The opposing sides in the Republican civil wars often seemed to levy huge numbers of extra legions very quickly - some were veterans but many were fresh recruits (particularly in the case of the Marians post Marius)
Such troops are usually represented as raw legionaries but would they in fact have borne any resemblance to Legionaries (drilled, triple acies, pila, scutum) or would they really have been more akin to a medieval emergency peasant levy?
And were some of the new troops also mercenaries and if so what fighting styles did they use?
There are a lot of questions about these legions. One was what did they wear, because mail takes a fair bit of time to produce and were there arsenals with twenty or thirty thousand sets of mail just waiting to be taken?
I know at one point is was assumed they had leather armour, but even that would have taken a lot of time to produce.
I suspect that it was comparatively easy to train them to legionary drill, because you'd have the cadre available to do it. But putting together the equipment would have been a lot harder.
My guess is that in the east you'd have seen all sorts of things hauled out of storage.
Interestingly we have Philo, 25 BCE – c. 50 CE who is just after this period. He commented
(92) And indeed it was not a long time before that, that the arms had been taken away from the Egyptians throughout the whole country by a man of the name of Bassus, to whom Flaccus had committed this employment. But at that time one might have beheld a great fleet of ships sailing down and anchoring in the harbours afforded by the mouths of the river, full of arms of every possible description, and numerous beasts of burden loaded with bags made of skins sewn together and hanging like panniers on each side so as to balance better, and also almost all the wagons belonging to the camp filled with weapons of every sort, which were brought in rows so as to be all seen at once, and arranged together in order."
Whether these were weapons that had been left in circulation by the civil wars or it was a comparatively normal state of affairs it's difficult to say. But in our very disarmed society it may be that we underestimate the amount of weaponry that was usually found in people's homes in this period
Jim
To reinforce Jim's point on the time taken to produce weapons and armour, some time ago I read a book on this subject
"Iron For The Eagles" by David Sim & Isabel Ridge. According to these two, who derived their numbers from timing blacksmiths, it took the following hours to produce the finished artefact from a iron billets and other semi-worked materials:
Legionary's gladius | 12 hours |
Officer's pattern-weld sword | 110 hours |
Pilum | 10 hours |
Javelin | 3 hours |
Mail shirt | 330 hours |
Also, would not equipping all the rankers with chainmail be prohibitively expensive (in any context)?
In the 11th & 12th & 13th Centuries Mail armour is commonly thought of as the preserve of the fantastically wealthy.
Quote from: NickHarbud on October 17, 2016, 04:05:13 PM
To reinforce Jim's point on the time taken to produce weapons and armour, some time ago I read a book on this subject "Iron For The Eagles" by David Sim & Isabel Ridge. According to these two, who derived their numbers from timing blacksmiths, it took the following hours to produce the finished artefact from a iron billets and other semi-worked materials:
Legionary's gladius | 12 hours |
Officer's pattern-weld sword | 110 hours |
Pilum | 10 hours |
Javelin | 3 hours |
Mail shirt | 330 hours |
Yes, I've got that book as well.
The idea of turning out tens of thousands of mail shirts in a year has always worried me
Jim
The limiting factor is presumably the number of available craftsmen (blacksmiths, weaponsmiths etc.). Each city usually had its own, together with stacks of weapons, armour and shields in the city armouries. The almost universal fashion for imitation legions would have made raising genuine legions a relatively simple task, because the pattern, infrastructure and equipment would have been present or easily obtainable, whereas raising, say, a pike phalanx to fight at a Republican Civil War battle would have been problematical.
The ready availability of materials and craftsmen, plus the financing permitted by drawing upon the resources of several hundred cities, would make the rapid armouring numbers of new legions a quite feasible, if not necessarily routine, exercise.
A couple of points.
Firstly wasn't someone executed by one of the early emperors for having such a large collection of arms and armour that he was deemed to be a danger to the throne.
Secondly, I would suggest that the kardiophylax might be the answer to rapid armouring. Manufacturing 10,000 brass or iron square plates might be something that could be done from stock.
Lastly I recall a discussion here a little while ago about the raising of legions from cohorts. The cohorts were described as being raised first , then presumably organised as legions. I think in that discussion someone suggested that the cohorts already existed as a sort of home guard . It may be that soldiers who were laid off and given land to settle upon retained their armour and perhaps handed it to their sons who, as citizens, could also ge called upon to serve. Hence there may have already existed large numbers of men who were both equipped and organised. Of course they may not have trained and for some it would be grandad!s kit, but it would make raising large numbers of legionaries relatively easy. Of course this facility would go away when the legions became professional and long service rather than being raised for campaigns.
Quote from: aligern on October 17, 2016, 07:54:31 PM
A couple of points.
Firstly wasn't someone executed by one of the early emperors for having such a large collection of arms and armour that he was deemed to be a danger to the throne.
One of the later Hasmonean or early Herodian princes, if I remember aright. Just tried to look him up but could not find him ...
Quote
Secondly, I would suggest that the kardiophylax might be the answer to rapid armouring. Manufacturing 10,000 brass or iron square plates might be something that could be done from stock.
The Assyrians and Etruscans seem to have had the same idea, and early Romans who could not manage a full metal cuirass also made do with same. By the Late Republic, however, we are probably looking at a Mediterranean-wide procurement organisation, even if temporarily bisected, and my suspicion is that mail shirts would be produced/issued from store as a matter of priority for legionaries while more rudimentary forms of armour would probably be fobbed off on auxiliaries.
The reason I suspect this is that none of our sources mention legionaries on either side, even the raw ones, being at a disadvantage through being under-armoured, though one
could argue this as a possible reason why at Munda the Pompeian pila volley caused few casualties while the Caesarian volley shot their opponents down 'in heaps'.
Quote
Lastly I recall a discussion here a little while ago about the raising of legions from cohorts. The cohorts were described as being raised first , then presumably organised as legions.
Yes, and the cohorts would probably be equipped locally. Most cohorts seem to have been raised or collected in cities, the number being variable. One reason for this might be variable availability of equipment in and around that city (another being the variable availability of manpower).
There are some Roman illustrations of what look to be unarmoured legionaries - see for example one in combat from the (probably Augustan) Arch of Orange at http://legio-wargames.com/blog/4591469581/The-Arch-of-Orange/9690047. Whether we can infer "real" unarmoured legionaries from this is of course open to debate.
In addition some authors interpret various representations as showing linen or leather armour, or padded subarmales worn without armour over them. Again, all down to artistic interpretation.
See also the discussion of the use of loricati at http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1298 - though it's not conclusive.
Quote from: Duncan Head on October 18, 2016, 09:14:33 AM
There are some Roman illustrations of what look to be unarmoured legionaries - see for example one in combat from the (probably Augustan) Arch of Orange at http://legio-wargames.com/blog/4591469581/The-Arch-of-Orange/9690047.
I wonder whether the unarmoured person with what seems to be a legionary helmet and shield could be an example of the elusive
antepilani of the era. He is associated with Roman cavalry, he does seem to have a legionary shield emblem, is facing a Gallic opponent and is in a pose consistent with wielding a spear-like weapon. Teaming of
antepilani with cavalry was first practised by Caesar at Pharsalus, and a good idea rarely goes completely away.
Quote from: aligern on October 17, 2016, 07:54:31 PM
I would suggest that the kardiophylax might be the answer to rapid armouring. Manufacturing 10,000 brass or iron square plates might be something that could be done from stock.
Mass produced rings for chain mail could also have been prepared in advance, mainly by semi-skilled apprentices rather than the blacksmith himself. There might also have been a degree of automation or specialist tooling in their production.
For example, step 1 would involve drawing a red-hot iron billet into a wire coil of uniform size by drawing through a die. The next step is chopping the wire into uniform lengths. Then you cold curl all the short bits of wire around a mandril. Before you know it, your team of apprentices has turned out several thousand rings that simply need the master to join together.
Yes, but the 300 hours takes into account drawing the wire etc. It's 308 man years to produce the mail for a legion assuming 365 twelve hour days a year.
I cannot imagine any blacksmith is going to have fifty four tons of iron rings lying about on the off chance somebody is going to raise a legion.
(four thousand five hundred mail shirts each weighing 12 kg. the figures are approximate but whats a couple of tons either way among friends ;) )
On top of this you'd have another three tons to produce the swords and another four or five tons for helmets
I think we forget the sheer bulk of stuff that we're talking about. To put this in proportion, the Inchtuthil hoard of worked and unworked iron buried to prevent it falling into enemy hands was ten tons
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 18, 2016, 05:02:55 PM
I cannot imagine any blacksmith is going to have fifty four tons of iron rings lying about on the off chance somebody is going to raise a legion.
A blacksmith might not, but cities could produce, and if necessary store, on an industrial scale.
"The cantons of Etruria were the first to promise assistance, each according to its means. Caere contributed corn and provisions of all kinds for the crews; Populonia, iron; Tarquinii, cloth for the sails; Volaterrae, timber for the hulls and corn; Arretium, 3000 shields and as many helmets, whilst they were ready to supply as many as 50,000 darts, javelins and long spears." - Livy XXVIII.45.10
This was in 203 BC. As they were equipping a fleet at no cost to Rome, the question of armouring legionaries did not arise. Over the next couple of centuries, they acquired a lot more practice at equipping Romanised land forces.
"All the sacred places, the temples, and every other unoccupied space, were turned into workshops, where men and women worked together day and night without pause, taking their food by turns on a fixed schedule. Each day they made 100 shields, 300 swords, 1000 missiles for catapults, 500 darts and javelins, and as many catapults as they could. For strings to bend them the women cut off their hair for want of other fibres." - Appian
Punic Wars XIII.93
This is Carthage in 149 BC (start of the Third Punic War). It would eventually equip 30,000 men as soldiers. All the arms and armour in the city had previously been handed over to the Romans and such metal as there was went into new weapons.
I have no comparable rates for producing armour, but given that each side in the various 1st century BC civil wars usually had hundreds of cities in dozens of provinces to draw on, and many of those habitually supported ongoing annual campaigns while some were accustomed to raising fresh armies at short notice (notably in Italy, Seleucid Syria and subsequently Pontus* - even a single part-time prince in Judaea with a passion for collecting could accumulate thousands of spare suits of armour). It is not as if they had to raise armies from scratch and a peacetime industrial base: they were turning out war materials in quantity much of the time.
*
Coincidentally, Syria and Pontus were where the Pompeians raised their new legions just prior to Pharsalus.
Quote
It's 308 man years to produce the mail for a legion assuming 365 twelve hour days a year.
Say we need 100 armourers each with maybe 4-5 apprentices; this is well within the capabilities of a decent-sized city, which could fit out an entire legion in a few months. Given that armour and weapon-making facilities would tend to be concentrated at local capitals, one might expect to be able to outfit, say, one legion in Pontus (perhaps at Amasia) and two in Syria (around Antioch) in a single season.
these do give us figures for comparison
Arretium, 3000 shields and as many helmets,
well the helmets contain enough iron for 250 mail shirts.
But seriously remember that drawing wire is not standard blacksmiths work in this period (or any period to be honest) as far as I could see it's a specialist trade skill,some blacksmiths could do it, and it wasn't something you could set apprentices to do, they'd need a fair bit of training first
But I found the interesting thing about the list is nobody was offering body armour
Looking at what I assume is the Carthaginian example, making dart heads and javelin heads is simple smith work, apprentices could probably do that, the rest of the weapon is wood turning.
Your swords is where the true smith skill comes in and so we can assume that is how many decent smiths they have. We know from the work rates that a man could do one a day, so Carthage, a truly major city, had 300 smiths of that level of ability.
Which means that if you took them off swords, in a year they could have produced enough mail for a legion, doing nothing else.
But given this is one of the biggest, richest and most advanced cities in the area at the time I think that shows you how limited production really was
Jim
We may be able to deduce skill from cost.
