Roman Republican Civil War Legions

[Jim Webster]

The Gallic trophy kit was, we are told, issued as a punishment as opposed to a shortage-induced necessity; debtors and slave legionaries would of course have problems providing their own kit as their property status and hence disposable income was a bit on the low side.

Following the Marian reforms, which were themselves soon followed by the Italian allies gaining citizen status, some sort of Roman central coordination, and perhaps storage, seems inevitable: increasing numbers of non-propertied (and hence armourless) persons were joining the legions, and they would need to be equipped somehow.  Once you start equipping the capite censi because they lack armour, the temptation for the poorer elements to quietly jettison granddad's dinner-plate-on-a-string chest protector and line up for a full suit of nice shiny mail would be overwhelming.

And once you start equipping the lower-income citizenry, the middle-income citizenry, who are being squeezed by the dual difficulties of neglect of their farms through continuous campaigning and the rise of huge slaveowner-run farms driving them out of business, will also want equipping as their hand-me-downs are unfashionable, falling apart and increasingly unaffordable to replace.

Everything in the 1st century BC thus pressures Rome towards the state increasingly equipping legions and legionaries.

robbing temples of their displays as a method of punishing people is a new one. Where does it say this?

The new recruits wouldn't be lining up for shiny new mail, they'd get the set that the last armourless recruit handed back when he left.
This is one of the problems, we don't really know whether troops who were issued with equipment got to keep it. There's evidence for later for equipment being both kept and being reissued.

You have a very enlightened view of the state. In reality states tend to be very penny pinching on such things as soldiers kit, so that they will go out and buy their own stuff once they have money. The proportion of British troops wearing issue footwear on some 20th and 21st century campaigns has been surprisingly low.
Certainly we know from the Roman Empire than men seem to have spent considerable sums personalising their kit.

Given the multiple terms of service many of the poorer men did, it could well be that even the poor had managed to put together some decent kit by the end of their first term, whether through loot, purchase or even an issue of equipment to the small proportion of men who didn't have anything.
If they then rejoined the next legion, they could well just have taken any issue equipment with them rather than it being handed back. Indeed if there was pay deductions for equipment they might have regarded it as theirs anyway.
But in normal times, when a legion was raised prior to the civil wars, it is unlikely that the state would have had to provide kit for everyone, indeed it's entirely possible that legions could be raised that just needed a bit of topping up.

The problem comes when you have a civil war and suddenly everybody is raising troops, and at this point you've got some veterans with kit, some with partial kit, some new recruits with kit and some without. Over the next few months as stuff comes forward from various cities men are going to get their equipment made up, but it's hardly likely to be uniform.

Interestingly comments from the early republic about being able to hand out shields to men to get them to pose as extra Triari could well show that there might have been a stockpile of 'expendables' that went with the army

[Patrick Waterson]

Patrick appears to suggest that a dispersed armament production throughout the Roman world, so that any area could produce fully equipped cohorts quickly without recourse to ancestral arms or stores.  This would be a mix of new production and prepared stores.  While plausible, there seems to be a lack of evidence to either prove or disprove this.

Hence the discussion ...

The boast of a politician should never be confused with reality.
Again you assume some sort of central coordination but without any evidence that it existed.

Regarding Pompey, he was not a politician but a C-in-C; he did attempt to 'stamp his foot' and troops were raised all over Italy (thus demonstrating central coordination - see Caesar's Civil War), but Pompey rather spoiled the effect by retreating to Brundisium just as they were coming on line.

robbing temples of their displays as a method of punishing people is a new one. Where does it say this?

"And then, in addition to the two city legions which had been enrolled by the consuls at the beginning of the year, and the levy of slaves, also the cohorts raised from the Picene and Gallic districts, he stooped to that last defence of a state almost despaired of, when honour yields to necessity: namely, he issued an edict that, if any men who had committed a capital offence, or were in chains as judgment debtors, should become soldiers under him, he would order their release from punishment or debt. [4] Six thousand such men he armed with Gallic spoils which had been carried in the triumph of Gaius Flaminius, and thus set out from the city with twenty-five thousand armed men." - Livy XXIII.14.3

Those equipped with Gallic spoils were criminals or debtors, alike despised by Roman society; they had failed to be proper Romans and hence were given barbarian, non-Roman, weaponry.

