Macedonian cavalry success against close order infantry

[Justin Swanton]

The bottom line seems to be, can one prove that a cavalry wedge armed with long lances is physically incapable of penetrating a hoplite phalanx armed with much shorter spears? I suspect that opposition to the idea comes from its strangeness rather than any inherent absurdity. A priori the thing could work. So far I haven't been given any compelling reason why it couldn't.

[Jim Webster]

The bottom line seems to be, can one prove that a cavalry wedge armed with long lances is physically incapable of penetrating a hoplite phalanx armed with much shorter spears? I suspect that opposition to the idea comes from its strangeness rather than any inherent absurdity. A priori the thing could work. So far I haven't been given any compelling reason why it couldn't.

It might well work in theory, but I see no evidence that it ever happened in practice. We have a period with this sort of cavalry facing infantry with shorter weapons which lasted from some point in Philips reign to Pyrrhus in Italy.

We then had even more heavily armoured cavalry using even longer lances at infantry who had even shorter spears, and they waiting until the infantry formation had been disrupted by missile fire from horsearchers or whatever.

I have no reasons why it shouldn't work, I'd just comment that it appears that in reality either it didn't work or nobody wanted to be the poor sap on the point of the wedge and try it

Jim

[RobertGargan]

Arrian in his Anabasis of Alexander describes, infers, the great commander is wary of charging the dense, compact formation of Mallian spearmen, and without his own infantry present decides to ride round them.  The text is interesting because it states Alexander specifically avoided close fighting with his lance armed cavalry.
It may be that the hoplites broken at the Granikos were experiencing low morale with the flight of their allies, unlike the Malli spearman, who rushed to take on Alexander who only had cavalry and light forces in the initial confrontation.
The hoplite dory spear was up to 9 feet in length - any longer and it would probably be difficult to use.  The Macedonian xyston lance would have been difficult to use at 12 feet, given the centre of gravity would restrict forward projection.  It would have been ideal for use against enemy cavalry, and routed forces, as I suspect the Persians were quick to discover.
Not sure what happened at Chaironeia, it is a pity we do not have more detailed information.
Robert Gargan

[Patrick Waterson]

1)  The use of the term Sarissa is perhaps inconclusive, perhaps not, but at least we're arguing on the basis of a positive statement, we're not postulating the use of something in that melee that wasn't mentioned at all, like cavalry

Or infantry. 

We might remember that Arrian (I.16) specifically mentions a particular cavalry troop type: sarissophorous hippeas, sarissa-bearing/using cavalry.  These seem later to be referred to as prodromoi, 'before-runners' or scouts*, but the very existence of the designation sarissophorous hippeas is sufficient to refute any contention that the 'sarissa wounds' taken by the Sacred Band in Plutarch's Life of Pelopidas 'must have' come from phalangites.

*Aretes is mentioned as the commander of the sarissophoroi at the Granicus and the prodromoi at Gaugamela.

2) We might have been through the hoops, but they still fail to convince, A youth who was not of military age is postulated to have been at the head of a postulated wedge formed from postulated cavalry.

Yet this 'youth not of military age' (what was 'military age'? - remember that in the first winter of his campaign he released all the men who had recently married so they could go home and enjoy themselves until spring) fought his first campaign two years prior to Chaeronea.

3) Demosthenes does have the advantage of having been at the battle. He also studied the Macedonians and any bias he had was known, he wasn't from a generation which vaguely genuflected to Alexander as a god.

And the disadvantage that he combined the objectivity of a fanatic with the judgement of a politician.

Arrian in his Anabasis of Alexander describes, infers, the great commander is wary of charging the dense, compact formation of Mallian spearmen, and without his own infantry present decides to ride round them.  The text is interesting because it states Alexander specifically avoided close fighting with his lance armed cavalry.

This is presumably Arrian VI.6.3-4, where I suspect rereading the account would clarify matters. 

In VI.6.3 he surprises one town, having arrived by a difficult route, causes havoc and shuts the survivors up within their walls.

