The Hoplite - What Made Him Special?

[RichT]

To continue the Plataea digression a little, Herodotus' account doesn't describe a single set piece encounter between deployed forces, but more of a piecemeal meeting engagement. Putting his account in context:

Hdt 9.59
With that, he [Mardonius] led the Persians with all speed across the Asopus in pursuit of the Greeks, supposing that they were in flight; it was the army of Lacedaemon and Tegea alone which was his goal, for the Athenians marched another way over the broken ground, and were out of his sight. Seeing the Persians setting forth in pursuit of the Greeks, the rest of the barbarian battalions straightway raised their standards and also gave pursuit, each at top speed, no battalion having order in its ranks nor place assigned in the line.
60 So they ran pell-mell and shouting, as though they would utterly make an end of the Greeks.
...
61  The Lacedaemonians and Tegeans accordingly stood alone, men-at-arms and light-armed together... These offered sacrifice so that they would fare better in battle with Mardonius and the army which was with him. They could get no favorable omen from their sacrifices, and in the meanwhile many of them were killed and by far more wounded (for the Persians set up their shields for a fence, and shot showers of arrows). Since the Spartans were being hard-pressed (piezo) and their sacrifices were of no avail, Pausanias lifted up his eyes to the temple of Hera at Plataea and called on the goddess, praying that they might not be disappointed in their hope.
62 While he was still in the act of praying, the men of Tegea leapt out before the rest and charged the barbarians, and immediately after Pausanias' prayer the sacrifices of the Lacedaemonians became favorable. Now they too charged the Persians, and the Persians met them, throwing away their bows. First they fought by the fence of shields, and when that was down, there was a fierce and long fight around the temple of Demeter itself, until they came to blows at close quarters [othismos]. For the barbarians laid hold of the spears and broke them short. Now the Persians were neither less valorous nor weaker, but they had no armor; moreover, since they were unskilled and no match for their adversaries in craft, they would rush out singly and in tens or in groups great or small, hurling themselves on the Spartans and so perishing.
63 Where Mardonius was himself, riding a white horse in the battle and surrounded by a thousand picked men who were the flower of the Persians, there they pressed their adversaries hardest (piezo). So long as Mardonius was alive the Persians stood their ground and defended themselves, overthrowing many Lacedaemonians. When, however, Mardonius was killed and his guards, who were the strongest part of the army, had also fallen, then the rest too yielded and gave ground before the men of Lacedaemon. For what harmed them the most was the fact that they wore no armor over their clothes and fought, as it were, naked against men fully armed.

So the stages of the fighting are more confused, with contingents perhaps engaging in sequence and over some distance of ground - as Macan observes:

"In this particular case, if the battle has shifted down the ridge, and is now going forward beside the Demetrion (as above located), the fugitive Persians would probably be met by swarms advancing to the assault, or support, none too regularly, and escape would be doubly difficult. But we cannot be sure that the words which follow do not describe the scene immediately on the overthrow of the gerra. Stein, indeed, marks a lacuna after othismon on the ground that the next sentence is not in logical or natural sequence of the argument or narrative."

The idea of a piecemeal engagement is supported by the account in Plato, for what it is worth:

Plato Laches 191c
For they say that at Plataea, when the Spartans came up to the men with wicker shields, they were not willing to stand and fight against these, but fled; when, however, the Persian ranks were broken, the Spartans kept turning round and fighting like cavalry, and so won that great battle.

Which doesn't fit well with Herodotus' account, but emphasises the idea of engaging in smaller bodies against broken ranks.

This is why I think Plataea is not a good example to use in support of the scrum othismos - not least because it is unclear what the Persians are supposed to have been doing on their side. We may note incidentally that piezo, the verb used for Mardonius' picked men (and earlier the archers) pressing their adversaries hardest, is the common 'push' verb from Polybius et al (used for the 'pushing', 'pressing' role of the rear ranks of the Macedonian phalanx).

If we are just saying that in close quarters hand to hand fighting the Spartans had the advantage over the Persians (largely because of their better armour, as Herodotus says twice) then we are in full agreement.

Agree also that we shouldn't discount hardware factors - just that they aren't the whole story. According to Lendon, emphasis on hardware is a part of the Greek historiographical tradition, as opposed to the Roman which emphasised software ('virtus' etc). Just worth keeping this in mind. In wargame terms, Greek historians would enjoy WRG 6th ed and see Spartans as 'HI, LTS, Sh'. Romans might prefer Lost Battles ('Veteran Hoplites').

