File recoil

[Patrick Waterson]

That is sort of my point - Napoleonic columns were deep, but nobody assumes that they all pushed each other in the back when (if) they came to close contact with an enemy, which is why I don't think we should assume such a thing for Theban or Macedonian columns. Being from a different period, with different weapons, and different doctrine, such a thing might have happened - but we shouldn't assume it did just because the formations were deep.

I think we tend to assume it because of Greek sources' frequent reference to extra 'weight' (baros) in connection with the deeper formations.

We may grant that depth per se does not ipso facto confer pushing-power, not least because it takes a bit of training/familiarity/discipline to get everyone pushing together.  Hence the very deep Achaemenid formations were relatively helpless before the more disciplined and othismos-oriented Greeks when, er, push came to shove.

As helpful as the table is, it could be rearranged in at least two ways to produce more useful data.

True, though it looks as if we shall have to do this ourselves.  At least it collects the raw data on one sheet of, um, electronic pixels.

Athens - straight 8, except when the Thirty Tyrants (or post-Peloponnesian War oligarchy) were trying to winkle Thrasybulus and his exiles out of their rocky stronghold in 403 BC.

Sparta - straight 8 with the questionable exception of Dipaia (known to be in 471 BC but otherwise undescribed except as a 'great Spartan victory') until about 371 BC when they begin adding extra ranks (9-12 deep).

Syracuse - 16, on the one occasion they are described (415 BC).  This may be an attempt to counter the superiority of Athenian hoplites.

The Ten Thousand (401-400 BC) - straight 8 in battle; 4 deep on parade (when they scared off the Cilician forces with a mock charge).

Thebans - 25 or 'very deep' until Epaminondas, then 50 deep.

Macedonians - straight 8 under Alexander; the 'mixed' phalanx with Persian missilemen was 16 deep, as were Successor pike formations by the end of the 3rd century BC (Cynoscephalae).

Alexander's 120-deep formation in Illyria was to intimidate the Taulantians into giving up a mountain pass and in addition to distract attention from a couple of cavalry detachments moving up to make flank attacks.  It worked - deep formations do appear to be intimidating and certainly catch the attention.

[RichT]

I think we tend to assume it because of Greek sources' frequent reference to extra 'weight' (baros) in connection with the deeper formations.

Sure - but then we should be more cautious. Looking no further than the Wikipedia page on 'column formation' for example we find:

"battalions in French armies often attacked in column formation in an attempt to drive through enemy lines by sheer weight of numbers."

"the military historian Sir Charles Oman is credited with developing the theory that the French practically always attacked in heavy columns"

Yet we all agree that French infantry, heavy columns or not, didn't really push anybody.

[Mark G]

Wrong.

French battalions were made of 6 companies if men, each 3 men deep.

When formed in a column, there were two companies in line in front, and then a gap the exact depth as the width of one company, whence came two more companies in line.
Behind them, again after a gap the same space as a full company in line, came the last 2 companies.

The gap was to give deployment distance for the next line to wheel out past the first l as fast as possible.

Comparisons to deep formations of 8 or more men are therefore rubbish.

And Oman has be proven to have misunderstood his sources and is wring on thus point.

They are only deep in the flimsiest sense of the word, and bear no relations our period.

[Patrick Waterson]

I think we tend to assume it because of Greek sources' frequent reference to extra 'weight' (baros) in connection with the deeper formations.

Sure - but then we should be more cautious. Looking no further than the Wikipedia page on 'column formation' for example we find:

"battalions in French armies often attacked in column formation in an attempt to drive through enemy lines by sheer weight of numbers."

"the military historian Sir Charles Oman is credited with developing the theory that the French practically always attacked in heavy columns"

Yet we all agree that French infantry, heavy columns or not, didn't really push anybody.

Although 'baros' has the overtone or perhaps undertone of 'pressure'.  Even in English a barometer measures air pressure rather than air weight.

And I do not think Polybius was using a metaphor, as one does in 'weight of numbers' or 'heavy column'. 

On the question of later period relevance, a Napoleonic attack column was a rather different thing from a classical period infantry formation: it was, as Mark indicates, differently composed and differently used.  The insistence by many authorities that bayonet fighting or any actual physical contact between infantry was an extremely rare thing in open battle in Napoleonic times should, if accepted, highlight a vital difference: that the Napoleonic column operated principally by frightening off the opposition as opposed to fighting through it.  Classical formations operated principally by engaging in melee and attempting to rout or destroy the opposition, a rather different proposition requiring a rather different modus operandi.

[Dangun]

Athens - straight 8, except when the Thirty Tyrants (or post-Peloponnesian War oligarchy) were trying to winkle Thrasybulus and his exiles out of their rocky stronghold in 403 BC.

Sparta - straight 8 with the questionable exception of Dipaia (known to be in 471 BC but otherwise undescribed except as a 'great Spartan victory') until about 371 BC when they begin adding extra ranks (9-12 deep).

Syracuse - 16, on the one occasion they are described (415 BC).  This may be an attempt to counter the superiority of Athenian hoplites.