"He took them completely by surprise, and most of them, unarmed as they were, offered no resistance and were killed.  Some shut themselves up in the town, whereupon Alexander, whose infantry had not yet arrived upon the scene, blocked them up in there by throwing a cordon of mounted troops round the walls."

He cordons the town with cavalry because his infantry has not yet arrived.  In essence, he is not assaulting the town with just cavalry; he awaits his infantry for the purpose.

In VI.6.4, as soon as he is joined by his infantry, he sends Perdiccas with two cavalry hippachies on to another town:

"... at which large numbers of the Indians had concentrated, and ordered him not to attack until he himself should arrive, but to keep his eyes open to prevent anyone from slipping out of the town and informing the other natives that he was already on the way."

The mission was essentially to keep the target isolated.  Meanwhile, Alexander took the town he had surrounded, and Perdiccas

"... reached his objective.  He found the town deserted, and learning that it was not long since the inhabitants had fled, he rode with all speed in pursuit of them, his light infantry following at the best speed they could make.  Some of the fugitives managed to escape into the marches; the rest were overtaken and killed."

There was no question of Macedonian cavalry being shy of attacking formed infantry: Perdiccas had been sent on a watch-and-interdict mission which he adjusted to a pursuit-and-slay mission as soon as he realised that the Indians had run rather than face his cavalry.

It may be that the hoplites broken at the Granikos were experiencing low morale with the flight of their allies, unlike the Malli spearman, who rushed to take on Alexander who only had cavalry and light forces in the initial confrontation.

As we have seen, these particular Mallian spearmen were only to keen to rush in the opposite direction - they never even saw Alexander.

The hoplite dory spear was up to 9 feet in length - any longer and it would probably be difficult to use.  The Macedonian xyston lance would have been difficult to use at 12 feet, given the centre of gravity would restrict forward projection.  It would have been ideal for use against enemy cavalry, and routed forces, as I suspect the Persians were quick to discover.

The centre of gravity was probably well back, judging by the grip a quarter of the way along the length shown in the Alexander Mosaic.  Hellenistic designers had a habit of counterweighting things, and I suspect the xyston was one of these.

Not sure what happened at Chaironeia, it is a pity we do not have more detailed information.

Agreed - it would make this discussion unnecessary, for a start.  Sadly all we have are clues which we can attempt to patch together.

[Jim Webster]

1)  Arrian wrote 500 years later so might have been inexact in his terms, but still, it appears that the only cavalry he thought had sarissa were scouts and did not charge frontally into Hoplites.
But still I think I'll be guided by Duncan's comments in this

2) The ephebes were aged about 17 or 18, and were not full men

3) So from now on we must disregard all history written by an ancient writer who took part in politics. Well there's goodbye to Xenophon (who somehow neglected to mention things because he was somewhat pro-Agesilaus), Polybius (who's opinions of the Aetolians were hardly without bias) and of course Caesar.
Of course Demosthenes was a politician, so was Thucydides. Of course he was biased. Most historians are, even if their bias consists of the charming belief that they rise above their own inate bias 

Jim

[Erpingham]

The bottom line seems to be, can one prove that a cavalry wedge armed with long lances is physically incapable of penetrating a hoplite phalanx armed with much shorter spears? I suspect that opposition to the idea comes from its strangeness rather than any inherent absurdity. A priori the thing could work. So far I haven't been given any compelling reason why it couldn't.

I'm not sure it is for the those who are unconvinced by a radical new theory to disprove it.  It is for the proponent to make a convincing case.  My opposition to the wedge idea comes from its inherent improbability.  Would we expect a formed phalanx, either elite or professional, to be helpless in the face of cavalry?  Inexperienced maybe, helpless no.  Could horsemen, no matter how skilled, perform the feat of riding through the enemy formation at a trot picking off individual hoplites?  Why are the two disputed examples given the only ones in history - one would expect such a miraculous anti-infantry tactic to at least be tried again?  Why does the model of infantry combat against formed infantry (easy- breezy charge through) seem so at odds with our knowledge of other periods?  Sorry, Justin, but there are many compelling reasons to doubt this theory.