[Patrick Waterson]

The context actually demonstrates that the action has made the transition from the pursuit to a set-piece engagement where the Spartans are holed up on a hill while the massed ranks of Persian infantry are lined up to use the Spartans as a shooting gallery.

"The Lacedaemonians and Tegeans accordingly stood alone, men-at-arms and light-armed together; there were of the Lacedaemonians fifty thousand and of the Tegeans, who had never been parted from the Lacedaemonians, three thousand. These offered sacrifice so that they would fare better in battle with Mardonius and the army which was with him. [3] They could get no favorable omen from their sacrifices, and in the meanwhile many of them were killed and by far more wounded (for the Persians set up their shields for a fence, and shot showers of arrows). Since the Spartans were being hard-pressed and their sacrifices were of no avail, Pausanias lifted up his eyes to the temple of Hera at Plataea and called on the goddess, praying that they might not be disappointed in their hope." - Herodotus IX.61.2-3

The impression is that the entire Persian infantry contingent ('Mardonius and the army ... with him')  is present and shooting, having 'set up their shields for a fence' and shooting 'showers of arrows', not just an inconsequential patter of missiles from detached groups, but enough shafts to kill many and wound far more.  The delay in Spartan response on account of the continually unpropitious sacrifices would anyway have given any laggard Persians time to join up and form up - Macan's notes on the subject seem incidentally to be largely imagination with no actual basis in Herodotus' narrative.

The change in the omens and the Spartan charge led to the fight 'at the fence of shields'.  Subsequent activities by small groups of Persians and Greek (or general) othismos occurred only after this shield-wall was down.  Plato's Laches reference may supply the missing detail from Herodotus about how this was achieved.

The Laches reference suggests that the Spartans lured the Persians out of their shield wall by a Thermopylae-style pretended flight.  This is conceivable, and although not quite in the spirit of Herodotus' narrative is reconcilable with the latter.  I suspect Richard has unintentionally turned up something quite important here.  It has, however, nothing to do with the subsequent Persian small group fighting or the othismos, which incidents in Herodotus' narrative occur after the overthrow or rupture of the Persian shield wall.

One presumably non-othismotic aspect of the Spartan stand is that the 'men-at-arms and light-armed together' [mounōthentes ... sun psiloisi] appear to have constituted, intentionally or otherwise, a single formation.  An open question is just how closely the hoplites and their supporting psiloi were integrated, the Spartans in particular having seven light troops per hoplite instead of the usual one.  With everyone grouped together on a hill, would the hoplites have been forming a ring inside which were the psiloi, and would the latter have had any part to play in the subsequently developing action?

[RichT]

I suspect Richard has unintentionally turned up something quite important here.

How nice of you to say so! But intentional or otherwise, I can't claim to have turned it up, it is well enough known.

I think "largely imagination with no actual basis in Herodotus' narrative" is the best summary and marks the time to leave this topic alone.

[Mark G]

That was a pretty good summary, pat.  I think it also dovetails with the change in intensity in warfare from seasonal city state clashes for hegemony to wars of conquest - Persian invasions, then the Peloponnesian war.

So given all this change, and the equipment changed, and the increased professionalism, and the overall change in force composition.

Which hoplites do we mean by hoplite?

[Andreas Johansson]

During the 5th century BC, the Greek armoured infantryman, already a popular addition to Egyptian and occasionally Neo-Babylonian armies, came to dominate the infantry battlefield.

Tangential, but the evidence for Greek mercenaries in Neo-Babylonian armies seems to be quite thin:

Alcaeus and Antimenidas: Reassessing the Evidence for Greek Mercenaries in the Neo-Babylonian Army, by Alexander Fantalkin and Ephraim Lytle.

[Patrick Waterson]

Tangential, but the evidence for Greek mercenaries in Neo-Babylonian armies seems to be quite thin:

Alcaeus and Antimenidas: Reassessing the Evidence for Greek Mercenaries in the Neo-Babylonian Army, by Alexander Fantalkin and Ephraim Lytle.