If we can estimate the ratio of metal between mail and plate (or better, segmentata), and then use that ratio to get a raw metal cost.
Compare that to the cost of nail vs the example solid armour, and you effectively have the cost of labour, which is time x skill.
I would expect mail to be low skill - build the wire, a twist it into rings, assemble the rings to a pattern.
While solid armour seems to require more smithing at a higher level.
Which is a testable proposition, I think.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 18, 2016, 11:05:25 PM
But I found the interesting thing about the list is nobody was offering body armour
Indeed: they seem to have helped themselves to Roman armour in the early stages of the campaign. Until then, they may have made do with linen or leather - or just done without.
Quote
Your swords is where the true smith skill comes in and so we can assume that is how many decent smiths they have. We know from the work rates that a man could do one a day, so Carthage, a truly major city, had 300 smiths of that level of ability.
Which means that if you took them off swords, in a year they could have produced enough mail for a legion, doing nothing else.
But given this is one of the biggest, richest and most advanced cities in the area at the time I think that shows you how limited production really was
Although we have to remember that in this instance Carthage was cut off from any imports of metal by Roman possession of Spain and the presence of the Roman fleet, so they were having to prioritise with what supplies of metal they had within the city. Antioch, Alexandria or even Amasia would do at least as well, being open to fresh supplies of metal - and these were just three cities out of several hundred in the running at the time of the civil wars, albeit presumably the best three in the east. Given Pharnaces' ongoing campaigns at the time, equipping a legion in Pontus would just be business as usual.
And as Nick and Mark point out, a good deal of mail production can be 'subcontracted' to smiths of less than master level, the materials then being assembled into suits.
To put some substance on this latter assertion, does anyone who has
Iron For The Eagles by David Sim & Isabel Ridge know how much of the 330 hours is required to join the rings into a mail suit?
given that Greek hoplites were happy to fight with a large shield and no body armour, my guess is that the hastily raised legions made do with a shield and helmet and no armour
I think you're missing the point with Carthage, we're not talking about the amount of iron, we talking about the number of men capable of working it to that standard.
The important thing was to convert the iron into swords etc as quickly as possible, to get the weapons into the hands of the defenders.
The bottle neck wasn't iron, it was skilled iron workers
Quote from: Mark G on October 19, 2016, 11:44:29 AM
I would expect mail to be low skill - build the wire, a twist it into rings, assemble the rings to a pattern.
While solid armour seems to require more smithing at a higher level.
remember iron has to be worked into bars and rods of a suitable quality for the wire to be drawn in the first place. Hammering iron into scales or lamellae would be vastly quicker than making mail
You just hammer the iron into strips and cut them rather than hammering into bars and then drawing them and riveting the links etc
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 19, 2016, 01:08:07 PM
The bottle neck wasn't iron, it was skilled iron workers
Indeed, and if we give Carthage 300 master smiths, and take this as the norm for a major city/capital, then these same 300, plus 4-5 apprentices each, could turn out some 300 suits a week (330 man-hours/5 men = 66 hours per suit, probably an irreducible minimum given the finer points of assembly*). Twenty weeks on and your entire legion is armoured, with about a thousand suits to spare (assume the extra time/resources are soaked up making flashy suits for the officers).
*This may be unduly pessimistic: see the forum discussion here (https://forum.rpg.net/showthread.php?512063-How-long-did-it-take-to-make-(chain)Mail). Of particular interest is this bit:
"A friend of mine made a late dark-age/early medieval mail hauberk (covering tops of arms & only hanging slightly below the waist). It took him a bit over 40 hours of continuous work. He had all the links already made & most of the leather fittings pre-cut. He had made 2-3 hauberks previously so was competent but not a professional at it. The longest bit was assembling the basic mail squares, that were then connected together & attached to the leather fastenings into the finished hauberk form. The padded arming jacket beneath the mail was already made & took 15-20 hours from complete scratch, including a bit of embroidery.
He reckoned that a full length mail coat hanging to the knees with full sleeves & coif would take twice as long. Another 3-4 hours if he made all the leather fittings from scratch. The rings would take at least 3 weeks for just the hauberk, from extruding the wire from bars, twisting it into rings & clipping them (this was one bit he wouldn't do), this did not including mining & smelting iron ore into bars.
Realistically he was looking at 2 weeks to make a hauberk & arming jacket, and a solid 3 weeks for a full mail coat. An extra 3-4 weeks to make all the links, and an extra 3-4 weeks to mine & smelt the iron ore into bars – assuming he could even do this & had access to a working mine. Trapping animals, tanning leather, making non-metal components etc would add another week."
It looks as if the 'critical path' component, i.e. the assembly of the metal links, would be in the 40-hour-plus bracket. Note how the rings are the major time/effort component, so if apprentices can do these it leaves the master smith to concentrate on assembly, say one mail suit per week. 300 such smiths would thus be able to turn out 300 mail suits per week, as previously suggested. A legion needs about 5,000 mail suits to armour everyone, so 17 weeks would see the basic job done.
I'm afraid I don't think the example is particularly useful "The rings would take at least 3 weeks for just the hauberk, from extruding the wire from bars, twisting it into rings & clipping them (this was one bit he wouldn't do),"
So he's just guessing whereas at least the 330 hours figure is based from doing the job
the other problem with your 300 smiths and their imagined four of five apprentices each (sorry but how the hell are they supporting this number of imaginary apprentices in peace time?) is that even if that number of apprentices exist, they're the ones making the spear and dart heads, and producing the metal bits for the shields
And suddenly you've promoted them to being fully qualified metal workers capable of drawing wire, which wasn't a particularly common process and many smiths would spend years without doing it.
And of course, in this period you've ended up with a force of men who might have armour, but alas have neither sword nor spear to actually attack the enemy with
A couple of things occur to me are needed to get the overall picture. Firstly, how was armour normally procured? Was it collected in batches from all sorts of cities made by jobbing smiths or was there an armour industry with recognised centres, with armourers and big workshops as per medieval practice?
Secondly, who held stocks of armour and how much? Were there arms dealers who could turn you up 1000 panoplies in a few weeks, for example? Or city armouries or temple collections which could find a few thousand sets of kit in an emergency?
Regarding the time to make rings versus the rest of manufacture, it does depend a lot upon the type of rings one is making. The simplest rings simply curled the wire around until the two ends met.
(http://viny80100.homelinux.com/images/picsht/chainmail%20bra%20how%20to%20004mod2small.jpg)
More sophisticated and better quality mail rivetted the ends together as shown here.
(http://www.blades4you.com/store/images/Round%20riv.JPG)
Regarding who could do what, the blacksmith would need to forge the iron billet and draw the wire. Cuting the wire to length and cold working it into rings can be done by the lowliest apprentice - even I can do this. Flattening the ends of rings and rivetting would need a team, but would not require reheating the rings and could be done by apprentices. Note also that half the rings could be completed before being assembled into sheets of mail.
Incidentally, it is somewhat impressive that the legionary gladius has been engineered for rapid production, but is still such a useful weapon.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 19, 2016, 01:44:01 PM
the other problem with your 300 smiths and their imagined four of five apprentices each (sorry but how the hell are they supporting this number of imaginary apprentices in peace time?)
What peace time?? Warfare, foreign or civil, was endemic in the 1st century BC.
Quote from: Erpingham on October 19, 2016, 03:00:11 PM
A couple of things occur to me are needed to get the overall picture. Firstly, how was armour normally procured? Was it collected in batches from all sorts of cities made by jobbing smiths or was there an armour industry with recognised centres, with armourers and big workshops as per medieval practice?
We do not, as far as I know, have details for this period, but the later Roman Empire had
fabricae complexes, dedicated workshop centres which produced and stored certain types of weapons and armour, or in a few cases all of them. It is unlikely that Hellenistic kingdoms (whose resources the Romans would have inherited when they muscled into the East Med) would be less well organised and coordinated.
Quote
Secondly, who held stocks of armour and how much? Were there arms dealers who could turn you up 1000 panoplies in a few weeks, for example? Or city armouries or temple collections which could find a few thousand sets of kit in an emergency?
I expect this would mostly be a matter for the royal armouries, generally situated at the capital but also at centres of provincial government. Hellenistic powers usually worked on a soldier/settler (katiokoi/kleruchoi) arrangement which provided soldiers for life, but seem also to have maintained armour-producing facilities. Alexander famously ordered - and received - new suits of armour for his whole army prior to his invasion of India.
Of all the civilised powers which fought for or against Rome around the Mediterranean, the only one for which a serious shortage of armour is explicitly noted is the Judaean rebels during the AD 66-70 Jewish Revolt. A combination of mass recruitment and restricted access to the extant armouries left them distinctly short of armour.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 19, 2016, 07:47:28 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 19, 2016, 01:44:01 PM
the other problem with your 300 smiths and their imagined four of five apprentices each (sorry but how the hell are they supporting this number of imaginary apprentices in peace time?)
What peace time?? Warfare, foreign or civil, was endemic in the 1st century BC.
So endemic that areas of the world that had no tradition of making mail had time to develop the techniques for non-paying customers?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 19, 2016, 07:47:28 PM
We do not, as far as I know, have details for this period, but the later Roman Empire had fabricae complexes, dedicated workshop centres which produced and stored certain types of weapons and armour, or in a few cases all of them. It is unlikely that Hellenistic kingdoms (whose resources the Romans would have inherited when they muscled into the East Med) would be less well organised and coordinated.
Quote
But there is no actual evidence of this, and given that the Hellenistic empires tended to use a lot of troops armed and equipped in 'ethnic' styles I'd say unlikely.
Because so many of them also based their armies on a core of soldier settlers who were supposed to provide their own equipment, the central state wouldn't have needed to go down the fabricae route
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 20, 2016, 10:18:55 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 19, 2016, 07:47:28 PM
Warfare, foreign or civil, was endemic in the 1st century BC.
So endemic that areas of the world that had no tradition of making mail had time to develop the techniques for non-paying customers?
This begs a very important question: imitation legions had been the rage for about a century by the time of Pharsalus and Philippi, so the tradition of making mail would be well established throughout the East Med (perhaps also a certain amount of the West Med, which Rome controlled in any case). The famous Sidonian soldier may or may not demonstrate that Egypt had adopted imitation legions, but he does demonstrate the wearing of chainmail.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 20, 2016, 10:21:18 AM
... given that the Hellenistic empires tended to use a lot of troops armed and equipped in 'ethnic' styles I'd say unlikely.
Because so many of them also based their armies on a core of soldier settlers who were supposed to provide their own equipment, the central state wouldn't have needed to go down the fabricae route
Until they started equipping imitation legions. The Seleucids also had regular pretenders and ongoing civil wars, and hence a high turnover of men and equipment, at least until Pompey turned up and extinguished the Seleucids, but what with the Parthians there was still plenty of warfare around (Crassus equipping seven new legions, for a start). It is perhaps no coincidence that Lentulus went to Syria to embody and equip the legions he brought to Pharsalus.
The crux of the matter seems to be that Dark Ages-style limitations just do not apply to the classical era. ;)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 20, 2016, 12:08:01 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 20, 2016, 10:18:55 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 19, 2016, 07:47:28 PM
Warfare, foreign or civil, was endemic in the 1st century BC.
So endemic that areas of the world that had no tradition of making mail had time to develop the techniques for non-paying customers?
This begs a very important question: imitation legions had been the rage for about a century by the time of Pharsalus and Philippi, so the tradition of making mail would be well established throughout the East Med (perhaps also a certain amount of the West Med, which Rome controlled in any case). The famous Sidonian soldier may or may not demonstrate that Egypt had adopted imitation legions, but he does demonstrate the wearing of chainmail.
