Roman Republican Civil War Legions

[Jim Webster]

If you want an example of raising legions try Sallust the Catiline war http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Sallust/Bellum_Catilinae*.html


While this was taking place in Rome, Catiline combined the forces which he had brought with him with those which Manlius already had, and formed two legions, 2 filling up the cohorts so far as the number of his soldiers permitted.91 Then distributing among them equally such volunteers or conspirators as came to the camp, he soon completed the full quota of the legions, although in the beginning he had no more than two thousand men. 3 But only about a fourth part of the entire force was p117provided with regular arms.92 The others carried whatever weapons chance had given them; namely, javelins or lances, or in some cases pointed stakes.

With the Civil war we have the problem that it was written at Caesar's behest, and it wasn't particularly to his advantage to portray his opponents as poorly armed.
And when those opponents joined him, it wasn't really tactful to mention that when he'd found them they were in charge of a half equipped rabble with the backsides hanging out of their trousers

[Patrick Waterson]

One should point out that Catiline was a renegade and a conspirator and as such did not have imperium.  This is why he was scratching around for whatever he could find.

"Accordingly, when the elections had been held Marcus Tullius and Gaius Antonius were proclaimed consuls, and this at first filled the conspirators with consternation. 2 And yet Catiline's frenzy did not abate. On the contrary, he increased his activity every day, made collections of arms at strategic points in Italy, and borrowed money on his own credit or that of his friends, sending it to Faesulae to a certain Manlius, who afterwards was the first to take the field." - Sallust, Catiline 24.1-2

Catiline was trying to assemble a private army.  As Sallust himself points out:

"The power which according to Roman usage is thus conferred upon a magistrate by the senate is supreme, allowing him to raise an army, wage war, exert any kind of compulsion upon allies and citizens, and exercise unlimited command and jurisdiction at home and in the field; otherwise the consul has none of these privileges except by the order of the people." - idem 29.3

Catiline did not have imperium, and hence lacked access to the system of recruitment and equipment which fielded Roman armies, which is why he was resorting to desperate measures to field whatever he could find.  Before he could take the field he was pronounced a traitor by the senate (idem 36.2) and the Roman recruitment machine swung into action:

"It was further voted that the consuls should hold a levy and that Antonius with an army should at once pursue Catiline, while Cicero defended the capital." - idem 36.3

Antony's army took the field without any equipment deficiencies being noted, but Catiline, who had been assembling his private army as best he could, found himself high and dry with a partly-equipped force.

In short, the case of Catiline is not an example of the normal procedure for a Roman army being raised.

we know there was production capacity, nobody doubts there was production capacity, and if you don't ask for stuff you don't get it. But there's no evidence of any sort of stockpile capable of equipping multiple extra legions, and there's no evidence of any sort of factory based mass production.

And yet multiple legions were equipped, evidence or no.  While I am happy to agree that there was unlikely to have been anything quite like the fabricae of the later Empire, the ease with which large numbers of troops were raised and, unlike Catiline's improvised efforts, no deficiencies in equipment noted, indicates some kind of combination of excess stock and/or excess production capacity and a system to manage them.

So all Pompey did is send word to scores of communities and those who felt like supporting him would, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, go and see what was sitting on the shelves of various local smiths. If they were really keen supporters of him they might even have put up money to get more produced. The results indicate that there weren't a lot of really keen supporters in Italy

He put together about six legions, more than half of which were inherited by Caesar: one wonders what would have happened if he had had some really keen supporters.   And six legions' worth of equipment sitting on the shelves of local smiths does sound rather like a stockpile ...

Or one can infer that through his imperium he put into motion a well-established framework for raising and equipping legions, about eight at a time, which seems to have been the norm when Crassus was doing the same.  This appears to have been organised at city level, and would involve more than just hoping to find something on the shelves of local smiths.

[Jim Webster]

One should point out that Catiline was a renegade and a conspirator and as such did not have imperium.  This is why he was scratching around for whatever he could find.

