Macedonian cavalry success against close order infantry

[Mark G]

Well i am saying that when the king commands, everyone obeys.

And that king had good reason to want his left wing to be on foot.

[Jim Webster]

Well i am saying that when the king commands, everyone obeys.

And that king had good reason to want his left wing to be on foot.

Yep, it makes far more sense to take on heavy infantry with other heavy infantry rather than try the novel and never before attempted technique of riding them down with heavy cavalry :-)

Jim

[Justin Swanton]

Just had to! 

[Jim Webster]

It sums up entirely what we've got.

There is no evidence for Alexander leading cavalry in this battle.
But we have a hypothesis which suggests that contrary to all previously held beliefs that Alexander led cavalry to defeat elite heavy infantry with a frontal charge.
Using a technique that had never been used before and was immediately forgotten after his reign

But there's no evidence he led cavalry in the battle in the first place. Except of course that the fact that subsequently he led  cavalry proves that he did at this time and that on the strength of this, an infantry weapon with which light cavalry were briefly issued with had to become the weapon for heavy cavalry as well (even through there is no contemporary evidence for it)

Jim

[Erpingham]

Could I suggest the parties, rather than produce further tit-for-tat, draw back and look at the framing of the question(s) we are trying to answer?

We seem to have become confused about whether we are trying to interpret the Battle of Chaeronea or whether we are looking at Macedonian cavalry tactics against infantry in the time of Alexander.

If we take the wider question, we can look at some battles where Macedonian cavalry did fight infantry.  We can look at their level of success and the factors behind that in our sources.  We can postulate certain tactics were used.  We can then say that we think those tactics were first tested at Chaeronea.  If we start from Chaeronea, we just have insufficient clear information, capable of plausible interpretation in totally opposite ways, so we will get nowhere (roundabouts indeed).

[Justin Swanton]

Entirely agree. Comparing every engagement involving Macedonian cavalry will help weigh up which is the most likely scenario for Chaeronea. Of course our big difficulty is that we have data, a theory to explain the data, but no way of verifying or refuting the theory by experimentation, unless someone can come up with a really sophisticated computer simulation or a lot of re-enactors who have decided they are tired of life.

[Mark G]

Not really,

comparing every engagement involving Macedonian cavalry is pretty much identical to comparing ever battle involving king alexander on horseback and then declaring the same must apply to prince alexander at charonea.

More fruitful.

Describe all reported battles involving king Philip.
Examine those for evidence of cavalry usage.
Then see how that fits to charonea.

And then write a good paper on how Alex took an infantry focussed army designed to beat hoplites frontally, and turned it into a proper combined arms force which conquered Asia.

[Patrick Waterson]

We seem to have become confused about whether we are trying to interpret the Battle of Chaeronea or whether we are looking at Macedonian cavalry tactics against infantry in the time of Alexander.

If we take the wider question, we can look at some battles where Macedonian cavalry did fight infantry.  We can look at their level of success and the factors behind that in our sources.  We can postulate certain tactics were used.  We can then say that we think those tactics were first tested at Chaeronea.  If we start from Chaeronea, we just have insufficient clear information, capable of plausible interpretation in totally opposite ways, so we will get nowhere (roundabouts indeed).

Indeed.  We have already examined the Granicus, Issus, Gaugamela and a couple of actions in India, together with Alexander's campaign against the Taulantians.  These actions provided good reason to conclude that Macedonian cavalry could take on hoplite infantry with success - indeed they did so in every major battle against the Persians, with complete success at Issus and Gaugamela and partial success at the Granicus (they appear to have got stuck, the most likely reason being the compression of the target from all-round attacks).  We have noted that, presumably learning from the lesson of the Granicus, Alexander was perfectly happy to use his cavalry to attack heavy infantry in India unless it had closed up into a dense formation.

Chaeronea was fought in 338 BC;  Philip died in 336 BC.  Prior to the Granicus, Alexander's campaign against the Taulantians and others in 335 BC displays similar tactics - forming wedge and charging to contact against opposing infantry - as were used in his campaigns against the Persian Empire.   The Granicus was fought in 334 BC.   None of our sources mention Philip altering the cavalry between 338 and 336 BC or Alexander altering it between 336 and 335 BC (or for that matter 334 BC) so it seems logical to conclude that any changes in equipment and tactical combat techniques between 338 and 334 BC would have been relatively minor.

Since the techniques from our known period involve leading cavalry wedges from the front, it makes sense to conclude that this method would have been employed at Chaeronea a few years earlier under the same military system.  Comparing this assumption against our scarce source details for the battle shows remarkable consistency, much more than one sees for any offered alternative.

Describe all reported battles involving king Philip.
Examine those for evidence of cavalry usage.
Then see how that fits to charonea.

Please go ahead, Mark.  I shall be interested to see how far you get and what you can find out about Macedonian cavalry usage pre-Chaeronea.

[RobertGargan]

At Chaeronea the Greek allies only had generals such as Stratocles and Chares, a less than well disciplined Athenian hoplite force, up against generals of the order of Philip and Alexander, and the unified, balanced field army of Macedonia.  The result was not unexpected.
In the Lamian War, under better leadership, the Greek allies were joined by the formidable Thessalian cavalry and  were much more successful against Macedonian cavalry and phalangites.  The hoplite enjoyed good flank support, leadership and high morale - part of a well organised and more effective combined arms field army and more than able to hold its own.
I suspect the fractured nature of Philip and Alexander's Greek enemies was a significant feature in the Greek defeat at Chaeronea rather than a frontal attack by Macedonian lancers - although - I accept, no one but Alexander knew how to lead soldiers.
Robert Gargan

[Patrick Waterson]

I suspect the fractured nature of Philip and Alexander's Greek enemies was a significant feature in the Greek defeat at Chaeronea rather than a frontal attack by Macedonian lancers - although - I accept, no one but Alexander knew how to lead soldiers.
Robert Gargan

A good observation, though it does not have to be either/or; it can be both/and.  Fractured Greek leadership and frontal attacks by Macedonian cavalry do not have to be mutually exclusive.

While we have this thread open, it may be worth looking further into Macedonian cavalry technique.  Alexander (who provides our material because his battles were written about in some detail) always seems to provide missile support for a Macedonian cavalry attack. 

At the Granicus,

"Command of the right had already been given to Philotas, Parmenio's son, with the Companion cavalry, the archers, and the Agriane javelinmen ..." - Arrian I.14.1

At Issus,

"At the same time ... he threw forward his Prodromoi under Protomachus together with the Paeonians under Ariston and the archers under Antiochus." - Arrian II.9.2

At Gaugamela,

"One half of the Agrianes, commanded by Attalus and in touch with the Royal Squadron (ile basilike) on the right wing were, together with the Macedonian archers under Brison, were thown forward ... the position in advance of the Royal Squadron and other units of the Companions was occupied by the other half of the Agriane contingent and archers, supported by Balacrus' javelinmen (akontistai) ..." - Arrian III.12.2-3

This consistent grouping of missilemen with cavalry suggests that preparatory and covering shooting were a standard recourse of Macedonian cavalry technique, even if not always called upon (at Issus Alexander seems to have dispensed with any shooting and just charged as fast as possible, a variation of technique that becomes understandable if he was facing archers).  In considering the effects and effectiveness of Macedonian cavalry we should perhaps consider the part played by their supporting shooters.

[Justin Swanton]

Interesting. I can only think that missile fire would stop infantry from moving, obliging them to put their shields up. This would make the cavalry charge more of a surprise for them, whilst their immobility helped the cavalry pinpoint their targets, the infantry file spaces.