Composition of Carthaginian Army during the Mercenary War.

[David Kush]

Anyone have opinions on what troops would not be allowed in either the loyal army or the revolting mercenary army?

[Patrick Waterson]

Polybius I.67.7 notes that just before the mutiny:

"There were in the army Iberians and Celts, men from Liguria and the Balearic Islands, and a considerable number of half-bred Greeks, mostly deserters and slaves; while the main body consisted of Libyans."

Hence we have:

Iberians, presumably armed as Spanish, perhaps both caetrati (light troops) and scutati (rough terrain capable heavier infantry).
Celts, presumably armed as Gauls (in Polybius I.77 there are 2,000 Gauls).
Ligurians, presumably with Ligurian equipment (seemingly akin to Gaulish).
Balearic Islanders, almost certainly slingers.
Greek 'halfbreeds' (mixellenes), perhaps both skirmishers and heavier infantry (hoplites? peltasts?)
Libyans, maybe Liby-Phoenicians, predominantly heavy infantry, probably hoplite-style.

Overall numbers were 20,000.

Some of the above seem to have been cavalry, judging by the claim for 'lost horses' in Polybius I.68.8, but the mutineers do not seem to have fielded much in the way of useful cavalry, or perhaps they did but it was overawed by the Carthaginian elephants.

These troops were very experienced, having mostly served for seven years under Hamilcar in Sicily, and:

"... their engagements with the Roman legions in Sicily had convinced them, that not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to face them in the field, but that it would be difficult to find any nation in the world who could."

Troop quality should be above average to reflect this.

Conspicuous by their absence are Numidians, although some joined later on (Polybius I.77).  Soon afterwards, 2,000 of these under Naravas defected to Carthage, joining Hamilcar Barca's army.

There was one Campanian in the army, "a runaway Roman slave named Spendius".  He may have had a few compatriots, but there seem to have been too few fugitives from Rome to have formed a separate contingent.

On the Carthaginian side, there was initially no army whatsoever.  Once the Carthaginians had dug deep into their pockets to scrape one together they appointed Hanno as general and things got moving:

"They also set about collecting mercenaries; arming their own citizens who were of military age; training and drilling the city cavalry; and refitting what were left of their ships, triremes, penteconters, and the largest of the pinnaces [akation = light boats]."

This gave them:
Mercenaries (composition unspecified)
Carthaginian citizens (probably mainly hoplite types)
City cavalry (heavy cavalry)

To this, one can add numerous elephants and (later, under Hamilcar) 2,000 Numidians.  Exclusive of Numidians, Hamilcar fielded 10,000 troops and 70 elephants.

The rebel leaders, Mathos and Spendius, quickly gained both the upper hand and numerous local reinforcements:

"Meanwhile Mathōs, being joined by as many as seventy thousand Libyans, distributed these fresh troops between the two forces which were besieging Utica and Hippo Zarytus, and carried on those sieges without let or hindrance. At the same time they kept firm possession of the encampment at Tunes, and had thus shut out the Carthaginians from the whole of outer Libya."

Hanno attempted to relieve Utica, spearheading his army with his elephants:

The number of his elephants, of which he had as many as a hundred, struck terror into the enemy; yet he made so poor a use of this advantage that, instead of turning it into a complete victory, he very nearly brought the besieged, as well as himself, to utter destruction. He brought from Carthage catapults and darts, and in fact all the apparatus for a siege; and having encamped outside Utica undertook an assault upon the enemy's entrenchment. The elephants forced their way into the camp, and the enemy, unable to withstand their weight and the fury of their attack, entirely evacuated the position. They lost a large number from wounds inflicted by the elephants' tusks; while the survivors made their way to a certain hill, which was a kind of natural fortification thickly covered with trees, and there halted, relying upon the strength of the position. But Hanno, accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who, once turned, never stay their flight till they are two days removed from the scene of the action, imagined that he had already put an end to the war and had gained a complete victory. He therefore troubled himself no more about his men, or about the camp generally, but went inside the town and occupied himself with his own personal comfort. But the mercenaries, who had fled in a body on to the hill, had been trained in the daring tactics of Barcas, and accustomed from their experience in the Sicilian warfare to retreat and return again to the attack many times in the same day. They now saw that the general had left his army and gone into the town, and that the soldiers, owing to their victory, were behaving carelessly, and in fact slipping out of the camp in various directions: they accordingly got themselves into order and made an assault upon the camp; killed a large number of the men; forced the rest to fly ignominiously to the protection of the city walls and gates; and possessed themselves of all the baggage and apparatus belonging to the besieged, which Hanno had brought outside the town in addition to his own, and thus put into the hands of the enemy.

Hanno was replaced with Hamilcar Barca, who had the following forces (Polybius I.75):

"... seventy elephants, the newly-collected mercenaries, and the deserters from the enemy; and along with them the cavalry and infantry enrolled from the citizens themselves, amounting in all to ten thousand men."

The battle in Polybius I.76 is also useful for detailing something of the forces of both sides:

When he understood what had taken place Spendius advanced into the plain to meet Hamilcar. The force from the city at the bridge amounted to ten thousand men; that from before Utica to more than fifteen thousand men; both of which now advanced to support each other.
When they had effected a junction they imagined that they had the Carthaginians in a trap, and therefore with mutual words of exhortation passed the order to engage, and at once commenced. Hamilcar was marching with his elephants in front, his cavalry and light troops next, while his heavy armed hoplites brought up the rear. But when he saw the precipitation of the enemy's attack, he passed the word to his men to turn to the rear. His instructions were that the troops in front should, after thus turning to the rear, retire with all speed: while he again wheeled to the right about what had been originally his rear divisions, and got them into line successively so as to face the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries mistook the object of this movement, and imagined that the Carthaginians were panic-stricken and in full retreat. Thereupon they broke from their ranks and, rushing forward, began a vigorous hand to hand struggle. When, however, they found that the cavalry had wheeled round again, and were drawn up close to the hoplites, and that the rest of the army also was being brought up, surprise filled the Libyans with panic; they immediately turned and began a retreat as precipitate and disorderly as their advance. In the blind flight which followed some of them ran foul of their own rearguard, who were still advancing, and caused their own destruction or that of their comrades; but the greater part were trampled to death by the cavalry and elephants who immediately charged. As many as six thousand of the Libyans and foreign troops were killed, and about two thousand taken prisoners.

