Could the Persian Empire logistically support an army several million strong?

[Jim Webster]

They would also need to draw on store-cities across the Empire for this initial concentration, so those on the Euphrates, for example, would need to be well stoocked to supply the transiting Eastern satrapies troops. 

I wonder if there were 'store-cities' as such. Certainly for such things as grain.
A city would have to store enough grain to get itself through until next years harvest.  Citizens and the market would normally handle matters perfectly well, but if the city had a stockpile which they purchased after harvest when grain was cheap, they could help manipulate the price down later in the season to the advantage of the inhabitants.
But even if a city habitually did store enough grain to carry the inhabitants though a year, these were not large cities.
According to the wiki as source of all knowledge, Babylon itself had a population of perhaps 150,000.
So an army with 600,000 men and 600,000 servants is going to strain the resources.

But within the Empire, there is one thing in favour of the army. If these men had stayed at home, they would have been fed. What we have here is the 'milk bottle problem'
(This comes from the fact that in the days of the old Milk Marketing Board, you would have your order for milk placed on your doorstep every morning. But when you went on holiday you cancelled the order and the MMB then had to guess whether you were going to Scarborough or Blackpool and send your milk on after you. Because the last thing you wanted is to arrive on holiday and discover there was no milk in the resort. So wise people without computers would have to know where extra milk should be sent)

So in theory if you take 60,000 men from Media, that's so many meals not eaten in Media but eaten in Ionia instead.
The problem is one of transport. Actually unless there are major river and sea connections it would probably be easier to grow the grain elsewhere. So Egyptian troops could be followed by Egyptian grain. Median troops would have to have grain grown for them on arrival because there's no way they could haul enough with them.

The problem comes once you cross into Europe. The newly conquered territories are not as well managed and don't have the level of agriculture that you're used to. They can probably find the rations for troops raised in that area,  but they're not going to be able to find rations for those who've crossed the bridge.

[Erpingham]

My admittedly poor research skills have not found much evidence for 'biblical armies' around a million or so- Sargon of Akkad is meant  to have fielded a force of 5,400 men which was considered a mighty host at the time

I think if we are to discuss the size of "Biblical" armies, it ought to be elsewhere.  I know from other discussions that Patrick unsurprisingly has a different approach to the evidence than the conventional and to fully develop it would throw this thread off.  Also, if we discuss it here, people with an interest in the ancient Near East may miss it.

[Patrick Waterson]

My admittedly poor research skills have not found much evidence for 'biblical armies' around a million or so- Sargon of Akkad is meant  to have fielded a force of 5,400 men which was considered a mighty host at the time.I am a little suspicious of temple inscriptions as by their nature they are not meant as historical documents giving a realistic depiction of events. For example Rameses  is not some 20 times the size of  a Egyptian or Hittite soldier from the lower classes.

I would caution against confusing conventions of visual depiction (Pharaoh is bigger because he is more important) with numerical confusion.  On the subject of large armies, Herodotus (II.165-6) credits Egypt's military class with 160,000 'Hermotybians' and 250,000 'Calasirians', giving 410,000.  Diodorus I.47.6 gives a pharaoh ('Ozymandias', i.e. Ramses II Usermaatre) 400,000 infantry and 20,000 mounted troops for a campaign against 'Bactria' (probably a misreading for ta-Kheta, the Land of Hatti).

Tacitus II.60 describes part of Germanicus' journey to Egypt, during which he visits Thebes and has some of the inscriptions explained to him, one of which describes how Thutmose III had a military manpower of 700,000.  This interestingly ties in with II Chronicles 12:2-3 in which 'Shishak' (Thutmose III Djeserkau-sekhempeti, also 'seksek', 'destroyer' or 'conqueror') conquers Judah with 1,200 chariots, 60,000 cavalry and infantry 'without number'.  If we assume a 1:10 ratio of cavalry to infantry, as was customary in Near Eastern armies, it would bring 'without number' down to 600,000 and give us an interestingly close coincidence with Tacitus' second-hand 700,000.

When Sargon II was campaigning against Urartu, he does not specify numerical strengths but does note that he captured the capital whose armoury contained a scattering of other weapons but 325,000 short swords (presumably of an obsolete pattern and hence not issued to the troops).

