Macedonian cavalry success against close order infantry

[Patrick Waterson]

I'll be writing an article on this for Slingshot, so correct me now before I embarrass myself in print... but invariably in set piece Macedonian battles the Companion cavalry charged into a gap that was created in the enemy infantry line by the echeloned attack of the phalanx.  The cavalry either hit the enemy infantry in the flank, or penetrated the gap and exploited the enemy tactical rear echelons.  I don't recall ever hearing about a frontal attack against infantry.  The closest to that was Alexander's foolhardy charge across the Granicus against formed Persian heavy/extra heavy cavalry waiting for him atop the opposite embankment and that very nearly got him killed.

We have two cases where Macedonian cavalry seems to have charged frontally into a hoplite formation - once with complete, and once with limited, success.

1) Chaeronea: the sparse details are detailed earlier in this (rather long) thread, but in essence, by working from hints that Alexander was 'first to break through the enemy line' (of Theban hoplites, in this case specifically the Sacred Band) and noting that at the other end of the field Philip led 'ahead' of his troops one can conclude that a pointed formation (i.e. wedge) was involved.  Attempts to recast this as post-victory propagandistic waffle do not convince me, because we know that Alexander did habitually charge at the head of a cavalry wedge.

2) The Granicus: once Alexander has the Greek mercenaries cornered (they ask for clemency and he says no), we learn that he ordered a combined infantry and cavalry attack on them and had a horse killed under him by someone putting a sword through its ribs.  Putting two and two together, Alex led a wedge into an attack on the hoplite formation, and because the hoplites were surrounded and hence facing outward in every direction this attack was perforce frontal.  It also seems to have got stuck, probably because the targets were too closely packed to be knocked aside as would be possible with a normal hoplite formation, which gave someone the chance to put a short sword into the side of Alex's horse.

I have to admit I find it difficult to deploy a wargames army to great effect!
Robert Gargan

This is actually what started this discussion: the fact that trying to refight Chaeronea tends to have Alex's cavalry wing up against the right hand part of the Theban line, Sacred Band included, and under existing wargame rules the result is usually an ignominious Macedonian loss in this sector.  If however the Companions are allowed to defeat hoplites frontally, the result is much more like the impression we get from the snippets in our sources.

One interesting comment is that if the destroying hoplites with a cavalry charge is true, nobody thought fit to ever mention it. Alexander is the only person in his day who seems to have managed in, but with the true Humility of the Englishman he's to diffident to mention it and his biographers all ignore this unique achievement. 

Remember we are missing a fair number of period sources, including the History by Callisthenes (which may admittedly only have begin with Alexander's arrival in Asia in 334 BC); we may also note that Curtius' early chapters (1 and 2) are lost and that even Arrian only begins with Alexander's kingship, omitting his early life - perhaps because this still leaves him with a lot to cover - hence our source for main Chaeronea becomes Diodorus XVI.86.

"The armies deployed at dawn, and the king stationed his son Alexander, young in age but noted for his valour and swiftness of action, on one wing, placing beside him his most seasoned generals, while he himself at the head of picked men exercised the command over the other; individual units were stationed where the occasion required. [2] On the other side, dividing the line according to nationality, the Athenians assigned one wing to the Boeotians and kept command of the other themselves. Once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both. [3]

Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. [4] As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory." - from Perseus.

Note that he 'ruptures' (errexe) the enemy front, which one would expect from a wedge but not from a line.  Observe also how he forces his way through, as if the first person to do so, and that Philip also 'advanced well in front'.  Such positioning is consistent with leading a cavalry wedge.

I'll be writing an article on this for Slingshot, so correct me now before I embarrass myself in print... but invariably in set piece Macedonian battles the Companion cavalry charged into a gap that was created in the enemy infantry line by the echeloned attack of the phalanx.

