The Proto-Manipular Legion

[RobertGargan]

After reading Rodger Willliams and Patrick Waterson's fascinating article on the Proto-Manipular Legion, issue 292, I referred back to Nick Secuna's Osprey's, Early Roman Armies, which argued for the hoplite army remaining well into the 4th century B.C.  Given Athens was a larger and wealthier city at this time and could, on occasion, usually field an army of 10,000 hoplites, I thought Rome's four legions, in 480 BC, totalling 20,000 heavy infantry a little OTT.  The article has certainly inspired me to do some further research - particular as I was interested in creating a 15mm Roman hoplite army circa 400 BC!
Robert Gargan

[Justin Swanton]

Here is a comparative map of Rome in 500BC and Athens. Given that Rome was more militarised and expanded rapidly after this date the figure of 20 000 men is credible.

[Jim Webster]

We have to be careful with regard areas.

Currently the City of Carlisle has an area of 1,040 km² whilst little Birmingham has an area of 267.8 km²

But the Population of Carlisle is 100,739, that of Birmingham is 1.074 million

Athens was a great trading city, and certainly in 400BC was importing the majority of its food, whereas Rome was just another self supporting Polis on the banks of a modest river.

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

That said, the populations of both city-states were largely rural: see Thucydides II.16.

"The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent townships. Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most Athenians still lived in the country with their families and households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move now, especially as they had only just restored their establishments after the Median invasion."

[Jim Webster]

That said, the populations of both city-states were largely rural: see Thucydides II.16.

"The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent townships. Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most Athenians still lived in the country with their families and households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move now, especially as they had only just restored their establishments after the Median invasion."

There are various suggestions as to population
For Athens http://archive.samj.org.za/1998%20VOL%2088%20Jan-Dec/1-4/Articles/01%20January/13%20HISTORY%20IN%20MEDICINE.THE%20EPIDEMIC%20OF%20ATHENS,%20430-426%20BC,%20Francois%20P%20Retief,%20Louise%20Cilliers.pdf

For Rome http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rsw/cornell.pdf

There the estimate is of between 60,000 and 190,000 in 300BC as opposed to Athens of 400,000

Jim

[Justin Swanton]

There the estimate is of between 60,000 and 190,000 in 300BC as opposed to Athens of 400,000

Jim

Take a middle figure of 120 000. That gives 60 000 males of which about a third are of military age and fit to fight. This excludes the rural population of a territory not much smaller in 500BC than the Athenian state.

[Erpingham]

There the estimate is of between 60,000 and 190,000 in 300BC as opposed to Athens of 400,000

Jim

Take a middle figure of 120 000. That gives 60 000 males of which about a third are of military age and fit to fight. This excludes the rural population of a territory not much smaller than Athens in 500 BC.

These estimates need to be used carefully.  Reading the Athens article, the population given for greater Athens (i.e. the urban bit) is 155,000 only 60,000 of whom are citizens and 70,000 are slaves.  The Roman figure is the city of Rome and includes slaves, but doesn't estimate the proportion.  So, an estimate of the rural population and the number of slaves is required for Rome if this is to be meaningful.  That should give the potential military pool across all classes.  Then you need the regulations about selecting the army to work out what proportion of the available man power was mobilized.

[Erpingham]

This article may be useful, if anyone out there has a jstor account :

Roman Population, Territory, Tribe, City, and Army Size from the Republic's Founding to the Veientane War, 509 B.C.-400 B.C.
Lorne H. Ward
The American Journal of Philology
Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring, 1990), pp. 5-39

http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/295257?uid=3738032&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21104035757147

[Justin Swanton]

Interesting. The author cites a census (p7) taken in 509BC which placed the total population at 130 000 - with a minimum population  of 104 000 taking into account effective use of arable land in that time. One can certainly raise a citizen army of 20 000 men from that.

