Something on early Renaissance Italian infantry tactics

[Patrick Waterson]

We do have a few descriptions of Hellenistic pike fights, essentially Sellasia and Raphia.  Both suggest mobility, i.e. 'sarissmos' or something like it rather than fence-and-foyne or any sort of defensive barrier.

That said, at Atrax the Macedonian garrison stood in place, much to the frustration of the Romans, who could do nothing to them.

Sorry no references; in a bit of a hurry tonight.

[RichT]

Atrax:
"For the Macedonians who formed the garrison, numerous and picked men, thinking that it would be a most noble exploit to defend the city with arms and valour rather than with walls, in close array, strengthening their formation by increasing the number of ranks within it, when they saw the Romans scaling the ruins, thrust them out over ground that was rough and admitted no easy retreat. The consul [Flamininus] was enraged ... and sent out cohorts, one after the other, under their standards, to pierce, if possible, with their attack the formation of the Macedonians - they themselves call it the phalanx. But in addition to the limits of space, only a little of the wall having been destroyed, the enemy had the advantage in character of weapons and in tactics. When the Macedonians in close order held before them spears of great length, and when the Romans, hurling their javelins to no purpose, had drawn their swords against this sort of testudo, closely-fashioned with shields, they could neither approach near enough to engage hand to hand nor cut off the ends of the spears, and if they did cut off or break any of them, the spear shaft, the broken part being itself sharp, helped, along with the points of the undamaged pikes, to make a sort of wall [vallum]. Moreover, the parts of the rampart that still stood protected the two flanks, nor was it possible either to retire or to charge from a distance, a manoeuvre which usually throws the ranks into disorder." Livy 32.17

Sellasia:
"Putting the mercenaries in front, he [Antigonus] drew up the Macedonians behind them in two phalanxes with no interval between [diphalangia epallelon], the narrowness of the space rendering this necessary ... Each side now recalled by bugle their light-armed troops from the space between them, and shouting their war-cry and lowering their sarissas, the two phalanxes met. A stubborn struggle followed. At one time the Macedonians gradually [epi poda] fell back [anachoresin] facing the enemy, giving way for a long distance [epi polu] before the courage of the Lacedaemonians, at another the latter were pushed [exothoumenon] from their ground by the weight [tou barous] of the Macedonian phalanx, until, on Antigonus ordering the Macedonians to close up in the peculiar formation of the double phalanx [epallelou phalangos] with its serried line of pikes [sumphraxantes tas sarisas], they delivered a charge which finally forced [exeosan] the Lacedaemonians from their stronghold." Polybius, 2.66; 2.69

Raphia:
"Meanwhile the phalanxes stripped of both their wings remained intact in the middle of the plain, swayed alternately by hope and fear. Antiochus was still occupied in pursuing his advantage on the right wing, but Ptolemy having retired under shelter of the phalanx suddenly came forward and showing himself to his troops caused consternation among the enemy and inspired his own men with increased alacrity and spirit. Lowering their pikes, therefore, the phalanx under Andromachus and Sosibius advanced to the charge. For a short time the picked Syrian troops resisted, but those under Nicarchus quickly turned and fled." Polybius 5.85

Nothing whatever can be gleaned from the account of Raphia. Atrax is a very clear account of Romans v. (static) phalanx. Sellasia we've picked over a bazillion times already this year and I doubt there's anything new to say about it. The vocabulary (aside from 'diphalangia epallelon' and 'sumphraxantas tas sarissas') is very similar to a dozen Classical hoplite battles, particularly exotheo, see previous discussions.

[Erpingham]

How exactly does foyning work? Is there a description of it anywhere?

On further reflection, here is (indirectly) a rather more positive view of the "foyning" style.  It is taken from the Renfroe translation of Delbruck's fourth volume

We have a document, True Advice and Reflections of an Old Well tested and Experienced Warrior (Trewer Rath und Bedencken eines Alten wol versuchten und Erfahrenen Kriegsmans), which was probably written toward the end of 1522 and perhaps was the work of no less a person than Georg Frundsberg. This document rejects the opinion that ''the formation should be tight', and should give the decision as a result of pressure from the rear, ''for the foremost men, who are supposed to do the work, do not wish to be too closely pressed; they must be left room for freely jabbing" , otherwise they would be pushed in ''as one pushes people into a ditch.''