Dave - in a word, no.  I am following Arrian's acounts here as they are the sharpest and clearest even if not always the most detailed.  At the Granicus Alexander sent in his right-wing cavalry, catching the Persian leadership together before they could disperse to command their contingents, and once he had reduced their number a bit the pressure of his cavalry and phalanx (which was beginning to cross) plus their leaderless state and a mistimed move down from the hill by the Persians' Greek mercenaries combined to panic and collapse the Persian centre, whereupon the more or less leaderless wings followed suit, leaving the mercenaries high and dry.  With the Persian cavalry out of the picture, Alex crushed the mercenaries with a combined cavalry and infantry attack.

At Issus, Alex and his Companions went through the Kardakes like a knife through butter and then engaged in a short but intense duel with Darius' bodyguard.  That concluded, Alex noticed his phalanx was in trouble and hit the Greek mercenaries responsible in the flank of their formation.  Whether the unengaged ones turned to face him prior to impact is an open question.

At Gaugamela, Alex teased the Persian left out of position and chased it off the field before leading his Companions against the left flank of the Persian centre.  This brought him into direct conflict with the left-hand contingent of Greek hoplites (there was one contingent on either side of Darius' bodyguard).  Whether or not they turned to face him (would you?) he and the Companions went through them easily enough to engage in the traditional fight against Darius' bodyguard while Darius again narrowly escaped.  The Alexander Mosaic seems to depict this action, and we may note a couple of downed hoplites as part of the detail.

Hence, one way or another, every major battle Alexander fought between arrival in Asia and entry into Babylon - Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela - saw Companions charging hoplites.  One of these charges - at the Granicus - had to be frontal.  The others were into the flank of a hoplite formation, though the hoplites could have turned to face (I would be surprised if they had not at least tried).

I might as well note that as of a few years ago I was firmly of the belief that cavalry could not effectively charge spear-armed infantry: a legacy of WRG rules.  Looking at the primary sources changed my mind.

[Erpingham]

One of these charges - at the Granicus - had to be frontal.  The others were into the flank of a hoplite formation, though the hoplites could have turned to face (I would be surprised if they had not at least tried).

A confident restate of your case, Patrick   However, I'm not sure I would say that being part of  combined assault on a group of surrounded hoplites is exactly the same as a frontal assault, unsupported.  While I would agree that the obvious thing would be to form an alround defence, do we know what the standard hoplite drill for this was?  A circle or a hollow square seem possibilities?  How much does this affect the support given by the files?

On charging to face when charged in the flank, it would be the obvious thing to do.  However, as the hoplite phalanx was very directional, just turning the flanking files isn't going to be the same as the fully formed front.  Instead of facing a line of well-armed and experienced file leaders, you primarily have the ordinary hoplites to contend with, for example.  And would the rank support be as effective when the ranks become files?

[Duncan Head]

I'll be writing an article on this for Slingshot

I don't envy you the task of summarising this rather lengthy discussion. You may also want to check the Chaironeia thread of which this is a sort of offshoot (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1195), for example because:

Alexander was 'first to break through the enemy line' (of Theban hoplites, in this case specifically the Sacred Band) and noting that at the other end of the field Philip led 'ahead' of his troops one can conclude that a pointed formation (i.e. wedge) was involved.

...it's in that thread that I noticed that "errexe", the verb used for the "breaking through" action which Patrick suggests implies a wedge, is actually used by other authors to describe hoplite combat, that is breakthroughs by infantry who are not in wedge.

[Mark G]

Indeed, pats basis for a wedge equally rests upon the belief that all infantry combat not involving a wedge must result in an equal line of othismos pushing but never piercing.

so you have to accept othismos, accept lines never pierce lines, accept kardakes equal hoplites, accept alexander was on horseback at all times, etc etc.

Its a big ask just to result in a singular event.

