SoA Forums

That is entirely possible, but equally Polybius is strongly implying that the cavalry fight, at least on the restricted Roman wing, was a more brutal, head-on affair than the, for want of a better word, etiquette of the Hellenistic norms described by him in your first quotation.  Indeed, if one believes Livy, a of the fight ended up dismounted because there was no room in which to move the horses.  This perhaps suggests no or far fewer gaps in the Roman cavalry deployment, more a solid front to try to blunt the superior numbers of the Iberian and Gallic horse.

Now, that might not be the same on their left wing.  Supposedly three times the number of allied horse to start with, a more open flank without the river, and up again Numidians who are assumed to be more interested in skirmishing.  The Romans cannot foresee the Gauls and Iberians beating one wing then spinning over to the other, so a more orthodox deployment might well have been used there, to allow manoeuvre versus the Numidians.  The allied cavalry's job (indeed likewise the Numidians') is to pin their opponents, not necessarily seek a decisive outcome; leave that to the infantry.

By the way, did not like to say so before, but I am a tad mystified by the earlier assertion that the Romans had two alae on the other side of the river.  Both Polybius and Livy (who admittedly is very likely using Polybius as his source) state that whilst the two Roman camps were divided by the river, when they marched out for the battle, one camp's troops crossed the river to join the other's troops and formed a single battle line.  So, eight legions, eight alae.  Which is rather important for frontage guesstimates!

Quote from: DBS on February 06, 2025, 09:15:36 AMThat is entirely possible, but equally Polybius is strongly implying that the cavalry fight, at least on the restricted Roman wing, was a more brutal, head-on affair than the, for want of a better word, etiquette of the Hellenistic norms described by him in your first quotation.  Indeed, if one believes Livy, a of the fight ended up dismounted because there was no room in which to move the horses.  This perhaps suggests no or far fewer gaps in the Roman cavalry deployment, more a solid front to try to blunt the superior numbers of the Iberian and Gallic horse.

That was Hannibal's ace in the hole. At first sight it seems pointless deploying the bulk of his cavalry against the Roman cavalry wing with the much shorter frontage. The 6000 Gauls and Spanish if deployed 500 yards wide would be 24 ranks deep!

But Hannibal never intended to fight a cavalry battle on that wing. The Gauls and Spaniards dismounted almost immediately on engaging the Romans, obliging them to dismount in their turn or be pulled off their horses. Now the extra depth did tell. The dismounted Roman horsemen, at one yard per man, formed a line 4 ranks deep. The Gauls and Spanish deployed 12-deep. An infantry line 12 deep would have no problem driving a 4-deep line back, which is what happened.

Quote from: DBS on February 06, 2025, 09:15:36 AMNow, that might not be the same on their left wing.  Supposedly three times the number of allied horse to start with, a more open flank without the river, and up again Numidians who are assumed to be more interested in skirmishing.  The Romans cannot foresee the Gauls and Iberians beating one wing then spinning over to the other, so a more orthodox deployment might well have been used there, to allow manoeuvre versus the Numidians.  The allied cavalry's job (indeed likewise the Numidians') is to pin their opponents, not necessarily seek a decisive outcome; leave that to the infantry.

For this battle there were twice as many allied cavalry as Roman cavalry according to Livy. The Numidians pretty much matched the allied horse in numbers. As you say the Romans were there as flank guards and didn't try anything adventurous - it was the legions who were supposed to win the battle. The horsemen on both sides were deployed quite deep in 8 ranks. My guess is that the Numidians deployed in two lines since some of them got around to the rear of the Roman infantry whilst the rest were still engaged with the allied cav. But that's just a guess.

Quote from: DBS on February 06, 2025, 09:15:36 AMBy the way, did not like to say so before, but I am a tad mystified by the earlier assertion that the Romans had two alae on the other side of the river.  Both Polybius and Livy (who admittedly is very likely using Polybius as his source) state that whilst the two Roman camps were divided by the river, when they marched out for the battle, one camp's troops crossed the river to join the other's troops and formed a single battle line.  So, eight legions, eight alae. Which is rather important for frontage guesstimates!

Polybius is clear that 10 000 men were kept back at the Roman camp, ready to assault the Carthaginian camp if the occasion presented itself:

QuoteThe ten thousand Romans who were captured had not, as I said, been engaged in the actual battle; and the reason was this. Lucius Aemilius left ten thousand infantry in his camp that, in case Hannibal should disregard the safety of his own camp, and take his whole army on to the field, they might seize the opportunity, while the battle was going on, of forcing their way in and capturing the enemy's baggage; or if, on the other hand, Hannibal should, in view of this contingency, leave a guard in his camp, the number of the enemy in the field might thereby be diminished. - Histories: 3.117

10 000 men equates to 2 legions, meaning that 14 legions, or 70 000 men, took part in the actual battle. This ties in nicely with Polybius' estimate of 70 000 Roman infantry killed.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 06, 2025, 11:25:38 AMPolybius is clear that 10 000 men were kept back at the Roman camp, ready to assault the Carthaginian camp if the occasion presented itself:

Fair enough, I had forgotten when rereading Polybius that he tacks them on as an afterthought, after the breakdown of casualties.  Apologies.  That said, we of course do not know if they formed from a couple of alae, or, say, were part of the extraordinarii or the triarii.  Given the very unusual depth of most of the Roman line, ten thousand might be missing from the rear ranks without affecting frontage, or, if two whole alae, with an effect on the frontage.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 06, 2025, 11:25:38 AMThe horsemen on both sides were deployed quite deep in 8 ranks.