The German of this is online and I think there is a slight mistranslation - the formation should literally be "thick" and the sense, from other quotes of the document, it is referring to excess depth.  The reason, of course, is that the weight of the formation is not being used.

The emphasis in what we are calling the foyning style is on aggressive weapon handling - foyning means thrusting.  As I've mentioned before, I'm not fully happy I understand its effectiveness.  We know that the foremost ranks of a Landsknecht formation were made of experienced and well armed men, so presumably the formation gained ascendancy over the opposition through aggression and casualty causation and forced them back.  But it must always have been vulnerable to the massed assault advocated by Monluc and Smith.  As described, especially by Monluc, the skilled pike fencers would just be rolled over and the unit would need to rely on its own depth to absorb the attack. 

[Andreas Johansson]

The German of this is online

Link?

[Erpingham]

The German of this is online

Link?

Try this - about three quarters of the way down.

I did have a better laid out version but have mislaid it for the moment.

Add : Google Books e-book here.  I find this much easier to read.

[Andreas Johansson]

Add : Google Books e-book here.  I find this much easier to read.

Thanks.

And you're quite right, Frundsberg (or whoever the author was) is arguing against excessive depth, not excessive density.

He also says that's it's the frontmost five or six ranks that win or lose the battle. Somewhat oddly, then, rather than a formation of six or so ranks, what he does recommend is one with trice the files as ranks. Delbruck suggests that deep formations remained in use because they were easier to manoeuvre than wide ones. I guess this suggests that 16C pikemen were worse drilled and/or more agressively used than Hellenistic ones, who evidently managed with relatively shallow depths.

[RichT]

Very interesting.

Concerning files/ranks, Hellenistic phalanxes used the same number of files as ranks, as the manoeuvre unit was the square (8x8 or 16x16) syntagma or speira, so in that sense they were deeper, relatively, than these 16th C ones.

Delbruck says (via Google translate):

"The forms of the new infantry were quite different from those of the ancient ones. The ancients had had the phalanx, the broad lineup, whether with the spit [pike], or with the pilum and the sword; the newer ones had several, usually three deep, square heaps with the long spears; they had the most similarity with the later Macedonian phalanx, with the sarisse, but the difference between the uniform broad lineup and the three piles is still fundamental. We will come back to this later"

Which comes down then to whether you envisage the Hellenistic phalanx being a monolithic very wide formation of relatively shallow depth, or just wide as made up of adjacent squares. The difference being that 16th C ones use multiple lines and gaps, like Romans (if I understand all this correctly). Though 45 ranks deep is still much deeper than Hellenistic (but 45 men deep and 135 wide is a much wider formation than a Hellenistic syntagma, proportionally, if the 45 x 135 block really was the manoeuvre unit).

As described, especially by Monluc, the skilled pike fencers would just be rolled over and the unit would need to rely on its own depth to absorb the attack. 

I guess as described by the advocates of each method, each method would always win . Maybe the hard part was getting the deep unit to close aggressively in the face of the skilled fencing, and this is where the rear ranks come in, keeping it moving forwards (as Monluc says). If the attacking column loses its nerve and comes to a halt, it will be defeated. So as with all these sorts of things, actual execution, getting people to advance aggressively right into contact, is the hard part.

[Erpingham]

He also says that's it's the frontmost five or six ranks that win or lose the battle. Somewhat oddly, then, rather than a formation of six or so ranks, what he does recommend is one with trice the files as ranks.

Twice as many files would give an approximately square formation (the rule of thumb for manoeuver formation in the 16th century was each man occupied 3ft x 7 ft - a 3ft frontage and six feet between ranks).

Interestingly, according to Daniel Stalberg, the Trewer Rath contains this breakdown of the close combat part of a Landsknecht unit

(Each rank is 13 files wide)
1-4th rank: "Doppelsöldner"
5th rank: halberdiers
6-7th rank: "Mittelsöldner"
8-10th rank: "gemeinen söldner"
11-13th rank: "Führern, Furirern, Waybeln und Schlachtschwerter" together with the two ensigns
14-18th rank: "gemeiner söldner"
19th rank: "knebelspeiss"
20-21st rank: Doppelsöldner

This formation is a lot deeper than it is wide.   Overall, the structure is like a sandwich of good troops with a filling of ordinary troops.  One might wonder whether this was how Hellenistic phalanxes also operated - men gaining experience in the middle then being promoted nearer the action or securing the rear as they serve their time.