I have seen it recently, and note that it deals only with Mesopotamian sources.  Greek mercenaries hired by the Neo-Babylonians are more likely to have served in and around the Levant and especially in Asia Minor.  One might also expect them to be more likely to encounter occasional opponents of above average height in such areas - Philistia in particular had a tradition of providing these.

I also did not like the attempted assassination of Strabo's reliability for no better reason than what he related did not fit the authors' pet theory.

So given all this change, and the equipment changed, and the increased professionalism, and the overall change in force composition.

Which hoplites do we mean by hoplite?

To begin with, the gentlemen in bronze with the aspis shield and two spears.  As we progress through the 5th century BC, we come to mean the linen-corseleted, Attic-helmed aspis-carrying spearmen who clash shields with their opponents and engage in a bit of weapon-play (doratismos, 'the spearing') before continuing with othismos ('the shove').  This leads - eventually - to trope, 'the collapse' and then it is off to the races in pursuit and never mind what is happening to your left wing - unless you are Spartan.

The Greeks seem to have used the term 'hoplite' to mean a heavy infantryman, whatever his equipment and nationality: for example, Roman infantry are often referred to by Greek authors as 'hoplites'.  But because by far and away the most frequent use is for Greek city-state armoured soldiers, that is the usage applied to it by English-speakers (and I suspect most other scholars) and hence any Greek citizen infantryman with spear, shield, helmet and armour is considered a 'hoplite'.  As we have seen, they alter their equipment and adjust their techniques during the flourishing period of the Greek city-state, but remain 'hoplites'.

I suspect Richard has unintentionally turned up something quite important here.

How nice of you to say so! But intentional or otherwise, I can't claim to have turned it up, it is well enough known.

It is nevertheless potentially significant as a possible - even probable - explanation of how the Spartans brought down the Persian fence of shields, echoing as it does Leonidas' Thermopylae tactics in Herodotus VII.211:

"When the Medes had been roughly handled, they retired, and the Persians whom the king called Immortals, led by Hydarnes, attacked in turn. It was thought that they would easily accomplish the task. [2] When they joined battle with the Hellenes, they fared neither better nor worse than the Median army, since they used shorter spears than the Hellenes and could not use their numbers fighting in a narrow space. [3] The Lacedaemonians fought memorably, showing themselves skilled fighters amidst unskilled on many occasions, as when they would turn their backs and feign flight. The barbarians would see them fleeing and give chase with shouting and noise, but when the Lacedaemonians were overtaken, they would turn to face the barbarians and overthrow innumerable Persians."

It is interesting to attempt this under WRG 6th Edition rules, albeit one needs a special Persian 'shield fence' rule giving them a defensive bonus, and should class the shield fence as an obstacle (i.e. immobile). 

First, the Spartans ("Reg A" HI, LTS, Sh) charge the Persians (a mix of "Reg A" HI, JLS, B, Sh* Immortals and "Irreg B" HI JLS, B, Sh Persians - except that the HI are downgraded to MI for leaving their armour behind).  The shield fence defensive bonus produces a draw, and after a couple of rounds of this the Spartans find they are getting nowhere.  They may be giving better than they get, not least because of their advantage in armour, but against the deep opposing formation they are not getting the one casualty per figure that would shift the Persians (force them to recoil).

(*Heavy Infantry with Javelin/Light Spear, Bow, Shield)

So the Spartans break off.

This is executed as an evade move (20 paces plus (10 paces times the roll of an average die)) and they achieve perhaps 60 paces in total, halting facing the enemy, who pursues 20 paces plus (10 paces times the roll of a normal die) for most Persians (Immortals, as regulars, use an average die) but with a 20 pace subtraction for being more than 2 figures deep.  They achieve around 40 paces in total and fail to regain contact.

The Spartans regain their order at the end of the move.  Next move, they charge the Persians, who stand or countercharge, but it matters not as the shieldless Persians are promptly bundled back with serious casualties.  Now the Persians themselves break off and head for the Temple of Demeter, the Spartans methodically following up in good order.  After some brave but futile charges by Persian subunits the Spartans lock horns with the main body of unprotected Persians and start to othismise them off the field.

It seems a bit forced in places, but the whole episode is just about possible under WRG 6th mechanics (re-enacting Thermopylae is similarly possible but takes both sides cooperating).