[Justin Swanton]

Collecting together the primary sources on the subject, this is what we have:

Asklepiodotos It is said that the Scythians and Thracians invented the wedge formation, and that later the Macedonians used it, since they considered it more practical than the square formation; for the front of the wedge formation is narrow, as in the rhomboid, and only one half as wide, and this made it easiest for them to break through, as well as brought the leaders in front of the rest, while wheeling was thus easier than in the square formation... Diodorus The armies deployed at dawn, and the king stationed his son Alexander, young in age but noted for his valour and swiftness of action, on one wing, placing beside him his most seasoned generals, while he himself at the head of picked men exercised the command over the other; individual units were stationed where the occasion required. On the other side, dividing the line according to nationality, the Athenians assigned one wing to the Boeotians and kept command of the other themselves. Once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both. Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory. - XVI.86.1-4 Plutarch The enemy, however, did not resist vigorously, nor for a long time, but fled in a rout, all except the Greek mercenaries. These made a stand at a certain eminence, and asked that Alexander should promise them quarter. But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword (it was not Bucephalas, but another); and most of the Macedonians who were slain or wounded fought or fell there, since they came to close quarters with men who knew how to fight and were desperate. - Life of Alexander, 16.6-7 Arrian Ordering a combined assault by infantry and cavalry Alexander quickly had them surrounded and butchered to a man. - Anabasis of Alexander, I.16.2

And that's it. What is obvious from this is that nothing in the texts conclusively and beyond doubt affirms that Alexander (and Philip) used horses when attacking formed hoplites or went in on foot. I'm not talking about what is more likely, just what is clearly stated or not clearly stated.

What emerges then is that if horses breaking through a hoplite phalanx is a reasonable possibility, the horse hypothesis has weight just as the infantry hypothesis does. One cannot discard it as unlikely or unproven. It's not as if one has to choose between on horse and on foot. Better to look at both and try to deduce which is more probable.

All this to say that I was also thinking of doing an article on the subject, but will keep it for later down the line - unless our esteemed editor thinks that two articles with differing conclusions on the subject is a good idea? If not then fine. 

[Jim Webster]

"The armies deployed at dawn, and the king stationed his son Alexander, young in age but noted for his valour and swiftness of action, on one wing, placing beside him his most seasoned generals, while he himself at the head of picked men exercised the command over the other; individual units were stationed where the occasion required. [2] On the other side, dividing the line according to nationality, the Athenians assigned one wing to the Boeotians and kept command of the other themselves. Once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both. [3]

Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. [4] As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory." - from Perseus.

Note that he 'ruptures' (errexe) the enemy front, which one would expect from a wedge but not from a line.  Observe also how he forces his way through, as if the first person to do so, and that Philip also 'advanced well in front'.  Such positioning is consistent with leading a cavalry wedge.

Save that it never once mentions cavalry, or horses, or mounted troops of any sort. After all Philip is not assumed to be charging at the head of a cavalry wedge yet we know he did fight on horseback.
Also Generals, linguistically, can lead their men to victory without every drawing and sword, even Spartan kings had bodyguards in front as well as alongside and behind them.

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

Save that it never once mentions cavalry, or horses, or mounted troops of any sort.

Then again, it does not mention infantry of any sort.  What conclusion are we to draw from this notable omission? 

A confident restate of your case, Patrick   However, I'm not sure I would say that being part of  combined assault on a group of surrounded hoplites is exactly the same as a frontal assault, unsupported. 

True, it is not exactly the same, the essential difference being that the boxed-in target formation lacked room for stricken individuals to drop, tumble or be pushed out of formation - which to me indicates why Alex got stuck and lost his horse: he just could not maintain momentum into the increasingly packed mass the way he could through a unidirectional formation which had room to collapse back onto.  This incident is the only mention we have of a horse being killed under him, even though he was wounded at Issus and almost wounded in the early stages of the Granicus.

While I would agree that the obvious thing would be to form an all-round defence, do we know what the standard hoplite drill for this was?  A circle or a hollow square seem possibilities?  How much does this affect the support given by the files?

As far as I can determine, there was no standard drill.  The Spartans may have been an exception: they trained for just about every eventuality they could think of, but being surrounded was such a rare event - I recall only three cases in the remainder of the hoplite era: Thermopylae (480 BC), the Thespians at Delium (424 BC) and the Athenians at Syracuse (413 BC).  There may be more but it was sufficiently rare not to drill for.