We do not know that.  At 12.18 Polybius states up to eight ranks with respect to a consideration of the frontages at Issus.  In fact, he seems to be saying that eight is the maximum, not necessarily the norm.  That does not mean that eight was necessarily standard for the Romans (after all, Polybius is somewhat critical of Roman cavalry anyway, at least in terms of kit, until they adopted Greek equipment without being clear when that happened, so they may not have met his high standards for tactics either) and it certainly does not follow that they were necessarily eight deep at Cannae.  By all means use it as an educated guess for the frontage, but we have to be careful to recognise where we have an explicit statement from someone like Polybius, and where we are inferring general principles that might or might not be true in the absence of such explicit statements 

Fair enough.

DBS wrote: No thank you, because the very idea that Pythagoras had anything to do with military organisation and deployment is self evidentially nonsense.

Me: And still no proof to back up your claims. More mindless rhetoric.

Plutarch (Numa 8 9) claim that Pythagoras was enrolled as a citizen of Rome. Cicero (Tusculan Disputations 4 1-2) acknowledges that Pythagorean philosophy made its way to Rome, and that the Romans had adopted many Pythagorean customs. Iamblichus (Pythagoras 34) writes that the Romans united themselves to the Pythagoras sect. Diogenes Laertius (Pythagoras 8 14-15) and Porphyry (Life of Pythagoras 22) make the same comment that "the Lucanians, the Peucetians, the Messapians and the Romans remained attached to him and came to him to listen to his discourses. According to Pliny (Natural History 34 12 26), in the third century, when fighting the Samnites, as part of a religious command, the Romans had to erect one statue to the wisest of the Greeks and one to the bravest. In response, the Romans erected a statue to Pythagoras and one to Alcibiades, a testament to the high veneration the Romans held for Pythagoras.

DBS wrote: Look at enough numbers, discarding those you do not like, from enough different sources without regard to the context in which those sources were written, and you will see ostensible patterns.

Me: I don't cherry picking and I don't care what you believe. I give your opinions no value.

DBS wrote: There is no mention whatsoever of Classes in the Punic Wars. Nor should there be; the distinction between velites and the heavy infantry is by age and wealth, and then within the heavy infantry the three types are distinguished by broad age bands.

Me: Well after four decades of reading, you seem to forget that the wealth of a soldier is determined by his property class.

Polybius (6 21 6) "these being the names among the Romans of the four classes in each legion distinct in age and equipment."

Polybius (6 24 1) "from each of the classes except the youngest, they elect 10 centurions.

Polybius (6 29 4) "because as a rule the triarii number only half the strength of the other classes."

I can throw in Dionysius and Livy is you want.

DBS wrote: What Steven is proposing is a hopeless melange of the supposed "late monarchy" army (leaving aside the question of whether Servius Tullius ever existed and whether Livy had any reliable basis for his description five and a bit centuries later) with the contemporary description by an experienced military observer, Polybius, of the mid second century BC legion.

Me: I love the way you now switch to now addressing the members of the forum. David must warn every one of the boogey man, "danger, danger Will Robison." As you have never examined my work you are in no position to make such a judgement.

How can you claim that from all the data in the ancient sources, none of them relate to a 48-century legion or a consular army made up of 48-century legions? Tell me how you can do that without seriously examining and understanding the data? How about providing proof to back up your outrageous claims? My bet is you will not and cannot. All I will get is more rhetoric. Maybe the 48-century legion is tied in with the Roman fleet organisation. Can you categorically claim it is not?

DBS wrote: Just dividing supposed strengths of forces by a number to come up with 48 is not evidence, because it completely ignores the fact that throughout military history, hardly any unit has maintained its theoretical establishment once on campaign, even assuming that it was raised to theoretical establishment in the first place.

Me: How about you break these numbers down for me. Show me how good you are? After four decades of reading, it should be child's play for you.

Eutropius (2 21 4) and Orosius (4 9 3) give the Roman army that landed in Africa at 32,000 men. Appian (The Punic War 8 3) gives the size of the Roman army that landed in Africa at 30,000 men. After the departure of the consul Lucius Manlius Vulso, Polybius (1 29 allocates the consul Marcus Regulus, with an army of 15,000 infantry, 500 cavalry and 40 ships. Warning, some rounding is involved.

Here's the challenge, you break down the army whatever size legion you come up with, you then match those numbers to the Roman fleet of Lucius Manlius Vulso and Marcus Regulus, of which Appian and Polybius provide a wealth of detail.

Did I say Polybius was a fool? Make sure you quote me properly. If you want to trigger David, say something derogative about Polybius, because Polybius is David's precise pretty.