I suspect the reason for the depth is it has solidity.  Just five or six ranks hit by an "en masse" attack of the Monluc variety, especially if it hasn't closed in on itself but stays at manoeuver spacing, might not be enough to prevent a breakthrough. 

[Andreas Johansson]

Very interesting.

Concerning files/ranks, Hellenistic phalanxes used the same number of files as ranks, as the manoeuvre unit was the square (8x8 or 16x16) syntagma or speira, so in that sense they were deeper, relatively, than these 16th C ones.

I think the relevant sense here, though, is absolute depth; Delbruck and Frundsberg are discussing the (lack of) utility of great depth in the context of only the frontmost several ranks actually being able to fight.

The thee blocks of the "Swiss" system don't really constitute separate lines - they're commonly deployed side by side, or in echelon.

[Erpingham]

Forgive me as I introduce another 16th century description of pike fighting, this time French written in 1548  (in 16th century English translation)

    And who so would consider of the force of this order, shall finde that euerye sort of armes shall doo his office throughlye; for the Pikes are profitable against the Horssemen: and when the footmen doe meete Batailon against Batailon, the ferue to a good vse before that the rankes are throng together, but after that they are once at the close, the Pikes can doe no more seruice. Wherefore the Switzers, to auoide this inconueuience, after euerye three rankes of Pikes do place one ranke of Halbardes, which they doo to the intent giue their Pikemen space and place to fight in a prease; but yet this is not ynough, but as for vs, we will haue our Pikemen both before the Ensigne and behinde to carrye Targets: and there shall be Halbards in the middest, by meanes of this order, to resist bothe Horssemen and footmen, to breake into the enemie: for you know that Pikes may serue no turne after that the rankes are preassed together, because that the Souldiers are then as it were one in anothers necke: and therefore if the Pikemen had nothing but their Pikes and Swordes the Pike being abandoned they should be naked: for which cause I have giuen them Targets to couer themselues from blowes, and to fight in all places, what unease soeuer there were. Moreouer the Halbardiers maye also fight better in a prease then the Pikemen, which Halbardiers are expressely appointted for this purpose, and likewise they may followe the sayde Targets at the heeles, who are heauily laden, to reskue them with their Halbards. And as for the Target men, I would haue them but onely to thrust at the face and legges, or at any other parte that were vnarmed.

Raimond de Beccarie de Pavie, baron de Fourquevaux, Instructions for the Warres (1548; 1589 English translation),

By this time we should see a lot of familiar elements.  Of interest that Fourquevaux's Swiss seem to use Landsknecht tactics.  They don't immediately press together, they have three ranks of pikes then halberds so that the pikes have room to fight.  The halberds also have a role in the press - they can be used at close quarters when pikes can't.  Justin will be pleased that he is not the first one to see the idea of providing small shields to pikemen so that can fight better after losing their pikes

For those continuing to wonder what this has to do with our period, I'm trying through studying what descriptions we have of combat through the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance to understand how infantry fights actually worked at that time.  I think I'm getting closer.  But I hope of interest of those of a more classical bent, the practical reflections on pike fighting may help to see some questions that might be asked of earlier practice.  For example, our pikes seem to have three modes we have identified - foyning (standing off and engaging at pike length, using individual weapon skills in relatively loose formations), a fight involving tight mass (either from the off or developing from a foyning fight) and a close order defensive.  Foyning fights seem to have the potential to become a press and renaissance pike formations have tactics to break the deadlock in these (sword and buckler men, halberdiers, big swords).  If we take Hellenistic pikes, there don't seem to be any of these deadlock breakers integral to phalanxes.  Did their push of pike not descend into a press (or whatever the Greek word is - begins with O I think )?  If it did, did the resolve things differently?  Or didn't they care and leave it there until the battle was resolved around the two locked phalanxes?