At the Granicus, the likely formation would be a rectangle, perhaps initially an 8 deep hollow rectangle with not much room in the middle; conceivably a solid rectangle as this would be more in keeping with a last-ditch stand-and-die deployment.  The latter is my preferred guess.

On charging to face when charged in the flank, it would be the obvious thing to do.  However, as the hoplite phalanx was very directional, just turning the flanking files isn't going to be the same as the fully formed front.  Instead of facing a line of well-armed and experienced file leaders, you primarily have the ordinary hoplites to contend with, for example.  And would the rank support be as effective when the ranks become files?

Very likely not.  It makes little difference in many wargaming rules, but in life a face-to-flank (as against redeploy-to-flank) would be an emergency measure for hoplites, with the files in an unaccustomed relationship so that any support would be of a very improvised nature.  While the fact of facing men with spears would be the same, the formation would be hard put to exert effective counterpressure.  It should nevertheless still be enough to cause javelin-armed cavalry to keep their distance.

Indeed, pats basis for a wedge equally rests upon the belief that all infantry combat not involving a wedge must result in an equal line of othismos pushing but never piercing.

I always say, beware of generalisations.  However in this case the general outline of infantry combat - and specifically hoplite vs hoplite or hoplite vs phalanx combat - involving linear relationships seems appropriate.  There were quite a few cases when hoplites broke hoplites (a hunt through Thucydides will reveal many of these; Xenophon's Hellenica has most of the others), and something of a question mark as to whether a phalanx ever broke hoplites in frontal combat, but one looks long and hard for a case of the leader of a hoplite or phalanx formation being first through the enemy line.

Also Generals, linguistically, can lead their men to victory without ever drawing a sword, even Spartan kings had bodyguards in front as well as alongside and behind them.

Macedonian generals eschewed linguistic leadership in favour of the real thing, as pointed out previously.

[Jim Webster]

Then again, it does not mention infantry of any sort.  What conclusion are we to draw from this notable omission?

I'm not the one building a theory on the basis of the omission. If the source mentioned either individual fighting with their mounted troops, that's fine. But we're extrapolating back from Alexander, king, and man of military age to Alexander, crown prince and perhaps not yet a full adult

Macedonian generals eschewed linguistic leadership in favour of the real thing, as pointed out previously.

Macedonian Kings did, or rather one King before Alexander (I don't think we know much about the battlefield performance of those before Philip and not a lot about him) and those we know after him. Whether, for example, Antipather found the need to ostentatiously mix it in the front rank we don't know.

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

... we're extrapolating back from Alexander, king, and man of military age to Alexander, crown prince and perhaps not yet a full adult

Alexander was precocious in many ways, and had conducted his first campaign two years prior to Chaeronea.  I think extrapolating back to age 18 (Chaeronea) from age 22 (Granicus) is not too great a leap.

Macedonian generals eschewed linguistic leadership in favour of the real thing, as pointed out previously.

Macedonian Kings did, or rather one King before Alexander (I don't think we know much about the battlefield performance of those before Philip and not a lot about him) and those we know after him. Whether, for example, Antipater found the need to ostentatiously mix it in the front rank we don't know.

Again, judging by what people thought of Perseus at Pydna for not leading from the front, I doubt that Antipater would have been respected by his troops had he not done so.  Obviously we have no source stating explicitly that all Macedonians who commanded led from the tip of a wedge (apart from Antigonus at Ipsus who unusually fielded himself with his phalanx), but looking at all the indicators from such Macedonian kings as we have information for does suggest a tradition of leading from the front, on horseback, and I would expect to see this at Chaeronea.

[Erpingham]

Obviously we have no source stating explicitly that all Macedonians who commanded led from the tip of a wedge (apart from Antigonus at Ipsus who unusually fielded himself with his phalanx), but looking at all the indicators from such Macedonian kings as we have information for does suggest a tradition of leading from the front, on horseback, and I would expect to see this at Chaeronea.

