The Empire is dead, long live the army

[Justin Swanton]

Also rather swamped. On the subject of the late Roman solidi I may have one or two things to say, but I'm like to  spend the weekend looking into any evidence for the existence of the Gallic Field army in the course of the 5th century. The historical record, for example, is extremely vague on the exact composition of the forces that Aetius commanded during his campaigns even if it does mention barbarian contingents.

[aligern]

There are two ways to read the multi comtingent lists that we are given by Sidonius , Jordanes and to an extent by Procopius. One is that the only effective troops in period are barbarian contingents and that the vast bulk of Roman units are in garrisons and not mobile. That fits with a picturej of economic deline in which  the most expensive Roman units, the large cavalry troops have decayed whereas the infantry who are more cloaely tied to places that support them have tended to survive. Barbarians for hire, or settled and then summoned by treaty or individually recruited as bucellarii become the source for cavalry and probably infantry too.
There is an alternative view, which is that the Roman mobile army still exists, but that it is a luterary fashion to mention the contingents of barbarians because the numbering off of submissive tribes following the standards indicates Roman power and it is just unfashionable to mention the Roman regulars. One could read the Sidonian description of Majorian's force in this way, at least in part because he mentions following the standards and fancy antiquarian names are used.  Alternatively it could well be that, apart from a couple of guard units, the barbarians are Majorian's force. We know that at least a unit of scholae survived in Italy til Theoderic's  reign, though it may only be membership of a shadow unit.
There is mention that  when Odovacar launches a coup the Roman troops are too diminished to stand up to the barbarians. As this is in Italy, where it is likely taxes were still paid I take this as indicating that there is no Roman mobile army worth speaking of in 476.
Looking at Jordanes description of Aetius' force against Attila it looks very much as though he has to put together a wide alliance of troops that are no longer really Roman and even then he needs the Visigoths. If Gaul harboured a Roman field army after 450 it would have been with Aetius. contra that you could say that Jordanes gives Attila a speech that describes a Roman army with its wall of shields, but then that is a prime candidate  for an item of rhetoric, not a description of Aetius' real polyglot force.
Reaching back, if In the 430s there is a sizeable, mobile, Roman force in Gaul then why does Litorius not use it? Instead he leads a large force of Huns. We know that the Western Empire is strapped for cash at this time which leads to the further question of how would they manage to pay for a Roman army and a force of 10,000 Huns?
Similarly, the structure of Aetius' army is a clue as to what has happened. It is made up of federates, laeti, a group of limitanei etc. If the land is supporting all of these various groups it is surely because the system of having ac largely disarmed civilian population and a professional full time,  military has broken down.
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

All good points, if true.

Sidonius Apollinaris was a contemporary of the later 5th century AD in Gaul and his letters provide some interesting clues about the continuing presence and pervasiveness of Roman administration.

Letter IV.17, to Epriphus, dated between AD 461 and 467

The talk was enlivened with amusing jests and pleasantries; above all (and what a blessed thing it was!), there was not a word about officials or taxes, not an informer among us to betray, not a syllable worth betrayal. Every one was free to tell any story worth relating and of a proper tenor; it was a most appreciative audience; the vein of gaiety was not allowed to spoil the distinct relation of each tale.

We note the reference to officials and taxes.

Letter IV.13, to Pannychius, dated AD 469

HAVE you heard that Seronatus is coming back from Toulouse? If you have not (and I hardly think you have), learn it from these presents. Evanthius is hurrying to Clausetia, making passable the parts of the road in the contractor's hands, and clearing it wherever it is choked with fallen leaves. When he finds any part of the surface full of holes, he rushes in a panic with spadefuls of soil and fills them with his own hands; his business is to conduct his monster from the valley of the Tarn, like the pilot-fish that leads the bulky whale through shoals and rocky waters. [2] But lo! the monster, swift to wrath and slow to move by reason of his bulk, no sooner appears like a dragon uncoiling from his cave, than he makes immediate descent upon the pallid folk of Javols, whose cheeks are pale with fear. They had scattered on all sides, abandoning their townships; and now he drains them dry by new and unparalleled imposts, or takes them in the mesh of calumny; even when they have paid their annual tribute more than once, he refuses to let these unhappy victims return to their homes.

We observe contractors, imposts and an annual tribute exacted by what appears to be a Roman official.

This at least indicates that Roman administration was functioning, even in the debatable part of Gaul, as of the 460s AD.  We shall consider soldiery and the economy later.  For now one observation will suffice.

