What is the point of 16 ranks in a pike phalanx?

[Patrick Waterson]

It would be more the case that dust in the eyes of man and horse would seriously interfere with the ability to see and dust in the lungs can interfere with the ability to breathe; normally dust gets raised behind an individual man or horse or vehicle so does not worry them, but the proposed device would be raising dust in front of the man and horse and furthermore channelling it into their faces because of the shape of the 'pilot'.

As has previously been indicated, dust would not be the only potential problem.  However in view of the fact that we are unable to build and test a working prototype we may as well leave the matter there.  It is an interesting idea but not one we are in a position to evaluate effectively.

[Mark G]

A bicycle or wheelbarrow should demonstrate most if the basic problems of high speed propulsion of a large heavy flat front object, if you really wanted to try it

[andrew881runner]

vehicles like this https://www.google.it/search?q=carretto+gelati&client=ms-android-samsung&hl=it-IT&source=android-browser-type&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=o9TSU-GND6Ke0QXu_oAY&ved=0CDUQ7Ak&biw=360&bih=615&rlz=1Y1XIUG_itIT587IT588 with a heavy front object and rear traction (from human leg) shows that it is more than possible to have a heavy front object.
Dust problems is much much minor of what you could think. Firstly, unless you run with your horses in the ground or on peculiar dusty ground, you will not have it. If you have ever ridden a bike in extra urban streets, you would know that few paths are really that dusty. I know few of them and even there I have never had a dust problem when I rode closely behind another biker. I think you are over evaluating the quantity of dust it is usually life d by wheels even in peculiar dusty places.
Secondly, the lifted dust will not go neither in the eyes of horse, who is much higher (about 160 cm higher or more) than wheels, not in the eyes of the rider who is even higher (probably the level of the rider's eyes are about 2 mts or more).
Last but not least, we should consider that the wheels are not necessarily in front of the horse or the rider. Usually they should be on the sides. They could be even very far, depending on how large is the frontal wooden panel (or wooden covered by metal plate).
Really and sincerely, I agree that I cannot demonstrate that this engine could work, but I don't see any problems from a theorical point of view.
I agree that we could move forward (if some moderator wants to cut this thread and put it in a peculiar topic, I am happy with it)

Anyway watching better in Google images I have found this https://www.google.it/search?client=ms-android-samsung&hl=it-IT&rlz=1Y1XIUG_itIT587IT588&biw=360&bih=615&tbm=isch&sa=1&ei=PdjSU_eXMeOj0QXSm4DYBA&q=front+wagon+horse+push&oq=front+wagon+horse+push&gs_l=mobile-gws-serp.3...3788.6647.0.8337.11.11.0.0.0.0.331.1989.0j9j1j1.11.0....0...1c.1.49.mobile-gws-serp..10.1.171.IMUGDZXvmkQ look close the second pic.

[Patrick Waterson]

I agree that we could move forward.

Very good.

The original point of this thread was to see if we could establish why later Hellenistic pike phalanxes became 16 deep rather than the 8 deep of Alexander the Great's time (this depth can be seen in Polybius' Book XII critique of Callisthenes' account of Alexander's deployment for Issus).  The reasons (those we could think of) were 1) additional pressure from the back ranks (a slightly contentious point with those who believe that back ranks do not exert pressure in any formation) and 2) protection from missiles provided by the increased number of overhead pikes.

Does anyone have any further reasons why a 16-deep pike phalanx might be desirable?  Would the troop quality of a later Hellenistic phalanx be even throughout, or might the additional depth be a useful way of incorporating relatively inexperienced troops?  Would the deeper formation allow only front ranks to be armoured, thus saving on equipment costs (a saving perhaps diluted by committing the extra troops)?  Or would the reasons be purely tactical?