As our evidence of Chaeronea is incomplete, one could equally well interpret that Alexander and Philip lead from the front of the phalanx and Antigonus is following an established tradition.

Part of the difficulty we are having in this debate is that Patrick and Justin are running not with a dispute whether Alex was on a horse at Chaeronea but a full-blooded leap to Alex had introduced a new phalanx-smashing tactic which took the Sacred band so much surprised that they stood like rabbits in the headlights, allowing themselves to be speared to death. 

If we break this down, I would say that the fact that Alex fought on horseback at Chaeronea is possible from the evidence.  This means it is possible that the Companions did break the Sacred Band, especially if we allow the idea that the words xyston and sarissa could be interchangeable.  Even if not, the possiblity of a combined arms attack on the Sacred band by phalangites and Companions must be acknowledged, simply because it is one way of reconcilling conflicting acccounts.  But the idea that Alexander is leading an infantry phalanx from the front is also possible from the evidence.

That the Macedonian cavalry attacked infantry in wedge must be speculative - our evidence could point to the idea that wedge was a good anti-cavalry tactic and no more.  The methodology suggested for the wedge attack on hoplites, that a cavalry attack in wedge would reduce trained hoplites to passive fatalism and particularly that the horsemen could ride through a hostile hoplite phalanx at a trot, virtually unhindered, is a huge leap of imagination that I personally find implausible.

[Patrick Waterson]

Part of the difficulty we are having in this debate is that Patrick and Justin are running not with a dispute whether Alex was on a horse at Chaeronea but a full-blooded leap to Alex had introduced a new phalanx-smashing tactic which took the Sacred Band so much by surprise that they stood like rabbits in the headlights, allowing themselves to be speared to death. 

If Alex is on a horse and leading from the front, the former being our surmise and the latter stated by our sources (Plutarch and Diodorus), then he would need to be at the head of an effective fighting formation or he would be a target and in all probability a casualty.  Since the Sacred Band died to a man without any of our scant sources suggesting that they gave anywhere near as good as they got, I infer they faced an opponent with significantly superior technique and casualty-inficting ability.

The question is: what was this technique, and how did it work?

If we break this down, I would say that the fact that Alex fought on horseback at Chaeronea is possible from the evidence.  This means it is possible that the Companions did break the Sacred Band, especially if we allow the idea that the words xyston and sarissa could be interchangeable.  Even if not, the possiblity of a combined arms attack on the Sacred band by phalangites and Companions must be acknowledged, simply because it is one way of reconcilling conflicting acccounts.  But the idea that Alexander is leading an infantry phalanx from the front is also possible from the evidence.

In order to attempt the leading-a-phalanx hypothesis it is necessary to dismiss our sources' united assertion that Alexander was 'first' or 'foremost' as a literary dislocation.  While not a barrier to the phalanx hypothesis it is noticeable that this requirement already puts more strain on our sources than the cavalry wedge hypothesis.

That the Macedonian cavalry attacked infantry in wedge must be speculative - our evidence could point to the idea that wedge was a good anti-cavalry tactic and no more. 

Except that if (leaving out Chaeronea) we look at the number of occasions on the battlefield when Macedonian Companions attacked significant contingents of enemy infantry and cavalry, we get:

Granicus
Cavalry: yes  Infantry: yes (Greek mercenaries)

Issus
Cavalry: no*  Infantry: yes (Kardakes and Greek mercenaries)

Gaugamela
Cavalry: no*  Infantry: yes (Greek mercenaries)

*In these battles, the only cavalry the Companions fought during the course of the battle was Darius' own bodyguard - unless one counts the sharp action with the Indian and Persian cavalry contingent when Alexander was returning from his pursuit to help Parmenio.

We are left with the perhaps surprising conclusion that the majority of fighting on the battlefield by Companions seems to have been done against infantry, and most of that was against Greek hoplites.  Companions are generally mentioned in our sources as fighting in wedge, whether against infantry or cavalry (albeit not every instance is specific, should we wish to go into details); they do not appear to have had one formation for use against cavalry and another against infantry.  Polyaenus (quoted earlier) stated that Philip adopted the wedge because it was good at cutting through enemy formations (taxeis) without specifying either infantry or cavalry, and so probably meaning both.

