandui and Atrebates seem to have been less inclined to fight to the last, though Caesar refers to his cavalry as having "scoured the whole battlefield and tried to outdo the legionaries in gallantry," which suggests a lot of action on the battlefield but no extended pursuit as such.  For all that, the Atrebates are down to 4,000 in 52 BC and the Viromandui do not appear at all.

That's good Patrick, you'll be explaining to us why the Nervii are an active threat just a couple of years after the Sambre then :-))

caes.gal.5.38":    [5.38] Elated by this victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with his cavalry to the Aduatuci, who bordered on his kingdom; he halts neither day nor night, and orders the infantry to follow him closely. Having related the exploit and roused the Aduatuci, the next day he arrived among the Nervii, and entreats "that they should not throw away the opportunity of liberating themselves forever and of punishing the Romans for those wrongs which they had received from them;" [he tells them] "that two lieutenants have been slain, and that a large portion of the army has perished; that it was not a matter of difficulty for the legion which was wintering with Cicero to be cut off, when suddenly assaulted; he declares himself ready to cooperate in that design. He easily gains over the Nervii by this speech.

"caes.gal.5.39":    [5.39] Accordingly, messengers having been forthwith dispatched to the Centrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, all of whom are under their government, they assemble as large bodies as they can, and rush unexpectedly to the winter-quarters of Cicero, the report of the death of Titurius not having as yet been conveyed to him. That also occurred to him, which was the consequence of a necessary work-that some soldiers who had gone off into the woods for the purpose of procuring timber and therewith constructing fortifications, were intercepted by the sudden arrival of [the enemy's] horse. These having been entrapped, the Eburones, the Nervii, and the Aduatici and all their allies and dependents, begin to attack the legion: our men quickly run together to arms and mount the rampart; they sustained the attack that day with great difficulty, since the enemy placed all their hope in dispatch, and felt assured that, if they obtained this victory, they would be conquerors forever.

"caes.gal.5.40":    [5.40] Letters are immediately sent to Caesar by Cicero, great rewards being offered [to the messengers] if they carried them through. All these passes having been beset, those who were sent are intercepted. During the night as many as 120 towers are raised with incredible dispatch out of the timber which they had collected for the purpose of fortification: the things which seemed necessary to the work are completed. The following day the enemy, having collected far greater forces, attack the camp [and] fill up the ditch. Resistance is made by our men in the same manner as the day before; this same thing is done afterward during the remaining days. The work is carried on incessantly in the night: not even to the sick, or wounded, is opportunity given for rest: whatever things are required for resisting the assault of the next day are provided during the night: many stakes burned at the end, and a large number of mural pikes are procured: towers are built up, battlements and parapets are formed of interwoven hurdles. Cicero himself, though he was in very weak health, did not leave himself the night-time for repose, so that he was forced to spare himself by the spontaneous movement and entreaties of the soldiers.

"caes.gal.5.41":    [5.41] Then these leaders and chiefs of the Nervii, who had any intimacy and grounds of friendship with Cicero, say they desire to confer with him. When permission was granted, they recount the same things which Ambiorix had related to Titurius, namely, "that all Gaul was in arms, that the Germans had passed the Rhine, that the winter-quarters of Caesar and of the others were attacked." They report in addition also, about the death of Sabinus. They point to Ambiorix for the purpose of obtaining credence; "they are mistaken," say they, "if they hoped for any relief from those who distrust their own affairs; that they bear such feelings toward Cicero and the Roman people that they deny them nothing but winter-quarters, and are unwilling that the practice should become constant; that through their [the Nervii's] means it is possible for them [the Romans] to depart from their winter-quarters safely and to proceed without fear into whatever parts they desire." To these Cicero made only one reply: "that it is not the custom of the Roman people to accept any condition from an armed enemy: if they are willing to lay down their arms, they may employ him as their advocate and send embassadors to Caesar: that he believed, from his [Caesar's] justice, they would obtain the things which they might request."

"caes.gal.5.42":    [5.42] Disappointed in this hope, the Nervii surround the winter-quarters with a rampart eleven feet high, and a ditch thirteen feet in depth. These military works they had learned from our men in the intercourse of former years, and, having taken some of our army prisoners, were instructed by them: but, as they had no supply of iron tools which are requisite for this service, they were forced to cut the turf with their swords, and to empty out the earth with their hands and cloaks, from which circumstance, the vast number of the men could be inferred; for in less than three hours they completed a fortification of ten miles in circumference; and during the rest of the days they began to prepare and construct towers of the height of the ramparts, and grappling irons, and mantelets, which the same prisoners had taught them.

The Nervii are not an active threat until 54 BC and then only because the Eburones have just annihilated Sabinus' legion and are out and about spreading encouragement.  Caesar describes the Nervii sitting at home minding their own business until Ambiorix drops in and says: hey, lads, how about it?