It begs an even more important question, how many imitation legionaries wore mail? (Actually how universal was mail amongst the legions of the republic anyway)
There would be a tradition of making mail amongst the Galatians and any tradition may have come from them rather than the Romans. Certainly their presence in Egypt could have brought mail production with them
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 20, 2016, 12:08:01 PM
Until they started equipping imitation legions. The Seleucids also had regular pretenders and ongoing civil wars, and hence a high turnover of men and equipment, at least until Pompey turned up and extinguished the Seleucids, but what with the Parthians there was still plenty of warfare around (Crassus equipping seven new legions, for a start). It is perhaps no coincidence that Lentulus went to Syria to embody and equip the legions he brought to Pharsalus.
But there again when you look at the various Seleucid pretenders, they used mercenaries, who would have turned up with their own kit as was traditional in the Greek world, Barbarian auxiliaries who also turned up armed, and those military formations who changed sides who also had their own kit
I'm not aware of any Seleucid pretender who arrived on the scene and raised twenty thousand men from scratch who had never been soldiers and needed arms, equipment and training.
With Crassus it gets interesting but complicated. He'd led eight legions to victory in Italy to end the servile war, and had raised soldiers for Sulla before that.
So he had clients who would be willing to serve, legionaries and the sons of his legionaries.
A good question is how much kit did a legionary take home with him
In Crassus we might see some clue as to how the armies were raised
All of which are not bad points, although mercenaries may have been equipped by the pretender rather than coming with their own gear, but ...
1) When Seleucid cavalry upgraded to cataphract status, where did their armour come from?
2) When Seleucid imitation legionaries appeared on the scene, where did their armour come from?
Then again, we have Armenians and Parthians fielding large numbers of armoured cavalry. When Crassus sets out on his Parthian campaign, Artavasdes joins him with 6,000 guard cavalry and promises an additional 10,000 cataphracts. The Parthians also feature numerous armoured cavalrymen, as per Cassius Dio's description:
"The Parthians make no use of a shield, but their forces consist of mounted archers [hippotoxotai] and pikesmen [kontophoroi = lancers], mostly in full armour. Their infantry is small, made up of the weaker men; but even these are all archers. They practise from boyhood, and the climate and the land combine to aid both horsemanship and archery." - Cassius Dio XL.15.2
As an aside, Cassius Dio's account of Crassus' defeat at Carrhae (Book 40, chapters 17-27) contains numerous details not present in Plutarch, including this bit about the main action:
"When this had taken place, the Roman infantry did not turn back, but valiantly joined battle with the Parthians to avenge his death. Yet they accomplished nothing worthy of themselves because of the enemy's numbers and tactics, and particularly because Abgarus was plotting against them. 2 For if they decided to lock shields for the purpose of avoiding the arrows by the closeness of their array, the pikemen were upon them with a rush, striking down some, and at least scattering the others; and if they extended their ranks to avoid this, they would be struck with the arrows. 3 Hereupon many died from fright at the very charge of the pikemen, and many perished hemmed in by p439the horsemen. Others were knocked over by the pikes or were carried off transfixed. 4 The missiles falling thick upon them from all sides at once struck down many by a mortal blow, rendered many useless for battle, and caused distress to all. They flew into their eyes and pierced their hands and all the other parts of their body and, penetrating their armour, deprived them of their protection and compelled them to expose themselves to each new missile. 5 Thus, while a man was guarding against arrows or pulling out one that had stuck fast he received more wounds, one after another." -
idem XL.22.1-5
Back to legions and armour.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 20, 2016, 06:00:54 PM
In Crassus we might see some clue as to how the armies were raised
Sadly Plutarch and Dio both skip this aspect of the campaign, though Plutarch goes to great lengths to point out the attention Crassus lavished on increasing his personal finances. What does emerge is that Crassus seems to have brought his forces ready equipped from Italy (Plutarch,
Life of Crassus 17), lost a number of his ships in a storm, presumably with soldiery still on board as they were just out of Brundisium, and then drummed up various auxiliaries in the east, including the Armenians previously mentioned. His first incursion into Mesopotamia results in his placing 7,000 foot (pezoi) and 1,000 horse in garrisons and withdrawing to Syria to spend the winter, where his son joins him with 1,000 Gallic and German cavalry.
Crassus then takes the field with seven legions, 4,000 light troops (psilous) and about 4,000 cavalry. Seven is an unusual number of legions (they usually came in pairs), so he presumably left one legion garrisoning the few cities he had collected the previous year. This would mean he started off with eight legions, the same size force he fielded against Spartacus, which seems logical. This was at the same time as Caesar filling out his legions in Gaul and Pompey taking an army to Spain. Now that Rome was recruiting all and sundry (and Crassus' recruits seem to have been more sundry than most) rather than just propertied persons, the armouries of Italy would be getting a
lot of practice. One rather suspects that when the Roman civil wars eventually died down and Augustus
reduced the military establishment to 28 legions, he found himself with a lot of surplus equipment on his hands.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 20, 2016, 07:52:28 PM
All of which are not bad points, although mercenaries may have been equipped by the pretender rather than coming with their own gear, but ...
1) When Seleucid cavalry upgraded to cataphract status, where did their armour come from?
2) When Seleucid imitation legionaries appeared on the scene, where did their armour come from?
The seleucid cavalry upgrade appeared after the campaigns against the Parthians and Bactrians, both of whom had accept Seleucid overlordship
Firstly some armour (and perhaps horses) could have been handed over in peace negotiations, much like the Indians handed over elephants
secondly we're not sure exactly how much armour upgrade there was, and a lot of it could be achieved with captured kit on campaign, and perhaps a cash allowance to men to buy kit between campaigns.The horse armour might have been metallic, scales on a fabric backing, which isn't particularly technical, or there might have been leather involved.
When Seleucid imitation legionaries appeared on the scene, they were already soldiers who already had armour. Why would they throw their armour away and get new armour? As armour wore out more and more men might acquire mail, as opposed to their late father's battered fabric and scale job (or whatever the old man had)
With regard to Armenians and Parthians fielding large numbers of armoured cavalry, you're looking at a lot of legacy stuff. The French could field large numbers of armoured cavalry at Crecy and elsewhere without the need for government arsenals and regular issues of new kit.
Military aristocracies accumulate the stuff and pass it on down the family. Also how much of it was metal and how much in the back ranks was a mixture of metal and leather with fabric coverings for horses we don't really know
The argument against a Seleucid armoury establishment seems to be:
1) Their armour was mainly handed down from previous generations.
2) Some of it was provided by Galatians.
3) Cataphract upgrade was provided by Parthians and Bactrians.
The question arises: where and by whom were the original suits made? Would Galatians, Bactrians and Parthians have had organised armour production but the Seleucids not? This seems a little hard to believe.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 20, 2016, 10:20:57 PM
With regard to Armenians and Parthians fielding large numbers of armoured cavalry, you're looking at a lot of legacy stuff.
Are you? Did the Parthians (Parni) come off the steppes encased in metal armour? Traditionally, mass metalworking is the preserve of civilised societies, who can get people to stay in one place for long enough to a) dig up the ore, b) process it to get usable metal and c) work it on a large enough scale to get viable armour for large formations.
The Armenians had the advantage of sitting next door to one of the world's principal sources of decent iron, so prodding the Phrygian and Cappadocian ironworkers into action would not have been a problem for Tigranes, who seems to have popularised the cataphract among Armenians. Legacy armour after Tigranes seems not unreasonable, but before Tigranes would take some explaining to compete with the ready availability of ironworkers and metalsmiths in his empire.
QuoteAlso how much of it was metal and how much in the back ranks was a mixture of metal and leather with fabric coverings for horses we don't really know
Dio Cassius can help here:
"The Parthians make no use of a shield, but their forces consist of mounted archers and pikesmen [kontophoroi],
mostly in full armour [ta polla kataphraktoi]. Their infantry is small, made up of the weaker men; but even these are all archers." - XL.15.2
'kataphraktoi' seems to be used only for metal armour, so we have our answer. :)
Which brings us back to: where did they get all this armour? The simplest answer would seem to be: they took over the Seleucid armouries and manufacturies in the eastern half of the empire and got them churning out what they wanted. Cue Antiochus the Great, who regains these territories and coincidentally re-equips his cavalry cataphract style. Had there been no manufacturies and had he simply picked up the Parthians' own suits, there would be the question of where the next generation of Parthians got
theirs from.
The reason this discussion started was because of doubts over being able to equip a dozen or so legions from scratch at the height of a civil war. Given the rate the Romans were turning out armies, there does not seem to have been a problem as far as Italy was concerned, and even when they had to fall back on recruiting legions outside Italy there seems to have been enough of a base of skills and resources for legions to have been raised and equipped in ones and twos at provincial capitals. I just do not see any reason to suppose a shortage of skills or materials: arms and armour were big business, or at least
big if not necessarily business, before and during the 1st century BC. The problem seems to have been not so much a lack of availabilty of resources as ensuring you were sitting on the resources in the first place, e.g. Pompey ordered numerous cohorts recruited throughout Italy just in time to have them collected by Caesar ...
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 21, 2016, 11:26:46 AM
Are you? Did the Parthians (Parni) come off the steppes encased in metal armour? Traditionally, mass metalworking is the preserve of civilised societies, who can get people to stay in one place for long enough to a) dig up the ore, b) process it to get usable metal and c) work it on a large enough scale to get viable armour for large formations.
Weren't the Turks (Tu-Chueh) famous as metal workers? And I believe the current view is that cataphract armour evolved in Central Asia so yes, the Parthians _did_ come off the steppes encased in metal armour.
Regards
Mick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 21, 2016, 11:26:46 AM
The argument against a Seleucid armoury establishment seems to be:
1) Their armour was mainly handed down from previous generations.
2) Some of it was provided by Galatians.
3) Cataphract upgrade was provided by Parthians and Bactrians.
Frankly that is nonsense and you know it.
Point 1
Military settlers had a duty to supply their own equipment, including horses. This was hardly novel, it had been so under the Persian and Babylonians as well.
So it wasn't all ancestral pieces, as stuff wore out, the soldier had a duty to replace it
Point 2
That is not what I said. I merely pointed out that the Galatians had a longer culture of making mail than the Romans
Point 3
What I actually said was that the initial upgrade could well have been facilitated by the use of equipment supplied by the defeated Bactrians and Parthians on the same sort of terms that the Indians provided Elephants. Once the equipment was in place it would have been the duty of the military settler to maintain it and replace it when it wore out, just like any other military equipment he had.
None of this presupposes a centralised production system, or even a real need for one.
As for "'kataphraktoi' seems to be used only for metal armour, so we have our answer." I assumed that the word was also used for ships as well?
May I make a point about steppe peoples? Nomads exist in relationship with settled townsfolk. Nomad lifestyles do not provide enough goods to be self sufficient, ingenious though the nomad is with leather and bone. Nomads produce a surplus of , milk, cheese, leather, fur, embroidery and small handwork items. They trade these with the townspeople for metal, weapons, cloth etc.
So nomad armours are generally made of many small plates of leather, bone and metal. Nomad smiths buy plates in the town which they can then drill, lace and assemble. Inneffect the metal plates mimic what the nomads originally used the metal, bone and chitin for.
Thus the Parthians, before they became an imperial power, already have trade and tribute relationships with settled peoples and thus an armour production system that is suitable for a mobile population. A population that may not actually be that mobile, because, if their herdng is transhumance, they may well do several months in the winter, moving to a camp in summer where they are stationary for another period of months. So the smith and the jeweller and the saddlemaker only need a setup that can fit on a wagon.
Roy
Interestingly in sub-Saharan Africa it seems that there was a class of blacksmiths who were nomadic, or at least itinerant, and they moved taking their tools with them.
Given the small amounts of iron normally worked the lack of permanent forge doesn't seem to have been too much of a problem
Exactly Jim, hence lamellar armour, spangenhelms , scale etc. all staples of the steppe armoury. Of course, with most of these assemblage armours, less skiiled chaps can produce the kit of parts rather more eadily than spinning a Montefortino or Coolus helmet or muscle cuirass out of a sheet of bronze.