The methodology suggested for the wedge attack on hoplites, that a cavalry attack in wedge would reduce trained hoplites to passive fatalism and particularly that the horsemen could ride through a hostile hoplite phalanx at a trot, virtually unhindered, is a huge leap of imagination that I personally find implausible.

Not so much imagination as deduction.  If Alex was on horseback leading a formation at Chaeronea, that formation has to be cavalry.  If he was at the head of it then the formation has to be a cavalry wedge.  That much is deduction.  How the cavalry wedge would run down and/or run through a hoplite formation is imaginative/speculative, but does seem to accord with the slender evidence we possess about Chaeronea and the fight against the mercenaries at the Granicus.

To round out the picture, I would point out that Alexander usually (always in the cases our sources - notably Arrian - describe) supports the Companions with archers and Agrianians.  This suggests that missiles were used to prepare the target - a combined arms attack - before the Companions went in; Issus may have been an exception because the target (the Kardakes) seems to have had more missile capability than Alexander's supporting missilemen, so he just charged straight away - and it worked.

Since the alternative idea of Philip and Alexander leading infantry formations at Chaeronea has again been advanced, I again invite anyone to explain how this might work and how it might tie in with our source statements: as an alternative hypothesis it deserves close examination.

[Jim Webster]

In order to attempt the leading-a-phalanx hypothesis it is necessary to dismiss our sources' united assertion that Alexander was 'first' or 'foremost' as a literary dislocation.  While not a barrier to the phalanx hypothesis it is noticeable that this requirement already puts more strain on our sources than the cavalry wedge hypothesis.

But at least we have support for the phalanx in the wounds the Thebans suffered. We also know that 'leading' a force, and being foremost doesn't necessarily mean standing at the front, especially when you're reading a historian who wrote three hundred years later and was seeing Alexander through the lens of 300 years of legend.
It is notable that Alexander is less prominent in the eyes of Demosthenes who was a contemporary and hadn't lapped up several centuries of Alexander worship

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

But at least we have support for the phalanx in the wounds the Thebans suffered.

I am not sure that they do: Plutarch's mention of 'sarissa' wounds need not mean they were inflicted by Macedonian infantry: I have looked at usage earlier in this thread and the term is far from conclusive.

We also know that 'leading' a force, and being foremost doesn't necessarily mean standing at the front, especially when you're reading a historian who wrote three hundred years later and was seeing Alexander through the lens of 300 years of legend.

Diodorus does not describe Alexander as 'leading' but as 'first'; Plutarch likewise.  In any event, as previously mentioned, leadership for Macedonians was not an abstract concept but a concrete station at the tip of a wedge, and historians who write 300 years after the event use sources younger then themselves.  We have been through these hoops a few times already.

It is notable that Alexander is less prominent in the eyes of Demosthenes who was a contemporary and hadn't lapped up several centuries of Alexander worship

This being the Athenian orator Demosthenes, lifelong hater and bitter enemy of Philip, Alexander and all things Macedonian? 

[Duncan Head]

I am not sure that they do: Plutarch's mention of 'sarissa' wounds need not mean they were inflicted by Macedonian infantry: I have looked at usage earlier in this thread and the term is far from conclusive.

I suspect you may be the only one who thinks so.

[Jim Webster]

1)  The use of the term Sarissa is perhaps inconclusive, perhaps not, but at least we're arguing on the basis of a positive statement, we're not postulating the use of something in that melee that wasn't mentioned at all, like cavalry

2) We might have been through the hoops, but they still fail to convince, A youth who was not of military age is postulated to have been at the head of a postulated wedge formed from postulated cavalry.

3) Demosthenes does have the advantage of having been at the battle. He also studied the Macedonians and any bias he had was known, he wasn't from a generation which vaguely genuflected to Alexander as a god.