[andrew881runner]

we should not forget that syntagmas were 16 x 16, so many small squares. You should watch the reason to have many squares instead that a long thin line. I guess the reason was not only additional pressure and moral given by having more ranks behind, not only more men to change the dead s or injured guys in front, which seem rather obvious, but even an added manoeuvrability. Then if you have lots of recruits and few veterans, how Alexander had, you can use back ranks to put weakest soldiers, poorly effective and trustworthy in battle, but doing their job to "add mass" in the back ranks. I don't go for the protection from arrows, since I doubt that in original Alexander s phalanx, where men were more spaced, pikes could intercept so many arrows. If protection from. arrows was the purpose, I would have given them bigger Shields or anyway, if bigger Shields were to bulky to use pike, armor on all the body. While we know that thighs for example were almost totally uncovered (small Shields did not reach things, differently than aspis shield: ok, maybe in battle position torso and shield was lowered so shield covered the left thigh too, but not enough on my opinion). Same for arms, or better, right arm. So I guess that arrows were not considered a big threat, otherwise they would have put some simple boiled leather protection for thighs and arm, and a slightly bigger shield.
Anyway, if I can accept a 16 rank phalanx, I doubt about the effectiveness of a 50 x 32 ranks phalanx as that used in Magnesia. Since the back ranks beyond the 5th in the phalanx cannot participate in battle, why would you put 27 more ranks then necessary?

[Mark G]

Physics, Andrew.
All of those have the front object weight centered evenly on each side of the wheel axel, so it does not tip forward.
You are proposing something combat ready, which must have its fighting weight entirely to the front, and from toe to head height.

[Erpingham]

I think we need to make some allowance for perceived effect, as well as actual effect.  If the ancients felt that the rear ranks gave protection against missiles, they may have gone with that feeling rather than done a mathematical analysis of probabilities of arrows being deflected.  If the front ranks felt more secure against incoming missiles because of these belief, it would have benefit anyway.

On stuffing the back ranks with less experienced or less well equipped men, probably (although the man right at the back was usually a veteran).  However, if this wasn't militarily useful, why expend the logistical effort of maintaining a phalanx twice as big as it needed to be?

Turning to the pressure argument, there must be something to it because it is given as a reason for the phalanxes (phalanges?) success by people who were there.  But we know it can't have been 11 ranks pushing with all their might against the "fighting five".  Does the fact that an experienced phalanx could go through an inexperienced one like a dose of salts hint that there was a technique which a phalanx with experience, drill etc. had mastered to deliver its full power to the front?

[Patrick Waterson]

Anyway, if I can accept a 16 rank phalanx, I doubt about the effectiveness of a 50 x 32 ranks phalanx as that used in Magnesia. Since the back ranks beyond the 5th in the phalanx cannot participate in battle, why would you put 27 more ranks then necessary?

I think the 32-rank pike 'formation' at Magnesia may be a historians' misunderstanding: in Polybius Book XII he quotes Callisthenes describing Alexander approaching Issus, with an initial 32-deep formation closing up to 16 deep and then 8 deep.  This indicates that 32 deep (with a 6' or 1.8m spacing between men) was a marching formation, and to assume battle formation the troops closed up, first to 16 deep and 3' (0.9m) per man, then to 8 deep and 18" (0.45m) individual frontage.  The 32-deep 'deployment' at Magnesia seems to have been the troops waiting in march formation until the battle began with skirmishing; they would then let the skirmishers through and close up to fight.

This would make the Seleucid phalanx at Magnesia 8 deep rather than 16 deep, suggesting the 16 deep phalanx may have been limited to the Greek mainland.  Alternatively, and perhaps more reasonably, the Seleucids were waiting in 32 deep formation with 3' (0.9m) frontage in order to close up to 16 deep when ready to fight.

We should not forget that syntagmas were 16 x 16, so many small squares. You should watch the reason to have many squares instead that a long thin line.

The numerous syntagmas would normally be used to form a long, thin line.  However in Appian's account of Magnesia the Seleucid pikemen form a large square or rectangle (or several smaller squares, depending upon how one understands the text) when attacked by Pergamene and Roman cavalry after the rout of the Seleucid left.

I think we need to make some allowance for perceived effect, as well as actual effect.  If the ancients felt that the rear ranks gave protection against missiles, they may have gone with that feeling rather than done a mathematical analysis of probabilities of arrows being deflected.  If the front ranks felt more secure against incoming missiles because of these belief, it would have benefit anyway.