Roy
It's all simple basic techniques, hammering bar flat, cutting, putting holes in it, riveting. All of it can be done with comparatively few tools and with the exception of the helmets, a lot of the work could be handed over to others. In fact I'd suspect that a lot of lacing etc might be done by women who were perfectly at home with leather and other fabrics
Jim
Or even civilised folk who call themselves smiths and armourers ...
I think we are in danger of losing the basic point in question, which was whether the Mediterranean world could cope with armouring the legions fielded for the various civil wars of the 1st century BC. There seems to be no reason why not; even Gauls and Parthians can make mail in apparent quantity, so what escapes me is Jim's real objection to civilised powers doing so. ;)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 21, 2016, 09:24:44 PM
Or even civilised folk who call themselves smiths and armourers ...
I think we are in danger of losing the basic point in question, which was whether the Mediterranean world could cope with armouring the legions fielded for the various civil wars of the 1st century BC. There seems to be no reason why not; even Gauls and Parthians can make mail in apparent quantity, so what escapes me is Jim's real objection to civilised powers doing so. ;)
Patrick you're talking nonsense. Given that the Roman state had been sending out legions, some of whom were wearing mail, for a couple of centuries, I have no problem with them producing mail
It's just that with no evidence of state production, and limited evidence of stock piling, combined with the known slow speed of production I question how rapidly legions could be equipped with full mail body armour.
The fact that states resorted to robbing trophies from temples indicates that at the very least they faced production bottlenecks.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 21, 2016, 09:44:43 PM
It's just that with no evidence of state production, and limited evidence of stock piling, combined with the known slow speed of production I question how rapidly legions could be equipped with full mail body armour.
We have references to cities providing equipment, e.g. for Scipio's fleet in 203 BC, so I would question the 'no evidence for state production' bit. Roman citizen legionaries would of course be expected to make private arrangements prior to Marius' reforms, but we are looking at the period when his system was the norm and substantial numbers of legionaries needed to be issued with weapons and armour. The 'slow speed of production' means you wait a few weeks for the armour as opposed to it necessarily trickling out in small quantities: the Romans could draw on the resources of dozens of cities in Italy, each producing its own few cohorts' worth, and an unknown number of cities outside Italy. Each city's contribution might not necessarily amount to much, but there were a lot of cities. This incidentally may be why in Caesar's time troops were levied in cohorts and then assembled into legions.
There is another aspect to Roman mobilisation: planning. When a consul was appointed, he was given a province and voted a force deemed adequate to do whatever he was supposed to be doing. Knowing in advance what will be needed makes it a lot easier to have the right amount of equipment ready in time.
Quote
The fact that states resorted to robbing trophies from temples indicates that at the very least they faced production bottlenecks.
In a few cases, yes, though such 'borrowing' seems to have been the exception, not the norm. Did you have any particular instances in mind?
right so we've established there was no centralised production and no centralised stockpiles.
So let's move on.
Yes cities would have people capable of making weaponry. We know from Athens that Lysias had a factory with 120 slaves making shields.
The citizens of Greek cities seem to have been largely capable of producing enough weaponry to produce their own needs, it's occasionally that we read of someone, (Often Ptolemy in the later period) sending equipment
So when Rome was raising troops for some major project it was highly likely that cities would send ambassadors to Rome to offer the use of their facilities. Makes for good relations and you might be able to wrangle a change in tax status on the back of it.
Then when the ambassador made their way back, the order would doubtless be given to produce stuff. There might even be small amounts in stock. But allowing time for the city to decide who to send and what to offer, for the ambassador and his party to get there and be seen and their offer accepted, it is hardly going to be instant. It could cheerfully take some months, especially if you're talking about cities in Asia Minor
So for the Roman general trying to raise his legions, especially in a civil war, it would be a complicated procedure, because I have no doubt most cities could produce shields (although classic legionary shields were a different technique to Greek shields) and swords, it's perfectly possible that some cities would have nobody experienced in making mail. After all, how many of their citizens ever purchased it.
So your potential Imperator would be getting batches of stuff from all over the place.
With regard to temples, the Romans used gallic trophy kit after Cannae, and here it's generally accepted that not many of the slave legionaries and debtors got mail, because it times of crisis there wasn't time to produce it.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 21, 2016, 10:20:04 PM
The citizens of Greek cities seem to have been largely capable of producing enough weaponry to produce their own needs, it's occasionally that we read of someone, (Often Ptolemy in the later period) sending equipment
Indicating that he at least had either production or stockpiles to spare.
Quote
So when Rome was raising troops for some major project it was highly likely that cities would send ambassadors to Rome to offer the use of their facilities. Makes for good relations and you might be able to wrangle a change in tax status on the back of it.
Then when the ambassador made their way back, the order would doubtless be given to produce stuff. There might even be small amounts in stock. But allowing time for the city to decide who to send and what to offer, for the ambassador and his party to get there and be seen and their offer accepted, it is hardly going to be instant. It could cheerfully take some months, especially if you're talking about cities in Asia Minor
So for the Roman general trying to raise his legions, especially in a civil war, it would be a complicated procedure, because I have no doubt most cities could produce shields (although classic legionary shields were a different technique to Greek shields) and swords, it's perfectly possible that some cities would have nobody experienced in making mail. After all, how many of their citizens ever purchased it.
So your potential Imperator would be getting batches of stuff from all over the place.
No quarrel with this: many hands make light work. :) The key to getting deliveries rather than shortages at the end of the day would be accurate planning so the ambassadors can get their marching orders (and inventory orders) early. Regarding mail manufacture, every city would most probably have something even if their infantry fought unprotected, because their officers would have valued their lives. Yes, there would be lots of local production, but it would have to be centrally coordinated somehow.
That such coordination existed, or was assumed to exist, can be seen in Pompey's boast (50 BC or thereabouts) that he had but to stamp his foot and Italy would be filled with troops.
Quote
With regard to temples, the Romans used gallic trophy kit after Cannae, and here it's generally accepted that not many of the slave legionaries and debtors got mail, because it times of crisis there wasn't time to produce it.
The Gallic trophy kit was, we are told, issued as a punishment as opposed to a shortage-induced necessity; debtors and slave legionaries would of course have problems providing their own kit as their property status and hence disposable income was a bit on the low side.
Following the Marian reforms, which were themselves soon followed by the Italian allies gaining citizen status, some sort of Roman central coordination, and perhaps storage, seems inevitable: increasing numbers of non-propertied (and hence armourless) persons were joining the legions, and they would need to be equipped somehow. Once you start equipping the
capite censi because they lack armour, the temptation for the poorer elements to quietly jettison granddad's dinner-plate-on-a-string chest protector and line up for a full suit of nice shiny mail would be overwhelming.
And once you start equipping the lower-income citizenry, the middle-income citizenry, who are being squeezed by the dual difficulties of neglect of their farms through continuous campaigning and the rise of huge slaveowner-run farms driving them out of business, will also want equipping as their hand-me-downs are unfashionable, falling apart and increasingly unaffordable to replace.
Everything in the 1st century BC thus pressures Rome towards the state increasingly equipping legions and legionaries.
Just to refocus on the question :
Quote
Everything in the 1st century BC thus pressures Rome towards the state increasingly equipping legions and legionaries.
This seems a reasonable hypothesis, certainly in Italy, for the reasons given. But the challenge from Jim as I read it was not that the state didn't equip troops, it was how did the greater republic (or whatever it called itself) manage to equip a lot of extra legions in a hurry? Patrick appears to suggest that a dispersed armament production throughout the Roman world, so that any area could produce fully equipped cohorts quickly without recourse to ancestral arms or stores. This would be a mix of new production and prepared stores. While plausible, there seems to be a lack of evidence to either prove or disprove this.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 22, 2016, 11:38:07 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 21, 2016, 10:20:04 PM
The citizens of Greek cities seem to have been largely capable of producing enough weaponry to produce their own needs, it's occasionally that we read of someone, (Often Ptolemy in the later period) sending equipment
Indicating that he at least had either production or stockpiles to spare.
of course, a thousand shields here, a thousand shields there. Hardly seven legions
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 22, 2016, 11:38:07 AM
No quarrel with this: many hands make light work. :) The key to getting deliveries rather than shortages at the end of the day would be accurate planning so the ambassadors can get their marching orders (and inventory orders) early. Regarding mail manufacture, every city would most probably have something even if their infantry fought unprotected, because their officers would have valued their lives. Yes, there would be lots of local production, but it would have to be centrally coordinated somehow.
That such coordination existed, or was assumed to exist, can be seen in Pompey's boast (50 BC or thereabouts) that he had but to stamp his foot and Italy would be filled with troops.
The boast of a politician should never be confused with reality.
Again you assume some sort of central coordination but without any evidence that it existed.
Accurate pre-planning in a civil war takes some doing. Firstly you might hope that a city sends you and ambassador, rather than your rival, and you might suspect the city sends ambassadors to both, (being prepared to deny the official status of the one which went to the losing side) and at the same time the city is going to procrastinate and send equipment to neither, or send nominal amounts to both.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 22, 2016, 11:38:07 AM
The Gallic trophy kit was, we are told, issued as a punishment as opposed to a shortage-induced necessity; debtors and slave legionaries would of course have problems providing their own kit as their property status and hence disposable income was a bit on the low side.
Following the Marian reforms, which were themselves soon followed by the Italian allies gaining citizen status, some sort of Roman central coordination, and perhaps storage, seems inevitable: increasing numbers of non-propertied (and hence armourless) persons were joining the legions, and they would need to be equipped somehow. Once you start equipping the capite censi because they lack armour, the temptation for the poorer elements to quietly jettison granddad's dinner-plate-on-a-string chest protector and line up for a full suit of nice shiny mail would be overwhelming.
And once you start equipping the lower-income citizenry, the middle-income citizenry, who are being squeezed by the dual difficulties of neglect of their farms through continuous campaigning and the rise of huge slaveowner-run farms driving them out of business, will also want equipping as their hand-me-downs are unfashionable, falling apart and increasingly unaffordable to replace.
Everything in the 1st century BC thus pressures Rome towards the state increasingly equipping legions and legionaries.
robbing temples of their displays as a method of punishing people is a new one. Where does it say this?
The new recruits wouldn't be lining up for shiny new mail, they'd get the set that the last armourless recruit handed back when he left.
This is one of the problems, we don't really know whether troops who were issued with equipment got to keep it. There's evidence for later for equipment being both kept and being reissued.
You have a very enlightened view of the state. In reality states tend to be very penny pinching on such things as soldiers kit, so that they will go out and buy their own stuff once they have money. The proportion of British troops wearing issue footwear on some 20th and 21st century campaigns has been surprisingly low.
Certainly we know from the Roman Empire than men seem to have spent considerable sums personalising their kit.
Given the multiple terms of service many of the poorer men did, it could well be that even the poor had managed to put together some decent kit by the end of their first term, whether through loot, purchase or even an issue of equipment to the small proportion of men who didn't have anything.
If they then rejoined the next legion, they could well just have taken any issue equipment with them rather than it being handed back. Indeed if there was pay deductions for equipment they might have regarded it as theirs anyway.
But in normal times, when a legion was raised prior to the civil wars, it is unlikely that the state would have had to provide kit for everyone, indeed it's entirely possible that legions could be raised that just needed a bit of topping up.
The problem comes when you have a civil war and suddenly everybody is raising troops, and at this point you've got some veterans with kit, some with partial kit, some new recruits with kit and some without. Over the next few months as stuff comes forward from various cities men are going to get their equipment made up, but it's hardly likely to be uniform.
Interestingly comments from the early republic about being able to hand out shields to men to get them to pose as extra Triari could well show that there might have been a stockpile of 'expendables' that went with the army
Quote from: Erpingham on October 22, 2016, 12:16:41 PM
Patrick appears to suggest that a dispersed armament production throughout the Roman world, so that any area could produce fully equipped cohorts quickly without recourse to ancestral arms or stores. This would be a mix of new production and prepared stores. While plausible, there seems to be a lack of evidence to either prove or disprove this.