[Justin Swanton]

And yet Leuctra shows what happens to "a formed phalanx, either elite or professional" when it is up against a tactic designed to overcome it and which it has never encountered before. Military history is full of this. Why should it be improbable for cavalry to take advantage of a phalanx's natural weakness - its file gaps - if the phalanx has no counter tactic?

A counter tactic would have been easy enough to devise: close up ranks, use lances/pikes, ground spears, etc. Even kneeling with large elongated shields set on the ground - as practised by late Roman infantry - provides an adequate block against horses. The point is that the hoplites did none of this because they were not used to being charged by cavalry. This was the first time horsemen had been used in such a shock role, and for ever afterwards it would be known that they were capable of it. Countermeasures would be devised that would render the tactic obsolete. The surprise is gone.

Penetrating a hoplite phalanx as described earlier would require a high degree of precision which supposes a level of training not present in many cavalry armies. You can't imagine barbarian horsemen or Mediaeval knights pulling it off.

So no-one was trained for it, armed for it, or had thought of it before, and it would be relatively straightforward for infantry to counter it afterwards. How many times was the Theban column used?

[Erpingham]

A counter tactic would have been easy enough to devise: close up ranks, use lances/pikes, ground spears, etc. Even kneeling with large elongated shields set on the ground - as practised by late Roman infantry - provides an adequate block against horses. The point is that the hoplites did none of this because they were not used to being charged by cavalry.

As you say, counter tactics are easy to suggest.  What evidence have we that they were not used?  We have no certain evidence that Companion cavalry could defeat hoplites frontally, let alone the tactics that were used if it did happen.  Granted, the ground spears tactics do seem to be absent from the hoplite playbook, but closing up was standard.  As to Companions being the best trained cavalry in our period, I leave that to those with a mastery of the sources. 

[Prufrock]

I've annoyed myself by not being able to find the reference quickly, but at one point Caesar writes something to the effect that formed and determined infantry are perfectly safe against cavalry.  Obviously later in time, with legionaries rather than hoplites or phalangites, and the cavalry would certainly not be using sarissa, but perhaps of some bearing.

[RobertGargan]

Patrick
I should have identified the passage. It is V1.8.6-7:

...But when the Indians saw he had cavalry only, they turned about and made a vigorous resistance, in number about fifty thousand.  Alexander, seeing their infantry formation solid, and with his own infantry not yet on the field, kept circling round and making charges, but without coming to close quarters with the Indians...

The arrival of the Macedonian heavy infantry was enough to bring about the flight of the Mallians.  My point is that the Macedonian cavalry alone were not the battle winners but it was Alexander's uncanny ability to organise the combined arms of foot and horse in mutual support on the battlefield.

Robert Gargan

[Duncan Head]

We might remember that Arrian (I.16) specifically mentions a particular cavalry troop type: sarissophorous hippeas, sarissa-bearing/using cavalry.  These seem later to be referred to as prodromoi, 'before-runners' or scouts*, but the very existence of the designation sarissophorous hippeas is sufficient to refute any contention that the 'sarissa wounds' taken by the Sacred Band in Plutarch's Life of Pelopidas 'must have' come from phalangites.

The very existence of the term sarissophoroi  to identify one unit of cavalry actually implies that other Macedonian cavalry - notably, the Companions - did not carry the sarissa. There'd be no point in distinguishing them as "sarissophoroi" if everyone else had the sarissa, it would be like calling them "The Helmet-Wearers".

So unless we think that Alexander led not the Companions but the prodromoi at Chaironeia, the term "sarissophoroi hippeis" is actually quite a telling argument against his leading a wedge of sarissa-armed cavalry.

[Prufrock]

Gaebel has quite a good discussion of Chaeronea and, more generally, Alexander's use of cavalry.  The book is here: http://www.kavehfarrokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Gaebel_202_Cavalry_Operations_in_the_Ancient_Greek_World.pdf

For Chaeronea see pages 154-156; for Alexander see the chapter beginning p.159.