WRG rules apart, The Laches quote would seem to provide a useful insight into how the Spartans dealt with the shield fence problem, and my thanks to Richard for airing it.  The Athenians at Mycale, up against a similar situation on the Asia Minor coast on the same day, presumably dealt with the problem in a different way as their tactical repertoire was not as varied as the Spartans'.

[RichT]

As we progress through the 5th century BC, we come to mean the linen-corseleted, Attic-helmed aspis-carrying spearmen who clash shields with their opponents and engage in a bit of weapon-play (doratismos, 'the spearing') before continuing with othismos ('the shove').  This leads - eventually - to trope, 'the collapse'

Or not. 

Patrick is here echoing (chiefly) Hanson:

"There was generally a certain regularity to Greek battle: charge, collision, hand-to-hand combat, push and eventual rout. This sequence of events is borne out by ancient observers who developed a vocabulary to describe what they saw or heard: the charge (ephodos or epidrome), the clash of spears (doratismos), the hand-to-hand struggle (en chersi), the push (othismos), and the collapse (trope)."
Hanson, The Western Way of War p. 185

If I may throw in another digression - we have seen that 'othismos' is a very long way from being the common (or even exclusive) term for a phase of hoplite battle that is sometimes thought, and is used just once (by 'ancient observers') for hoplites v hoplites.

Just for fun, try doing the same exercise for 'doratismos' - I have found just two uses of the word:

Plut Pyrr 7.5 (single combat between Pyrrhus and Pantauches)
"At first they hurled their spears [doratismos], then, coming to close quarters, they plied their swords with might and skill. Pyrrhus got one wound, but gave Pantauchus two, one in the thigh, and one along the neck, and put him to flight and overthrew him; he did not kill him, however, for his friends hauled him away."

(Note that 'hurled their spears' is a very free translation here though seems reasonable).

Plut Timoleon 28.1 (Crimisus, Timoleon v. Carthaginians)
"But these withstood his first onset sturdily, and owing to the iron breastplates and bronze helmets with which their persons were protected, and the great shields which they held in front of them, repelled the spear thrusts [doratismon]. But when the struggle came to swords and the work required skill no less than strength, suddenly, from the hills, fearful peals of thunder crashed down, and vivid flashes of lightning darted forth with them."

Does anyone know of any other uses? This is all Perseus found. No uses whatever for Greek hoplite battles. It looks to me as if we may be in the presence of another of ancient history's urban myths - a meme that gets started in some secondary source and repeated until accepted as the truth. Which isn't to say of course that hoplites and other infantry didn't fight with spears, but that the confidently repeated assertions of the secondary literature (and internet forum posters) may be built on the flimsiest of foundations.

[Patrick Waterson]

Xenophon (Hellenica IV.3.17) uses doru aphikomenoi ('spear's reach') for the same stage in a battle - a Greek hoplite battle, to be precise, Second Coronea - which suggests that 'doratismos' was a later appellation for this stage of hoplite battle which is nevertheless a convenient label for English-speaking scholars.

Does anyone know of any other uses? This is all Perseus found. No uses whatever for Greek hoplite battles. It looks to me as if we may be in the presence of another of ancient history's urban myths - a meme that gets started in some secondary source and repeated until accepted as the truth. Which isn't to say of course that hoplites and other infantry didn't fight with spears, but that the confidently repeated assertions of the secondary literature (and internet forum posters) may be built on the flimsiest of foundations.

Indeed, though if those foundations describe an actual stage in a hoplite battle, as they seem to do, then we do not have a problem.  Loose vocabulary and inaccurate vocabulary are not necessarily the same thing, although I would encourage Richard to seek out any more commonly accepted concepts and see what underlies them.  It might be worth another Slingshot article.

Meanwhile, we may benefit from examining a hoplite battle: Athenians vs Syracusans, near Syracuse, 415 BC.  The Athenians had hoplites of superior quality, the Syracusans, a superiority in numbers, especially of cavalry and light troops.  Thucydides (VI.67-70) writes:

"The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, their dispositions being as follows:—Their right wing was occupied by the Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the Athenians, and the rest of the field by the other allies. Half their army was drawn up eight deep in advance, half close to their tents in a hollow square, formed also eight deep, which had orders to look out and be ready to go to the support of the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers were placed inside this reserve. [2] The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed their heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the mass-levy [pandēmei] of their own people, and such allies as had joined them, the strongest contingent being that of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of the Geloans, numbering two hundred in all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers from Camarina. The cavalry was posted on their right, full twelve hundred strong, and next to it the darters [akontistas - javelinmen]."