[Patrick Waterson]

Hellenistic armies appear to have lacked any built-in 'deadlock breakers', indicating that they relied on the phalangites themselves to reach a decision.  At Sellasia and Raphia, despite the success of one (or each) side's cavalry, the homogenous sarissa-armed phalanx seems to have been the agency which broke the opposing phalanx, or at least forced it to yield ground whether or not this resulted in a final decision of the battle.

[RichT]

No need to apologise for out of period examples Anthony, I'm certain this is the way forward, given the paucity of in period evidence. I would be extremely interested to hear more about your research.

Some more bits and bobs (even more out of period) from A treatise of the art of war dedicated to the King's Most Excellent Majesty Roger Boyle, Earl of Orrery (1621-1679).

Ancient and Modern:
"It is very worthy of Observation, though the present way of Fighting, and of Arming our Soldiery, be very different from what was practis'd by the Greeks, and Romans, who were in their Times, the Great Masters of the Military Art; yet the Famousest Captains of the Latter, and the Present Age, take the Ancients, but especially Iulius Caesar, for their Example, in all the Noblest and Best Principles of War, whose Commentaries are not enough to be extoll'd, both for the Modesty, and Policy of them. And 'tis to the Experience of those Famous Nations, that we owe most of that Discipline, which now, on our own Tryals, we have judged worthiest to be observed and imitated. For though the use of all Fire-Arms, and of Cannon, were Intirely unknown to them, which has much alter'd the manner of making War: And though they Fought with their Files exceeding deep, which we with much Reason have Alter'd; yet as to the Main, we owe to them most of our Knowledge: And the Difference seems Little more, than between Old-fashion'd Plate, hammer'd into New; where though the Form is chang'd, yet the Substance remains."

Targets:
"Maurice Prince of Orange (a Famous Captain) was exceedingly desirous to introduce the Target among the Infantry; and having, for his own satisfaction, made many tryals of the great usefulness of it, experimentally found, that Targets, though very flippent ones, have not only resisted the Push of the Pikes, but also, that half the number of Targetteers, have entred into the Ranks of double their number of Pikes, without Targets, and have Routed them."

Width v. Depth:
"I shall crave leave to offer some Considerations on what we generally observe, and seldom or never alter whatever the occasion requires. And that is, the drawing up our Shot, and Pike, six deep; and our Horse, three deep. And this I should not presume to do, had not I been emboldened to it by some Experiments of my own, which God did bless with success: For when I found my self over-winged by the Enemy, they drawing up their Foot six deep, and their Horse three deep; I judged it best for me to Fight my Foot four deep, and my Horse two deep; whereby I added one third of more hands to the Front, and Breadth, of my Battalions, and Squadrons. For I was fully satisfied, that it was likelier I should be worsted by the Enemy, if he fell into my Flanks and Rear, holding me also to equal Play in the Front, than if four Ranks of my Foot should be broken, or two Ranks of my Horse, that the third Rank of the Horse, and the fifth and sixth Ranks of my Foot, should recover all again; for I had often seen Battalions and Squadrons defeated, by being overwinged: But I never saw the last Rank of the Horse, and the two last Ranks of the Foot, restore the Field, when the four first Ranks of the Foot, and the two first Ranks of the Horse were Routed. For commonly if the two first Ranks of the Horse are Routed, they themselves (for they still are broken inward) Rout the third Rank; and though the like cannot truly be said of the Foot in all points, yet in a great measure it usually follows. But I must confess, that he who makes such an alteration in Military Discipline, (unless he be a Sovereign Prince, or have sufficient Orders to do it) ought to resolve, his success only must Apologize for it; that is, to be victorious, or be kill'd... For my own part, I will ingeniously acknowledge, that after having as throughly weighed all the Arguments for and against it, as my weak judgment could suggest to me, I would, without hesitation, (if it were left to my own Election) fight my Foot and Horse no deeper than four, and two, in any case where the ground would admit me to extend my Battalions and Squadrons to the full. For if I fight against equal Numbers, and equally good Soldiers to my own, 'tis more likely falling into their Flanks, and as much into their Rear also, as I overwing them the depth of a File in each Flank, that I shall Rout them; then it is, that before I perform that, they shall have pierced through my four Ranks, since Rank to Rank of equally good Soldiers, and equal in Number, will more probably hold longer play one with the other, than Soldiers equally good, can defend themselves at once, if briskly charged in Front, Flanks, and Rear; and since the Flanks and Rear of Foot them selves, fight with great disadvantage against those who Charge them there all at once; but when Horse are Charged in the Flanks, and in the Rear, 'tis next of kin to a miracle, if they 'scape being broken: For the Troopers in the Ranks when they go to Charge, are as close as the Riders knees can endure it; and therefore 'tis impossible for the Flanks to do any thing, or the last Rank to face about, and consequently they must have their backs expos'd to the Shot, and Swords of their Enemy. The Foot indeed will easily face about; but then if the depth of Files be the advantage, I have it who Charge every where four deep, and they every way defend, but three deep at the most."