And you believe I would be "laughed out of court in any academic environment." My work has been vetted by academic circles, and one is Emeritus Professor Ronald Ridley (Melbourne University), highly regarded and even given access to the Vatican Library. In conjunction with Melbourne University and Sydney University, none, not one faulted my research, except to correct commas or grammar. I was even given a lecture (by members of Sydney University) about how my research "is going to destroy the reputation of many academics past and present." One comment made by Professor Ridley was what I uncovered had been "hidden by its simplicity." A Napoleonic historian, who loves the Pythagorean research, stated I had "simply joined the right dots." Why would Professor Ridley (now 84 years old) waste his time with me since 2005, give me access to the professor's library, digital journals and help me with translations and such if I am this laughing stock?

And as for my research, I have two offers from two publishing houses. And also, I was recommended to one of those publishing houses by an academic (name not given to me), who was an assessor for another publishing company. After he read my work, he recommended the publishing house grab it, but in the end the publishing house declined due to nature of the research being "highly academic" for their market. This unknown academic, then approach another publishing house, and this publishing house then approach me. To this day I still do not know who this academic is.

Justin wrote: My overall impression is that this construct requires essentially a rejection what major sources like Livy and Polybius say about the size and organisation of the legion. Size - they give a variety of sizes except 4800 men.

Me: I wrote 4,800 infantry, not men. Now by adding the 60 centurions, 60 optiones, 60 artificers and 60 musicians, this produces 5,040 infantry, which gets rounded to 5,000 infantry. I purposely left the officers and musicians out of the discussion to keep it clean.

Justin wrote: - nowhere does anyone affirm there were more hastati than principes, and above all that the legion consisted of 6 lines of hastati, principes and triarii.

Me: Reading your book, you take things at face value to fast without questioning, you jump before you leap. You impose your own logic into what you read in the ancient sources, and do not stop to seriously question or understand what the ancients are trying to say. Does three lines actually mean three lines or do the ancients consider that each line has two parts. Vegetius (3 15) writes that if the army numbers are sufficient, the lines can be drawn up 10 deep or more." Could each line mean two parts each of five ranks? In order to better understand the ancient sources, such questions need to be investigated. That requires critical thinking.

Justin wrote: The earlier legion had 5 lines if you include the rorarii and accensii but that was a different beast.

Me: Yes, the Dionysius' five property classes in five lines. Maybe Dionysius has confused the property class arrangement for the voting procedure with the deployment of the army. Just asking for a friend. When fighting the Volscians in 459 BC, Livy (3 22) has the Roman army arrayed in a triple formation." You failed to mention that in your chapter "Introduction of the Double Line." However, taking your view that the infantry was arrayed in five lines, and by including the cavalry in the triple formation, this would amount to six lines, which could have been converted by Dionysius or his source to three lines (with each line actually having two lines). So, how do you know if this was not a practice used by the ancient historians?

Justin wrote: - nowhere does anyone affirm there were more hastati than principes.

Me: Well, I am really surprised that you have asked that. For one, in your book you are well aware of Livy's reference to 15 maniples and on page 237, you claim that each maniple of hastati and princeps consists of 120 men, so 15 maniples of hastati multiplied by 120 men per maniple equals 1,800 hastati, which is 600 more men than the 1,200 princeps.

Livy (8 , "the foremost line consisted of hastati, formed into 15 companies, drawn up at a short distance from each other. 15 maniples x by 120 infantry per maniple = 1,800 hastati.

Livy (42 34 5) mentions that the hastati were organised into 10 ordines and that an ordo (singular) had 180 soldiers (I omit the officers). 10 ordines multiplied by 180 equals 1,800.

I read what you have to say on ordines, I don't buy it, so no need to do a cut and paste.

Livy (33 1) "the hastati of the legion, numbering 2,000 men, were ordered to follow him. With a century of hastati having 60 men, 1,800 hastati would have 30 centurions, 30 optiones and 30 musicians, giving a total of 1,890 men. So, either the 1,800 hastati or the 1,890 men has been rounded to 2,000 hastati.

Livy's reference (33 1) "the hastati of the legion, numbering 2,000 men, were ordered to follow him," I could not find in your book. Can you provide the page number?

When it comes to the legion, I'm quite happy that the sources give enough coherent information to enable us to reconstruct the legion without us having to reject whole swathes of what they affirm.

Actually, you omit "swathes of what they affirm." Your theories are based on a selective selection of the ancient sources. For example, in your section of "The Early Roman Hoplite Phalanx" it is completely devoid of a lot of data to be found in the ancient sources. You go off on your own mathematical tangent. You fail to incorporate or examine this data in relation to your Roman army of 85 centuries, or is it 11,800 men or 12,800 men. If you had done so, your 85-century army would not hold up, but maybe you already knew that.

In 487 BC, Dionysius (8 64) writes that: "the senate voted that the youth already enrolled should be divided into three bodies." The consul Gaius Aquilius was to campaign against the Hernicans. The other consul, Titus Sicinius, with the second army marched against the Volscians, while Spurius Larcius, (city prefect), with the remaining third part, defend that portion of the country that lay nearest to the city. Those who were above the military age (the seniores) that were still capable of bearing arms were arrayed under their standards and guarded the citadels of the city and the walls, to prevent any sudden attack by the enemy while all the youth were in the field."