Elated by this victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with his cavalry to the Atuatuci, who bordered on his kingdom; he halts neither day nor night, and orders the infantry to follow him closely. Having related the exploit and roused the Atuatuci, the next day he arrived among the Nervii, and entreats "that they should not throw away the opportunity of liberating themselves forever and of punishing the Romans for those wrongs which they had received from them;" [he tells them] "that two generals have been slain, and that a large portion of the army has perished; that it is not a matter of difficulty for the legion which was wintering with Cicero to be cut off, if suddenly assaulted;" he declares himself ready to cooperate in that design. He easily gains over the Nervii by this speech.  - Caesar, Gallic War V.38

One does observe their much-reduced scope: in 57 BC they and their allies take on Caesar's eight legions, but in 54 BC it is all they and their allies can do to blockade a single legion.  When Caesar marches to the relief of Cicero's legion, he does so with a force of 7,000 men (Gallic War V.49) which proves adequate for the purpose.  The Gauls opposed to him, Eburones apparently included, can muster, united, no more than 60,000 fighting men - which in 57 BC was the strength of the Nervii alone.

Patrick, no one doubts that the Nervii had been substantially damaged by the action at the Sambre. They may have once been able to field 30,000 warriors, but they won't have been reduced to 500 that casualty rate does not accord with common sense. Losing armies suffer casualties up to 20%, not 90% unless they are trapped against a natural feature and massacred. At the Sambre there is ample opportunity to get away and disappear into the forest. If 30,000 men fought I bet 10,000 escaped.

I don't buy the 60,000 number for an original strength either. It is another of Caesar's inflated numbers.  To have 60,000 warriors the Nervii would have either 250,000 population if all men fought or half a million if they have a substantial class of unfree land workers. Either way it is too huge a number for the Nervii who do not appear to have a huge territory.
However, Patrick we agree that we will almost never agree on numbers.:-))
Roy

While ample opportunity for a getaway may have existed, it does not seem to have been taken.  Caesar describes the Nervii as scorning flight and fighting practically to the last man and the last gasp.

Heroic though this was, and greatly though it earned Caesar's admiration and respect, it was obviously not a winning strategy, a point which was immediately grasped by the Nervii's neighbours and allies, the Atuatuci.  These descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones completely abandoned any idea of facing Romans in the open field (or even wooded slope) and tucked themselves into their well-situated, well-defended (by Gallic standards) principal town.

The Romans swiftly reduced it to the point of surrender through their superior siege techniques.  The Atuatuci tried one last cunning plan: they surrendered, yielded up their weapons and shields, or enough of them to look convincing, and then attacked in the dead of night.  Unfortunately for them the Romans took it all in their stride and the surviving Atuatuci (of all ages and genders) were sold as slaves in one job lot of 53,000.

Over the next few years (56-52 BC) we see the Gauls gradually coming to terms with the fact that their traditional approaches do not work against Romans and instead developing new methods of dealing with the hitherto invincible invader.

Caesar spends the rest of 57 and 56 BC subduing the remainder of Gaul, including the maritime Veneti.  Then he encounters the first real change in Gallic military technique.

About the same time Caesar, although the summer was nearly past, yet, since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the Menapii alone remained in arms, and had never sent embassadors to him [to make a treaty] of peace, speedily led his army thither, thinking that that war might soon be terminated. They resolved to conduct the war on a very different method from the rest of the Gauls; for as they perceived that the greatest nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been routed and overcome, and as they possessed continuous ranges of forests and morasses, they removed themselves and all their property thither. - Gallic War III.28

Essentially, the Morini had decided upon a strategy of hiding and ambush.  Now they tried the ambush.

When Caesar had arrived at the opening of these forests, and had began to fortify his camp, and no enemy was in the mean time seen, while our men were dispersed on their respective duties, they suddenly rushed out from all parts of the forest, and made an attack on our men. The latter quickly took up arms and drove them back again to their forests; and having killed a great many, lost a few of their own men while pursuing them too far through those intricate places. - idem III.28

With the ambush defeated, Caesar could now seek out the hiders.  He adopted a new form of fortification to cover his progress into the woods.

During the remaining days after this, Caesar began to cut down the forests; and that no attack might be made on the flank of the soldiers, while unarmed and not foreseeing it, he placed together (opposite to the enemy) all that timber which was cut down, and piled it up as a rampart on either flank. - idem III.29

Caesar's fortified road penetrated into the heart of the Morini forest.  Then rain stopped play.

When a great space had been, with incredible speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle [of the enemy] and the rear of their baggage train were already seized by our men, and they themselves were seeking for the thickest parts of the forests, storms of such a kind came on that the work was necessarily suspended, and, through the continuance of the rains, the soldiers could not any longer remain in their tents. - idem III.29

Naturally it was the weather, not the evasive Morini tactics, that rendered the campaign a non-success.

Therefore, having laid waste all their country, [and] having burned their villages and houses, Caesar led back his army and stationed them in winter quarters among the Aulerci and Lexovii, and the other states which had made war upon him last.

This was not an ideal result for either side, but for the first time a Gallic tribe had survived the attentions of a Roman army and remained unsubdued.

Three Caesarian campaigns later (against Germania, Britannia and Britannia) another Gallic tribe would do even better - they would wipe out a legion.

Interesting how Gauls and Germans (Ariovistus) try out Caesar frontally and then decide that face o face is not a viable  tactic and so move on to ambush. Later the Eburones will try ambush more successfully and Vercingetorix  will opt for a scorched earth policy and using cavalry to cut off Caesar's supplies. Then he will try entangling Caesar in a seige that enables the Gauls to attack from two sides and none of these tactics will work. It will be educative to see how often in the battles to come the Gauls  suffer because they make uncontrolled advances. Of course we might encounter an example of the Romans doing just that!

Roy