So was Caesar according to his opponents. Catiline's problem was that he was defeated. His inability to find arms and armour in an Italy where apparently you only had to stamp your foot shows that perhaps there wasn't that much kit lying about. After all, if it was so easy to raise six legions because there was so much stuff lying about, it's amazing that Catiline couldn't lay hands on enough for the few thousand men he'd got. If you read the account he has men going with their armed followers to various towns and cities, indeed there were such stocks of arms in Arretium that Catiline had to supply arms to the citizens. Yet these towns and cities aren't mentioned as closing their gates to him
Others might not have done as badly as him, but Pompey's experience shows that it wasn't that easy

[Jim Webster]

He put together about six legions, more than half of which were inherited by Caesar: one wonders what would have happened if he had had some really keen supporters.   And six legions' worth of equipment sitting on the shelves of local smiths does sound rather like a stockpile ...

except there is no evidence to show that they were fully equipped, their arms and armour are not actually mentioned. We discover the men are not sold on the idea of fighting for Pompey, it's entirely possible that their lack of enthusiasm is due to lack of equipment, reasonable organisation and the fact that nothing seemed to be coming together properly

Remember our main source is someone who doesn't want to embarrass those who had changed sides to join him

[Duncan Head]

One should point out that Catiline was a renegade and a conspirator and as such did not have imperium.  This is why he was scratching around for whatever he could find.

The other point brought up by this example is that producing (or even collecting) equipment takes time. Catiline was in a hurry. In Pompey's case, even if not all the men he raised in Italy were fully equipped straight away, he had a year while Caesar secured the West, so that by Dyrrhachium or Pharsalus one can reasonably expect that any deficiencies would have been made up.

Nonetheless, the Catiline example is one of the few passages directly relevant to Harry's original question:

Such troops are usually represented as raw legionaries but would they in fact have borne any resemblance to Legionaries (drilled, triple acies, pila, scutum) or would they really have been more akin to a medieval emergency peasant levy? 

But only about a fourth part of the entire force was provided with regular arms. The others carried whatever weapons chance had given them; namely, javelins or lances, or in some cases pointed stakes.

Sed ex omni copia circiter pars quarta erat militaribus armis instructa, ceteri, ut quemque casus armaverat, sparos aut lanceas, alii praeacutas sudis portabant.

"Sparos" from sparus, a hunting-spear; the same kind of weapon that Cato in Livy 34.15 was using whilst mounted; "lanceas", quite an unusual use of lancea in a Republican context, the word is much commoner describing Imperial forces. I wonder what the recruits were doing "by chance" with lanceae: another sort of hunting-spear, perhaps?

[Duncan Head]

Another example of haste:

(Octavian) collected about 10,000 men, not fully armed and not mustered in regular cohorts, but serving merely as a body-guard under one banner. ... Some of them asked leave to return home in order to arm themselves, saying that they could not perform their duty with other arms than their own.

These are re-mobilised veterans rather than raw recruits, though.

As to whether "new" legions were "drilled, triplex acies", one example is:

(Brutus) had a high opinion of his Macedonian soldiers and he drilled them in the Roman way.

[Jim Webster]

One should point out that Catiline was a renegade and a conspirator and as such did not have imperium.  This is why he was scratching around for whatever he could find.

The other point brought up by this example is that producing (or even collecting) equipment takes time. Catiline was in a hurry. In Pompey's case, even if not all the men he raised in Italy were fully equipped straight away, he had a year while Caesar secured the West, so that by Dyrrhachium or Pharsalus one can reasonably expect that any deficiencies would have been made up.

so I think we're agreed that there were no real stockpiles of equipment ready for issue. Probably because the biggest fear was a Catiline on a Spartacus, (even Catiline's supporters feared a slave uprising and run away slaves were turned away)
As for later, yes, draw on a large enough area and you'll collect enough kit if you've got time.
But back to the original question "Such troops are usually represented as raw legionaries but would they in fact have borne any resemblance to Legionaries (drilled, triple acies, pila, scutum) "


I think that given there were no major stockpiles, armies in a hurry would take what they could get.
I would suspect that there could be a wider variety of helmets amongst eastern legions than western as more local styles were used.
With shields, I'd suspect everybody had a scutum but there could have been subtle differences in size and weight due to woods used etc. Probably not enough to show in a wargames figure 

Armour was probably the big area of difference, and I'm moving away from the leather armour because unless there was a tradition in an area, producing all the moulds and suchlike necessary is going to be a major investment, which would pay off centrally but not for the small manufacturer
I would suggest that the armourers just supplied the armour they normally supplied. On top of this some men would have their own kit already, so I'd see eastern legions being very mixed, probably with some men without armour.
Western legions would probably be less mixed because more armourers were used to making mail, but again, depending upon how long it was since units were raised, there could still be men without armour

As time went on, the number of men without armour would decrease, but I'm not sure units would get more or less uniform as they looted each other 

[Prufrock]

It might be of interest to look at Caesar's description of how Vercingetorix prepared for war.