The new recruits wouldn't be lining up for shiny new mail, they'd get the set that the last armourless recruit handed back when he left.
This is one of the problems, we don't really know whether troops who were issued with equipment got to keep it. There's evidence for later for equipment being both kept and being reissued.

By this time legionaries were serving their sixteen years more or less in sequence, which means they kept it for that length of time.  When discharged, they would be expected to hand back anything not theirs.

You have a very enlightened view of the state. In reality states tend to be very penny pinching on such things as soldiers kit, so that they will go out and buy their own stuff once they have money. The proportion of British troops wearing issue footwear on some 20th and 21st century campaigns has been surprisingly low.
Certainly we know from the Roman Empire that men seem to have spent considerable sums personalising their kit.

The armies of the latter years of the Republic appear to have contained an increasing proportion of, to use a Wellingtonian term, scum.  These men (often noted for sedition on campaign, cf. Fimbria's career and Lucullus' experiences) appear to have been more interested in take-home loot than in personalising their kit - they were not the career ethos professionals of the Empire period.

States around this time did take much better care of their soldiers than those of the post-mediaeval period: it was essentially enlightened self-interest because to begin with the soldiers were also the citizens who voted you in as consul, and the art of war of the time specified looking after the needs of troops as a priority (contrast General Oscar Potiorek in 1914: "In war one must expect to go hungry.").

As far as Rome was concerned, they would have been quite happy to armour their troops because someone else usually ended up footing the bill.  The end of the second Punic War and the war against Antiochus III both ended with Rome being paid a huge indemnity, and the habit did not stop there.  Such money as did not stick to the fingers of the consuls was squirrelled away for useful purposes, presumably including building roads and equipping legions as not a lot was spent on anything else (yet).

But in normal times, when a legion was raised prior to the civil wars, it is unlikely that the state would have had to provide kit for everyone, indeed it's entirely possible that legions could be raised that just needed a bit of topping up.

The problem comes when you have a civil war and suddenly everybody is raising troops, and at this point you've got some veterans with kit, some with partial kit, some new recruits with kit and some without. Over the next few months as stuff comes forward from various cities men are going to get their equipment made up, but it's hardly likely to be uniform.

Granted that during a civil war there is at least double the usual demand, but Rome had been having more or less continual civil wars and/or multiple major consular campaigns, interspersed with the odd major slave revolt for variety, since 90 BC.  By 48 BC they were probably quite used to the level of demand involved in equipping new troops simultaneously for both sides.

In Caesar's and Pompey's war, both sides seem to have had returning veterans who quite likely lacked kit (they had gone off to farm their lands in comfortable retirement): they were usually parcelled out to stiffen the newer legions.  One presumes they were equipped at the same time.

Interestingly comments from the early republic about being able to hand out shields to men to get them to pose as extra Triari could well show that there might have been a stockpile of 'expendables' that went with the army

If this relates to the accensi at Vesuvius in 340 BC (Livy VIII.8-10 and all that), Rodger Williams' article in Slingshot 292 sort of looked at this.  What appears to have happened is that accensi were the butchers, bakers and candlestick makers who were only called to the standards in a national emergency, and then parcelled out 900 to a legion (bringing it up to the traditional emergency strength of 5,000 or so).  The question is whether, as they served so infrequently, they brought their own kit or were issued with that left behind by former (deceased) triarii, of which there would presumably accrue a stockpile over time.  Or both: I think armour was personal, though weapons may have been issued by the state (not entirely sure: don't quote me on this).

[Jim Webster]

Regarding Pompey, he was not a politician but a C-in-C; he did attempt to 'stamp his foot' and troops were raised all over Italy (thus demonstrating central coordination - see Caesar's Civil War), but Pompey rather spoiled the effect by retreating to Brundisium just as they were coming on line.

