Chariots as equid battering rams

[RichT]

As a small point of fact 'weight of the horses and vehicles' is a poor translation; 'impetus' means 'attack'.

Latin: "turbata hinc etiam signa legionum multique impetu equorum ac vehiculorum raptorum per agmen obtriti antesignani;"

Spillan and Evans (1849): "Hence also the battalions of the legions were thrown into disorder: through the impetuosity of the horses, and of the carriages which they dragged through the ranks, many of the soldiers in the van were trodden or bruised to death"

Roberts (1912): "Even the standards of the legionaries were thrown into confusion, and many of the front rank men were crushed by the weight of the horses and vehicles dashing through the lines"

Foster (1926): "from them the disorder was communicated to the standards of the legions, and many of the first line were trodden underfoot, as horses and chariots swept through their ranks."

I don't have a more recent one to hand.

Me (2018): "Even the standards of the legion were disordered by this, and many antesignani were crushed/trampled/destroyed by the attack of the horses and the drawn vehicles through the line".

'Impetuosity', 'weight' and - what - 'sweeping'? - are various goes at 'impetus' but Koon's Infantry Combat in Livy's Battle Narratives shows it is a general word for 'attack' in Livy.

And in passing - Anthony is right, it's clear that the legion is disordered 'by this' ie the flight of the cavalry, so the chariots are attackng a disordered line - as we'd expect. Also presumably from the flank.

[Erpingham]

So the work of the light chariots (recce, despatch, mobile missile troops) has been taken over by cavalry as the army developed.

If patrick is right and heavy and light chariots don't co-exist in armies, there could be something to this.  I recall a theory of mounted warfare evolution that cavalry were initially supplementary to chariotry with limited capabilities.  Gradually, cavalry became more effective and could handle some of the mobile warfare roles as well, and cheaper, than light chariotry.  Scout, patrol, driving off annoying skirmishers.  This left chariotry to carry out the attack mission and they specialised by becoming heavier.  Cavalry could protect them as they positioned and waited for the enemy to be weakened or disorganised by other arms, then delivered the coup-de-grace.  Eventually cavalry became sufficiently developed to replace them in even this role, leaving them to hang on only as disruptive sacrificial weapon.  It's an idea but as we have discovered there is little solid evidence available to say yay or nay to it.  Certainly, it only goes part way to explaining Celtic chariotry tactics, in which cavalry do seem to have taken on many of the mobile warfare roles but chariots remained lighter and more mobile (I am not yet convinced of patrick's theory of light and heavy Celtic chariots).

In summarising where we are so far, I think we have demonstrated that chariots and chariot tactics were much more sophisticated than "equid battering rams" and have confirmed that, like WWII tanks, there were different types with different roles.

What we haven't fully laid out, I think, is how the various elements of a chariot army combined as a fighting force.

[Andreas Johansson]

In summarising where we are so far, I think we have demonstrated that chariots and chariot tactics were much more sophisticated than "equid battering rams" and have confirmed that, like WWII tanks, there were different types with different roles.

I remain unconvinced by the latter. Near as I can tell, Patrick is basically right that different sorts of chariots were not fielded alongside one another by the same army, so while I do believe different types of chariots were used in different ways, I don't believe the situation is analoguous to the WWII one where different types were fielded alongside one another for different missions.

Apparent exceptions to the one-type-per-army rule:

Sumarian battle-carts and straddle cars: we don't even know if the latter had a military role at all, so can't say if they were tactically differentiated from the former.

Hittites with 2-man and 3-man vehicles: It's disputed whether the latter are a "thing" or just infantry catching a ride, but in any case they appear in different national contingents. I rather doubt the Hittite kings made particular vassal rulers specialize in particular tactical roles: more likely the difference simply reflects different national habits.

Galatians with scythed and normal vehicles at the Elephant Victory. Hard to say much about, but Lucian doesn't seem to have perceived a tactical difference. 

Other Celts with allegedly scythed chariots: no writer yet cited says they had a different tactical role from the regular version: they seem to be assuming all Celtic chariots were scythed.