Hence the discussion ...
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 22, 2016, 05:55:19 PM
The boast of a politician should never be confused with reality.
Again you assume some sort of central coordination but without any evidence that it existed.
Regarding Pompey, he was not a politician but a C-in-C; he did attempt to 'stamp his foot' and troops were raised all over Italy (thus demonstrating central coordination - see Caesar's
Civil War), but Pompey rather spoiled the effect by retreating to Brundisium just as they were coming on line.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 22, 2016, 06:07:53 PM
robbing temples of their displays as a method of punishing people is a new one. Where does it say this?
"And then, in addition to the two city legions which had been enrolled by the consuls at the beginning of the year, and the levy of slaves, also the cohorts raised from the Picene and Gallic districts, he stooped to that last defence of a state almost despaired of, when honour yields to necessity: namely, he issued an edict that,
if any men who had committed a capital offence, or were in chains as judgment debtors, should become soldiers under him, he would order their release from punishment or debt. [4] Six thousand such men he armed with Gallic spoils which had been carried in the triumph of Gaius Flaminius, and thus set out from the city with twenty-five thousand armed men." - Livy XXIII.14.3
Those equipped with Gallic spoils were criminals or debtors, alike despised by Roman society; they had failed to be proper Romans and hence were given barbarian, non-Roman, weaponry.
Quote
The new recruits wouldn't be lining up for shiny new mail, they'd get the set that the last armourless recruit handed back when he left.
This is one of the problems, we don't really know whether troops who were issued with equipment got to keep it. There's evidence for later for equipment being both kept and being reissued.
By this time legionaries were serving their sixteen years more or less in sequence, which means they kept it for that length of time. When discharged, they would be expected to hand back anything not theirs.
Quote
You have a very enlightened view of the state. In reality states tend to be very penny pinching on such things as soldiers kit, so that they will go out and buy their own stuff once they have money. The proportion of British troops wearing issue footwear on some 20th and 21st century campaigns has been surprisingly low.
Certainly we know from the Roman Empire that men seem to have spent considerable sums personalising their kit.
The armies of the latter years of the Republic appear to have contained an increasing proportion of, to use a Wellingtonian term, scum. These men (often noted for sedition on campaign, cf. Fimbria's career and Lucullus' experiences) appear to have been more interested in take-home loot than in personalising their kit - they were not the career ethos professionals of the Empire period.
States around this time did take much better care of their soldiers than those of the post-mediaeval period: it was essentially enlightened self-interest because to begin with the soldiers were also the citizens who voted you in as consul, and the art of war of the time specified looking after the needs of troops as a priority (contrast General Oscar Potiorek in 1914: "In war one must expect to go hungry.").
As far as Rome was concerned, they would have been quite happy to armour their troops because someone else usually ended up footing the bill. The end of the second Punic War and the war against Antiochus III both ended with Rome being paid a huge indemnity, and the habit did not stop there. Such money as did not stick to the fingers of the consuls was squirrelled away for useful purposes, presumably including building roads and equipping legions as not a lot was spent on anything else (yet).
Quote
But in normal times, when a legion was raised prior to the civil wars, it is unlikely that the state would have had to provide kit for everyone, indeed it's entirely possible that legions could be raised that just needed a bit of topping up.
The problem comes when you have a civil war and suddenly everybody is raising troops, and at this point you've got some veterans with kit, some with partial kit, some new recruits with kit and some without. Over the next few months as stuff comes forward from various cities men are going to get their equipment made up, but it's hardly likely to be uniform.
Granted that during a civil war there is at least double the usual demand, but Rome had been having more or less continual civil wars and/or multiple major consular campaigns, interspersed with the odd major slave revolt for variety, since 90 BC. By 48 BC they were probably quite used to the level of demand involved in equipping new troops simultaneously for both sides.
In Caesar's and Pompey's war, both sides seem to have had returning veterans who quite likely lacked kit (they had gone off to farm their lands in comfortable retirement): they were usually parcelled out to stiffen the newer legions. One presumes they were equipped at the same time.
Quote
Interestingly comments from the early republic about being able to hand out shields to men to get them to pose as extra Triari could well show that there might have been a stockpile of 'expendables' that went with the army
If this relates to the
accensi at Vesuvius in 340 BC (Livy VIII.8-10 and all that), Rodger Williams' article in Slingshot 292 sort of looked at this. What appears to have happened is that
accensi were the butchers, bakers and candlestick makers who were only called to the standards in a national emergency, and then parcelled out 900 to a legion (bringing it up to the traditional emergency strength of 5,000 or so). The question is whether, as they served so infrequently, they brought their own kit or were issued with that left behind by former (deceased) triarii, of which there would presumably accrue a stockpile over time. Or both: I think armour was personal, though weapons may have been issued by the state (not entirely sure: don't quote me on this).
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 22, 2016, 11:09:11 PM
Regarding Pompey, he was not a politician but a C-in-C; he did attempt to 'stamp his foot' and troops were raised all over Italy (thus demonstrating central coordination - see Caesar's Civil War), but Pompey rather spoiled the effect by retreating to Brundisium just as they were coming on line.
It seems that his soldiers weren't as good or as well equipped as he hoped. So he had to fall back to give time for training and time to get them properly equipped
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 22, 2016, 11:09:11 PM
"And then, in addition to the two city legions which had been enrolled by the consuls at the beginning of the year, and the levy of slaves, also the cohorts raised from the Picene and Gallic districts, he stooped to that last defence of a state almost despaired of, when honour yields to necessity: namely, he issued an edict that, if any men who had committed a capital offence, or were in chains as judgment debtors, should become soldiers under him, he would order their release from punishment or debt. [4] Six thousand such men he armed with Gallic spoils which had been carried in the triumph of Gaius Flaminius, and thus set out from the city with twenty-five thousand armed men." - Livy XXIII.14.3
Those equipped with Gallic spoils were criminals or debtors, alike despised by Roman society; they had failed to be proper Romans and hence were given barbarian, non-Roman, weaponry.
nowhere does it say that "The Gallic trophy kit was, we are told, issued as a punishment as opposed to a shortage-induced necessity"
Firstly he took volunteers from amongst them. Secondly it appears he offered them the only equipment he had available, he'd raised two legions and a number of cohorts and he well was dry
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 22, 2016, 11:09:11 PM
The armies of the latter years of the Republic appear to have contained an increasing proportion of, to use a Wellingtonian term, scum. These men (often noted for sedition on campaign, cf. Fimbria's career and Lucullus' experiences) appear to have been more interested in take-home loot than in personalising their kit - they were not the career ethos professionals of the Empire period.
States around this time did take much better care of their soldiers than those of the post-mediaeval period: it was essentially enlightened self-interest because to begin with the soldiers were also the citizens who voted you in as consul, and the art of war of the time specified looking after the needs of troops as a priority (contrast General Oscar Potiorek in 1914: "In war one must expect to go hungry.").
As far as Rome was concerned, they would have been quite happy to armour their troops because someone else usually ended up footing the bill. The end of the second Punic War and the war against Antiochus III both ended with Rome being paid a huge indemnity, and the habit did not stop there. Such money as did not stick to the fingers of the consuls was squirrelled away for useful purposes, presumably including building roads and equipping legions as not a lot was spent on anything else (yet).
except that in the civil war it wasn't states that were raising the armies
Similarly money squirreled away was not a lot of use. Carthage had perhaps three hundred men capable of making swords. Throw twice as much money at them on Monday and you still only had three hundred men capable of making swords on Wednesday.
The money stockpiled could pay the wages of legions, it couldn't summon into being their equipment overnight. If Rome had the wherewithal to produce equipment at the drop of a hat, cities wouldn't have been stepping forward to offer equipment, they'd have just offered cash.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 23, 2016, 07:09:20 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 22, 2016, 11:09:11 PM
Regarding Pompey, he was not a politician but a C-in-C; he did attempt to 'stamp his foot' and troops were raised all over Italy (thus demonstrating central coordination - see Caesar's Civil War), but Pompey rather spoiled the effect by retreating to Brundisium just as they were coming on line.
It seems that his soldiers weren't as good or as well equipped as he hoped. So he had to fall back to give time for training and time to get them properly equipped
It was not that so much as Caesar crossing the Rubicon when he did, catching everyone on the hop with troops still being raised, trained, equipped etc. (which takes a few weeks). Pompey had two choices: go to meet Caesar with what he had (the potentially winning choice), or run away with what he had to either Spain (where he had an army) or the East (where he had the means to raise an army) - either being an apparently safer option, though delusively so. He took the latter choice; apparently by this point in his career he felt more at home raising armies than commanding them.
One should note that Pompey's falling back did
not give time for his newly-raised troops to be equipped and trained: he simply abandoned many of them to Caesar. The rest were still somewhat untrained, albeit seemingly wholly equipped as nobody comments on any deficiencies in their equipment, by the time of Pharsalus.
On the troops raised with Gallic trophy weaponry ...
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 23, 2016, 07:14:37 AM
nowhere does it say that "The Gallic trophy kit was, we are told, issued as a punishment as opposed to a shortage-induced necessity"
Firstly he took volunteers from amongst them. Secondly it appears he offered them the only equipment he had available, he'd raised two legions and a number of cohorts and he well was dry
Although nowhere does it say that he was dry, or that this was the only equipment available. Polybius II.31 incidentally notes that 40,000 Celts fell at Telamon and the spoils were sent to Rome, so we have to ask why if arms were in such short supply only the criminals and debtors were issued with them.
And on money and materials ...
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 23, 2016, 07:19:25 AM
except that in the civil war it wasn't states that were raising the armies
Actually it was. To raise an army an individual needed
Imperium, which came in two aspects: appointment to a relevant office (usually consul; occasionally dictator) and use of the state's facilities and officials. This is one reason why each side was keen to have its own senate.
Quote
Similarly money squirreled away was not a lot of use.
"The sinews of war are infinite money" - Cato.
Quote
Carthage had perhaps three hundred men capable of making swords. Throw twice as much money at them on Monday and you still only had three hundred men capable of making swords on Wednesday.
But bring in Utica and a few other cities and their facilities, and you have maybe six hundred men capable of making swords on Wednesday.
Quote
The money stockpiled could pay the wages of legions, it couldn't summon into being their equipment overnight. If Rome had the wherewithal to produce equipment at the drop of a hat, cities wouldn't have been stepping forward to offer equipment, they'd have just offered cash.
Let us not confuse the pre-90 BC situation, where Rome lived principally on the contributions of its allies, with the post-90 BC situation where everybody in Italy was a Roman citizen (and some ambitious types were aiming at ruling the lot). Of course money cannot be transmuted into equipment 'overnight': there is always a waiting period of some weeks, but those weeks habitually occurred between the election of consuls (and apportionment of their campaigns) at the very beginning of a year and the mustering of the legions in the spring. This would be the time when the coffers were opened, or at least orders placed for payment once fulfilled. Naturally, if the springtime was rather fuller of activity than expected, as occurred in 49 BC, the process could be moved elsewhere with the same time lag (which gave Caesar a chance to collect Spain in the interim).
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 23, 2016, 12:02:07 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 23, 2016, 07:09:20 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 22, 2016, 11:09:11 PM
Regarding Pompey, he was not a politician but a C-in-C; he did attempt to 'stamp his foot' and troops were raised all over Italy (thus demonstrating central coordination - see Caesar's Civil War), but Pompey rather spoiled the effect by retreating to Brundisium just as they were coming on line.
It seems that his soldiers weren't as good or as well equipped as he hoped. So he had to fall back to give time for training and time to get them properly equipped
It was not that so much as Caesar crossing the Rubicon when he did, catching everyone on the hop with troops still being raised, trained, equipped etc. (which takes a few weeks). Pompey had two choices: go to meet Caesar with what he had (the potentially winning choice), or run away with what he had to either Spain (where he had an army) or the East (where he had the means to raise an army) - either being an apparently safer option, though delusively so. He took the latter choice; apparently by this point in his career he felt more at home raising armies than commanding them.