If Gaul harboured a Roman field army after 450 it would have been with Aetius. contra that you could say that Jordanes gives Attila a speech that describes a Roman army with its wall of shields, but then that is a prime candidate  for an item of rhetoric, not a description of Aetius' real polyglot force.

Attila to my mind would seem an unlikely candidate to use rhetoric when his army could see quite plainly what was in front of them.  My own reading of this description - and the simplest explanation - is that Attila was referring to Aetius' regular infantry, whatever their ethnic composition, and not to the entire army fielded by the anti-Hun alliance.  We can speculate about whether Armoricans or laeti turned up in Roman-style formations, but Aetius' regular contingent would be the logical irreducible minimum for Attila's comment.

[Jim Webster]

One thing to remember with Sidonius is that he was based in Southern Gaul, Lyons and then the Visigoth area. As far as I can make out his correspondents are in the same area. Southern Gaul retained contact with the Empire far longer than the north and I'm not sure that we can extrapolate what happened in the north from what happened in the south

Jim

[Duncan Head]

If Gaul harboured a Roman field army after 450 it would have been with Aetius. contra that you could say that Jordanes gives Attila a speech that describes a Roman army with its wall of shields, but then that is a prime candidate  for an item of rhetoric, not a description of Aetius' real polyglot force.

Attila to my mind would seem an unlikely candidate to use rhetoric when his army could see quite plainly what was in front of them.  My own reading of this description - and the simplest explanation - is that Attila was referring to Aetius' regular infantry, whatever their ethnic composition, and not to the entire army fielded by the anti-Hun alliance.  We can speculate about whether Armoricans or laeti turned up in Roman-style formations, but Aetius' regular contingent would be the logical irreducible minimum for Attila's comment.

However, remember that Aetius did also bring troops from Italy - "auxilia" says Sidonius, and in the Catalaunium thread we discussed what he might have meant. If these Italian units formed up in a regular Roman wall of shields, Attila's quote (even assuming Jordanes didn't just make it up) need say nothing about whatever troops Aetius found in Gaul.

[Justin Swanton]

We can speculate about whether Armoricans or laeti turned up in Roman-style formations, but Aetius' regular contingent would be the logical irreducible minimum for Attila's comment.

This brings to mind a possible comparison with the Rhodesian army (I am ex-Rhodesian so what can I say?). The Rhodesian army was eminently a White institution, modelled closely on the British army and using methods the British army developed in its own guerilla war in Malaya in the 1950's. It existed to uphold White rule in Rhodesia and the way of life established by the Whites. It was an extremely professional force, perhaps the most potent anti-guerrilla army ever developed.

What most people don't know, however, is that two-thirds of its effectives were blacks. All Blacks had the same training as the Whites. The RAR (Rhodesia African Rifles - entirely Black with White officers) for example, took part in Fireforce operations, parachuting in to attack guerrilla positions. The RLI (Rhodesia Light Infantry) was an all-White regiment, and something of a glamour unit, but the best unit of the army, the killer regiment par excellence, were the Selous Scouts.

The Scouts accounted for about 66% of all guerrillas killed in the Rhodesian War (just 'the War' to us Rhodies). It was about 80% Black, though the officers were White. A large proportion of the Blacks were captured guerrillas who were offered the choice of enlistment or execution. Given their lives, medical care if necessary and regular pay, these became some of the best soldiers in the regiment.

The Scouts were entirely professional in their training and fighting ability. The odds did not matter: guerrillas were just dead meat if the Scouts encountered them. At Nyadzonya, for example, 84 Scouts equipped with armoured cars, machine guns and assault rifles destroyed a camp of about 5000 guerrillas.

The point I'm making with this is the power the esprit de corps of a military unit has on its members. The training and discipline of a professional formation moulds the minds and wills of soldiers in a way that a civilian perhaps cannot grasp. Furthermore in time of war soldiers depend in each other for their lives, and this creates bonds between them that have nothing to do with politics or race. A soldier's loyalty, and his source of pride and professionalism, is to his unit - regiment or legion - and not to wider and more abstract concepts.  And the nature of the unit depends entirely on the officers who control it.

Thus, in looking for a Roman army in Gaul we need to discern which formations were professional troops - regardless of their background - and which were temporarily employed barbarian federates. If the commanders and officers were Roman or Gallo-roman, then the units were effectively Roman.