Gauls with two kinds of vehicles: Haven't really gotten around to forming an opinion on this yet.

Late Achaemenids with scythed chariots and a regular one for the king: the latter is not properly tactical.

Indian bullock-carts: If this was ever used, it was a desperate attempt to make up for a shortage of proper chariots, not deliberately employed means to achieve a different tactical objective.

Any I'm missing?

[Erpingham]

I don't believe the situation is analoguous to the WWII one where different types were fielded alongside one another for different missions.

I was contrasting with Justin's view that all tanks essentially had the same role in WWII.  Even if they never inhabited the same battlefield, doctrine defining roles would have led to design decisions that created different vehicles.  I simply think that there were different chariots for different roles.  I'm happy for others to present evidence about whether, across the wide ranging history of the chariot, no power except possibly the Gauls and Galatians, fielded two types at once.

[Patrick Waterson]

On the subject of expecting skirmish and shock chariots to be fielded together, this paragraph from Armies of the Ancient Near East (WRG) illustrates what I was thinking:

"The large, four-horse Assyrian chariot was primarily used in a 'shock-charge' capacity. It was a development from the earlier, lighter vehicles which had to be multi-purpose reconnaissance, despatch and shock-charge vehicles. The first two roles had been increasingly taken over by the developing cavalry arm since the 10th century B.C., cavalry being both cheaper and more efficient in these roles. With these limitations on weight removed, the chariot could become far more specialised to meet the purpose for which it was best suited, to deliver an attack by heavily armed elite troops with speed and mobility. As cavalry began to become effective as mobile missile troops, and, to a limited extent, close combat troops, the number of the crew, the amount of protection and the size of the chariot were increased to the detriment of manoeuvrability, and limited further the terrain on which it could be used" (p.60).

So the work of the light chariots (recce, despatch, mobile missile troops) has been taken over by cavalry as the army developed.

Looks good on the whole, assuming the Assyrians thought the same way as we do and relied upon light chariots (and subsequently cavalry) for reconnaisance rather than guides and spies as Ramses II was doing at Kadesh (with 1,200 light chariots to hand he had not one of them out on reconnaissance).

The reservation I would have is that we do not seem to have a single reference anywhere to light chariots acting as scouts, anywhere, ever, in the records of Egypt and Assyria (not sure about anyone else, either).  From the occasions when Egyptian armies walked flat-footed into an ambush it is evident that they did not use their 'light' chariots as scouts, and Sargon II, complete with theoretically scouting-capable cavalry in addition to his specialised heavy chariots, entered in blissful ignorance into his surprise encounter with the Urartian army in his eighth campaign (this kind of approach is probably what got him killed by the Cimmerians in 705 BC).  So while the theory sounds good and logical, it does not seem to accord with the practice.  And that is why I am being fussy about what might otherwise seem to be a cut-and-dried topic.

[Patrick Waterson]

We see gallic chariots in shock mode against over-extended cavalry, which shouldn't surprise us.  Was there a point in the action where skirmishing would be the obvious tactic?  If we take the analogy several times stated with light cavalry, would they have skirmished or charged in a similar situation?

Hard to tell if there was such an occasion, but in this case the chariots appear to have charged successful albeit probably unformed attackers as opposed to 'over-extended cavalry', and light skirmishing cavalry would probably have either evaded or been caught up in the general Gallic cavalry reverse.

I still think that opportunistic exploitation against a confused or disordered infantry line, rather than a separate assault against formed troops, is a likelier explanation.

This I think is half correct: it was what some wargame rules would call a 'converted charge', in that the flight of the original target (the Roman cavalry) brought the chariots to within striking distance (charge reach) of the legions, and the 'impetuous' chariots went straight into the new target.  I am a bit sceptical about the Roman cavalry having caused any physical disruption to the legions; morale disruption, yes, but the 'horses and chariots' ripping through the Roman infantry lines are not 'cavalry and chariots' but specifically animals with vehicles.