The Ten Thousand (401-400 BC) - straight 8 in battle; 4 deep on parade (when they scared off the Cilician forces with a mock charge).

Thebans - 25 or 'very deep' until Epaminondas, then 50 deep.

Macedonians - straight 8 under Alexander; the 'mixed' phalanx with Persian missilemen was 16 deep, as were Successor pike formations by the end of the 3rd century BC (Cynoscephalae).

Alexander's 120-deep formation in Illyria was to intimidate the Taulantians into giving up a mountain pass and in addition to distract attention from a couple of cavalry detachments moving up to make flank attacks.  It worked - deep formations do appear to be intimidating and certainly catch the attention.

This is interesting.
Admittedly, it is a small number of data points...
But once you arrange the data like that, to clearly show what each nation was doing, does it reduce the question to: 8 ranks was normal, and we just have to explain why the Thebans chose differently?

[Mark G]

Wouldn't it be more important to explain why no one copied this winning Theban system, even the Thebans don't seem to have used it again.

A one off might just as easily be surprise and luck

[RichT]

Mark

Wrong.... rubbish.

Depends on the column. Closed columns had circa three paces between companies (in depth). D'Erlon's corps at Waterloo was in Divisional columns of battalions with four paces between battalions. This is not, I maintain, very different from the deep formations of our period.

Edited to add - and I know the use and purpose of Napoleonic columns was different - that was my point. I was attempting to point out that evidence of deep formations was not, in itself, evidence of 'rugby scrum othismos' - which is where this whole digresison kicked off from (but as it is now no doubt trying the patience of our fellow forum goers, can we leave it at that?)

Patrick

And I do not think Polybius was using a metaphor

I know you don't! Others do (with provisos - which we've been over lots of times).

Bottom line is that the othismos situation is uncertain and given the state of the evidence undecidable, and anyone expressing greater certainty on the matter is kidding themselves.

Mark

Wouldn't it be more important to explain why no one copied this winning Theban system, even the Thebans don't seem to have used it again.

A fair question - one reason is the tension between depth and width, and the need to win frontally before being beaten laterally. But also I believe this may be because as I've suggested, people in antiquity weren't really sure how or why deep formations worked either, and didn't have the luxury of being able to experiment with models or theory much more than we do. The only test was to try it in battle, amd failure meant the deaths of thousands of your compatriots, which is a strong disincentive to experimentation.

[Dangun]

Wouldn't it be more important to explain why no one copied this winning Theban system, even the Thebans don't seem to have used it again.

Because, as you suggested, it would seem that contemporaries did not think it was successful and perhaps not even did the Thebans...

So IMHO I think my question is more interesting (although obviously related)... why did the Thebans do what they did?

[Erpingham]

So IMHO I think my question is more interesting (although obviously related)... why did the Thebans do what they did?

Well one possibility is they didn't think they could match their opponents man-for-man at a similar depth.  Do we have any evidence that Thebans weren't very good, or tended to inferior equipment? Or that they were less experienced at the battles quoted than their enemies?

Deep formations do allow less well equipped or trained troops to be protected from direct contact with the enemy, while still serving a useful function.

[Patrick Waterson]

Thebans are noted as using formations at least 25 deep from Delium in 424 BC right through to Second Mantinea in 362 BC.  After Second Mantinea Thebes, bereft of militarily talented leaders, went into eclipse and I do not recall any depth being specified although at Chaeronea in 338 BC we may infer that the Sacred Band deployed 10 deep.

So how many battles did the Thebans lose when thus deep?  They nearly lost Delium, but not quite.  They won at Haliartus, perhaps because they skewered Lysander before he could get his act together.  They were on the losing side at the Nemea and Second Coronea, but it was their outflanked allies who took the brunt of the losses (a feature of the Theban system was that with anything like numerical parity their allies on the other wing always got the short end of the stick).  Having gone to 50 deep they won Leuctra and Second Mantinea, in each case advancing rapidly to get to grips soonest and avoid problems for their allies (these were Epaminondas' battles).  In essence, the success rate was good albeit expensive in allies prior to 371 BC - and when it did fail, the allies tended to be chewed up more than the Thebans.

Why did others not adopt this system?  Spartans never felt the need, Athens never had the manpower even if they saw virtue in the approach and either the Theban deep formation or (more usually) its allies on the other wing were vulnerable to outflanking, and outflanking seems to have been far more decisive than depth, witness Delium in 424 BC where the 25-deep Thebans pushed back the Athenian left while the 8-deep outflanking Athenians massacred the Theban left.

In essence it seems that Thebes used depth to make its perhaps rather pedestrian hoplites more effective and did not really care about what happened to its allies.  As Richard succinctly summarises:

... one reason is the tension between depth and width, and the need to win frontally before being beaten laterally.

Nicely put.  We might add that the Theban approach was aided by the tendency of victorious hoplites on the other wing to chase beaten opponents rather than curl round behind the Thebans.  When they met an opponent who instead redeployed his successful right to defeat the victorious Theban deep column (as at the Nemea and 2nd Chaeronea) the Theban approach came unstuck and lost.