Most of the assumptions and calculations for pike formation missile stopping-power seem to have assumed the pikemen would be 3' apart.  If they were just 18" apart then coverage increases dramatically.  I think it was a real, not just a morale, effect, though the sight of a forest of intercepting shafts would in itself indeed be comforting.

On stuffing the back ranks with less experienced or less well equipped men, probably (although the man right at the back was usually a veteran).  However, if this wasn't militarily useful, why expend the logistical effort of maintaining a phalanx twice as big as it needed to be?

True: there is little point encumbring a formation with extra bodies if they are not useful.  If there is anything in the 'inexperienced back ranks' argument I suspect it would be that such men would be well enough trained in manoeuvre and steady enough to hold their pikes up as cover for the formation, meanwhile absorbing combat experience from a fairly safe location: improvement without risk.

Turning to the pressure argument, there must be something to it because it is given as a reason for the phalanxes (phalanges?) success by people who were there.  But we know it can't have been 11 ranks pushing with all their might against the "fighting five".  Does the fact that an experienced phalanx could go through an inexperienced one like a dose of salts hint that there was a technique which a phalanx with experience, drill etc. had mastered to deliver its full power to the front?

Polybius (XVIII.30.4) just says:

"These rear ranks, however, during an advance, press forward [piezountes] those in front by the weight of their bodies [somatos barei kata]; and thus make the charge [ephodon = attack, approach, charge] very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about."

I suspect practice and timing would have much to do with this effectiveness (which in itself indicates that those in rearward ranks could not have been too untrained, whether or not they were less experienced), and a phalanx which could coordinate well enough to develop this pressure instantaneously on contact would smash one in which less experienced men tentatively applied pressure rank by rank.

[andrew881runner]

rephrasing: if you have many men in your back (pressing) it is more difficult to leave your shield and run away, which would have disrupted the formation.
If in a hoplite phalanx with Shields overlapping escaping was impossible even in few ranks (6 or , in a pike phalanx men had more space to move so they could have escaped, maybe, among the men in the back. But if you put 15 men in your back, someone will probably stop you anyway.
Then if you consider that in every army there is a small part of Veterans and a big part of recruits (not necessarily untrained, but new to battle) putting the few veterans in the front rows and all the mass of recruits in the back seems the best solution. After a while veterans would have died and the guys in the back would have been the new veterans.

[Jim Webster]

What has struck me is that if we have 16 ranks 'pushing', the guys at the back aren't really in combat. So it may be that the depth of the phalanx was a way of short-circuiting the problem with infantry combat, that the infantry on both sides glared at each other until someone worked up the courage to storm forward, then fell back again.
With the pike phalanx, the pressure from behind would keep them moving forward when the front ranks might otherwise grind to a halt, and would certainly stop them going back easily

Jim

[andrew881runner]

we should take into account the existence of some relief system between ranks even in pike phalanx or hoplite phalanx anyway. It would not have sense that only first ranks would have fought in battle. Especially in the hoplite phalanx where soldiers were common citizens so not veterans... why should they want to be in first line doing all the job and risking their life while others simply push them towards the enemies? OK being in the first rank was the most dangerous place anyway for the charge at the beginning which did many casualties, but I cannot imagine that even after the first rank fought all the battle. In pike phalanx this could be even easier since soldiers have more space for themselves.

[Patrick Waterson]

There may have been potential for relief in a hoplite army, but Macedonian pikemen fought with a frontal spacing of 18" (0.45 metres) per man, which leaves no room for anyone to drop out of the ranks.  Then again, they probably would not need to, as the only opponents who could harm them frontally would be other pikemen.

I remember it being stated (though cannot remember the reference) that Spartans wore red tunics so that their foes should not be encouraged by seeing when they were wounded.  This, and various references to men fainting from loss of blood from 'many wounds' suggests that the men in the first ranks did fight until they dropped or the enemy was beaten, with the next man stepping over his fallen front-ranker to take his turn fighting.  Hoplite battles tended to be quite intense and rapid (one exception was the fight outside Syracuse in Thucydides VI.70, which went on longer than expected although the better troops eventually won).  Hoplite armour and shields tended to prevent an opponent from landing a killing blow (it was possible but rare, although one presumes much more likely against a novice who still did not really know what he was doing) so standing in the front rank was by no means a death sentence, provided the men concerned were sufficiently experienced to look after themselves.  Hoplite battles seem to have been shoving matches rather than killing matches, with the majority of casualties incurred when a formation broke.

