Alexander versus Caesar

[Chris]

Who Would Win? [Part 1]

Drawing inspiration (however belatedly) from the theme content of the April 2014 issue of Wargames Illustrated (Simon MacDowall's "Legion versus Phalanx" and Simon Miller's "We Need to Talk about Caesar" articles were of especial interest and were read/studied several times), I thought it might be entertaining to see what would happen if two great military men faced each other across my modest tabletop. The historical figures I had in mind were Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. It is, I readily stipulate, completely ahistorical and perhaps even bordering on the ridiculous to posit a clash between Roman legionary infantry and auxiliary units commanded by Caesar and Companion cavalry and pike phalanxes led by Alexander. Nevertheless, I believe such a counterfactual contest might make for an interesting - or at the very least, enjoyable - wargame. Having convinced myself (not all that difficult to do really), I proceeded to prepare the armies and terrain for this ahistorical adventure.

ORDERS OF BATTLE
The Macedonians were drafted from Page F (Antiquity section) of the Armati 2nd Edition rule book. Alexander would command an army three times the usual size. His core force of 6 units of phalanx, 3 units of Hypaspists, 3 units of Agrianians (skirmishers), and 3 units of Companions (heavy cavalry) would be reinforced by 300 points worth of bonus troops. Ten more cavalry units (5 light, 5 heavy) joined the nucleus of his army, 6 units of "hired" Greek heavy infantry and 6 more units of phalanx (1 being Hypaspists) were also present. As to light troops, there were 10 units of skirmishers (a mix of archers, javelins, and slingers) in addition to 9 units of light infantry (peltasts). The veteran formations in this army were 2 of the units of Companion cavalry and 1 unit of the Hypaspists.

Instead of using the Marian/Caesarian list on Page K (Age of Empires section) of the rule book, I decided to use Luxor's Late Republican Legions list. (This version was found on Warflute and the list was last updated 08 November 2006.) The veteran of the Gallic Wars and excursions to Britannia would have a core force containing 3 cohorts of elite legionary infantry, 9 foot units of regular legionaries, 3 units of light cavalry, and 3 units of javelin-armed skirmishers. Caesar's supporting formations were also drawn from an allowance of 300 bonus points. The following troops were purchased: 3 units of cohorts representing the vaunted 10th Legion (all of these formations were classed as veterans), 9 additional units of legionary foot, 2 units of German heavy cavalry, 5 units of allied heavy horse (not quite as good as the Germans), 1 more unit of light cavalry, 9 units of Gallic warbands, and 10 units of skirmishers carrying a mixture of missiles.

TERRAIN
As to the appearance of the battlefield for this very fictional engagement, I adapted the map of Chaeronea 338 BC found on page 68 of WARFARE IN THE CLASSICAL WORLD. I retained the acropolis (transformed into a collection of ruins with overgrown walkways and gardens), marshy ground, and series of hills (ridge line) along one long table edge but removed the 3 of the 4 identified water courses. I kept the river labeled as the Cephissus though it was not given a name for this scenario. The majority of the tabletop was left undecorated and was classified as open ground.

TINKERING
As for amendments to the written rules, these were - of course - many and varied, ranging from missile fire modifiers based on range, to interpenetration during movement, to the effects of the marshy ground, to adjustments to the distances units may breakthrough after a victorious melee and how far broken units will run away before being removed from the table. Special consideration was given to the two personalities on the model battlefield. Borrowing some ideas from Mr. David Kay's article on leadership (see pages 42-44 of the January-February 2015 SLINGSHOT) and taking full advantage of the 'blanket' permission given in the Armati rules on page 4 ("For scenario play, a General's abilities may vary."), I gave Alexander a melee modifier of plus 3, a morale modifier of plus 4, and a key unit value of 6. His Roman counterpart was not rated as highly. Caesar was granted a melee modifier of plus 2, a morale modifier of plus 3, and a key unit value of 4. The additional difference was this: Alexander's ratings would only apply when he was attached to a particular unit; Caesar's influence would extend 6 scale inches in all directions. Any friendly unit within this radius would benefit from the great man's charismatic leadership. Without going into too much detail on these subjective (and subject to revision) ratings, I think it may be agreed that Alexander was more rash when it came to engaging in combat and Caesar was more rational. The impact on morale and loss is, again, tied to the ideas produced after reading Mr. Kay's educational piece on commanders. (Sidebar: A search of the Internet turned up nothing in the way of blog reports or other entries on wargaming Alexander versus Caesar but did result in the discovery of the following forum discussion: http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=62339. Interested readers are invited to review the electronic conversation. Rather coincident-ally, just  a few days after I started this project, Mr. Justin Swanton wondered about the greatest general in antiquity. See the SOA General Discussion Board for "The Greatest General in Antiquity" - original post made on March 25, 2015.)   