One hopefully final note on matters Napoleonic.

D'Erlon's corps at Waterloo was in Divisional columns of battalions with four paces between battalions. This is not, I maintain, very different from the deep formations of our period.

It might not be had D'Erlon's columns been a) permanent organisational and tactical formations, b) organised by file and c) trained exclusively in melee tactics, but they were not, so the difference remains.

What is important is not the shape but the structure.

[Mark G]

And c, not surprised by the very cavalry they had adopted that novel formation to react to.
Quite literally a matter of seconds.

But enough of this out of period digression.

[Dangun]

Do we have any evidence that Thebans weren't very good, or tended to inferior equipment? Or that they were less experienced at the battles quoted than their enemies?
Deep formations do allow less well equipped or trained troops to be protected from direct contact with the enemy, while still serving a useful function.

We've discussed it before, but I think this is an excellent candidate explanation.
Deep formations would be easier to maneuver if the troops are of poor quality. Keeping wide but shallow formations orderly takes training.

Another candidate explanation might be a preference for speed.
Narrower columns can be maneuvered faster in an orderly fashion than wider formations.

Why did others not adopt this system?  Spartans never felt the need

I think its important to be more precise here: "The Spartans, nor anyone else, ever felt the need presumably because it did not produce better results."

Athens never had the manpower

This does not follow. The Thebans are described as deploying deeper, not in larger formations, or fielding larger armies.
Athens could have copied the strategy. But they did not.
No literary source opines about the wonders of crack Theban phalanx who had mastered the dark arts of counting beyond the number 16.

[Mark G]

The easier to manoeuvre argument does seem to rest on the example of 18/19th century formations, which had cadence marching.

We have much less example for our period, but a lot of examples of deploying initially in such way as to not manoeuvre at all.

[Patrick Waterson]

The Thebans are described as deploying deeper, not in larger formations, or fielding larger armies.
Athens could have copied the strategy. But they did not.
No literary source opines about the wonders of crack Theban phalanx who had mastered the dark arts of counting beyond the number 16.

Yes, I need to be a bit more precise (accurate?) here.

The Athenians, in each battle on the list in which they feature (and leaving aside their fratricidal tiff in 403 BC), deploy 8 deep and either match an enemy line which apparently had superior numbers but greater depth (Syracuse, 415 BC) or outflank an enemy line left hanging by the Thebans (Delium, 424 BC) or try - unsuccessfully - to avoid being outflanked (First Mantinea 418 BC, the Nemea 394 BC).  I am not sure they really had the option to attempt a Theban-style deep deployment in any of these battles, at least not without crushing disadvantages.

In theory they might have done better attempting a deep deployment at the Nemea and First Mantinea in order to delay disadvantageous contact and be more resilient when it occurred, but in these cases they started more or less opposite the enemy right then found themselves having to conform to a right-hand drift which left them seriously outflanked and vulnerable - a contingency which even if foreseeable they presumably did not foresee, or at least mistakenly trusted their allies not to create such a situation.

As for the Thebans, they were successful in their own way but their passion for deep formations seems to have been regarded with tolerant condescension rather than any form of awe by other Greeks (we may note in passing that our sources for the period are principally Athenian) until their surprise success over the Spartans at Leuctra.  Their resultant period of supremacy was correctly ascribed to the skill of Epaminondas rather than the majesty of the Theban deep formation, but, that said, there is no record of a Theban deep formation being broken in frontal combat, or at least none of which I am aware.

It looks as if it was principally a matter of horses for courses: the Thebans liked their deep formation and used it at every opportunity; real men who did not sacrifice their allies on the other wing fought eight deep and took their chances.

[Chuck the Grey]

To add to the previous information about depth of formations for Greek hoplite armies, this is a summary of the information presented in Ancient Greek Military Practices Part I by W. Kendrick Pritchett, University Of California Press, 1971.

A recent thought I have had about depth in hoplite formations, and this can be considered for another formations, is to ask if the increase depth adds to the offensive power of the formation, or does it increase the ability of the deep formation to resist attack.

Date   Army      Place         Depth
471?   Spartans   Dipaia         1
424   Athenians   Delion         8
424   Thebans   Delion         25
418   Spartans   Mantineia      8 generally
415   Athenians   Syracuse      8
415   Syracusans   Syracuse      16
408   Spartans   Athens      4
403   Athenians   Peiraieus      50+ (under Kritias)
403   Athenians   Peiraieus      10 - (underThrasybolos)
402   Spartans   Thrace      8
401   10 Thousand   Tyriaeion      4
400   10 Thousand   Byzantion      8
399   Spartans   Maeander R.      8
394   Athenians   Nemea R.      16
394?   Spartans   Thebes      2
373   Spartans   Kerkyra      8
371   Spartans   Leuktra      12 -
371   Thebans   Leuktra      50+
370   Spartans   Mantineia      18/2→ 9/10
335   Macedonians   Pelion         120
333   Macedonians   Issos         16→32→16→ 8
323   Macedonians   Babylon      16
276   Galatians   ?         24
197   Macedonians   Kynoskephalai   16 32 (or 8 16?)