[Erpingham]

Thus, in looking for a Roman army in Gaul we need to discern which formations were professional troops - regardless of their background - and which were temporarily employed barbarian federates. If the commanders and officers were Roman or Gallo-roman, then the units were effectively Roman.

A slight shift in emphasis, I think?  I don't think anyone would have a problem with elite units with strong identities led by Roman officers being Roman.  But aren't these buccelarii?  Also, what defines a professional?  I would suggest it is a kept fighting man.  Such a man does not need to be part of a drilled unit with a monetary reward.  He can be someone who receives quality provisions , provided with weapons, clothes, jewels maybe even property if lucky.  He may be a hired thug or he may have the glamour of a gunslinger or a modern day sports star - the acknowledgement and respect he receives is part of the reward of being a professional.  Like a modern sports star, his ethnicity may not matter - he is paid for his skills.  Beyond that, I suspect you have a caste of socio-professionals - these could be farmer-soldiers or men who serve for a priviledge like a land holding (several models of this evolve in the early middle ages) or even men who serve because it is an expression of their position in society.  And beyond that - short or long term bands of hirelings or allies and, if all else fails, armed civilians.

[Patrick Waterson]

I don't think anyone would have a problem with elite units with strong identities led by Roman officers being Roman.  But aren't these buccelarii?

Bucellarii are, strictly, private or household troops retained by an individual, as opposed to regular forces maintained by the state.  They may be organised on a regular pattern (like Belisarius' household regiment) but they are private retinues - maintained by their individual paymaster - as opposed to professional soldiers.

Also, what defines a professional?  I would suggest it is a kept fighting man.  Such a man does not need to be part of a drilled unit with a monetary reward.  He can be someone who receives quality provisions , provided with weapons, clothes, jewels maybe even property if lucky.  He may be a hired thug or he may have the glamour of a gunslinger or a modern day sports star - the acknowledgement and respect he receives is part of the reward of being a professional.  Like a modern sports star, his ethnicity may not matter - he is paid for his skills.  Beyond that, I suspect you have a caste of socio-professionals - these could be farmer-soldiers or men who serve for a privilege like a land holding (several models of this evolve in the early middle ages) or even men who serve because it is an expression of their position in society.  And beyond that - short or long term bands of hirelings or allies and, if all else fails, armed civilians.

Actually there is a very simple and obvious criterion for a professional soldier in Late Roman times: his ultimate superior is the Magister Militum.  And he does need to be part of a drilled unit for a monetary reward if he wants to collect his pay! 

[Patrick Waterson]

However, remember that Aetius did also bring troops from Italy - "auxilia" says Sidonius, and in the Catalaunium thread we discussed what he might have meant. If these Italian units formed up in a regular Roman wall of shields, Attila's quote (even assuming Jordanes didn't just make it up) need say nothing about whatever troops Aetius found in Gaul.

Indeed.  But if it was Gallic units that formed the regular Roman wall of shields with or without the auxilia from Italy then Jordanes is attesting to Gaul-based Roman regular units at Chalons.  The sad fact is that we cannot tell for certain one way or the other, but we can say that the description he places in Attila's mouth is consistent with the presence of a not negligible contingent of Roman regulars under Aetius' command.

We may note in passing that when Attila invaded Italy in AD 453 there seems to have been no army to oppose him.  Aetius' power base was in Gaul, and Valentinian III had Aetius murdered just before the Huns invaded Italy.  Is it too much to suggest that the Roman army had remained with Aetius and had been principally stationed in Gaul following Chalons?

[Patrick Waterson]

Reaching back, if In the 430s there is a sizeable, mobile, Roman force in Gaul then why does Litorius not use it? Instead he leads a large force of Huns. We know that the Western Empire is strapped for cash at this time which leads to the further question of how would they manage to pay for a Roman army and a force of 10,000 Huns?

I would doubt the existence of such a force in the 430s because the Battle of Rimini, fought between Bonifacius and Aetius, had consumed Aetius' army with the result that he fled to the Huns.  It would have taken a while to reconstitute the army.

[Erpingham]

Bucellarii are, strictly, private or household troops retained by an individual, as opposed to regular forces maintained by the state.  They may be organised on a regular pattern (like Belisarius' household regiment) but they are private retinues - maintained by their individual paymaster - as opposed to professional soldiers.

Actually there is a very simple and obvious criterion for a professional soldier in Late Roman times: his ultimate superior is the Magister Militum.  And he does need to be part of a drilled unit for a monetary reward if he wants to collect his pay! 