The Bible is full of massive armies.  In II Samuel 24:9 David's census as reported by Joab gives 800,000 fighting men of Israel and 500,000 of Judah.  (One might wonder why these are numbered separately in a supposedly unified kingdom, but that is how it is recorded.)  When Israel revolts against Rehoboam, he musters 180,000 choice fighting men to go and subdue it (the campaign proved abortive); II Chronicles 13 describes a battle between 800,000 men of Israel under Jeroboam against 400,000 men of Judah under Abijah (Abijah won when Jeroboam's encircling attempt came apart).  And so forth.  We are all presumably familiar with the Assyrians losing 185,000 men under the walls of Jerusalem in 702 BC.

Some armies are smaller: at Qarqar, Shalmaneser III enumerates his foes as 60,000 infantry, 4,000 chariots, 2,000 cavalry and 1,000 camelry.  This force was a collection of contingents supplied by various allies; the largest contingent was that of Damascus, 1,200 chariots, 1,200 cavalry and 20,000 infantry.  This heterogenous army nevertheless sufficed to check Shalmaneser's progress.

I would caution about taking at face value any figures given in secondary sources (i.e. academic books as oposed to historical texts).  Historical texts (inscriptions, books, scrolls) may or may not be correct, but they show a reasonably consistent pattern, whereas academics seem to pluck figures out of thin air and then make up reasons to arrive at those figures.  If one sticks to the historical sources one has only one level of potential errors to consider.

Store cities were the order of the day: just looking in a Concordance turns up about eleven Old Testament references to store cities Hebrew kings were using or ordering to be built.  Various tablets from Sumeria to Assyria refer to drawing materials from royal storehouses.  Egypt stored grain like a squirrel stocking up on nuts.  Storing up material - and grain - on a large scale for contingencies and future use was second nature to these cultures.  The standard modus operandi on campaign was to require nearby cities (never mind their notional affiliation) to supply the army from their own grain stocks - they usually complied, because the alternative was not pleasant.

At the risk of starting a religious row can I respectfully point out that the Old Testament isn't universally considered a historical document  some people even doubt the the existence  of an extensive Kingdom of Israel pointing to lack of archaeological evidence in spite of  Israeli archaeologists best efforts to unearth it. There are certainly no royal inscriptions proving evidence of enormous Hebrew forces off roading. Also theses societies are not really that  similar  Egypt was probably good at organising lots of men due to being a society that existed around irrigation.  Urartu, the Sea Peoples  and David's Hebrew Empire should it have existed were different beasts.

The Bible actually turns out to be better than expected as a historical document; a lot of the 'lack' of archaeological evidence is simply a corpus of archaeologists seemingly obsessed with disproving the Bible.  Every time there is a new 'Davidic' or 'Solomonic' find in Israel the story is the same: some archaeologists consider it 10th century BC, some 9th, some stridently affirm it is 8th.  It is not so much that evidence is lacking as that some people have an agenda to ensure that it is never ascribed to the Kingdom of David.

It is also the case that  Kadesh one of the better recorded battles from the 'biblical ' period the Egyptian army didn't swarm across the countryside like locusts but split into 4 segments following roads/tracks presumably due to supply issues.

If you look at the reliefs of Ramses II's army on the march (sorry no links but the pictures tend to be hidden behind paywalls these days) the infantry is in squares, several of these squares are marching in parallel (i.e. over a wide front) and they have chariots between them on all sides.  This would be quite an effective way of keeping the body of troops together on the march.

The Egyptian army advanced in four 'divisions'.  There is much misunderstanding of what constitutes a 'division, because of a text by Hori, the 'speedy scribe', challenging his corrspondent to allocate rations for a force of 5,000 men of various nationalities.  The actual 'divisions' are described by Diodorus, quoting Ramses II's tomb inscriptions:

"... he had made a campaign with four hundred thousand foot-soldiers and twenty thousand cavalry, the whole army having been divided into four divisions, all of which were under the command of sons of the king."

