The Macedonian double whammy

[Prufrock]

Well, Diodorus says Alex deployed his cavalry across the front of his infantry. Arrian says only two ilae deployed to the right of the phalanx. Quintus Curtius Rufus affirms that two ilia deployed near the mountains whilst the rest of the cavalry concentrated "at the main danger point of the battle". Plutarch is not specific about the deployment of the cavalry.

Arrian says:
'As soon as Alexander found the ground in front of him opening out a little more he brought his cavalry - the Thessalian and Macedonian divisions, together with the Companions - up from the rear to the right wing under his own personal command....'

So more than two ilae are deployed to the right of the phalanx.

Diodorus says Alex attacked towards Darius with the cavalry, engaging the Persian cavalry and routing them before pursuing Darius. He affirms the battle between the phalanx and the Persian infantry was a separate fight, cut short by the rout of the cavalry.

Arrian says Alex led the phalanx forward with a measured step, but without specifying that Alex was himself part of the phalanx. However he says the phalanx was involved in Alex's attack: "the Macedonian phalanx had been broken and disjoined towards the right wing; because Alexander had charged into the river with eagerness, and engaging in a hand-to-hand conflict was already driving back the Persians posted there" He adds that the right wing regiments outflanked the Greek mercenaries after "perceiving that the Persians opposed to them had already been put to rout" - which implies that it wasn't they that routed them. Whilst they are outflanking the Greeks Alexander pursues Darius. The implication is that he had cleared the way for the right wing contingents of the phalanx but operated separately from them.

Arrian has:
'Alexander, at the head of his own troops on the right wing, rode at a gallop into the stream' so he was most certainly leading cavalry, not infantry. The effect of the passage you are quoting is to contrast the speed of Alexander's own success with the relative slowness of the centre, which opened up a gap between the cavalry and the main body of the phalanx that Nicanor and his hypaspists were in place to fill.

Putting it all together, the conclusion is that the right wing Macedonian attack is a combined cavalry-infantry affair with cavalry in front of infantry. There aren't any other detailed accounts of Issus in the sources so this is all we have to go on.

I hate to be blunt, but this reading is entirely wrong and not at all supported by Arrian's account of the battle. The cavalry are to the right of the phalanx, with the hypaspists a sort of hinge linking the two.

I suppose the commonly accepted standard for historical certitude is several unrelated sources all explicitly affirming exactly the same thing in clear terms. Problem is that there are few historical events that have that kind of testimony. The entire first Persian invasion of Greece is described by only one author, Herodotus. Caesar's campaigns in Gaul are described only by Caesar. And so on. Which, if we follow that criteria, leaves us knowing very little for sure about history.

Alexander used combined arms to achieve victory, but not in the way you are suggesting.

[Prufrock]

Sorry to have sounded so oppositional, Justin.

I certainly agree that the manner in which the cavalry and infantry coordinate is very important in Alexander's battles, but cannot see how a 'double whammy' fits the descriptions in the sources. 

[Justin Swanton]

Sorry to have sounded so oppositional, Justin.

I certainly agree that the manner in which the cavalry and infantry coordinate is very important in Alexander's battles, but cannot see how a 'double whammy' fits the descriptions in the sources.

No worries Aaron. For controversial topics like this one disagreement is the order of the day. And anyway I'm used to being a minority of one. It's a sad and lonely life...

[RichT]

All this talk of Issus makes me realise there isn't an entry for it in the Battles sub forum, so I've made one. Just the sources for now, I'll add a commentary when I'm feeling strong.

[Erpingham]

Thanks Richard.  Useful to have those sources.  I look forward to your commentary, especially on Polybius' hatchet job on Callisthenes account

[Erpingham]

I've now had a chance to read through the sources and, I have to confess, had a lot of difficulty seeing any reference to a "double whammy".  In none of the accounts do the infantry attack an opponent that has been broken by cavalry.  All accounts that mention it imply Alexander delivered a right hook to envelop the Persian centre, not a frontal charge.

I also noted Justin is using a different version of Arrian's account and in particular relies on a couple of passages which are quite different in the version Richard posted.  In particular, the positioning of the left wing cavalry in relation to the Cretans etc. (in Richard's version, the Cretans are in front of the infantry and the cavalry are further ahead on their left, rather than them being behind the cavalry) and the passage of the Thessalians (Richard's version has these transfer from the left behind the phalanx, similar to Curtius, rather than from the centre in front of the phalanx). 

[RichT]

Justin's translation of Arr. Anab. 2.9.3 (concerning the left wing cavalry) is E. J. Chinnock's of 1884. I quoted P. A. Brunt's of 1976 (itself a revised version of E. Iliff Robson's of 1966). I think Brunt's translation is better.

The Thessalians though, you may be conflating two incidents, the movement of the Thessalians (Arr. Anab. 3.9.1 and QC 3.11.3) and that of the Companions (Arr. Anab. 2.9.3, not mentioned by QC).

[Erpingham]

The Thessalians though, you may be conflating two incidents, the movement of the Thessalians (Arr. Anab. 3.9.1 and QC 3.11.3) and that of the Companions (Arr. Anab. 2.9.3, not mentioned by QC).