It seems that his soldiers weren't as good or as well equipped as he hoped. So he had to fall back to give time for training and time to get them properly equipped

[Jim Webster]

"And then, in addition to the two city legions which had been enrolled by the consuls at the beginning of the year, and the levy of slaves, also the cohorts raised from the Picene and Gallic districts, he stooped to that last defence of a state almost despaired of, when honour yields to necessity: namely, he issued an edict that, if any men who had committed a capital offence, or were in chains as judgment debtors, should become soldiers under him, he would order their release from punishment or debt. [4] Six thousand such men he armed with Gallic spoils which had been carried in the triumph of Gaius Flaminius, and thus set out from the city with twenty-five thousand armed men." - Livy XXIII.14.3

Those equipped with Gallic spoils were criminals or debtors, alike despised by Roman society; they had failed to be proper Romans and hence were given barbarian, non-Roman, weaponry.

nowhere does it say that "The Gallic trophy kit was, we are told, issued as a punishment as opposed to a shortage-induced necessity"
Firstly he took volunteers from amongst them. Secondly it appears he offered them the only equipment he had available, he'd raised two legions and a number of cohorts and he well was dry

[Jim Webster]

The armies of the latter years of the Republic appear to have contained an increasing proportion of, to use a Wellingtonian term, scum.  These men (often noted for sedition on campaign, cf. Fimbria's career and Lucullus' experiences) appear to have been more interested in take-home loot than in personalising their kit - they were not the career ethos professionals of the Empire period.

States around this time did take much better care of their soldiers than those of the post-mediaeval period: it was essentially enlightened self-interest because to begin with the soldiers were also the citizens who voted you in as consul, and the art of war of the time specified looking after the needs of troops as a priority (contrast General Oscar Potiorek in 1914: "In war one must expect to go hungry.").

As far as Rome was concerned, they would have been quite happy to armour their troops because someone else usually ended up footing the bill.  The end of the second Punic War and the war against Antiochus III both ended with Rome being paid a huge indemnity, and the habit did not stop there.  Such money as did not stick to the fingers of the consuls was squirrelled away for useful purposes, presumably including building roads and equipping legions as not a lot was spent on anything else (yet).

except that in the civil war it wasn't states that were raising the armies
Similarly money squirreled away was not a lot of use. Carthage had perhaps three hundred men capable of making swords. Throw twice as much money at them on Monday and you still only had three hundred men capable of making swords on Wednesday.
The money stockpiled could pay the wages of legions, it couldn't summon into being their equipment overnight. If Rome had the wherewithal to produce equipment at the drop of a hat, cities wouldn't have been stepping forward to offer equipment, they'd have just offered cash.

[Patrick Waterson]

Regarding Pompey, he was not a politician but a C-in-C; he did attempt to 'stamp his foot' and troops were raised all over Italy (thus demonstrating central coordination - see Caesar's Civil War), but Pompey rather spoiled the effect by retreating to Brundisium just as they were coming on line.

It seems that his soldiers weren't as good or as well equipped as he hoped. So he had to fall back to give time for training and time to get them properly equipped

It was not that so much as Caesar crossing the Rubicon when he did, catching everyone on the hop with troops still being raised, trained, equipped etc. (which takes a few weeks).  Pompey had two choices: go to meet Caesar with what he had (the potentially winning choice), or run away with what he had to either Spain (where he had an army) or the East (where he had the means to raise an army) - either being an apparently safer option, though delusively so.  He took the latter choice; apparently by this point in his career he felt more at home raising armies than commanding them.

One should note that Pompey's falling back did not give time for his newly-raised troops to be equipped and trained: he simply abandoned many of them to Caesar.  The rest were still somewhat untrained, albeit seemingly wholly equipped as nobody comments on any deficiencies in their equipment, by the time of Pharsalus.