One should note that Pompey's falling back did not give time for his newly-raised troops to be equipped and trained: he simply abandoned many of them to Caesar. The rest were still somewhat untrained, albeit seemingly wholly equipped as nobody comments on any deficiencies in their equipment, by the time of Pharsalus.
so actually he was neither a successful general nor a successful politician. ;D
He couldn't stamp his foot and produce soldiers, and the system couldn't arm and equip them properly. This does seem to militate against there being large stockpiles of equipment because if Italy contained them, Pompey would have had access
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 23, 2016, 12:22:21 PM
On the troops raised with Gallic trophy weaponry ...
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 23, 2016, 07:14:37 AM
nowhere does it say that "The Gallic trophy kit was, we are told, issued as a punishment as opposed to a shortage-induced necessity"
Firstly he took volunteers from amongst them. Secondly it appears he offered them the only equipment he had available, he'd raised two legions and a number of cohorts and he well was dry
Although nowhere does it say that he was dry, or that this was the only equipment available. Polybius II.31 incidentally notes that 40,000 Celts fell at Telamon and the spoils were sent to Rome, so we have to ask why if arms were in such short supply only the criminals and debtors were issued with them.
simple arms were in such short supply because there was no facilities for rapid production and no stockpile.
They'd already just raised two legions and some cohorts, through usual channels.
The reason debtors and criminals were issued with Gallic arms you've already answered. They wouldn't have their own. So if they volunteered, somebody had to supply it
Because the Roman state had no stockpile and production took a long time, the only source was the gallic arms.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 23, 2016, 12:22:21 PM
"The sinews of war are infinite money" - Cato.
Quote
Carthage had perhaps three hundred men capable of making swords. Throw twice as much money at them on Monday and you still only had three hundred men capable of making swords on Wednesday.
But bring in Utica and a few other cities and their facilities, and you have maybe six hundred men capable of making swords on Wednesday.
Except that given communications, Wednesday could be three, six or even nine months off, and half these cities could either openly or covertly support the other side.
But still the point stands, mere money is no use when the skills are the limiting factor and your answer to them being the limiting factor does not involve money, but widening the recruitment area. Money is comparatively meaningless.
It is the sinews of war in that it can pay for those with the skills to work for you, be they smiths, leather makers or soldiers, but it will not create extra leather makers or smiths, it merely alters their allegiance. The amount of legions that can be supplied doesn't increase because you're stealing smiths from the common pool.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 23, 2016, 12:22:21 PM
Let us not confuse the pre-90 BC situation, where Rome lived principally on the contributions of its allies, with the post-90 BC situation where everybody in Italy was a Roman citizen (and some ambitious types were aiming at ruling the lot). Of course money cannot be transmuted into equipment 'overnight': there is always a waiting period of some weeks, but those weeks habitually occurred between the election of consuls (and apportionment of their campaigns) at the very beginning of a year and the mustering of the legions in the spring. This would be the time when the coffers were opened, or at least orders placed for payment once fulfilled. Naturally, if the springtime was rather fuller of activity than expected, as occurred in 49 BC, the process could be moved elsewhere with the same time lag (which gave Caesar a chance to collect Spain in the interim).
It was you who brought in the cities making contributions initially, mainly as far as I can tell because the lack of evidence of Roman stockpiles meant that other sources were necessary.
Placing orders for kit isn't the same of having kit on hand.
We know from Egypt somewhat later that when the army placed orders for clothing, those who took the order went round scores of subcontractors who would start weaving garments suitable for the military rather than other garments.
For armour and swords, we're not talking about major arms manufacturers, we're talking about hundreds of small businesses who might have a few pieces in stock (but not many because having your capital tied up in stock is not good business.)
And you cannot turn round to these weapons producers and say "Make only for us for six months" because if you do that, what you've done is guaranteed that those men who were buying their own kit, or having armour altered, or whatever, cannot get it done, which means that you've got to armour them
And anyway it doesn't work because you're just the state, you turn up, place big orders that you pay for late and are prone to cancelling at short notice. He on the other hand is the son of a valued customer, you fix all his farm implements for him as your father did for his father, and you'll continue to work with down the generations. His kit will get fixed and the state order will be done between times
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 23, 2016, 02:43:49 PM
He couldn't stamp his foot and produce soldiers, and the system couldn't arm and equip them properly.
There was more to it than this simplistic statement.
"Multitudes of veterans, who had formerly served under [Pompey], flocked to him from all parts, allured by the expectation of rewards and dignities. A great number of officers belonging to the two legions lately returned by Caesar, had likewise orders to attend him. Rome was filled with troops." - Caesar,
Civil War I.3.2-3
But all was not plain sailing.
"But when Pompey began to levy recruits, some refused to obey the summons, and a few came together reluctantly and without zest, but the greater part cried out for a settlement of the controversy. For Antony, in defiance of the senate, had read before the people a letter of Caesar containing propositions which were attractive to the multitude. He asked, namely, that both Pompey and he should give up their provinces, disband their armies, put themselves in the hands of the people, and render an account of what they had done." - Plutarch,
Pompey 59.2
The result was a hesitant and half-hearted attempt to talk and mobilise at the same time, with limited success in each. In the middle of all this,
"And now word was brought that Caesar had seized Ariminum, a large city of Italy, and was marching directly upon Rome with all his forces." -
idem 60.1
The result was strident chaos.
"As soon as the report of this came flying to Rome and the city was filled with tumult, consternation, and a fear that was beyond compare, the senate at once went in a body and in all haste to Pompey, and the magistrates came too. And when Tullus asked Pompey about an army and a military force, and Pompey, after some delay, said timidly that he had in readiness the soldiers who had come from Caesar, [4] and thought that he could speedily assemble also those who had been previously levied, thirty thousand in number, Tullus cried aloud, 'Thou hast deceived us, Pompey!' and advised sending envoys to Caesar ..." -
idem 60.3-4
And yet it appeared to Caesar that Pompey had been mobilising with some success.
"Troops were levied over all Italy, arms enjoined [arma imperantur = equipment ordered], money demanded of the colonies and free towns, and even taken from the very temples; in fine, neither divine nor human rights were regarded." - Caesar, op cit I.6.8
This last passage of Caesar, with the laconic 'arma imperantur', demonstrates that equipment had been ordered for the troops being raised. Note that money, but not equipment, was being taken from temples.
QuotePlacing orders for kit isn't the same of having kit on hand.
True. And we see here that mass mobilisation of troops was parallelled with mass production of equipment. The original point at issue was whether such capacity existed: Caesar's statement demonstrates that it did. It does not really matter whether it consisted of myriad domestic forge-owners or state-run establishments whose slaves churned out endless supplies of kit under master craftsmen, or both; the capacity was there. QED.
arma imperantur can also mean 'arms demanded'
I don't think we can use the term mass production, it's a technical term and tends to mean the production of standarised product on a particular site.
There is no evidence whatsoever of one or two factory sites
All that happened was Pompey sent out agents to buy stuff up, knocking on the doors of armourers and blacksmiths the length of italy.
There is no reason for weapons to be taken from temples, only comparatively few temples would have weaponry as votive offerings. They certainly weren't being used as arsenals
Arms were ordered or demanded, but there's no evidence that they actually appeared, after all the military force evaporated
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 23, 2016, 08:40:16 PM
arma imperantur can also mean 'arms demanded'
Same difference: Pompey orders them obtained. This indicates the existence of stockpiles, production capacity or both.
Quote
All that happened was Pompey sent out agents to buy stuff up, knocking on the doors of armourers and blacksmiths the length of italy.
Now this really is imagination ... ;D
Quote
Arms were ordered or demanded, but there's no evidence that they actually appeared, after all the military force evaporated
Between ourselves: as a discussion strategy, I really would recommend reading the period sources instead of making erroneous assertions. The military force did not evaporate: some of it was collected by Pompey en route to Brundisium, but most fell into Caesar's hands and was either enlisted by him or (rarely) demobilised and sent home.
Specifically,
Pompey's officer Thermus had raised five cohorts and avoided capture by abandoning Iguvium, but his troops deserted and went home. (Civil War I.12)
Pompey's officer Attius had raised an unspecified number of cohorts at Auximum, "whence he had despatched senators to levy forces over all Picenum". The chief citizens of Auximum told him they would not shut their gates against Caesar, so he left, with Caesar pursuing.
"But some of Caesar's first ranks pursuing him, obliged him to stop; and a battle ensuing, he was deserted by his men. Some of the troops returned home; the rest went over to Caesar, and brought along with them L. Pupius, first centurion, who had formerly held the same rank in Pompey's army." - idem I.13.3-5
It was at this juncture that Pompey and his adherents left Rome.
"Pompey had left the town the day before, and was upon his way to Apulia, where he had quartered the legions he had received from Caesar. The levies were discontinued within the city, and no place appeared secure on this side of Capua." -
idem I.14.3-4
The interrupted mobilisation then recommenced, including a curious attempt to turn gladiators into cavalry:
"Here, at last, they took courage and rallied, and began to renew their levies in the colonies round about, which had been sent thither by the Julian law. Lentulus summoned into the forum the gladiators whom Caesar had ordered to be trained up there, gave them their liberty, furnished them with horses, and commanded them to follow him. But being afterwards admonished by his friends that this step was universally condemned, he dispersed them into the neighbouring town of Campania, to keep garrison there." -
idem I.14.4-5
At no point is either manpower or equipment seen as a limiting factor.
The big mobilisation in northern Italy was under Domitius, at Corfinium. This indicates both the dispersal and the organisation of the Roman troop levying arrangements.
"Caesar meanwhile leaving Auximum, traversed the whole country of Picenum; where he was joyfully received in all parts by the inhabitants, who furnished his army with every thing necessary. Even Cingulum itself, a town founded by Labienus, and built at his own expense, sent deputies to him, with an offer of their submission and services. He demanded a certain number of soldiers, which were sent immediately. Meantime the twelfth legion joined him; and with these two he marched to Asculum, a town of Picenum. Here Lentulus Spinther commanded with ten cohorts; who, hearing of Caesar's approach, quitted the place with his troops, who almost all deserted him upon the march. Being left with only a few, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Picenum to encourage his followers in those parts. Vibullius understanding from him the state of affairs in Picenum, dismissed Lentulus, and took the soldiers under his command. He likewise drew together from the neighbouring provinces as many as he could meet with of Pompey's levies: among the rest, Lucilius Hirus, who was flying, with six cohorts, from Camerinum, where they had been quartered. Out of all these he formed thirteen cohorts, with which he posted, by great journeys, to Corfinium, where Domitius Ahenobarbus commanded; whom he informed that Caesar was approaching with two legions. Domitius had already got together, with great expedition, twenty cohorts from Alba, the country of the Marsi, Peligni and the neighbouring provinces." -
idem I.15
As one may see, these are substantial forces. Both sides were engaged in levying troops, sometimes in the same area.
"Caesar having made himself master of Asculum, and obliged Lentulus to retire, ordered the soldiers who had deserted him, to be sought after, and new levies to be made." -
idem I.16.1
Caesar would have been making use of the same recruitment/equipment mechanism as his predecessor, albeit with his own appointees in charge.
Caesar then acquired seven cohorts from Sulmona, twenty-two cohorts and the VIII legion from Gaul and 300 cavalry from Noricum (I.18). He then settles in to besiege Corfinium, which yields soon afterwards with 30 cohorts, which he acquires ("He ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the usual oath to him" - I.23.5). The process of recruitment and acquisition of troops still went on.