We may note the unusual Athenian disposition, presumably intended to foil flanking attacks by the numerous Syracusan cavalry, and the Syracusan 'pandēmei' or mass-levy ('the whole demos') of everyone who qualified as a hoplite.

"[3] As the Athenians were about to begin the attack, Nicias went along the lines, and addressed these words of encouragement to the army and the nations composing it:—
'Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men like ourselves, who are here to fight in the same battle, the force itself being, to my thinking, more fit to inspire confidence than a fine speech with a weak army. [2] Where we have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the first of the islanders in the ranks together, it were strange indeed, with so many and so brave companions in arms, if we did not feel confident of victory; especially when we have mass-levies [pandēmei] opposed to our picked troops [apolektous], and what is more, Siceliots, who may disdain us but will not stand against us, their skill not being at all commensurate to their rashness. [3] You may also remember that we are far from home and have no friendly land near, except what your own swords shall win you; and here I put before you a motive just the reverse of that which the enemy are appealing to; their cry being that they shall fight for their country, mine that we shall fight for a country that is not ours, where we must conquer or hardly get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in great numbers. [4] Remember, therefore, your renown, and go boldly against the enemy, thinking the present strait and necessity more terrible than they.'"

We can take a break here to observe that Nicias is emphasising that his hoplites are 'picked troops' [apolektous], which would seem to signify that they are men trained to the standards of the Argive 'Thousand' at Second Mantinea and hence capable of meeting even Spartans on more or less even terms, so a 'pandēmei' of ordinary Sicilian hoplites should not be serious opposition.

Was he right?  The battle continues:

"After this address Nicias at once led on the army. The Syracusans were not at that moment expecting an immediate engagement, and some had even gone away to the town, which was close by; these now ran up as hard as they could, and though behind time, took their places here or there in the main body as fast as they joined it. Want of zeal or daring was certainly not the fault of the Syracusans, either in this or the other battles, but although not inferior in courage, so far as their military science might carry them, when this failed them they were compelled to give up their resolution also. On the present occasion, although they had not supposed that the Athenians would begin the attack, and although constrained to stand upon their defence at short notice, they at once took up their arms and advanced to meet them. [2] First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing, and routed or were routed by one another, as might be expected between light troops; next, soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and trumpeters urged on the heavy infantry to the charge; [3] and thus they advanced, the Syracusans to fight for their country, and each individual for his safety that day and liberty hereafter; in the enemy's army, the Athenians to make another's country theirs and to save their own from suffering by their defeat; the Argives and independent allies to help them in getting what they came for, and to earn by victory another sight of the country they had left behind; while the subject allies owed most of their ardour to the desire of self-preservation, which they could only hope for if victorious; next to which, as a secondary motive, came the chance of serving on easier terms, after helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest."

Preliminaries over (and we may note how the skirmishing was ended, and the advance of the heavy infantry begin, by trumpet), the action commenced.

"The armies now came to close quarters [en khersi], and for a long while fought without either giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps of thunder with lightning and heavy rain, which did not fail to add to the fears of the party fighting for the first time, and very little acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries these phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much more alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. [2] At last the Argives drove in [ōsamenōn, from ōtheō, a word which should be familiar to us] the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians routed [parerrēgnuto = broke by attacking the flank] the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus cut in two and betook itself to flight. [3] The Athenians did not pursue far, being held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan horse, who attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom they saw pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the victors followed so far as was safe in a body, and then went back and set up a trophy. [4] Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the Helorine road, where they reformed as well as they could under the circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures there. The rest returned to the town."

We may note that although spears crossed there is no mention of doratismos or any other designation for this stage, suggesting that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence and hence literary term-searching may not be a good way of demythologising Hellenic battle procedure.  The 'en chersi' struggle is followed by 'othismos', or at least by successful Argive otheo-ing against the Sicilian left, which uncovers the flank of the Athenians' opponents, permitting the Athenians to exploit the exposed flank and precipitate a collapse which saw off the rest of the Syracusan army.

[Erpingham]

It would be good to have some examples which separate doratismos, en khersi and othismos as distinct phases, so that we can be sure this division isn't a modern artefact.  Given the limited evidence for the term doratismos, is it possible it can become absorbed into another author's concept of en khersi, for example?