Ok, we clearly have a different view of what professional soldiers are    To me, a soldier maintained by a paymaster is a professional - who the paymaster helps define the type of professional.   And there was I thinking I'd found some common ground

[Justin Swanton]

It really does help to take a good look at the primary sources, preferably in the original language, in this case Jordanes' description of Aetius's forces at Chalons. The Latin:

A parte vero Romanorum tanta patricii Aetii providentia fuit, cui tunc innitebatur res publica Hesperiae plagae, ut undique bellatoribus congregatis adversus ferocem et infinitam multitudinem non impar occurreret. Hi enim adfuerunt auxiliares: Franci, Sarmatae, Armoriciani, Liticiani, Burgundiones, Saxones, Ripari, Olibriones, quondam milites Romani, tunc vero iam in numero auxiliarium exquisiti, aliaeque nonnulli Celticae vel Germanie nationes.

And a translation:

On the side of the Romans, meanwhile, the foresight of the Patrician Aetius, on whom the whole Empire of the western reaches depended, was so great that, by gathering warriors from everywhere, it was not on unequal terms that he met the fierce and numberless multitude. Now these were his auxiliaries: Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones (once Roman soldiers and now the flower of the auxiliaries), and some other Celtic or German tribes.

The sense of the passage can be seen as this: Aetius needed to meet Attila on equal terms, with the implication that he could meet him on unequal terms with what he already had - his regular Gallic troops. He buffed up his numbers by 'gathering warriors from everywhere', and these warriors were not his core army, they were his auxiliaries.

Another point: The fact that Olibriones were 'once Romans soldiers and now the flower of the auxiliaries ', implies that they left the regular army but kept the training and expertise - which in turn implies that the regular army was still around, and that it was still good.

This interpretation is reinforced by Attila's speech, where he clearly distinguishes between the Romans and various barbarians, calling them a 'union of discordant races', after which he focusses his contempt (probably assumed for the benefit of his troops) on the Romans. Attila - bear in mind - makes this speech after Aetius's men have won the fight for the heights on the Roman left.

The Latin:

Aggrediamur igitur hostem alacres ; audaciores sunt semper qui inferunt bellum. Adunatas despicite dissonas gentes ! Indicium pavoris est, societate defendi. En, ante impetum nostrum terroribus jam feruntur : excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et, sera plenitudine, in campis munitiones efflagitant. Notum est vobis quam sint levia Romanorum arma : primo etiam non dicam vulnere, sed ipso pulvere gravantur, dum in ordine coegunt et acies testudinesque connectunt.

And a literal translation:

Let us then attack the foe eagerly; for they are ever the bolder who make the attack. Despise this union of discordant races! To protect oneself by alliance is proof of fear. See, even before our attack they are smitten with terror. They seek the heights, they seize the hillocks and, when it is far too late, clamor for fortifications in the level fields. You know how ineffectual the weapons of the Romans are. They are weighed down, I will not say even by the first wound, but by the dust itself while they are still gathering in formation and joining up their battle lines and tortoises.

The reference to 'testudines' can mean only a Roman military formation. The sense of the Latin is of drilled, trained troops. The next part of Attila's speech is particularly interesting:

Vos confligite perstantibus animis, ut soletis, despicientesque eorum aciem ! Alanos invadite, in Wisigothas incumbite ! Inde nobis est citam victoriam quaerere, unde se continet bellum. Abscisis enim nervis mox membra relabuntur ; nec potest stare corpus, cui ossa subtraxeris. Then on to the fray, remaining resolute in heart as is your wont, and despising their battle line. Attack the Alans, fall on the Visigoths! It is for us to seek a swift victory in the place where the fight is kept up. For when the sinews are cut the limbs soon drop, nor can a body stand when you have removed the bones.

The sense is this: the Huns have been stopped dead in their tracks by the Roman troops on their right flank. Attila tells them not to lose heart - the Romans' heavy equipment makes them slow. The Huns must leave them and hit the Alans and the Visigoths, for with these swept out the way, the Roman troops cannot hope to stand on their own.

All of which argues a professional Roman army, smallish in size, but still better in quality than anything it fought one to one.

[Jim Webster]

Actually there is a very simple and obvious criterion for a professional soldier in Late Roman times: his ultimate superior is the Magister Militum.  And he does need to be part of a drilled unit for a monetary reward if he wants to collect his pay! 