Yes, I see the error - thanks.  I would still hold that a covert move is unlikely to have been across the front, or even a withdrawal through the phalanx, but behind it, as explicit in the movement of the Thessalians on a similar mission. 

[RichT]

Absolutely, and there is no reason to suppose the Companions were ever in front of the phalanx. Arrian is not totally clear where these two squadrons of Companions moved from or to. If the "two squadrons of Companions" (Arr. Anab. 2.9.3) are the same as the "three hundred horsemen" of 2.9.4 (in QC, "two squadrons" 3.11.2) who were left to watch the flanking force on the hills, then Alexander transferred these two squadrons from the Companions alongside the phalanx ("the centre") out to the far right, freeing up the Agrianians and other cavalry that had initially protected this flank, who were then used to oppose (outflank, according to Arrian) the Persian main line.

All the movements before Issus are complicated by the unclear timeline in Arrian and especially Curtius (Diodorus doesn't bother with a sequence of events). The Macedonian army deployed successively wider as it advanced, not just the infantry reducing depth, but cavalry and other forces deploying out to the wings as the plain opened out. Some of the obscurities - like why moving the Thessalians from right to left didn't leave a Thessalian-shaped hole in the Macedonian line - are no doubt due to this.

[Justin Swanton]

I'll come back to this - a little tied up at present. For now I'd be interested in your take on Arrian, Anabasis: 3.14:

"he himself led those with him for a short time further to the right, but when the cavalry who had been sent to help against the Persians who were encircling the right wing had broken their frontline to some extent, he turned through the gap and made a wedge formation with the companion cavalry and the part of the main phalanx stationed there, and then led them at a run with a full battle cry straight at Darius himself."

καὶ ὥσπερ ἔμβολον ποιήσας τῆς τε ἵππου τῆς ἑταιρικῆς καὶ τῆς φάλαγγος τῆς ταύτῃ τεταγμένης

[Erpingham]

For anyone confused (as I was), Justin has switched the focus to the Battle of Gaugamela.

[Justin Swanton]

For anyone confused (as I was), Justin has switched the focus to the Battle of Gaugamela.

Not quite. The first post in this thread looked at Chaeronea, Issus and Gaugamela to see if a double whammy hypothesis fits the sources. The one explicit reference to a combined cavalry-infantry attack - with the cavalry in front and the infantry behind - is Arrian's description of Alex's right flank attack at Gaugamela. If one accepts that Alex indeed did create a kind of wedge with the Companions and the part of the phalanx stationed on the right (i.e. the hypaspists) then it becomes plausible that he did exactly the same thing at Issus - where there isn't a black-and-white description of a composite wedge, but where the textual evidence supports the existence of such a wedge. But if Alex never created a composite cavalry-infantry wedge then is one is left with the necessity of providing a plausible explanation for Anabasis 3.14. I imagine one could just say it was erroneous, as Rich affirms Diodorus was erroneous. Any textual source that doesn't fit a preconceived theory is erroneous. Easy way of doing history I suppose...

[Prufrock]

Absolutely, and there is no reason to suppose the Companions were ever in front of the phalanx. Arrian is not totally clear where these two squadrons of Companions moved from or to. If the "two squadrons of Companions" (Arr. Anab. 2.9.3) are the same as the "three hundred horsemen" of 2.9.4 (in QC, "two squadrons" 3.11.2) who were left to watch the flanking force on the hills, then Alexander transferred these two squadrons from the Companions alongside the phalanx ("the centre") out to the far right, freeing up the Agrianians and other cavalry that had initially protected this flank, who were then used to oppose (outflank, according to Arrian) the Persian main line.

They are not the same squadrons, according to the notes in my Penguin edition, ed. Betty Radice, trans. de Selincourt, intro. and notes, JR Hamilton.

These are not the two squadrons of companions just mentioned, but the 'units of mounted troops' mentioned with the Agrianians above, two squadrons according to Curtius (3.11.2).They were doubtless mercenaries.

[Erpingham]

If one accepts that Alex indeed did create a kind of wedge with the Companions and the part of the phalanx stationed on the right (i.e. the hypaspists) then it becomes plausible that he did exactly the same thing at Issus - where there isn't a black-and-white description of a composite wedge, but where the textual evidence supports the existence of such a wedge.

But beware of the fallacy that the tactics used in one battle were automatically those used in all the others.  In medieval military studies this is famously illustrated by Burne's application of what he thought was a standard English deployment to all battles of the Hundred Years War, even though the proposed deployment was only recorded at one of them (and, even then, subsequent writers reckon he misinterpreted it).

We have no evidence for this tactic at Issus, though we have detailed sources, so we must be careful, even if, as you suggest, it may be plausible.

[Erpingham]

I imagine one could just say it was erroneous, as Rich affirms Diodorus was erroneous. Any textual source that doesn't fit a preconceived theory is erroneous. Easy way of doing history I suppose...

All interpretation of multiple sources involves a process of reconciliation and, I suppose, we all have methods we deploy.  Richard, it seems to me, used a standard method - if you have six sources and five say one thing and the unique source is clearly not your best source, you may well assume errors in it.

And perhaps the old adage about people in greenhouses not throwing stones applies.  Your personal methodology does make itself vulnerable to cherry-picking of bits of sources, after all.