DEPLOYMENT
General deployment was determined by competitive dice rolls. Due to Alexander's superior key unit rating, the Macedonians were declared the attacker and won the privilege of setting up their formations after Caesar had completed his arrangements. As defender, Caesar elected to position his army just in front of the ridge line with the river and marshy ground on his right and the ruins of the acropolis on his left. Expecting the main thrust of the enemy to be launched against his right or center right, Caesar put most of his cavalry on the far right of his battle line. Light horsemen screened the heavier allied squadrons while the German cavalry were held in reserve. Three strong divisions of legionary infantry (each containing 6 units) were positioned in the center. Two of the divisions were arranged on the right of this sector, the second less than a move away from the front line force. The left flank (the one opposite the acropolis) contained the Gallic warbands (3 divisions of 3 units each) and the remaining allied heavy horse. A small force of elite legionary infantry was held in reserve on this side of the line. Skirmishers and light cavalry were spread across the broad front of this large army. As for Caesar and his vaunted 10th Legion, the great man and his veterans were arranged on a gentle hill overlooking the left center of the main legionary deployment.

Seeing that the Roman high command had placed the majority of their cavalry against his left, Alexander decided to reply in kind and deployed all of his Companions and allied heavy horse near the river. A small formation of light cavalry protected the extreme left of this powerful wing. Alexander would ride with a unit of his veteran Companions. The phalanx was arranged in 3 divisions (6 units, 3 units, and 3 units) in the center of the line and was screened by peltasts and a forward line of skirmishers. The Hypaspists were placed to the right of the phalanx and the Greek allied hoplites to the right of these valued and veteran troops. Again, light infantry and skirmishers screened these solid blocks of foot soldiers. A couple of units of Prodromoi and one more of Greek light horse completed the Macedonian deployment on the right flank.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE BATTLE
Not surprisingly, the Gauls made a strong push against the Macedonian right flank. A majority of the warbands advanced on the waiting line of hoplites; the rest moved up in support. Allied cavalry joined in the local offense, trotting up the gentle hillside on the left of the acropolis ruins. Macedonian light cavalry and light infantry tried to contest this movement but could not stand up against the wave of warriors. One unit of peltasts did make a brief fight in the rough ground of the ruins but was quickly overwhelmed by the barbarians. When the wave of Gauls hit the wall of hoplite shields and spears, however, it was an entirely different story. Though one group of Greek heavy infantry was broken by the force (i.e. ferocity) of the initial attack, the rest of the hoplites held their ground. A back and forth battle developed. It did not go in favor of the Gauls. While they threw themselves again and again on the shields and spears of the enemy heavy infantry, the allied cavalry on the extreme left ran down some peltasts, some skirmishers, and then galloped into the right rear of the Macedonian line. Unfortunately, these squadrons went too far and had trouble rallying so that they could move against the exposed rear of the hoplite formation or continue and launch an attack on the rear ranks of Alexander's phalanx. What few Gauls survived the first clash withdrew to catch their collective breath and rally on supporting friends. The Greeks used the intermission to rest, reorganize, and reestablish a proper line of battle. With a great shout, the second wave of Gauls ran forward, brandishing long swords and spears. For a second time, they crashed into aligned shields and spear points. The melee was as hard fought as the first, but again, the Gauls could not pierce the ordered formation of heavy infantry spearmen protected by large round shields.