The 'cavalry' are presumably a total of mounted troops including chariotry; if so, this would give four 'divisions' each of 100,000 infantry and 5,000 mounted.  Given their size, it is unsurprising that they were separated for the march through the 'forest of Baw' and its environs, particularly as Ramses had been led to believe that his opponents were nowhere near.  I understand that his army stretched back 20 miles, including intervals, which rather nullifies modern attempts to limit him to 20,000 troops as even with the intervals this would leave him with an army in single file.  Given the way his reliefs depict his infantry as moving in square formations, single file or even quadruple file is out.  If on the reliefs one figure = one man, then nothing less than 30 wide (plus chariots) will serve.  If the relief scale is more of a wargaming scale (1 figure = 10 men, for example) the avenue of advance becomes even wider.

Taking the numbers as read it is obvious that where the Persian Empire attempted to campaign away from home the numbers involved were in the low or mid  hundred thousands rather than in the millions. Perhaps that might give you  reason to doubt  the numbers claimed by Herodotos?

This is looking at it the wrong way, I fear.  The numbers given by Diodorus for the reconquest of Egypt followed, not preceded, Xerxes' invasion of Greece and incorporated lessons (doubtless including logistical lessons) learned fighting the Greeks.  There is no reason why Artaxerxes II and III's expeditions against Egypt in the 4th century BC should give reason to doubt Xerxes' indiscriminate mass mobilisation in the 5th century BC.

One may note that when the Achaemenid Empire was invaded, it mustered numbers not far off those mobilised by Xerxes.  Xenophon records that Artaxerxes II in 401 BC brought together 900,000 at Cunaxa, and another 300,000 under Abrocomas were on their way but dawdled to await the winner.  Cyrus the Younger took only his best 100,000 Anatolians and his 12,500 Greeks against Artaxerxes - and nearly won.  When Alexander invaded the Persian Empire, Darius took the field against him with 600,000 at Issus (I use Arrian's figures because the quality of Arrian's research seems far superior to that of his predecessors), lost, and attempted a reprise two years later with 1,000,000 or so at Gaugamela.  The pattern of massive mobilisation is consistent, and one can detect the trace of an outline in which six parts of the Empire each provide a force of 300,000 troops at full mobilisation; given that Xerxes left 120,000 men to garrison Egypt, his mobilising 1.7 million instead of the expected 1.8 million under this system looks exactly right.

Artaxerxes in 401 BC mobilised 1,200,000 men, which would be four of the six areas (Asia Minor was not available - it was supporting Cyrus - and he presumably did not draw upon the easternmost provinces, Bactria, Sogdiana, etc.)  Darius in 333 BC (Issus campaign) presumably had the Mesopotamian and Syro-Phoenician levies for his 600,000 while in 331 BC he would have not been able to draw on Asia Minor, Syria/Phoenicia or Egypt, so fielded his Mesopotamian, Medo-Persian and Eastern Satrapies levies, which should provide 900,000 men under this system, plus his mercenaries, royal guards and survivors of Issus, which neatly allows Arrian's 1 million or so.  There is an interesting and attractive consistency about this, and as mentioned this accords with Xerxes putting 1.7 million into the field when he mobilised the entire Empire, i.e. all six zones.

[Patrick Waterson]

The problem comes once you cross into Europe. The newly conquered territories are not as well managed and don't have the level of agriculture that you're used to. They can probably find the rations for troops raised in that area,  but they're not going to be able to find rations for those who've crossed the bridge.

True, and this would seem to be why in Herodotus VII.115 we have heralds visiting months in advance, instructing that food in certain quantities be gathered in a certain place for a certain date, resulting in feverish grain accrual (and 'many months' supply of corn being ground together at once' as the army approached), animal purchase and breeding, etc. followed by the Achamenid army being fed for a day in that locality and incidentally decamping with the valuable serving ware.  It suggests someone had been along, taken a look and concluded that a very special effort would have to be made just to get the army through the area for one day.

[Erpingham]

I tried

Patrick has a very consistent approach.  Ancient numbers must be accepted at face value.  Archaeology can largely be discounted as it is interpreted by academics. 

[Patrick Waterson]

No, I don't think so.  Arrangements for marching through friendly territory are rarely those of operating within striking distance of the enemy.

As a general principle, this is fine.  However it does not fit every situation, particularly where we have explicit source testimony to the contrary.