Again, in 462 BC, Dionysius (9 69) has the Roman army again divided into three bodies, with one army remaining behind to defend Rome, while the other two armies marched out with the consuls to face the Aequians and Volscians. In 459 BC, after the levy had been completed, both consuls marched against the Aequians and Volscians, and left a third part of the army to guard the city. (Dionysius (10 20) In 458 BC, after completing the military levy, the Romans again divided the army into three parts, with one part left to in the city, while the other two parts were allocated to the consuls. (Dionysius (10 22)

There are more references to the Roman army being divided into three parts, and also there are other distribution patterns for the Roman army. In 495 BC, Dionysius (6 26) writes that the Roman senate convened to deliberate what forces were to be taken into the field to fight a Volscian army.  This indicates that the Roman senate had other selection alternatives besides the three-part divisions, and indeed they do, but I could not find any investigation by you into how this could be accomplished. Can you direct me to the correct page?

Your Roman army of 85-centuries, numbering 8,500 men, how does this divide by the army being organised into three separate armies? Page 218, Rome can field an army of around 10,000 or 11,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry, giving a grand total of 11,800 men or 12,800 men. How to you reconcile that at the battle of Silva Arsia, according to Plutarch (Publicola 9), the Romans lost 11,299 men. Taking your largest figure of a Roman army of 12,800 men, the Romans had 1,501 men left, but according to Plutarch, the Romans managed to capture 5,000 Etruscans.

Your 85 centuries of juniors when divided into three armies would allocate each army 28 point 3 centuries. Even your army of 11,800 men or 12,800 men also do not divide equally by three. Dionysius claims the Roman army at Lake Regillus has 23,700 men and when divided by three equals 7,900 men. So, 23,700 Romans divided by 85 centuries equals 278 point 88 per century. Is that right? However, 85 centuries of juniors and 85 centuries of seniores makes 170 centuries divided by 23,700 men means each century had 139 point 4 men. Maybe you need to read my paper on this:

https://www.academia.edu/27762717/The_Roman_Tribes_and_the_Roman_Army_of_499_BC

I do believe you won't read it.

In 478 BC, the senate resolved to send three armies into the field, and that each consul had two legions of Romans. (Dionysius (9 16)

How do you allocate each army two legions? How are they organised? How many legions in your army of 11,800 men or 12,800 men?

In 508 BC, while Rome was under siege by the Etruscan king Lars Porsena, Plutarch (The Parallela Minora 2F), mentions Mucius, a Roman noble took "400 men of his own age" to infiltrate the Etruscan camp and assassinate Lars Porsena. However, both Dionysius (5 29) and Jordanes (Romana 121) mention 300 men (not 400 men) as being sent to kill Lars Porsena. So, which is right, 300 or 400 men? Was the 300 or 400 men a legitimate Roman military organisation?

At the battle of Cumae in 524 BC, Dionysius (7 4) describes a combined army of the Etruscans from Tarquinii, the Umbrians, and the Daunians, "without any order, the horse and the foot intermingled, fighting against 600 Cumean cavalry." In 449 BC, when fighting the Sabines, Livy (3 62) reports that the cavalry of two Roman legions amounted to 600 cavalry. In 495 BC, while fighting the Aurunci, Dionysius (6 33) writes that the Roman cavalry commander Aulus Postumius Albus commanded a body of 600 cavalry.

Three references to 600 cavalry. Why are Dionysius and Livy on the same page?

At the battle of Lake Regillus, Dionysius (6 10) mentions that when the Romans and Latins charged, the light infantry and the cavalry on each side, and the solid foot were all mingled. No explanation of this in your book Battle Formations. I thought that would be very important.

In 464 BC, during an engagement between the Romans and the Volscians, Dionysius (9 63) mentions that two cohorts not exceeding 1,000 men made a sortie against the Volscians. How does this interlock with your Roman army of 8,500 men, 11,800 men or 12,800 men or the 23,700 Romans at Lake Regillus?

In 462 BC, Dionysius (9 69-71) states that four cohorts numbering 600 men were stationed in front of Rome. Do you mention and explained this reference in your book?

In 446 BC, two consular armies engaged the Aequi at Mount Algidus. On the day of battle, Dionysius (11 25) has a cohort of 800 volunteers who had already completed their regular term of service. Can you provide any information about these 800 volunteers? Is it a single cohort or two cohorts?

Justin wrote: Oh yes, my book - I don't in the least mind being proven wrong (I've already abandoned a few assumptions I made in it) but you're going to have to prove me wrong by reference to the sources, not by an appeal to Pythagorean mathematics, sorry.

Me: I don't believe you mind being proven wrong, small items of little irrelevancy maybe, but not your whole opus on the Romans. As for appealing to Pythagorean mathematics, I don't need to.

Justin wrote: That figure of 4344 men piqued my interest. I found the reference in Livy: "The consul Fabius ordered his son Quintus to take to M. Valerius, the proconsul in Sicily, the remains, so far as they had been got together, of the army of Fulvius. They amounted to 4344 men." - History, 27:8.13. This is the remnants of an army, not a regular structured legion!

Me: Well, how about proving the 4,334 men is the remnants of an army. My claim is they are replacements, and there is plenty of references to be found in the ancient sources that support my claim.

That being the case, the 2000-odd Roman cavalry on the Roman right, if deployed 8-deep (the maximum practical depth for cavalry) would have occupied a frontage of about 500 yards. The 4000-odd allied cavalry on the Roman left would have occupied a frontage of about 1000 yards. That brings the total frontage of the Roman army up to 2900 yards - a little short of 3km.

