Delium 424 BC

[Patrick Waterson]

Delium 424 BC

Athenians:  Hippocrates, with 7,000 hoplites, 2,000+(?) light infantry, 300+ cavalry
Boeotians:  Pagondas, with 7,000 hoplites, 10,000+ light infantry, 500 peltasts, 1,000 cavalry

Source: Thucydides IV.93-96


Thucydides IV.93-96

93. By these arguments Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp led his army forward, it being now late in the day. On nearing the enemy, he halted in a position where a hill intervening prevented the two armies from seeing each other, and then formed and prepared for action. [2] Meanwhile Hippocrates at Delium, informed of the approach of the Boeotians, sent orders to his troops to throw themselves into line, and himself joined them not long afterwards, leaving about three hundred horse behind him at Delium, at once to guard the place in case of attack, and to watch their opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the battle. [3] The Boeotians placed a detachment to deal with these, and when everything was arranged to their satisfaction appeared over the hill, and halted in the order which they had determined on, to the number of seven thousand heavy infantry, more than ten thousand light troops, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers [peltastai]. [4] On their right were the Thebans and those of their province, in the center the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the other people around the lake, and on the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians, the cavalry and the light troops being at the extremity of each wing. The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep, the rest as they pleased. [5] Such was the strength and disposition of the Boeotian army.

94. On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry throughout the whole army formed eight deep, being in numbers equal to the enemy, with the cavalry upon the two wings. Light troops regularly armed there were none in the army, nor had there ever been any at Athens. Those who had joined in the invasion, though many times more numerous than those of the enemy, had mostly followed unarmed [aoplon = unarmoured], as part of the levy in mass of the citizens and foreigners at Athens, and having started first on their way home were not present in any number. [2] The armies being now in line and upon the point of engaging, Hippocrates, the general, passed along the Athenian ranks, and encouraged them as follows:—

95. 'Athenians, I shall only say a few words to you, but brave men require no more, and they are addressed more to your understanding than to your courage. [2] None of you must fancy that we are going out of our way to run this risk in the country of another. Fought in their territory the battle will be for ours: if we conquer, the Peloponnesians will never invade your country without the Boeotian horse, and in one battle you will win Boeotia and in a manner free Attica. [3] Advance to meet them then like citizens of a country in which you all glory as the first in Hellas, and like sons of the fathers who beat them at Oenophyta with Myronides and thus gained possession of Boeotia.'

96. Hippocrates had got half through the army with his exhortation, when the Boeotians, after a few more hasty words from Pagondas, struck up the paean, and came against them from the hill; the Athenians advancing to meet them, and closing at a run. [2] The extreme wing of neither army came into action, one like the other being stopped by the water-courses in the way; the rest engaged with the utmost obstinacy, shield against shield. [3] The Boeotian left, as far as the center, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand; some of the Athenians also fell into confusion in surrounding the enemy and mistook and so killed each other. [4] In this part of the field the Boeotians were beaten, and retreated upon the troops still fighting; but the right, where the Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and shoved them further and further back, though gradually at first. [5] It so happened also that Pagondas, seeing the distress of his left, had sent two squadrons of horse [duo tele ton hippeon], where they could not be seen, round the hill, and their sudden appearance struck a panic into the victorious wing of the Athenians, who thought that it was another army coming against them. [6] At length in both parts of the field, disturbed by this panic, and with their line broken by the advancing Thebans, the whole Athenian army took to flight. [7] Some made for Delium and the sea, some for Oropus, others for Mount Parnes, or wherever they had hopes of safety, [8] pursued and cut down by the Boeotians, and in particular by the cavalry, composed partly of Boeotians and partly of Locrians, who had come up just as the rout began. Night however coming on to interrupt the pursuit, the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily than they would otherwise have done. [9] The next day the troops at Oropus and Delium returned home by sea, after leaving a garrison in the latter place, which they continued to hold notwithstanding the defeat.


Commentary:
Delium is a useful indicator of hoplite battle techniques.  The Athenians formed up in what we regard as the customary eight deep, while the Thebans, with their 25-deep deployment, foreshadow their later 50-deep (coincidentally twice 25) formation at Leuctra.

The Athenians, despite apparently fighting uphill, cracked the Boeotian left while the Thebans were still pushing back the Athenian left – and also enveloped the still-resisting Thespians, while the remaining Boeotian troops fell back on their own 'fighting-line'.  This suggests a 'revolving door' action in which only half the door revolved, with the Thespians forming the 'hinge'.  Pagondas, the Theban commander, was interestingly able to control his right-wing cavalry despite aparently being in the usual hoplite commander's position at the right-hand front corner of his infantry, suggesting that having the 'extreme wing' of his army stopped by a watercourse actually turned out to be quite useful on account of leaving both him and the cavalry disengaged.

Pagondas, being on a hill and presumably unengaged, was thus able to see what was happening to his own left and to order two 'tele' (squadrons, presumably 200-250 strong) of cavalry from his right to pass behind the hill and emerge upon the flank of the victorious Athenian right.  The surprise effect of this, plus the misperception if the cavalry as the vanguard of a new army, seems to have produced an Athenian panic out of all proportion to the actual impact of two formations of horse.  The original cavalry on the Theban left had presumably been chased away.

Conversely, the 300 Athenian cavalry left at Delium do not appear to have 'watched their opportunity' very effectively, or did not see an opportunity to intervene.  Presumably the Boeotian detachment sent to block them did its job.  It is unlikely that Pagondas' manoeuvre would have worked had Athenian cavalry been covering their army's right.

Thucydides portrays the Boeotians as having a massive superiority in light troops.  The psiloi accompanying the Athenian army had mostly already departed, leaving us to guess how many remained behind.  An estimate in the low thousands would seem appropriate.  The light troops seem to have taken no part in the action, opting to stay clear of the hoplites until the contest was decided.

Casualties in this battle were: 'almost 500' Boeotians; 'nearly 1,000' Athenians including the commander, Hippocrates, plus 'a great number' of light troops and camp followers. (Thucydides IV.101)

It seems that what decided the action was not the Boeotian hillside deployment, nor their superiority in light troops, nor their 25-deep deployment, but the surprise effect of two cavalry formations appearing on an open and hitherto victorious flank and being mistaken for the vanguard of an army.