[RichT]

Well to be abundantly clear I'm not saying hoplites didn't fight with their spears - we can take that as a given. I'm objecting to people saying "there were phases that Greeks called doratismos, othismos, etc" since that isn't true.

It is a slightly different subject as to whether there were (more or less) discrete phases at all, whatever we want to call them. Difficult to prove to everyone's satisfaction since it's always possible to see a battle as happening in discrete phases if you want to - Patrick's account of the Syracuse battle being a case in point.

We may note that although spears crossed there is no mention of doratismos or any other designation for this stage, suggesting that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence and hence literary term-searching may not be a good way of demythologising Hellenic battle procedure.

OK - some misunderstanding then since I'm not denying the presence of fighting with spears - just that it wasn't called doratismos (if you want to apply a label to it, fine, but let's be clear it is a modern label).

The 'en chersi' struggle is followed by 'othismos', or at least by successful Argive otheo-ing against the Sicilian left, which uncovers the flank of the Athenians' opponents, permitting the Athenians to exploit the exposed flank and precipitate a collapse which saw off the rest of the Syracusan army.

You see, there is nothing whatever in Thucydides description that makes me read this as separate phases (to which we might apply the labels 'doratismos', 'othismos' etc, if so inclined). It is perfectly clear to me that they fought for a while until the Argives and Athenians each defeated their respective opponents. Thucydies uses different words for 'defeated' because it is good style to do so, not because they are different phases or types of fighting (you are greatly overinterpreting the 'attack in the flank' part, by the way). Saying "The 'en chersi' struggle is followed by 'othismos'" is a classic example (I know you qualify it) of the way discrete phases, with modern labels attached to them, get invented and applied.

Anthony:

It would be good to have some examples which separate doratismos, en khersi and othismos as distinct phases, so that we can be sure this division isn't a modern artefact.  Given the limited evidence for the term doratismos, is it possible it can become absorbed into another author's concept of en khersi, for example?

Absolutely, though getting an example that we all agreed did, or didn't, show distinct phases, doesn't seem very likely to happen. It is my belief that 'hand to hand', 'with swords', 'with spears', 'pushing' etc are all broadly speaking different words for the same thing (ie close quarters fighting between closely serried heavy infantry).

What we need is an analysis of Thucydides' and Xenophon's combat vocabulary, equivalent to Sam Koon's analysis of Livy's. This would be a huge job, but on a more modest scale, I'm working on something like this that may find its way into Slingshot.

[Patrick Waterson]

It would be good to have some examples which separate doratismos, en khersi and othismos as distinct phases, so that we can be sure this division isn't a modern artefact.  Given the limited evidence for the term doratismos, is it possible it can become absorbed into another author's concept of en khersi, for example?

It could: Thucydides does not employ 'doratismos' at all, or at least not detectably by the Perseus lexicon, but has 'en khersi' or its variations dozens of times to cover armies coming together and engaging in fighting which may or may not extend to othismos.  Since there are 82 instances of 'kheiras'/'khersi' variations in Thucydides I shall leave the diligent Richard to separate the wheat from the chaff.

Well to be abundantly clear I'm not saying hoplites didn't fight with their spears - we can take that as a given. I'm objecting to people saying "there were phases that Greeks called doratismos, othismos, etc" since that isn't true.

Though there do seem to have been phases, whatever the Greeks called them and whatever the modern label.  I accept the thought that we should not assume the Greeks had a tidy little battle stages diagram with labels identical to Hanson's.  I decline to accept that such phases did not exist on the basis that Hanson may have overdone the definition.

It is a slightly different subject as to whether there were (more or less) discrete phases at all, whatever we want to call them. Difficult to prove to everyone's satisfaction since it's always possible to see a battle as happening in discrete phases if you want to - Patrick's account of the Syracuse battle being a case in point.

The 'en chersi' struggle is followed by 'othismos', or at least by successful Argive otheo-ing against the Sicilian left, which uncovers the flank of the Athenians' opponents, permitting the Athenians to exploit the exposed flank and precipitate a collapse which saw off the rest of the Syracusan army.