Why do you think the Persian army before Plataea is operating in the same way as on the march from the Hellespont?

Because it is the same army?   Actually it is racing in pursuit over a wide front as opposed to tramping through the countryside on a wide front.  Is there an important point to be made here?

So if we assume five in Greece, which are presumably not identical to the cities who feed the army for a day, which Patrick identified.  That isn't enough for a one week between restocking march.  So are we looking at a hierarchy of supply dumps?  Or are there only five?  If only five, we are looking at a different mechanism for feeding the army on the march.  A longer supply train, for example, or that supply ships actually accompanied the army, rather than just operating a conveyor to Asia Minor? 

There are enough supply ships (c.3,000) to accompany the army and sustain a 'pipeline' from Asia Minor.  Incidentally, Herodotus IX.3 gives us an intriguing insight into Achaemenid trans-Aegean communications:

"What he [Mardonius] desired was to take Athens once more; this was partly out of mere perversity, and partly because he intended to signify to the king at Sardis by the line of beacons across the islands that he held Athens."

It looks as if the Achaemenids had the capability to notify ships (convoys?) departing from Asia Minor of the progress of the army and hence any intended rendezvous.

I think if we are to discuss the size of "Biblical" armies, it ought to be elsewhere.  I know from other discussions that Patrick unsurprisingly has a different approach to the evidence than the conventional and to fully develop it would throw this thread off.  Also, if we discuss it here, people with an interest in the ancient Near East may miss it.

We can at least mention them here, as they form part of a source pattern, even if they are more suitably discussed elsewhere.

Patrick has a very consistent approach.  Ancient numbers must be accepted at face value.  Archaeology can largely be discounted as it is interpreted by academics. 

I would rather say that if they are accepted at face value and compared, they give a surprisingly consistent picture.  It would be disingenuous to pretend that archaeology is anything other than a highly interpretative discipline.  This does not make it valueless, rather that the conclusions of archaeologists need to be treated with an eye open to their methodology and an understanding of their agenda - not unlike historical sources!

[Flaminpig0]

My admittedly poor research skills have not found much evidence for 'biblical armies' around a million or so- Sargon of Akkad is meant  to have fielded a force of 5,400 men which was considered a mighty host at the time

I think if we are to discuss the size of "Biblical" armies, it ought to be elsewhere.  I know from other discussions that Patrick unsurprisingly has a different approach to the evidence than the conventional and to fully develop it would throw this thread off.  Also, if we discuss it here, people with an interest in the ancient Near East may miss it.

I thought he might have   

It is worth noting that  the argument for the massive size of Xerxes Army due to it being heir to a biblical way of warfare is ultimately based on a literalist reading of the Bible.

[RichT]

The military use of the whip is an interesting sub-topic.

Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 24, 2018, 09:20:30 PM
As always I am in awe if your mastery of ancient sources however the quote you provide  could easily refer to whipping horses rather  than  men

Doubtful; as far as I know whips were not part of cavalry equipment at the time and the Persian army at Gaugamela was predominantly infantry - besides, by this point in the battle the Persian cavalry left had run away and their cavalry right was off-stage busy with Parmenio.

Diod 17.60.3f. "A shout went up at this from the Persians around Dareius, and those at a greater distance thought that the king had fallen. They were the first to take to flight, and they were followed by those next to them, and steadily, little by little, the solid ranks of Dareius's guard disintegrated. As both flanks became closed, the king himself was alarmed and retreated. The flight thus became general. Dust raised by the Persian cavalry rose to a height, and as Alexander's squadrons followed on their heels, because of their numbers and the thickness of the dust, it was impossible to tell in what direction Dareius was fleeing. The air was filled with the groans of the fallen, the din of the cavalry, and the constant sound of lashing of whips."

It's interesting to compare Curtius' account (4.15.33): "And already it had ceased to be a battle and became a massacre, when Darius also turned his chariot to flee. The victor was close upon the backs of the fugitives, but the cloud of dust which rose to the ksy made it impossible to see; therefore they wandered as if in the darkness of night, ever and anon coming together at the sound of a familiar voice or in response to a signal. Yet they made out the noise of the reins by which the horses which drew the chariot were constantly lashed; these were the only traces of the fleeing king that they had."