On the Roman right flank, battle was quickly joined between opposing cavalry formations. Both sides committed their light horsemen. These squadrons were reinforced by heavy cavalry and the resulting melee was confused and prolonged. Alexander and his Companions avoided this action, aiming their horses at a gap between the right flank of the line of legionary infantry and the various units of allied and German horse in Rome's employ farther to the right. While the initial action continued - both sides fed more allied heavy cavalry into the swirling fight - the Germans wheeled in order to contest the advance of Alexander and his leading regiment of Companions. They did not time the move correctly, however, and had to settle for attacking some enemy heavy cavalry in the flank and rear. These squadrons (allied to the enemy) had foolishly elected to charge a line of legionary infantry from the front. The destruction of the enemy horse was the one bright spot for Caesar and his subordinates on this flank. Slowly but certainly, the tide of the main cavalry melee turned against the Romans. One by one, their units of allied heavy horse were engaged and broken by their enemy counterparts. A unit of valued German heavy cavalry took on a unit of Companions and was defeated for their efforts. The last unit of German horse found itself trapped between opposing lines of heavy infantry. Indeed, by finishing off 2 formations of enemy horse (these regiments were the ones who thought it would be good to attack Roman heavy infantry from the front), they left themselves open to the advance of a large Macedonian phalanx. With no room to maneuver, the German veterans perished on the end of serried ranks of pike points. As the cavalry contest in this sector of the field came to a conclusion, Alexander was able to wheel his veteran Companions and charge the exposed flank of a legionary line. As might be imagined/expected, the ensuing contest did not go at all well for the defending infantry. Alexander led by example, and his regiment chewed its way slowly into the now disordered ranks of the legionaries. Although his troopers were soon exhausted by the bloodletting, they kept at it, breaking one unit and moving on to the next in line. A separate unit of Companions followed this example, charging into the exposed flank of another line of legionary infantry. Similar results were produced.

As the Greeks held on the right and the cavalry seemed to ride over everything on the left, the three phalanxes advanced slowly across the plain. They were joined, on the right of the line, by a few units of Hypaspists. Instead of waiting for these formations, Caesar ordered the first two lines of legionary infantry forward. The infantry of both sides met somewhere in the middle of the field and from the start, things did not go at all well for the Roman rankers. On occasion, the legionary infantry were able to get past the leveled forest of pikes and make some inroads against the staggered phalanxes, but overall, the phalangites held firm, then advanced steadily and made the Romans pay the steepest price.

With the Gauls well and truly broken, with his right flank non-existent, with the phalanx proving more than a match for his experienced legionaries, and with Alexander and Companion cavalry cutting his way through a supporting line of heavy infantry, Caesar saw that, for this particular day, the writing was on the wall. He salvaged what he could of his once powerful and professional army and then, under the protection of small escort, left the field to the victorious Alexander.

EVALUATION
Instead of reviewing the merit(s) of the idea and my approach, instead of critiquing the drafted orders of battle, the recycled terrain (I have waged battle on this ground before), and the tinkering done with the purpose of building a "better" set of rules, I will simply offer that I quite enjoyed playing both Alexander and Caesar in this fictional contest. On review, it appears that I did a better job of it as Alexander. My plan was not very complicated. It depended quite a bit on the roll of the dice. In the guise of Caesar, it seems that my plan was also fairly simple. However, it was just not as good. Gauls against Greek hoplites? What was I thinking?! Not supporting my cavalry wing with at least some of the 10th Legion? Again, what was I thinking?! Adding insult to injury, it appeared (from very early on) that my famous luck had well and truly abandoned me.

Here's hoping that my luck returns when I face Alexander (myself) again in a Hail Caesar version of this counterfactual contest. Long term plans (projected completion date - late June 2015) call for a third iteration of this epic clash of historical personalities using Lorenzo Sartori's IMPETVS.

[Mark G]

Its a mini battle day, 3 goes at the same counter factual using different rules.

Well, Polybius would agree with thus outcome.
Best and most cavalry should always win

[Justin Swanton]

Interesting battle that went pretty much as one would have expected. Alexander had superior troops in all departments, and Caesar would only have had a chance in favourable terrain that broke up the phalanx, as at Pydna or Cynoscephalae. A few elephants would also have come in handy for the Romans.

[Chris]

Gentlemen,
Thanks for taking the time to read and reply. Feedback is always appreciated.
Having just completed the HC trial (abbreviated experiment; Alexander's win marked with an asterisk) I am beginning to think or  see this as more of an extension of  the legion versus  phalanx "problem" as opposed to a duel between commanders.