Various ups and downs followed, but Hamilcar inexorably ground down the mutineers until he managed to crush their main force of 50,000 (Polybius I.85), largely by starving them out, and then brought their final army to battle around Leptis.

These snippets should be enough to provide a basic Order of Battle.  For the whole story, in Polybius I.67 and following, just click on this link and keep advancing the pages until I.88.

[aligern]

Great response Patrick??  Almost an article.
Roy

[Jim Webster]

Great response Patrick??  Almost an article.
Roy

Yes
One thing that I've been wondering about are the words " accustomed from their experience in the Sicilian warfare to retreat and return again to the attack many times in the same day."

I'm not sure whether I can think of any phalanx formation that did that, but legionaries were almost designed for it, and Spanish troops were also used to more fluid combat.
I'd suggest that the various Greek halfbreeds and Liby-phonecians, Italians and  probably the Spanish formed up a 'phalanx'.
Given that they were men who'd been trained and fought under the Barcas I'd ponder as to whether this 'phalanx'might have been an early step along the road to a more 'Roman' infantryman.

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

Good observation, Jim.

Polybius reckons that there were no pitched battles between Hamilcar and the Romans, but both sides tried just about everything else.  This suggests that the Carthaginian 'hoplite' types were either peltast-capable (or reinvented themselves as such) or started taking a leaf out of the Romans' book, as you suggest.

[Mark G]

why does it suggest that?

[Jim Webster]

The passage that attracted my attention was

"But the mercenaries, who had fled in a body on to the hill, had been trained in the daring tactics of Barcas, and accustomed from their experience in the Sicilian warfare to retreat and return again to the attack many times in the same day."

I cannot think of any examples of Hoplite phalanxes 'attacking many times in the same day.'
But Legionaries and similar did mount repeated attacks
I must admit that for me it destroys totally any thought that the Carthaginians were using a sarissa armed phalanx at this point.

Another interesting section is

"The Libyans and mercenaries mistook the object of this movement, and imagined that the Carthaginians were panic-stricken and in full retreat. Thereupon they broke from their ranks and, rushing forward, began a vigorous hand to hand struggle. When, however, they found that the cavalry had wheeled round again, and were drawn up close to the hoplites, and that the rest of the army also was being brought up, surprise filled the Libyans with panic; they immediately turned and began a retreat as precipitate and disorderly as their advance. In the blind flight which followed some of them ran foul of their own rearguard, who were still advancing, and caused their own destruction or that of their comrades; but the greater part were trampled to death by the cavalry and elephants who immediately charged."

This could easily be poorly disciplined hoplites (or legionaries or any sort of infantry for that matter) breaking ranks to charge a enemy on the run. It could also be one where inexperienced 'centurions' have ordered 'maniples' forward in a disjointed and uncoordinated manner and then tried to withdraw them. If there was only this passage I'd assume the hoplites, but combined with the other passage it gives me pause. It's another straw in the wind.

Jim

[Mark G]

Interesting passages, but do keep in mind that hoplite battles were very fast hard head in fights compared with punic battles.

Id read both as further evidence supporting the non continuous melee models myself.

Not sure id go so far as viewing all Carthaginians as peltasts though

[Patrick Waterson]

The troops in question are specifically Hamilcar's army in Sicily (the bulk of which became the revolting mercenaries of the Mercenary War).  Hence, while the Carthaginian norm may still have been hoplitocentric, these particular troops may have got into the habit of doing things differently, as highlighted by the passages Jim mentions.

[Jim Webster]

I wonder whether we're seeing the results of a change-over from 'Hoplite' to 'thureophoroi'

We're talking about 240BC (and the years preceding it)
A lot of the Greek cities seem to have shifted to thureophoroi  round and about 278 BC (ish)
Indeed we're getting to the stage where some Greek cities, Boiotia for example and later Achaea, were upgrading from thureophoroi to phalangites.

If we knew how Thureophoroi fought it would probably help :-(

Jim

[Duncan Head]

I wonder whether we're seeing the results of a change-over from 'Hoplite' to 'thureophoroi'

Possibly. But the Carthaginian Montefortino helmets from the Aegates Islands wrecks suggest to me a process of Italianization rather than Hellenisticization.

[Jim Webster]

I wonder whether we're seeing the results of a change-over from 'Hoplite' to 'thureophoroi'

Possibly. But the Carthaginian Montefortino helmets from the Aegates Islands wrecks suggest to me a process of Italianization rather than Hellenisticization.

That I can cope with. Mind you I often wondered if thureophoroi might not have been an italianisation as a result of Pyrrhus.

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

We do tend to forget that Rome and Carthage were almost friends while each was fighting Pyrrhus, and his Sicilian campaign did take place about a decade before the First Punic War.

[David Kush]

Thank you Patrick.

[Jim Webster]

Thank you Patrick.

Before you asked the question, you could have made a stab at an army list. Now, thanks to Patrick and I you know that whatever you pick is probably wrong :-)

Jim