I think all this just goes to show that opinions varied, and there was no certain right or wrong answer (to questions of depth etc), and also that times changed for all the similarities (45 deep or 4 deep). As Orrery says, it would be hard to experiment, since a failed experiment would probably be a final experiment.

[Andreas Johansson]

The six deep infantry that Orrery takes as standard is, of course, a far cry from Swiss squares or Frundsberg's 3:1 formation. There's a slow but definite trend towards shallower and shallower infantry formations from the 16C to the 19C.

(At least in Europe. I have very little idea what was going on elsewhere.)

Now, in at least part that's surely due to gradual improvements in gunpowder technology, which militates against deep formations in at least two aways: offering deep targets to cannon becomes more costly and the gain from increasing the number of men able to shoot increases. Relatedly, the emphasis shifts from CC to shooting (shot gradually replaces pike). But I've got a suspicion that the deepest formations c. 1500 were never really worthwhile, being used in imitation of the impressively successful Swiss but not actually the cause of those Swiss victories.

(Now, assuming this to be true, how would we reflect it in wargames rules? If we make the latter ranks of a pike square more-or-less pointless, players won't use them unless forced to. If they don't use them, battles won't look like their historical prototypes; if they're forced to, variants like Frundsberg's aren't possible. Mandate per army list? Make further ranks purely decorative and costing zero army points?)

Speaking of technological change, one would expect that Hellenistic tactics were more likely to be optimal, given the options available, than Renaissance ones, simply because the pace of change was slower: commanders had more time to figure out what worked or not before the rules changed.

[Patrick Waterson]

Indeed; the Macedonian sarissa phalanx was a very different creature in a very different time and system.

The Swiss seem to have owed many of their victories to speed and impetus, and their deep keil enabled them to operate on a limited frontage and hence ease the burden of command and control which became an increasing problem in the 17th centiury AD as shallower lines led to wider deployments and greater distances between army commanders and subordinates.  The deep Swiss formations (and for that matter the deep Hapsburg tercios) also provided considerable defensive stability and endurance; it could take hours to beat down a Swiss pike formation with crossbows and knights, as at Arbedo in AD 1422.  The Spanish tercios similarly held out for a considerable time at Rocroi in AD 1643.  We might validly conclude that the main effect of rear ranks in a Renaissance pike formation was to add stolidity and support (or in wargame terms increase the number of reverses the formation can accept before being weakened or destroyed) rather than contributing directly to the offensive power of the formation.

This would also explain the fashion for 'deadlock breakers', which are conspicuously absent from the much more integrated and homogenous Hellenistic phalanx.  Renaissance pikes, with few ranks actively contributing but many providing inertia, would tend to end up deadlocked.  Hellenistic phalanxes, in which the fully integrated rear ranks added their 'weight' to make the formation 'very forcible', would not.

All of this is pointing in a particular direction, namely that Renaissance and Hellenistic phalanxes are not going to tell us much about the other system, and are more likely to be productive of misconception than understanding if cross-applied.  Each is a separate system which deserves and requires separate study.

[Justin Swanton]

Maurice Prince of Orange (a Famous Captain) was exceedingly desirous to introduce the Target among the Infantry; and having, for his own satisfaction, made many tryals of the great usefulness of it, experimentally found, that Targets, though very flippent ones, have not only resisted the Push of the Pikes...

Now that is interesting.