It's a bit difficult to picture Caesar employing elephants but I suppose, given the fiction of the experiment, I should not rule this out completely. Perhaps a refight (going back to the Armati rules) is warranted? As to the proposition that Alexander had superior troops in all departments, the PH units in the Macedonian list and the legion infantry in the Roman list all have a frontal fighting value of 7. So the infantry contest seems, literally, a roll of the dice. Alexander does have an advantage in horse. This is more abstracted in Armati than in HC. I am curious to see how it plays out in/with IMPETVS.

Chat on the rules forum of IMPETVS seems to suggest that Roman legionaries have an advantage over large units of Macedonian pikemen. I shall see how true this is. Narrative (or at least notification via link) pending.

Regards,

Chris

[Jim Webster]

Certainly with Impetus I've used Roman Republicans in the traditional three lines against Macedonians and I've managed to beat the pikes. It is suitably tough to do.

Interestingly because you need to have at least some of the triarii held back as a third line to fill gaps (rather than out stiffening the flanks) the Macedonians don't suffer from being outflanked.

Where they do suffer is if they don't have enough pikes and some of their peltasts or similar end up facing Legionaries 

Jim

[Duncan Head]

It's a bit difficult to picture Caesar employing elephants ...

As we've touched on previously in this forum, Polyaenus disagrees - see http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1098.msg12104#msg12104

Note also Bellum Africanum 72, where Caesar ships coals to Newcastle, or rather elephants from Italy to Africa, to train his troops - firmer evidence that he at least had access to them.

[Patrick Waterson]

True; if Caesar really wanted elephants, he could have them.  The drawback is that they would be of the North African variety, which Polybius in particular considers unable to stand up to Indian elephants (which Alexander would have).

[Justin Swanton]

As to the proposition that Alexander had superior troops in all departments, the PH units in the Macedonian list and the legion infantry in the Roman list all have a frontal fighting value of 7. So the infantry contest seems, literally, a roll of the dice.

On level ground the legionaries should have little chance against the phalanx. The latter should have major negative modifiers if it gets on rough or difficult terrain, more than the legionaries, which then gives them some hope.

[Chris]

Gents,

Fair points, all. It would seem then that an Armati rematch is in order. I shall give Caesar a number of smaller pachyderms and his more handsome and dashing opponent some of the Indian variety. As to the FV for the main troop types, I shall have to address and redress these . . . Lower the Roman HI to 6? Allow the Macedonians a plus 1 modifier on the first round of melee?

Interesting to see how the other two rule sets dealt with the issue of pikes versus pila. In IMPETVS, the legionaries had an advantage. With HC, the Clash values were the same, but the pike took away the charge bonus (if memory serves). Both sides, being heavy infantry, could "close ranks" and reduce casualties as well as ability to inflict damage.

Thanks for reading and commenting.

Chris

[Justin Swanton]

There have been several pike vs pilae discussions on the forum. The conclusion IIRC was that legions will always give way before a formed phalanx on good terrain - more a case of recoil than casualties. Anything that breaks up the phalanx - rocky outcrops, dense copses - makes it a sitting duck for Caesar's more manoeuvrable maniples, who can get at the flanks of the separated phalanx blocks and carve them up. If the phalanx is outflanked, as at Cynoscephalae, it is equally incapable of reacting, so when faced by Alexander on an open field Caesar must win the battle for the flanks. If he can't do that he must deploy at least some of his infantry on or before terrain adverse for the phalanx. Otherwise he doesn't have a snowball's.

[aligern]

I wholeheartedly agree Justin, that Caesar must win the battle fir the flanks, however, you do not cite the one battle where his flank was truly threatened by heavy cavalry...Pharsalus.  There , as we all know, he withdrew cohorts from his main line to support his less numerous cavalry. We are left with conjecture as to whether Alexander's cavalry could charge down the legionaries. I suppose the best comparitor is the Parthian cataphracts against Crassus an d Anthony, though I would entertain doubts as to how exact the comparison would be. Sarmatians using a very xyston lije weapon and with a reputation fir charging, were not. expected to take out legionaries, essentially similar to Caesar's, as long as the legionaries were firmed and ready. I submit that Caesar having designated men to deal with the Macedonian cavalry, is going to have them properly formed and braced forbthe job.