[Patrick Waterson]

On the troops raised with Gallic trophy weaponry ...

nowhere does it say that "The Gallic trophy kit was, we are told, issued as a punishment as opposed to a shortage-induced necessity"
Firstly he took volunteers from amongst them. Secondly it appears he offered them the only equipment he had available, he'd raised two legions and a number of cohorts and he well was dry

Although nowhere does it say that he was dry, or that this was the only equipment available.  Polybius II.31 incidentally notes that 40,000 Celts fell at Telamon and the spoils were sent to Rome, so we have to ask why if arms were in such short supply only the criminals and debtors were issued with them.

And on money and materials ...

except that in the civil war it wasn't states that were raising the armies

Actually it was.  To raise an army an individual needed Imperium, which came in two aspects: appointment to a relevant office (usually consul; occasionally dictator) and use of the state's facilities and officials.  This is one reason why each side was keen to have its own senate.

Similarly money squirreled away was not a lot of use.

"The sinews of war are infinite money" - Cato.

Carthage had perhaps three hundred men capable of making swords. Throw twice as much money at them on Monday and you still only had three hundred men capable of making swords on Wednesday.

But bring in Utica and a few other cities and their facilities, and you have maybe six hundred men capable of making swords on Wednesday.

The money stockpiled could pay the wages of legions, it couldn't summon into being their equipment overnight. If Rome had the wherewithal to produce equipment at the drop of a hat, cities wouldn't have been stepping forward to offer equipment, they'd have just offered cash.

Let us not confuse the pre-90 BC situation, where Rome lived principally on the contributions of its allies, with the post-90 BC situation where everybody in Italy was a Roman citizen (and some ambitious types were aiming at ruling the lot).  Of course money cannot be transmuted into equipment 'overnight': there is always a waiting period of some weeks, but those weeks habitually occurred between the election of consuls (and apportionment of their campaigns) at the very beginning of a year and the mustering of the legions in the spring.  This would be the time when the coffers were opened, or at least orders placed for payment once fulfilled.  Naturally, if the springtime was rather fuller of activity than expected, as occurred in 49 BC, the process could be moved elsewhere with the same time lag (which gave Caesar a chance to collect Spain in the interim).

[Jim Webster]

Regarding Pompey, he was not a politician but a C-in-C; he did attempt to 'stamp his foot' and troops were raised all over Italy (thus demonstrating central coordination - see Caesar's Civil War), but Pompey rather spoiled the effect by retreating to Brundisium just as they were coming on line.

It seems that his soldiers weren't as good or as well equipped as he hoped. So he had to fall back to give time for training and time to get them properly equipped

It was not that so much as Caesar crossing the Rubicon when he did, catching everyone on the hop with troops still being raised, trained, equipped etc. (which takes a few weeks).  Pompey had two choices: go to meet Caesar with what he had (the potentially winning choice), or run away with what he had to either Spain (where he had an army) or the East (where he had the means to raise an army) - either being an apparently safer option, though delusively so.  He took the latter choice; apparently by this point in his career he felt more at home raising armies than commanding them.

One should note that Pompey's falling back did not give time for his newly-raised troops to be equipped and trained: he simply abandoned many of them to Caesar.  The rest were still somewhat untrained, albeit seemingly wholly equipped as nobody comments on any deficiencies in their equipment, by the time of Pharsalus.

so actually he was neither a successful general nor a successful politician. 
He couldn't stamp his foot and produce soldiers, and the system couldn't arm and equip them properly. This does seem to militate against there being large stockpiles of equipment because if Italy contained them, Pompey would have had access

[Jim Webster]

On the troops raised with Gallic trophy weaponry ...

nowhere does it say that "The Gallic trophy kit was, we are told, issued as a punishment as opposed to a shortage-induced necessity"
Firstly he took volunteers from amongst them. Secondly it appears he offered them the only equipment he had available, he'd raised two legions and a number of cohorts and he well was dry

Although nowhere does it say that he was dry, or that this was the only equipment available.  Polybius II.31 incidentally notes that 40,000 Celts fell at Telamon and the spoils were sent to Rome, so we have to ask why if arms were in such short supply only the criminals and debtors were issued with them.

simple arms were in such short supply because there was no facilities for rapid production and no stockpile.
They'd already just raised two legions and some cohorts, through usual channels.