Justin wrote: How can 2,100 Roman cavalry for the seven Roman legions be arrayed eight deep? 2,100 divided by 8 = 262.5 horse frontage by 8 horses deep. How can a Roman cavalry squadron of 30 horse be arrayed 8 deep?

Again, referring to your comment "When it comes to the legion, I'm quite happy that the sources give enough coherent information to enable us to reconstruct the legion without us having to reject whole swathes of what they affirm."

Your section of the Early Hoplite Legion, the Roman maniple legion, Marius legion does just that, omits hundreds of pieces of data. You make claims and fail to back it up with any serious investigation. Page 255 "The Roman Soldier" concerning the speech by Spurius Ligustinus, which details his promotions as an officer, no detailed breakdown of diagram highlighting his promotions. You also claim he was given the command of the tenth maniple of hastati, which most translation have "the tenth ordo." If you believe that an ordo is another term for a maniple, how about providing proof, and you opinion is not proof.

The title of the book is "Ancient Battle Formations" and yet I cannot find anything on the cavalry lanes in relation to the Roman battle formation. This is well documented, and examples can be found from the early republic to the battle of Turin in 312 AD, between Constantine and Maxentius, Constantine left lanes for the enemy cavalry to pass through. Panegyric 4 (Nazarius 321 AD) Panegyric 12 (Trier, 313 AD). Arrian (The Expedition against the Alani 4-6) writes that, because the Roman cavalry was arrayed behind the infantry, Arrian instructed the infantry that when the Alanni cavalry was routed, "the infantry units must clear lanes and the horsemen should advance." I thought this would be important to include when examining battle formations.

In 297 BC, the scouts of Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullinius detected a Samnite army near Tifernum, that had concealed themselves in a secluded valley, and were waiting to ambush and attack Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullinius from both sides of the rising ground when the Romans entered the valley. Livy (10 13-14) After informing his men of the Samnite ambush, the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullinius had the baggage placed in a safe position and left a small guard to protect it. In preparation for the ambush, Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullinius had the Roman army arrayed in a solid square formation. When the Roman army entered the valley in the solid square formation, the Samnites, realising they had lost the element of surprise, moved down to the lower ground and began arraying for a set piece battle. In response, the Romans changed formation from the solid square to battle formation.

As your book is about ancient battle formations, and as the back cover states "is a detailed study of the battle winning formations of the ancient world" and "examines how these formation operated and how effective they were," you have completely ignored this battle and fail to detail how a consular army changed from column of march to a solid square formation and then into battle formation. This whole movement can be done in accordance with Polybius' comment about a Roman army being able to do it in one movement.

In his account of the battle of Asculum in 279 BC, Plutarch (Pyrrhus 21 9) remarks that because the second day's battle at Asculum was fought on level ground, the Romans had no opportunity to conduct "sidelong shifts and counter-movements, as was done on the previous day."

You make no mention of this manoeuvre and how it was used in other battles, which is strange, because it appears to have been a concern for Pyrrhus.

When describing the Roman order of march, which was conducted at times of danger when the army was moving through open ground, Polybius (6 40 10-14) writes:

"For in this case the hastati, princeps, and triarii form three parallel columns, the pack trains of the leading maniples being placed in front of all, those of the second maniples behind the leading maniples, those of the third behind the second and so on, with the baggage trains always interspersed between the bodies of troops. With this march order, when the column is threatened, they face now to the left now to the right, and getting clear of the baggage confront the enemy from whatever side he appears. So that very rapidly, and by one movement the infantry is placed in order of battle (except perhaps that the hastati may have to wheel round the others)."

There is no explanation of how this is done in your book, that is changing from march to order of battle "in one movement." You just have a simple diagram of the legion on the march in parallel columns and then have the troops do a counter march to get into position instead of a wheel. Livy (3 27) also mentions that the Roman formation was equally adapted for marching and for fighting. (4) In the same manner as Livy and Polybius, Tacitus (Annals 2 16), writes that when facing the Germanic tribes at the battle of Idisiaviso in 16 AD, the Roman army was arranged so that the column of march could come to a halt in line of battle.

In 109 BC, the consul Metellus, while advancing through Numidia to seek an engagement with the Numidia army under the command of Jugurtha, the Roman army, while in march order, Metellus had light-armed cohorts and a picked body of slingers and archers forming the van, while the rear of the column was protected by the cavalry under the command of Gaius Marius. As a further counter measure against being attacked from the Numidian cavalry, Metellus stationed on the flanks, auxiliary cavalry intermixed with light infantry. While coming down the mountain and into the plain, Metellus become aware of the Numidian army positioned on a hill to Metellus' right. Now aware that he was walking into a trap, Metellus halted his army, and changed its march order formation. Sallust reports that the right flank, which was nearest the Numidian army, Metellus strengthen with three lines of reserves, and between the maniples he placed the archers and slingers, while on both wings he stationed the cavalry. Sallust (The Jugurthine War 49-50) then writes that Metellus then advanced into the plain, "in the manner he had drawn it up, with those who had been in the van now forming the flank." Later Sallust writes "then, as the circumstances and situation demanded, he advanced slowly in the same order in which he had come down from the mountain, keeping Marius behind what had been the front line, while he himself was with the cavalry on the left wing, which had now become the van."