I also expect that Caesar would have recruited up enough auxiliaries to deal with the anticipated enemy.nSo he would recruit more archers and slingers (we know he recruited archers in Gaul and light cohorts in Spain) and Gallic and German cavalry. Combine all these and Caesar holds the flanks.
We should also remember that he encountered a pike army at Zela and beat it.  Maybe  Pharnaces' men are not Alexander's  so it would be a tougher fight, but I'd bet on a similar outcome.
One of the Romans' great advantages over the Macedonians is that they have the same type of soldier everywhere in the battle line.  The legions will generally outflank the pikes against whom they wil fall back, meanwhile they will chew up the units of Galatians or petasts on the flank of the phalanx and as others have said, assault it in the flanks.
Alex is thus going to lose this battle. He has one hope and that is to ride at Caesar himself and kill him. The difficulty with applying this tactic against Caesar is that he has to get through a lot of Romans to do ut and could end up on a pyre hinself. Als Caesar is a very mobile commander, unlike Darius, and thus finding him might be rather difficult. Of course there is also the question as to how Caesar's army would react if he was killed. i rather think Romans would just get angrier and more vicious with you!
Lastly, if this is a war rather than a battle, Caesar can afford to lose an army and recruit another one or two. Inam not sure that Alexander can afford the attrition.
Roy

[Justin Swanton]

I wholeheartedly agree Justin, that Caesar must win the battle fir the flanks, however, you do not cite the one battle where his flank was truly threatened by heavy cavalry...Pharsalus.  There , as we all know, he withdrew cohorts from his main line to support his less numerous cavalry. We are left with conjecture as to whether Alexander's cavalry could charge down the legionaries.

I'm sort of a fan of the KTB theory so would posit that the Companions and Sarissophoroi could cut through the legionaries without much difficulty unless Caesar was up on the tactic and had devised a countermeasure.

The first time Romans encountered cataphracts at Magnesia they didn't do very well, and the cataphracts' frontal smash into infantry was not (presumably) as effective as the kind of surgical operation performed by the Macedonian heavy horse.

I suppose the best comparitor is the Parthian cataphracts against Crassus an d Anthony, though I would entertain doubts as to how exact the comparison would be. Sarmatians using a very xyston lije weapon and with a reputation fir charging, were not. expected to take out legionaries, essentially similar to Caesar's, as long as the legionaries were firmed and ready. I submit that Caesar having designated men to deal with the Macedonian cavalry, is going to have them properly formed and braced forbthe job.

And armed. Preferably with pikes.

I also expect that Caesar would have recruited up enough auxiliaries to deal with the anticipated enemy.nSo he would recruit more archers and slingers (we know he recruited archers in Gaul and light cohorts in Spain) and Gallic and German cavalry. Combine all these and Caesar holds the flanks.
We should also remember that he encountered a pike army at Zela and beat it.

Who were not many (most of the army were not pikes), were charging uphill and were probably disordered crossing over the Roman fortifications.

One of the Romans' great advantages over the Macedonians is that they have the same type of soldier everywhere in the battle line.  The legions will generally outflank the pikes against whom they wil fall back,

Only if they can create a longer infantry line than the phalanx. That would mean having considerably more legionaries than Alexander had phalangites, as the 3-line Roman system, still in use under Caesar, had greater depth than the 16-man deep Macedonian phalanx. How many legionaries would Caesar have?

meanwhile they will chew up the units of Galatians or petasts on the flank of the phalanx and as others have said, assault it in the flanks.
Alex is thus going to lose this battle. He has one hope and that is to ride at Caesar himself and kill him. The difficulty with applying this tactic against Caesar is that he has to get through a lot of Romans to do ut and could end up on a pyre hinself. Als Caesar is a very mobile commander, unlike Darius, and thus finding him might be rather difficult. Of course there is also the question as to how Caesar's army would react if he was killed. i rather think Romans would just get angrier and more vicious with you!
Lastly, if this is a war rather than a battle, Caesar can afford to lose an army and recruit another one or two. Inam not sure that Alexander can afford the attrition.
Roy

True. Romans seemed always able to raise another army whereas Macedonia's resources seem to have been more limited. But I doubt Alexander would allow himself to be drawn into a battle where he did not have a distinct advantage over Caesar. His troops are already equipped to deal with an opponent like a Roman army - pikes beat pilae and swords, superior cavalry beats inferior cavalry. Alex's only disadvantage is the non-manoeuvrability of his infantry formations. Unlike the Romans, they cannot react quickly to an unexpected threat, but one would expect his genius to make sure no unexpected threats came his way.