The fact that the chariots were held back from the cavalry action, not once but twice, suggests they may have been intended to swoop on the flank and/or wing of the Roman infantry once the Gallic cavalry had defeated their Roman counterparts.  However the Gallic cavalry did not defeat their Roman counterparts, and hence the chariots were committed to the cavalry fight; I am inclined to think Richard may be right about them hitting the Roman infantry line in flank, at least partly, especially if this was their original intention.

[Patrick Waterson]

What we haven't fully laid out, I think, is how the various elements of a chariot army combined as a fighting force.

This might merit a separate thread.  I for one have some ideas about this, albeit largely conjecturally erected on a small amount of actual information.

[PMBardunias]

Leaving aside chariot runners for a moment, because their role is unclear, the line-breaking chariot begs the question of what was supposed to happen once they did break the line.  I am unaware of a battle description that suggest a force of infantry or cavalry that were deployed to specifically follow a scythed chariot through the line and exploit such a breach. I have a few answers to my own questions, but I wondered if this troubles anyone else.

[Patrick Waterson]

I think the short answer is that the enemy were supposed to run, and the chariots, plus any accompanying troops, could then indulge in a glorious pursuit and slaughter.

[Erpingham]

This I think is half correct: it was what some wargame rules would call a 'converted charge', in that the flight of the original target (the Roman cavalry) brought the chariots to within striking distance (charge reach) of the legions, and the 'impetuous' chariots went straight into the new target.  I am a bit sceptical about the Roman cavalry having caused any physical disruption to the legions; morale disruption, yes, but the 'horses and chariots' ripping through the Roman infantry lines are not 'cavalry and chariots' but specifically animals with vehicles.

Oddly enough, the follow-on charge is exactly what I had in mind.  Contact with routing friends has caused a "stand disordered" result on the legionaries' reaction test

Seriously, I think we do have a similar view of what is being described, we are just filling in the blanks differently based on our different understandings of chariot warfare.

[Erpingham]

Leaving aside chariot runners for a moment, because their role is unclear, the line-breaking chariot begs the question of what was supposed to happen once they did break the line.  I am unaware of a battle description that suggest a force of infantry or cavalry that were deployed to specifically follow a scythed chariot through the line and exploit such a breach. I have a few answers to my own questions, but I wondered if this troubles anyone else.

On a line-breaking chariot attack, I think Patrick is probably correct when it comes to the original conception of line-breaking poor quality or disordered foot.  Images of Pharaoh riding through piles of enemy shooting them in the back is doubtless symbolic but also aspirational for the chariot corps.  A bit like 19th and early 20th century cavalry holding the successful charge as the pinnacle of military achievement, even if what they mostly did was more ordinary.

When it comes to scythed chariots, I'm unsure.  The Xenophon quote we looked at many posts back suggests in origin the scythed chariot corp s was not seen as a suicide weapon but capable of fighting its way through.  Perhaps a stripped back version of heavy chariot tactics?  If so, it doesn't work like that and the familiar "disposable" chariot appears.  Were later chariots just weapons of disruption?  If so, as Paul has said, it would only make sense if their was a follow-up force to exploit the situation.  Have we records of that?  I recall Xenophon has a story of Spartans v. scythed chariots, where the persians supported their chariots with cavalry.

[Mark G]

Don't forget the cock up at magnesia, where it seems clear that the scythes were supposed to break up the Roman cavalry, and the macedonian cavalry then exploit the disorder.

Kind if worked in reverse, but still.

One could postulate a similar intention behind the Indian deployments, but I think that is a stretch for a battle that makes more sense as a hasty Indian redeployment, than a coherent plan, to me

But if so, it would build to a theory that chariots frighten horses, and can therefore gain an advantage frontally against formed cavalry, which they lose once their flanks become exposed.

[Patrick Waterson]

Scythed chariots were indeed formation breakers; to paraphrase Anthony, 'weapons of mass disruption'.   In their debut at Thymbra, they act uncannily like the Gallic chariots at Sentinum.

"As soon as Artagerses saw Cyrus in action, he delivered his attack on the enemy's left, putting forward the camels, as Cyrus had directed. But while the camels were still a great way off, the horses gave way before them; some took fright and ran away, others began to rear, while others plunged into one another; for such is the usual effect that camels produce upon horses. And Artagerses, with his men in order, fell upon them in their confusion; and at the same moment the chariots also charged on both the right and the left. And many in their flight from the chariots were slain by the cavalry following up their attack upon the flank, and many also trying to escape from the cavalry were caught by the chariots.