This is a detailed and important battle formation, and you have omitted it from your book.

In 53 BC, Plutarch (Crassus 20-23) has Marcus Licinius Crassus invading Mesopotamia with seven legions, nearly 4,000 cavalry and about the same number of light troops. At the battle of Carrhae, to prevent the Parthians from surrounding his army, Marcus Crassus at first extended his infantry as far as possible across the Carrhae plain, and placed the cavalry on each wing. Plutarch reports that in this array, because the Roman army did not have much depth, Marcus Crassus changed his mind and arrayed his army in a hollow square. In this formation Marcus Crassus hoped to advance to the attack with equal protection everywhere.

How did Crassus' army change from an extended battle order to a hollow square? And what did the hollow square look like? Your book does not cover this, and yet, it is about ancient battle formations.

I have from the Ancmed day to now being accused of cherry-picking information; accusations made by people who have never examined my work. Well, to my accusers, everything I have listed here that Justin has failed to investigate, I have done so, and in great detail, and with supporting evidence from the ancient sources.

Too many authors writing on the Roman army have begun, first, with a theory, and then have omitted (a technique called bricking out), any information or data that threatens their theory. Academic journals and books are full of it, and Justin's book is no different. Justin's choice of references is extremely selective. My methodology first involved taking all the data relating to unit sizes and army sizes for a particular period (for example, the First Punic War), and then investigating how this data correlates to each other. I had no preconceived theory to begin with because I had no true idea what a legion actually was, I wanted the ancient sources to speak back to me. I wanted the ancients to tell their story.

However, there are traps along the way. All the ancient historians have made categorical mistakes. No one is exempt or more reliable than the other. The methodology of academic having favourite ancient historian based on their reliability is the most flawed and damaging approach to understanding the Roman army. For the last 400 years, it has modern historians going around in circles, the proverbial dog chasing its tail.

Some of the mistake made by the ancient historians (or their sources I might add), are horrendous. Justin allocates the early Roman army as having 85 centuries of juniors (aged 17 to 46 years) and 85 centuries of seniores (aged over 46 years). I made this mistake also, because like Justin, that is what the ancient sources tell us. However, many an academic has stated no population has an equal number of juniors to seniores, and they are correct.

After discovering the internal organisation of the Roman tribe, I also organised the tribes into an equal number of junior and seniores centuries, and after two years I still could not reconcile this arrangement with the army numbers found in the ancient sources. In a discussion with Professor Ridley, I declared that I was going to interpret that the 20,000 men (200 centuries) in the Roman army as claimed by Dionysius were all juniors and go from there. To me, it seemed the logical approach as there are 200 artificers and 200 musicians mentioned being in the Century Assembly and as the seniores are always mentioned as guarding Rome, 10,000 seniores seemed too high a figure.

It worked, and two years of frustration came to an end, I was able to reconcile the 20,000 juniors with the army data in the ancient sources, and the distribution patterns of the Roman army as found in the ancient sources. Some years later, I was able to find the reason why there was 85 centuries of juniors and 85 centuries of seniores. It had been staring back at me the whole time. At first, I simply didn't see the connection. In one of the Roman army distribution patterns, that is dividing the army into three parts, it was the third part of the army left at Rome had made some ancient historian, and I believe Fabius Pictor, to believe there was an equal number of centuries of juniors and seniores. The 20 tribes of Rome amount to 240 centuries consisting of 200 centuries of juniors and 40 centuries of seniores. This works out to each tribe having 12 centuries (10 junior and 2 senior). When divided into three divisions, each division has 80 centuries. This means the 240 centuries are divided into six legions each of 40 centuries (5 juniors and 1 seniores). The two consuls are allocated 80 centuries, thereby leaving 80 centuries at Rome, consisting of 40 centuries of juniors and 40 centuries of seniores. Dionysius' lists six legions for Veii in 480 BC, but he has confused the 40 centuries of seniores as juniors. So, the two legions left at Rome (1 junior and 1 senior), and their century structure has been converted into the Century Assembly because each Roman military century has 85 infantry (40 Class I, 10 Class II, 10 Class III, 10 Class IV and 15 Class V). What happens next is the men in a single century has then been multiplied by 200 centuries, so the 40 infantry of Class I is then divided by 200 to arrive at 8,000 Class I infantry consisting of 4,000 juniors and 4,000 seniores. The end result is 8,500 junior and 8,500 seniores, both infantry.

I have posted this information on academia some years ago

https://www.academia.edu/12646553/The_Roman_Tribes_A_New_Perspective

https://www.academia.edu/27762717/The_Roman_Tribes_and_the_Roman_Army_of_499_BC

When Justin mentions the Roman army at 23,700 infantry and 1,000 cavalry at Lake Regillus, as Dionysius mentions the Roman army totalled 20,000 infantry, the 23,700 infantry at Lake Regillus is incorrect. As the Roman army for Lake Regillus was portioned into four parts, 240 divided by 4 = 60 centuries. With three commanders mentioned at Lake Regillus, and one remaining at Rome, each of the three Roman commanders at Lake Regillus commanded 60 centuries of juniors, leaving Rome with 60 centuries (20 junior and 40 seniores). This can all be supported. The 180 centuries at Lake Regillus, at 85 infantry per century amounts to 15,300 infantry, and when the 23,700 Roman infantry is subtracted from Dionysius' figure of 40,000 Latin infantry, this leaves a residue of 16,300 men, which consists of 15,300 Roman infantry and the 1,000 Roman cavalry as listed by Dionysius. Therefore, the 23,700 Roman infantry is in fact the Latin infantry, and has been rounded from 23,760 Latin infantry.