My money's on Alex, any day. 

[Jim Webster]

Lastly, if this is a war rather than a battle, Caesar can afford to lose an army and recruit another one or two. Inam not sure that Alexander can afford the attrition.
Roy

Slight quibble. Rome could  recruit another army, I'm not sure whether Caesar could. His army was the armed wing of his political supporters, the next army he raised might not share their devotion to him.
As a political leader, Alexander was probably in a more robust situation, but Rome could out recruit Macedonia

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

One of the Romans' great advantages over the Macedonians is that they have the same type of soldier everywhere in the battle line.  The legions will generally outflank the pikes against whom they wil fall back, meanwhile they will chew up the units of Galatians or petasts on the flank of the phalanx and as others have said, assault it in the flanks.

Permit me to point out that Alexander never deployed peltasts, Galatians etc. on the flanks: his forward infantry line was always pure hypaspists and phalangites and, given that he usually deployed them eight deep and dense, he would be the one outflanking Caesar's infantry if the sides have anything like equal numbers.

He did however customarily have a second line of peltasts, thureophoroi, etc. which served nicely to intercept anyone taking advantage of cracks in the phalanx - or at least did in theory: one is not sure if it worked at Issus, but it may have stopped the rot there; it definitely sorted out the Persian cavalry who poured through the gap at Gaugamela.

Hence even if Alex's phalanx started to develop gaps, this second line would sort out anyone who tried to take advantage of them.  One may note that late Hellenistic armies went fort a single 10-deep phalanx instead of an 8-deep phalanx and presumably 8-deep second line: generations of never having to worry about gaps in the phalanx may have encouraged this development.

Slight quibble. Rome could  recruit another army, I'm not sure whether Caesar could. His army was the armed wing of his political supporters, the next army he raised might not share their devotion to him.
As a political leader, Alexander was probably in a more robust situation, but Rome could out recruit Macedonia

Good observation: one badly lost battle and Caesar will be city roadsweeper for life.  Rome could indeed out-recruit Macedonia, though if we commit an Alex who is already in charge of the Persian Empire he could pull together quite a lot of pantodapoi and similar Hellenised Asiatic types.

I also expect that Caesar would have recruited up enough auxiliaries to deal with the anticipated enemy.nSo he would recruit more archers and slingers (we know he recruited archers in Gaul and light cohorts in Spain) and Gallic and German cavalry. Combine all these and Caesar holds the flanks.

But remember whom he is up against: Alexander will have recruited his own additional cavalry and missile troops to deal with Caesar's additional helpings of each.

We should also remember that he encountered a pike army at Zela and beat it.

Pharnaces' close-fighting infantry were essentially imitation legionaries.  The Pontic army had ceased to be pike-based before 75 BC.

[aligern]

Ah yes, Peltasts are used by later generals than Alex to protect the flanks, Caesar, however can easily raise 40,000 legionaries and so outflank the hypaspists who are doing the flank orotection job, or he can take the third line and put them out to the flank. Unlike the Macedonians Carsar's men are extrememely flexible in their organisation so he has no need to stick to fixed depths.
Unlike Caesar's Romans the Macedonians have a real oroblem if they default down to an eight deep formation because they are just not flexible. Their longer line becomes even more brittle and vulnerable to penetration whereas the Romans can front the pijes with a single line of cohorts that falls back if the Greeks advance and falls on them if the pijes split apart. So expect Caesar to have enough men and to be coming round the flanks.
Its the falling back that really does for the Macedonians because, unlike the unweildy Asiatic mass or the fixed hoplites ( though they coukd fall back) the Romans can give ground without losing cohesion.
As to Caesar lising an army and then ending as a street sweeper...well there are two Caesars. One in Gaul, the other in the Civil Wars. In Gaul you might be right, but then the Romans had a history of becoming more determined when defeated so he might have lost troops as he did to the Eburones and yet survived in command. Once the mighty Caesar was dictator you are most definitely wrong. He gad armies fighting in his cause simultaneously in the East, in Africa and in Spain. Caesar would just have gone and git another army.
Another area that the partisans of Alexander have forgotten here is the Romans' aggressive use of field firtifications a la Sulla when facing cavalry and aggressive positioning of forts as in Spain. Alexander would have found himself penned back by these fortifications and his room for manoeuvre drastically reduced.

Roy