"Pompey, having intelligence of what passed at Corfinium, retreated from Luceria to Canusium, and from thence to Brundusium. He ordered all the new levies to join him, armed the shepherds and slaves, furnished them with horses, and formed a body of about three hundred cavalry. Meanwhile the praetor L. Manlius flying from Alba, with six cohorts; and the praetor Rutilus Lupus, from Tarracina, with three; saw Caesar's cavalry at a distance, commanded by Vibius Curius: upon which, the soldiers immediately abandoned the two praetors, and joined the troops under the conduct of Curius. Several other parties, flying different ways, fell in, some with the foot, others with the horse." -
idem I.24.1-4
One is reminded of the 1815 placard placed in Paris by a wag when Napoleon was marching on Paris at the start of his Hundred Days:
"
To Louis XVIII: my dear brother, there is no need to send more troops; I have enough already."
As can be seen from the above, Roman organisation for enlistment and equipment of troops was extensive, thorough and pervasive. Nowhere is it noted that any troops were deficient in equipment and indeed the newly-raised troops were occasionally committed to battle, where had they been lacking equipment of any sort it would have been very noticeable.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 24, 2016, 12:44:21 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 23, 2016, 08:40:16 PM
arma imperantur can also mean 'arms demanded'
Same difference: Pompey orders them obtained. This indicates the existence of stockpiles, production capacity or both.
we know there was production capacity, nobody doubts there was production capacity, and if you don't ask for stuff you don't get it. But there's no evidence of any sort of stockpile capable of equipping multiple extra legions, and there's no evidence of any sort of factory based mass production.
So all Pompey did is send word to scores of communities and those who felt like supporting him would, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, go and see what was sitting on the shelves of various local smiths. If they were really keen supporters of him they might even have put up money to get more produced. The results indicate that there weren't a lot of really keen supporters in Italy
If you want an example of raising legions try Sallust the Catiline war http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Sallust/Bellum_Catilinae*.html
While this was taking place in Rome, Catiline combined the forces which he had brought with him with those which Manlius already had, and formed two legions, 2 filling up the cohorts so far as the number of his soldiers permitted.91 Then distributing among them equally such volunteers or conspirators as came to the camp, he soon completed the full quota of the legions, although in the beginning he had no more than two thousand men. 3 But only about a fourth part of the entire force was p117provided with regular arms.92 The others carried whatever weapons chance had given them; namely, javelins or lances, or in some cases pointed stakes.
With the Civil war we have the problem that it was written at Caesar's behest, and it wasn't particularly to his advantage to portray his opponents as poorly armed.
And when those opponents joined him, it wasn't really tactful to mention that when he'd found them they were in charge of a half equipped rabble with the backsides hanging out of their trousers
One should point out that Catiline was a renegade and a conspirator and as such did not have
imperium. This is why he was scratching around for whatever he could find.
"Accordingly, when the elections had been held Marcus Tullius and Gaius Antonius were proclaimed consuls, and this at first filled the conspirators with consternation. 2 And yet Catiline's frenzy did not abate. On the contrary, he increased his activity every day, made collections of arms at strategic points in Italy, and borrowed money on his own credit or that of his friends, sending it to Faesulae to a certain Manlius, who afterwards was the first to take the field." - Sallust,
Catiline 24.1-2
Catiline was trying to assemble a private army. As Sallust himself points out:
"The power which according to Roman usage is thus conferred upon a magistrate by the senate is supreme, allowing him to raise an army, wage war, exert any kind of compulsion upon allies and citizens, and exercise unlimited command and jurisdiction at home and in the field; otherwise the consul has none of these privileges except by the order of the people." -
idem 29.3
Catiline did not have
imperium, and hence lacked access to the system of recruitment and equipment which fielded Roman armies, which is why he was resorting to desperate measures to field whatever he could find. Before he could take the field he was pronounced a traitor by the senate (
idem 36.2) and the Roman recruitment machine swung into action:
"It was further voted that the consuls should hold a levy and that Antonius with an army should at once pursue Catiline, while Cicero defended the capital." -
idem 36.3
Antony's army took the field without any equipment deficiencies being noted, but Catiline, who had been assembling his private army as best he could, found himself high and dry with a partly-equipped force.
In short, the case of Catiline is
not an example of the normal procedure for a Roman army being raised.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 24, 2016, 01:12:40 PM
we know there was production capacity, nobody doubts there was production capacity, and if you don't ask for stuff you don't get it. But there's no evidence of any sort of stockpile capable of equipping multiple extra legions, and there's no evidence of any sort of factory based mass production.
And yet multiple legions were equipped, evidence or no. While I am happy to agree that there was unlikely to have been anything quite like the
fabricae of the later Empire, the ease with which large numbers of troops were raised and, unlike Catiline's improvised efforts, no deficiencies in equipment noted, indicates some kind of combination of excess stock and/or excess production capacity and a system to manage them.
Quote
So all Pompey did is send word to scores of communities and those who felt like supporting him would, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, go and see what was sitting on the shelves of various local smiths. If they were really keen supporters of him they might even have put up money to get more produced. The results indicate that there weren't a lot of really keen supporters in Italy
He put together about six legions, more than half of which were inherited by Caesar: one wonders what would have happened if he had had some really keen supporters. ;) And six legions' worth of equipment sitting on the shelves of local smiths does sound rather like a stockpile ...
Or one can infer that through his
imperium he put into motion a well-established framework for raising and equipping legions, about eight at a time, which seems to have been the norm when Crassus was doing the same. This appears to have been organised at city level, and would involve more than just hoping to find something on the shelves of local smiths.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 24, 2016, 10:13:23 PM
One should point out that Catiline was a renegade and a conspirator and as such did not have imperium. This is why he was scratching around for whatever he could find.
So was Caesar according to his opponents. Catiline's problem was that he was defeated. His inability to find arms and armour in an Italy where apparently you only had to stamp your foot shows that perhaps there wasn't that much kit lying about. After all, if it was so easy to raise six legions because there was so much stuff lying about, it's amazing that Catiline couldn't lay hands on enough for the few thousand men he'd got. If you read the account he has men going with their armed followers to various towns and cities, indeed there were such stocks of arms in Arretium that Catiline had to supply arms to the citizens. Yet these towns and cities aren't mentioned as closing their gates to him
Others might not have done as badly as him, but Pompey's experience shows that it wasn't that easy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 24, 2016, 10:13:23 PM
He put together about six legions, more than half of which were inherited by Caesar: one wonders what would have happened if he had had some really keen supporters. ;) And six legions' worth of equipment sitting on the shelves of local smiths does sound rather like a stockpile ...
except there is no evidence to show that they were fully equipped, their arms and armour are not actually mentioned. We discover the men are not sold on the idea of fighting for Pompey, it's entirely possible that their lack of enthusiasm is due to lack of equipment, reasonable organisation and the fact that nothing seemed to be coming together properly
Remember our main source is someone who doesn't want to embarrass those who had changed sides to join him
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 24, 2016, 10:13:23 PM
One should point out that Catiline was a renegade and a conspirator and as such did not have imperium. This is why he was scratching around for whatever he could find.
The other point brought up by this example is that producing (or even collecting) equipment takes time. Catiline was in a hurry. In Pompey's case, even if not all the men he raised in Italy were fully equipped straight away, he had a year while Caesar secured the West, so that by Dyrrhachium or Pharsalus one can reasonably expect that any deficiencies would have been made up.
Nonetheless, the Catiline example is one of the few passages directly relevant to Harry's original question:
QuoteSuch troops are usually represented as raw legionaries but would they in fact have borne any resemblance to Legionaries (drilled, triple acies, pila, scutum) or would they really have been more akin to a medieval emergency peasant levy?
QuoteBut only about a fourth part of the entire force was provided with regular arms. The others carried whatever weapons chance had given them; namely, javelins or lances, or in some cases pointed stakes.
Sed ex omni copia circiter pars quarta erat militaribus armis instructa, ceteri, ut quemque casus armaverat, sparos aut lanceas, alii praeacutas sudis portabant.
"Sparos" from
sparus, a hunting-spear; the same kind of weapon that Cato in Livy 34.15 was using whilst mounted; "lanceas", quite an unusual use of
lancea in a Republican context, the word is much commoner describing Imperial forces. I wonder what the recruits were doing "by chance" with lanceae: another sort of hunting-spear, perhaps?
Another example of haste:
Quote from: Appian, Civil Wars 40ff(Octavian) collected about 10,000 men, not fully armed and not mustered in regular cohorts, but serving merely as a body-guard under one banner. ... Some of them asked leave to return home in order to arm themselves, saying that they could not perform their duty with other arms than their own.
These are re-mobilised veterans rather than raw recruits, though.
As to whether "new" legions were "drilled, triplex acies", one example is:
Quote from: Appian, 75(Brutus) had a high opinion of his Macedonian soldiers and he drilled them in the Roman way.
Quote from: Duncan Head on October 25, 2016, 09:18:41 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 24, 2016, 10:13:23 PM
One should point out that Catiline was a renegade and a conspirator and as such did not have imperium. This is why he was scratching around for whatever he could find.
The other point brought up by this example is that producing (or even collecting) equipment takes time. Catiline was in a hurry. In Pompey's case, even if not all the men he raised in Italy were fully equipped straight away, he had a year while Caesar secured the West, so that by Dyrrhachium or Pharsalus one can reasonably expect that any deficiencies would have been made up.
so I think we're agreed that there were no real stockpiles of equipment ready for issue. Probably because the biggest fear was a Catiline on a Spartacus, (even Catiline's supporters feared a slave uprising and run away slaves were turned away)
As for later, yes, draw on a large enough area and you'll collect enough kit if you've got time.
But back to the original question "Such troops are usually represented as raw legionaries but would they in fact have borne any resemblance to Legionaries (drilled, triple acies, pila, scutum) "
I think that given there were no major stockpiles, armies in a hurry would take what they could get.
I would suspect that there could be a wider variety of helmets amongst eastern legions than western as more local styles were used.
With shields, I'd suspect everybody had a scutum but there could have been subtle differences in size and weight due to woods used etc. Probably not enough to show in a wargames figure ;)
Armour was probably the big area of difference, and I'm moving away from the leather armour because unless there was a tradition in an area, producing all the moulds and suchlike necessary is going to be a major investment, which would pay off centrally but not for the small manufacturer
I would suggest that the armourers just supplied the armour they normally supplied. On top of this some men would have their own kit already, so I'd see eastern legions being very mixed, probably with some men without armour.
Western legions would probably be less mixed because more armourers were used to making mail, but again, depending upon how long it was since units were raised, there could still be men without armour
As time went on, the number of men without armour would decrease, but I'm not sure units would get more or less uniform as they looted each other :-\
It might be of interest to look at Caesar's description of how Vercingetorix prepared for war.
Gallic War, vii.4:
Quote[Vercingetorix] is saluted king by his partisans; he sends ambassadors in every direction, he conjures them to adhere firmly to their promise. He quickly attaches to his interests the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovice, and all the others who border on the ocean; the supreme command is conferred on him by unanimous consent. On obtaining this authority, he demands hostages from all these states, he orders a fixed number of soldiers to be sent to him immediately; he determines what quantity of arms each state shall prepare at home, and before what time; he pays particular attention to the cavalry.
http://classics.mit.edu/Caesar/gallic.7.7.html
If we extrapolate from this, the Roman world in time of civil war is probably not dissimilar, and Patrick is on the right track. The general sends out 'ambassadors' and makes known what it is that he needs and when. The towns of the area visited then decide whether to cooperate or not, knowing that there will be consequences either way.
This seems to be the way it was done at the time: before he secured 'imperium' from the Gauls, Vercingetorix was building up his strength in much the same manner as Catiline (
Gallic War VII.3). Once he had 'imperium', he levied troops in much the same manner as Pompey and Caesar.
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 25, 2016, 10:31:16 AM
But back to the original question "Such troops are usually represented as raw legionaries but would they in fact have borne any resemblance to Legionaries (drilled, triple acies, pila, scutum)"
This we can answer in the affirmative; the weakness of these newly-raised troops, as Pompey and Caesar both realised, was not that their organisation or equipment was deficient, but that they had not seen battle. Against similarly inexperienced troops they would perform well, or as well as could be expected; against veterans of many campaigns they would be inferior in elan, morale and technique, perhaps decisively so.