The mistake made by the ancient sources are quite numerous but have proven to not be insurmountable.

Erpinham wrote: Steven hasn't given a frontage figure for his legions but it must be less than the figure used by Justin.   In order for a 1400 yd battle line, the cavalry must also be at a narrower frontage than Justin allows.  Or have I just misunderstood the proposed deployment?

I only provided a diagram of the standard array of a 60-century Roman legion. For Cannae, Polybius states that the depth of the maniple was greater than its frontage, so the Cannae legion has a smaller frontage.

Quote from: Monad on February 07, 2025, 11:56:32 PMHow can you claim that from all the data in the ancient sources, none of them relate to a 48-century legion or a consular army made up of 48-century legions?

OK.  Give one quotation where an ancient author says there are 48 centuries in a legion.

Quote from: DBS on February 08, 2025, 02:39:47 AMOK.  Give one quotation where an ancient author says there are 48 centuries in a legion.

Come on David. Be a good boy. Stop deflecting and answer my questions.
 

How is it deflecting?  You keep asserting that there is a lot of data that supposedly proves that some legions had 48 centuries.  I am merely asking you to give a single quotation that backs up that claim, a single instance where a reputable ancient source says that a legion in this or that period had 48 centuries.  A perfectly reasonable challenge.

Monad, can I give some genuinely friendly advice? Don't take it personally if people disagree with you. People disagree with me and somehow life goes on. None of us are going to be the New Thing in military history; we are and will continue to be relative nobodies. But one can survive that.

I'll come back to your points later.

Quote from: Monad on February 07, 2025, 11:56:32 PMI only provided a diagram of the standard array of a 60-century Roman legion. For Cannae, Polybius states that the depth of the maniple was greater than its frontage, so the Cannae legion has a smaller frontage.

Thanks for the clarification, Steven.  I would assume the simplest version of this would be 6 x 10, so a 60 man front, or would you go narrower (and deeper) still?

Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 08, 2025, 08:41:12 AMI'll come back to your points later.

You may wish to consider a separate topic on the "composition of Roman legion pre the so-called Marian reforms*" , as a great deal of the detail under discussion is not related to Cannae specifically?

* I take no position on this, I just know you Romanists have doubts   

I have asked you David to back up your claim that Pythagoras had anything to do with military organisation.

I have asked you to back up your claim that there is no mention whatsoever of Classes in the Punic War.

I have asked you to back up your claim that there is no evidence whatsoever for a 48-century legion.

I have asked you to give a break down of the army numbers for the invasion of Africa. Eutropius (2 21) and Orosius (4 9 3) gives the Roman army that landed in Africa at 32,000 men. Appian (The Punic War 8 3) gives the size of the Roman army in Africa at 30,000 men. After the departure of the consul Lucius Manlius, Polybius (1 29) allocates the consul Marcus Regulus, an army of 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry.

A perfectly reasonable challenge and yet you refuse to answer. And yet you are trying to make out I am some kind of villain for not answering your question, which is deflecting.

But so as not to be on your level, I know and you know there is no single quotation of a source saying a legion had 48 centuries. A 48-century legion is a 60-century legion with 12 centuries missing (1 vexillation). If you want to know where the information is for a 48-century legion, examine the data. From what I have found out, I am the only stupid bastard that has done it.

In 14 AD, in order to conduct raids against the Germanic tribes, the Roman commander Germanicus crossed the Rhine with four legions the 1st (Germanica), the 5th (Alaudae), the 12th (Valeria Victrix), and the 21st legion (Rapax), amounting to 12,000 legionaries, plus 26 allied cohorts and eight alas of cavalry. Tacitus (Annals 1 49) 12,000 divided by four legions = 3,000 infantry per legion. Where in the primary sources does it say how many centuries in those four legions of 3,000 infantry?

Here's another question David, where in the primary sources does it say that a legion had 60 centuries each of 70 infantry?

Answer my questions David, or do as I have asked, and stop communicating with me.

Justin wrote: Monad, can I give some genuinely friendly advice? Don't take it personally if people disagree with you.

No Justin, no need to go down that road. David has been making it personal. And where were your words of wisdom to David then. No, two peas in a pod. I'm not taking it personally; and it's not about people disagreeing with me. It is how it is done. I am getting a little frustrated (of which I apologise) because I am sick of the hypocrisy directed at me. Forums are not about discussion and learning anymore, they are about shutting people down that do not conform to some world view, or they are threatening some precise person's sensibilities on the Roman army. There are a lot more people on this forum, haven't they anything to say?