The reason debtors and criminals were issued with Gallic arms you've already answered. They wouldn't have their own. So if they volunteered, somebody had to supply it
Because the Roman state had no stockpile and production took a long time, the only source was the gallic arms.

[Jim Webster]

"The sinews of war are infinite money" - Cato.

Carthage had perhaps three hundred men capable of making swords. Throw twice as much money at them on Monday and you still only had three hundred men capable of making swords on Wednesday.

But bring in Utica and a few other cities and their facilities, and you have maybe six hundred men capable of making swords on Wednesday.

Except that given communications, Wednesday could be three, six or even nine months off, and half these cities could either openly or covertly support the other side.
But still the point stands, mere money is no use when the skills are the limiting factor and your answer to them being the limiting factor does not involve money, but widening the recruitment area. Money is comparatively meaningless.
It is the sinews of war in that it can pay for those with the skills to work for you, be they smiths, leather makers or soldiers, but it will not create extra leather makers or smiths, it merely alters their allegiance. The amount of legions that can be supplied doesn't increase because you're stealing smiths from the common pool.

[Jim Webster]

Let us not confuse the pre-90 BC situation, where Rome lived principally on the contributions of its allies, with the post-90 BC situation where everybody in Italy was a Roman citizen (and some ambitious types were aiming at ruling the lot).  Of course money cannot be transmuted into equipment 'overnight': there is always a waiting period of some weeks, but those weeks habitually occurred between the election of consuls (and apportionment of their campaigns) at the very beginning of a year and the mustering of the legions in the spring.  This would be the time when the coffers were opened, or at least orders placed for payment once fulfilled.  Naturally, if the springtime was rather fuller of activity than expected, as occurred in 49 BC, the process could be moved elsewhere with the same time lag (which gave Caesar a chance to collect Spain in the interim).

It was you who brought in the cities making contributions initially, mainly as far as I can tell because the lack of evidence of Roman stockpiles meant that other sources were necessary.
Placing orders for kit isn't the same of having kit on hand.
We know from Egypt somewhat later that when the army placed orders for clothing, those who took the order went round scores of subcontractors who would start weaving garments suitable for the military rather than other garments.
For armour and swords, we're not talking about major arms manufacturers, we're talking about hundreds of small businesses who might have a few pieces in stock (but not many because having your capital tied up in stock is not good business.)
And you cannot turn round to these weapons producers and say "Make only for us for six months" because if you do that, what you've done is guaranteed that those men who were buying their own kit, or having armour altered, or whatever, cannot get it done, which means that you've got to armour them
And anyway it doesn't work because you're just the state, you turn up, place big orders that you pay for late and are prone to cancelling at short notice. He on the other hand is the son of a valued customer, you fix all his farm implements for him as your father did for his father, and you'll continue to work with down the generations. His kit will get fixed and the state order will be done between times

[Patrick Waterson]

He couldn't stamp his foot and produce soldiers, and the system couldn't arm and equip them properly.

There was more to it than this simplistic statement.

"Multitudes of veterans, who had formerly served under [Pompey], flocked to him from all parts, allured by the expectation of rewards and dignities. A great number of officers belonging to the two legions lately returned by Caesar, had likewise orders to attend him. Rome was filled with troops." - Caesar, Civil War I.3.2-3

But all was not plain sailing.

"But when Pompey began to levy recruits, some refused to obey the summons, and a few came together reluctantly and without zest, but the greater part cried out for a settlement of the controversy. For Antony, in defiance of the senate, had read before the people a letter of Caesar containing propositions which were attractive to the multitude. He asked, namely, that both Pompey and he should give up their provinces, disband their armies, put themselves in the hands of the people, and render an account of what they had done." - Plutarch, Pompey 59.2

The result was a hesitant and half-hearted attempt to talk and mobilise at the same time, with limited success in each.  In the middle of all this,

"And now word was brought that Caesar had seized Ariminum, a large city of Italy, and was marching directly upon Rome with all his forces." - idem 60.1

The result was strident chaos.