You see, there is nothing whatever in Thucydides description that makes me read this as separate phases (to which we might apply the labels 'doratismos', 'othismos' etc, if so inclined). It is perfectly clear to me that they fought for a while until the Argives and Athenians each defeated their respective opponents. Thucydies uses different words for 'defeated' because it is good style to do so, not because they are different phases or types of fighting (you are greatly overinterpreting the 'attack in the flank' part, by the way). Saying "The 'en chersi' struggle is followed by 'othismos'" is a classic example (I know you qualify it) of the way discrete phases, with modern labels attached to them, get invented and applied.

Except that the 'othismos' by the Argives follows the 'en chersi' struggle both in the text and in the timing of the battle.

"... much more alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. [2] At last the Argives drove in [ōsamenōn] the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians the troops opposed to them [kai met' autous tōn Athēnaiōn to kata sphas autous] ..."

The 'at last' seems to be a translator's interpolation, but the fact that this development follows an extended session of 'continued resistance of the enemy' shows it is not the same stage of the fighting.

Richard is right on one point, however: the flanking aspect occurs after, not before, the Athenians see off their own opponents.

What we need is an analysis of Thucydides' and Xenophon's combat vocabulary, equivalent to Sam Koon's analysis of Livy's. This would be a huge job, but on a more modest scale, I'm working on something like this that may find its way into Slingshot.

Well ... actually, that is not what we need.  What we need is an understanding of how the troops concerned fought, which requires perspective from many aspects and angles.

[RichT]

Well it appears we are limping toward some agreement.

Except that the 'othismos' by the Argives follows the 'en chersi' struggle both in the text and in the timing of the battle.
...
The 'at last' seems to be a translator's interpolation, but the fact that this development follows an extended session of 'continued resistance of the enemy' shows it is not the same stage of the fighting.

Again to be absolutely clear - I'm not denying that the defeat came after the fighting. No dispute about that. That does not however mean that there were two phases of fighting. As my othismos article shows (to my satisfaction), 'otheo' is a general word for defeat, repel, push back, drive off, discomfit. So Thucydides is just saying - they fought for a while, as a result of which the Argives defeated their opponents, and the Athenians defeated theirs. No separate phases of fighting, just that one event follows the other. (The word 'othismos' is not used, remember).

What we need is to start by being clear what the ancient authors actually said, rather than just repeating modern assumptions. I will set to checking out those word usages

[Patrick Waterson]

Well it appears we are limping toward some agreement.

Except that the 'othismos' by the Argives follows the 'en chersi' struggle both in the text and in the timing of the battle.
...
The 'at last' seems to be a translator's interpolation, but the fact that this development follows an extended session of 'continued resistance of the enemy' shows it is not the same stage of the fighting.

Again to be absolutely clear - I'm not denying that the defeat came after the fighting. No dispute about that. That does not however mean that there were two phases of fighting. As my othismos article shows (to my satisfaction), 'otheo' is a general word for defeat, repel, push back, drive off, discomfit. So Thucydides is just saying - they fought for a while, as a result of which the Argives defeated their opponents, and the Athenians defeated theirs. No separate phases of fighting, just that one event follows the other. (The word 'othismos' is not used, remember).

Whereas to me, this just looks like woolly thinking and an inability to grasp the subject except by its literary coat-tails, reminiscent of a blind Brahmin with an elephant (just my perception - no offence intended ).  One might similarly lump together all the uses of 'barrage' and conclude that as the term was used for reporters' questions it could not have meant an inhibitory wall of shellfire to keep out enemy troops, or one might similarly assume or presume that 'kick out' simply meant 'evict' and never the actual application of boot to posterior to accelerate departure.  Try stripping out the non-battle uses of otheo/othismos and see when and how they are actually employed in the context of battle.

Let us look at another Greek hoplite battle (they are quite rare in this era): First Mantinea, in 418 BC.  The Spartans (and allies) have been surprised by the Argives and Athenians (and allies) but have rapidly drawn up their order of battle when the Spartan king Agis tries tinkering with his line and ends up with a damaging gap in his left centre.