These troops were raised (and seemingly equipped and given basic training) as cohorts, and then combined into legions (and, as soon as possible, trained to act as legions). The one part that the training and equipment establishment could not supply was combat experience and the confidence and capability it confers.
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I think that given there were no major stockpiles, armies in a hurry would take what they could get.
These armies would not necessarily be in a hurry: they would be raised according to the usual timetable for Roman campaigning, and everything would be done in the usual measured, classical (and even more so Roman) way. We can conjecture about the level of production as opposed to stockpiling; production would probably be favoured, but it would be a rare city which did not maintain some form of armoury, if only to equip its own citizens in time of emergency now that property qualification had largely gone by the board (along with, apparently, Roman and Italian cavalry).
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I would suggest that the armourers just supplied the armour they normally supplied. On top of this some men would have their own kit already, so I'd see eastern legions being very mixed, probably with some men without armour.
Western legions would probably be less mixed because more armourers were used to making mail, but again, depending upon how long it was since units were raised, there could still be men without armour
As time went on, the number of men without armour would decrease, but I'm not sure units would get more or less uniform as they looted each other :-\
Given that the customary procedure was to take a season (or at least a few weeks) to raise a legion, Pompey's eastern legions had rather longer and could have presented a much more uniform appearance, albeit one perhaps reflecting the style of the area in which they were raised. This I leave to those who know of such matters. It seem unlikely that any Roman citizen would have been fielded without armour: were this to occur, questions would be asked; heads would, if not roll, at least be relieved of a fine - and equipment found to make up the deficiency.
Duncan's quote from Appian is important here and should reeive more weight. If the recruits were going home to collect weaponry there is a strong implication that at home they would find helmet, mail, sword, shield, pila. These are presumably the kit of retired veterans . It may be that the recruits are the sons or grandsons of veterans, but the kit is still there. Given that Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, Anthony, Crassus the Pompeians, had all raised many legions the amount of kit around would have been huge and would likely have lasted for 30 to 50 years especially if chaps e pected a call up even though they themselves had never fought. As I said eRlier, in frontier provinces such as Gallia Transalpina , Spain, Greece there were very likely cohorts raised and used as paramilitary, probably part time police and these would have kit. Hence what would be required for a general muster would be repair rather than creation of arms from new.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on October 25, 2016, 12:44:39 PM
As I said eRlier, in frontier provinces such as Gallia Transalpina , Spain, Greece there were very likely cohorts raised and used as paramilitary, probably part time police and these would have kit. Hence what would be required for a general muster would be repair rather than creation of arms from new.
Roy
I suspect forces of this type were those initially sent against Spartacus from e.g. Capua.
Appian says:
"Varinius Glaber was first sent against him and afterwards Publius Valerius, not with regular armies, but with forces picked up in haste and at random, for the Romans did not consider this a war yet, but a raid, something like an attack of robbery. "
Plutarch says this was actually the third force sent, with forces from Capua and Rome already having been defeated.
Indeed, the first reaction to and line of defence against local troubles appears to have been the use of city cohorts as opposed to legions.
One point to consider about Octavian's not-fully-equipped bodyguard is that this was yet another private army: Antony held a tenuous imperium and the command for Macedonia, but "I brought my army from Macedonia to Brundisium so that I might use it in emergencies." - Appian, Civil War III.37. Four of his five legions followed him to Brundisium. Octavian "went to Campania with money to enlist the veterans who had been settled in those towns by his father." - idem III.40; this was his own private enterprise. He subsequently tampered with Antony's troops and managed to get two legions to defect to him, the Senate wavering all the time.
Appian also has this to say about the situation:
"[Antony's] army, exclusive of the new levies, consisted of three legions summoned from Macedonia (for the remainder had now arrived). There was also one of discharged veterans, old men, who appeared nevertheless to be worth twice as much as the new levies. Thus Antony had four legions of well-disciplined troops, and the helpers who usually accompanied them, besides his body-guard and the new levies. Lepidus in Spain now four legions, Asinius Pollio with two, and Plancus in Transalpine Gaul with three, seemed likely to espouse the side of Antony.
47 Octavian had two legions equally efficient, those which had deserted from Antony to him, also one legion of new levies, and two of veterans, not complete in numbers or in arms, but these also filled up with new recruits. He brought them all to Alba and there communicated with the Senate, which congratulated him in such a way that now one would have been at a loss to know who were those who had lately ranged themselves with Antony; but it regretted that the legions had not come over to the Senate itself instead of to him. It praised them and Octavian nevertheless, and said that it would vote them whatever was needful as soon as the new magistrates should enter upon their duties. It was plain that the Senate would use these forces against Antony; but having no army of its own anywhere, and being unable to levy one without consuls, it adjourned all business until the new consuls [Hirtius and Pansa] should come in." - idem III.46-47.
Hope this is not getting boring, but it does show how even a sympathetic Senate will not open the coffers or authorise equipment for Octavian until the new consuls give the process the stamp of legality. Until this happens, Octavian's 10,000 remain partly-armed.
While Octavian was trying to turn his privately-recruited veterans into full legions, Antony was doing, or said to be doing, the opposite.
"At Brundusium he organized a royal cohort [speira basilike] for his own use and openly made men-at‑arms [sidērophorountes andres = iron-armoured men] his private guards [edoruphoroun] and night-watchmen [enuktophulakoun], serving under a countersign." - idem III.52
The Senate voted to strip Antony of his imperium, but his remaining troops took no notice. There followed one of the most confusingly involved stories of shifting allegiances in Roman history, which anyone interested can follow in Appian's Civil War III.63-76.
One of the more unusual incidences of recruitment during this period concerns a legion Caesar left in Syria. The actual and titular commanders clashed, and the latter was slain. The legion feared Caesar's wrath.
"Accordingly, they took an oath together that they would defend themselves to the death if they were not pardoned and restored to confidence, and they compelled Bassus [their commander] to take the same oath. They also enlisted and drilled another legion as associates with themselves." - idem III.77
If nothing else, this showed that it was possible to raise a legion in Syria - and without imperium.
I think we're getting to the stage where imperium is of marginal utility. At times, yes, it appears the Senate is seen as strong and respected and the general needs that imperium.
But at other times and other places the Senate is seen as weak, or a long way away, and people will ignore imperium
In Syria it could well be that Greek cities and others recognised the authority of the local strongman because that's the way politics had worked there with the collapse of the Seleucids?
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 25, 2016, 10:29:47 PM
In Syria it could well be that Greek cities and others recognised the authority of the local strongman because that's the way politics had worked there with the collapse of the Seleucids?
And the local strongman recently had as often as not been Pompey, or Crassus, or Caesar, or someone they had left behind to mind the shop. Before that there would have been a Seleucus, an Antiochus and/or a Demetrius and perhaps someone named Lysias or Tryphon, maybe all at the same time, all seeking to raise an army which, following the career of Mr Epiphanes*, would probably have been at least partly Romanised.
*
Antiochus IV to his friends
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 26, 2016, 12:12:38 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 25, 2016, 10:29:47 PM
In Syria it could well be that Greek cities and others recognised the authority of the local strongman because that's the way politics had worked there with the collapse of the Seleucids?
And the local strongman recently had as often as not been Pompey, or Crassus, or Caesar, or someone they had left behind to mind the shop. Before that there would have been a Seleucus, an Antiochus and/or a Demetrius and perhaps someone named Lysias or Tryphon, maybe all at the same time, all seeking to raise an army which, following the career of Mr Epiphanes*, would probably have been at least partly Romanised.
*Antiochus IV to his friends
the caliber of Roman strongmen wasn't particularly high, Marcus Aemilius Scaurus., abandoning the siege of Petra for 300 talents, or Aulus Gabinius who restored Ptolemy XII for a bribe of 10,000 talents
I seem to remember Herod the Great having to bribe Romans to either fight with him as they'd been told to do, or to go away and turn a blind eye.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 26, 2016, 12:32:37 PM
the caliber of Roman strongmen wasn't particularly high, Marcus Aemilius Scaurus., abandoning the siege of Petra for 300 talents, or Aulus Gabinius who restored Ptolemy XII for a bribe of 10,000 talents
I seem to remember Herod the Great having to bribe Romans to either fight with him as they'd been told to do, or to go away and turn a blind eye.
And Rome had a reputation for integrity. ::)
I suppose one could say that the 'Roman strongman' in the above cases was significant in one respect, namely that he was the one
worth bribing in order to get results ...
one wonders how far down the chain of command the bribe had to percolate, and at what level the chance of loot was enough
The Roman reputation for integrity seems to have been largely held by Romans and even they always seemed to regard it as being of a previous generation
Cato the Younger seems to have come as something of a shock to his generation :-[
Its no different from the Victorians or likely any imperialists. They were convinced of their own moral probity whilst doing the most immoral and venal things. Imperialism is theft and often murder on a grand scale and self enrichment was as attractive to the British aristocracy as it was to the Roman...or indeed the Macedonian. Aristocrats (mostly) don't regard other people as human on the same scale as themselves, including their own troops. So anyone who conquers on the scale of the Romans, the Mongols, the Turks or the Arabs, the Greeks, the Barbarians, the French, the British is going to be led by people greedy and venal. If they were not hungry for money and power they would stay on the farm and read literature or screw slavegirls.
Roy
They might in addition hold banquets, Lucullus being the archetypal case in point.
The trick when building an empire is to be less venal/corrupt/immoral than the present incumbent. Contrasts are often more important than absolutes.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 27, 2016, 01:29:37 PM
They might in addition hold banquets, Lucullus being the archetypal case in point.
The trick when building an empire is to be less venal/corrupt/immoral than the present incumbent. Contrasts are often more important than absolutes.
and also to ensure that a suitably influential group of locals benefit from the opportunities corruption brings. Gives them a vested interest. I think that may have been one of the strengths of the East India Company :-[
And give the local potentates a good thrashing when they step out of line. :)
This was to a great extent the British and Roman way of empire-building: take your time, start by trading or otherwise contacting a local prince/chief, help him against his neighbours, get into the habit of helping him against his neighbours, let his neighbours ask you to help them against each other, start giving them hints as to who is next in line for succession - and pocket the gold and other things they shower on you, because otherwise they will doubt your sincerity and feel insulted.
In essence, let them draw you in and establish yourself as the trump card in their mutual rivalries. Once you become the deciding factor in any conflict, you are well on the way to making them permanent 'allies' until they run out of heirs, at which point you graciously assume government of their territories.
There is one further critical consideration: you must stay ahead of the competition. Very few empires are built from a single power flexing its muscles in an otherwise placid world; more often, two or more dynamic powers are snatching opportunities from each other with the local princes/populations and their own intrigues and wars as backdrop.
Or you can do it Thutmose III's way: cut out the middleman and go directly for the most powerful opponent, take him down and then pick up the waverers.
That said, I think we are wandering slightly off topic here. ;)
true
But as a general summing up
Western legions of the civil wars probably mainly in mail as more and more equipment came through with less and less men wandering about with no armour
Eastern legions (the dividing line drawn vaguely and without mentioning whether Africa was eastern or western) presenting a somewhat less uniform appearance with a wider variety of armour and helmet types, again with less men with no armour as time went on.
Probably not a bad summary, especially for the aspiring figure collector/painter.
I would still think lack of armour to be the exception rather than the rule, but short of borrowing a time machine to go back and check it would be hard to find firm evidence. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 28, 2016, 01:32:55 PM
Probably not a bad summary, especially for the aspiring figure collector/painter.
I would still think lack of armour to be the exception rather than the rule, but short of borrowing a time machine to go back and check it would be hard to find firm evidence. :)
I think it's only the figure collector/painter/wargamer who likes diversity in his units who needs worry. There is probably no real difference in the quality of the units other than the accepted inferiority of some hastily raised legions anyway.