"As soon as the report of this came flying to Rome and the city was filled with tumult, consternation, and a fear that was beyond compare, the senate at once went in a body and in all haste to Pompey, and the magistrates came too. And when Tullus asked Pompey about an army and a military force, and Pompey, after some delay, said timidly that he had in readiness the soldiers who had come from Caesar, [4] and thought that he could speedily assemble also those who had been previously levied, thirty thousand in number, Tullus cried aloud, 'Thou hast deceived us, Pompey!' and advised sending envoys to Caesar ..." - idem 60.3-4

And yet it appeared to Caesar that Pompey had been mobilising with some success.

"Troops were levied over all Italy, arms enjoined [arma imperantur = equipment ordered], money demanded of the colonies and free towns, and even taken from the very temples; in fine, neither divine nor human rights were regarded." - Caesar, op cit I.6.8

This last passage of Caesar, with the laconic 'arma imperantur', demonstrates that equipment had been ordered for the troops being raised.  Note that money, but not equipment, was being taken from temples.

Placing orders for kit isn't the same of having kit on hand.

True.  And we see here that mass mobilisation of troops was parallelled with mass production of equipment.  The original point at issue was whether such capacity existed: Caesar's statement demonstrates that it did.  It does not really matter whether it consisted of myriad domestic forge-owners or state-run establishments whose slaves churned out endless supplies of kit under master craftsmen, or both; the capacity was there.  QED.

[Jim Webster]

arma imperantur can also mean 'arms demanded'

I don't think we can use the term mass production, it's a technical term and tends to mean the production of standarised product on a particular site.
There is no evidence whatsoever of one or two factory sites

All that happened was Pompey sent out agents to buy stuff up, knocking on the doors of armourers and blacksmiths the length of italy.
There is no reason for weapons to be taken from temples, only comparatively few temples would have weaponry as votive offerings. They certainly weren't being used as arsenals

Arms were ordered or demanded, but there's no evidence that they actually appeared, after all the military force evaporated

[Patrick Waterson]

arma imperantur can also mean 'arms demanded'

Same difference: Pompey orders them obtained.  This indicates the existence of stockpiles, production capacity or both.

All that happened was Pompey sent out agents to buy stuff up, knocking on the doors of armourers and blacksmiths the length of italy.

Now this really is imagination ...

Arms were ordered or demanded, but there's no evidence that they actually appeared, after all the military force evaporated

Between ourselves: as a discussion strategy, I really would recommend reading the period sources instead of making erroneous assertions.  The military force did not evaporate: some of it was collected by Pompey en route to Brundisium, but most fell into Caesar's hands and was either enlisted by him or (rarely) demobilised and sent home.

Specifically,

Pompey's officer Thermus had raised five cohorts and avoided capture by abandoning Iguvium, but his troops deserted and went home. (Civil War I.12)

Pompey's officer Attius had raised an unspecified number of cohorts at Auximum, "whence he had despatched senators to levy forces over all Picenum".  The chief citizens of Auximum told him they would not shut their gates against Caesar, so he left, with Caesar pursuing.

"But some of Caesar's first ranks pursuing him, obliged him to stop; and a battle ensuing, he was deserted by his men. Some of the troops returned home; the rest went over to Caesar, and brought along with them L. Pupius, first centurion, who had formerly held the same rank in Pompey's army." - idem I.13.3-5

It was at this juncture that Pompey and his adherents left Rome.

"Pompey had left the town the day before, and was upon his way to Apulia, where he had quartered the legions he had received from Caesar. The levies were discontinued within the city, and no place appeared secure on this side of Capua." - idem I.14.3-4

The interrupted mobilisation then recommenced, including a curious attempt to turn gladiators into cavalry:

"Here, at last, they took courage and rallied, and began to renew their levies in the colonies round about, which had been sent thither by the Julian law. Lentulus summoned into the forum the gladiators whom Caesar had ordered to be trained up there, gave them their liberty, furnished them with horses, and commanded them to follow him. But being afterwards admonished by his friends that this step was universally condemned, he dispersed them into the neighbouring town of Campania, to keep garrison there." - idem I.14.4-5

At no point is either manpower or equipment seen as a limiting factor.