With the pike phalanx, the pressure from behind would keep them moving forward when the front ranks might otherwise grind to a halt, and would certainly stop them going back easily

Very true: even hoplite battles could grind to a halt (the one in Thucydides VI.70 being a case in point) but deeper pike formations would keep things moving when push came to shove.

[Erpingham]

There may have been potential for relief in a hoplite army,

I am reminded that Spartans attacked by peltasts could send out younger age groups to chase them.  These younger men would be in the inner ranks, so some movement must have been possible.  Perhaps they would need to be at six foot spacing for this?  However, is there actually any evidence of relief, other than stepping over the dead body of the man in front?  Is there evidence of wounded being carried to the rear, even?

Very true: even hoplite battles could grind to a halt (the one in Thucydides VI.70 being a case in point) but deeper pike formations would keep things moving when push came to shove.

However we see the use of weight in pushing, pike phalanxes must have had a lot of inertia.  Going forward they would be hard to stop, standing their ground hard to push back.

[aligern]

The Spartans dare hoplites, not in a pike phalanx. If they wanted to allow the back ranks to run through to chase off Light infantry then they only needed to close up alternate files so file 2 moves to file 1. file 3 to file 4 to create a lane for the men in 5 -and 6 to run up.

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

The question of where the Spartans stationed their young men (and how they left the formation to take up pursuit) has been discussed previously, without as far as I recall any final conclusion being drawn.  The basic evidence comes from Xenophon's Hellenica, which unfortunately does not specify how the younger 'classes' were disposed within the formation.


Exhibit 1: Hellenica IV.4.16-17

"Again, Iphicrates and his troops invaded many districts of Arcadia also, where they plundered and made attacks upon the walled towns; for the hoplites of the Arcadians did not come out from their walls at all to meet them; such fear they had conceived of the peltasts. But the peltasts in their turn were so afraid of the Lacedaemonians that they did not approach within a javelin's cast of the hoplites; for it had once happened that the younger men among the Lacedaemonians, pursuing even from so great a distance as that, overtook and killed some of them. [17] But while the Lacedaemonians felt contempt for the peltasts, they felt even greater contempt for their own allies; for once, when the Mantineans went out against peltasts who had sallied forth from the wall that extends to Lechaeum, they had given way under the javelins of the peltasts and some of them had been killed as they fled; so that the Lacedaemonians were even so unkind as to make game of their allies, saying that they feared the peltasts just as children fear hobgoblins."


Exhibit 2: Hellenica IV.14-17

"And Callias formed his [Athenian] hoplites in line of battle not far from the city, while Iphicrates with his peltasts attacked the Lacedaemonian regiment. Now when the Lacedaemonians were being attacked with javelins, and several men had been wounded and several others slain, they directed the shield-bearers to take up these wounded men and carry them back to Lechaeum; and these were the only men in the regiment who were really saved. Then the polemarch ordered the first ten year-classes to drive off their assailants. [15] But when they pursued, they caught no one, since they were hoplites pursuing peltasts at the distance of a javelin's cast; for Iphicrates had given orders to the peltasts to retire before the hoplites got near them; and further, when the Lacedaemonians were retiring from the pursuit, being scattered because each man had pursued as swiftly as he could, the troops of Iphicrates turned about, and not only did those in front again hurl javelins upon the Lacedaemonians, but also others on the flank, running along to reach their unprotected side. Indeed, at the very first pursuit the peltasts shot down nine or ten of them. And as soon as this happened, they began to press the attack much more boldly. [16] Then, as the Lacedaemonians continued to suffer losses, the polemarch again ordered the first fifteen year-classes to pursue. But when these fell back, even more of them were shot down than at the first retirement. And now that the best men had already been killed, the horsemen joined them, and with the horsemen they again undertook a pursuit. But when the peltasts turned to flight, at that moment the horsemen managed their attack badly; for they did not chase the enemy until they had killed some of them, but both in the pursuit and in the turning backward kept an even front with the hoplites. And what with striving and suffering in this way again and again, the Lacedaemonians themselves kept continually becoming fewer and fainter of heart, while their enemies were becoming bolder, and those who attacked them continually more numerous. [17] Therefore in desperation they gathered together on a small hill, distant from the sea about two stadia, and from Lechaeum about sixteen or seventeen stadia. And the men in Lechaeum, upon perceiving them, embarked in small boats and coasted along until they came opposite the hill. Then the troops, being now desperate, because they were suffering and being slain, while unable to inflict any harm themselves, and, besides this, seeing the Athenian hoplites also coming against them, took to flight. And some of them plunged into the sea, and some few made their escape with the horsemen to Lechaeum. But in all the battles and in the flight about two hundred and fifty of them were killed."