And Abradatas also lost no more time, but shouting, "Now, friends, follow me," he swept forward, showing no mercy to his horses but drawing blood from them in streams with every stroke of the lash. And the rest of the chariot-drivers also rushed forward with him. And the opposing chariots at once broke into flight before them; some, as they fled, took up their dismounted fighting men, others left theirs behind.

But Abradatas plunged directly through them and hurled himself upon the Egyptian phalanx; and the nearest of those who were arrayed with him also joined in the charge." - Xenophon, Cyropaedia VII.1.27-30

[A quick Who's Who: Abradatas is in charge of Cyrus' scythed chariots.  Cyrus commands one wing of 'ambushers'; Artagerses the other.  Each 'ambush' wing has taken in flank one of the Lydian wings, Croesus having just tried to 'wrap around' the Medo-Persian army.]

The role of the chariots at Thymbra is remarkably similar to the actual, whether or not the intended, role of the chariots at Sentinum.  They begin by charging the enemy's cavalry (and, at Thymbra, also his chariotry) and putting it to rout.  Then they move straight into an attack on the enemy's infantry (at Thymbra, that part which is still standing).  Cyrus' scythed and decidedly 'heavy' chariots at Thymbra are thus acting in a very similar way to the presumably unscythed and allegedly 'light' Gallic chariots at Sentinum.  It is activity patterns like this which induce me to conclude that every chariot, no matter how small or humble, is at heart a formation-breaker.

But if so, it would build to a theory that chariots frighten horses, and can therefore gain an advantage frontally against formed cavalry, which they lose once their flanks become exposed.

Could be a very good observation, and it is more or less supported by the actions of chariots at Thymbra and Sentinum, not to mention Mithridates' success against the Bithynians in 89 BC (if interested, see here for details, especially section 18, where the scythed chariots see action against the Bithynian cavalry).

[Erpingham]

I will be guided by the classicists here but should we be putting so much weight on Xenophon's Thymbra description?  It is taken from a fantasy work, not a historical one.  I accept that fictionalised accounts can contain useful references to practices in the author's time, especially if that author is an experienced soldier, but surely we must be cautious in the weight we apply?

This article by Alexander Nefedkin (or Nefiodkin - he seems to spell his latinised name both ways) may be of interest for the sources he assembles, though I don't know if his views have been challenged by others.

[Patrick Waterson]

I will be guided by the classicists here but should we be putting so much weight on Xenophon's Thymbra description?  It is taken from a fantasy work, not a historical one.

The label 'fantasy' seems a little excessive: Xenophon appears to be regurgitating a (possibly idealised and conceivably simplified) version of tales he would have picked up as a member of Cyrus' entourage.  He is not making it up out of whole cloth (the allies of Croesus are, for example, confirmed by Herodotus, as is the use of camelry to disrupt Lydian cavalry).

I accept that fictionalised accounts can contain useful references to practices in the author's time, especially if that author is an experienced soldier, but surely we must be cautious in the weight we apply?

Again, Xenophon's account is probably sieved and filtered through a peripherally acquainted Greek mind as opposed to being 'fictionalised'.  If he is by any chance imagining and/or fictionalising anything, then his account of the use and behaviour of Median scythed chariots (the elder Cyrus was technically a Median monarch) accords surprisingly well with the behaviour and use of the Gallic chariots at Sentinum a century later; all the more amazing if Xenophon was hypothetically the world's first fantasy author.  (The chance of the Gauls basing their essentially successful chariot tactics on Xenophon's Cyropaedia seems impossibly remote.)

So whatever the provenance of Xenophon's information, what he describes accords with the actions of chariotry in a solid historical example from a later period, i.e. one he could not crib from.  This makes him either remarkably prescient or properly informed.  Given the presence and operation of scythed chariots in his own time, and his acquaintance with Cyrus the Younger, I would incline to the latter.