"However, as he gave these orders in the moment of the onset [ephodō = first assault], and at short notice, it so happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not move over, for which offence they were afterwards banished from Sparta, as having been guilty of cowardice; and the enemy meanwhile closed [prosmeixei = come near/attack, assault] before the Sciritae （whom Agis on seeing that the two companies did not move over ordered to return to their place） had time to fill up the breach in question. [2] Now it was, however, that the Lacedaemonians, utterly worsted in respect of skill, showed themselves as superior in point of courage. [3] As soon as they came to close quarters [en khersin] with the enemy, the Mantinean right broke [trepei = turned] the Sciritae and Brasideans, and bursting in with their allies and the thousand picked Argives into the unclosed breach in their line cut up [diephtheiron = broke up, destroyed] and surrounded [kuklosamenoi = going around, enveloping] the Lacedaemonians, and drove them [exeōsan, from exōtheō] in full rout to the wagons, slaying some of the older men on guard there. [4] But the Lacedaemonians, worsted [hessonto - overcome] in this part of the field, with the rest of their army, and especially the center, where the three hundred knights, as they are called, fought round King Agis, fell on the older men of the Argives and the five companies so named, and on the Cleonaeans, the Orneans, and the Athenians next them, and instantly routed them; the greater number not even waiting to strike a blow [etrepsan oude es kheiras = turning without hand-to-hand], but giving way the moment that they came on, some even being trodden under foot, in their fear of being overtaken by their assailants. "

We have the 'ephodos' or what we would consider the 'charge', the initial coming-together of the lines, followed by 'en khersin' hand-to-hand combat, albeit with the customary Thucydidean lack of any separate reference to 'doratismos', with the outwinged left of each line immediately collapsing ('trope').  Apart from the left-wing Spartans being 'exotheo-ed' back to the baggage, nobody does anything resembling a push, but this is because of the instantaneous collapse of their opponents.  These are not just different ways of saying 'the enemy was beaten'.  One can see how Hanson would have started compiling his list, and why.

What we need is to start by being clear what the ancient authors actually said, rather than just repeating modern assumptions. I will set to checking out those word usages

I suggest beginning with the above.

[Erpingham]

Not being an expert on the sources like Patrick and Rich, I'm limited to avid reading of the examples and trying to make sense of them.

I'm increasingly dubious about doratismos as a separate phase.  When does it happen?  Several descriptions have shown that hoplites closed at a run, impacting shield to shield.  When was this stand-off at spears length?  There seems actually to be an impact stage, when the spear is for a few seconds vital, moving rapidly to an active hand-to-hand phase which becomes a crowded melee by natural process if one of the parties does not collapse from the off.

[RichT]

No offence taken! In turn, my perception is of someone so determined to maintain that black is white he would argue with himself, if no one else was available, right up to being killed on the next zebra crossing.

Having dispensed with the pleasantries -

Try stripping out the non-battle uses of otheo/othismos and see when and how they are actually employed in the context of battle.

I wrote an article for Slingshot, published in the latest issue (306) which does exactly this. Please do read it, you might find it interesting.

Let us look at another Greek hoplite battle (they are quite rare in this era): First Mantinea, in 418 BC.

Yes, I consider this in the article I mentioned (the use of exotheo).

We have the 'ephodos' or what we would consider the 'charge', the initial coming-together of the lines, followed by 'en khersin' hand-to-hand combat, albeit with the customary Thucydidean lack of any separate reference to 'doratismos', with the outwinged left of each line immediately collapsing ('trope').  Apart from the left-wing Spartans being 'exotheo-ed' back to the baggage, nobody does anything resembling a push, but this is because of the instantaneous collapse of their opponents.

Then we are in agreement, are we not? I've lost the thread of your argument and don't know what you think this passage proves. I assume you don't think the left-wing Spartans were literally shoved back to the baggage? Or that 'customary Thucydidean lack of any separate reference to doratismos' is down to a quirk of Thucydides' writing, rather than because there wasn't any separate doratismos?

Perhaps you should find a passage or passages, as Anthony suggests, where there are clear examples of fighting in different phases (hint - there IS some evidence for fighting in phases - you will find some collected for you in my article). NB that if your evidence for a pushing phase is just the use of 'otheo' verbs, then you will need to demonstrate how and why the use of such verbs in hoplite battles is proof of a literal pushing phase, while in all other types of battle it is not. You will find the relevant references collected in my article, if you read it.

Anthony:

There seems actually to be an impact stage, when the spear is for a few seconds vital, moving rapidly to an active hand-to-hand phase which becomes a crowded melee by natural process if one of the parties does not collapse from the off.

Yes, that's how I see it too (though there could be lots of variation in degree of getting stuck in depending on circumstances).