[Mark G]

Don't forget the property qualifications and citizenship criteria.
Not every able body is allowed to serve.
You need to get that right before you start

[Jim Webster]

Absolutely Mark, They have to be men of a certain economic standing who can afford to serve. Ironically when you do the sums, Spartan hoplites were probably cheaper to keep than Athenian 

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

One of the points in the article is that Servius Tullius seemed to be maximising the use of his available manpower by improving the ratio of heavy-ish to light-ish troops.   The early legions continued this approach up to c.314-310(?) BC with a light infantry component limited to the 20 leves in each hastati maniple.  The Roman system would thus allow considerably more troops to be fielded as close combat infantry than in an equivalent Greek population.

With regard to second-guessing Roman numbers, I think we can place too much reliance on modern attempts at working out what could have been.

Ironically when you do the sums, Spartan hoplites were probably cheaper to keep than Athenian 

An intriguing thought, Jim: how do you work that out?  And would this be overall or just during wartime?

[RobertGargan]

To resist the Etruscan power I would argue the Romans adopted the state of the art hoplite tactics, but given the many small scale border raids with the surrounding hill tribes light armed javelin skirmishers must have been in constant deployment.  It could be that the nobles, cavalry, of Rome and tribal elements were used to light infantry skirmishing in the surrounding hilly land but the citizen hoplites reserved for the rarer, larger battles, to defend the city.
The Roman hoplite militia may have been the only forces organised in centuries and Dionysius' accounts sound a little heroic, possibly based on legends to provide a Greek audience with a "Roman history".  Nonetheless Rome's defeat of the Latin League in the mid fourth century significantly increased her pool of citizen manpower, and thereafter not simply a larger than average city state.
Robert Gargan

[Patrick Waterson]

Dionysius' account of the last battle of the Sabine War of 505-503 BC is the one where the 'pila portent' of the night before inspired an outnumbered Roman army to heroic victory the following day.  For this to be remembered and sufficiently widely remembered to come to the attention of a Greek historian in Sicily argues that it was an event affecting a significant Roman force, and for it to conclude the war argues that it would have been much more than a border skirmish.

The problem with any 4th century hoplite hypothesis is that it has to disregard the character of combat expressed in Livy and Dionysius, which has consistent use of missiles followed by close fighting with swords from at least 480 BC.  That the Roman republic started out with a hoplite army seems almost certain, given the result of their battle with Tarquin in 509 BC - each side's right beat the other's left and the battle as a whole was inconclusive.  That they swiftly abandoned it thereafter practically screams from the pages of Dionysius and is supported by numerous hints in Livy, while anything supporting a hoplite organisation after 504 BC is simply absent from either source.

When I first approached this subject I was convinced that the Romans retained their hoplite organisation into the 4th century BC.  However when we began looking at the primary sources a very different picture emerged, hence the title of the article.

[Jim Webster]

Ironically when you do the sums, Spartan hoplites were probably cheaper to keep than Athenian 

An intriguing thought, Jim: how do you work that out?  And would this be overall or just during wartime?

I wrote about it, it seems only yesterday, but I discover it was in Slingshot 258 back in May 2008!

Ever had the feeling that some of your articles are so old they almost qualify you as an eye witness.

However the core of the article, to answer your question directly is

"The Athenian hoplite was a hoplite because his land could produce more than 200 medimnoi which was about 8 tonnes of wheat.
Yet in 'Mess Contributions and Subsistence at Sparta', Thomas J. Figueira the mess contribution of a Spartan Hoplite, plus the ration he gives his wife is about 2 tonnes (this assumes that he sells wheat to buy wine, figs etc) and allowing for the comment that helots paid half over to the Spartans, this would indicate that the Helots farming his Kleroi had 2 tonnes as well.
Egyptian figures seem to reckon a family needed 727kg of wheat (equivalent, they obviously sold some of it to buy other things) to support themselves through a year then the grain left in the Kleroi could well support enough helot families to farm it."

So whereas it took eight tons of wheat to support an Athenian hoplite, his family, slaves, whatever, you could support a Spartan hoplite and his wife on two tons and the helots that ran the farm on another two tons.
Interestingly the standard of living of Spartan Helots was probably nothing to sneer at either. They were probably reasonably prosperous small tenant farmers.

Now then, We know that prior to his defeat at Sellasia in 221BC Cleomenes III freed 'such helots as could pay 5 attic minas' (Plutarch). Suddenly we get a glimpse of where the money has come from, the long term savings of these tenant farmers.

Jim