I have found, through many years of extensive study of the data, has uncovered the many, many military doctrines the Roman conduct that alter the size of the standard legion of the time. Everything I present is new, but it is all backed up to the high heavens. The 48-century legion comes into its own during the First Punic War. As I told David, it is a 60-century legion with a vexillation removed. That vexillation mans the ships that protect the harbour. For Ecnomus and the whole First Punic War, in 256 BC, when the two consular fleet arrived in Sicily, every legion left one vexillation to protect the harbour (8 vexillations in total), and their allocated ships, while the rest of the fleet sailed to Africa. That is why there a differing Roman fleet numbers for the First Punic War. For example, in 260 BC, Polybius gives the size of the Roman fleet at 120 ships, Florus 160 ships. Notice how Regillus is left with 40 ships in 256 BC, and notice the difference is 40 ships between Polybius and Florus. Polybius claims that a quinquereme can convey 120 soldiers so Florus' 160 ships x 120 infantry = 19,200 infantry divided by four legions = 4,800 infantry per legion and 40 ships per legion. Polybius' 120 ships x 120 infantry per ship = 14,400 infantry = four legions each of 3,600 infantry. Using other data from the First Punic War Polybius' figure of 120 ships has been rounded from 128 ships x 120 infantry = 15,360 infantry = four legions each of 3,840 infantry.

For Polybius to arrive at the Roman fleet in 260 BC as having 120 (infantry) quinqueremes instead of 128 infantry quinqueremes, the 32 infantry quinqueremes per legion have been rounded to 30 infantry quinqueremes and then multiplied by four legions, to produce 120 quinqueremes.

For Mylae, Diodorus numbers the Roman fleet at 120 quinqueremes, while Orosius numbers the Roman fleet at 130 quinqueremes. Diodorus' 120 Roman quinqueremes has been rounded from 128 quinqueremes, and Orosius 130 has been rounded from 128 ships.

In 253 BC, Eutropius and Orosius have the consuls Cnaeus Servilius Caepio and Caius Sempronius Blaesus sailed to Africa with 260 ships, which has been rounded from 256 quinqueremes, or two consular fleet of 128 infantry ships x 2 =256.

With the omission of the officers and supernumeraries, the eight legions that landed in Africa amounted to 31,920 men (30,720 infantry and 1,200 cavalry), consisting of:

  7680 velites
11520 hastati
  7680 princeps
  3840 triarii
30720 infantry
  300 Roman cavalry
  900 allied cavalry
31920 men

The 30,720 infantry when divided by 120 infantry per ship amount to 256 ships. Eutropius and Orosius give the Roman army that landed in Africa at 32,000 men, which has been rounded from 31,920 men. Appian gives the size of the Roman army that landed in Africa at 30,000 men, which been rounded from 30,400 infantry, which has been arrived at by rounding the 3,840 infantry in a legion to 3,800 infantry, and then multiplying this by the eight legions for a result of 30,400 infantry, which has then further been rounded to 30,000 men.

With the omission of the officers and supernumeraries, Marcus Regulus' consular army amounted to 15,960 men (15,360 infantry and 600 cavalry).

  3840 velites
  5760 hastati
  3840 princeps
  1920 triarii
15360 infantry
  150 Roman cavalry
  450 allied cavalry
15960 men

The 15,360 infantry when divided by four legions gives each legion 3,840 infantry organised into 48-centuries each of 80 infantry (20 velites, 60 hastati, or 60 princeps or 60 triarii). I've seen articles and papers giving Regillus three legions each of 5,000 infantry, which is wrong.

Notice how the 600 cavalry has been rounded to 500 cavalry. This is one of the many classic examples of the sub-totals being rounded that I have in my collection. The 150 Romans have been rounded to 100 Roman cavalry and the 450 allied cavalry to 400 allied cavalry, thereby producing 500 cavalry. I am 99% convinced that the original sources for the army numbers that the ancient historian is looking at lists everything in infantry centuries and cavalry centuries. In the end, the ancient historian has to do his own calculations so as to arrive at number of infantry and cavalry.

I have so much confidence in my research, and what I have uncovered that I do not feel threatened by anyone.

Justin wrote: None of us are going to be the New Thing in military history; we are and will continue to be relative nobodies. But one can survive that.

I have to disagree. I have come across quite a few who want to be somebodies or the new thing in military history. I am not one of those. I guess if I was, I would have this opus of mine published a lot sooner. This project is not a priority of mine, far from it.

OK, I don't want to come over heavily moderatorial but the tone of this discussion is edging it toward a lock out. Disagreeing with one another about the evidence is fine, aggressively and personally doing it isn't.  And that applies across the board - I'm not singling out individuals.

My personal viewpoint is we want the forum to be a discussion space for theories and evidence that does not exclude the non-expert. The people participating here (me excluded) are seriously knowledgeable about the sources on the Roman Army of the Cannae period, so I hope the focus can be on enlightenment.

Steven

If you post on here, expect others to respond.  Do not tell me not to communicate with you.  As Anthony says, this is getting really unpleasant.  I am not looking for a fight, but I do expect people who advance such radical theories to be prepared to defend that position, not just assert that they are the only person ever to have been clever enough to work things.  Justin gave you some friendly advice.  Let me also give you some friendly advice; your posts are far too long, poorly structured, and because of that very difficult to read.

Now, I have said my piece, and offered above my qualifications on Justin's thoughtful thesis on the frontage of Cannae.  I do not agree with all he says, but I respect him for presenting his logic rationally and clearly.