Gallic War, vii.4:

[Vercingetorix] is saluted king by his partisans; he sends ambassadors in every direction, he conjures them to adhere firmly to their promise. He quickly attaches to his interests the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovice, and all the others who border on the ocean; the supreme command is conferred on him by unanimous consent. On obtaining this authority, he demands hostages from all these states, he orders a fixed number of soldiers to be sent to him immediately; he determines what quantity of arms each state shall prepare at home, and before what time; he pays particular attention to the cavalry.

http://classics.mit.edu/Caesar/gallic.7.7.html

If we extrapolate from this, the Roman world in time of civil war is probably not dissimilar, and Patrick is on the right track. The general sends out 'ambassadors' and makes known what it is that he needs and when. The towns of the area visited then decide whether to cooperate or not, knowing that there will be consequences either way.

[Patrick Waterson]

This seems to be the way it was done at the time: before he secured 'imperium' from the Gauls, Vercingetorix was building up his strength in much the same manner as Catiline (Gallic War VII.3).  Once he had 'imperium', he levied troops in much the same manner as Pompey and Caesar.

But back to the original question "Such troops are usually represented as raw legionaries but would they in fact have borne any resemblance to Legionaries (drilled, triple acies, pila, scutum)"

This we can answer in the affirmative; the weakness of these newly-raised troops, as Pompey and Caesar both realised, was not that their organisation or equipment was deficient, but that they had not seen battle.  Against similarly inexperienced troops they would perform well, or as well as could be expected; against veterans of many campaigns they would be inferior in elan, morale and technique, perhaps decisively so.

These troops were raised (and seemingly equipped and given basic training) as cohorts, and then combined into legions (and, as soon as possible, trained to act as legions).  The one part that the training and equipment establishment could not supply was combat experience and the confidence and capability it confers.

I think that given there were no major stockpiles, armies in a hurry would take what they could get.

These armies would not necessarily be in a hurry: they would be raised according to the usual timetable for Roman campaigning, and everything would be done in the usual measured, classical (and even more so Roman) way.  We can conjecture about the level of production as opposed to stockpiling; production would probably be favoured, but it would be a rare city which did not maintain some form of armoury, if only to equip its own citizens in time of emergency now that property qualification had largely gone by the board (along with, apparently, Roman and Italian cavalry).

I would suggest that the armourers just supplied the armour they normally supplied. On top of this some men would have their own kit already, so I'd see eastern legions being very mixed, probably with some men without armour.
Western legions would probably be less mixed because more armourers were used to making mail, but again, depending upon how long it was since units were raised, there could still be men without armour

As time went on, the number of men without armour would decrease, but I'm not sure units would get more or less uniform as they looted each other 

Given that the customary procedure was to take a season (or at least a few weeks) to raise a legion, Pompey's eastern legions had rather longer and could have presented a much more uniform appearance, albeit one perhaps reflecting the style of the area in which they were raised.  This I leave to those who know of such matters.  It seem unlikely that any Roman citizen would have been fielded without armour: were this to occur, questions would be asked; heads would, if not roll, at least be relieved of a fine - and equipment found to make up the deficiency.

[aligern]

Duncan's quote from Appian is important here and should reeive more weight. If the recruits were going home to collect weaponry there is a strong implication that at home they would find helmet, mail, sword, shield, pila. These are presumably the kit of retired veterans . It may be that the recruits are the sons or grandsons of veterans, but the kit is still there. Given that Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, Anthony, Crassus  the Pompeians, had all raised many legions the amount of kit around would have been huge and would likely have lasted for 30 to 50 years especially if chaps e pected a call up even though they themselves had never fought. As I said eRlier, in frontier provinces such as Gallia Transalpina , Spain, Greece there were very likely cohorts raised and used as paramilitary, probably part time police and these would have kit. Hence what would be required for a general muster would be repair rather than creation of arms from new.
Roy

[Swampster]

As I said eRlier, in frontier provinces such as Gallia Transalpina , Spain, Greece there were very likely cohorts raised and used as paramilitary, probably part time police and these would have kit. Hence what would be required for a general muster would be repair rather than creation of arms from new.
Roy

I suspect forces of this type were those initially sent against Spartacus from e.g. Capua.
Appian says:
"Varinius Glaber was first sent against him and afterwards Publius Valerius, not with regular armies, but with forces picked up in haste and at random, for the Romans did not consider this a war yet, but a raid, something like an attack of robbery. "

Plutarch says this was actually the third force sent, with forces from Capua and Rome already having been defeated.

[Patrick Waterson]

Indeed, the first reaction to and line of defence against local troubles appears to have been the use of city cohorts as opposed to legions.

One point to consider about Octavian's not-fully-equipped bodyguard is that this was yet another private army: Antony held a tenuous imperium and the command for Macedonia, but "I brought my army from Macedonia to Brundisium so that I might use it in emergencies." - Appian, Civil War III.37.  Four of his five legions followed him to Brundisium.  Octavian "went to Campania with money to enlist the veterans who had been settled in those towns by his father." - idem III.40; this was his own private enterprise.  He subsequently tampered with Antony's troops and managed to get two legions to defect to him, the Senate wavering all the time.