We can't be sure what Diodorus' and Curtius source originally said, but the 'whips' in this case are exceedingly unlikely to be the massed whips of Persian infantry NCOs.

These are the other mentions of whips in Herodotus (missing out straightforward whipping of individuals):

Hdt 4.3.4 (Scythians fight their rebellious slaves: "Men of Scythia, look at what we are doing! We are fighting our own slaves; they kill us, and we grow fewer; we kill them, and shall have fewer slaves. Now, then, my opinion is that we should drop our spears and bows, and meet them with horsewhips in our hands. As long as they see us armed, they imagine that they are our equals and the sons of our equals; let them see us with whips and no weapons, and they will perceive that they are our slaves; and taking this to heart they will not face our attack."

Hdt 7.22.1 (the digging of Xerxes' canal): "Since those who had earlier attempted to sail around Athos had suffered shipwreck, for about three years preparations had been underway there. Triremes were anchored off Elaeus in the Chersonese; with these for their headquarters, all sorts of men in the army were compelled by whippings to dig a canal, coming by turns to the work; the inhabitants about Athos also dug."

Hdt 7.35 (Xerxes whips the sea): "When Xerxes heard of this, he was very angry and commanded that the Hellespont be whipped with three hundred lashes, and a pair of fetters be thrown into the sea. I have even heard that he sent branders with them to brand the Hellespont."

Hdt 7.56.1 (crossing the bridges): "When Xerxes had passed over to Europe, he viewed his army crossing under the lash. Seven days and seven nights it was in crossing, with no pause."

Hdt 7.103.3f. (Xerxes responds to Demaratus' views on the superiority of the Spartans): "Let us look at it with all reasonableness: how could a thousand, or ten thousand, or even fifty thousand men, if they are all equally free and not under the rule of one man, withstand so great an army as mine? If you Greeks are five thousand, we still would be more than a thousand to one. If they were under the rule of one man according to our custom, they might out of fear of him become better than they naturally are, and under compulsion of the lash they might go against greater numbers of inferior men; but if they are allowed to go free they would do neither. I myself think that even if they were equal in numbers it would be hard for the Greeks to fight just against the Persians. What you are talking about is found among us alone, and even then it is not common but rare; there are some among my Persian spearmen who will gladly fight with three Greeks at once. You have no knowledge of this and are spouting a lot of nonsense."

Hdt 7.223.2-3 (Thermopylae): "Xerxes and his barbarians attacked, but Leonidas and his Hellenes, knowing they were going to their deaths, advanced now much farther than before into the wider part of the pass. In all the previous days they had sallied out into the narrow way and fought there, guarding the defensive wall. Now, however, they joined battle outside the narrows and many of the barbarians fell, for the leaders of the companies (hegemones ton teleon) beat everyone with whips from behind, urging them ever forward. Many of them were pushed into the sea and drowned; far more were trampled alive by each other, with no regard for who perished."

Other military lashings:

Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.25: "And the Greeks were well pleased to see the hills, as was natural considering that the enemy's force was cavalry; when, however, in their march out of the plain they had mounted to the top of the first hill, and were descending it, so as to ascend the next, at this moment the barbarians came upon them and down from the hilltop discharged their missiles and sling-stones and arrows, fighting under the lash."

That's all I know of.

Comments - a Persian whip-corps, or more likely habitual use of the whip by officers/NCOs, seems unlikely based on these passing references, but possible. It looks more like an extension of the exhortatory, prodding, pushing role of the rear rank men in battle which is familiar to us from other discussions and from other eras (which is what Hdt 7.223 suggests). At the same time, there is clearly a cultural aspect to consider, as shown by Xerxes 'speech' to Demaratus.

Incidentally, I like "You have no knowledge of this and are spouting a lot of nonsense". How apposite.

[Erpingham]

Actually it is racing in pursuit over a wide front as opposed to tramping through the countryside on a wide front.  Is there an important point to be made here?

You're the one making it - is it important?  You are saying, as I understand it, that we can assume that the army marching down from the Hellespont used the same formation because it was the same army, regardless of circumstances like proximity to the enemy, terrain, army composition.  It's quite a radical view but whether its important in this discussion, I don't know.