Exhibit 3: Hellenica IV.6.8-12

"On the next day Agesilaus undertook to lead his army away. Now the road which led out from the meadow and plain surrounding the lake was narrow on account of the mountains which encircled it round; and the Acarnanians, taking possession of these mountains, threw stones and javelins upon the Lacedaemonians from the heights upon their right, and descending gradually to the spurs of the mountains pressed the attack and caused trouble to such an extent that the army was no longer able to proceed. [9] And when the hoplites and the horsemen left the phalanx and pursued their assailants, they could never do them any harm; for when the Acarnanians fell back, they were speedily in safe places. Then Agesilaus, thinking it a difficult matter for his troops to go out through the narrow pass under these attacks, decided to pursue the men who were attacking them on the left, very many in number; for the mountain on this side was more accessible both for hoplites and horses. [10] Now while he was sacrificing, the Acarnanians pressed them very hard with throwing stones and javelins, and coming close up to them wounded many. But when he gave the word, the first fifteen year-classes of the hoplites ran forth, the horsemen charged, and he himself with the other troops followed. [11] Then those among the Acarnanians who had come down the mountains and were throwing missiles quickly gave way and, as they tried to escape uphill, were killed one after another; on the summit, however, were the hoplites of the Acarnanians, drawn up in line of battle, and the greater part of the peltasts, and there they stood firm, and not only discharged their other missiles, but by hurling their spears struck down horsemen and killed some horses. But when they were now almost at close quarters with the Lacedaemonian hoplites, they gave way, and there fell on that day about three hundred of them. [12] When these things had taken place, Agesilaus set up a trophy."


What emerges from the above is that the younger Spartans must have been able to leave rapidly and in good order, with no delay.  Also, in the instance of the mora attacked near Lepraeum (Exhibit 2), the polemarch begins by sending out the 'first ten-year classes' and subsequently expands this to 'the first fifteen-year classes', the latter apparently being standard practice judging by the other two instances above.  This indicates some flexibility in arrangements and hence an organisation capable of utilising some or all of the 'first fifteen-year classes'.

It would appear that the reason Iphicrates' men were not caught was because they took care to remain at extreme javelin range and ran at the first sign of movement in the Spartan ranks.  In both other examples, the Spartans caught their targets.

We may note how in Exhibit 3 the 'fast hoplites' and cavalry pull away from the main formation 'when he [Agesilaus] gave the word', with Agesilaus and the other troops following, indicating prearrangement and the possibility that the younger hoplites may have been grouped in a detachment.

My own surmise is that the younger hoplites were assigned to specific files.  This would allow them to leave the formation in a forwards or backwards direction at a moment's notice without disrupting the formation or requiring it to change composition to let them out (or back in).  The alternative of assigning them to specific ranks (as Roy suggests) is also quite conceivable, although this would require them to leave sideways and would leave them devoid of organisation during the pursuit unless an alternative temporary command structure and organisation existed for this purpose.

Either way, I do not see them struggling through the rest of the formation to do their duty: they had to be able to make a swift and clean break when the word was given, especially to be able to catch peltasts who had a lead of 'a javelin's cast'.