Appian also has this to say about the situation:

"[Antony's] army, exclusive of the new levies, consisted of three legions summoned from Macedonia (for the remainder had now arrived). There was also one of discharged veterans, old men, who appeared nevertheless to be worth twice as much as the new levies. Thus Antony had four legions of well-disciplined troops, and the helpers who usually accompanied them, besides his body-guard and the new levies. Lepidus in Spain now four legions, Asinius Pollio with two, and Plancus in Transalpine Gaul with three, seemed likely to espouse the side of Antony.

47 Octavian had two legions equally efficient, those which had deserted from Antony to him, also one legion of new levies, and two of veterans, not complete in numbers or in arms, but these also filled up with new recruits. He brought them all to Alba and there communicated with the Senate, which congratulated him in such a way that now one would have been at a loss to know who were those who had lately ranged themselves with Antony; but it regretted that the legions had not come over to the Senate itself instead of to him. It praised them and Octavian nevertheless, and said that it would vote them whatever was needful as soon as the new magistrates should enter upon their duties. It was plain that the Senate would use these forces against Antony; but having no army of its own anywhere, and being unable to levy one without consuls, it adjourned all business until the new consuls [Hirtius and Pansa] should come in." - idem III.46-47.

Hope this is not getting boring, but it does show how even a sympathetic Senate will not open the coffers or authorise equipment for Octavian until the new consuls give the process the stamp of legality.  Until this happens, Octavian's 10,000 remain partly-armed.

While Octavian was trying to turn his privately-recruited veterans into full legions, Antony was doing, or said to be doing, the opposite.

"At Brundusium he organized a royal cohort [speira basilike] for his own use and openly made men-at‑arms [sidērophorountes andres = iron-armoured men] his private guards [edoruphoroun] and night-watchmen [enuktophulakoun], serving under a countersign." - idem III.52

The Senate voted to strip Antony of his imperium, but his remaining troops took no notice.  There followed one of the most confusingly involved stories of shifting allegiances in Roman history, which anyone interested can follow in Appian's Civil War III.63-76.

One of the more unusual incidences of recruitment during this period concerns a legion Caesar left in Syria.  The actual and titular commanders clashed, and the latter was slain.  The legion feared Caesar's wrath.

"Accordingly, they took an oath together that they would defend themselves to the death if they were not pardoned and restored to confidence, and they compelled Bassus [their commander] to take the same oath. They also enlisted and drilled another legion as associates with themselves." - idem III.77

If nothing else, this showed that it was possible to raise a legion in Syria - and without imperium.

[Jim Webster]

I think we're getting to the stage where imperium is of marginal utility. At times, yes, it appears the Senate is seen as strong and respected and the general needs that imperium.
But at other times and other places the Senate is seen as weak, or a long way away, and people will ignore imperium

In Syria it could well be that Greek cities and others recognised the authority of the local strongman because that's the way politics had worked there with the collapse of the Seleucids?

[Patrick Waterson]

In Syria it could well be that Greek cities and others recognised the authority of the local strongman because that's the way politics had worked there with the collapse of the Seleucids?

And the local strongman recently had as often as not been Pompey, or Crassus, or Caesar, or someone they had left behind to mind the shop.  Before that there would have been a Seleucus, an Antiochus and/or a Demetrius and perhaps someone named Lysias or Tryphon, maybe all at the same time, all seeking to raise an army which, following the career of Mr Epiphanes*, would probably have been at least partly Romanised.

*Antiochus IV to his friends

[Jim Webster]

In Syria it could well be that Greek cities and others recognised the authority of the local strongman because that's the way politics had worked there with the collapse of the Seleucids?

And the local strongman recently had as often as not been Pompey, or Crassus, or Caesar, or someone they had left behind to mind the shop.  Before that there would have been a Seleucus, an Antiochus and/or a Demetrius and perhaps someone named Lysias or Tryphon, maybe all at the same time, all seeking to raise an army which, following the career of Mr Epiphanes*, would probably have been at least partly Romanised.

*Antiochus IV to his friends

the caliber of Roman strongmen wasn't particularly high, Marcus Aemilius Scaurus., abandoning the siege of Petra for 300 talents, or Aulus Gabinius who restored Ptolemy XII  for a bribe of 10,000 talents
I seem to remember Herod the Great having to bribe Romans to either fight with him as they'd been told to do, or to go away and turn a blind eye.

Jim