There are enough supply ships (c.3,000) to accompany the army and sustain a 'pipeline' from Asia Minor. 

The ships of thirty and of fifty oars, the light galleys, and the great transports for horses came to a total of three thousand all together. 7.97.1

Are there another three thousand transports hidden somewhere, because these are all warships except for the horse transports.  When H adds up their crews in 7.184, he assumes they are all penteconters.

I would rather say that if they are accepted at face value and compared, they give a surprisingly consistent picture.  It would be disingenuous to pretend that archaeology is anything other than a highly interpretative discipline.  This does not make it valueless, rather that the conclusions of archaeologists need to be treated with an eye open to their methodology and an understanding of their agenda - not unlike historical sources!

The apparent consistency of the sources should be viewed as critically as anything else.  If there is a systematic bias in the figures, they will be equally consistent.  To me, we seem to have a pattern.  A fairly compact count of "elite" forces - chariots, cavalry, hoplites - accompanied by "unnumbered hordes" of infantry and camp followers (not always properly distinguished).  Estimates of the horde are coloured by accounts of other hordes and so the topos self reinforces.

[Dangun]

I would rather say that if they are accepted at face value and compared, they give a surprisingly consistent picture. 

This is exactly why the Xerxes figure is obviously problematic.

Whether or not you agree with the Xerxes figure being inconsistent with what was logically possible - as presented by 20th century academia, then:
The Xerxes figure is still inconsistent with just about any other literary claim for large armies, by about an order of magnitude.
The Xerxes figure is also still inconsistent with any other military action in the following 2400 years.

It is so strikingly inconsistent, that your pattern recognition software should be flashing red and an alarm blaring in the background.

If these examples are too nuanced, what exactly is consistent with the 117million man army of Lan Na or the reality of Constantine's aerial crucifix over Malvin Bridge?

[Jim Webster]

My admittedly poor research skills have not found much evidence for 'biblical armies' around a million or so- Sargon of Akkad is meant  to have fielded a force of 5,400 men which was considered a mighty host at the time.I am a little suspicious of temple inscriptions as by their nature they are not meant as historical documents giving a realistic depiction of events. For example Rameses  is not some 20 times the size of  a Egyptian or Hittite soldier from the lower classes.

I would caution against confusing conventions of visual depiction (Pharaoh is bigger because he is more important) with numerical confusion.  On the subject of large armies, Herodotus (II.165-6) credits Egypt's military class with 160,000 'Hermotybians' and 250,000 'Calasirians', giving 410,000.  Diodorus I.47.6 gives a pharaoh ('Ozymandias', i.e. Ramses II Usermaatre) 400,000 infantry and 20,000 mounted troops for a campaign against 'Bactria' (probably a misreading for ta-Kheta, the Land of Hatti).

Tacitus II.60 describes part of Germanicus' journey to Egypt, during which he visits Thebes and has some of the inscriptions explained to him, one of which describes how Thutmose III had a military manpower of 700,000.  This interestingly ties in with II Chronicles 12:2-3 in which 'Shishak' (Thutmose III Djeserkau-sekhempeti, also 'seksek', 'destroyer' or 'conqueror') conquers Judah with 1,200 chariots, 60,000 cavalry and infantry 'without number'.

What you have to beware of here is that Germanicus and Chronicles may well have got their information from the same, flawed, source. They don't need to be independent.
Also I suspect that a lot of ink could be spilled in the discussion as to whether Shishak in II Chronicles is actually Thutmose III because that depends on the chronology somebody decides to follow and that is an argument I am not getting drawn into

What you must remember is that the Bible does have a penchant for large numbers, the number of Israelites which Moses is supposed to have led may have been larger than the population of Egypt.

[Jim Webster]

The problem comes once you cross into Europe. The newly conquered territories are not as well managed and don't have the level of agriculture that you're used to. They can probably find the rations for troops raised in that area,  but they're not going to be able to find rations for those who've crossed the bridge.

True, and this would seem to be why in Herodotus VII.115 we have heralds visiting months in advance, instructing that food in certain quantities be gathered in a certain place for a certain date, resulting in feverish grain accrual (and 'many months' supply of corn being ground together at once' as the army approached), animal purchase and breeding, etc. followed by the Achamenid army being fed for a day in that locality and incidentally decamping with the valuable serving ware.  It suggests someone had been along, taken a look and concluded that a very special effort would have to be made just to get the army through the area for one day.