The big mobilisation in northern Italy was under Domitius, at Corfinium.  This indicates both the dispersal and the organisation of the Roman troop levying arrangements.

"Caesar meanwhile leaving Auximum, traversed the whole country of Picenum; where he was joyfully received in all parts by the inhabitants, who furnished his army with every thing necessary. Even Cingulum itself, a town founded by Labienus, and built at his own expense, sent deputies to him, with an offer of their submission and services. He demanded a certain number of soldiers, which were sent immediately. Meantime the twelfth legion joined him; and with these two he marched to Asculum, a town of Picenum. Here Lentulus Spinther commanded with ten cohorts; who, hearing of Caesar's approach, quitted the place with his troops, who almost all deserted him upon the march. Being left with only a few, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Picenum to encourage his followers in those parts. Vibullius understanding from him the state of affairs in Picenum, dismissed Lentulus, and took the soldiers under his command. He likewise drew together from the neighbouring provinces as many as he could meet with of Pompey's levies: among the rest, Lucilius Hirus, who was flying, with six cohorts, from Camerinum, where they had been quartered. Out of all these he formed thirteen cohorts, with which he posted, by great journeys, to Corfinium, where Domitius Ahenobarbus commanded; whom he informed that Caesar was approaching with two legions. Domitius had already got together, with great expedition, twenty cohorts from Alba, the country of the Marsi, Peligni and the neighbouring provinces." - idem I.15

As one may see, these are substantial forces.  Both sides were engaged in levying troops, sometimes in the same area.

"Caesar having made himself master of Asculum, and obliged Lentulus to retire, ordered the soldiers who had deserted him, to be sought after, and new levies to be made." - idem I.16.1

Caesar would have been making use of the same recruitment/equipment mechanism as his predecessor, albeit with his own appointees in charge.

Caesar then acquired seven cohorts from Sulmona, twenty-two cohorts and the VIII legion from Gaul and 300 cavalry from Noricum (I.18).  He then settles in to besiege Corfinium, which yields soon afterwards with 30 cohorts, which he acquires ("He ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the usual oath to him" - I.23.5).  The process of recruitment and acquisition of troops still went on.

"Pompey, having intelligence of what passed at Corfinium, retreated from Luceria to Canusium, and from thence to Brundusium. He ordered all the new levies to join him, armed the shepherds and slaves, furnished them with horses, and formed a body of about three hundred cavalry. Meanwhile the praetor L. Manlius flying from Alba, with six cohorts; and the praetor Rutilus Lupus, from Tarracina, with three; saw Caesar's cavalry at a distance, commanded by Vibius Curius: upon which, the soldiers immediately abandoned the two praetors, and joined the troops under the conduct of Curius. Several other parties, flying different ways, fell in, some with the foot, others with the horse." - idem I.24.1-4

One is reminded of the 1815 placard placed in Paris by a wag when Napoleon was marching on Paris at the start of his Hundred Days:

"To Louis XVIII: my dear brother, there is no need to send more troops; I have enough already."

As can be seen from the above, Roman organisation for enlistment and equipment of troops was extensive, thorough and pervasive.  Nowhere is it noted that any troops were deficient in equipment and indeed the newly-raised troops were occasionally committed to battle, where had they been lacking equipment of any sort it would have been very noticeable.

[Jim Webster]

arma imperantur can also mean 'arms demanded'

Same difference: Pompey orders them obtained.  This indicates the existence of stockpiles, production capacity or both.

we know there was production capacity, nobody doubts there was production capacity, and if you don't ask for stuff you don't get it. But there's no evidence of any sort of stockpile capable of equipping multiple extra legions, and there's no evidence of any sort of factory based mass production.
So all Pompey did is send word to scores of communities and those who felt like supporting him would, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, go and see what was sitting on the shelves of various local smiths. If they were really keen supporters of him they might even have put up money to get more produced. The results indicate that there weren't a lot of really keen supporters in Italy