[Justin Swanton]

Interesting, Aaron. Looking at the passage on Chaeronea:

A more fundamental question about Chaeronea is whether Alexander was commanding cavalry or infantry. In spite of the absence of clear evidence from the ancient sources, the majority of modern historians is convinced that Alexander was leading cavalry during the battle, apparently basing their judgment on his later use of the mounted arm in Asia. A satisfactory argument against cavalry, however, is provided by P. A. Rahe, who points out that "the inability of ordinary Greek cavalry to charge through the phalanx had nothing to do with any deficiency in equipment and tactics. The problem lay with the horse. A horseman can charge into a mob, but only if those in his path give way before him. If those in the crowd link arms and stand their ground, the horse will shy,"

Not really conclusive. Horses throughout history have been trained to charge groups of men who did not voluntarily give way but were shoved aside or bowled over (and I can't recall any instances of infantry linking arms as a cavalry counterploy  )

and goes on to day that "the effect of shock cavalry is psychological and not physical."

Cataphracts and knights notwithstanding?

Buckler, apparently independently, reached the same conclusion, emphasizing the fact that no ancient source mentions cavalry at the battle.

This point has been covered already in the thread.

Perhaps most telling is Plutarch's statement that the Sacred Band faced Macedonian sarissas, a weapon that the ancient sources never associate with the Macedonian regular cavalry.

The existence of sarissophoroi proves at least that some Macedonian horsemen were equipped with such weapons. Patrick has argued that the Companions in their early phase were likewise equipped, switching to a somewhat shorter and more easily manageable lance later on whilst this body of cavalry retained the original weapon.

These arguments should be sufficient to cast serious doubt on the claim that cavalry broke into the Sacred Band at Chaeronea. Indeed, precisely because this elite Theban unit of heavy infantry fought and died where it was posted in the battle line, it is more likely to have faced infantry rather than cavalry. The sarissa-bearing Macedonian phalanx would have presented a dense array of spearpoints that was essentially impenetrable, and when individuals fell wounded, others moved up from behind. The much looser formation of cavalry would have made it easier for the steadfast Thebans to parry lance thrusts as well as to injure horses but more difficult for that cavalry to inflict intense slaughter in a confined space.

Unless they were penetrated by a wedge as described earlier.

When cavalry kill large numbers of infantry, it is usually done against men in flight. In 326, even against Mallian infantry in India, Alexander was unwilling to bring his cavalry to close quarters until his own foot had arrived, at the sight of which the Mallians turned and fled.

To reproduce Robert's post:

I should have identified the passage. It is V1.8.6-7:

...But when the Indians saw he had cavalry only, they turned about and made a vigorous resistance, in number about fifty thousand.  Alexander, seeing their infantry formation solid, and with his own infantry not yet on the field, kept circling round and making charges, but without coming to close quarters with the Indians...

The arrival of the Macedonian heavy infantry was enough to bring about the flight of the Mallians.  My point is that the Macedonian cavalry alone were not the battle winners but it was Alexander's uncanny ability to organise the combined arms of foot and horse in mutual support on the battlefield.

One needs to note that Alexander faced fifty thousand Indians. With all the will in the world he could not hope to defeat such a force with cavalry alone, no matter how effective the wedge was (bearing in mind a wedge charge was good for one pass, perhaps two at the most). He needed to pin them in place, keep them on the defensive with cavalry activity, until his infantry arrived enabling him to finish them off.

[Jim Webster]

Actually it is an interesting exercise to come up with clear examples (Say prior to 1550) of

1) Decent quality infantry who were not weakened  or disordered by being caught moving or out of formation
2) Who had not first been weakened by missile fire
3) who were then ridden down and destroyed where they stood by mounted troops

Even the Swiss who were ridden through by Knights survived any number of charges which passed through them and finally withdrew.
They weren't bowled over or massacred where they stood.

Be interesting to see who comes up with how many

Jim

[Mark G]

Aren't hoplites supposed to lock shields? So where exactly are these gaps which horses are looking at?