To increase a breeding flock takes rather more than months. It means the population has to reduce their meat intake now (which for subsistence farmers is tricky because malnourishment beckons. You then keep a non-breeding female for one or two years when she does nothing but eat, and then get your first lamb in the third year.
So your flock is now taking more grazing and needs more manpower to manage it.

On top of this if Xerxes is demanding more grain grown, this also takes more land and more manpower. Also by definition, the good land that is easily worked is already farmed. Putting more land into cultivation takes far more manpower. And we have subsistence farmers who have enough to do to produce what they're already producing.

Can we have some numbers please as to how large an increase in production you imagine Xerxes demanded? How many men they were supposed to feed as opposed to being fed from imports.
By this time Greece was almost certainly dependent on grain imports anyway

[Justin Swanton]

Are there another three thousand transports hidden somewhere, because these are all warships except for the horse transports.  When H adds up their crews in 7.184, he assumes they are all penteconters.

We wouldn't need 3000 transports. Presuming the navy has the job of entirely supplying 3 million men throughout the campaign. That's 3000 tons of grain a day deposited on the shore by 60 50-tonner ships. Assume an average round trip of 10 days from the Balkan/Macedonian/Thessalian shore to Asia Minor and you need 600 not-very-big ships. Include the supply depots and what is furnished by the locals and you probably need considerably less.

[Justin Swanton]

The problem comes once you cross into Europe. The newly conquered territories are not as well managed and don't have the level of agriculture that you're used to. They can probably find the rations for troops raised in that area,  but they're not going to be able to find rations for those who've crossed the bridge.

True, and this would seem to be why in Herodotus VII.115 we have heralds visiting months in advance, instructing that food in certain quantities be gathered in a certain place for a certain date, resulting in feverish grain accrual (and 'many months' supply of corn being ground together at once' as the army approached), animal purchase and breeding, etc. followed by the Achamenid army being fed for a day in that locality and incidentally decamping with the valuable serving ware.  It suggests someone had been along, taken a look and concluded that a very special effort would have to be made just to get the army through the area for one day.

To increase a breeding flock takes rather more than months. It means the population has to reduce their meat intake now (which for subsistence farmers is tricky because malnourishment beckons. You then keep a non-breeding female for one or two years when she does nothing but eat, and then get your first lamb in the third year.
So your flock is now taking more grazing and needs more manpower to manage it.

On top of this if Xerxes is demanding more grain grown, this also takes more land and more manpower. Also by definition, the good land that is easily worked is already farmed. Putting more land into cultivation takes far more manpower. And we have subsistence farmers who have enough to do to produce what they're already producing.

Can we have some numbers please as to how large an increase in production you imagine Xerxes demanded? How many men they were supposed to feed as opposed to being fed from imports.
By this time Greece was almost certainly dependent on grain imports anyway

It would be an idea to try and determine what percentage of the army's needs would be met by a) local contributions, b) the supply depots, and c) the navy.

[Erpingham]

We wouldn't need 3000 transports. Presuming the navy has the job of entirely supplying 3 million men throughout the campaign. That's 3000 tons of grain a day deposited on the shore by 60 50-tonner ships. Assume an average round trip of 10 days from the Balkan/Macedonian/Thessalian shore to Asia Minor and you need 600 not-very-big ships. Include the supply depots and what is furnished by the locals and you probably need considerably less.

A reminder it is Patrick who claims 3000 transports, not me.  Also, the figure of 3,000 tons calculated at the beginning was wrong on the figures being used at the time (It should be 3,500 tonnes at 1 kg per man per day) and that was before we realised there are at least 4.5 million people to feed according to Herodotus, so we need 4,500 tonnes.  Then we placed all the grain in amphorae, which cut the weight of grain a 50 ton ship could carry by half (the other half being ceramic).  So you need the equivalent of 9,000 tonnes of stores offloaded per day.  That is assuming you can source your fodder locally.  So, the true figure is around 1,800 50 tonne ships.  I leave the plausibility of that in the context of the time to others.