I think you're being a bit simplistic in the definition. Firstly a soldier's ultimate superior is actually the Emperor and it will be to him he will swear the military oath.
Secondly I don't think you can just dismiss Bucellarii. Indeed by your definition the Bucellarii of the Magister Militum are soldiers.
I think we have to be rather more flexible in our definition of soldier, (as Aetius might well have been.)
I think in this period a soldier is someone who is armed and is performing military duties. We might add 'for reward', we might add something about 'under orders from an authority recognised as legitimate by at least some factions'.

Jim

[Justin Swanton]

As promised, the 'day's march' quote info:

The 'day's march' quote is not Halsall, it is from Elton 'Defence in 5thC Gaul' from Drinkwater and Elton's '5thC Gaul: A Crisis of Identity?'.

It is based on the idea that both Aegidius, post the victory at Orleans 463, and Syagrius (following his assumption of some kind of position of authority) had their hands full in Northern Gaul with threats from everywhere; including Franks, Saxons, Alamanni and Burgundians.
Aegidius' offensive operations stopped after Orleans perhaps because things were just too hot at home.
Aegidius' ambassadorship to the Vandals in 465 is attributed to the aim of cooperation against yet more threats to the southwest from the Visigoths, though this may be interpreted as the seeds of an offensive strategy.
Elton also states  that Aegidius may have had 'factions' (other than those led by Arbogast and Paul) of Roman attitude (but he does not, frustratingly name them, but says 'we also know of') who could have been subordinate, allied, non-aligned or even hostile to Aegidius.
Perhaps this is a reference to Gallo-Roman landowner factions who fancied themselves as the boss...or not.

His conclusion in this section of the paper:
'Though often portrayed as an independent Roman state in north Gaul, Aegidius and Syagrius' 'kingdom' was probably not much bigger than a day's march from their army'.

What is suggested is that northern Gaul was much more fragmentary than is conferred by the phrase 'the kingdom' and Aegidius' and Syagrius' grip on it only extended as far as the force they could project.

Notice that this is a pile of suggestions without a scrap of hard evidence. The only evidence I am aware of for Syagrius controlling only Soissons and its immediate environs is the reference in the Vita Sanctae Genovefae to Childeric occupying Paris:

The king of France, Childeric, how be it he was a pagan, held her in great reverence, so did also the barons of France, for the fair miracles that she did in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. Whereof it happened on a time that the said king held certain prisoners judged to death, but because Genevieve should not demand them, he issued out of Paris, and made to shut the gates after him. The holy virgin knew it anon, and went hastily after him for to help to deliver them. As soon as she came to the gates, they opened without key, all the people seeing which, thought it a great wonder. She pursued the king and obtained grace for the prisoners.

Paris was right in the centre of Syagrius's realm, which would mean that the Frankish king controlled the territory to the north and south of Soissons, leaving Syagrius with very little to call his own. This interpretation however is incredible: it means that Syagrius would have had only a small force of men to lead against the Frankish alliance of Clovis, and yet with that small band he was eager to meet Clovis in battle. Was he seeking an honourable death? Then why did he flee to the Visigoths?

The idea that Childeric occupied Paris is contradicted by the Vitae itself:

The said king [Clovis] did increase much the realm of France, and franchised it by his puissance from the Romans. He conquered Melun, and the land lying by Seine and Loire, Touraine, Toulouse, and all Guienne, and at his coming to Angouleme the walls of the city fell down. He made Almaine and Bourgogne his tributaries, he ordained and instituted Paris to be the chief siege of the realm.

It was Clovis who conquered the Paris region and by implication Paris itself (the idea of the Franks controlling an isolated town for years in the middle of hostile Roman territory is absurd).

The best way to interpret the incident of Childeric in Paris is to suppose that the scribe, out of confusion or a possible deference to Clovis, substituted his father's name for an incident that involved Clovis when he was still a pagan, i.e. just before his baptism in 496/7.

[Jim Webster]

You are confusing Childeric the king of a group of the franks and Childeric the roman official. Whilst they were the same person, given that Childeric was an important part of the plans of both Aegidius, and Comes Paul of Angers, there is no reason why, at some point, he wasn't the officer in charge of Paris a generation before Syagrius.
We mustn't fall into the trap of drawing a hard and fast line between 'Roman' and 'Barbarian'. There is no more reason why a Frank should not become the officer commanding Paris than why a Vandal, a Burgundian or a Goth should not become magister militum
As for complaining about a lack of hard evidence, there appears to be none whatsoever for a Regular field army in the North of Gaul in the time of Syagrius.  :-)

Jim